Assessing the changing relationship between trade unions and the state: a historical analysis of union/state relations in Zimbabwe

By

Zedias Mutema

A Doctoral thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Keele University

Keele University
Management School

December 2015
SUBMISSION OF THESIS FOR A RESEARCH DEGREE

Part I. DECLARATION by the candidate for a research degree. To be bound in the thesis

Degree for which thesis being submitted: Doctor of Philosophy

Title of thesis: Assessing the changing relationship between trade unions and the state: a historical analysis of union/state relations in Zimbabwe

This thesis contains confidential information and is subject to the protocol set down for the submission and examination of such a thesis. YES/NO (please delete as appropriate)

Date of submission: December 2015 Original registration date: January 2009

Name of candidate: Zedias Mutema

Research Institute: Social Sciences

Name of Lead Supervisor: Dr Alhajie Saidy Khan

I certify that:

(a) The thesis being submitted for examination is my own account of my own research

(b) My research has been conducted ethically. Where relevant a letter from the approving body confirming that ethical approval has been given has been bound in the thesis as an Annex

(c) The data and results presented are the genuine data and results actually obtained by me during the conduct of the research

(d) Where I have drawn on the work, ideas and results of others this has been appropriately acknowledged in the thesis

(e) Where any collaboration has taken place with one or more other researchers, I have included within an ‘Acknowledgments’ section in the thesis a clear statement of their contributions, in line with the relevant statement in the Code of Practice (see Note overleaf).

(f) The greater portion of the work described in the thesis has been undertaken subsequent to my registration for the higher degree for which I am submitting for examination

(g) Where part of the work described in the thesis has previously been incorporated in another thesis submitted by me for a higher degree (if any), this has been identified and acknowledged in the thesis

(h) The thesis submitted is within the required word limit as specified in the Regulations

Total words in submitted thesis (including text and footnotes, but excluding references and appendices) 98,890 words

Signature of candidate: Zedias Mutema................................. Date: December 2015

Note

Extract from Code of Practice: If the research degree is set within a broader programme of work involving a group of investigators – particularly if this programme of work predates the candidate’s registration – the candidate should provide an explicit statement (in an ‘Acknowledgments’ section) of the respective roles of the candidate and these other individuals in relevant aspects of the work reported in the thesis. For example, it should make clear, where relevant, the candidate’s role in designing the study, developing data collection instruments, collecting primary data, analysing such data, and formulating conclusions from the analysis. Others involved in these aspects of the research should be named, and their contributions relative to that of the candidate should be specified (this does not apply to the ordinary supervision, only if the supervisor or supervisory team has had greater than usual involvement).
Abstract

Drawing on semi-structured interviews and published documents, this thesis examines the changing union-state relationship in Zimbabwe. Unlike many existing work on the subject, this thesis is a holistic analysis in that it considers the views of the government officials, International Labour Organization (ILO) officials, Business Executives and trade unionists.

An in-depth empirical study revealed that union-state relations in Zimbabwe are complex, unpredictable and can only be fully understood by fully understanding, acknowledging, and appreciating the local and international relations context at play. The conclusion challenges the established view which sought to focus on shop floor issues as key determinants of union-state relations. International political pressures and dynamics which are often selectively ignored do have a direct impact on union-state relations in post-colonial Africa. When the views of a single actor are only considered or examined, partial understanding of the relationship results, a problem that has characterised several previous works on the subject.

The thesis contributes to existing related literature on union-party relations in Zimbabwe and Africa in general. Theoretically, it challenges the applicability to the Zimbabwean situation, of existing theoretical frameworks and typologies of union-party/union-state relations. The civil society narrative and national liberation narratives are the competing frameworks used by unions and the state to define their flagship and shape employment relations in contemporary Zimbabwe. One needs to examine the conflict generation systems, in particular, evaluating the extent to which they provide incentives to key actors on the political and economic front and assess the impact this has on employment relations. Methodologically, this thesis raises the need for a multi-actor’s perspective approach in researching union-state relations. Finally, the thesis points to the need for further research on the changing nature of union-state relations in Zimbabwe in particular and Sub Saharan Africa in general.
Acknowledgements

Being in full-time employment, a parent, with huge responsibility for my extended family and studying for a PhD at the same time is not easy. To navigate through the huge challenges and obstacles required support and sympathy from several people whose names cannot be mentioned here. They played a crucial role.

I cannot fully express my gratitude to my PhD Supervisor, Dr Alhajie Saidy Khan. He had great enthusiasm, inspiration and constructive criticism and encouraged me throughout my studies. His understanding and interest in the area of research helped me to access key participants who are not usually available to take part in studies of this nature. When he moved to take up a new role at Anglia University, I was honoured that he took the decision to continue supervising me.

The research participants were great and offered me their rich experience.

My family has been a huge blessing to me.
Dedications

To my late father Aaron Xavier Maganga Mutema

To my mother-Ireen Mutema

And to my family

I say, THIS IS FOR YOU
# Table of Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................ iii  
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... iv  
Dedications ........................................................................................................................ v  

## CHAPTER ONE

Introduction and Background ........................................................................................ 1  

1.0 The problem ........................................................................................................... 2  
1.1 Zimbabwe’s Post-Independent political historical context................................. 5  
1.2 Character of the Economy and Economic Relations ...................................... 7  
1.3 Zimbabwe government’s relations with Unions and the ILO ....................... 18  
1.4 Research Aims ..................................................................................................... 24  
1.5 Objectives and Research Questions .................................................................... 24  
1.6 Research gap and significance of the study...................................................... 26  
1.7 Organization of the thesis .................................................................................... 29  

## CHAPTER TWO

Theorising trade unions: Party-Union/ State-Union relations ................................. 33  

2.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 34  
2.1 Defining and theorising trade unions ................................................................. 35  
2.2 Objectives of trade unions in Africa .................................................................. 36  
2.3 Framework on state-union relations and their applicability to Zimbabwe .... 47  
2.4 The contemporary context: ‘Trade unions as civil society’ in relation to the state .................................................. 50  
2.5 National Liberation ideology as counterhegemonic discourse to unions as civil-society ........................................................................................................... 55  
2.6 Union/state/government relations in Sub Saharan Africa .................................. 64  
2.7 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 69
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>The character of the Zimbabwean state</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FIVE</td>
<td>The ‘honeymoon’ and early strains in the relationship (1980-1995)</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Union-state relations during colonialism (prior to 1980)</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Union-state relations from independence in 1980-1995</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>The socio-economic and political challenges at independence</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Role of Civil society and the use of violence</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Role and objectives of unions</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Politics of the stomach</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER SIX</td>
<td>‘Traumatic Separation’ 1996-2008</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Personality clashes vs. institutional clashes</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Union independence and autonomy versus political alliances</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>The contested role of the West</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Funding Unions: Funding for Regime Change?</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Oppressive Labour Legislation</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>‘Unfit-for-purpose’ Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF)</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Politicisation of workplaces</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Attacks on Freedom of Association and of the Right to Organise</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8.1</td>
<td>Right to strike in Zimbabwe</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 7.3: Summary of all the key issues 1980-2013 ........................................283

Table of Tables
Table 3.1: The breakdown of research participants ........................................86
Table 3.2: Ethical factors and accompanying questions ..................................106
Table 6.1: Affiliates of ZCTU in 2012 and subscriptions made .....................228
Table 6.3: Country Risk Factors .....................................................................242
Table 6.4: Summary of Injuries .....................................................................270
Table 7.1: Summary of Key Research Findings .............................................297
APPENDICES:

Appendix 1: Participant Information sheet (sample)
2: Participant Consent Form (sample)
3: Authorisation letter from Ministry of Labour
4: Authorisation Letter from ZCTU
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIPPA</td>
<td>Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMCOZ</td>
<td>Employers Confederations of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITUC</td>
<td>International Trade Union Confederation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOMA</td>
<td>Law and Order Maintenance Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constitutional Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSA</td>
<td>Public Order and Security Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNF</td>
<td>Tripartite Negotiating Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZFTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Industrial Relations Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Open University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO-Norway</td>
<td>Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjoner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trade Union Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLC</td>
<td>Canadian Labour Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FES</td>
<td>Freidrich Ebert Stiftung (FES-Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNV</td>
<td>Federation of Netherlands Trade Councils (Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction and Background

“History is a great teacher. Now everyone knows that the labour movement did not diminish the strength of the nation but enlarged it. By raising the living standards of millions, labour miraculously created a market for industry and lifted the whole nation to undreamed of levels of production. Those who attack labour forget these simple truths, but history remembers them”

(Martin Luther King Jr. 1929-1968)
1.0 The problem

One of the many functions of unions is to engage in political representation of the workers. In practice their role involves checking the power of the state so that it does not negatively affect the workers. For the state, unions are an important aspect of governance in that they can be used to compliment the power of the state. According to Ewing (2005, p.5) this includes “ …being involved in the development, implementation and delivery of government policy …to some extent the administrative agent of the state as instruments for the delivery of certain economic objectives such as controlling wage inflation …”.

When union-state relations appear to be too strained, it raises the questions about to how aspects of the industrial relations system, in particular and the labour market in general, are affected. Union-state relations do not only affect workplace relations and productivity, but also have a bearing on the general performance of the economy (ILO 1997; Beckman 2004; and Ewing 2005). The recent recession and the wider challenges of globalisation have provided lessons to labour market actors to work together in the formulation and implementation of economic and social policy to ensure broad support of reforms. Union support at a time when international human rights and consumer rights groups are vigorously campaigning for governments’ compliance with ILO standards is critical. In addition, union-state relations may have contributed to the difficult political relationships that have defined perceptions about the political and economic affairs of post-independent Zimbabwe. This thesis is therefore significant in assessing the changing relationship between the unions and the state.

This thesis argues that the neoliberal economic policies, the human rights discourse, good governance agenda, the national liberation discourse and international political relations all conspire against the state to create particular problems which are at the heart of union-state relations. The challenges posed to the state by these ‘forces’ could weaken and
threaten its ‘sovereignty’ and, in some instances, the state responses with strategies that result in curtailing of various freedoms and rights that are the essence of trade unionism, including; the right to freedom of association, the right to organise, the right to collective bargaining, the right to strike and various other trade union rights. Any criticism of the state by the Western countries is framed by the government as an attack arising out of its land redistribution and empowerment policies. This gives ZANU PF an opportunity to mobilise Zimbabweans and African countries to support the controversial policies. Since many African countries have not resolved the colonial legacy around the land question, many have tended to support the Zimbabwe government even though they did not approve of the mechanism of such reforms. The net result of the dynamics leads to the polarisation and politicisation of workplaces and industrial relations, which does not only affect union-state relations, but the country’s economic performance as well.

The neoliberal economic paradigm did not only create hardships for both the state and unions, but it was also a way of avoiding fulfilling the obligations of the Lancaster House Agreement which brought about Zimbabwe’s political independence. This is because the Lancaster House Agreement did not allow for land distribution in the first ten years of independence except under the “willing seller-willing buyer” basis. At the end of the ten years, the IMF neoliberal policies emphasised market forces, which is land had to be sold at market rates making it impossible for both the government and the majority to afford it. The neoliberal economic paradigm in the context of Zimbabwe appeared incompatible with the socio-political realities of Zimbabwe. A critical review of the neoliberal narrative will be provided in the literature review chapter. However, it is important to appreciate the relevance and significance of the neoliberal paradigm as the basis for understanding the contemporary political economy of Zimbabwe. First, as a package of economic reforms, it brought a lot of challenges including, loss of jobs and negatively affected union density. Second, is what may be regarded as ‘the paradox of the neoliberal turn’ in that it facilitated the subsuming of the labour agenda by broadly redefining workers’ organisations as ‘civil
society’ organisations. The problem is that the ‘civil society organisation’ concept implied a broader definition of the role of unions and, that accounted for the subsuming of the labour agenda. The governments fear of regime change also resulted in union’s activities being closely monitored resulting in further marginalisation of the labour agenda. Third, unions also capitalised and rode on the ‘good governance’ narrative to mutate into political parties. The ‘good governance narrative’ appealed to unions in that it advocates for broad participation of those groups usually marginalised in socio-economic and political processes. It emphasises trade union rights and defines them as human rights to be enjoyed by every worker. If trade union rights are human rights, one can conclude that it does not benefit labour to align with any particular political party, since aligning to political parties is intended to secure those rights which are defined as human rights by the neoliberal narrative.

The next section of this chapter begins with an analysis of the post-independent political historical context paying particular focus on what distinguishes Zimbabwe from other African countries and how this evolved to influence union-state relations. The character of the economy and economic relations that resulted from the evolving political context is also analysed. This is important because perceived economic imbalances influenced approaches and ideas about what to do to redress the situation, paving way for what turned out to be contested and or controversial government policies around land redistribution, indigenisation, empowerment and neo-liberal policy interventions. However, the chapter does not debate these issues since they became the focus of the actor’s perceptions and experience of the union-state relations which were analysed in chapters six and seven.

The state's relations with the unions and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) are also analysed as they form part of the actors’ perceptions of international interventions and how they could have shaped the relationship. The focus is on what happened to influence the change in relations with the ILO and how this provided the background and
motivation for the thesis. This then informed the broader research aims, questions and objectives of the study which are articulated towards the end of the chapter. The research gap and contribution of the thesis follows the objectives. Finally, a synopsis of the thesis concludes the chapter.

A key conclusion made is that union’s alliances with political parties, at this stage in the development of Zimbabwe’s industrial relations and political systems, will not deliver economic and material benefits for workers but prolonged suffering. Both ZANU PF and MDC are neo-liberal in outlook and an alliance with any of them is not necessarily in the interest of labour unions. As is the case in South Africa, any association or alliance needs to be spearheaded from the bottom (by the membership) for it to be sustainable. There was no evidence or suggestion that this was happening between unions and the state in Zimbabwe. What seems to be exist are ‘flashes of elite instigated and led alliance between ZCTU and the MDC and between ZFTU and the Government. None of these seems to address the fundamental problems the workers face.

1.1 Zimbabwe’s Post-Independent political historical context

Moyo (2006) argues that Zimbabwe is unique from many other African countries in a number of ways. The first being that decolonisation occurred late in 1980. The second, it was affected by severe and extensive rural armed struggle. Third, that the challenges to do with land and racial issues remained unresolved long after independence. Fourth and final, the state continued to suffer from apartheid South Africa and rebels from Mozambique during the early years of political independence.

The net result of these, argues Moyo (2005), was the prolonged period of high level security and military mobilisation well into independence. While this could have developed a perception on the part of the political leadership that the country was still under threat of attack, it gave birth to two main problems. The first is the general intolerance of political
opposition which is seen as a betrayal of political independence (Kagoro 2003). The second is that the fundamental politico-economic questions remained unresolved.

Zimbabwe has recently gone through three disputed Presidential elections. From the year 2000, Zimbabwe experienced land reforms, a politically diverse parliament (MDC/ZANU PF and Coalition government), economic sanctions, unprecedented high inflation levels, high levels of unemployment, the ‘collapse of the formal sector, flourishing informal markets, high levels of brain and skills drain, salaries below the poverty datum line, relocation of companies to neighbouring countries, alleged high corruption levels’ particularly in government-owned companies and contestable economic policies (Kanyenze 2007). All these created pressure and strains in the labour market thus impacted on labour relations. In addition, there are external pressures in the form of political sanctions against the political leadership of ZANU PF and those connected to it that have business interests in other countries.

The international community has been actively spearheading voter education through various civic groups including trade unions. In addition to this, there are growing debates and criticism of Zimbabwe’s observance of the rule of law and perceived intolerance of opposing views (Moyo 2005; ZCTU 2007). All in all, there are questions being asked relating to the legitimacy of the current ZANU PF led-government. There is international condemnation of alleged violation of human rights in Zimbabwe in 2009. The International Labour Organization (ILO) set up a Commission of Enquiry to investigate alleged violation of trade union rights and failure to observe ILO Conventions and Recommendations. It found the state to be in gross violation of trade union rights clearly suggesting that there is a ‘governance crises in Zimbabwe’ (ILO 2009).

At the time of conducting field-work (January 2012 to March 2012), the popularity and influence of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) which advocate for human rights, the rule of law and a change in Zimbabwe’s constitution was very evident and growing. On
the other hand, the government is calling for increased recognition of the role played by
ZANU PF as a party that brought political independence, and is increasing calls for state
sovereignty and support for land distribution. On the other hand, the NGOs are pressing
for democracy, observation of human rights and free, fair and transparent elections. On
the labour front, there is currently a campaign for restructuring the industrial relations
system and reforming the labour laws to bring them in line with the ILO requirements. All
these make this study unique in comparison to many of the existing commentaries about
union-state relations in Zimbabwe.

In the next section, a brief analysis of the character of the economy and economic
relations follows. This is presented within the context of an overlap between the class
character and structure and its relationship to the overall economic performance. An
understanding of the character of the economy and its relationship to the economic
performance is a useful context for appreciating the demands made by labour. Given this
background, the thesis also examined research participants’ views on the public policy
making framework as a context for understanding how union-state relations were shaped
or developed overtime.

1.2. Character of the Economy and Economic Relations

It is generally argued that the main role for unions is to represent the economic interests
of workers (Webb’s 1920; Hoxie 1923; Flanders 1960; Hyman 2001). For that reason an
assessment of the nature of the economy and economic relations is an important context
for understanding union-state relations. Zimbabwe’s economy is in crisis. It has not
recovered from cumulative economic decline and chronic shortages of foreign currency,
fuel and basic commodities, very low levels of capacity utilisation, erratic supply of water
and electricity, rising unemployment, skills shortages in critical areas arising from the brain
drain, declining levels of productivity, widespread corruption, endemic poverty afflicting
85% of the population and its feminization, and polarisation of the population along political lines.

The average minimum wage per month has for a decade been below the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) creating a large pool of the working poor. As a result of the crisis, the level of employment in Zimbabwe dipped from the peak of 1.4 million in 1998 to 998,000 by 2004, (Kanyenze 2006). Credible statistics on current employment levels are unavailable but there is a growing feeling among political commentators that the unemployment levels are getting worse. With the virtual collapse of the formal sector, it is the informal economy that has borne the burden of absorbing the masses of unemployed people, (ZCTU 2010; Kanyenze 2006). This situation naturally weakens trade unions and in particular, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) - the main trade union federation in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's poor economic performance is traced and reflected in figure 1.1 and 1.2.

Figure 1.1: Trend in Real GDP Growth, 1995-2005 (%)
Figure 1.2 compares the rates of growth for Zimbabwe with those for Sub-Saharan Africa and the world average for the period 1980-2005.

![Figure 1.2: Zimbabwe, Sub-Saharan and World GDP rate 1980-2005 (%)](image)

**Source:** World Bank Report (2007)

Whereas Zimbabwe’s performance during the period 1980-1990 was better than the Sub-Saharan African and world averages, this is reversed from 2002, with Sub-Saharan Africa and the world averages are positive and much higher than before, during the 1990s and new millennium, while that for Zimbabwe is negative in the latter period. There may not be one single factor that accounted for Zimbabwe’s poor economic performance after 1990. However, it needs to be stressed that Zimbabwe’s performance was better than sub-Saharan Africa and World averages just before the introduction of neo-liberal reform programme. The situation only reversed two years after the SAPs were introduced thus questioning the logic or justification of such economic reform programme. An appreciation of this is crucial for understanding the contemporary political economy of Zimbabwe for it provides a context for the evolution of union-state relations which is ignored in existing
literature. This is because the challenges that employees faced from that time onwards, coincided with the political mobilisation of unions on one hand, and the heavy-handed methods of state control on the other.

The budget deficit progressively deteriorated from 5.5% of GDP in 1998 to 24.1% by the end of 2000. Domestic debt, which stood at Z$24.5 million in 1995 shot up to Z$347 million by end of 2002. Foreign debt has remained almost static at US$4 billion between 2002 and 2007 (ZCTU 2007).

Kanyenze (2007) argues that against this background, the relationship between Zimbabwe and its development partners deteriorated resulting in Zimbabwe being considered a high-risk country. His views could also be contested because the reverse could also be argued, that is, the deterioration of relations with development partners exacerbated the economic decline. Be that as it may, the result was a serious shortage of foreign currency. Secondly, in addition to the state of the economy claims relating to the breakdown of the rule of law and anti-western rhetoric by the ZANU PF government resulted in strained relationship between Zimbabwe and the powerful western economies. Some donors, notably America, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Germany, to name a few, deserted the country (Kanyenze 2007; ZCTU 2008) with ZCTU accusing government of committing economic suicide.

Today, Zimbabwe’s economy, like all other postcolonial economies, is poorly, dependently, lopsidedly and distortedly developed to the disadvantage of the indigenous people of Zimbabwe (Ake 1981; Ekekwe 1986; Otu 2010). Otu (2010, p.193) captures the economic situation by arguing that “the condition and nature of this substructure of Zimbabwe has seriously impacted on other aspects of the Zimbabwe’s life hence, the truncation of the political system and social values of the Zimbabwe people, and the subsequent mass mobilization and revolts across the landscape".
Part of this condition and nature of the Zimbabwean political economy is the land question. The importance of land to Zimbabweans cannot be under-estimated and cannot be reduced to a mere political rhetoric. As already argued elsewhere (Otu 2010; Moyo 2005; Gwisai 2002) the uniqueness of land rests on the fact that it is not only a factor of production to an average Zimbabwean; it is also a unique social amenity: a secure form of holding wealth and gaining social and political advantages and food security (Riad El-Ghonemy 1999). Given the nature of colonial settlement and the uniqueness in access to land in Zimbabwe and other Southern African counties, land is thus, a very sensitive issue in Zimbabwe because it deals with the fundamental question of justice and fairness about how best to broaden and democratized land use and ownership to a majority of Zimbabweans, who for centuries, were pushed to the brink of land disadvantage (Otu 2010, p.194). Politically, the land issue represents unfinished war of liberation. It thus attracts very heated arguments, confrontations from all interested parties, trade unions included. With regard to ZANU PF, it has brought in arguments about sovereignty, nationalism, liberation rights and a general view, albeit contested, of what to do with those who seem to oppose the decisions of the government and those who are seen as aligning with ‘elements preferred’ by or receiving sympathy from western powers.

National ownership of the economy is very low, with over two-thirds of invested capital foreign owned (GoZ 1986). The lack of asset entitlement on the part of the black population is clearly demonstrated with regard to the allocation of land. Through the Land Apportionment Act (1930) and the Land Tenure Act (1969) a pattern of land distribution emerged whereby 18 million hectares were allocated to blacks, an equal share was given to whites, with the remaining 2 million hectares being game reserves and government land. An estimated 6,000 white farmers held claim to 51% of the land outside urban areas. Their farms ranged between 500 and 2,000 hectares. By 1980, the communal areas, with a carrying capacity of 275,000 families, were already overcrowded with 700,000 families. This situation is in sharp contrast to that prevailing in white farming
areas where an estimated 60% of the land was either unused or under-utilised (Jackson and Collier 1988).

The large scale commercial farms, which are predominantly white-owned, are located in the prime agro-ecological regions I and II, with communal areas mainly located in the poorer natural regions IV and V (Kanyenze 2007).

Owing to the inequitable distribution of resources, income distribution followed a similar pattern. The table below summarises the distribution of income by race.

Table 1:1 The Distribution of Income by Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Proportion of population</th>
<th>Share of Wages and Salaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While blacks represent 97.6% of the population, they receive a disproportionate share representing 60% of wages and salaries. In contrast, whites represented only 2% of the population, and accounted for a disproportionate 37% of wages and salaries. On the whole, an estimated 3% of the population controlled two-thirds of gross national income (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989).

The World Bank (1987) found that at independence, black incomes were one-tenth of that of whites, with the wage differentials as high as 24 times for whites compared to those for blacks in agriculture. The differential stood at 7.3 times for manufacturing, with the lowest differential of 3.5 in the financial services. The observed trend is that the lower the average skill level in a sector, the higher the average wage differentials between black and white, and vice versa.
The situation above and what to do about it, is a crucial aspect of the historical economic context that also account for the contemporary state of the political economy of Zimbabwe. With such a skewed economic landscape, it becomes debatable as to whether a neo-liberal economic policy reform framework was appropriate and sets a useful yet often ignored background for understanding how union-state relations evolved.

Zimbabwe’s economic performance is shown below:

Table 1.2: Zimbabwe’s Economic Performance: Selected economic indicators, 1986-2005 (Periodic Annual Averages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP Growth (%)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP Per Capita (%)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing Volume Index – 1990=100</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>103.5</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>58*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing/GDP (%)</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export of Goods and Services (US$ million)</td>
<td>1,360.23</td>
<td>1,709.43</td>
<td>2,094.02</td>
<td>2,482.92</td>
<td>1,503.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings/GDP</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-1.7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment/GDP</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Deficit (% of GDP)</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Debt (Z$ million)</td>
<td>4,537.50</td>
<td>16,075.63</td>
<td>52,358.47</td>
<td>628,256.33</td>
<td>10,735,989.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad Money (M3) Growth (%)</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>185.2</td>
<td>371.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (%)</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>156.5</td>
<td>308.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lending Rate (Z$/US$ annual average)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>281.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposit Rate (annual average)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>174.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Wage Index –1990=100</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>10.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Sector Employment</td>
<td>1,118,133</td>
<td>1,249,200</td>
<td>1,329,200</td>
<td>1,162,400</td>
<td>998,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Index – 1990=100</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>111.5</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>83.7*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Virtually all the economic indicators suggest a deteriorating economic performance since 1997. Kanyenze (2007) and Magure (2014) argued that the ‘populist economic policies’ had much to do with the poor economic performance particularly in 1997. ‘Populist policies’ refer to those policies formulated by the government in order to arrest or
ameliorate the negative impact of SAPs. In essence, the term ‘populist’ also represents an expression of rejection of World Bank/IMF neoliberal policy interventions yet they are not necessarily based on sound economic imperatives but based on short term electoral gains for ZANU PF hence the label ‘populist’. These populist policies continued to be implemented after 1997 and some of which include “Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (1996-2000), Zimbabwe Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (2001-2002), The National Economic Revival programme: Measures to Address the Current Challenges Framework (2005-2006), the National Economic Development Priority Programme and Short-Term Economic Recovery Programme 1 and 11 (2009-2011) and the 2013 Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-Asset)” (Magure 2014, p. 3). The poor economic performance starting in 1997 could be attributed to the ‘incompatibility’ of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme which was subsequently abandoned at the end of 1996. So the lack of expected investment in the economy, for whatever reason, may have a lot to do with the poor economic performance in particular in 1997. Yet, it is equally contestable whether the above policy interventions were not neo-liberal in practice despite abandonment of earlier version of ESAP. Real economic growth deteriorated from an average annual rate of 4.6% during the period 1986-90 to 2.8% (1991-96), -0.7% (1997-1999), -6.2% (2000-2003) and –4.1% (2004-2005). This poor economic performance supports the views of Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) who point how “populist regimes” further destroy the economy through “unorthodox economic interventions” (Magure 2014:14), an analysis which aptly captures the range of policies adopted by the Zimbabwe government post-1997.

The informal economy is now the main employer where jobs are unregulated, unprotected, unrepresented, are therefore not decent and income levels are below poverty levels. It is therefore not surprising that close to 90% of the population lives in poverty. In that respect, Zimbabwe is not really different to most SSA.
The current socio-economic and political challenges might have contributed to ‘social mobilization’, ‘movement’ and ‘crises. ‘Mobilisation’ in the sense that civic organizations have helped mobilise people to first, oppose the first constitutional process on many grounds, but chiefly on the premise that it entrenches the interests of the incumbent President. And secondly, non-governmental organizations, together with the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) facilitated the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which is currently the main opposition political party in Zimbabwe. ‘Crises’ in the sense that the economy is not performing well, land repossession had taken place against heated opposition from within Zimbabwe. Political and economic sanctions have been implemented against Zimbabwe, and the fact that there was a deadlock in Presidential elections of 2008 due to allegations of vote-rigging and political harassment created a particular and unique, yet unexplored context for studying union-state-relations. What is crucial is that the limited research in labour studies has resulted in the ‘privileging of political commentaries’ which have relegated the role of the labour movement to that of merely facilitating the formation of the MDC. Thus, the role of the labour movement in generating interest, conflict, perceptions, controversies around the contemporary state of the political economy of Zimbabwe, in particular on the land question, sanctions, presidential and parliamentary elections, to name a few, is neither sufficiently appreciated, understood nor acknowledged. Similarly, the position of the ILO and employers is not sufficiently articulated and contextualised to give an understanding of union-state relations in Zimbabwe.

According to Otu (2010, p.189) the socio-political situation that exists in Zimbabwe typifies the crisis faced by many post-colonial states in Africa. Thus he argues,

“That the problems, speaks very eloquently of the very sharp contradictions inherent in the socio-economic formation of the independent states of Africa, and the tortuous, complex and long processes involved in resolving these challenges, or holding them in abeyance. The increasing economic misery in Zimbabwe, the struggle by Zimbabwe’s ruling class to
keep afloat in the midst of a drowning global economic downturn, the struggle to hold on to state power, the ‘depoliticization’ of a faction of the ruling class and the masses generally, and the clever but clandestine manoeuvre of the Western powers to perpetuate her economic, social and political agenda, are some of the dynamic social forces which are fomenting the revolutionary consciousness and the revolutionary pressures in Zimbabwe today”.

He goes on to argue that the current struggles in Zimbabwe are a result of sharp contradiction in the country’s post-colonial liberal and neoliberal economic policies. This, he maintains, has led to increased socio-political and economic alienation of the majority Zimbabwe's working class and peasantry. Such marginalisation is seen as one of the reasons for growing consciousness and the desire to seek answers to key socio-economic and political questions. Such contradictions are seen as linked to the incorporation and co-optation of Zimbabwean society into the emerging world capitalist system following colonialism (Makamure 1978; Gwisai 2002; Otu 2010). A factor which many commentators tend to miss in discussing consciousness and the Zimbabwe crisis is the level of education of the average Zimbabwean. Zimbabwe's literacy rate is the highest in Africa (The African Economist 6 July 2013; UNDP 2010) and higher than many developed countries. If viewed from that perspective, it should be perceived as normal that people are asking important questions relating to social transformation of the skewed economic structure, issues of rights, constitutionality and constitutionalism, fair distribution of land and anything considered a national cake.

On the other hand, however, a lot is said about how the new Western industrial capitalist system distorted native Zimbabwe’s social structure of production which relied on land (Moyo 2005; ZANU PF 2000; Dashwood 1996). More importantly is the view that the system entrenched a “class system” with accompanying class differences, contradictions and struggles. While a lot has been written about how the western countries fuel Zimbabwe’s socio-political problems (Otu 2010; Moyo 2005; ZANU PF 2000, 2002, 2009),
it needs to be pointed out that to regard Zimbabweans as simply driven by the ambition of western powers is somewhat inaccurate. It assumes that Zimbabweans cannot decide and do not know what they want, need and expect on the socio-economic front and challenges that might affect fulfilment of these needs, wants and expectations. Whether the western powers and or TNCs really fuel the current problems in Zimbabwe for their own needs is a contested issue. The fact of the matter remains that the current politico-socio and economic situation is important in shaping relationships between the government and other key players, trade unions included.

Reflecting on the class character and relations in Zimbabwe (Campbell and Kwayana 2008), there are four main competing interests in Zimbabwe. The first, but not in order of importance are the interests of the ruling party (ZANU-PF) and its supporters that cut across ethnic and classical class lines. The second, are the interests those of the opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and its supporters which also like the ruling class cut across ethnic and class line. The third constitutes the vested interests of the white minority settlers supported heavily by the United Kingdom and the neoconservatives of the United States of America. The forth, but according to Campbell and Kwayana (2008), the first in rating, are the interests of all the producers (workers, poor peasants, farm workers, traditional healers, students, traders, hawkers etc.) in Zimbabwe. According to Otu (2010), this last group has been rendered poor and powerless by the present government of Robert Mugabe and the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union, Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Otu’s views are however difficult to sustain because they suggest that those “rendered poor and powerless” are not members of ZANU-PF. Their analysis of class relations neither acknowledges nor attempt to address how the class interests play out to shape contemporary union-state relations and the challenges that might result.

It does appear however, that the neoliberal policy interventions that were formulated had a lot to do with the contemporary class formation in Zimbabwe, resulting in the ‘evolution’ of
a class which benefits and thus defends neoliberal interventions. In this case class is defined in terms of a range of factors including access to political power, clear membership to political party and relationship to means of production. There is also a class severely affected by such policies but who do not seem to offer any alternative policy ideas. It is unclear how this translates into the dynamics at play within both the state and labour movement. It appears that the colonial class interests are being reproduced in contemporary Zimbabwe, albeit via a different route and different strategies.

1.3. Zimbabwe government’s relations with Unions and the ILO

This section examines Zimbabwe’s relations with the International Labour Organization (ILO) with respect to compliance with internationally recognised labour standards. It provides a long catalogue of complaints against Zimbabwe for two reasons. The first is to provide a context which motivated the need to conduct this research. Second, it articulates the nature of union-state relations within the international tripartite framework, thereby reinforcing the role of the ILO as participants in this study.

The aim of the ILO includes the formulation of policies and programmes aimed at assisting labour-market actors (government, unions and employer organisations). The tripartite nature of the ILO gives it the mechanism to direct the implementation of conventions and recommendations to ensure compliance by the labour-market actors. It is for this reason that the relationship between the ILO and the Zimbabwean state is important as it provides an insight into the union-state relations. Zimbabwe joined the ILO in June 1980 and is still a member to this date. It ratified twenty-six conventions including all core conventions (ILO 2011, p. 26).

