Baiasu, S (2016) Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat. Philosophia, 44 (4). pp. 1185-1208. ISSN 1574-9274

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Abstract

Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given independently from us; instead, my concern will be more narrowly epistemic – whether those claims can be derived from premises, which are normatively less substantial than the normative conclusions themselves. I focus on Korsgaard’s transcendental articulation of the constitutivist argument. I conclude that more work would need to be done, in order for this argument to function as intended.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is the accepted author manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Springer at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9746-3 Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
Uncontrolled Keywords: Immanuel Kant, Christine Korsgaard, Michael Smith, Constitutivism, Constructivism, Transcendental argument, Anaytic/synthetic, Metaphysics
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment
Depositing User: Symplectic
Date Deposited: 22 Sep 2016 09:44
Last Modified: 08 Jun 2018 11:48
URI: http://eprints.keele.ac.uk/id/eprint/2218

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