Baiasu, S (2015) Existentialist Freedom, Distorted Normativity and Emancipation. Oñati Socio-Legal Studies, 5 (3). 874 -894. ISSN 2079-5971

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Abstract

Usually associated with a view of freedom as absolute, Sartre’s philosophy seems particularly able to account for the indeterminacy that we experience today in most areas of human experience that have a normative dimension. Without denying that this is a plausible reading, it will be argued here that it is nevertheless a problematic interpretation. On this reading, existentialism seems unable to account for the fact that we are powerfully conditioned by a significant number of factors, which limit our freedom and, in certain situations, make emancipation a normative requirement. It is held here that this problem can be addressed and a less problematic interpretation of Sartre can be defended, once we start to acknowledge that in Sartre we have a variety of notions of freedom that can provide a robust account of our freedom, of authentic choice and of responsibility.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: existentialism, normativity, freedom, emancipation, Sartre
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
Depositing User: Symplectic
Date Deposited: 22 Sep 2016 10:55
Last Modified: 22 Sep 2016 10:59
URI: http://eprints.keele.ac.uk/id/eprint/2213

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