For the first sixteen years of its membership, Zimbabwe did not appear on agenda of ILO (1980-1996). However, in 1996 following a general strike by the civil services, some complaints were filed against Zimbabwe relating to its treatment of striking workers. Also
in 1998, a report on the assault of ZCTU Secretary General (Morgan Tsvangirai) was submitted. More problems were after 2000. After 2000, a number of complaints emerged requiring the use of Article 26 of the ILO constitution. This Article gives the ILO the power to investigate complaints. As ZCTU-state relations worsened, so were complaints received by the ILO. The first complaint to the ILO was filed by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in 1996 in which it alleged that the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) used violence in breaking up a sympathy demonstration by workers in support of striking nurses and doctors. The second was filed by the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, Professional and Technical Employees as a response to mass dismissal of striking bank workers (ILO 2009, p.11). Each year between 1999 and 2009, complaints were filed regarding the “legislative discrepancies …in particular, interference in trade union affairs, compulsory arbitration, collective bargaining and the coverage of public servants” (ILO 2009, p.12). The government did not provide reports despite request from the ILO.

In 2002, the government declined an ILO mission to help it reform the labour laws and, instead, responded by locating the conflict between unions and the state as emanating from the political processes that were unfolding. The government did not appreciate ILO’s role in this respect preferring “the cooperation with African leaders to address problems it faced … arguing that those who were trying to participate in the political process in the country were failing to respect the fact that African countries were capable of resolving their problems on their own” (ILO 2009 p.12). In 2003 the ICFTU filed another complaint “concerning allegations of arrest of 165 trade union leaders during a nationwide protest, some of whom were seriously assaulted, and of 390 trade unionists at a nationwide protest one month later” (ILC 2009, p.12). A further complaint was made to the Committee on Freedom of Association by the ICFTU, UNI Global Union and the Organisation of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU). The complaints related to alleged “dismissals and indefinite suspension of trade union officials”, (ILC 2009). The other allegation was to do
with “harassment, intimidation, arrest and assault of 265 union members during the September 2006 demonstration” (ILO 2009, p.13). Complaints against allegations of interference into the running and organisation of unions, unions’ funds, creation and or promotion of splinter unions were filed to the ILO on a recurring basis since 2000 (ILC 2009).

Finally, it needs to be stressed that the ILO “Conference Committee has discussed the case of Zimbabwe four times in relation to Convention 98 and three times in relation to Convention 87, mentioning the country in Special Paragraph of its report once for Convention No 98 and twice for Convention No 87. By 2008, nine complaints against Zimbabwe were considered by the Committee on Freedom of Association, seven of which were brought before Governing Body as ‘Serious and Urgent’ cases” (ILO 2009, p.11; also see Case Nos. 1909, 1937, 2027, 2081, 2184, 2238, 2313, 2328 and 2365). In these cases, the government is alleged to have ignored the recommendations of the Committee of Experts or declined to provide reports preferring to say that the issues in dispute were of a political nature and political issues are about sovereignty of each state which should not be interfered with.

The state was no longer responding to any information requests and complaints since 2006, (ILO 2006). In 2007, the state chose to provide written response to the ILO but declined to participate in the Committee’s proceedings in respect of its application of the Freedom of Association Convention despite being present at the ILO Conference in Geneva (ILO 2007). In 2008, the government failed to appear before the Conference Committee on Freedom of Association resulting in decisions being made without government’s input (ILO 2008). These events resulted in the setting up of a Commission of enquiry at the June 2008 ILO Conference. The Commission Commenced work in February 2009 and issued a report whose findings the government of Zimbabwe rejected but whose recommendations it accepted. These recommendations were to do with
effecting amendments to labour laws, respect for trade union rights, strengthening of social dialogue, stopping all anti-union practices and providing training on freedom of association to key stakeholders including the police, security forces and social partners. The ILO also recommended that Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission be rendered operational and that the Public Order Security Act (POSA) be applied with due regard to conventions 87 and 98.

The increase in complaints of union rights violations to the ILO coincided with the transformation of the post-colonial economy of Zimbabwe. As shall be argued in the literature chapters, this transformation was exacerbated by the neo-liberal economic policies and their contradiction with the land reform programme and other indigenisation policies. Crucial at this point is that the neoliberal turn also saw a mutation of unions with the adoption of much more deliberate and obvious partisan political agenda. Ignoring this aspect of the political economy is bound to lead to a misunderstanding of union-state relations in Zimbabwe. Despite the growing concerns for violating union rights, the Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) was established and constituted as follows:
Table 1.3: Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMCOZ (business coordinator and co-chairperson)</td>
<td>Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (Chairperson)</td>
<td>ZCTU (Labour coordinator and co-chairperson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI)</td>
<td>Ministers of: Finance</td>
<td>Public Service Association (PSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC)</td>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Teachers Association (ZIMTA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankers Association of Zimbabwe (BAZ)</td>
<td>Industry and International Trade</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Nurses Association (ZNA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe (COMZ)</td>
<td>Mines and Energy</td>
<td>5 members of the Executive Office of the ZCTU attend the TNF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Farmers Union (CFU)</td>
<td>Lands and Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU)</td>
<td>Environment and Tourism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union (ZCFU)</td>
<td>Information and Publicity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Council of Tourism (ZCT)</td>
<td>Energy and Power Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environment and Tourism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State for Policy Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprise Development</td>
<td>State for Public Enterprises, Anti-Monopolies and Anti-Corruption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authors construct 2014

This is a social dialogue structure between unions, government and employers. Its objective is to address labour-market issues which affect the stakeholders. The TNF was established to perform a number of key functions. The first is to identify socio-economic issues which can be negotiated over, then negotiate and recommend to Cabinet possible solutions to critical socio-economic challenges. It should primarily build confidence and portray a positive image of the country, monitor the implementation of agreed positions ratified by Cabinet and expeditiously implement decisions reached at TNF.
The TNF has an institutional representation so members are seconded into this structure by their constituents. It has two key committees. These are the Agenda Setting committee and the Tripartite Technical committee. The former is responsible for preparing the agenda items for the TNF. This committee is composed of the Secretary for Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare; the Executive Director of Employer Confederation of Zimbabwe and the Secretary General for the ZCTU. The latter is composed of highly qualified and technical personnel from each of the social partner-constituencies and is responsible for two main functions. The first is preparing background papers to be considered by the policy-makers from the tripartite partners in the TNF meetings. The second is to conduct research and present concept papers on matters that are before the TNF. So as a structure, in principle, it is tripartite and in line with the social dialogue spirit of the ILO. In terms of its method of work, the TNF only meet whenever there are issues that lend themselves for negotiation. The meetings of the TNF are based on the commissioning of research and studies by the TNF Technical Committee. In a document that outlines its founding principles, the TNF is said to be guided by a set of values and principles which every partner was to observe. These principles are:

“Cultivating a culture of tolerance and restraint; sharing a common vision regarding the future development of the country; negotiating in good faith; ensuring that social partners are accountable to each other; subordinating sectorial interests to national interests; promoting a mutually beneficial environment (win-win situation); adopting a flexible approach to negotiations that allows for adjustment to cater for new and unforeseen developments; and; ensuring strict confidentiality of issues under negotiation” (Declaration of Intent Towards a Social Contract, signed in 2001).

With regards to state-union relations however, the TNF and the above founding principles represent a subtle attempt at subordinating the labour agenda under the government’s nationalist agenda/developmental agenda in the same way as other attempts in the immediate post-independence era.
1.4. Research Aims

Given the background set out above the broader aim for this study is to examine and explain the nature of the state/union relations in contemporary Zimbabwe. In doing so the aim is to seek an answer to the broad questions- ‘what is the nature of state-union relationship? Have state-union relations changed since independence and what are the factors that shape contemporary state-union relations in Zimbabwe?

The increase in alleged cases of violation of trade union rights in Zimbabwe appears unprecedented in post-colonial SSA, yet scholarly work in this area is reduced to political commentaries depending on which side of the political platform writer stand. This research gives agency/voice to the key actors and thus a departure from partisan political commentaries which sympathise with either trade unions or the government. It seeks to holistically address the above questions and therefore make conclusions that better explain state-union-relations in contemporary Zimbabwe.

1.5. Objectives and Research Questions

In order to achieve the above aim, the following key objectives were formulated to guide the thesis:

(a) to explore and assess union-state relations from a historical perspective and thus gain an appreciation of historical influences that impact on employment relations in Zimbabwe;

(b) to examine the applicability of some of the main theoretical frameworks about union typology and state/union relations to the Zimbabwean context, and, finally;

(c) to identify the factors that shape contemporary employment relations in Zimbabwe.
In order to achieve these objectives, the following research questions were formulated and guided the research process:

1. What is the nature of the relationship between unions and the state in Zimbabwe and how, and to what extent, have union-state relation changed since political independence?

2. Based on current literature and empirical evidence, what are the key milestones that define the developments in the relationship and to what extent do these issues influence the success or failure of the employment relations systems?

3. To what extent if any, does the nature and extent of union-party relations in Zimbabwe affect the independence and autonomy of unions?

4. What are the objectives and functions of trade unions and to what extent is their role consistent with government’s expectations of the role unions should perform in contemporary Zimbabwe?

To achieve the above objectives and answer the research questions an ‘inductive approach’ (Hyde 2000; Wilson 2014) was adopted. An inductive approach is broadly defined as a research strategy that seeks to collect data and develop theory as a result of one’s data analysis (Ghauri and Grohaug 2005, p.15). This is because of two reasons. The first is that existing literature on union-state relations is of limited value, and second, that the area of industrial relations in Zimbabwe is under-researched. As such, it was essential to adopt an approach that seeks to build and develop knowledge from both a historical and field-based context and from this, theoretical considerations about trade union-state relationship.
1.6. Research gap and significance of the study


A study of the relationship between the state and the unions was long overdue for two main reasons. The first is the changing political context including the formation of a political party (the movement for Democratic Change-MDC) from the womb of the main trade union federation (the ZCTU) supported by civil society organisations. The second, important contextual factor are the inconclusive Presidential election of 2008 in which the opposition political party won the elections but not the majority to take over the throne resulting in the formation of a government of national unity. Economically, there is the imposition of sanctions (albeit “smart sanctions”) by the European Union against the leadership of ZANU-PF for allegedly violating human rights in Zimbabwe.

Elsewhere in southern Africa, there is a concern about the absence of contemporary research on labour movements. In South Africa, Buhlungu (2009) mourns the decline of labour studies, a situation that resembles the developments in Zimbabwe albeit for
different causes. According to him the decline is caused by the changing relationship between unions and academia. Thus he argues, “…the close cooperation and high levels of trust that had previously characterised the relationship between academics, researchers and unions were replaced by a high level of distrust displayed by union leaders towards intellectuals …” (Buhlungu 2009, p.155). With regards to Zimbabwe, two reasons seem to have influenced the limited interest in labour studies. The first is that it is incredibly difficult to have access to key participants due to the political situation that has prevailed in the last two decades. Second, a view exists which suggest that the 'first post-colonial generation of university lecturers and researchers of labour studies' were an elite group whose ideological orientation was “Stalinized Marxism” (Zeilig 2008, p.220). According to him, “the collapse of the Berlin Wall” and the subsequent implementation of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme arguably created a huge 'ideological crisis' forcing them to desert the academic field. Since then, the only work that focus on labour studies with a historical orientation are the works of Raftopoulos, Sachikonye, and Brittain and to a limited extent, the work of Gwisai already alluded to above. Neither new research nor new researchers have emerged to contribute to the field of labour studies in Zimbabwe. What we see then is a complete absence of a body of critical studies examining union-state relations, relations between unions and the employers, union’s strategic choices, practices or alliances with political parties or union democracy. This bankruptcy of labour studies was all too evident during fieldwork when basic information such as union membership was not up-to-date and sometimes unknown.

The significance of this present study is its contribution to the history of trade unions in Zimbabwe and a better understanding of industrial relations in post-colonial Africa in terms of the state-union relations. Second, the study makes a theoretical contribution to the debate on state-union relations by challenging the applicability of existing theoretical frameworks on state-union relations to the Zimbabwe situation. Third, the thesis brings back to the agenda, the centrality of the labour question in the socio-economic and
political systems not only of Zimbabwe, but of developing countries as well. A sound and healthy industrial relations system, in particular, a harmonious working relationship between trade unions and the state is crucial for a country which has been negatively affected by two decades of economic turmoil. It appears that those countries with healthy industrial relations systems, and low strike density benefit from a continuity of production although it can equally be argued that industrial relations issues are not the sole cause. These include Russia, India and South Africa (ILO 2013). The opposite is the case that is those countries with frosty union-state relations and high strike density, including Brazil, Nigeria and Turkey (Bhorat et al., 2013, p.14); tend to have unstable labour markets and significantly lower levels of employment continuity. Therefore, cordial union-state relations create the stability business organisations need. Unions and their members are more likely to benefit in a number of ways from the resulting labour market conditions. For the governments, healthy industrial relations are one of the cornerstones of economic success, and in the context of Zimbabwe, perhaps a key aspect of economic transformation. It is hoped the thesis will generate debate and public policy interest on the importance or relevance of state-union relations not only to Zimbabwe, but other developing countries as well.

Two theoretical issues arise from this study. The first relates to the role, objectives, and autonomy of trade unions under different political and economic conditions; and begs the questions: ‘Is the relationship changing and what factors account for such change? And, ‘how much independence and autonomy do unions have within Zimbabwe’s industrial relations system?’ The second theoretical question concerns the role of the state in industrial relations and how union-state relations in Africa, in general, and Zimbabwe, in particular, develop.

The type of institutions under study, that is, ZCTU and relevant institutions that are under direct state control exist and operate in different social-economic and political context compared to most in the western economies. The values and paradigms that determine
‘reality’ for participants in these institutions are to some extent different. However, it can be argued that these institutions are mimics of Western industrial relations institutions and actors’ concerns are not entirely different to their Western counterparts. To the extent that they are ‘hybrids’ of ‘western counterparts’ their ‘realities’ may not be completely different.

There are also practical issues regarding access to research resources and research participants taken into account in conducting fieldwork. It is therefore the practical circumstances such as these that dictate research strategy not the dogmatic adherence to a particular model.

1.7. Organization of the thesis

The first chapter is a brief account of the socio-economic and political situation in Zimbabwe. This is essential for contextualisation of the analysis of contemporary state-union relations in Zimbabwe. This is a brief account, because these issues are picked up again in the third chapter. It provides the research scope in terms of aims, objectives, the research questions, background and contribution of the study. Zimbabwe’s class character and structure is analysed paying attention to how it overlaps with the economic situation.

The current context makes Zimbabwe’s case unique in a number of ways. Whereas the global economy is experiencing an economic crisis, Zimbabwe’s economic situation has an added dimension of unresolved historical economic foundations which exacerbates the problem. An understanding of socio-economic and class character provides a useful perspective for understanding, in historical terms, the influences of union-state relations.

Chapter two addresses two broad aims. Firstly, it examines trade union purposes and objectives and secondly, it analyses the relevance of Martin’s (1989) typology/theoretical framework on union-party/union-state relations to Zimbabwe. Emerging models of state-union relations in Zimbabwe are also considered.
Chapter three is the research framework and methodology which draws linkages between research questions and research objectives. It examines the key considerations made in the research process, how data collection took place and how participants were selected for the study. Finally, it reflects on ethical issues and dilemmas faced and end with an outline of the key themes that emerged from the analysis of data.

Chapter four is an analysis of the development of trade unions in Zimbabwe. It provides a historical context within which unions developed and by extension, how union-state relations evolved. It examines the colonial and post-colonial era as well as the political system within which state-union relation evolved. The significance of the regional context within which trade unions were formed and developed cannot be under-estimated and is provided as a basis for drawing comparisons. Attention is given to the examination of key moments in history which shaped union-state relations. An understanding of union-state relations is incomplete without an examination of the nature of the ‘Zimbabwean state’. In addition, it provides a critique of the dominant paradigms that have influenced union-state relations. Focus is on the relevance of the neo-liberal ideology and the national liberation discourse in shaping union-state relations in Zimbabwe. The chapter also examines state-civil society relations as a broad context within which union-state relations could be understood. Zimbabwe’s neoliberal experience is also analysed since the economy can be the thermometer for measuring union-state relations. The discourse of national liberation and its impact in closing democratic space has been analysed as a broader theoretical perspective within which an understanding of union-state relations in Zimbabwe could be understood.

Chapter five is the first of the empirical chapters. In order to give a complete picture of the relationship, the key characteristics of unions in colonial Zimbabwe are captured. The key themes from the data following interviews are complemented by historical data. It will be argued that a range of factors contributed to the nature of union-state relations during the period 1980 to 1995, including the political character of the union leadership, the nature of
the economy at independence and the inequalities that arose, the role of civil society and how it motivated the use of violence as well as the contested role and objectives of trade unions. The politics at the ILO with regards to the treatment of union-state disputes as well as the political character of unions were all important in creating strained union-state relations during the period.

Chapter six examines what is perceived as the darkest period regarding union-state relations in post-colonial Zimbabwe. A range of factors contributed to the nature of union-state relations during the period 1996 to 2008. These issues are; personality clashes between union and government officials, attacks on union autonomy and political alliances, interference in union’s political activities, the influence of the Western countries in fanning conflict, the listing of Zimbabwe in a Special Paragraph of the ILO report and the funding of unions. Oppressive labour legislation, failure of the TNF to resolve conflicts through dialogue, the politicisation and polarisation of work places, the partnership between unions and capital, attacks on the right to freedom of association and the right to organise, brutal attacks on unionists, entry restrictions and deportation of unionists from other countries and the treatment of trade unionists while in police custody all conspired to create extremely confrontational industrial relations. Chapter six and seven entail primary data and as such, the chapter titles and arguments are a product of actors' views and perceptions.

Finally, Chapter seven concludes the thesis by examining the extent to which it has achieved its goals. A summary and conclusion of the major findings and points to the direction future research could take. The implications of the study and its limitations are also discussed.

This chapter presented a detailed background of Zimbabwe’s post independent historical context. The objective was to show the very sharp contradictions inherent in the socio-economic formation of the country and the complex challenges inherited which formed the
foundation upon which state-union relations were founded upon and developed overtime. It also showed that the state tried to implement the ILO consultation mechanism (the tripartite negotiating forum) to address the country’s challenges. Further, the chapter discussed the trade union abuses that shaped state-ILO relations indicating a failure by the state to observe basic trade union rights. The post-independence historical context provided a framework for the incorporation of unions into the state’s nation-building agenda subsuming workers’ interests to the broader nationalist agenda. Thus state-union conflicts presented in the chapter reflect trade unions’ resistance to government strategies.

The next chapter addresses two broad aims. First, it examines trade union purposes and objectives. Second, it analyses the relevance of Martin’s (1989) typology/theoretical framework on union-party/union-state relations to Zimbabwe. Emerging models of state-union relations in Zimbabwe are also considered.
CHAPTER TWO

Theorising trade unions: Party-Union/ State-Union relations

“Unionism is in its very essence a lawless thing …”

(Hoxie 1923)
2.0. Introduction

This chapter looks at theoretical frameworks about union-state/union-party relationships. It examines the theoretical debates about what a trade union does and what its objectives or purpose should be. This discussion will demonstrate that an understanding of trade union objectives requires an appreciation of the unique circumstances and context within which they are formed and operate. Thus, the union functions in a developing country may focus on issues which those in a developed country might not since the circumstances faced may be different. It is on the basis of an appreciation of the mediation of context that this chapter also examines how Zimbabwe state-union relations sit within the theoretical framework set out above.

The study of unions and their relationship with the state or political parties has often attracted attention from researchers in industrial relations. In most studies, the definition of what trade unions are and what they should do has always been contested (see Hoxie 1923; Martin 1989; Hyman 2001; Turner 1962; Kanyenze 2007). What the state should do under different economic and political conditions is also subject for contestation. Both trade union and state theories do present different perspectives on what the role of each should be. But these theories are also contested making it interesting to study state labour relations. In this chapter theories of trade unions are analysed as possible theoretical framework for understanding state-union relations broadly. A broader discussion of literature on union-party and state-union relationship is essential as it provides models for understanding the current study.

In this chapter the analysis centres on trade union purpose and how various frameworks are inadequate to explain state-union relations in contemporary Zimbabwe. Given that the existing theoretical frameworks (Martin’s 1989-popular typology of Marxists-Leninist, Syndicalist, Pluralist, ‘Organist’ and Authoritarian framework) are inadequate the chapter
also provides an analysis of the two key frameworks that seem to be emerging as alternative models shaping state-union relations in Zimbabwe. These are the conceptualisation of trade unions as ‘Civil-Society organisations’ in relation to the state and the ‘National Liberation’ ideology as counterhegemonic discourse to unions as civil-society.

2.1. Defining and theorising trade unions

Two important issues relating to trade unions have been voiced over the years. The first is in agreeing precisely on what trade unions are and the second is to do with whether it is possible to establish what the common and significant functions of trade unions are (Valenzuela 1992; Hyman 2001). This has led to a range of perspectives, theories, typologies and frameworks on unions. The classic definition of trade unions, as offered by the Webbs is that they are; “A continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their working lives” (Webb and Webb 1920, p.1). Whereas Dunlop (1958) perceives as purely and essentially economic organisations which rely on collective bargaining in pursuit of their goals, the Webbs identified three trade union methods namely; ‘mutual insurance’, ‘collective bargaining and legislative regulation (S. and B. Webb 1896, p.455). The Webbs (1920) strongly argued that collective bargaining was a powerful vehicle for strengthening workers although it may not be compared to legal enactment, while Marx felt collective bargaining maintained the exploitation of workers by limiting their goals to that of an acceptable wage under a capitalist system (Fox 1973, p.219). However, such conceptions of trade union purpose are problematic as they reflect the limitations of union doctrines which ignore the legal and political contexts within which unions operate.

Several other conceptions of unions have been developed with others seeing them as ‘an agency and medium of power’ (Hyman 1996) or more broadly in terms of functions or
purposes (Martin 1989; Clegg 1979; Perlman 1970) or institutions of violence (Hoxie 1923) to name a few. There are also conceptions of unions based upon typologies (Gardner 1989; Turner 1962; Hall and Harley 1996; Valenzuela 1992; Dabscheck and Niland 1981; Drago et al., 1992; Heery and Kelly 1994; Callus et al., 1991 and Bramble 1995). These provide a mere classification of unions based on their internal characteristics. The problem of typologies is that they do not precisely explain what unions. However, Webster (2007, p.3) provides a typology for classifying unions based on four categories. The first is the ‘traditional client model’ where unions are a client/’conveyor belt’ of the ruling party. Second is ‘divorce’ where unions break out of the alliance and forms a party as part of the opposition. Third is the ‘unhappy marriage’ where trade unions are in an uneasy alliance with the ruling party. Fourth and final is ‘abstinence’ where unions withdraw from party politics and a multiparty democracy is created. This model is more appropriate in seeking to explain the current range of state-union relations in Africa.

Understanding union objectives is central to the understanding of state-union relations. The empirical evidence will show that the acrimonious relations between the government and unions arise out of serious differences over union purposes. The next section therefore is a critical discussion of this important subject.

2.2. Objectives of trade unions in Africa

It is important to analyse trade union objectives in relation to specific contexts in which they operate if one is to develop a proper and full understanding of what they actually do (Hyman 2001). Broader models and typologies are useful only as a starting point as unique and changing regional and country-contexts are central in defining what unions do (Hall and Harley 1996). Rather than simply ask ‘what the objectives are of trade unions?’ it is more useful to ask the question ‘what are the objectives of trade unions in Africa or in
SSA? In the context chapter, I will argue that the historical development of trade unions in SSA and in Zimbabwe specifically, was a product of the violent colonial experiences and challenges which cannot, for instance, be equated to western countries. It is this experience which dictated and defined the objectives of trade unions. As such, a broader generalisation of what unions do will miss out on the specific socio-economic and political situations. It is for this reason that the next section analyses the specific objectives of trade unions in Africa before analysing the various theoretical frameworks and typologies of state-union relations.

Discussing trade union objectives in Africa without analysing the creation of wage labour paints an incomplete picture. The forces which created wage labour provided the framework, deliberately or by default, of how trade unions perform their role. There is a suggestion that the labour movement in Africa, in particular its mode of ‘proletarianization’, which is different from the way in which the European working class emerged, has produced particular notions of the African working class. The idea of “semi-proletarian peasantry” has been used to describe the “ambiguous” location of these waged workers between the urban and the rural, (Sandbrook and Cohen 1975; Adesina 1992; and Cooper 1983, 2002). It has been strongly argued that the continued flow between the urban and the rural areas and continued links to rural areas by the working class produced a particular brand of workers whose social reproduction is supplemented by rural mode of surplus production.

The differences between Africa and Europe is that, in the former, industrialization has not been as thoroughgoing and this resulted in a number of important characteristics; the industrial working class is very much a minority of wage earners who are not growing as fast as the population and class divisions have not been as simplified as in Europe. In Africa, workers are divided by a multiplicity of vertical cleavages such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, region, kinship. While these divisions play a part in Europe, the relative
lack of industrialisation and policies of colonial division exacerbates these divisions. In practice, what amounts to an industrial relations problem in Europe is not necessarily an industrial relations issue or trade union issue. It can therefore be argued that these characteristics created problems for trade union organization, formation and development and any notions of working class politics. Firstly, a “semi-proletarian peasantry” could hardly be expected to join and be committed to trade unions.

The movement of labour in urban areas were heavily controlled. In the process of defining and controlling urban space and movement, colonial urban planning set out, “not to integrate or even give the illusion of integration but to emphasise distinctiveness and domination”, (Cooper 1983, p.27). Colonialism was not about fairness or integration of the colonised into the new economic dispensation. Black labour was a commodity to be exploited hence the system of control that was introduced. This colonial experience as seen by Cooper is not dissimilar to the developments which occurred in settler Zimbabwe and had implications for trade unionism and in particular its relationship with political parties and the state. These patterns of urban development and housing, in turn, affected the ways in which workers have been integrated into the colonial social order, and the prospects of labour organization and their objectives for affiliating to different organisations.

Another useful perspective is to examine the role of trade union in economic development. The role of trade unions in the process of economic development has dominated debates in Africa for the past thirty years mainly because the former colonies are facing complex problems regarding socio-economic development. However, according to Fashoyin (1986, p.59) such debates and studies have continued to focus on the misleading “dichotomy between the self-serving interests of unions and their role in the development process”. While Fashoyin’s argument is credible, it is equally credible to argue that the emergence of wider socio-economic role for unions did not come about simply because ‘former
colonies face complex problems’, but rather, unions have been persuaded to subsume the labour agenda to wider political issues of governance, with the logical conclusion of the ‘Chiluba effect’ and, to a less conclusive extent, the MDC effect. In Zambia, Chiluba became the country’s President and sympathised less with unions compared to his predecessor. In Zimbabwe, the MDC was a birth-child of the trade unions (ZCTU) but immediately developed neoliberal policies which ZANU PF is pursuing and directs unions to broader issues of governance at the expense of workers’ immediate concerns.

Two perspectives of the debate appear to have emerged. The first one contends that unions predominantly focus on guarding the interests of workers within the industrial relations field and stresses as a negative, the view that the ‘working class’ are only the minority of the population. The words ‘working-class’ in this context do not refer to the classifications established by Thompson (1963) in his analysis of the working class in the UK. It simply refers to anyone who has a job whether casual or permanent. This is because within Africa, multiple class identities and fragmented class relations which do not fit into Thompson’s categories do exist. This perspective sees unions as selfish or anti-economic development in the sense that improving the position of the worker is not seen as improving the conditions and welfare of the entire nation, (Kindleberg 1958; Fashoyin 1986).

It is for this reason that the union’s main vehicle, collective bargaining, is attacked through the neo-classical argument that collective bargaining represents market distortion and those who attack it, especially the IMF, WTO and World Bank tend to use the “aristocracy thesis” and “urban bias” thesis to argue that unions represent the interests of the minority but also in a way that distorts the market realities (Cooper 1996). The African politicians notoriously refuse to concede that the interest of unions in collective relations go beyond the bread and butter issues. Unions' other interests include education, housing, national planning, and many other issues that are part of development strategy. To appreciate the indirect interests of African trade unions, one has to analyse it is important to review their
participation in the socio-economic institutions of the state, their views on development issues, and their specific contributions to development. But to what extent is this argument true with regards to the working class in Africa? Do trade unions represent a minority? Jauch (2008) provides part of the answer by arguing that in Africa, the working class, who are mainly concentrated in towns and cities, continue to have linkages with the rural population. As such, workers’ wages contribute significantly to the survival of family members in the rural areas, the extended family and even the clan. As a result, the workers bear substantial burden caused by widespread unemployment. Given this context, it becomes questionable to claim that unions’ demands for better wages represent a minority and privileged interest. This labour aristocracy thesis is also challenged by Miles (2007, p.197) in his analysis of the role played by the Mine Workers’ Union in Zambia. He sees unions’ demands as demonstrating broad social and political concerns. One can argue that trade unions’ sectoral gains are societal gains. Further, an important question is does trade union interest in overall national development deny them their claim to improving their members’ working and living conditions?

The second perspective of the debate argues that trade unions in the developing countries should subordinate self-interests to national (development) interests. In other words, unions in these countries should play, if only in the course of development, roles different from those that led to their formation. Schweinitz (1954) argued that this approach to labour is bound to emerge since the ideological and economic environment in the less-developed countries (LDCs) makes this form of state-union relations, and control of the latter, inevitable. To what extent are union roles and functions in Africa determined by ideological and economic reasons? If indeed these are significant, what happens if ideology and economic contexts are in conflict? In any event, whose ideology are we referring to? Is it the ideology of the government/state on how they want industrial relations systems to work? Is it the ideology of trade unionists? And finally, is it the ideology of business which since colonialism has continued to dominate in influencing
economic policies? These questions seem not to have received enough scholarly attention over the years.

The first argument, though true to some extent, tends to be misleading, for it presents too narrow a view of what trade unions in developing countries are. According to Fashoyin (1986, p.60) “the incompatibility between the sectoral interests of workers and national interests is generally exaggerated”. For much the same reason, the second view is erroneous because it assigns to unions roles that contradict the objectives behind their formation. This view, as defined usually by political elites, sees the unions as governmental agencies in the execution of national development programs.

Unavoidably, union members’ interests are subordinated to those of political parties or, as is commonly argued, to societal interests of nation-building”. In the case of Zimbabwe, Raftopoulos (1994) argues that although workers and trade union leaders took an active part in the liberation struggle, labour issues were relegated to secondary importance, along with urban and even women’s issues -all subordinated to the broad nationalist struggle, and articulated around rural issues. This subordination became embedded in the first planning document Growth with Equity in 1981, in which workers were described as a “small and privileged urban wage income elite and efforts must be made to avoid perpetuating this situation” (Government of Zimbabwe 1981). Such links to the wider economic climate (‘Keynesianism’) reflects that the government viewed the objectives of the ZCTU as being parallel to those of national development. The extent to which this is still true with regards to the Zimbabwean situation is one that has to be explored.

Trade unions in developing countries are called upon to play a major role in economic development because of their strategic position and the impact they have to the economy (Damachi 1983). Most developing countries, according to Fashoyin (1986, p.60) depend heavily on a small, but crucial, industrial sector, where the role of industrial workers, especially when they are organized, in the growth of that sector is very important. “A
relatively small strike can have an adverse impact on the economy; production will be lost, and this can discourage investment”. Moreover, the actions of the organized workers indirectly affect the conditions of the unorganized, either positively, as benefits received by union members often provide a basis for the treatment of the unorganized, subsistent sector and for rural workers, or negatively, since the actions of trade unions in the articulation of their sectorial interests have been adduced for the growing differentials between the organized and the unorganized workers (Fajana 1975). In either case, trade-union activities, particularly in the articulation of the economic interests of their members, affect development. The first question that remains to be answered is- ‘To what extent are trade unions capable of going beyond the immediate issues of employment and wages (of social partnership) as part of development? The second question is about expectations people have about trade unions with regard to their influence in other spheres such as the political arena. More specifically, should people expect trade unions to play a significant role in parliamentary politics in societies where the working class is numerically marginal in comparison with an overwhelming majority of peasants, small traders and other ‘independent’ service producers?

Part of the answer to this question seems to be provided by Beckman and Luckman (2010, p.79) who argue that “although the working class is small compared to other social forces, the nature of the workplace and the mode of incorporation in production are decisive for the development of collective forms of organization and political capacity”. Andréa and Beckman (1998) argued in their study of Nigerian textile industry that unions played a crucial role in the diffusion of constitutionalism and political rights, thereby contributing to the development of capitalist relations of production as well. It is this special exposure and competence that also allows unions to offer leadership for wider segments of society. The problem for Africa is that forming labour parties is usually a mechanical response to an opening than a serious commitment of union federations and
this always leads to tensions and contradictions within the labour movements (Tidjani and Ndiaye 2001).

In development studies, it is strongly argued that the concern for economic development and social justice demands high productivity and restraint on wages, plus an equitable distribution of national wealth and resources. In seeking to achieve these objectives, the activities of trade unions must be reconciled with the imperatives of economic development (Bates 1971). Nevertheless, Damachi (1974, p.6) has argued that attempts by many developing African countries to achieve the above objectives through subordination or co-optation of unions are questionable. He argues that many African leaders experience anxiety about the right of trade unions to operate as independent institutions—that is to say, primarily for reasons of political expediency, many political leaders prefer to control the unions so that the latter do not threaten the political stability of the ruling elites (Bates 1971; Gertzel 1975; Gladstone 1980). If trade unions influence economic development, should they be subordinated or should they be partners? In the case of Africa, are economic objectives achieved by controlling and subordinating unions?

