Tartaglia, JPF (2016) Response to Darragh Byrne's "Do Phenomenal Concepts Misrepresent?”. Philosophical Psychology, 29 (5). pp. 679-681.

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Abstract

I begin by summarizing my view of the progression that occurred from the 1950s to the 1990s on the topic of physicalism and, in terms of this, present an overview of the reconciliation I was attempting in “Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.” I then address Byrne’s two main arguments. In the case of the first, I show that his argument turns on a third-person conception of appearance which is not the one addressed in the debates in question, and argue that functionalism is not relevant to physicalism about consciousness in the manner Byrne thinks. In the case of the second, I argue that Byrne’s attempt to prize metaphysics apart from science shows a misunderstanding of the physicalist agenda. In conclusion I indicate how my views have moved on. My misrepresentation thesis, like any form of conventional physicalism, ultimately entails eliminativism; and I reject eliminativism.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology on 15 April 2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09515089.2016.1142072
Uncontrolled Keywords: philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment
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Depositing User: Symplectic
Date Deposited: 30 Mar 2016 08:12
Last Modified: 15 Apr 2019 08:58
URI: http://eprints.keele.ac.uk/id/eprint/1387

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