In Africa, there are two broad operational approaches to the relationship between the state/party and trade unions that can be discerned. At one end of the spectrum are countries in which a partnership relationship between unions and the party/government is emphasized, the former being called upon to pursue their objectives in a way consistent with the promotion of the sectoral interests of their members yet not create obstacles to the development programs of the state. Countries in this category are strikingly few in Africa: post-independence Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zambia, and, to a lesser extent, Kenya and Post-Busia Ghana, excluding Rawlings's military regime, are examples of countries that have emphasized, in varying degrees, the partnership relationship. In Nigeria, for example, the military administration introduced a labour policy in December 1975 the role of trade unions and employers as partners in economic development (Fashoyin 1980).
The foundation of such a partnership is a social contract which often guarantees collective bargaining and other benefits by the state (Gray 1980; Fashoyin 1982).

The second type of union-state relationship, common in Africa is one that co-opts labour into the party/state framework. Panitch (1981) defines co-optation, as a system in which unions are integrated into the dominant political party. One where there is a social pact and interaction with the union leadership but also one where there is social mobilization and control at the mass level.

This relationship exists, or has existed, in Tanzania, Botswana, Ghana under Nkrumah (1959-66), and all of the Francophone West African states. In these states, trade unions confirm, to a large extent, Galenson's (1962, p.107) contention that unions in the developing world are "administrative arms of the State, charged with the primary responsibility of maintaining discipline and furthering productivity". The extent to which trade unions are allowed to influence industrial relations in Africa cannot be ignored. In practice, trade unions are constrained in advancing better working conditions, i.e. shorter working hours and or higher wages, since the state is presumably improving these conditions as rapidly as the development of the economy allows (Galenson 1962; Fashoyin 1982). There was evidence of this in the one-party state of Tanzania, where the ruling political party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), made the only labour organization, JUWATA (Tanzania Workers' Organization)-its agent, in which role the latter served to propagate the objectives of the political and economic ideology of the party/state, which is Ujamma, or Tanzanian socialism (Mihyo1974, p.252). Unions became transmission belts. This form of co-optation meant, in the case of Tanzania, total emasculation of the right to free collective bargaining and the strike weapon. As Jackson (1979) has demonstrated, workers’ legitimate protests have more or less been outlawed since strikes have practically disappeared in Tanzania.
In Francophone West Africa, demands for better wages and increased benefits have historically been denounced as self-centred and harmful to national unity and economic growth (Berg 1968; Marten 1982). In Tanzania and Nkrumah’s Ghana, for example, top union leaders were either appointed by the state or their appointments were subject to governmental approval (Beckman 2001; Tidjani and Ndiaye 2001). More important is the fact that co-optation, in practically all cases, not only renders trade unions impotent but destroys them as effective social-pressure groups. When unions are so treated, their members tend to be frustrated and apathetic, and their doubts about the usefulness of membership in such organizations often increase. Naturally, they lose interest in official methods of grievance settlement, which are often non-functional. Accordingly, they shift their attention to the political arena for resolution of their grievances. In Tanzania, the creation of Workers’ Committees, following the state takeover of the union (JUWATA) helped to render the latter irrelevant, as workers channelled their grievances through their committees. This might appear satisfactory, except that the workers’ committees serve more as punitive machinery rather than for the maintenance of discipline and efficiency, for which they were intended (Shivji 1976, p.129). Many labour movements in Africa continue to resist ‘co-optational’ moves by the state resulting in confrontational industrial relations. This is because both unions and capital do not accept that co-optation is a suitable economic development strategy (Jack and Leggett 1980).

From the foregoing, it would appear that the consequences of union co-optation into the state/party framework are not desirable for the promotion of economic development since such strategy detracts from the constructive role of trade unions in the development process. Unions tend to lose their members and their vitality the moment they perform functions different from those for which they were formed. Furthermore, they lose their image as an effective source of social change in the society. This has led Fashoyin (1983) to conclude that co-optation or subordination of unions in African states, because of rapid economic development not only is a misconception of the purposes of trade unions, but
that such policies rely on the erroneous concept that unions cannot participate effectively in the development process and still remain independent institutions. Flanders (1970, p.39) has argued that unions have transformed society by remaining doggedly confined to their primary objectives and refusing to be "captured" and exploited by political parties. It is from this perspective that one may question the purpose of union participation in politics in Africa. There is no evidence to disprove the fact that their involvement in politics has usually caused their self-destruction. Participation in politics has brought many African unions into disrepute and, more importantly, has detracted from whatever gains might have been achieved through resolutely confining themselves to industrial activities. In Lesotho, for example, the unions' resolve to support a particular political party led to the persecution of their leaders and, ultimately, to the demise of the labour movement (Ananaba 1979).

Similar events occurred in Ghana during the Nkrumah and Busia regimes of 1959-1966 and 1969-1971, respectively (Damachi 1974; 1983). In Nigeria during the period 1979-1983, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) was reportedly harassed and threatened by politicians who saw union leaders interfering in political issues. Still on Nigeria, unions failed to have any significant impact on the 'return to democracy' in 1999 that was first greeted with much expectation (Ndiaye 2004). In Senegal, although unions played an active part in overturning an effective one-party state, supporting the opposition led by Wade, it soon found itself confronted with new levels of authoritarian rule (Tidjani and Ndiaye 2001. In the Namibian case, unions have been subordinated to the one-party state. In South Africa, COSATU's intervention in influencing the succession in the ANC appear to suggest that the labour movement has been able to retain the political clout it demonstrated in the apartheid struggles (Beckman and Sachikonye 2010). Yet, it may be argued that such intervention carried few gains for rank and file of the labour movement, whose authority was appropriated by narrow stratum of ambitious union officials. Its success is contestable. For this reason, on the question of alignment to political parties,
Ghana has now taken a different route to most African countries. The Trade Union Congress of Ghana (TUC) adopted a policy of non-association and non-affiliation with political parties and this was articulated in its constitution. Secondly, the Ghanaian government, by law, also made it impossible for such an arrangement to occur (Akwetey and Dorkenoo 2010, p.47).

There is a case to be made that when unions get involved in politics in Africa; self-destruction is the most likely outcome. It is important to recognise that workers, in the particular conditions that prevail in Africa, do not form a trade union because they all share the same political view or ideology. As Fashoyin (1983) and Damachi (1983) have demonstrated, the fact that all the political parties that have been formed in Nigeria since the 1950s, (on the platform of the working class) failed to arouse the interest and commitment of workers is evidence that African unions cannot successfully operate on a political basis in the foreseeable future. Recent events in South Africa show the tension between COSATU and the ANC where trade unions are unhappy with their marginalisation yet, they do not consider themselves capable of forming and sustaining a workers’ political party. The next section analyses contemporary state-union relations in Zimbabwe.

2.3. Framework on state-union relations and their applicability to Zimbabwe

This section offers an analysis on state-union relations in Zimbabwe. I argue that Eurocentric frameworks, such as the Marxist (Marx and Engels 1933; Lenin 1970; Hyman 1975), pluralist (Fox 1973), syndicalist (Rocker 1938; Price 1998), organicist (Martin 1989), business unionism (Hoxie 1923) authoritarian (Marx 1958 and social democratic models (Chamberlain 1951; Clegg 1960) are of little relevance to Zimbabwe.

I have consistently argued that the context determines the direction state-union relations in SSA take. I have discussed the character of the state elsewhere. My attention here is
on analysing the nature of the evolving state and how it shapes state-union relations. I argue that the nature of the state and the role it plays, and not any particular industrial relations framework, is more relevant to understanding state-union relations in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe, no distinction really exists between the ‘state’, ‘government’, and ZANU PF/party. They largely mean the same thing and this is why European and North American studies on industrial relations framework are not useful in explaining state-union relations. This quotation provides the starting point;-

“Civil servants should always bear in mind that there is nothing government does that does not come from the party. No one should say I work for government and not for the party and if you hear any civil servant saying that in this area, please let me know …” (Kumbirai Kangai, Senior ZANU PF Cabinet Minister-cited from The Herald, 14 January 1995).

Further evidence of the complication of the state is reflected in the following statement by Nkomo:

“I had once asked him (Prime Minister Mugabe) directly- “What is the supreme organ in Zimbabwe? He had answered; the supreme body in Zimbabwe is the Central Committee of ZANU PF, my party” (Nkomo Joshua 2001, p.3).

The interchangeability of concepts of ‘government’, ‘state’ and ‘political party’ is a product of the political management systems adopted soon after independence. All former British colonies broke away from the dual British model of separate head of government and head of state in preference for an Executive Presidential System (Tordoff 1997 and Dzimbiri 2005) resulting in the subservience of the legislature and the judiciary to the executive and the integration of other non-political organizations including trade unions into the ruling party and state machinery (Nwabueze 1974). The second problem is that it led to “clientelism” (van de Walle 2003, p.297-321), a form of unionism whose main function was to serve the political party and not so much the workers. What we find is that national institutions and processes have been so politicised along party lines resulting in their national character being severely undermined (Kaulemu 2001, p.80).
The state is no more because it has been, in practice, replaced by party politics. It is common for some ruling party members to consider themselves as part of government and use state structures for their own ends”. The party’s decision-making structures are confused for an elected government. Thus Kaulemu concludes that “People who are not members of government make decisions through processes that are not accessible to public accountability” (Kaulemu 2001, p.80). In Zimbabwe, prior to the Government of National Unity (between ZANU and MDC), there existed five ministries which were solely responsible for party affairs and they provided administrative services to ZANU PF and its women’s’ and youth sections. The army, Air force and Police leaders serve on the party’s politburo at the discretion of the party president (Knight 1990, 1992).

From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the way the state has evolved from the colonial to post-colonial, its features or major characteristics, how it sought to relate to various institutions including trade unions, makes it impossible to see how the Pluralistic framework, the Marxist, the Syndicalist and the Social Democratic models can be applied to adequately explain state-union relations in Zimbabwe. The emerging explanation of state-union relations seems to be coming from a combination of two frameworks - 'social movement unionism and political unionism'. Social movement unionism goes beyond the traditional political-economic divide and challenges unions to form structured alliances with social movements as well as engage in national campaigns against the state, (Waterman 1988, 1989, 1993; Webster 1996; Wood 2002; Lambert 1988, 1989; Bramble 2003; Buhlangu 2005). Political unionism is “unionism that is dominated by or subordinated to a political party or state, to which leaders give primary loyalty. This results in generally but not totally neglecting workplace issues for the larger political issues.

In addition, the reconceptualization of trade unions as civil society organisations in Zimbabwe has created another important dimension that makes fitting state-union relations into any existing industrial relations theoretical framework rather difficult. What is
happening is that trade union alliances with civil groups is gaining momentum at a time when union membership is significantly declining due to informalisation of the economy and high unemployment rate. Such a situation makes it very difficult to argue that the main objective of unions is representing workers. This fact, compounded by the new roles or objectives of trade unions where they are together with civil society organisation, actively engage in voter education, demonstration against shortage of HIV/anti-retroviral drugs, demanding to be election monitors/observers and mobilising against land reform presents more questions than answers regarding how that places Zimbabwe within the existing theoretical frameworks on state-union relations.

2.4. The contemporary context: ‘Trade unions as civil society’ in relation to the state

Following on from the above discussion, it would appear the central and initial point in attempting to understand union-state relations in contemporary Zimbabwe is to consider the state and society in mutual relation and locate unions in context of civil society organisations. It is therefore important to develop a conceptual perspective of what counts as civil society, then locate the African conception of civil society. This is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion about civil society but a brief analysis of how trade unions are considered part of civil society in Africa.

Civil society is a difficult concept to define with precision because of the many different conceptions of it. Broadly speaking civil society can be understood as referring to organisations which are non-market in nature. This conception is referred to as the ‘associationalist approach' and includes trade unions non-governmental organisations, social movements, traditional informal organisations, and professional associations including academics, doctors, agronomists, (Bebbington 1996; Farrington et al., 1993). The concept ‘civil society’ is viewed by Edwards (2004), Howell and Pearce (2002), Lewis (2002) and Farrington et al., (1993) as referring to non-market organisations that agitate
for the interests of different groups including, NGOs, social movements, membership organisations, trade unions and professional associations. This conception emphasises what is popularly known as the ‘Associationalist’ aspect of civil society which, according to Edwards (2004) is healthy for democratic development. For that reason, it is imperative that civil society organisation’s capacity be strengthened to enhance their efficiency and effectiveness. It is questionable whether these associations are truly representative of the majority poor, particularly in rural areas (Lewis 2002). An often neglected weakness of the associational view is the faint line between civil society and the state (Mamdani 1992). This is caused by the labour mobility of key people between these associations and the state apparatus making it challenging to represent the poor except their own personal interests. A second conception of civil society relates to the ‘apparatus’ within which public debate takes place and one in which dominant ideas about how society ought to be organised are both discussed and formed. This might be referred to as a ‘public sphere’ or ‘deliberative’ understanding of civil society. This is where trade unions are seen as strategic and instrumental and thus targeted by international donors mainly because, they have easy access to the state, workers, politicians compared to any other issue-based-organisations (Thomson 2000). It is this perceived strategic position that is shaping union-state relations in Zimbabwe. The World Bank (2010) refers to civil society as the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations … it refers to an array of organisations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations and foundations.

Clearly, trade unions are seen, in this conceptualisation, as part of civil society and as such, have become a key part of funding institutions and donor agencies to spearhead those programmes, projects or objectives that are in line with funders’ expectations. It is at this point and for that reason that they are set up against their governments. In this
respect, unions are grouped together with those groups perceived to be aiming at regime change. Therefore, such conceptualisation of unions as part of civil society leads to the redefinition of not only their role and functions but also defines their relationship with the state. I will revisit this important point in the empirical chapters when I examines participants’ perceptions on the subject. This is why conceptualising unions as part of civil society is a contested issue (Armstrong et al., 2010; Pinkney 2009; Oloka-Onyango and Baryo 1997; Robinson 1998; Hutchful 1996; Gibbon 1996; Makumbe 1998). For that reason, Riddell and Bebbington (1995, p.23) argue, “Civil Society is a notoriously slippery concept. It has entered donor terminology without careful definition …In many respects; the term is used as a code for a set of ideas related to participation, good government, human rights, privatisation and public sector reform”.

The primary objective of civil society organisations in Africa has been mainly to do with democracy (Webster 2007), a concept which is even more contested both in terms of its meaning and substance. It is to do with promoting plurality of views and democratic elections and the proportion of human rights. For a state considered to be autocratic, such objectives means that even before the donor money comes in to support civil society, it is already perceived to be about regime change. Whoever receives it becomes the target of the state. For that reason, the sphere of civil society is one that is heavily regulated by the state in Africa primarily because their sphere of activity and influence are limited by what the state ideologically perceive and define as legitimate organising and political activity. Whether the state should be allowed to dictate the legitimacy or otherwise of civil society organisations is a contestable issue. Equally contestable is whether democracy really leads to better conditions for unions and workers since democracy focuses on processes of governance not the substance. In other words, democracy usually exists alongside serious inequalities within the society (Robinson 1996, p.356) and this is never emphasised to workers as democracy is presented as a solution to labour market issues. It is for this reason that Edwards (2004, p.VI) is critical about civil society in Africa arguing
that, “civil society has been used to justify radically different ideological agendas, supported by deeply ambiguous evidence, and suffused with many questionable assumptions”. This sentiment is also echoed by Allen (1997, p.329) who argued that civil society, in the context of Africa, represent “diffuse, hard to define, empirically imprecise and ideologically laden” concept. As I shall elaborate in the empirical chapters, it is also for these reasons, that the Zimbabwean government is very suspicious and resentful with regard to civil society participation especially through trade unions.

Whatever controversy surrounds the involvement and participation of civil society and organisations that are associated with the concept, its advocates perceive it to be an effective and fair ‘vehicle’ for ferrying participation to the public and thus ensure ownership of both the process and outcome of such participation in matters that affect the public. Neo-liberal advocates including international financial institutions aggressively push for the participation of citizens through the civil organisations (Cornwall and Pratt 2003, p.1) in the hope that it will bring about the elusive democracy and good governance perceived to be seriously lacking within African countries (World Bank 2004, p.237).

It is important to stress that participation arguably results in sharing power and control over resources and life chances, whereby those with less power struggle to gain more control over their lives (Nelson and Wright 1995). This conception of participation is a contested issue in the sense that the goals for such participation are not always agreed and sometimes reflect the interests of those people who stand to benefit at the expense of others. Power is exercised over others and it is not always that such individuals or groups are always in agreement over the amount/degree of such power or over the context in which it is to be exercised. In the case of developing countries, it is not so obvious why some groups seek to participate or why they seek power over certain decisions. The colonial history is still alive and frequently re-written to explain why some groups, particularly those heavily funded by the international donor community stake their claims
for participation or advocate for the participation of certain home-grown pressure groups/civic organisations. So in analysing state-society relations/state-civil society relations (or in this case state-union relations), one has to analyse the definitions the parties involved do attach to the concept of participation and power. Secondly, how these concepts are contested and deployed in practice cannot be ignored as they reveal what is at stake, which is what the parties stand to lose or gain depending on the level of participation or exclusion from such participation. Whereas the World Bank and other international financial institutions publicly push for the participation of civil society groups (see IMF 2010; IDA and IMF 2002). Their SAPs of the mid-90s were predicated on the idea of alienating the public yet centralising ‘authoritarian power’ in the hands of the state to come up with state institutions that would enforce compliance with neo-liberal reforms against mass opposition.

Broadly speaking and as argued by White (1996, p.185) civil society are capable of altering the balance of power between state and society, improving the accountability of both politicians and administrators, acting as an intermediary between state and society and legitimating the political system by promoting the values of liberal democracy ...”. There is a danger however in generalising the role of civil society and assuming that it is homogeneous. This is clearly observed by Marx in his criticism of Hegel's view of the state which is aptly captured by Mamdani (1992, p.17) where he argued that “contradictions within civil society are reproduced within the state, at the same time the state reinforces certain interests in civil society and undermines others. Civil society is not just external to the state, rather various and even contradictory groups in the civil society differentially penetrate the state”. This conception of civil society in respect of their relation to the state is the least preferred by donor agencies including neo-liberal advocates. But does civil society remain constant in its thinking, behaviour and methods of influence to name but a few elements? As civil society changes due to the pressures, constraints and aspirations that constitute it, it would also seek to ‘negotiate’ with or influence the state using means
available to it. What are the dominant groups or institutions within the civil society? What is their standing, character and how do they seek to influence the state? Where do their resources, both intellectual and material for their strategies come from? What is the position of trade unions in relation to that of civic society in matters to do with the state or government? All in all, how does this all play to influence civil societies and specifically, trade unions’, relations with the state?

Therefore a simple analysis, that views the state as responsible for ‘writing up’ or ‘re-inventing’ the society are limited in the same way as those suggestions which hold that imperialism or lack of democracy is the cause of a range of problems in Africa, Zimbabwe included. Using this argument, Kanyenze et al., (2006) advocate for a “holistic approach” to understanding the Zimbabwe situation and, by extension, one that captures the full nature of the state. It follows that a ‘holistic approach’ does not analyse matters in a fragmented manner. For instance, when a proposition is made that imperialism is the cause of crisis in African countries, the usual or common defence offered is that the African politician must and should not blame imperialism all the time. It is the African politician and governments which adopt questionable policies and which embark on alarming levels of corruption, human rights violations and criminal methods of staying in political leadership.

2.5. National Liberation ideology as counterhegemonic discourse to unions as civil-society

As a direct response to the broadening of unions as civil society organisations, the government has swiftly turned to the ideology of national liberation to define its relations not only with trade unions but also with society as a whole. As shall be elaborated in the empirical chapters, civil society is perceived as foreign or foreign-funded and government is suspicious of such civil organisations for they are perceived to be part of the broader regime-change agenda. They are part of the opposition to the state and relying on
national liberation discourse seems an alternative where governments led by former liberation movements are concerned.

Buhlungu (2010) observes that available commentaries on union-state relations in Africa fail to engage adequately with the phenomena and discourse of national liberation. For him, only the work of Cooper (1996) comes closest to addressing the nature of union-state relations which arise where the discourse of national liberation is effectively deployed. In post-colonial Africa, state-society relations are influenced by the politics of national liberation because the political parties that participated in the nationalist struggle against colonial rule generally perceive themselves as having the right to rule. To some extent, those ruled also find it difficult for some time, to challenge the party that is associated with national liberation. Cooper (1996) views the change in union-state relations in the post-colonial period as caused by new tensions that emerge between the party and the unions following the change in the role of the liberation movement into a ruling political party.

An appreciation of those tensions provides a useful foundation for understanding the nature of independence that characterises Africa. This independence is one that creates politically assertive and socially conservative regimes focused on their control of the coercive, patronage and symbolic apparatus of the state (Cooper 1996). In virtually all post-colonial societies, national regimes sought to integrate or subordinate trade unions to the ruling party regardless of whether they believed in Marxism or not (Cooper 2006; Buhlungu 2010). It is this strategy that brings tensions as the civil society groups are marginalised.

The colonial legacy continues to manifest itself in politics, institutions and culture, religion and virtually every aspect of social and political life on the continent and one only needs to analyse political speeches prior to and after national elections. These campaigning/political speeches convey hatred and remind the masses of the brutality of the former colonial administration 'supported by Britain'. All internal organisations and
pressure groups aligning themselves with Britain are perceived as harbouring ulterior motives of reversing the gains of independence. Such a legacy it can be argued has the capacity to influence union-state relations and the nature of industrial relations systems that are created. However, one might argue that this is just orientation that development has taken, because depending of Cold war affiliation, unions have also been proscribed on the basis of allegation of Socialist/Marxist orientation.

The discourse of national liberation uses nationalist rhetoric to define the status of different groups in the country and establish their role or suitability in participation processes in the country. As a political perspective, nationalism defines national issues setting out parameters for acceptable national identity, national unity and national autonomy as political resources at the disposal of the liberation movement (Breuilly 1993; Vhutuza and Ngoshi 2008). There are different arguments as to the relevance of nationalism. While Hobsbawn (1990) observes the decline in the relevance of the nationalist discourse, Smith (2001) and Vhutuza and Ngoshi (2008) argues for its re-emergence as a powerful discourse in national politics. Those who points towards its demise argue that in the face of globalisation and economic dependence, mass communication and cultural hybridization, there is no way nationalist discourse can remain relevant (Hobsbawn 1990). But given the negative media coverage of Zimbabwe in the past ten years, and the sanctions which sought to isolate the country economically, how relevant is this argument? Or is it not true that such economic and political isolation leads to the re-emergence and relevance of nationalist discourse?

There is an argument that nationalism is a legitimating factor (Campbell 2007). In other words, supra-national bodies which have been dictating to nations the new course of action are seen to lack the national legitimacy of the electorate. According to Vhutuza and Ngoshi (2008, p.6) “Nationalism derives from the uneven exploitation, often violent imposition of capitalism and unfairness on the periphery …” This view seems a rather
simplistic explanation on how nationalism continues to influence/define state-society
relations in particular long after African countries had attained independence.

Raftopoulos (2006, p.3) identifies the challenge faced by opposition forces as one of a
“Strong legacy of legitimacy enjoyed by former liberation movements and their capacity for
revived nationalist mobilisation …” He further argues that civic and opposition forces in
Africa in general, and Southern Africa in particular, struggles to locate themselves firmly
within the historical legacies and contemporary demands of their particular national
contexts. In the case of Zimbabwe, he argues that such civic groups are not only
confronted with a strong national liberation movement, but also one led by a leader with
enormous prestige on the continent who also relies on the credibility constructed around
the legitimacy of the liberation struggle.

A further problem of such legitimacy is that it places the ruling party support within the
armed forces and intelligence services (Raftopoulos 2005). There are a number of
implications and questions following from this context. First, given the credibility and
respect of the liberation leaders (Mugabe, in the case of Zimbabwe), will other countries
led by liberation parties likely to support a trade union federation that forms a political
party to oust that leader? If yes, in what way and to what extent? Second, if the liberation
party leader commands the respect and support of the army, does the trade union
federation have to engage with the army in order to secure industrial relations outcomes
favourable to workers? And if that is the case, how can they proceed to achieve that goal?
Third, does this context justify the involvement of the army in employment situations?
Fourth, what sort of trade union objectives should we expect from such a context? Fifth,
will authoritarian culture result from such a context?

The first four questions remain unanswered in literature. However Raftopoulos (2005)
partially provides an answer to the last question in his analysis of party politics in
Zimbabwe. He argues that since opposition parties operate in specific national contexts,
they tend to “reproduce and assimilate aspects of the undemocratic cultures they are challenging and trying to transform” (Raftopoulos 2005, p. 4). He further argues that the repressive conditions under which these parties operate have necessitated a degree of ‘commandism’ in opposition structures. While this analysis might be true of political parties, it still has to be established if the same ‘commandism’ exists within the trade unions. This becomes important in the context where it facilitated the formation of an opposition political party. In addition, if the ZCTU continues to be involved in the activities of the MDC does this also lead to the creation of similar structures in order to engage with alleged autocratic elements within the party and the state?

Another important issue relating to the ideology of national liberation is what is generally referred to as “ideological closure” (Hammar et al 2003; Ranger 2004). This refers to a mind-set which strongly believes that freedom can only result from and be guaranteed by former liberation movements. As such, the will of the people for the foreseeable future, can only be represented by liberation parties (Sithole 1997; Moyo 1993; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2004 and Masunungure 2004; Buhlunlu 2010). In addition to the army and state security machinery, Dorman (2001) argues that “ZANU PF and the state draw on a considerable amount of ideological capital because of its liberation history”. Such ideological capital, it can be argued, makes it difficult for opposing voices to be accepted if they challenge the existence of the liberation party. It is safe to argue that union-state relations will be affected in a context where one facilitated the formation of an opposition political party. In addition, a trade union issue might as well be the responsibility of the army and this complicates the industrial relations systems, processes and structures and marks a key difference from how industrial relations issues might be viewed and addressed within other parts of the world.

But there are other problems with the ideology of national liberation common to Africa countries and Zimbabwe, in particular. The first is the problem of defining the state and separating it from the party. The second relates to the expectation of liberation
movements with regards to the conduct of trade unions and their objectives in general, and the conduct of workers in public services, in particular. This has led to the creation of specific labour legislation for public service workers but this legislation has taken two directions. The first has allowed trade unions to operate freely in the public sector (Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Malawi and Mauritius). However, there is a perception that these public service unions are not seen as going against the nationalist agenda of the party, which is why they are allowed that freedom. The second application of the nationalist agenda does not recognise the registration of trade unions for public service workers for example, in Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe and The Gambia (Kalula and Madhuku 1997; Saidy-Khan 2004). Workers are expected to support the party and its nationalist agenda even if it is perceived to be against the working class interests.

Following on from the application of the nationalist ideology are two common policies namely, ‘labour integration’ and ‘labour affiliation’. The former required all workers who belonged to the ruling party to automatically become union members of the central union and that all union members were supposed to be ruling party members. The latter directed ruling party constituents to automatically become members of the central union but that other union member could belong to other political parties (Tidjani and Ndiaye 2001; Webster and Wood 2006). The carrot and stick methods that followed from this reduced union militancy against the state especially in Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, and Uganda, (Ananaba 1977; Liatto 1989). There is a trend of union-inspired political parties, - in Gambia and Nigeria (Beckman 2004). Leys and Saul (1994, p.146) provide an analysis of why liberation movements tend to be autocratic in their dealings with opposition parties and this might also explain state-union relations; “the very process of struggling for liberation, especially by resort to force of arms may generate political practices that prefigure undemocratic outcomes in the wake of revolutionary success”. In addition, they argue that the legacy of war creates hierarchies, hardships and brutality which continue to impact on the nature and system of governance, the nature of institutional forms created
as well as relations with civilian population after gaining political independence. There is however the question ‘why these institutions, structures and systems of governance fail to change even after a number of decades after acquiring political independence?’ This requires in-depth scholarly attention. However Southall (2003), Hammer and Raftopoulos (2003) attribute the problem to the liberal constitutions adopted by the post-colonial governments and the tensions they create. Such tensions will dictate how the liberation party constructs its relations with civil society, unions included.

In most of Africa, there is a trend that as soon as the former national liberation movement assumes political office, they claim not only to have brought freedom but also to be the only vehicle through which that freedom can be preserved and advanced, (Buhlungu 2010). According to him, this leads to a permanent claim to legitimacy and power. This makes the study of elements of national liberation politics a vital context against which trade union mobilisation was, and still is, conducted within Africa. Buhlungu (2010) goes further to argue that trade unions in Africa have to contend not only with employers and the state but must engage with the nature of politics as represented by national liberation movements and their leaders. Critics of liberation movements have however described their actions and activities as despotic and desperate attempts to hold on to power. What is missed in such criticism is that there is a clear ideological positioning within these movements which strongly believes in their claim to be the custodian of independence.

The emerging scholarship on trade unions in Africa proceeds from the premise that trade unionism and thus industrial relations, is mainly shaped by employer and state policies and practises ignoring the role played by the politics of national liberation. From the time of colonialism trade unions and their leaders became conscious of the need to engage with the discourse and practise of national liberation (Buhlungu 2010). It was inescapable because both employer and the colonial state were perceived to be agents of colonialism (ZCTU 1981). Therefore, trade unions were directly shaped by national liberation politics in several ways.
The first, as acknowledged by Buhlungu (2010, p.198), is that, “In the colonial context, the power of capital at the workplace as well as the broader economy was underwritten by colonial authority in such an explicit way that all African workers could see the connection”. Legislation, such as the Industrial Conciliation Act, the Master and Servants Act and Pass laws, among many others, were crafted in such a way which made this connection unavoidable in practice. One can conclude that the emergence of trade unions in Africa was not only a result of exploitative economic strategies practised by employers but also became a response to political oppression which denied political rights to the public and the dignity of workers. Given this context, it appears safe to argue that trade unions in Africa were economic and political creatures from the early days of their existence, something many scholarly analyses missed as they sought to pigeonhole African unions as either class-based or nationalist organizations. Those who argue that trade unions should not be involved in politics clearly overlook the main motivation for the formation of trade unions given that background. Following on from this position is a conclusion that industrial relations systems in most African countries are also a product of the conflict between the discourse of colonialism and that of national liberation. The extent to which the industrial relations systems have continued to reflect those of the colonial period is one that is subject to contest.

Where the party relies on the claims for liberating the country from colonialism but perceives trade unions as representing colonial interests, then in practice, it places unions in a position where they have to engage with the same discourse of liberation- to either show that they are not agencies of colonialism or to try and discredit the liberation movements. One can conclude that the formation of political parties under the banner of trade unions is usually a response by unions to a national liberation movement that lost its mandate. Therefore, one of the unwritten objectives of trade unions in such a context is to discredit the old national liberation movement and inherit its mantle as a party of liberation (Buhlungu 2010, p.201). There is also a suggestion that trade unions understand
liberation and democracy as means to an end rather than ends in themselves. On the other hand, African governments led by liberation movements have serious concerns about democracy if this threatens their hold to power. It therefore follows that the notion of national liberation politics is important in shaping union behaviour—whether or not the unions share the same understanding with liberation movements. Former liberation movements which are now ruling parties also harbour their own concerns about union involvement in politics when such involvement is with opposition parties (Buhlungu 2010).

Evidence of this became noticeable during a meeting of labour ministers from Southern Africa in Harare in February 2005. The South African labour minister, Membathisi Mdladlana, expressed this concern; “Ministers here now have a fear because people are talking about possible political parties emerging everywhere, and the liberation movements of the past are getting a bit nervous about the current trend because, in their view, it does look like trade unions are being pumped from elsewhere (Sunday Times, 6 February 2005).

If this is a worrying development for former liberation movements now in government, how do they respond to this development? How do they position themselves if they believe trade unions are being sponsored in order to threaten their hold to political power? Does this concern suggest a unified strategy among African liberation movements or political elites against trade unions? If so does this mean the ideology of liberation will for some time dictate union behaviour and state-union relations in Africa? Buhlungu (2010, p.202) makes an observation about the relationship between African states and state institutions. He argues that state institutions are closely associated with former national liberation movements. As such, they “Are steeped in the politics of national liberation, and particularly in so far as it is promote the notion of a single locus of power in the party-state nexus”. While he shows the connection between national liberation movements and state institutions, he does not show how such an association translate into the wider industrial relations systems. For example, how are the industrial relations structures affected by
state institutions placing into context their relationship with the liberation party/movement? Since the movements continue to use national liberation politics to keep trade unions in check, how do trade unions deal with the legacy of national liberation? Following on from this is the question- ‘What form of industrial relations systems emerge when unions engage by challenging the notion of national liberation? Buhlungu observes that, “…the centrality of national liberation politics to the relations between unions and the state institution is also illustrated by the fact that any change in relations between unions and the ruling party inevitably results in a change in union-state relations” (Buhlungu 2010, p.202).

The preoccupation of the party and, by extension, these institutions with the maintenance of peace and national stability and with creating an environment conducive to reconstruction and development makes them see labour as a potential threat at all times. No wonder that they always seek to find ways to maintain a tight rein on union activities through co-optation or coercion. The security agencies including intelligence institutions, in most African states, make it their business to monitor union activities closely. Even those countries which have the most liberal labour dispensations such as South Africa do monitor union activities with great suspicion in order to guard jealously the gains of national liberation.

2.6. Union/state/government relations in Sub Saharan Africa

The working class and its trade unions in SSA emerged from the womb of capitalism, in particular, from its mode of production. They are a vibrant expression of the underpinning social relations of exploitation which runs across the writings of Marx. The nature of the relationship between capital and labour under capitalism tend to reflect the material and ideological dominance of capital and the reactive response of labour. Since the short-term interests of unions are mainly on the wage increments, this makes it impossible to
achieve the abolition of capitalist exploitation as Marx had initially anticipated. While some unions adopt politico-economic strategies, they seem unable to break out of the ideological straightjacket of ‘economism’. The implications of this later prompted Marx to note that trade union struggles to secure wage increments did not fundamentally disturb the whole wage system as their efforts were mainly aimed at maintaining a given value of labour. This is one way to view trade union objectives (Adesina 1992).

In some independent African countries, communication between management and black workers is conducted either through the Police, District Commissioners, and District Administrators or through the tribal chiefs because the major employer, being the government, is more tempted to use immediate available government agencies in the area (Adesina 1989). Not only does this complicate industrial relations issues, but it also makes the role and objectives of the trade unions difficult to define, and a challenge to study and analyse. Secondly, it tends to present a difficulty in distinguishing the state from the government and the party and thirdly, it makes redundant the use of the main theoretical frameworks which basically are Eurocentric and North American.

With regards to trade unions, there is a long established perception that has continued through the writings of Frantz Fanon from the early 80s, which holds that the unionised urban workers in Africa were not the exploited and deprived class. Arrighi and Saul (1973) refer to them as a privileged “labour aristocracy”. This view sees urban workers in a putative position which gave them a vested interest in the colonial and neo-colonial status quo. Hence trade unions which were subjected to increasing state regulation and control either merely mark time or turn to political activity in order to wrestle more of the fruits of neo-colonialism from the national bourgeoisie. The peasantry at this stage is a mere spectator. Following on from this, is the perception that trade unions are selfish and short-sighted institutions devoted to grasping higher wages and better working conditions for
their already privileged members, without regards for public interest or economic development objectives (Jauch 2008).

Firstly, all developing African countries are pursuing forms of capitalist strategies and secondly, they do share certain features of social structure such as; - the existence of a small native bourgeoisie, a large civil service employed by the state, a working class who earn well below the poverty datum line and yet has responsibility for looking after the extended families (Jauch 2003); numerous unemployed people creating serious unemployment problems and a large peasantry. Such a context has been the key to understanding trade union objectives and their role in industrial relations. Thirdly, trade unions in Africa are in a hopeless condition to resist governmental demands in order to retain a capacity for autonomous action in the economic sphere. This is so because too often, the smallness of trade unions in African countries, together with their financial and organizational weaknesses makes them fail to match the power of military regimes and de facto one-party states. There is an expectation, if not a rule, that union leaders must be loyal both to the one-party state and to the party in power. This not only creates a compromise on their trade union objectives, but also modifies their industrial relations position. Fourthly, is the issue of funding for the trade unions? Historically, international donors and international trade unions have been known to fight European problems on African soil using trade unions (Sithole 1977; ZCTU 1993). There is a general perception that as long as full-time national and branch union leaders remain dependent upon those below for financial and personal support, they will cling tenaciously to traditional union objectives of increasing wages, improving working conditions and solving grievances (Sachikonye 2001; Beckman 2001; and Tidjani and Ndiaye 2001). The success with which trade union leaders achieve these objectives is diverted or undermined by how much external financial support is given to replace income from members.
In broad terms, there are three main objectives of trade unions in post-colonial Africa and these are critical in shaping state-union-relations. The first, is to deliver the workers from oppression, the second, to deliver them from usury and ignorance, and finally, to help them seek the right path to become the artisans of their own deliverance, seeking, finding and perfecting methods of training and forms of expression and organization which will enable them to play a role and express their opinions in a democratic society (Ndiaye 2010; Sandbrook and Cohen 1975; Adesina 1992 and Cooper 1983; 2002). The characterisation in broad terms, (as advanced by Webb) tends to conceal unique objectives of individual trade union federations and assume that trade unions in every part of the world have the same objectives. Yet, different country circumstances tend to dictate the objectives of unions. In that regard Hyman’s (2001) argument that in order to understand union’s objectives, one simply has to look at what they do is pertinent. In the context of Africa, the specific objectives, which allow for a clear understanding of the relationship between unions and governments, are never analysed and discussed as they are subsumed in the historical accounts of the broader contribution of unions to the nationalist struggle or for the fight for democracy.

Whereas unions in Africa perform some functions that are consistent with the general definitions of unions and union purposes (Webbs 1920; Flanders 1960; Hoxie 1923; Hyman 1975; 2001) there is an attempt by governments to prescribe union function and purposes. Countries that specify legal requirements for registration and certification of trade unions, in their effort to define unfair labour practices by union or workers’ committees tend to define union purpose and activity. In the case of Zimbabwe, the Labour Act 2007 not only defines what a trade union is, but it goes on to specify the scope of its mandate. There is a trend that newly independent African state prescribed its own objectives to trade unions. According to Ndiaye (2010, p.25) the nationalist project of new elites required the restructuring of trade unions and a redefinition of its objectives as a requirement for nation-building. Unions were a vehicle for the nationalist project, one of
being a conveyor belt of government policy and initiatives. So the state would create and support a major union federation and then subordinate all workers to the state through it raising concerns raises concerns about the extent to which unions can pursue their legitimate objectives and, at the same time, participate in the development process. Much of the criticism of the role of trade unions and of retaining them as independent institutions poised to protect the interests of their members has in Africa, focused on the use of strikes as a weapon. In the case of Zimbabwe, the use of strikes and their regulation is a key issue in shaping state-union relations. I will return to this in detail in the empirical chapters. However, Fashoyin (1986, p.69) asks the question; “How can a society effect a better distribution of profit between labour and capital to the point of achieving the governmental and societal goal of equitable income distribution without an effective watchdog over the use of managerial powers and discretion in the vital area of industrial development?”.

One can argue that trade unions’ sectoral gains are societal gains. Further, a relevant question arises, that is, ‘does trade union interest in overall national development deny them their claim to improving their members’ working and living conditions? Be that as it may, African trade unions’ concern for job interests often takes them beyond the purview of the workplace, and become involved in intricate and complex issues of international trade and wider political and social issues of governance and service provision (Damachi 1983). The latter have become a central plank of civil society agenda since the 1980s. With regards to unions’ relationships with governments, Taylor (1989, p.45) argued that despite national differences and extremely varying structures, all unions seem to have the same objective, that is to engage in free collective bargaining, and that this perception is very much in line with the British tradition.

What is happening in Africa today is that the neoliberal agenda now includes a new paradigm of co-opting unions and subsuming the labour agenda into wider political and
economic-governance (Buhlunyu 2010; Beckman 2001). Thus union-state relations in Zimbabwe and several other African countries fit into the category ‘controlled’ whereas those in most western countries trade unions have retained a high degree of freedom of association. They have the right to strike, the freedom to choose their leaders and they are free of government scrutiny. Finally, there were numerous attempts to silence labour and remove its leadership by means of banning orders, detentions, beatings, arrests, imprisonment and other forms of harassment with significant success. This is the trend in SSA and is a departure from what exists in western countries.

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter examined the applicability of a range of theoretical frameworks about union-state/union-party relationships to the Zimbabwe context. It briefly examined some key debates around trade union purposes and objectives. It was argued that a sound understanding of trade union objectives requires an appreciation of the unique circumstances and context within which unions are formed. The view that the mainly Eurocentric and North American frameworks are relevant to all contexts is not correct. Therefore trade union functions in a developing country are not necessarily the same as those in a developed country rendering the broader theoretical frameworks inadequate in explaining union-party/union-state relations.

Finally, the chapter discussed the alternative/ emerging models of state-union relations in Zimbabwe. These are the conceptualisation of trade unions as civil-society organisations in relation to the state and the ideology of national liberation as counterhegemonic discourse to unions as civil-society as the basis for understanding state-union relations in contemporary Zimbabwe.

The next chapter is a detailed discussion of the research framework and methodology of the study.
CHAPTER THREE

Methodology

“Coming into direct contact with the unionists themselves” is crucial to understanding unionism …” (Hoxie 1923, p.30)
3.0. Introduction

This chapter serves two broad purposes. The first is to provide a research framework which is essential as a frame of reference to base the research design, the nature and conduct of interviews as well as the interpretations and generalisations that could be made from this study. The second is to provide the context within which the research was conducted, the methodological processes adopted and the rationale behind the strategies deployed in studying state-union relations in Zimbabwe. The importance of developing and following a research framework has been stressed by many authors. Hartley (1994) for example, warns researchers that they are at risk of describing the phenomenon under study without bringing out its deeper meaning. This chapter provides the research framework, thus setting out the scope of the study and the relationship between the research objectives and the five main research questions. It also shows the concepts developed from literature which will be studied through participants’ accounts of state-union relationship.

I argue that the political context within which the study is conducted is one of the most important considerations in determining the choice of research methods. Researching union-state relations against a background of reported gross violation of trade union rights and disputed presidential elections presents not only challenges in conducting fieldwork, but it also makes the topic sensitive. The fact that the labour movement formed the main opposition political party compounded the research process in terms of accessibility to participants and their freedom to participate. Some participants, in particular, the workers were considered vulnerable and were thus excluded from participating in the research. Observations of ILO meetings and the TNF meetings were also considered impossible under the political climate. Despite the importance of epistemological issues, they were only considered after settling what was possible and what the Ethics Committee was comfortable with. Finally, this chapter presents the rationale behind relying on semi-structured interviews and documentary evidence as data collection methods.
I now address the relationship between the research objectives and research questions identified in chapter one.

**3.1. First research objective and corresponding research questions**

As already provided in chapter one, the first research objective is to explore and assess union-state relations from a historical perspective and thus gain an appreciation of its impact on employment relations in Zimbabwe. Such appreciation involves an assessment of the effectiveness of the Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) which is a key component of Zimbabwe's industrial relations system. This objective will be achieved by answers to the following specific questions and similar questions indicated in the interview schedule. The first is -what is the relationship between unions and the state in Zimbabwe and how and to what extent have union-state relations changed since political independence? The second, is- based on current literature and empirical evidence what are the key milestones that define the relationship and to what extent do these issues influence the success or failure of the TNF’?

These research questions are intended to explore participants' experience of the relationship overtime. It is expected that the participants will have some historical knowledge of the relationship dating back from the immediate post-independence period. This framework recognises that where historical accounts are researched into, people’s memory plays up and they tend to remember the immediate memorable or unpleasant events. For that reason, any knowledge gaps will be filled-in by literature and records regarding the key milestones in the union-state relationship. The history of trade unions in colonial Zimbabwe is comprehensively covered by a number of writers among them Van Onselen (1980), Sachikonye (1995, 1997, 2000), Raftopoulos and Phimister (1997) although such literature inadequately address the question of union-state relations. This is one of the reasons why a historical account is required from participants. More importantly
is how the past influenced the contemporary union-state relations. Therefore, a range of questions focusing on the current situation will be explored in interviews in order to contribute to knowledge about the current state of the Zimbabwe situation. Therefore a number of questions including the following will be asked; the first is, ‘Should a relationship exist between trade unions and the State in Zimbabwe and if so, what should be the basis for such a relationship?’, second, ‘What is the current thinking within government regarding the relationship between trade unions and their international allies?’, Third, ‘To what extent has the relationship between trade unions and the state been central to the success or failure of the TNF?’, and forth, ‘What is the current thinking within the trade unions regarding the role the state expect trade unions to play and to what extent are trade unions playing that role?’

Even the Employer Organisation officials and the ILO will be asked and are capable of answering similar questions around union-state relations as they are also bound to be affected by it. Thus, relevant questions include, ‘What is the view of the ILO regarding the relationships between trade unions and the state in Zimbabwe? Or, ‘In your view, does a relationship exist between trade unions and the state in Zimbabwe and if it exists, on what foundation is this relationship built upon?’; and ‘To what extent has the relationship between trade unions and the state been central to the success or failure of the TNF?’ These and many other questions directly linked to an understanding of how state union relations evolved in Zimbabwe will be asked to address the first objective and broader corresponding research question.

3.2. Second research objective and corresponding research question

The second research objective is to examine the applicability to the Zimbabwean context of some of the main theoretical framework about union typology and state/union relations. This objective was achieved first by reviewing and analysing literature on union-party/
union-state and typologies of union-party relations in broader perspective. This was followed by an analysis of how Zimbabwe sits within that theoretical framework. The theoretical framework examined are the Syndicalist, the Social Democratic model, the Marxist, the Pluralistic and Authoritarian frameworks and Martin’s (1989) typology of union-state relations. These frameworks required a closer analysis of leading scholars including Hoxie (1923), Webb’s (1920), Ludlam et al (2001), Hyman 2001) and Martin (1989). These theoretical frameworks are about trade union aims, purposes and functions. More importantly, these frameworks are about the nature of the union-party relationship, in particular whether unions are in alliance, are incorporated into the party, have influence or no influence or are subordinated and not allowed any independence and autonomy.

Based on the thrust of the theoretical frameworks, participants will therefore be asked about how they see the role of trade unions in contemporary Zimbabwe. Central to achieving objective two are two questions. The first is ‘What are the objectives and functions of trade unions and to what extent is their role consistent with government’s expectations of the role unions should perform in contemporary Zimbabwe?’, and second, ‘Are unions independent and autonomous? To what extent, if any, are they linked to political parties in Zimbabwe?’ Third, ‘To what extent is the autonomy and independence of unions influenced and or affected by union-state relations?’

In interviews several other questions will be asked to all ‘clusters’ of participants with a view to understanding trade union purposes and the relevance of the theoretical framework in explaining union-state relations in contemporary Zimbabwe. While employers will be asked ‘What role does the Employer Organisation expect trade unions to play and do you think trade unions are playing that role?’ a similar question on the same aspect will be asked to unionists. In particular, ‘What is the current thinking within the trade unions regarding the role the state expects trade unions to play and to what extent are trade unions playing that role?’
As the literature chapters have already demonstrated, it is recognised that the search for answers to these questions in countries with democratic traditions is not an urgent matter but in the context under study, these issues are central in shaping existing union-state relations. While the intention here is not to provide a discussion of the interview schedule, it clearly shows that there is a direct relationship between research objectives, research questions and instrument of data collection. That way, one is able to claim not only contribution to knowledge about the Zimbabwe employment relations situation but also make a theoretical contribution on union-state relations as well as the broader research methodology in the field of industrial relations.

3.3. Third research objective and corresponding research question

The third and final objective of the study is to identify the factors that shape contemporary employment relations in Zimbabwe. This is an overarching objective for which each of the five research questions contributes in attempting to answer. But it is also an objective that draws from the current developments within Zimbabwe and the researcher’s broader understanding of the context under study. So in addition to the five key questions already identified above, the interviews will focus on exploring emerging issues and disputes arising at the ILO and those before the courts of law which are potentially shaping union-state relationship. These include: first, ‘Can a trade union effectively represent workers’ interests if it is aligned to a political party? Is this an issue within the Zimbabwean context?’ and second, a current affairs development question in particular, one relating to the formation of a labour-based political party. A fundamental question thus becomes - ‘The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) recently facilitated the formation of an opposition political party –the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-; how did your federation become involved in the formation of the MDC, what was the thinking behind its
involvement in the formation of the MDC and, to what extent, if any, has this changed the relationship between the trade unions and the state?

In view of literature which argues that trade unions should be essentially economic and not political (Webb’s 1920; Hoxie 1923), a question of aligning to a political party is important. Thus, the question which will be asked is ‘Can a trade union effectively represent workers’ interests if it is aligned to a political party? Is this an issue within the Zimbabwean context? This question can be answered by all participants in the study (unionists, Employer Organisation officials, ILO officials and government officials). Similarly all participants can provide an answer to the question; ‘What is the view of government regarding alliances or relationships between trade unions and political parties in Zimbabwe? And ‘To what extent has the relationship between trade unions and the state been central to the success or failure of the TNF?’ These questions about the contemporary industrial relations situation in Zimbabwe have not been asked and answered and this study will contribute in this direction.

The remainder of the chapter is a detailed discussion of the methodology in which I address the research approach, the selection of research participants, data collection and analysis strategies and the ethical challenges faced.

3.4. Epistemological conviction and research paradigm

A range of research strategies were identified initially and evaluated against the three criteria of internal validity, external validity, and reliability to ascertain how their strengths and weaknesses might best help to address the research questions. The choice of research methods was also influenced by the norm in researching industrial relations issues. A discussion of paradigm wars and my epistemological orientation follows considering the suitability of the interpretivist paradigm. It is vital to address the
epistemological question for it aids making claims about validity, reliability and the legitimacy of one’s work. Thus, “… all research is based on some vision of the world, uses certain method and proposes results aimed at predicting, prescribing, understanding, constructing or explaining …” (Thietart et al., 2001, p.13).

In order to claim reliability, validity and legitimacy, guidance was drawn from three major paradigms which represent the main epistemological streams in organizational science. These are positivism, constructivism and interpretativism, (Kuhn 1970; Durkheim 1982; Popper 2002). A paradigm is “a set of beliefs that deals with ultimates or first principles. It represents a worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature of the world, the individual’s place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world and its parts” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, p.107).

Paradigms are viewed as addressing three fundamental questions namely, “The ontological question, that is, what is the form and nature of reality and therefore, what is there that can be known about it? The epistemological question, that is, the relationship between the knower and what can be known, and the methodological question, that is, how can the enquirer go about finding out what can be known?” (Punch 2014, p.15). The positivist position is that knowledge produced is independent of the people who produce it; it is objective and a-contextual in that it is about revisiting existing laws and reality is external to the individual. In short, it is about objective reality. However, I was more influenced by the interpretativism paradigm. This basically holds that reality is subjective and that there are “multiple constructed realities which can be studied holistically and that enquiry into these multiple realities will inevitably diverge and that each enquiry raises more questions than it answers” (Punch 2014, p.17).

According to O’Donoghue (2007, p.16) the focus of interpretativism is on the meaning people offer to situations and behaviour and which they use to make sense of their world and these meanings are essential to understanding the changing relationship between
unions and government in Zimbabwe. According to Cuncliffe (2010, p.15) “Our metatheoretical assumptions have very practical consequences for the way we do research in terms of our topic, focus of the study, what we see as data, how we collect data and analyse data, how we theorise and how we write up our research accounts”.

In view of the above, Symon and Cassell (2012) argue that such assumptions are a key part of the methodology within which our methods of data collection and analysis are located. Accordingly methodology comprises both our philosophical assumptions and our methods. The assumption in this thesis was that, only by accessing the experiences and participants’ meanings will it be possible to understand the union-state relations in Zimbabwe and the broader industrial relations situation. An understanding of the key milestones in union-state relations, their daily struggles, daily realities (Patton 1990; Guba and Lincoln 1994; Denzin and Lincoln 2005) of these industrial relations actors could only be possible when we seek their views as opposed to the ‘only truth’.
In deciding which type of empirical data was needed for this thesis, the essential question addressed was, "Do I need to impose a structure of the number system on the data and secondly, is it useful to impose a number structure on the data (Punch 2014). Do I need to measure anything for which assigning numbers could be essential? In order to measure something, the element of variable becomes central. However, I had no specific variables that needed measuring. Thus, in this thesis it became clear that in terms of the research
questions and research aims, it was impossible to anticipate the variables that could be affecting union-state relations in Zimbabwe. It became useful to approach the study and data collection strategy with broad questions aimed at finding out what was happening ‘out there’. As such, the empirical question was approached not in the form of numbers but words to elicit respondents’ experience of the relationship, hence the adoption of qualitative data collection strategies or “qualitative empirical materials” (Denzin and Lincoln 2011; Punch 2014).

As already highlighted in chapter one, this research adopted an inductive approach where I identified recurring instances (Silverman 2013, p.32) participants’ narratives and extended my search in the identification of themes to several cases seeking evidence which provided a balance in reporting the meanings the actors attached to state-union relations (seeking both confirming and contrary evidence). In doing so, I was less concerned with the need to generalise the findings but to understand both the context within which state-union relations are formed and how this will help understand contemporary employment relations in Zimbabwe.

3.5. Research approach

It needs to be stressed that the main reason for conducting this study is to capture the key moments, processes and milestones of the state-union relationship. Capturing key moments may not be possible through observations but through interviews where rapport has been established. But given that memory of participants plays a part in interviews, the use of documents might pave way to identify these moments, milestones and processes and cross-check with participants. For this reason, I follow the advice of Gill and Johnson (2002) who suggest that researchers need to first, justify an appropriate research strategy prior to the choosing of appropriate methods for carrying out the fieldwork within the framework of the chosen research strategy. To begin with, I briefly examine the potential
or relative suitability of a range of research strategies for capturing the state-union relationship. I will also identify the epistemological standpoint of each strategy.

From the above summary, it appears clear that the case study becomes the more appropriate research strategy for conducting an in-depth analysis of the ZCTU-State relations. Robson (2002, p.178) defines case study as a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence. Another reason why a case study was employed is its considerable ability to help generate answers to the ‘why?’ the ‘what?’ and ‘how?’ questions (Saunders et al., 2007, p.139). The use of interviews and documentary analyses to clarify observations might also enhance internal validity. There is probably not much need for population validity given that first, the aim is to gain a better understanding of the problem under study, by explaining the processes or events which shape union-state relations.

Not only was there a consideration of the researcher’s epistemological position as an influence to research design, but also an attempt to address the question ‘How are industrial relations problems researched’? Whitfield and Strauss (2008) write about the changing nature of industrial relations and label it as a field in a state of flux. They provide evidence of the changing nature of the field and how its conceptual framework is increasingly coming under intense scrutiny. In addition, that its boundaries with related fields are becoming ever more blurred and that new research techniques are shaping the field. They then argue that academic discourse has become more quantitative because the nature of research funding available is dictating the type of research being conducted in industrial relations. Secondly, the advent of the computer has made possible the quick and cheap analysis of massive data-sets thus giving an added impetus towards quantitative research. There is thus a shift in industrial relations academia to publish only those research projects which makes use of some quantitative aspects (Frege 2005). This is triggering a change in the problems that industrial relations now focus on. One of the
distinctive characteristics of IR has been its focus on socially defined problems. Compared with related fields and disciplines, industrial relations research has traditionally been heavily policy focused on the major policy issues of the time. As a consequence, relative to more theoretically-inclined fields, it has tended to be more multidisciplinary, more focused on a number of different organizational levels, more based on representative samples, more often involve respondents who are role holders rather than private individuals, and, finally, is more likely to examine complex causal processes (Whitefield and Strauss 2008). This thesis brings back the focus to qualitative research. I argue that, to be able to use a data-set, two things must exist. The first is that such a data-set must be created and made available; the second is that the data-set must be valid and reliable. Unfortunately none of these is currently in place and related topics are very under researched in Zimbabwe. Concentrating on the quantitative aspects of research is bound to marginalise contemporary and important industrial relations issues in Zimbabwe.

Researching into union-state relations in violent and politically-charged contexts requires special data elicitation techniques such as third-person questioning designed to decrease the reluctance of participants to respond to various forms of inquiry. A range of methods ought to be deployed in identifying, categorizing, and verifying the existence of constructs and quantitative accounts tend to miss the scope, location and magnitude of issues which define the relationship. However, despite the absence of data-sets on this and related topics, intensive use of a range of documents took place. This was in order to compensate for gaps in knowledge on historical accounts which participants might have forgotten overtime. An attempt to construct quantitative data from the existing literature is also achieved and reflected in the empirical chapters.

This study is an attempt at understanding the relationship between the ZCTU and the ZANU PF government in Zimbabwe. It is therefore asking for a life-story of the participants, their lived experience. As such, a qualitative aspect is going to drive the mixed method design. The quantitative component is only a small part of the study.
Qualitative research deals with “human-lived experience”, (Schwandt 2001, p.84). It is the life-world as it is lived, felt, undergone, made sense of, and accomplished by human beings that is the object of this study. A primary purpose of qualitative research is to describe and clarify experience as it is lived and constituted in awareness. Human experience is a difficult area to study. It is multi-layered and complex; it is an on-going flow that cannot be halted for the benefit of researchers. Unlike the objects of nature, the layers of experience are not rigidly ordered, nor are its moving contents related according to mathematical patterns. Methods designed to study physical objects are not a good fit for the study of experience. Qualitative methods are specifically constructed to take account of the particular characteristics of human experience and to facilitate the investigation of experience. Experience has a vertical depth, and methods of data gathering, such as short-answer questionnaires with Likert scales that only gather surface information, are inadequate to capture the richness and fullness of an experience. People have access to much of their own experiences, but their experiences are not directly available to public view. Thus, the data gathered for study of experience need to consist of first-person or participants’ own experiences.

3.6. Selection of Participants

Purposive sampling was the main sampling strategy used in this study. The thrust was to identify those individuals whose experience and positions in either government, trade unions, Business or the International Labour Organization placed them in a position where they could comment on the nature of the relationship between trade unions and the state. The participant group that was excluded was the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU). There was personal security reasons considered after making the initial contact. It was from this sample that snow-ball sampling became the procedure for identifying those participants who fitted the required criteria. In selecting participants, the issue of sample
size was a key consideration, in particular, addressing the question regarding “how many qualitative interviews is enough for a PhD research” (Baker and Edward 2012; Bryman 2012; Mason 2010; Guest et al 2006; Morse 2000). The fact that there is no agreed position as what is the required number; the aim was to continue the snowball until saturation point was achieved. So for both the research participants and the documents used, purposive sampling was used. In the case of documents, it meant choosing only those which the researcher felt would substantially give aspects from which union-state relations could be understood or learnt (Patton 2002).

Merriam (2002) advises that since the researcher in a qualitatively dominant enquiry is not interested in ‘how much’ or ‘how often,’ “Random sampling makes little sense. Instead, since qualitative element seeks to understand the meaning of a phenomenon from the perspectives of the participants, it is important to select a sample from which most can be learned. This is called a “purposive or purposeful sample” (Merriam 2002, p.12). It was important to compare and contrast the views of different participant groups, (Business, Unionist, ILO and Government officials). In this sense, multiple participants serve as a kind of triangulation on the experience, locating its core meaning by approaching it through different accounts. Triangulation does not serve to verify a particular account but to allow the researcher to move beyond a single view of the experience.

This thesis made greater use of snowball sample, a method which according to MacNeally (1999, p.157) is “a population of interest which cannot be identified other than by someone who knows that a certain person has the necessary experience or characteristics to be included”. Two strategies helped to build on the snowball. The first is that each participant interviewed was asked to suggest a person who could be interviewed as part of the study. This strategy helped to ensure access to participants who are not easily accessible due to bureaucratic hurdles and the political environment that prevail.
Snowballed respondents attended Regional ILO meetings in Harare. The second strategy was to informally get in touch with the Zimbabwe Embassy in the United Kingdom and in Geneva in order to identify potential participants before going to commence fieldwork in Zimbabwe. This strategy proved crucial as the embassy was well aware of the prevailing socio-economic and political context and the circumstances under which potential key participants could be found. This is because in the last fifteen years, the Zimbabwe embassies have witnessed demonstrations by people in the diaspora regarding violation of trade and human rights in Zimbabwe. They were keen to facilitate access to some key documents.

The next section is a detailed account of the data collection phase of the research.

3.7. Data collection strategy

The study relied on primary data collected from representatives of the ILO based in Harare and other Sub Sahara African countries, the Employer Organisation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ), the unionists from unions affiliated to the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and Officials from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. Primary data was supplemented with secondary data obtained from each of the participant’s organisations during my field work in Zimbabwe from January 2012-March 2012 (in line with the guidance provided by the Ethics Committee). Extensive reference was also made to unpublished and published materials including government policy statements on the economy, on labour-market issues which had relevance for the analysis and understanding of state-union relations.

A detailed breakdown of research participants is presented below.
Table 3.1.: The breakdown of research participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Former senior officials and current leadership</td>
<td>5 Females</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Male</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO- Officials</td>
<td>Former Regional officials</td>
<td>6 all Male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current country-office senior personnel</td>
<td>4 all Male</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Officials</td>
<td>Former Ministers of Labour, and former Senior personnel in the Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>2 Females 4 Males</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current Senior Officials in the Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>2 Females 7 Males</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer/Business</td>
<td>Previous senior and current business Executives</td>
<td>4 all Male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives (EMCOZ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current Business Executives</td>
<td>2 All Male</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author's construct, 2014

This study shows an underrepresentation of females (17.6% compared to 82.4% male participants. However, this represents the general underrepresentation of females within the unions, Ministry of Labour, employer organisation as well as ILO regional structure.

3.8. Pilot Study

The significance of conducting a pilot study has been stressed by almost every textbook on research methodology (see Punch 2014; Piantanida and Garman 2009; Rapley 2011; Perry 2001; Beebe 2007; Padgett 2008 and van Teijlingen and Hundley 2001), to name a few. While a good pilot study does not necessarily guarantee success at conducting the main interviews, the researcher can benefit from conducting pilot studies regardless of their experience. Apart from helping one gauge the time it takes to go through key questions, thus time management awareness and skills, there is an added advantage of affirming one’s readiness, capability and commitment to conduct the study (Beebe 2007; Perry 2001). According to Padgett (2008) such pilot studies greatly enhance the credibility of qualitative studies. This is because one has the opportunity to develop context-specific
issues that might affect the research process as well as require a modification in approach or line of questioning. Due to the short-window period allowed by the ethics committee for conducting primary research, only four (4) participants were selected for pilot interview, which means only one from each targeted organisation. These pilot interviews were all conducted in Harare, Zimbabwe.

3.8.1. Interviews and informal conversations

Fifty-one (51) participants were interviewed and a total of sixty (60) interviews were conducted. Nine (9) were follow-up interviews. The breakdown of the participants is provided in table 3.1. These were in-depth semi-structured interviews lasting about 45 minutes. However, interviews with government officials generally took much longer than an hour on average. As a condition for securing ethical clearance, four interview schedules were prepared (see appendices). However, interviews took the conversation form and did not follow the order of questions in the interview schedules. The aim was not to find predictable commonalities among individuals (Piantanida and Garman 2009, p.95) but to explore each participant’s experience of the union-state relationship. Although interviews are prone to bias, error and misdirection (Holstein and Gubrium 1995, p.113), the questions asked prompted participants to provide useful data. One of the issues that confront qualitative interviewing is how to judge quality. This is a recurrent criticism whenever interviews are conducted and this study may not be immune to this attack. There seems to be an absence of a consistent criterion or terminology used in relation to the assessment of ‘quality’ of qualitative interview research (Roulston 2010). She points to the fact that Rubin and Rubin (2005) for example use the terms ‘credibility’ and ‘thoroughness’, while Kvale (1996) employs the concept ‘validity’. On the other hand, Mahler (1986) cites the four ‘Rs’ from Katz (1983) (representativeness, reactivity, reliability, replicability). As in qualitative inquiry more broadly, a variety of terms have been used to discuss the quality of qualitative interviewing, with debates over how researchers establish the ‘validity’ of their work – that is, the truth, trustworthiness, or accuracy of their
claims – central (Roulston 2010, p. 203). I acknowledge that this criticism might hold for this study.

Questions have been raised regarding the transparency of the interview method as a tool for eliciting data that will inform understandings of the meanings that participants make of their lived experiences (see for example, Atkinson and Silverman 1997; Potter and Hepburn 2005). As Walford (2007) points out, embedded in one form of qualitative inquiry – ethnography – is a fundamental assumption that interviews alone are an insufficient form of data to study social life. He mentions four key problems relevant to the ways in which research participants might respond to interviewers’ questions. These include ‘misinformation, evasion, lies and fronts’ (Douglas 1976, cited by Walford 2007, p.147); arguing that even setting aside the “epistemological question of whether or not there is any ultimate ‘reality’ to be communicated, the interviewee may have incomplete knowledge and faulty memory. They will always have subjective perceptions that will be related to their own past experiences and current conditions. At best, interviewees will only give what they are prepared to reveal about their subjective perceptions of events and opinions. “These perceptions and opinions will change over time, and according to circumstance. They may be at some considerable distance from reality as others might see it” (Walford 2007, p. 147). This thesis to some extent suffers from this limitation. In addition, there are a number of “contingent and necessary problems’ to do with the design and conduct of interview studies and the analysis and reporting of findings” (Potter and Hepburn 2005, p. 281).

In addition to epistemological questions about the merits of interview data, and the various ways that interviewees might possibly thwart researchers’ purposes in generating ‘truthful’ or ‘credible’ data. While making initial contacts with government informants there has been an unusual welcome and expression of full support in particular, because one “of our own children is conducting research about Zimbabwe rather than the foreigners who had a special agenda to demonise the legitimately elected government” (Senior government
official). This statement is accorded great significance in this study considering that a number of government representatives have expressed the same position. A number of inferences can be made from such a statement. The first is that it may represent an opportunity for government voice to be heard in places where they believe it is marginalised, and might just about guarantee full cooperation from them. The second is that this could have been perceived as an opportunity to influence the direction of the study or its findings. The third inference is that, I might have access to those aspects of the union-government relations which may not easily be accessible to someone considered an outsider. For these reasons, the validity and reliability of the data needs to be cross-checked and re-confirmed perhaps with multiple informants.

Prior to the interview, and throughout the research process, interviewers observe culturally specific ethical protocols required by indigenous communities to gain entry to the community, as well as culturally specific protocols of respect, and practices of reciprocity with those involved in research (Smith 1999). These culturally specific protocols also exist for formal organizations such as government departments. On two occasions, participants who had previously worked for both the ZCTU and Government had to informally seek permission from their former employers to participate in my interview despite the fact that they were no longer working for either, in line with cultural norms of being Zimbabwean ("pachivanhu chedu" as they called it). Although information sheets and consent forms were presented prior to the interview, none of the participants including those who agreed to be tape-recorded accepted to sign the consent forms. Five (5) key informants walked off at being handed the information sheet and consent forms questioning the motive behind the use of such forms, “… if I was not a Western-sponsored journalist aimed at incriminating someone” and thus compounding the ethical dilemmas. So while Bryman (2008, p. 455) recommends, among many other issues that, “… ensure that interviewers appreciate what the research is about, its purposes and that their responses will be treated confidentially…” trying to do so through information sheet clearly backfired and
needed a rethink of what would work under the circumstances. The pilot interview and the many research methodology texts consulted did not prepare me for such an experience.

In the interview the interviewer together with the interviewee, generates the kind of talk that is deemed appropriate and valued in a particular indigenous community given the requirements of gender, status, age and other relevant social locations of the interviewer (IR) Interviewee (IE). Indigenous knowledge, practices and spirituality are taken into account by the IR in the design and conduct of the interview. Sometimes this talk uses “madimikira”- (local phrases) which becomes clear to the researcher and which need no further explanation but requires care when transcribing the interviews. Secondly, the setting of interviews is not as formal as one would normally have to find in European/English contexts, i.e. private room, quiet place but a rather informal manner which is a normal conversation. The investigative journalistic methods which have seen secret filming especially in times of elections by the media agencies, some of them banned from reporting in Zimbabwe, has shaped people’s perceptions about researchers. This affects research settings and processes in a way different to what is the norm in European contexts. Investigative journalistic methods have also created a negative attitude towards audio recording when interviewing. The use of consent forms is equally suspicious.

3.8.2. Informal conversations

Informal conversations constitute a key element of data triangulation. Making the best of these informal encounters was rooted in my intuitive responsiveness to opportune moments which presented themselves in the field. The conversations took place in various contexts, at the ILO regional meetings at participants ‘offices where possible, and in places where participants chose. To capture insights from these moments, a pocket notebook was kept at all times in order to immediately write down notes after the conversations, thus avoiding memory lapse.
Some informal discussions went on for hours and proved as valuable as the formal interviews. Questions which were ‘ducked’ by participants during the interview were followed up through informal conversations thus re-engaging the subject in a different context (Mabweazara 2010). As Schatzberg (2008) asserts, we need ‘to be aware that people will only reveal a certain degree of the truth ... to the researcher, and that the extent to which they are willing to share what is in their hearts and minds is likely to be governed by a host of contextual factors’. Two of these factors are Informant cultivation’ and my perceived ‘insider-status’. It needs to be pointed out that the strength of the ‘informal conversations’ were heavily predicated on my prior connections with the research context. Not only was I conducting research about my ‘native’ country, but I was also researching about institutions whose leadership I had some contact with through my professional life as a lecturer at two key tertiary institutions: the Harare Polytechnic College and at the Zimbabwe Open University (ZOU) (the latter on a part-time basis). These roles entailed regular interactions and contact with Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions on various platforms and levels, all linked to industrial relations training and the Zimbabwe Industrial Relations Association (ZIRA).

As a Lecturer and member of ZIRA, I paid regular visits to the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare where I established connections with senior civil servants. I also participated in the activities of the ZCTU and was thus known to a few in the leadership. For this reason, I am not a stranger to the research context. So to some extent, participants consider me to have an ‘insider-status’ which also helped to gain some rapport with the informants but which potentially helped avoiding mistakes in the highly polarized and sensitive political research context. Gaining rapport with informants was a crucial aspect of fieldwork (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Metcalf 1998).

My connection to the research context is currently reflected, to a large extent, in the unfettered conditions of access to the participants, for example, the ZCTU has placed my
email address on its emailing list to receive updates of their major plans and the Zimbabwe Embassy in Geneva and London were useful in facilitating access to senior government officials.

Although this ‘insider-status’ might bring to the fore questions on the impact of my biography on the research process, it earned my study a unique value, especially given the political problems that obtained in the country during my fieldwork, which in my conjecture, might have made it difficult for an ‘outsider’ to successfully negotiate access and entry to participants. Even though I had to use my early days in Zimbabwe to establish contacts and explain my research in person, I have negotiated access to the ILO, the ZCTU and Government representatives in labour matters from my base in the UK with little challenges. As Bryman and Burgess (1999) rightly note, gaining access to research settings is always fraught with difficulty – it can be a very stressful process and more so, when the topic under study is one that rises sensitive issues and conducted in a complex political context.

3.9. Use of documents

A document is an artefact which has as its central feature an inscribed text (Scott 1990). Simply put, a document is a written text. Documents are produced by individuals and groups in the course of their everyday practices and are geared exclusively for their own immediate practical needs (Scott 1990). They have been written with a purpose and are based on particular assumptions and presented in a certain way or style and to this extent, the researcher must be fully aware of the origins, purpose and the original audience of the documents (Grix 2001). It must be noted that documents are not deliberately produced for the purpose of research, but naturally occurring objects with a concrete or semi-permanent existence which tell us indirectly about the social world of the people who created them (Payne and Payne 2004). A document, unlike a speech, can have an independent existence beyond the writer and beyond the context of its production.
(Jury and Jary 1991). As such, they can be useful in providing those insights into the state-union-relation which were not originally intended by the document.

Piantanida and Garman (2009) stress the importance of reflecting on the process of acquiring documents. In order to access documents, two trips to the ILO Headquarters in Geneva were made to request consult documents relating to Zimbabwe. The librarian at the Pale-Expo in Geneva assisted in getting documents which would not be readily available to researchers in Zimbabwe or elsewhere. The ILO Harare office also provided official documents, particularly on programmes and activities that both the ZCTU and the state are involved in. The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights also provided some official documents, on human rights and trade union arrests.

The use of documentary methods refers to the analysis of documents that contain information about the phenomenon one wishes to study (Bailey 1994). Payne and Payne (2004) describe the documentary method as the techniques used to categorise, investigate, interpret and identify the limitations of physical sources, most commonly, written documents whether in the private or public domain. This thesis examined a number of documents, including correspondence between the ZCTU and the government, minutes of meetings, ILO documents relating to disputes between the ZCTU and the government, Commission of enquiry report, various newspaper articles, human and trade union rights violation reports by non-governmental organizations, court judgements, tripartite negotiating documents and letters of protest to the Zimbabwe government from various organizations and embassies around the globe.

There are two types of documents that are used in documentary study, namely primary documents and secondary documents. Primary documents refer to eye-witness accounts produced by people who experienced particular events, practices, or processes which might inform the study. In this case, reports of trade unionists reported to have experienced harassment, torture, reports of those ‘state witnesses’ who are documented
to have suffered human rights violations were used in the study. On the other hand, secondary documents are documents produced by people who were not present at the scene but who received eye-witness accounts to compile the documents, or have read eye-witness accounts (Bailey 1994, p.194). I have discussed fully the use of secondary documents in the next section. In this study the ILO documents were crucial for providing what Scott (1990) refers to as mediate access as opposed to proximate access. Mediate or indirect access becomes necessary if past behaviour must be inferred from its material traces, and documents are the visible signs of what happened at some previous time. This is in contradistinction to 'proximate or direct access', (Mogalakwe 2006), whereby the researcher and his sources are contemporaneous or co-present and the researcher is a direct witness of the occurrences or activities (Scott 1990). The ILO documents are capable of showing how cases between unions and governments were handled in previous conferences, the issues that remained outstanding and how those issues influenced state-union relations.

Therefore, greater use of both historical and contemporary sources characterised this research. However, before using the documents, I employed Scott’s two-way typology of documents based on authorship and access (Scott 1990; Jupp 2006). The concept of authorship is to do with the origin of the document while ‘access’ is to do with questions surrounding the availability of documents to people other than the authors.

In the context of this research, I had to address a number of questions. For example, how authentic was each document? To what extent does it pass the test of originality and genuineness? Is it credible and how do I know it is credible? To what extent is it representative of the totality of documents of its class and finally, what is the meaning of the document and what is it intended to say? As a matter of approach therefore, authenticity and credibility were checked against participants’ knowledge. In the case of the social dialogue process (TNF) for example, a range of documents provided by the government relating to the Kadoma Declaration, Pricing and Incomes Policy and foreign
currency stabilisation were checked against the trade unionists, employers representatives to find out if these documents had been seen by them as tripartite partners. Similarly, where reports from human rights groups were used, they were first checked by asking the authors of the reports and checking with the alleged victims of violence in this case senior leadership of the ZCTU and also compared them to witnesses' accounts in court cases. Documents from the ILO were official documents with logos, official stamps but their authenticity, credibility, meaning and representativeness were confirmed by interviewees from the ILO.

The above measures were taken in line with the advice by MacDonald and Tipton (1996, p.199) who argue that; “…in documentary research, nothing should be taken for granted … that everything needs to be checked from more than one angle”.

This was further strengthened when one of the research participants, in an informal conversation gave a strong warning about using official documents in Zimbabwe especially from government sources especially for a topic of this nature which could be considered political, thus she echoed; “You are looking for documents!! …ehh!! God help you. Never trust documents here, they mean nothing. Are they a fabrication, that I do not know, but let me give you a clue. Go to the courts and compile statistics from records. You cannot help but conclude that the ZCTU and the MDC are the most violent institutions in this country. Participants from these organizations are the ones who get arrested, are always in police detention or custody, they pay fines to buy their freedom but that could be seen as admission of guilty. ZANU PF members and youths are the victim that’s why you don’t find them in any of the torture chambers. If you are a little unlucky, that some of them murder you in cold blood and broad daylight, the post-mortem will reveal that you had committed suicide …, (anonymous, official Harare).

So I approached document analysis not with prejudice but with a critical eye and with clear consideration of what I was looking for and what I wanted to elicit from documents. My
focus was on those documents that helped explain union-state relationship but also documents which the parties could both identify with.

A possible limitation is that the documents written by trade unionists are in a representative capacity. As such, the extent to which their views reflect those of the rank-and-file is a matter that continues to constrain representative democracy: the views of the representatives are not necessarily those of the people they represent or the thirty-three (33) trade unions which make up the federation. Therefore, in trying to understand ZCTU-ZANU PF relations, there is a possible danger that relations between the state and the workers might be different from relations between the ZCTU and the government.

With regard to newspapers, the reporters’ comments and opinions on issues such as strike actions will be ignored. Concentration will only be on factual press statements or interviews of trade union leaders or government spokesmen. The third quality control mechanism is ‘representativeness’. This refers to whether the evidence is typical of its kind, or if it is not, whether the extent of ‘its’ ‘untypically’ is known.

Personal experience in the research context leads to the observation that bureaucrats are notorious for secrecy, and in this study, I made use of bureaucrats of both the state and trade unions. It was not surprising that no documents which negatively portray unions came out of unions and no documents which negatively portrayed government and/or its officials came out of government. One other challenge is that legislation such as the Official Secrets Act will always make it impossible to access some useful documents.

I believe however that the speeches by the President and his cabinet colleagues accurately reflect the position of the Zimbabwean government in relation to its dealings with the trade union federation. There is no known case of a cabinet minister who has made a pro-trade union speech which could be atypical of the government position on the issue. I can safely say that a speech by one minister, notwithstanding its particular
nuances or personal idiosyncrasies, to a large extent represents or reflects government policy. This will go a long way in understanding ZCTU-state relations.

An important point to be considered in the use of documentary sources is how to decide which inference to make from a document about matters other than the truth of its factual assertions (Platt 1980). For example, information on the number of strikes or number of trade union arrests is given in factual quantitative terms. This offers a different understanding or picture on the problem under investigation. But when this information is read together with information on structural changes in the economy, employment patterns and income distribution, labour legislation, rate of inflation the picture becomes more complex. This is because statistics only give face value meaning. Statistics are only ‘raw materials’ which must be interrogated and their real meaning reconstructed. One can only make sense of this wealth of apparently disparate bits and pieces of information, by situating it within a theoretical context. It is the theory that re-orders the data, and inferences come as a matter of interpretation of the raw material informed by theory.

3.10. Secondary data

This study also made use of secondary data in order to complement the empirical data. In the context of this study, this is data generated by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, the Human Rights organisations, High Court and Supreme Court judgements, records compiled by the Tripartite Negotiating Forum, letters and police reports regarding demonstrations and arrests as well as reports on labour-market issues from the Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ). These are documents produced for other purposes and not for this study and are available in both qualitative and quantitative forms (Cowton 1998). There are many advantages of relying on such data chief among the reasons being that they give context-specific data which allows further exploration in interviews. Secondly, this form of data is readily available;
therefore it takes little time to collect but is vital for triangulation with other methods thereby giving credibility in research findings (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2007). A range of official documents were collected and analysed in particular, Protocols on the Restoration of Production Viability, Protocol on the mobilisation, Pricing and Management of Foreign Currency, Incomes and Pricing Stabilisation Protocol, Founding Principles of the Tripartite Negotiating forum and the Kadoma Declaration-Towards a Shared National Economic and Social Vision. These are central to an understanding of state-union relations as well as the functioning/efficiency and effectiveness of tripartite consultations systems in Zimbabwe.

In conclusion, although documents (whether primary or secondary) may have their own weaknesses, in particular that the researcher has lack of control over the data (Delacroix 1982; Tolbert and Zucker 1983) and that the accuracy of documents is sometimes questionable and lacks contextual situation of the time the documents were written (Gottschalk et al., 1945, p.5) they still are useful. While I acknowledge these weaknesses, I also argue that there is no method of data collection which is perfect and the use of documents is intended to offer 'avenues' for cross-checking information obtained through interviews.

3.11. Data analysis and interpretation

The research objectives can only be fully achieved if data is properly analysed and interpreted (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Silverman 2011). This section presents how data was analysed and interpreted. According to Denzin (1994, p.502) data analysis and interpretation is "An art; (that) is not formulaic or mechanical (but) can be learned, like any form of storytelling only through doing … fieldworkers can neither make sense of nor understand what has been learned until they sit down and write the interpretive text, telling the story first to themselves, and then to their significant others, and then to the public".
In order to conduct a detailed and scientific analysis and to tell the story as argued by the above quotation, the principles of critical interpretive research guided the analysis. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990) the aim of critical interpretive research is to formulate interpretations of data grounded in reality and as a result, it provides a means for understanding the world.

Silverman (2011) stresses the importance of early analysis. In this thesis, transcription and coding of interviews took place as data collection was in progress. This gave me the opportunity to try out different theoretical approaches of analysing my data and see what worked well for me in view of the data that was at my disposal. This helped in carrying out intensive analysis of what was limited data in the early stages, but it also made me realise that people’s memory in bringing out the historical accounts of the relationship was very inconsistent due to memory. I therefore made intensive use of documents to fill-out this gap but to also follow-up by way of interviews anything that pointed to the relationship.

According to Rapley (2011, p.276) such “close inspection of the data is used to discover, explore and generate increasingly refined conceptual description of the phenomena …” in this thesis, close and detailed reading of the data involved identifying the essential data that illuminated the relationship. It also involved what was exceptional, outstanding and striking about participants’ narratives. So an attempt was made at times to fully capture the participants’ full narrative, thus taking guidance from Silverman who argues that, “one reason why brief data extracts are usually unreliable is that they tend to pull out material from the sequences of actions in which they are embedded”, (Rapley 2011, p.63). So for that reason, I do not only offer participants’ accounts of the union-state relationship but also preface it with the questions that were posed.

All interview data was read several times and data was systematically labelled, that is, similar items were given the same label (Huberman 2013; Punch 2014). Following on from Silverman (2011) all the data that related to the same label was collected together. A key
aspect of this process was that data and ideas were frequently checked against the label to ensure coherence was maintained. Initial labels were then combined by examining links between them, analysing repetitions and exceptions to ensure that both the popular views and those in the minority were given the same treatment.

Following Miles’ and Huberman’s (1994) guidance, two types of codes were generated for the study. The first is what they term the ‘descriptive codes’. This enabled me to go beyond ‘feeling the data’ to describing how each participant group was responding to the questions asked. At the first stage of analysis, there was no intention for “inferential or pattern codes”, that is, I was not concerned about whether there were differences in or particular patterns in the different groups’ responses to the core interview questions. The basic idea in the first instance was to summarise the segments of data.

This was then followed by the process of generating pattern and analytic codes (Miles and Huberman 1994). This process involved making connections to the data and trying to conceptualise it. In other words, it involved analysing the pattern in responses first within each cluster of participants for example assessing how trade unionists responded to key questions. This was followed by assessing how employer representatives, ILO officials’ responses and government officials’ responses on the same or similar question was. Findings from comparisons on how each cluster responded were noted and connections noted. Both the general trends and those responses in the minority were noted. The importance of making comparisons in qualitative analysis is well stressed (Punch 2014; Glaser 1978; Tesch 1990 and Strauss 1967). Without comparing, it is impossible to arrive at more abstract concepts which in this study are the more important in understanding union-state relations. But this then led to a second strategy in analysing data, that is, analysis of narratives and stories they offered. The focus was to examine the characteristics of the story the interviewee offered. According to Punch (2014, p.187) “narratives and stories are also valuable in studying lives and lived experience … narratives can give a uniquely rich and subtle understanding of life situations, and the
story is often a feasible way of collecting data just because it is such a common device in
everyday interaction”. I was aware that there is no single way of analysing participants’
stories (Elliott 2005; Lieblich 1998; Labov and Waletzky 1997). However, Mishler’s analytic
framework which focuses on three aspects, “meaning, structure and interactional context”
was preferred.

The following are the key themes that emerged from the data for which discussion of
findings is based on. These themes are however complemented by historical data
compiled and categorised to address three key questions. The first is that, when union-
state relations were positive, on which issues were they agreeing on? Second, when the
relationship was negative, on which issues were there disagreements? Third, what other
issues existed which had the same effect characterised the relationship?
Figure 3.2: Coding Analytical Framework of Empirical Chapters

|-----------|-----------|-----------|

- Colonial relationship continuities
- Marriage of Convenience (1980-1985)
- External political and economic challenges
- Socio-economic and Political challenges at independence
- Role of civil society and use of violence
- Politics of the stomach
- Role and objectives of unions

(Approx. time)

- Personality vs. institutional clashes
- Union-Independence vs. Political alliances
- Contested role of the West
- Union-funding: funding regime change
- Oppressive labour Legislation
- Politicisation of workplaces
- Unfit-for purpose TNF

(Approx. time)

- Attacks on Freedom of Association and Right to Organise
- Increase in brutal attacks on unions since 2000
- Treatment of ZCTU activists and Officials when arrested
- Entry restrictions and deportation of unions

Information Sources:
Interviews (with Trade Union, Government, ILO and Employer Representatives).
Official documents and correspondence complement empirical data.

Authors’ construct 2014

- Towards accommodation
- Promotion of ZCTU officials
- Increased militarisation of state-owned enterprises
- ZCTU appointed Election Observer
- Pro-labour Court judgements
- Attempts at resuscitating TNF
3.12. Ethical dilemmas

The significance of complying with ethical standards while conducting qualitative research has been stressed by leading researchers (Miles and Huberman 1994; Denzin and Lincoln 2011; Punch 2014). It is even more important when one research about institutions because of the nature of the data one gets access to. It is most likely to be sensitive, intimate and tend to be about the life of specific individuals in those organisations. According to Punch (2014) there are two main types of ethical issues. The most common is the ethical framework set by universities such as University of Keele and professional bodies including the European Social Science Research Council (ESRC). The second framework is essentially a set of best practice advocated by leading research scholars, practitioners and authors. Ethical clearance was granted by the University of Keele in line with the requirements for conducting ethically-sensitive research. Only interviews and document analysis were recommended for specific groups/levels of participants, excluding other methods of data collection to protect and exclude participants who could be vulnerable given the political developments taking place in Zimbabwe at the time of field-work.

However, a number of ethical dilemmas were faced. Participants declined to complete participant forms which would have given the researcher a clear understanding of whether they were consenting to have specific quotations attributed to them. None of them cared to read the information sheets aimed at explaining the purpose of the research and their expected role. As already hinted five informants declined to participate and walked away at the mention of consent forms. The perception was that I was trying to incriminate them hence the strategy to arm myself with future evidence against them.

Considering that the application process for ethical clearance took ten (10) months including a request for personal appearance before the Ethical Committee, it was heart-breaking to be in this position.
A further ethical dilemma was to do with naming participants in my analysis and presentation of findings. Two specific dilemmas arose. The first is that a significant number of participants gave permission to audio-record interviews and they challenged my strategy of guaranteeing confidentiality, “… we have nothing to hide, we want the whole world to know what we are going through. What is the purpose of your research if you don’t mention our names”? (Senior trade union official). The second is that listening to some of their descriptions of their experience of the union-state relationship; I had serious concerns as to whether or not the participants would regret later if their names were attributed to some of the highly sensitive things they were saying.

In one interview at the ILO in Harare, one participant had requested to be anonymous but gave permission for audio-recording in which he started by introducing his name and title. At the end of the interview, he kindly referred me to a senior colleague so I could interview him as well. At the end of that interview, he came over and handed some ILO documents to help with my reading. As he accompanied me out of the building, he then changed his mind and said “the interview we had just conducted was the most intellectually challenging I had been involved in since working for the ILO and I do not mind my name and verbatim accounts being used in the final report”. A day earlier, another participant at the ILO had given me a number of documents but in the process of doing so, cut off with a scissors,- any Official ILO stamp on the documents arguing that this could in future get him into trouble if the material fell into the wrong hands. Although the ethical clearance required me to guarantee that in some cases it would be impossible to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality, when one considers the unpredictable and volatile political context within which fieldwork was conducted, I came to the conclusion of sticking to the sociological tradition of not naming participants. However, naming the organizations involved would pose no harm to participants.

I am aware that the decision not to mention names presents potential limitations on the thesis, thus, “without the seeming protection of pseudonyms, researchers may be more
likely to censor their evidence at the expense of making convincing nuanced arguments”,
(Guenther 2009, p.413). Where direct quotations are used in this thesis, participants will be identified as Senior ZCTU official; Senior Government Official, Senior ILO Official, Applications Committee Member, etc. to protect the identity of the participants. Overall, the criterion advocated by Miles and Huberman (1994) (see table below) was instrumental in guiding and evaluating the ethical status of my research.
Table 3.2: Ethical factors and accompanying questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before fieldwork</th>
<th>Ethical questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worth of the research</td>
<td>Is the study worth doing? Will it contribute in some significant way (policy, publication opportunities, and my career?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence boundaries</td>
<td>Do I have the expertise to carry out a study of good quality and am I prepared to study, to be supervised, trained or consulted, to get that expertise? And is such help available?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed consent</td>
<td>Do people I want to study have full information about what the study is about, and what it involves? Is their consent to participate freely given? Is there a hierarchy of consent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits, costs reciprocity</td>
<td>What will each party in the study gain from taking part in the study? Do they have to invest time, energy or money?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>During fieldwork</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm and risk</td>
<td>What might this study do to hurt the people involved? How likely that such harm will occur?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty and trust</td>
<td>What is the relationship with people that I want to study? Am I telling the truth and do we trust each other?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privacy, confidentiality and anonymity</td>
<td>In what ways will the study intrude, or come closer to people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention and advocacy</td>
<td>What do I do when I see a harmful, illegal or wrongful behaviour by others during a study? Should I speak for anyone's interests besides my own and whose interest do I advocate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>After fieldwork</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research integrity and quality</td>
<td>Is my study being conducted carefully, thoughtfully and correctly in terms of some reasonable set of standards and under supervision?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership of data and conclusions</td>
<td>Who owns my field notes and analyses; me, my university or my sponsors? And once my thesis is written and completed, who controls its diffusion?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use and misuse of results</td>
<td>Do I have the obligation to help my findings to be used appropriately? What if they are used harmfully or wrongly?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Miles and Huberman (1994)
3.13. Conclusion

This chapter achieved two broad purposes. The first was to outline the research framework which guided the study. In doing so, it outlined the three research objectives alongside the corresponding five research questions. It will be clear in the empirical chapters that the first research objective is addressed through interviews, documents and a review of literature. The second is achieved through intensive analysis of the theoretical framework identified and as well as asking research participants questions framed around theoretical concepts such as union-party alliances, political participation. Union autonomy and independence, among others as discussed. The third objective seeks to identify and explore the contemporary issues shaping union-state relations in Zimbabwe. It needs to be reiterated that there are four participant clusters for this study, namely-trade union officials, government officials from the labour ministry, employer organisation officials and the ILO officials. The questions posed to these participants are all aimed at addressing the three objectives as well as the five research questions outlined in this chapter.

The second broad aim of the chapter was to provide a detailed account of the study's methodology. The philosophical underpinning of the study as well as the rationale for deploying a qualitative approach was also discussed. There are four participant groups that participated in the study. These are the ILO officials, the Government officials from the Labour Ministry, the Employer Organisation Officials and the Trade Union officials. All these, by virtue of their job and interaction, were considered central in the understanding of the changing relationship between trade unions and the state in Zimbabwe. Methodological considerations were discussed and so were the ethical dilemmas faced during fieldwork. The analysis of data and its presentation was influenced by ethical concerns as well as my epistemological convictions.
Overall data analysis comprised of four broad steps. That is, making comparisons within a single interview followed by comparing interviews within the same groups (e.g. trade unionists). Third involved comparing interviews from different groups (e.g. trade unionists and government; ILO officials and Employer representatives etc.) and finally making comparisons of data from interviews and documents. Data analysis was about categorization, abstraction and comparison aimed at establishing meaning, the structure of the arguments participants provided as well as the context within which they located their union-state relationship experience. It is important to stress that it was the participants ‘experience of the relationship that was being investigated and as such, the interpretative/constructivist tradition of analysis data was preferred. This is because no pre-determined assumptions were held as is the case in positivist’s tradition. The participants experience was expected to be varied and context-specific which was all essential for an analysis of state-union relations. This was a case study of state-union relations in Zimbabwe, conducted in Zimbabwe, using participants who are aware of and also experience the state-union relations because of the nature of their jobs.

The chapter also presented and emphasised the role of secondary sources of data, and other documents in corroborating and triangulating data obtained from interviews. The role of pilot study, ethical clearance and the process of conducting interviews were stressed.

The next chapter serves two purposes. The first is that it is an analysis of the history of the formation of trade unions in Zimbabwe. Given its significant reliance on secondary research it also forms part of the findings chapters and provides a framework within which the two empirical chapters can easily be understood. The next two chapters present, discuss and analyse research findings following the coding framework presented in figure 3.2.
CHAPTER FOUR

The formation of trade unions in Zimbabwe

““The African worker, in his present state of evolution, has not arrived at the stage where he has sufficiently developed to appreciate all the implications and responsibilities of unionism and only chaos can result from giving impetus to these ambitions.”

(A.J. Huxtable 1945; cited in Sambureni 1996, p.166)
4.0. Introduction

The above quotation sets out the dominant political thinking and underlying racial elements that militated against the development of trade unions in colonial Zimbabwe and in apartheid South Africa (Maree 1986). The effects of such a perception influenced the development of trade unions and the alliances that evolved later as shall be demonstrated in this chapter.

This chapter examines literature regarding the development of trade unions in Zimbabwe from a historical context. Although the review will make some reference to academic literature there is a reliance on official and trade union documents in this construction. The history of labour relations and development of trade unions in Zimbabwe is examined in three phases. The first is the precolonial period, the colonial and the immediate post independent up to 2000. The state-union relationship in contemporary Zimbabwe will be constructed from the empirical chapters based on participant accounts and documentary material.

4.1. The pre-colonial state-union relationships in Zimbabwe

The political system of the people of Zimbabwe before colonial rule (before 1893) was a feudal system, i.e. the government was in the hands of chiefs who distributed land to the people and led them in all important traditional ceremonies. The chiefs ensured that people kept to the tribal customs and laws and settled disputes among the people. Such a system was generally considered as embedding a “philosophy of great depth, value, beauty, and, above all, dignity… which many African people all but lost during the colonial period” (Achebe 1973, p.8). The beginning of colonial rule marked the first milestone in the creation of formal employment relationships as we now see in contemporary Zimbabwe. Therefore, Zimbabwe, as the sovereign country that it is today, did not exist then. Instead, the geo-political entity currently referred to as Zimbabwe comprised of
different independent Kingdoms. The economic relations before colonisation emphasised barter trade as a means of exchange between people. Socially, each community lived together as one big family on a clan basis linked from household to household by diversity of family relationships between them (Samkange 1968). The imposition of colonialism marked the end of this period and replaced it with a capitalist system characterised by labour policies and practices which gave rise to the birth of the working class and eventually the formation of trade unions. So prior to colonialism there was no state in the way it is conceived of today. There were no trade unions; there was no capitalist system in its contemporary conception.

4.2. Development of capitalist system and formation of unions in colonial Zimbabwe

Allen (1972) captures three characteristics of colonialism that had implications for the development of industrial relations in Africa. These are exploitation, imperialism and racism. Kaufman (2004, p.518) refers to the “third evil” and qualifies it by using the phrase “deep and persistent racism and a violation of human rights particularly in SSA where racial segregation was widely and rigorously enforced in all aspects of life ...” The same characteristics are important in developing an understanding of the evolution of union-state relations during colonialism. The black people of Zimbabwe (natives) soon began to experience the brutality of colonial experience (ZCTU 1993) as they were ‘in scripted’ into capitalist mode of production in the areas of farming, mining, and construction work. The white settler economy depended heavily on black labour and the history of colonialism is characterised by measures to secure labour. This trend was the same for all Southern African countries, (ZCTU 1993). Within the region, men, women and children were captured and forced to work for the settlers in the plantations. Black labour was deployed to work as farm workers, tilling land, planting and weeding up fields, fumigating crops. They were also employed to clear land and cultivating the enormous farms expropriated
by settler farmers. Those who were young worked as untrained miners and cleared tracks for settlers and their wagons and eventually for proper road building. Some had responsibility for herding cattle and horses while others worked as porters for the settlers carrying heavy luggage from place to place and work as domestic servants and gardeners.

The bullet and the whip were the colonialist’s tools of enforcement and response to any kind of resistance by blacks against forced labour (Chitiyo 2000; Ranchord 2004). The SSA experience of colonialism is varied, but in some parts of SSA, traditional rulers were also used for conscription of black African into forced labour and for pacifying such labour where necessary (Balandier 1968; Cohen et al 1978; Cohen 1980 and Akinnusi 1991). Therefore, employment relations (between the ‘employer and employee’) were not freely entered into as they would, in a normal situation. So there was resistance, and this resistance sometimes employed the political tactics and forms of guerrilla warfare. The defeat of the first black uprisings encouraged the settler rulers to become more ruthless in oppressing the black workers. This reduced the occurrence of further uprisings and forced black workers to accept settler exploitation. In doing so, it solved the critical problem of labour shortage. By arresting and sentencing to death the leaders of the uprisings (ZCTU 1991), the settlers managed to minimise future potential uprisings. Violence and forced recruitment by white settlers were not the only strategies used to force the Zimbabweans to work for them in mines and on road construction. Taxes were also introduced by the British South African Company. This strategy worked because by imposing taxes, which had to be paid in money, black people had to start working for a wage. And so, in 1894 a Hut and Poll tax was levied on all adult male blacks, to be paid in money only. Later taxes were also imposed on cattle and dogs (Chiripanhura and Kanyenze 2001). However, these measures were not enough to force the black peasant to work in the mines in sufficient numbers, similar to what was happening in Kenya (Cooper 1986, 2000). Therefore, a new measure was adopted in the form of land expropriation as the settlers
expanded the scope of economic activity, from mining to agriculture. The result was that the fertile agricultural land was expropriated and the peasants would thereby be forced to rely on the sale of their labour power (Hyman 1975; Braverman 1985) by finding work on farms and mines as a means of survival in the emerging capitalist economy. This strategy made blacks destitute and many offered themselves for employment as wage slaves (ZCTU 1993).

The other strategy was to recruit migrant labour. The extremely poor wages and working conditions discouraged many Zimbabweans to work in mines and on the farms. Therefore, the mining companies recruited labour from Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Jobs in these countries were very scarce and there too, the peasants were forced to earn a money wage to pay taxes (ZCTU 1993). This practice of forced migration was widely known as “Chibaro” which meant the rounding up of people to force them to work (Van Onselen 1980). Instead of organising into trade unions to fight working conditions, the peasants embarked on desertion, running away to hide in the bush and some tried to travel to South Africa where at least higher wages were offered. In order to stop these practices, a number of laws were introduced to control labour mobility (ZCTU 1991). So, state-labour relations were inherently hostile. In mines and on large plantations, black workers were forced to live in compounds which were fenced, heavily guarded like prison camps, with tight control on anybody leaving or entering the compound to deter anyone from running away. The Pass Law of 1902 made it illegal for non-workers to be seen in compounds thus separating men from their families (Barnes 1995). This is similar to time and space management strategies in colonial Mombasa (Cooper 1968). This situation is different from what was happening in Zambia, where married men, at the discretion of the employer, were allowed to be visited by their wives within the compounds, although for a limited period usually not more than two weeks (Phimister 1997). The legal proscription of access to family is perceived as one of the main reasons for the formation of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union in Zimbabwe, in 1927 (Parpart 1986).
It was difficult to control workers in smaller urban enterprises and small farms through the compound system, so the Masters and Servants Ordinance was passed and made it a criminal offence to break a labour contract. In 1902, a Pass Law was introduced which made it impossible for blacks to travel without a pass, indicating that permission of the employer had been given. This made desertion by workers difficult (Chitiyo 2000). The same development took place in South Africa with the introduction and enforcement of the “Dompass”, which every black person had to produce on demand by authorities, or face possible imprisonment. While it controlled the movement of every black person, it had implications for trade unionism and, in particular, the influence of the Marxist analysis of the relations between state, capital and labour (Hyman 1975; Braverman 1985). First, it made real organization and mobilisation very difficult. Second, it made it clear that there was a strong relationship between the state and employers which was at the expense of trade unionism. Jails were used as a source of free slave labour for the mines and farms. As such, the mobilisation of workers into trade unions was slowed down in those early days of colonialism. In practice, these ‘slaves’ or ‘prisoners’ could not form unions. However, wages for peasants were too low to sustain a living for the family while the colonial authority was enjoying supernormal profits (ZCTU 1991). These contradictions between employer wealth and worker poverty arguably created the conditions that led to the rise of organised labour in Zimbabwe and the struggles of the working class, to free themselves from colonial capitalism. This context within which trade unions were formed was similar to what happened throughout the colonies in Africa (Davidson 1978, and Barnes 1995). It is however important to point out that this conclusion could be contested on the ground that the creation of trade unions in the colonial states was also deliberate strategy and mechanism to maintain social control through the institutionalisation of conflict, which would be in line with the pluralist industrial relations traditions of the colonial power. This was legally legitimated by the 1929 Colonial Development Act, (Roper 1958; Friedland 1969; Sandbrook and Cohen 1975; Freund 1988; Gutkind 1978; Damachi
et al., 1979 and Clegg 1994). There was however no genuine attempt to make trade unions autonomous, but to encourage their creation with the view to controlling latent or overt conflict.

While Sidney and Beatrice Webb are highly regarded in the western countries and the discipline of industrial relations, they, ironically set out the tone for the marginalisation of trade unions for blacks. Indeed, Yesufu (1962, p. 29) observed that it was when Sydney Webb was the Acting Secretary of State for the Colonies (then Lord Passfield) in 1930 that he advised the British colonies to formulate and promulgate protective legislation which was consistent with the British Trade Union Act of 1871. But as also observed by Ojeli (1972, p.1) there was strong advice to ensure that “without systematic supervision and guidance the unions ... might divert their activities to improper and mischievous ends”. Such policy guidance influenced the dominant political thinking and underlying racial elements that militated against the development of trade unions in colonial Zimbabwe and in apartheid South Africa. Further testimony is reflected in these words; “The African worker, in his present state of evolution, has not arrived at the stage where he has sufficiently developed to appreciate all the implications and responsibilities of unionism and only chaos can result from giving impetus to these ambitions” (Huxtable A.J. 1945; cited in Sambureni 1996, p.166). It is also partly because of such a perception which led to the development of two sets of trade unions. The first was for whites only and white-led and the second for blacks only and black-led (Nel 1997). It therefore led to the creation of different employment rules along racial lines as well as an industrial relations climate that was based on racial segregation. With particular reference to SSA, Kaufman, (2004, p. 518) observes the impact of racial segregation “… in the work world, whites used law and coercion to gerrymander the job market so that they kept monopoly on management and supervisory positions, skilled trades and other desirable, better-paying occupations".
The first trade union organization in Zimbabwe was formed in 1927 as a branch of the South African Industrial and Commercial Union (ICU) (Zeilig 2002). This union fought for the political and economic rights of the urban workers. However, the law made it impossible for black workers to form and belong to the same trade union with white workers, by creating different industrial relations regulations. So there was an absence of a unified front in dealing with both the state and the employers. For example, the 1931 Public Service Act barred blacks from the civil service. This had to be seen against the background of the growing number of white workers that came to live in Zimbabwe who insisted on a strict division between them and the black workers, thus creating as in South Africa – a situation of apartheid (Maree 1986). In addition, the privileges of the white workers were made stronger by the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934, which legalised the formation of unions for white workers, while making the formation of unions for black workers illegal. The black workers would still fall under the repressive Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1901. Furthermore, the Act made it impossible for black workers to take up skilled jobs as they were barred from participating in the apprenticeship scheme which was a pre-requisite for entry into skilled jobs. Finally, this Act made provisions for the setting of wages for white workers only. Black workers’ wages were decided upon by each and every white employer at his or her will. Wages dropped significantly and this was worsened by the effects of the world economic recession of the 1930s (Chiripanhura and Kanyenze 2001). The 1940s saw an increase of black workers’ organizations which were identified as “associations” since black workers were not allowed to form trade unions. For the first time, miners in both Zambia and Zimbabwe co-ordinated and participated in the 1945 strike which brought the entire railway system down (ZCTU 1993). This is recorded as the first strike organised by an ‘association’ (trade union) of black workers that forced management to agree to negotiations with black workers. The success of this strike encouraged black workers to form more unions disguised as associations and a federation of all African Trade Unions in Bulawayo was formed in 1946 - (the Federation of Bulawayo African Workers’ Union - (FBAWU). Following another
successful general strike in 1948, more unions were formed and, finally, the 1959 Industrial Conciliation Act legalised the formation of trade unions for black workers, but under very strict conditions. For example, black-only trade unions could now be registered if they were considered by the Minister of Labour to fulfil key requirements. The first of these requirements was that they had to be representative, non-political, financially healthy, and must have consent of employers (Zelig 2002; ZCTU 1993).

The second requirement for registration was that a trade union must register the occupations that would fall under its scope of representation. Three basic categories were created: skilled workers (whites), semi-skilled workers (mainly coloured) and unskilled (blacks). In this way, the colonial regime managed to create a perpetual divide and rule situation among the working class on the basis of race, colour and skill. This hampered the development of effective trade unions in Zimbabwe and, in particular, soured the relations between black unions and the colonial regime yet at the same time helped to cement good relations between the unions for white workers and the colonial regime (Phimister and Van Onselen 2000).

The third requirement was that trade union funds were not to be used for political purposes. This was generally perceived as a move to prevent any links or alliances between trade unions and political organizations and enterprises. In addition to this, anyone arrested under the Unlawful Organizations (Political Parties) Act was not allowed to hold union office. This was aimed at removing politically militant people from the trade union struggles (Wood 1988). More importantly, given that political parties were banned at the time, political issues were being articulated through trade unions. Most of these people would have been arrested at some point on suspicion harbouring political interests. The fourth requirement for registration of black trade unions was that donations from friendly outside organizations to trade unions inside Zimbabwe had to be approved by the Minister of Labour. Such a requirement had the potential to limit solidarity with other liberation
movements in other parts of Africa. This legal proscription however, has to be understood within the context of the political situation, where the power and legitimacy of the colonial state was being challenged across the continent, with trade unions in vanguard in the struggle for political independence. The fifth requirement was that forgoing the right to strike was made a condition for registration. The extent to which this affected collective bargaining and any other form of worker participation remains unresolved. It can only be inferred that these measures made bargaining ineffective, if not impossible, because they denied unions the ability to leverage the sanction of possible collective withdrawal of the labour power of their members to secure objectives that would not other be able to secure (Burchill 2008). However, as argued by Ranchord (2004) the impact of the legal requirements for registration had its own effects. The first is that the labour movement could not develop a united national federation or a strong national centre. Second, and as was the case in South Africa, the working class organization was fragmented on racial lines and third, and final point, is that due to fear and constant detention of their leaders, poor quality of leadership led to underdevelopment of the labour movement. Throughout the colonial period, relations between black trade unions and those of white workers were sour and reflected those between the colonial state and black workers.

Despite their attempts and some success at forming trade unions, they confronted a colonial system that had overwhelming military power and which was determined to use it more ruthlessly. This created a repressive situation in which open resistance was not tolerated and thus an ‘Authoritarian industrial relations system’ existed. A major drawback particularly before the 1960s, the workers were not ready to mount sustained resistance because they still had a feudal frame of mind, whereby loyalty was to the tribe first and not to the workers as a class, so that employers could, and did, use divide and rule tactics (ZCTU 1991). Seen from this angle, the development of industrial relations and the employment relationship in colonial Zimbabwean cannot be regarded in the same way as it developed in Canada and Australia, for example, where trade unions were generally
encouraged consistent with British paradigm of pluralism to institute conflict in order to address social concerns within the empire. “Class consciousness” which is assumed to be reason for trade union formation (see Marx 1844; Cole 1913; Hoxie 1917; Webbs 1920; Perlman 1928; Clegg 1960; Dunlop 1975; and Chamberlain 1951) did not exist in the first two decades of colonial rule in Zimbabwe. There was no wage employment history, and as such, there was limited class consciousness if one conceives of ‘employment’ as it is defined from the Western/European perspective of the concept. In addition, ineffective communication (ZCTU 1991, 1993) militated against the development of trade unions and on how relations between the state and the unions developed. Thus the class-consciousness ideas put forward by many leading Marxist contributors to industrial relations are of little relevance in explaining developments of trade union experience and purposes in colonial Zimbabwe.

Despite the bleak prospects for unity, workers, especially miners, developed some form of organization and embarked on what is considered by some as one of the most successful strikes in the history of Zimbabwe, which is the Shamva Mine strike of 1927, when management failed to persuade the workers back to work and, instead, turned to the state to use the police and the army to force the miners back to work. However, the literature appears to be inconclusive on the outcome of Shamva Mine strike. Some give credit to the miners’ organizational capacity, while another analysis accuses workers for being merely afraid of ghosts and hence, their withdrawal of labour (ZCTU 1993). This might as well be the beginning of “revolutionary unionism” or “political unionism” or a hybrid of both. However, the period 1960s to the 70s represents the intensification of the black struggle for political independence and involved military conflict between the regime and the nationalist armies that had been forming ‘underground’. As such, the political struggle mediated the events and context within which black unionism engaged with the colonial apparatus. Between 1960 and 1970, the working class movement of Zimbabwe was met with very adverse experiences as a result of the divide and rule tactics designed by the
colonial capitalist system and to split and disorganise the trade union movement. The aim was to weaken the black working classes by creating conflicts and confusion amongst its leadership so as to ensure no more possibility of workers’ united action as occurred in the 1945 and 1948 General Strikes (ZCTU 1993). In the name of workers’ solidarity, some international trade union organizations, in particular, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the African American Labour Centre (AALC) did more harm than good to the trade union movement in Zimbabwe between 1959 and 1979 (ZCTU1993). The ICFTU encouraged and sponsored division of the trade unions at both national and industrial levels. In early 1960s it recruited some of the leaders of the Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Centre (SRTUC) and gave them the orientation of non-political, non-militant and anti-strike attitude, and helped them to form splinter unions (ZCTU 1991).

The very moment a splinter union would be formed, the international organizations would dangle money in the faces of the new leaders who, in the majority of cases succumbed to this tactic (ZCTU 1993). During the African Trade Union Congress Conference in 1971, a leading African trade unionist, Phineas Sithole, attacked the ICFTU in the presence of all affiliates; suggesting some of their hands were “greased” from the ICFTU’s coffers as summed up in these words, “…the brainwashing of the African trade union leaders by the ICFTU has reduced the status of these leaders to mere mercenaries answerable to foreign masters and not to their own members” (ZCTU 1993, p.24). Both the ICFTU and the AALC were seen as reluctant to support the growth of strong, combative trade unions and sought to divorce the political struggle from the economic struggle and created a core of the leadership that was not accountable to members. They both encouraged, through funding, those individuals who were known to be ‘apolitical’ to unions’ leadership positions. However, this period saw the intensification of the black struggle for political independence and the efforts of these two organisations did little to derail the political momentum of unions. They also created a culture of dependency through financial and
other material aid. This helped to create division and splits in the trade union movement to the extent that when the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was formed in 1981, there were six trade union centres, all of which had direct and or indirect support and influence of the same international trade union organizations (ZCTU 1991). By promoting conflicts between trade unions for black workers, both the ICFTU and AALC managed to divert attention away from the anti-union activities and mechanisms employed by the colonial state. The financial incentives to some extent succeeded in creating splits within the trade union Movement. As a result, the period from the 1960s to 1979 was unsurprisingly marred by numerous splits in both the political organizations and in the trade union movement. In 1961 there was a split within the sole trade union centre, the Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress (SRTUC). A break-away group formed the African Trade Union Congress (ATUC), which sought to directly connect, in a militant approach, worker struggle to the prevailing political context. Within the SRTUC, there were some leaders who favoured alignment with political parties. This resulted in yet another group breakaway to form the Zimbabwe African Congress of Trade Unions (ZACU). This group aligned itself with one of the main political parties -Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union-(ZAPU) and later the Peoples’ Caretaker Council (PCC). ZACU was later banned in 1965 and was succeeded by the National African Federation of Unions (NAFU), (ZCTU 1991; Sachikonye 2000).

In analysing union-state relations in Zimbabwe, one cannot escape to notice that the question of trade union autonomy has remained controversial. Within trade unions struggles, a common reason for the split in trade unions was the disagreement over the autonomy of trade unions. One group advocated for complete autonomy and non-linkage with political parties (liberation movements of the time). As such, trade union bureaucrats who held the ‘autonomy view-point’ worked actively to lead their members in a pro-capitalist direction and, to limit the struggle of the rank and file to the narrow economic view of wage arbitration. The tension between competing views of trade unionism is not
unique to Zimbabwe, but is well captured in various application of and analysis of typologies of trade unionism in particular, by Hoxie (1917) in his analysis of Business v. Revolutionary unionism and Cole (1913) in the conceptions of trade conscious vs. class conscious unionism. Such tensions, arguably, applied as constraints to the development of effective trade union organisation in Zimbabwe and most SSA (Ranchod 2004). In some countries, for example in Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, and Uganda, a person who holds a labour office culturally gets a position within the ruling party’s executive committee. Those who were known or suspected of not supporting the ruling party often lost their party positions as punishment (Ananaba 1977). Such carrot and stick methods (Liatto 1989) encouraged a model which subordinated unions and rendered them ineffective. However, in Ghana, the unions carefully avoided being enlisted on the side of either government or opposition and sought instead to enhance their influence through tripartite or other participatory and consultative institutions (Akwetey 1994). In Tanzania, trade unions maintained their position on union autonomy as they did during colonial rule, and distanced themselves from both the colonial government and opposition political parties (Shadur 1994). Union-inspired political parties which challenged government have however existed on the continent, for example in Gambia (Vidler 1998).

There was an argument for the withdrawal of the labour movement from the political struggle. This argument was based on the perception that union engagement in strictly political issues would only serve to augment and encourage the repressive measures by the colonial state. Politics had to be left to the nationalist movement (Astrow 1983). When Mzingeli, the leader of the Revived Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union stood up for the independence of the trade unions, he was violently assaulted at the instigation of nationalist politicians (Phimister and van Onselen 2000). The other group saw no difference between the political and economic challenges workers were facing making it an inescapable fact to be aligned to nationalist political parties. While the trade unions engaged in the struggle for political independence in Zimbabwe, many were reticent in
forsaking their autonomy. Given the experiences of Ghana and Tanzania, unions aimed to maintain a supportive, but separate role from political parties (Shadur 1994). So apart from the generally anti-union and oppressive colonial conditions, there were also conflicts between African trade unionists and African nationalist politicians. All these problems had significant effect on both the development of trade unions and the state-labour relations in colonial Zimbabwe. In many ways, these relations also manifested in what Kahn-Freund (1977) calls the restrictive application of the law in labour relations. In that regard, the colonial state’s actions resonate with what pertained in the UK post-1979.

Trade union actions were dealt with by repressive security legislation and the emergency powers of the state. Between 1965 and 1971, as the struggle for political independence and liberation war intensified, it became clear that unionism and nationalism were interlocked. Despite the repression, black unions, assumed a political-like character and intensified their political agitation. Trade union leaders now addressed themselves to a wide range of political issues as well, such as housing, education, residential segregation, tribal trust lands’ development. The colonial state was alert to these trends and started targeting individual trade unionists (ZCTU 1993). The repression of trade unions can be seen from the number of work stoppages recorded by the Department of Labour. This fell from 138 in 1965 to only 19 in 1971. An amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1967 had made it possible for the state to block union assistance from foreign sources. A later amendment had the effect of removing the right to strike when the Minister of Labour deemed it prejudicial to public interest. The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act also made striking in the “essential services” a criminal offence. Practically, all sectors of the economy were included under the definition of “essential services”. The Emergency Powers Act was used to constrain the freedom of assembly. Limits were set to the number of people who could be present at a meeting. Permission to hold a meeting had to be granted. The Unlawful Organizations Act of 1971 declared a great number of organizations unlawful. Many trade unions became the victim of these laws. Worker
leaders were arrested and detained and thrown into restriction camps (Phimister and van Onselen 2000; ZCTU 1993).

The state repression was aimed at controlling the trade union movement and its activities. Those who were convicted under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act or the Unlawful Organizations Act or those who had previously been in prison for a term of three months or more were barred from holding union office for seven years. Trade unions were still organised on racial basis. White workers organised their own unions which excluded black workers and vice versa. As a result, there existed separate national centres for white-led unions, while the African Trade Union Congress, ATUC, and the National African Trade Union Congress (NATUC) were black-led unions. In November 1979, the Zimbabwe Federation of Labour (ZFL) was formed and became the fourth national centre. By then, the NATUC had 13 affiliates, the ATUC 12 affiliates, the white led TUC 7 affiliates. This division came on top of the numerous problems already faced by the African-led trade union organizations at that time. These included; the hostile and repressive laws and state practices, the detention of trade union leaders leading to absence of continuity in leadership due to harassment, the hostility of white privileged labour and the refusal by employers to sanction the check-off system. A check-off system refers to the process where employers collect union dues and remit them to the unions and, as a result, the meagre union dues could not sustain essential union operations (Mandaza 1988, p. 251). This was the situation with regards to trade unions and their relations with the colonial regime immediately prior to independence.

4.3.0. Post-independence development of trade unions

The discussions here are intended to achieve three main goals. The first is to provide an analysis which shows that there were continuities of the colonial labour relations regime in terms of the previous trade union alliances with political parties. The second goal is to
demonstrate how the state sought to bring unions under its wing and facilitated the appointment of ZANU PF loyalists to union official positions and to the leadership positions in the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions the main union federation. The third goal is to demonstrate that state-union relations started to get severely strained due to a number of economic and political developments in particular, the neoliberal agenda and the role of IMF, World Bank and WTO in reshaping the political landscape and the politicization of the labour movement, with the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change

4.3.1. Immediate post-independence period

Zimbabwe became de-facto independence in 1980, and from that time, trade unions belonged to two broad categories. The first is the skilled Labour unions- mainly white-led and controlled with ideological linkages with colonial regimes. The second is the unskilled and semi-skilled unions being African organized and controlled. These ideological linkages were a continuation of the colonial period, where white unions had good relations with the regime while black unions had a good relationship with the liberation movements (then known and regarded as terrorists). The white-led unions were affiliated to the Trade Union Congress (TUC) which had a long established history of links with the colonial state and political parties that had formed successive governments. These unions, according to the Labour and Economy Report of the National Trade Unions Survey (1984) were “a labour aristocracy” that was strongly protectionist and anti-African. The African trade unions, which seriously lacked the capacity to meet workers’ expectations at independence, were affiliated to six confederations, namely; the African Trade Union congress (ATUC), the National African Trade Union Congress (NATUC), the Trade Union Congress of Rhodesia (TUCR), the Zimbabwe African Congress of Unions (ZACU), the Zimbabwe Federation of Labour (ZFL), and, Zimbabwe Trades Union Congress (ZTUC), (Sachikonye 2000; Sambureni 2004). These trade union federations were linked to other
opposition political parties during the liberation struggle and as such, provided the government with an impetus to intervene in order to see what was happening within the trade union movement. The government decided to merge all the six federations and created the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which henceforth, coordinated a large majority of the country’s trade unions. Indeed, 51 out of 58 unions responding to a survey in 1984 indicated that they were affiliated to the ZCTU (Research and Planning 1984, p.31). At its inaugural congress, the Minister of Labour personally ensured the election of a leadership loyal to the Party (Zeilig 2002) and the state sought to define union objectives, (Sachikonye 2001). Thus the new ZANU PF led government was defining a subordinate role of unions (Chiripanhura and Kanyenze 2001). But workers wanted to see a change in the employment relationship, and there was widespread upsurge in strike action.

According to Sachikonye (1997) and Raftopulos (2002) there was an absence of strong regulatory mechanisms to channel the interests and demands of workers and to mediate relations between capital and labour. However the trade union movement was also expecting state intervention in the employment relationship on its behalf. While the break in political alliance between the new political leadership and organized labour was not abrupt but gradual, it must be stressed that the ‘plethora’ of strike action in the immediate post-independence period was a reaction to the political conditions of suppression and economic exploitation that continued from the pre-independence era. These strikes were dealt with in heavy-handed manner, with riot police, tear-gas and buttons (Knight 1997). This is the broad context in which the new elements for the regulation of labour had to be introduced. While a weak trade union movement served the objectives of the colonial regime, it was a serious liability to the new ZANU PF-led government. As Sachikonye (1997) notes, the recourse to state corporatism in the wake of the industrial action was motivated partly too, by the ‘lack of clout’ unions had in restraining militancy among workers. The most direct form of such corporatism was the interventionist role that the
state played in passing a series of legislation which were pro-union. The legislation set out minimum wages, working conditions, and created the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The aim of reconstructing the labour movement and introducing a legal framework for the regulation of labour was essentially to contain industrial conflict through direct state intervention in the labour movement (Sachikonye 1995; Raftopoulos 2000). This is consistent with Harold Clay’s (1949) argument that Whitleyism (1917) and introduction of joint consultation, to promote collaboration and industrial peace in Britain was intended to ward off the threat of Bolshevism.

The trade union movement was further undermined by the government's assumption of trade union functions. It intervened in wage setting and reduced the scope for bargaining over both unskilled and skilled wages, (Chiripanhura and Kanyenze 2001). In addition more legislative measures were taken to make the ZCTU the predominant representative for the workers. The ZCTU and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare shared offices in various parts of the country. In this case, Zimbabwe’s experience is not dissimilar to that of Tanzania. The Tanzanian government shared the same offices with the union federation and supported it financially, arranged joint action on issues of common interest leading to Nyerere declaring that his political party and the union federation were legs of the same nationalist movement (Friedland 1979). This strategy of conferring monopoly representation on a single trade union organization and to incorporate it so that it would accept and implement government labour market policies has both economic and political explanations. These are the pursuit of the broader national economic interest and stifling of potential opposition (Knight 1997). This view is consistent with Cooper’s (1996, p. 468) observation that the idea of “nation building and national identity” unfortunately became state projects which “subsumed” all other affiliations. He concluded that it was a huge tragedy that the labour question was effectively weakened in preference of state sovereignty whose content was never clearly defined.
The South African labour movement has a unique position on the continent due to its longer history and the intensity of its struggles in both political and industrial arenas in the pre-transition period (Beckman and Sachikonye 2001). However, the same question could be raised about Zimbabwe, which also had a late transition after a period of intensified racial oppression and civil war. Literature suggests that a widespread of strikes occurred in Zimbabwe (Research and Planning 1984; Sachikonye 1996; Ranchord 2004; Beckman and Sachikonye 2001). These strikes were mainly designed to undermine the colonial labour relations regime and pressure the state into designing a more accommodating legislative framework which guaranteed employees and trade union rights. This had nothing to do with the trade unions’ organizational capacity and the state made concessions which were matched with a strategy of co-optation and drew the trade union leadership into a corporatist framework and this pact survived until mid-1980s. On this aspect of co-optation South African Trade Union Movement differs with the Zimbabwean union experiences. While alliances were created in South Africa, in Zimbabwe the situation was that of co-optation and re-arrangement of unions into an extension of the state’s labour department. In South Africa, COSATU, together with the South African Communist Party formally entered into an alliance with the state being fully aware of what they would demand and what they were likely to compromise on. According to Habib and Taylor (2000), the tripartite alliance in South Africa had two fundamental objectives. First, it was intended to maximise opposition against the apartheid regime and second, it was to ensure that a working class bias prevailed in the policies of the national liberation movement. The tripartite alliance, although only formalised in the 1990s, actually dates back to the establishment of COSATU in December 1985 (during apartheid), having been preceded by an alliance between ANC, SACP and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) that dates back to the 1950s. So the alliance has a historical background of success which differs from any other African Country. That puts union-state relations in South Africa at a different level to any African country. COSATU was a key player of the liberation struggle in that it forced the state to realise that instability would not simply
disappear with banning of political parties and repression (Taylor and Habib 2000). In
doing so, it succeeded in forcing the colonial government to ‘unban’ black political
organizations and trade unionists and release their leaders from prison. So in South
Africa, the development of trade unions was seen in the political field as a key issue for
national development and thus fewer obstacles have been placed by the ANC onto the
path of the unions. In Zimbabwe, the state adopted a corporatist labour policy
(Sachikonye 2000; Sambureni 2004; Raftopoulos 2003; Knight 1997) as the post-colonial
government sought to monopolize political representation. As a result, trade unions which
were aligned to ZANU PF were the ones which won the ZCTU elections, and their leaders
took command. It was only this ZCTU leadership which had the monopoly of worker
representation in dealings with the government. So the labour movement which emerged
was an appendage of the ruling party and for those days, it was very fashionable under
Marxist arrangements for a labour movement to be subordinated to a ruling party.

According to Sambureni (2004) it is on those premises that the ZCTU leadership in 1990
advocated that the State President should appoint someone from its structures as a non-
constituent member of parliament to represent the interests of labour in parliament. This is
a common practice that reflected the extent of the co-optation of organised labour into the
immediate post-colonial political structure as observed by Wiseman (1995). Other typical
cases of co-optation are Mauritius, Togo, Burundi, Tanzania, Senegal, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. In Mauritius for example, the Labour Federation was co-opted into the ruling
party until conflict arose over political and ideological differences (Cohen 1981). In
Burundi, the Labour Centre was co-opted by a military government known as APRONA. In
Togo, the Confederation Nationale des Travailleurs du Togo (CNTT) became an industrial
wing of the ruling party-the Ressemblence du Peuple Togolais (RPT). In Tanzania, the
National Union of Tanganyika workers’ was formed and the Republic President appointed
top trade union officials. The other trade union officials were then appointed by the top
officials who were loyal to the Republic President. Some trade unionists became members of parliament (Friedland 1969).

In Zimbabwe, the relationship between trade unions and the government in the immediate post-independence period was generally positive or cordial, because ZANU PF had a role to play in the appointment of union leaders who formed the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, a federation of trade unions. The promulgation of the Labour Relations Act 1985 was a major achievement not only in the development of industrial relations in Zimbabwe but in forging positive state-union alliances. The Act repealed the Industrial Conciliation Act and granted a range of rights including; the right to form trade unions, defined unfair labour practices, introduced collective bargaining, banned discrimination. Although the Act banned strikes in “essential services”, it provided a lengthy and cumbersome ‘retrenchment-process’ which made it difficult for employers to fire workers. The period 1980–1985 was strongly undermined by the tacit pact between the state, the emerging black bourgeoisie, the commercial farmers and big industrial corporations and ZCTU leadership to create enforced stability in labour relations through the repression of strikes, (Sachikonye 1996; Larmer 2001). The emerging black bourgeoisie, the commercial farmers and the industrialists had different interests to those of the shop-floor workers. Thus the policy of co-operation or co-optation was increasingly questioned by the rank and file in ZCTU, and in 1985 the pro ZANU PF leadership was voted out of office. This represented much more than simply a change of leadership. The unions were by the end of the 1980s clamoring for the autonomy of the trade unions from the state and this marked the beginning of strained state-union relations. The state responded to calls for union autonomy by abolishing the check off systems or automatic union-due salary deductions, creating financial problems for the trade unions (Skalnes 1995). This meant trade unions no longer had the support of the government in collecting union dues. The later years saw a return to some co-operation between the ZCTU and the government, but on totally different terms from those of the early 1980’s (Skalnes 1995). In the late 1990s,
government sought to control unions by legislating through the LRA (amendments) that the Ministry of Labour had the right, to investigate the trade union if it believed that its finances were being misused. This method of control has extended, in some cases, to demanding the ZCTU’s minutes of meetings in order to establish what was discussed.

The appointment of Tsvangirai to the position of ZCTU General Secretary coincided with the deterioration of relations between the unions and the government. In 1990, a General Election year, the ZCTU adopted and declared a clear position in favour of a multi-party democracy and against backing any particular party, and it also opposed the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme- ESAP (ZCTU 1990). While the ZCTU continued with its increasingly independent stance, a series of strikes occurred in 1989, 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996. By 1998, not only had the economic crisis deepened considerably, the temper of the class struggle had been transformed (The Worker, August 1994). A crucial fact is that at this point, Zimbabwe experienced a breakdown of post-colonial labour regimes, which became irrelevant and inadequate to deal with labour relations issues leading to an upsurge of strikes and sabotage by workers. These strikes were dealt with by the respective state ruthlessly, using riot police and the army. However, there were several union-led successful strikes leading to growing calls from the working class at labour forums, for the ZCTU to take on the government politically by leading the formation of a worker’s party following on the experience of other African countries, most recently, Zambia (Akwetey 1994; Tengende 1994). More importantly is that Zimbabwe and Zambia share a history as they were under the same colonial regime and regarded as one country under the Federation. Zambia was known as Northern Rhodesia and Zimbabwe was named Southern Rhodesia. For the first decade after independence state-union relations were generally positive in that it was a working relationship that ensured the basic needs of workers were met. However, in recent years this relationship has been strained due to a number of economic and political factors. The first is the adoption of the neoliberal economic reforms- the Economic Structural Adjustment. The following section
analyses Zimbabwe's neoliberal experience and argue that if the primary purpose for trade unionism is the economic benefits for workers (Hoxie 1917; Webb's 1920; Clegg 1960), then the economic framework within which the actors operate in is a ‘thermometer’ for measuring union-state relations.

I will start with a broader discussion of neoliberalism before discussing Zimbabwe’s experience relevant to state-union relations.

4.4. Neoliberal reform programme

Neoliberalism emphases the role of the market in determining what has to be offered and the price at which any product or service has to be offered at, (Simutanyi 2006; Stiglitz 2002; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Turnbull and Wise 1995). The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) marked a clear turning point for the corporatist strategy (Bond 1998, p. 259) that ZANU-PF had pursued during the 1980s. This ideology portrays trade unions as obstacles to reform and providing a rationale for their marginalisation. Deregulation of labour markets is for most liberalizers, a critical institutional reform which they claim will achieve many things for progress, not the least a reduction in poverty. Unions need to be rolled back because they stand in the way of labour mobility, flexibility, entrepreneurship and other desirable things which are good for development, (Beckman 2008). In the case of Zimbabwe, the main argument put forward by proponents of the neo-liberal economic reforms in particular, the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) and the Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU), was that state controls on prices, the high level of internal financing of the public deficit, and the protectionist trade regime were stifling the Zimbabwean economy. Only a radical strategy of economic deregulation and liberalisation would have removed the structural imbalances that were hampering economic growth in Zimbabwe (Skalnes 1993). Unemployment can be radically reduced if the price of labour is allowed to be determined by individual contracts in a free market
rather than through collective bargaining, seen as distorting prices. According to Beckman (2002) the rights and freedoms of markets and individuals stand opposed to the collectivistic, state-regulated labour regimes that have entrenched themselves in both rich and poor countries. Apart from theoretical and ideological arguments there seem to be strong pragmatic reasons for deregulation where regulation has already struck roots and for resisting regulation where it has not. If not, increasingly mobile capital and entrepreneurship will ‘run-away’. Existing labour market regulations, including laws protecting union rights, make major national firms as well as potential foreign investors look elsewhere and discourage small local entrepreneurs on whom poor people depend for employment and income.

There is an even more basic, political reason why liberalizers dislike unions. They are seen as part of a political coalition which has encouraged excessive public sector expansion and macro-economic imbalances. From this perspective, “The deregulation of labour markets is seen as a way of breaking statist political coalitions which stand in the way of the wider reform project and thus the welfare of the poor (Beckman 2002, p. 2). A strong case is also made that in East Asia, there has been unprecedented rapid industrialization which has been successfully achieved along with the oppression of trade unions while African unions face overwhelming problems in the absence of industrialization. In post-communist countries, trade unions are heavily discredited because of their linkage with the previous system and as such, are marginalised in the new order thus weakening possibilities of union-party linkages.

The movement towards disengaging from authoritarian labour regimes often runs alongside with new forms of engagement with state and politics, involving new social pacts as part of the economic reform process. This normally leads to cuts in employment, wages, and the public services thus undermining the market and workplace bargaining power of labour. On the other hand, this can enhance unions’ political bargaining power given the combined social conflict (caused by cuts in employment, wages, and services)
and the weakening of the institutions of state and capital. Debates on state-union relations fail to accommodate alternatives to market ideology. It can be argued that the neo-liberal perspective wrongly reduces every crisis in Zimbabwe to a mere problem of governance. Focus has been on the symptoms of the problem, such as increased militarisation of domestic politics, party violence, shrinking democratic spaces, executive lawlessness and questionable electoral conduct, illegitimacy of the government and ruling party, abuse of human and trade union rights and many other issues. It would appear that there is the emergence of “Nationalism” (Ranger 2004) and “Nativism” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006) to deal with the unresolved national questions and to defy global neo-liberal norms thus provoking the wrath of industrialised nations. Neoliberal anger has taken the form of support for the local civil society including trade unions, non-governmental organizations and opposition political parties. Unions and civil society have clamoured for democracy, human rights, privatisation and liberalisation of the economy. The state is under pressure from neo-liberal global forces to let market forces have a free rein in Zimbabwe while the frustrated African constituencies are calling for more state intervention into economic management, particularly to ensure justice and equitable land distribution. As has been noted by Castles et al., (1988), the reality creation of the national character, is not something, which happens once, at the beginning of a new nation. Rather, there is a constant process of asserting, questioning, redefining and examining the national identity.

In support of the neoliberal agenda is the ‘Urban Bias Thesis’. According to this thesis, urban based-interest groups (including unions) are responsible for skewing development in their direction to the detriment of rural-based groups in their rent-seeking activities, (Toye 1990). Unions are therefore viewed as partly responsible for causing some of the major African economic crises. Authoritarian regimes are therefore needed to ‘ride roughshod’ over the newly created special interest groups in urban areas. There was need for authoritarian or strong regimes to suppress entrenched special interest groups that will attempt to undermine adjustment programmes. This notion of authoritarian
regimes facilitating adjustment implementation was reaffirmed in an official World Bank publication (1994), which credited as “initial impressive beginning” of adjustment programming to the military character of the Babangida regime, thus; “the military government was able to initiate the reforms without worrying about how they might hurt some groups” (World Bank 1994, p. 238) trade unions being part of those groups. Urban-based organised labour was central to the World Bank’s definitions of groups that must be severely restrained. And this ideological position was often presented as the ‘primitives’ of the new normative economics and fundamentally altered the landscape for organised labour, severely undermining the base from which unions organise by widening income inequality, depressing wage-based income, raising the level of unemployment, and deepening poverty (Adesina 2000). While corporatist industrial relations policies implemented immediately after independence in African countries are in most cases not seen as an attack on trade unions, they have the same effect which is to attack collective bargaining but from an entirely different angle. This seems to suggest that authoritarianism, nationalism, neoliberalism all tend to attack African trade unions in a way that is different from their western counterparts. As a result, it makes the relationship between political parties and unions an ever present issue within industrial relations systems. The real motive of a neoliberal agenda in Africa is contestable. While the rationale for the economic reform programme was put forward as aimed to support medium-long term growth by means of economic and commercial liberalisation (GoZ 1991) there appeared to be another motive by the IMF and World Bank as most of the major sectors were sold to foreigners who assumed free reign on who was to be employed and where they sourced for their raw materials. The neoliberal strategy also envisaged that by abolishing government control and direct participation in the marketing of agricultural products, by removing the role of the marketing boards, would increase rural incomes.
This is where a Marxist analysis may be relevant in exposing the true intentions of a capitalist project in Africa, as aimed merely at facilitating economic exploitation than promoting sustained development. Indeed the experience of neoliberal policies in sub-Saharan Africa over the past three decades has almost been uniform. The neoliberal paradigm does not guarantee social welfare, improve incomes and reduce social inequalities. It actually promoted the opposite in the case of Africa, which is, it led to the reductions in social spending in the important areas of education, health and social security. At least the Marxist theory is sensitive to the idea of extending social welfare to the greatest number of people in the population. It emphasises a politics that takes into account the people’s welfare as a guide to party politics, and by implication, I would argue that such politics is also relevant to union-party relations. There is an argument that in the early 1990s, most African countries were overwhelmed by the demise of world socialism which left these developing nations without a credible ideological alternative, (Simutanyi 2006, p. 6) thus, “It is this lack of ideological alternative which helped entrench the neoliberal paradigm as the only viable economic strategy for economic development in Africa”. Huge sums were borrowed from the IMF and World Bank by tyrants and dictators in the peoples’ name. This is unsurprising because the ‘conditionalities’ of the SAPS, gave rise to undemocratic and dictatorial governance. Each government ended up being constrained by the same conditions and they responded in the same way thus creating a vicious cycle of dictatorship. It has been argued by Woodiwiss (2005) that only dictators were capable of implementing the IMF/World Bank conditionalities as democratic governments would easily be ousted from power. He goes on to argue that the IMF and the World Bank behaved like ‘gangster sharks’ not only in Indonesia and the Philippines but also in Mobutu’s Congo where he alleges the abuse of human rights, corruption and the transfer of ill-gotten monies to private accounts in Western financial institutions became common. This has led Emeagwali (2011, p. 7) to conclude that, “…we can argue that dictatorship and authoritarianism were inevitably the bedfellows and allies of the IMF
and the World Bank, whether by design or accidentally and that their support for
democratic elections was contradictory”.

There is argument to take a closer analysis of the connection between adjustment and
authoritarianism and human rights in Africa. This is because most recently, the conflict
between the ZCTU and the government of Zimbabwe features in a number of human
rights violations discussions. If there are indeed human and trade union violations, it is
imperative that the location, scope and key influences of these be understood and
presented as the context for union-state relations. Ibhawoh (1999) offered what appears
to be the most fascinating connection so far. He argues that a broader framework for
understanding the relationship between authoritarianism and adjustment policies in Africa
is the political economy perspective. This situates state policies in the dynamics of class
struggle. According to him, the political economy perspective- “…argues that the local
dominant classes in the Third World lack hegemonic power and can only prevail over
dominated classes through a combination of ideological hegemony and physical coercion.
In some parts of Africa where external factors dominate commerce and the bourgeois
classes have little or no control over the dependant state economy, their ability to create
ideological hegemony is weak, making it vulnerable and susceptible to challenges from
below”, (Ibhawoh 1999, p.160). There is thus the argument that this predisposes the post-
colonial state, over which the dominant classes preside to resort to increased use of
repression for there is no way of implementing the structural adjustment programme
without political repression (Rusk 1986; Ibhawoh 1999; Eke 1989). There is evidence that
the structures of neo-colonialism and the political pressures which adjustment create
make repression inevitable. Evidence of this was seen in Ghana where “early thrust
towards democratic governance was rubbedished in the interest of authoritarian control as
SAP gathered momentum (Hansen 1987). A similar situation occurred in Zambia where
the government was faced with a lot of pressure from both the domestic opposition and
that of financial aid agencies. The result was to implement repressive measures to
complement traditional methods of political management. The situation in Senegal was not different. It is argued that the authoritarian features of one-party dominance “reasserted in the face of adjustment reforms” (Ibhawoh 1999, p.160). Beckman (1992) shows that in Nigeria, adjustment led to repression and the co-optation of opposition forces. The position of the World Bank and the IMF on the issues of human rights violations in Africa is worrying and this goes to the heart of union-state relations in particular and state-society relations in general. According to Ibhawoh (1999, p.164) “…the World Bank has historically claimed that it is unable to make human rights considerations in its policy because that would violate the Articles of Agreement of the Bank. Human rights are seen as political issues and Articles of the Bank expressly prohibit all but economic considerations”. These financial institutions had clearly paid a blind eye to trade union and human rights violations, thus, by implication, supporting governments in their brutal attack on opposition and trade unions.

Such a context should be both relevant and useful in identifying and analysing the general behaviour of African countries, (Zimbabwe included), towards civil society in general and trade unions in particular. This needs to be looked at from two perspectives. The first is that SAPs created governance and autonomy challenges for states resulting in the political elite being reduced to functionaries of the IMF and World Bank with minimal power. This created extreme form of dependence and subordination. More importantly, it destroyed African neo-patrimonial system which had also given credibility to the post-colonial African state. The neo-patrimonial structure and culture made it possible for the states to control state resources and rent-seeking activities, (Van de Walle 1993; Konings 1996 and Gabriel 1999). So the question then is if human and trade union rights were committed by the governments, should responsibility and accountability be levelled against the IMF/World Bank as well? Should we ignore the politics of the IMF/World Bank in analysing union-state relations? The second perspective is that if one of the aims of the IMF and World Bank was to reinforce the neo-liberal model and laissez-faire in Africa, to
what extent might the conflicts between trade unions and governments in Africa are resolved without engaging the IMF/World Bank? When trade unions seek for alternatives to neo-liberalism, what forces and pressures do they face and are they aware of these forces and pressures? When it comes to engaging the IMF and World Bank, do they have capacity and the means to get the attention of these bodies? What will be the response of those forces? All these aspects do have an influence on union-state relations. In the context of Zimbabwe, Moyo (2002) argues that the land question was the first victim of the neo-liberal economic reforms. He further argues that in an attempt to balance the interests of both ‘external and internal capital interests’ and the indigenisation project, debates on macro-economic reforms overshadowed issues of redistribution and state intervention, in land markets. The larger white capital, argues Moyo (2002, p. 4) “…supported the changing of the eligibility criteria for access to land from notions of ‘landlessness’ and ‘insecurity’ to those of ‘capability, ‘productivity’ and ‘efficiency’, within the terms of the neo-liberal global development paradigm”. Land reform came to be seen as unnecessary as it was submerged with other socio-economic issues such as employment creation, (Rukuni and Eicher 1994; ZCTU 1996; World Bank 1995). ESAP was seen as offering little in the form of new investment resources for the black smallholder and export-led growth in commodity production, and did nothing to improve the restrictive land, water and other infrastructural conditions of communal areas.

Zimbabwe’s experience on the land issue appear to suggest that following the failure of adjustment reform programme, greater dependence on land for survival and accumulation triggers popular unrests and pressures for land redistribution. This essentially became an area of serious conflict between the ZCTU and the ZANU PF government leading to the formation of the MDC. Since independence, ZCTU’s position on the land question was clear. It argued that without land redistribution, there was not going to be any economic growth and workers will be disadvantaged. This was also a key point in ZCTU’s criticism of the Investment Code, a policy document adopted by the government soon after
independence. The land question is both a useful aspect and context for analysing union-state relations in Zimbabwe, thus “social and political mobilisation around the land question has led to the polarisation of the land and democratisation debates along class and racial lines as different interest groups, civic organizations and trade unions have different values on these issues within a neo-liberal model of democracy and market reform” (Moyo 2002, p. 4). Addressing historical imbalances and social injustices does not go hand in glove with democratisation and human rights agenda.

Such a background provides a context for understanding the policy proposals of the ZCTU and the logic of policy reform suggestions from ZANU PF. The removal of subsidies in education, health and social services provision resulted in increased hardships for the people, declines in school attendance sometimes along gender lines (Kapoor 2011; Bello (2005) while prenatal and postnatal care were severely affected. In the case of Somalia, SAPs were seen to increase intra-ethnic conflicts and cleared the ground for armed conflicts around the African continent. In addition, many post-independence socio-economic indicators were lost. Between 1980 and 1990, life expectancy had risen from 56 to 64 years, infant mortality fell from 86 to 49 per 1000 live births, and primary school enrolment rose from 83 to 117 per cent, (World Bank Country Report Memorandum 2006). These same indicators fell during the 1990s after the introduction of adjustment programme. In 1994, life expectancy was 51 years and down to 46 by 1996 (US census International Data base 2006). The primary school completion rates which had peaked at 83 per cent by 2003 had dropped to 63 per cent, (UNICEF 2005). Real wages fell from an index of 122 in 1982 to 88 in 1997. At the same time, employment growth fell from 2.4 per cent between 1985-1990 to 1.55 per cent between 1991 and 1997 (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2005). Between 1990 and 1995, food prices rose 516 per cent, medical care, transport and education by 3000 per cent, and by 1995, 62 per cent of households could no longer afford all the basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter and transportation (GoZ 1995). Such a background is conducive for conflict between the state and unions. This
state of the economy set out the context within which state-union relations evolved in contemporary Zimbabwe. Tripartite consultations during ESAP were also severely affected. Tripartite consultations are a measure of the nature of the relationship between the state, employers and trade unions. Tripartite consultations in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was much written about and discussed in the 1970s, but dropped off the agenda of policy makers during the 1980s and 1990s (Mazumdar 1994). There could be a number of explanations for this development. First, it implies that the process of economic policy decision making during the 1980s became more ‘closed and characterised by limited consultation between the various interest groups including trade unions and employer organizations. This period also marked the introduction of the IMF/World Bank economic reforms which, as have already been argued, encouraged authoritarian behaviour with less or no room for consultation so it is no surprise that there was a death of tripartite consultation processes. The second explanation why tripartite consultations did not take place during SAPs could be the perceived non-representativeness of the parties involved, that is, trade unions and employers’ organizations are not representative of the workforce or the employers as a whole. The third explanation for the absence of tripartite consultations could be the government’s own interest as a large employer, and as such, participation would compromise the government’s direct interest. Finally, there was fear of obstruction of the implementation of adjustment programmes.

In the proceeding chapter, I analysed and discussed what trade unions are and what they do. I argued against a one-size-fit-all explanation of objectives of trade unions, because different and unique contexts mediate what unions do. Similarly, we cannot have discussions about trade unions and their relationship with the government without an examination of that government in terms of its formation and the specific and unique challenges it faces. This will help avoid the generalisations and characterisations that are common in describing the Zimbabwean government. This will help understand why and
how state-union relations are evolving the way they do. This is precisely what the next section does.

4.5. The character of the Zimbabwean state

Zimbabwe is considered a classic case of a state led to ruin by a dictator desperately clinging to power (Blair 2002). In the literature on state failure, the country is deemed to be “on the brink” of failure, in a “downward spiral” or descending “into chaos,” (Woodward 2008). However, there is little by way of extended analysis to provide evidence to sustain the claim. In this literature, Zimbabwe is addressed cursorily, as a quick example or warning of what can happen when rulers behave badly. These accounts tend to be agent-centric, focused on the failings of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, (Rothberg 2003; Eizenstat et al., 2005; Power 2003 and Norman 2004, 2002). In some accounts, he is portrayed as “deluded” and “demented” (Clements and Moss 2005). Any conflicts that arise are a result of a man bent in dying in office (Meredith 2002).

Scholarly and policy works which frame Zimbabwe’s political and economic crises as a recent wrong turn can be considered atheoretical, and ignore to some extent, the long-term dynamics of state-society relations. Rather, what emerges is a more complex picture of a regime attempting to manage economic crises in conjunction with claims made on the state by politically organized groups-such as business associations, labour unions, and war veterans-and their challenges in response to the regime’s failure to meet their demands. One can argue therefore that it is not necessarily just the incompetent management of the economy by the political elite, but rather, the sometimes unreasonable demand of politically organised and powerful interest groups.

One strand of literature argues that Zimbabwe’s political instability arises from the structure of the state itself (Hobsbawn 1990 and Dzimbiri 2005). To understand that
structure, it is necessary to examine two key political and economic transitions that have strained its capacity to manage crises effectively. The first - the transition from war to peace with Zimbabwe’s independence from white rule in 1979 - was incomplete and set the stage for conflicts to arise throughout the 1980s. It was incomplete in the sense that it was a result of a negotiated settlement between the former colonial regime and the new black African political representatives. In negotiated settlements, parties compromise and that compromise reflects areas that would recur in need for a long lasting solution. The second, overlaying the first, was Zimbabwe’s transition from a developmental to a neoliberal economic management paradigm, producing intense social hardships for the population. These two transitions created a set of political struggles to which the ruling party, ZANU-PF had to address but which they also did not have the experience to at their disposal coming from a colonial experience. The concept of state failure is vague (Woodward 2004) especially as it is applied to Zimbabwe, because it does not specify what it is about the state that is supposedly failing, or why. This approach also tends to confuse causes and outcomes. In the language of state failure, is Zimbabwe weak because of “management flaws” and despotism, or is the regime’s increasing authoritarianism a result of existing structural weaknesses that have been exacerbated over time? Or, is the government failing because of unreasonable demands of powerful competing political and economic interests? The answers to these questions have not been clear when one examines available literature. It appears the answers to these questions are largely influenced by the political platform one stands.

To understand the political and economic choices made by the ZANU PF government, one has to examine the nature of the relationship between the state and society that framed these choices. I have argued earlier that context and circumstances mediate any form of relations that unions or the state develop with institutions in the country. In the context of Zimbabwe, these relationships have been a result of the serious economic and political crisis which has engulfed the country in recent times resulting in political turmoil.
(Tony and Laakso 2003). The economic and political choices are also a product of the unresolved land question following the Lancaster House Constitution and its failure to allow for land reform immediately after independence (also see Moyo 2002; Bratton and Masunungure 2011). In addition, an argument can be made that a breakdown in state-society relations occurred as resulting from the economic crises of the mid - to late 1990s, following the stringent implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). In response to the resulting social hardships and growing political discontent, the government made a series of flawed economic and political decisions, intending to gain support in the short-run, while contributing to long-run instability (Brett 2005).

Also significant is the effect of legacies of the liberation war in immediate post-war and contemporary politics in that the Lancaster House agreement established the terrain for post-war politics because it created an important place for ex-combatants, who were able to leverage their political strength within a new regime whose legitimacy was based on the liberation struggle (Kriger 2003). The role of the war veterans is also central in defining union-state relations in the sense that following the formation of the MDC from the labour party, war veterans formed a trade union federation ZFTU to counter the ZCTU and declared their allegiance to the government. This is what gave the national liberation ideology resurgence and became a counterhegemonic framework for unions as civil-society imperative/narrative.

The transition from war to peace with the Lancaster House agreement ended the liberation struggle in 1979. The “Zimbabwe crisis” in relation to state-union (or state-society) relations is not only a result of the structure of the state created by the Lancaster House peace agreement, but in the struggles between the two nationalist guerrilla armies - the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) associated with the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) associated with the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). ZANU, led by Ndabaningi Sithole, formed in 1963 after it split from ZAPU, the older African nationalist
party led by Joshua Nkomo. Indeed, these struggles continued after independence and throughout the period from 1980-87, while the new ZANU-PF regime consolidated power (Sachikonye 2001). According to Bratton and Masunungure (2011, p. 8) “the new African leaders of Zimbabwe inherited a state that deeply penetrated the economy and society and that offered various instruments of repressive rule”. Secondly, that the mode of decolonisation was important to take note of in any discussions of the state. They argue that “despite a hard guerrilla campaign, Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF gained power as a result of a military standoff rather than battlefield victory. Since the nationalist leaders could not prescribe the terms of independence, they entered, instead, into a negotiated political settlement brokered by the departing colonial authority. Bratton and Masunungure (2011, p.8) further argued that the independence constitution contained embedded legal constraints; for example, twenty seats in parliament were temporarily reserved for whites, civil service pensions were guaranteed, and private property rights, including land, were protected.

The elite pact reached at Lancaster House, London on 21 December 1979 involved an implicit bargain; blacks would ascend to positions of political leadership while whites would continue to enjoy ownership of the means of economic production …“ Woodward (2008) also argues that the political instability in Zimbabwe should be understood in terms of the structure of the state itself as the state has been strained in its capacity to manage crises effectively. The fact that control over the state was decided at the negotiating table, rather than through decisive military victory, laid the groundwork for the conflicts that took place between ZANU and ZAPU after the conclusion of the peace agreement. In addition, the initial independence period saw increasing disputes between central and local governments, as well as local-level rivalries over the distribution of resources. The Lancaster House agreements both created a new alliance between ZANU and ZAPU, the Patriotic Front (PF)—which was formed in order to increase their bargaining power at the
peace settlement negotiations—and also exacerbated the rivalry between the two parties which split after the settlement was signed.

It also failed to significantly change the structure of the Rhodesian state inherited by Zimbabwe by leaving intact the police, the army, the Supreme Court, and the civil service. It reserved twenty of one hundred parliamentary seats for whites for seven years, and precluded land reform by protecting existing property arrangements. Essentially, the process of transition from war to peace created the terrain on which contemporary politics are played out and also created problems within the economy not only by preserving the colonial ownership arrangements, but by protecting the unequal resource allocations. It reinforced the dual and enclave nature of the economy. More significantly, it protected capital and marked a compromise between socialist political objectives of the struggle for independence, with the neo-liberal structure which later manifested in the form of ESAP. As Dashwood (1996) argues, the change in the government's development strategy can be explained by shifts in the relationship between the state and its key constituencies. According to Dashwood, “the alliance between the ruling elite and the peasantry and working class that underpinned the original development strategy had eroded,” and was replaced by a new unity between ruling party members, business leaders, and landed elites, including the co-optation of the former opposition PF-ZAPU leaders after the Unity Accord in 1997 (Dashwood 1996, p. 28).

The second important transition in Zimbabwe’s history is that from a “developmentalist” to a neo-liberal economic management paradigm. Brett (2005) traces Zimbabwe’s trajectory from a successful state to a “crisis state in serious danger of collapse,” arguing that the shift to neoliberalism created not just economic, but political instability due to the failure of both internal and external technocrats to take into account the deleterious social consequences of structural adjustment. As the neoliberal transition put intense strains on the population (also at the same time that drought hit southern Africa), people became
politically organized in new ways, in the form of social movement organizations, labour unions, and in particular the mobilization of civil service workers who had previously been supportive of the regime. ZANU-PF responded to this new opposition through a populist turn in an attempt to shore up support it lost from these groups (Brett 2005).

The reforms it implemented led to the mobilization of political actors along both old and new cleavages. The first reason according to Kanyenze et al (2006) is that the people became de-politicised and demobilised. Alternatively, people allowed themselves to be demobilised in a misunderstood conception of solidarity with the "comrades" then in power. At critical moments they failed to take to the streets when the Empire imposed its will on their new governments. The second is that the agents of globalisation and the Empire quickly filled the vacuum so created. However, Kanyenze et al., (2006) do not distinguish the Southern African experience from other contexts, where state-society relations are not framed and developed on negotiated transfer of power? In fact, in other countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, and Jordan, people were quick to challenge (to take to the streets on what became known as “food riots”) the hardships caused by globalisation and neo-liberal policies (Walton and Seddon 1994). These aspects are arguably two sides of the same coin. The political demobilisation of the people and the filling of the resulting vacuum by the agents of the Empire were essential elements of the "Independence Constitutions" that were crafted at the point of transfer of power (or "regime change"). Whether such an outcome could have been avoided, for example, by extending the war of liberation in Zimbabwe or by deepening urban insurrection in South Africa (Astrow 1983 and Phimister 1988) is an academic question.

It is perhaps important to recognise that the agents of the empire were allowed to walk in and in some cases openly invited and solicited by the post-independence state. In the case of Zimbabwe, for example, it appears that the revolutionary spirit could not be sustained in the post-independence period and by 1990 the state incorporated the
strategy of the empire which is the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) within its "National Development" plan. In South Africa, it took an even shorter period to replace the reconstruction and development programme (RDP) with the Growth, Employment And Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, (Kanyenze et al., 2011). In the case of Zimbabwe, a decade and a half later, in 2002/04, the leadership of the ruling party admitted that ESAP was a miscalculation. However, the transformative spirit has to be ignited again within a population that has been demobilised and made despondent through impoverishment and loss of confidence in the post-independence political system. So conflict between trade unions and the state is bound to take a political character.

Globalisation has presented a number of challenges to the African State. In retrospect, the post-colonial African State acquired characteristics that rendered it vulnerable to the vagaries of the international economy. In the first place, the African state was an artificial creation (Wiseman 1990). It was artificial because in contrast to Western states, which evolved over a long period of time. African states, with a few exceptions, “were overnight creations lacking organic evolution from within civil society” (Chabal 1986, p. 13). As a result of this artificiality, the state became weak and was scarcely in full control within its borders despite the possession of massive coercive instruments (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Callaghy 1986). The successful overrun of some countries by rebels resulting in state collapse in recent years - Liberia (1990), Ethiopia (1991), Somalia (1991) and Rwanda (1994) are indicative of the fragility of the African state. Where the state has not totally collapsed, it is log jammed with rebels as in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. Yet, many have also survived armed insurrection and a few have managed to hold their own including Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC (1996) and to some extent, Zimbabwe soon after independence as it faced insurgency from Mozambique and apartheid South Africa. The fragility of African states is historical and traceable to the very basis of state formation. The post-colonial state was established to perform functions it was barely capable of. Consequently, as it attempted to assume the burdensome functions of its
predecessor, the colonial state, its ‘apparatus of governance crumbled before it has been fully consolidated’ (Bratton 1989, p. 409). However, some, including Zimbabwe, have merely stumbled and not crumbled, and this needs empirical studies to ascertain why these different experiences exist. There are four consequences of this weakness. First, in most cases it undermined its legitimacy. Second, this created a type of state which constantly had to resort to force and violence to secure allegiance and compliance with its policies. Third, largely because of this weakness, the African states were incapacitated to withstand pressure not only from within its territorial borders, but also from the international space. Fourth and more importantly, is that this post-colonial African state became overly dependent, following its incorporation into the global economy. As it produced raw materials, it relied on the international market for capital and machinery. This condition placed Africa in a situation where its economic fortunes became totally dependent on the international economy. Hodder-Williams’ (1984) metaphorical assertion that Africa catches pneumonia whenever the world’s economy catches a cold graphically illustrates the degree and dangers of the continent’s dependence on the global market. Such excessive dependence has vitiated the ability of African states to counter the adverse consequences unleashed by globalisation.

There is consensus among researchers, for example, (Akokpari 2001; Beckman 1992; Beckman and Sachikonye 2001 and Kanyenze et al., (2011) that the process of globalisation leaves in its wake damaging consequences for Africa and its fledgling economies. In many respects, globalisation compounds old problems and creates new ones. Among its many effects, globalisation changes the character and role of the African State. International public opinion and markets have become the main decision-makers for African states. The state is compelled to adopt economic policies that conform to international desires and not necessarily those that satisfy domestic constituencies. In this way, not only is the freedom of the state seriously circumscribed, but its options have also been severely limited. The state’s circumscription is reinforced by the information
superhighway. If news about a country’s budgetary difficulties spread, prices and interest rates in other countries both far and near immediately hike. Such fiscal external factors determine the response of the local economy and simultaneously undermine the ability of the state to autonomously prescribe solutions for local crisis. In the New World market order, prescriptions for dealing with a country’s internal economic malaise are determined by conditions in the global market. Market forces have taken over from the state the function to determine policy options for internal economic questions. This situation is bound to create political conditions conducive for prominence of trade unions as they seek to occupy spaces available for their elevation. The extent to which this might have occurred in Zimbabwe remains unclear.

In addition, globalisation has shifted government action from political to mainly economic, in particular on critical foreign policy issues. Important foreign policy decisions of governments are informed more by economic than political consideration. Drowned in debt, and constrained further by the imperatives of structural adjustment, the major foreign policy concerns of African states are dominated by a desire to receive foreign assistance (Agyeman-Duah and Daddieh 1994; Kraus 1994) and/or to reschedule debts (Callaghy 1987). Consequent on this shift away from political to economic issues, foreign ministries, which have traditionally been the gatekeepers between domestic and external policy environments, have lost this function, ceding it to finance ministries and central banks (Akokpari 1999a). Negotiating teams to international credit institutions are composed of technocrats and officials from central banks and finance ministries rather than from foreign policy ministries while the pursuit of important foreign policy questions are weighed against the preferences of creditors. This changes the character of states and their capacity to manage. In the context of union-state relations, it limits the scope within which the state can be responsive to employee needs.

Considering that globalisation is seen to erode state sovereignty, a question arises as to the new political order and how it ‘crafts’ union-state relations. While arguing for the
relative autonomy of the state in South Africa, Evans (1995) feared that the new ANC-government may be captured by the trade unions resulting in undermining business confidence. Therefore, to curb union militancy, some within the political movement called for relations between the state, business and the trade unions, in which the latter would be bound to help create a climate for investment, by for instance, not driving up wages. One of the implications of this analysis is that strong and militant trade unions are seen as capable of undermining the autonomy of the state and its transformative capacity. In this case, Britain provides a very relevant precedence in the form of the ‘social contract between the TUC and the Labour Government’ leading into the ‘Winter of Discontent’ (1978/79).

The former line of argument prefers the state having the capacity to impose its will on society. What remains clear, however, is that this argument bears resemblance to Midgal's strong state-weak society thesis (Midgal 1988), as well as both Johnson’s (1987) and Wade’s (1990) understanding of the developmental state – the state having the capacity to impose its will on society in spite of opposition from the latter. In this case, where does the state draw the resources to impose its will on the people? Several explanations arise. However, the ‘occupants of state office’ in post-colonial Africa tend to rely on rhetoric surrounding national liberation. Whereas in Africa, globalisation has negatively impacted on working conditions, labour relations, labour rights and general health and safety issues, we are now beginning to see some change in philosophy and policy orientation (ILO Bureau for Workers 2002). Thus, the adoption of and engagement with globalisation is slowly improving workers’ rights/conditions by virtue of multi-national's desire to protect their reputations. The case and response of PRIMARK and other companies following the collapse of garment factory in Pakistan is evidence of such concern. They have intensified efforts for promoting working rights for women workers and signing various health and safety contracts.
In conclusion however, globalisation has not only impacted on the capacity of the state with regard to economic management and political governance. It also had significant impact on trade union development and union/state/political party relations. One of the obvious implications is what has already been labelled as the ‘Chiluba effect’ (the politicisation of trade unions to the extent to becoming government) and the resulting subordination of labour and employment issues to wider economic, political and social agendas of economic liberalisation and ‘good governance’. In that respect, some of the literature has looked at the implications of structural adjustment programme for employment relations (Turnbull and Wise 1995; Wood and Brewster 2007) and yet, others have analysed the 1980s experience in the context of continuation of how Cold war rivalries have shaped the development of SSA trade unionism into two spheres of influences (Poole 1993). These two spheres are the Monrovia and the Casablanca blocks. The latter was led by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and comprised of Mali, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt and it preferred a federation of all African countries. The former, was led by Senghor of Senegal, comprised of Ethiopia, Nigeria and Senegal, and a large number of former French colonies strongly argued that unity should be achieved gradually, through economic cooperation and strongly opposed initiatives of a political federation.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter examined literature regarding the development of trade unions in Zimbabwe from a historical context relying more on official and trade union documents in this construction. The historical development of trade unions in Zimbabwe was examined in three phases. The first is the precolonial period, the colonial and the immediate post independent up to 2000. The state-union relationship in contemporary Zimbabwe was therefore presented as a product of the prevailing socio-economic and political factors which shaped each actor’s experiences and perceptions overtime.
What is important from the analysis is to understand that the colonial period was not just a one-stretch uniform system. It underwent two major phases. The first could be identified as the period of primitive accumulation, (1890-late 1920s). This basically was the period of the dispossession of both the Ndebele and Shona people of their productive property including fertile land and cattle. The principal legislation was the Master and Servants Ordinance of 1901 and it regarded black people not as workers but as servants. From the black people’s point of view, the state and the employer meant the same thing. This is because the colonial settlers came in as a company- The British South African Company. In terms of industrial relations, the unitary perspective was the ideological guidance and the ban of strikes and trade unions is indicative of its practice. Women were considered minors and could not enter into employment without their husband’s consent. The second phase of the colonial period (1930s-1980) saw a movement from the unitary ideology to colonial state corporatism. This period witnessed a significant change in the industrial relations landscape in that the labour question became central to the emerging capitalist relations of production. It resulted in the promulgation of a series of legislation including the Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) of 1934, which addressed white working class issues, yet, adopting a unitary law applicable to the majority of the ‘black working class’ or precisely- servants. This Act recognised collective bargaining, conciliation and arbitration for dispute resolutions, recognition of trade unions one per industry but with highly restricted freedom of association.

The ICA was openly racist, preventing blacks from competing with whites for skilled jobs; however, it provided a framework within which the post-colonial labour relations were founded upon. The immediate post-independence period saw a continuation of the colonial alliances that had been built between black trade unions and nationalist movements and those by white unions and the white colonial apparatus who were the major employers. The post-independence period saw positive developments in labour
legislation and relations between unions and the government developed in a state corporatist manner where the goals of trade unions were subsumed to the wider nation-building goals. What the review demonstrates is the double-edged nature of neoliberal economic reform programme led by the IMF, World Bank which weakened both the unions and the state and further strained their relations. Arguments were made to the effect that the SAPs could only be successfully implemented by authoritarian regimes which were prepared to deal with rising discontent and mass strikes and demonstrations.

The next chapter presents the findings from the empirical research conducted.
CHAPTER FIVE

The ‘honeymoon’ and early strains in the relationship
(1980-1995)

“The Marxist-Socialistic rhetoric appealed to the leadership of the labour
movement …”

(ZCTU 1993)
5.0 Introduction

The above quotation is union’s reflection on how the Marxist ideology appealed to the labour movement in the immediate post independent period. This view is consistent with that of Khan (2004) who argued that the Marxist ideology within the African context was useful in justifying why colonialism happened and why labour was being exploited by capitalists. However, it is its appeal which ensured the marginalisation and co-optation of unions. This chapter is the first of the findings chapters for this thesis. The dominant themes following fieldwork are discussed. Only the key characteristics of union-state relations, in colonial Zimbabwe, are captured. A detailed historical development of unions has been analysed in the literature chapters. The focus is on highlighting the key factors which define union-state relations. This is done to establish what Cooper (2002) refers to as “continuities and discontinuities” of one legacy into the other. These are essential in understanding why and how union-state relations in Zimbabwe developed over time. A brief examination of the state of politics soon after independence and a broader framework within which relationships developed is presented. The impact of the political dynamics at independence, have been missed by industrial relations scholars of post-colonial Africa leading to a partial and incomplete understanding of union-state relations in Zimbabwe.

The key themes, from interviews data, are complemented by historical data compiled and categorised to address two broad issues. The first is that, when union-state relations were positive, on which issues did they agreed on and when the relationship was negative, on which issues were there disagreements? Second, what other issues existed which influenced union-state the relations?
5.1. Union-state relations during colonialism (prior to 1980)

Participants shared the view that colonialism was about violent expropriation of resources and that it did not only bring new relations of production and property ownership, but it created a different type of working class from that which existed in Europe. The violence culture was inherited by the new political elite and it defined new relations of property ownership and employment relations. Unionists and employers argued that part of that legacy saw the continued use of the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA), Emergency Powers Act, for example, which are used to control worker militancy in the same way as they were used to control political organization during colonial rule.

So the industrial relations designed in post-colonial Zimbabwe created relations based on fear, coercion, subordination and exploitation and compliance. Unions for black workers represented a threat to the establishment. So they were managed in a heavy-handed manner through labour legislation appears which created and maintained relations of fear and coercion. There were no political freedoms for the black workers or the ‘natives’. Legislation and the colonial apparatus created racial segregation (Sachikonye 2002) which in itself was an effective tool in thwarting union organization.

On the other hand, it created those trade unions for white people with good or cordial relations with colonial administration Kanyenze 2007; Cooper 2002) creating the “external lobbying typology” (Ludlam et al., 2001). The combined effect of colonial administration instruments and the cordial relations between white-unions, resulted in, the creation of workplace managerial practices. These were also based on coercion, control and power against the workers. There were no industrial relations mechanisms for protecting black workers and trade unions. In fact, unions for black workers were prohibited under the Industrial Conciliation act 1934 and although in 1959 amendments to the ICA saw some minimal safeguards; one cannot say there was protection of black workers.
Participants talked about how legislative barriers to black trade resulted in an absence of mechanisms for collective bargaining. The Industrial Conciliation Act 1934 created a psychological contract between domestic capital and white labour. This sought to exclude blacks by barring them from being represented by Industrial Councils. These Councils had responsibility for setting apprenticeship conditions. The unions, in particular, the African Artisans Trade Union fought hard, for the elimination of colour bar. However, capital and white unions ensured that, this was not going to succeed. Strikes by black workers were usually suppressed by a combined strategy between white capital, white unions and the state. The courts were also against strikes by black unions. White workers were protected from competition with blacks through the definition of an employee (Raftopoulos 1997). Section four (4) of the ICA excluded blacks from wage bargaining and skilled trades because only ‘employees’ were allowed to become apprentices. The African Labour Regulations (1911) made it an offense to offer Africans higher wages in order to motivate them to work or break their existing contractual obligations with a particular employer. Under the Amended ICA 1959, employers would be fined, if a semi-skilled black worker was discovered in a skilled job. The worker would be dismissed from the job. The ICA 1959 formally recognised African trade unions but gave more voting power to whites. It defined three categories of workers. The first was the skilled, the second the semi-skilled and the third, the unskilled. Votes were allocated according to this criterion. One skilled worker’s vote was worth two of the semi-skilled and a quarter for the unskilled. It therefore meant that for every one white man’s vote there had to be four black people, or two Indians or coloureds. This ensured white domination on any decision making on trade union issues. Further, the Apprenticeship Training and Skilled Manpower Development Act required that for every 450 whites admitted every year for apprenticeship training, there were only 8 blacks allowed. White unions were united in preventing blacks from being skilled workers (Sambureni 1996, p. 164).
5.2. Union-state relations from independence in 1980-1995

All participants spoke about how the government’s national policies were designed to achieve nation-building. Unionists reluctantly praised government on the extent of the interventionist policies which created a “social welfare state”. The first five years were considered a huge success by all participants because the policy-making apparatus aimed at achieving redistribution of resources, reconciliation and addressing colonial inequalities. The interventionist policies, in particular, Growth with Equity Policy, Education for All Policy, Health for All policy, Agricultural Policy were considered by participants a huge success in areas whose positive impact extended to the labour market system. The state regulated every aspect of the employment relationship including working hours, leave, minimum wages and framework for settling disputes.

Responding to the colonial imbalances, it prohibited the discrimination on the basis of colour, creed, political affiliation, religion or gender. Women were no longer treated as minors and could be employed without the consent of their husbands and they now had paid maternity rights for 84 days. Five senior unionists however regretted that nothing was done to challenge the state and prevent it from assuming the power to control unions, including the right to vary or suspend any collective bargaining agreements. Overall, one could see what could be termed ‘post-colonial state corporatism’ which did not tolerate pluralism as evidenced by the heavy-handed manner of repressing strikes. However, this is a practice which characterised many post-colonial governments in SSA around the same period.

By ‘sweeping the carpet for the ZCTU’ and incorporating most of its leaders within the ZANU-PF party political structures resulting in a “union-party bonding typology” to use Ludlam et al (2001) concept. The period 1980 to 1995 was thus a period of positive relationship between the state and unions. The state had co-opted unions, at least its
leadership but this was a period of transition from minority to majority rule. Change was not effected overnight and there was thus a partial transition, “because there was continuity in certain aspects of the colonial regime …” (Sachikonye 2001, p.148). A combination of the “development agenda” and the “socialist rhetoric” and protective labour laws in the mid-80s, appealed to unions becoming the basis upon which a positive relationship in the early post-independence period evolved. Few conflicts existed reflecting the cordial relationship (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). According to participants, there were only two negative aspects. The first is the attempt by ZANU PF to form a one-party state and the second are union-led demonstrations introduction of SAPs.
Figure 5.1: Key issues defining union-state relations for the Period 1980-1995

**Issues where co-operation existed**
- Formation of ZCTU with government support
- Labour Relations Act of 1985 is passed declaring unions’ fundamental rights and defining unfair labour practice
- ZCTU leads government efforts to raise money for retrenched Zimbabwean workers in South Africa
- Minimum wages every 1st of May and Mugabe attends all ZCTU Commemorations
- Statutory instrument (S.I. 371) is introduced and made it almost impossible for employers to dismiss workers through a cumbersome and practically slow process
- The state in partnership with ZCTU advocated for One Union One Industry labour relations regime
- State seen to be implementing socialist policies hence public backing by ZCTU
- 1st 5 year Development Plan (1981-1985) Growth with Equity aimed at addressing colonial imbalances and actively supported by unions

**Potential Time-bomb issues**
- Implementation of ‘semi-socialist policies’
- Commencement of ‘Gukurahundi’
- Liberalisation of labour market
- Socialist policies abandoned and implements Transitional National Development Plans
- Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)
- ZCTU announces its decision to part ways with ZANU PF due to persistent caused by clashes/ideological differences (neoliberalism v preferred Marxism)
- Massive retrenchment of workers

**Red Light Issues**
- At its Congress in 1988, ZCTU rejects the One-Party State political system campaign advocated for by ZANU PF
- 1991 the first ever ZCTU post-independence demonstration against economic hardships
The key areas which defined the relationship during the first fifteen years are summarised in Figure 5.2 below:

Figure 5.2.: Summary of Key issues defining union-state relations (1980-1995)

Author’s construct 2014

The above issues and the nature of the relationship should be understood within the immediate context of colonialism. The authoritarian character of the state was inherited by the new political dispensation (Beckman and Sachikonye 2000). The inadequacy of the system was exposed when workers engaged in a spate of strikes demanding workers’ rights. Using Marxist-Socialist approach, government attempted to stop the strikes and ushered in labour-friendly legislation which weakened the labour movement. The state assumed the role of trade unions. The response of labour was to seek acceptance as part of ZANU PF structure alongside the same lines as the Youth and Women’s’ wing. The broader economic, social and political context for the changing union-state relations is examined in the next section.
5.3. The socio-economic and political challenges at independence

There was a spate of strikes indicating the weight of socio-economic challenges. The weight of expectations of the promises of independence made workers challenge the continuity of the colonial legacy and inequalities. But both the state and workers shared the same view regarding the effect of the colonial legacy. Union dissatisfaction was not necessarily targeted at the state but at "white capital". Unions were urging government to intervene in addressing the continuing colonial imbalances. In a way this showed the deficiencies of the inherited labour relations regime which did not provide mediation and dispute settlement procedures (Various interviewees). This structural deficiency revealed union’s inadequacies in effectively championing workers’ grievances. Interviewee’s accounts were also supported by literature, in particular, that “a small labour force existed and that was indicative of the level of industrialisation and that there existed a continuity of migrant labour system, particularly in agriculture, mining and industrial sectors. This showed that the low levels of skills and education that existed reflected within the new dispensation” (Beckman and Sachikonye 2001, p.148). Employers and unions were however reluctant to emphasise the role of socio-economic and political challenges facing the country soon after independence as having a connection on how union-state relations evolved. Yet government officials argued that the political challenges facing the country were a huge factor in shaping state-society relations for which unions were a part. This government view is consistent with political accounts of the time presented in literature in particular Astrow (1983) and Moyo (1990). There are perhaps two main reasons why trade unionists and employers were not articulating these political challenges. The research investigates a historical time-frame. The limitation is that of human memory decay. This can influence perceptions based on current emotions. The first, is that memory plays tricks and asking people to remember the political context for a period thirty-three years ago may be too much for to ask as people tend to remember the immediate past or those things that greatly affected them, hence the significance of
documentary analysis in this thesis. The second reason might be that where only one political party has been in power for such a long time, people tend to forget the political challenges that constructed relations and in any event, it is the bread and butter issues that tend to dominate their thinking.

Government officials argued that the instability in apartheid South Africa was a crucial issue in restricting political space, yet little scholarly attention has been given to this aspect in literature on union-state relations. In the field of political analysis, Moyo (1990) makes an important observation about the early political challenges. Thus he argues, “In 1980 regional politics were still driven by the cold war, and apartheid South Africa sought to take advantage of the super-power tension and conflict in both Mozambique and Angola. Pretoria made black majority rule in Zimbabwe appear as a threat, not only to white minority rule in South Africa, but also to Western geopolitical interests in Southern Africa” (Moyo 1990, p. 314).

Similarly, South Africa’s strategy to destabilise neighbouring countries was also analysed. Indeed Kanyenze (2004) argues that, “At the time of the ZIMCORD Donors’ Conference in March 1981, South Africa gave Zimbabwe one month’s notice, that it would not renew the bilateral trade agreement that had been in force since 1964. At the same time, South Africa stopped renewing contracts for Zimbabwean migrant workers and started sending them back home. An estimated 40 000 workers and remittances worth about Z$ 25 million per year (£25m at the time) were affected. Further, by March 1981, about 300 000 tonnes of Zimbabwean goods were stranded at South African Ports. The technicians who had been seconded to Rhodesia Railways’ by South Africa were withdrawn and on 4 April 1981, 24 diesel locomotives that had been leased to Rhodesia Railways were also withdrawn …” (Kanyenze 2004, p. 121).
Such a context created serious concerns of fear of continued South African destabilisation and the response was to narrow political space within Zimbabwe to ensure the whites would not conspire with the apartheid regime (Moyo 1990; Kanyenze 2004). Given an important political role played by unions in the struggle for political independence, government actively organised and funded the whole process and installing ZANU PF loyalists in the leadership thus narrowing political space. The ‘official objective’ of the first ZCTU executive was to ensure a loyal worker centre in line with government development philosophy. A further political challenge was that “reconciliation between blacks and whites ran into major difficulties largely because of the uncompromising stance and style of Ian Smith’s Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ) which controlled 20 parliamentary seats reserved for whites in accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement. Also the relationship between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU collapsed thereby ending the government of national unity and plunging the country into various forms of civil strife from 1982-1987” (Moyo 1990, p. 314).

It is argued that Mugabe was “forced to compromise and modify his tough-talking guerrilla fighter perspective to a respectable leader amenable to the politics of compromise, preaching national unity and reconciliation and committed to expanding but not restructuring the country’s economic base”, (Astrow 1983, p. 143). What one reads from this view is that there was no attempt at restructuring the country’s economy because of the political pressures that existed at the time. A capitalist economic structure was clearly not conducive for the creation of socialism, which trade unions appeared to have failed to observe at the time. In his own party, Mugabe had to silence critics who saw him as having shifted from socialism to capitalism and his response was “… although our principles derived from Marxism-Leninism, they also took into account our traditions, our own environment … we recognise that the economic structure of this country is based on capitalism, and that whatever ideas we have must build on that, modifications can only take place in a gradual way” (Astrow 1983, p.143). Unionists and business leaders talked
about the paternalistic approach taken by government in early years of independence
arguing that it was fashionable to do so and the state had evil motives to control and
impose a one-party state, hence a paternalistic industrial relations system. Unionists
argued that this had nothing to do with the political challenges the country faced.

The state apparatus that was inherited- the “continuities” (Cooper 2002; Khan 2004) was
crucial in shaping post-colonial relations. In the case of Zimbabwe, “the state apparatus
was politicised, militarised and interventionist resulting in public institutions catering for a
narrow spectrum of political interests” (Bratton 1980, p. 442). How much political space is
available or allowable in militarised systems for the expression of free will of civilians? Is it
an overstatement or an oversight to suggest union-state relations were cordial against
such a context? What narrow political interests dominated? In militarised and politicised
systems, to what extent is there a voice accorded to independent political analysis?
Considering that unionists and business leaders talked about how the academia in ZANU
PF have “rewritten the liberation history and marginalise the role of trade unions in
bringing political independence”, It is perhaps misleading to claim that union-state
relations were cordial in early years of independence. Existing literature on this aspect
seems open to criticism. Further, can one argue that the state was really Marxists-
Leninist? It is difficult to conclude both from the interviews and from literature on the
nature of union-state relationship immediately following independence. Elsewhere, it is
argued that “Large scale businesses, in partnership with the state engages in extensive
intervention to ensure for themselves preferential allocation of land and labour as well as
the social services of the state” (Bratton 1980, p. 444).

Given the skewed and exclusionary access to resources and opportunities, the new
dispensation was overwhelmed by demands for jobs and social services. The absence of
clear structures for articulation of popular interests elevated the status of the new state.
This marginalised the articulation of opposing views. The trade unionists’ analysis
attempted to equate state intervention in social services to Marxism was rather simplistic and perhaps points to the rather inaccurate assessment of the political situation which brought about their co-optation. Government was just continuing with the colonial inheritance but now in the majority’s interest but it was never socialist at any point. Asked what they really considered as a shift in government political perspective, the unionists argued that they saw a strong capitalist component each time there was a government reshuffle.

“We then saw a worrying trend of the appointment and elevation of London School of Economics, Harvard, Cambridge and Oxford graduates who had a sweet tooth for capitalism, and the World Bank and IMF seemed to be pushing these through” (Interview with Senior ZCTU official).

While the above reflected the concern of trade unions, it does in a way reinforce the attempts of government to continue building on the capitalist base the country had inherited and there was nothing inconsistent with its position. Unions simply misread government policies in the first decade of independence. So the assumed cordial union-state relations in the early post-independence period (Sachikonye 2001 and Raftopoulos 2002), was perhaps inadequate political analysis by the early ZCTU leadership.

The majority of unionists fought the liberation war alongside those in the current ZANU PF leadership. This is significant for this research for several reasons. They all mourned about being excluded, marginalised and betrayed by ZANU-PF. They argued that the political objectives of the liberation war were being sacrificed. This offers an important context to appreciate union-state relations in Zimbabwe. Veteran union officials and a significant number of government officials have a relationship problem originating from the struggle for independence, a factor never highlighted in the existing analysis of union-state relations. Did the unionists harbour political ambition right from the beginning, i.e. in early independence? This thesis is inconclusive on this aspect. Those who would point to
the fact that the ZCTU later formed the MDC and occupied key positions in the political party may find this as evidence to support their viewpoint.

Another economic challenge was that Zimbabwe experienced severe droughts in 1983, 1985 and 1987 (Moyo 1990; Kanyenze 2001; Africa Research Bulletin 1990). This resulted in country-wide drought relief programmes through imports. Such relief programmes were accompanied by some socialist posturing from the post-colonial state. ZANU PF provided for the people. Workers benefited from such relief programmes; it was therefore inconceivable that union relations with government were positive. It appears such a move shifted attention away from weaknesses of industrial relations structures to survival issues that confronted the workers, especially in relation to the strong linkage between the worker and rural sources of supplementing income. Collective bargaining was relegated to the lower levels, as workers concentrated on improving their rural sources of income. Government provided the seeds and fertilisers for subsistence farming, so this shifted attention from workplace issues. Does this mean union-state relations were cordial? It is difficult to conclude.

Government was sceptical of foreign investment as well as the existing power of whites resulting in the President expressing the point;

“Really, it's better to have capitalism which is based here, rooted here, domesticated, than capitalism which is foreign. We try to get our own people, either as cooperatives or as partners or as public companies to participate in the economy in a meaningful way and get in control of the means of production … we would then be faced with our own companies which are capitalist and it will be up to us to say in this area the state should have so much equity”, (Moyo 1990, p. 324).
This quotation highlights government’s fears of foreign capital. Similar suspicions were evident in interviews with government officials claiming the existence of an “unholy alliance between business and workers”. The idea of having an indigenous capitalist base has always been government’s agenda. Within the context of this research, it is important to realise, that this is one of the main reasons why government had clashed with trade unions. Clashes have been on the nature of processes involved in empowering blacks, with trade unions claiming that, such measures only serve to benefit “ZANU-PF cronies” at the expense of the masses. While the merits of indigenisation are beyond the scope of this research, what is important is to understand how such a mind-set came to be part of government’s thinking. Sibanda (1988) explains the economic constraints that might be inferred to this research as an explanation of why government is very ‘anti-Western capitalism’. It is argued that “Aid was being used as a political weapon against governments that went against the grain of Western thinking. For it is estimated that Zimbabwe lost some US40 million in US aid for voting against the USA invasion of Grenada and for abstaining against voting on the Soviet shooting of the South Korean Airliner”, (Sibanda 1988, p. 4).

Further, “At a farewell luncheon for the outgoing USA ambassador in April 1986, a speech read on behalf of the then minister of Foreign Affairs attacked US policy on Angola and declared that Zimbabwe will not be controlled by any power. This precipitated a walkout by former USA President Jimmy Carter, and USA officials attending the function, and suspension by USA of its aid to Zimbabwe”, (Kanyenze 1987, p. 38). So, there were socio-economic and political conditions that motivated the state to weaken unions and co-opt them. In the end, the ZCTU shared offices with the Ministry of Labour, and government would announce wage increases on every May Day. Favourable legislation followed and that greatly reduced possibilities for union-state conflict.
5.4. Role of Civil society and the use of violence

In the later part of the second decade following independence, union-state relations increasingly became acrimonious. The unions started opposing the one-party state initiative by ZANU PF. They questioned the structural adjustment reform package but they did so with evident support from civil society organizations. Unionists were arguing that they were simply responding to the challenges and hardships suffered by their constituents. Business leaders and government officials, on the other hand, expressed the visibility of civil society influence in educating workers to oppose government- the ‘educate to liberate strategy’. This same strategy was also used in South Africa to support ‘resistant movements such as ANC’. The state responded to this civil-society engagement through violent suppression, a strategy deployed not only in Zimbabwe but also in other African countries.

Mandaza (1998) assesses the role of civic society. He acknowledges their role in championing the good governance, transparency and democracy agenda. Their advocacy against human rights abuses, corruption and dictatorship has earned them the title of ‘regime-change’ agencies or ‘imperialist elements’. In Africa, their role has been clear and worrying for governments. The apartheid regime in South Africa could not have succumbed without pressure from civil groups. Civil groups are exerting the same pressure on the Monarch in Swaziland, where they have for some time been collaborating with trade unions in demanding for democracy. Trade unions, in Zambia succeeded in ending Kaunda’s rule because civil society groups played a sterling role. Similarly, in Malawi, Kamuzu Banda was ousted from office when civil groups campaigned against a one-party system. Recently, it was Egypt where Muammar Gadhafi was overthrown and killed. Their role in the ousting of Mobutu Sese Seko by Kabila sent a clear message to all politicians. Civil society groups are targeted because “the relationship between civic groups and trade unions in a number of African countries including Niger, Gabon, Guinea,
Mauritius and Congo have created the impression, within government circles that civic
groups are anti-states", (Mandaza 1998, p.307). Such a trend makes them unwanted by
many governments, unless they are directly working on programmes to support the
government of the day.

In this thesis, government officials questioned the genuineness of the democracy and
good governance agenda, which the ZCTU, the NCA and a number of human rights
groups were advocating, supported by America and Britain. They felt the good
governance and human rights agenda was anti-people and anti-African and should not be
tolerated. They were contradictory and a hindrance to the uplifting of the African people.
They argued that the human rights and property rights of thirty-three white commercial
farmers killed during the violent land riots are not more important than the human rights of
13, 000,000 landless Zimbabweans. Yet, government officials argued, the trade unions
were being played against their own governments by those western powers that have an
interest in Zimbabwe, all in the name of human rights and good governance. For that
reason, there was clear intolerance of any sort of linkage between unions and civil society
groups and the use of violence was legitimised.

Western democracy was being attacked from all angles by government officials. They
argued that the west should not continue to ‘mess-up Africa’ in the same way they caused
the ‘Arab Spring’ which has led to millions dying and millions becoming homeless. In
short, western democracy was synonymous with genocide and they would rather deal with
any association between unions and civil society in a heavy-handed way for the benefit of
the masses. It is the ZCTU that led calls for the rejection of one-party state and publicly
welcomed the formation of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in the 80s to contest
elections. The views held by government officials, were consistent with what was
observed in other African countries in their opposition to multi-party elections, that is
Western-led democratic initiatives through multi-partyism are “divisive, splitting the people,
and therefore the negation of national unity, that essential ingredient of national development …” (Mandaza 1998, p. 307). In the context of Zimbabwe, research participants were in agreement that union-state relations, took a different direction when the ZCTU opposed one-party-state initiatives by ZANU PF. Civil-society was viewed as leading the advocacy against land reform because of their connections to the British Labour government. Thus government officials were opposed to what they saw as ‘neo-colonialism’ that is, ‘getting the country back through the back door’.

“I think what we did by taking land from white farmers was a direct challenge to the Western establishment so they try any means to remove us using unions as the soft entry point”, (Interview; Senior Government Official).

Civil-society agenda was considered to be the same with that of the MDC, so they both required a ‘heavy-handed approach’ to protect the hard-won independence. This agenda, seen by government representatives as a ‘package of strategies’ comprised campaigning for sanctions against Zimbabwe, challenging the state policies especially those aimed at empowering people including indigenisation and land reform. The strategy was seen as camouflaged, by the human and trade union rights discourse, claims against alleged breakdown in rule of law and spreading falsehoods surrounding presidential and parliamentary elections.

Some civil society organizations focused attention on electoral reforms, educating the public on basic rights and creating a platform for the voice of the voiceless, and this includes trade unions. Given that the objectives of unions, civic groups and opposition parties were the same or similar, it complicated relationships with government. It is of little help to the ZCTU that the countries, whose civic groups have been active politically, are the same that have campaigned for sanctions against Zimbabwe. That has given a different direction and complexion to union-state relations in the late 1980s to mid-1990s. The direct support by civil-society to ZCTU plays into the hands of the state. First, often
ignored in analysis of union-state relations is the government’s ‘liberation war credentials’ gained through fighting colonial oppression. So anything that seems to be supported by Britain or other western countries against it appears to strengthen its position rather than weaken it. It also creates an impression that violence is justified given the violent nature of colonialism.

During the liberation struggle, Mugabe’s party also received support from the civic groups including the churches, in particular, the Roman Catholic (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace). So it is not, mere politicking on the part of government that regime change agenda is at the centre of trade unions relations with civic groups. Perhaps, no one is better-placed than the old-guard ZANU-PF nationalists, to assess the behaviour of civic groups. Within the context of Zimbabwe’s recent history, it is clear from interviews that government has not forgiven civic groups for creating and funding the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), which campaigned for constitutional reform and the rejection of government sponsored constitution in a referendum (the popular No-Vote referendum of 1999). The NCA, led by former ZCTU Secretary General, went on to participate in the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change. This nearly ousted ZANU-PF- the current ruling party out of power. Should one expect relations between the ZCTU and civic groups on one hand, with government on the other to be cordial? Perhaps not, and incidentally, most political parties in Africa are a creation of civic groups to the extent that “… soon after the attainment of national independence, the new black majority governments sought to control these civic groups through legislation, registration and various other measures which would enable the regime to know what was going on in these organizations”, (Mandaza 1998, p.307). Mandaza’s account is consistent with that of trade unionists, employers and ILO representatives, who argued that the state facilitated the formation of ZCTU, in order to control workers. Some argued that such control was not limited to the ZCTU but to journalists as well, that is the Zimbabwe Union
of Journalists. One unionist, who was directly involved in the formation of the ZCTU recalled;

“The government realised that if it allowed the unions to come together by themselves, the ZANU PF component in the overall movement would naturally be in conflict with government … they wanted a national centre which was loyal to the party, to themselves that is, because they were aware of the trade union divisions from before independence …”, (interview, Former ZCTU General Secretary)

In conclusion, the repression and attack of civil-society groups and trade unions were seen as necessary by government officials. Trade unionists expected to be repressed and beaten up and they were motivated to continue agitating politically in league with civil-society groups.

5.5. Role and objectives of unions

The debate regarding trade union objectives, in particular what they should actually do has resurfaced in Zimbabwe and brings back to life the earlier conceptualisation by Cole (1913); Hoxie (1923), Webb’s (1920), Marx (1844), Perlman (1928), Chamberlain (1951); Dunlop (1975) and many leading theorists of trade unionism. The perception that government was attempting to dictate the role of civil society has been documented elsewhere (Sylvester 1995 and Bratton 1994). In the context of state-union relations, there were concerns that the state apparatus was actively engaged in closing up democratic space to ensure no credible opposition emerges. The participants’ accounts of events were consistent with those of Bratton (1994, p. 407) who argued that “ … in its drive for a one-party state, the government promoted a one-sector, one union policy for industry, labour and the public service soon calling for the three agricultural unions to merge … the three unions were independent private associations over which the ruling party and cabinet ministers had no legal authority … the minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural
Resettlement intervened forcefully, employing ethnic slurs and intimidating admonitions to get the unions to immediately elect a new leadership”. Trade unionists talked about how trade unions for farmers were forced to merge with other unions aligned to the state against the wish of their membership.

Similarities could be drawn between this development and what the majority of research participants (trade unionists and employers) said in relation to the arm of government in forming the ZCTU, ensuring that the six different federations that existed at independence were all merged into one under a ZANU PF leadership. The same can also be said, about their accounts in relation to the formation of the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists. Such interest, by government, is largely seen as an attempt to define the roles these organizations play and because this is resisted, it then defines the nature of state-union relations. Against such a background and or observation, it becomes difficult to argue that these institutions are both independent and autonomous. It also becomes very difficult to sustain the popular view, in literature which holds that trade unions in the first decade of political independence had a cordial relationship with the state. In the case of agricultural unions, government’s action was “resisted by farmers who were engaged in efforts to divide into multiple entities, their leaders went along with government for personal gain, scrambling for well-paid positions in the new union and for access to symbolic and material spoils … were recruited to regime value in ZANU PF centred unity, albeit for their own reasons”, (Bratton 1994, p. 407).

This is in a way similar to what happened with the ZCTU in the sense that government facilitated its formation and installed its leadership, making sure that those who were not in ZANU PF were not to emerge victorious in the union elections. Given the absence of literature on how the membership felt about ZANU PF’s involvement in forming ZCTU, it is unclear how the membership reacted to the creation of the ZCTU. Business executives and unionists argued that, by facilitating the formation of the ZCTU in 1981, government
sought to influence the aims, and objectives of trade unions in a manner designed to subordinate the labour movement to ZANU PF. It was argued, that the state has not forgiven ZCTU for forming the MDC. They also explained how a rival union federation, the ZFTU works hand in glove with the government in all matters and behaves like a party political wing, a role which they argue ZCTU was not prepared to play.

“”To understand the role government expects trade unions to play, you have to look at the role played by ZFTU, a federation of employees which government created to counter the ZCTU. This federation is incidentally led by the same person who led the farm invasions- if you heard of Chinotimba. That’s the person that led the farm invasions. And after the farm invasions, he went on to do factory invasions. After factory invasions, that is the federation that is trying to create an alliance with employers which are pro-ZANU PF, actually not employers who are pro-ZANU PF but employers who are from ZANU PF because they are ZANU PF itself. Those people, they don’t question anything that government does. So that is the role government want us to play but ZCTU is saying NO-It is not part of the nationalist agenda …" (Senior ZCTU official).

There was overwhelming agreement amongst research participants that the government, in the first decade of independence succeeded in influencing union functions. Thus,

“”In the early days, there was subservience to the party by the first ZCTU administration. Those in the ZCTU didn’t want to be seen in conflict with the party which had fought for independence, a revolutionary party, one which espoused a socialist position and one claiming to be a workers’ party. So at first, the ZCTU had the carpet swept out from underneath their feet. The first administration was subservient to government, while the government was too paternalistic in terms of its relations with the labour movement, as a means of controlling it, of cause” (former ZCTU Secretary General).
Union-state relations in Zimbabwe are influenced by differing perceptions over the role unions are expected to play and are playing. There was a deliberate strategy by government officials to influence and dictate the role trade unions should play. Unions have resisted government’s pressure to be an extension of the ruling party resulting in broadening their political role culminating in the formation of the opposition political party, the MDC. The objectives of unions in Zimbabwe have changed over the years. In the literature chapters, it was argued that in colonial Zimbabwe, there were two categories of unions, one category for whites and another for blacks. Their objectives were not the same. Unions for white workers were required as an extension of the separate development ideology by the colonial administration thus, they were expected to defend the reservation of jobs for white workers, negotiate measures which ensured the job colour bar and prevent entry of blacks, into those job categories which were deemed to be the privilege for white workers. They were thus expected to cooperate with colonial administration in return for those favours. On the other hand, unions for black workers were part of nationalist struggle and resistance against colonial domination. Their objectives were therefore different. Whichever type of union one looks at, it was clear that the colonial administration was dictating the role and objectives of trade unions. Come independence, the same strategy of dictating union objectives seemed to continue as ZANU PF imposed a leadership into the newly formed union federation, the ZCTU. Just like any other unions around the globe, the ZCTU officials argued their principal role is to “promote, advance and safeguard the economic, social and constitutional freedoms of workers by securing legal, political, democratic and good governance framework” in Zimbabwe through strengthening its capacity and independence and those of its affiliates.

Representing workers in international fora, promoting friendship, cooperation, and solidarity and fraternal understanding with other trade union movements, progressive
institutions and mass organizations have become the dominant function of the ZCTU in the past two decades. There has also been an increase in discouraging and opposing the formation of splinter trade unions in Zimbabwe, or any other forms of worker disunity and to advance educational, political and economic knowledge within trade unions building their capacity to effectively defend their interests” (interviews with unions, employers and ILO officials-March 2013).

A closer look at these roles gives an idea, of why there is conflict between unions and the government. The modus operandi includes a political, democratic and good governance agenda. Government officials were uncomfortable about this. By discouraging the formation of splinter unions’ places these unions in direct conflict with the government. This is because the government appeared to be promoting its own unions and supporting a rival trade union federation which competes against the ZCTU. Government is actively supporting and encouraging multiplicity of trade unions arguing that this is in line with ILO conventions, in particular, freedom of choice and association. Zimbabwe’s labour legislation just like the UK laws provides for the right to choose which union to belong to. However, in the context of Africa where the working class is relatively small, multiplicity of unions lead to the shrinking of democratic space. This is because it weakens unions and their representational, legislative and governmental functions, thus failing to restrain the power of the state. Encouraging multiplicity and splintering of trade unions was perceived as punishment for ZCTU’s refusal to endorse the one-party state system advocated by ZANU-PF. So while as a punitive measure it affected the ZCTU, in terms of international labour standards, it did not violate any union rights.

Seeking to secure the broader governance framework makes it unavoidable to comment on those issues which affect the public and workers. It makes trade unions political further straining union-state relations. What exactly is meant by securing political and good governance framework? Does this include forming a political party to articulate those
concerns? Does it mean campaigning and or aligning to an opposition political party? Or does it mean entering into discussions with government and negotiate agreements that benefit the workers? Does it mean entering into a social contract or partnership with government on matters of economic policy? In other words, what are the processes that should bring about such political, economic and good governance framework? To the extent that this is still a grey area in Zimbabwe, it then becomes fertile ground for union-state conflict. Government’s viewpoint is that unions should not engage in politics. There were also claims by government officials that ZCTU was not formed by government to play the political role but to represent workers. Political representation can only be done by political parties so unions should not be political and should represent all workers regardless of political affiliation, creed or religious beliefs. Yet, government officials were concerned that the ZCTU was not accompanying it to international meetings in order to show support for its policies, in particular land, indigenisation, factory and other empowerment policies as well as campaigning against sanctions. Some government officials argued that the unions should be a department under the Ministry of Labour supervised on matters concerning representation of workers. Being an extension of ZANU PF party (Marxist tradition) they were not supposed to publicly oppose ZANU PF but do so through the relevant structure. All government officials were very concerned with the alliance between unions and civil society organisations and the relationship with international donor community.

The ZCTU accused the government of “dictatorship and economic suicide” arguing that every other government policy appeared crafted to enrich Army Generals, Police, Security forces, Judges and political cronies. Their members’ interests could only be protected by challenging such government actions. Therefore, the role of trade unions is shaped by government actions and economic mismanagement. They attacked the government for not understanding that there is no difference between politics and economics arguing that an economic issue is a political issue. Thus trade unions were playing their role in
contesting or challenging government, on what it believed was the political field. They were defiant that, they could not be expected to campaign against sanctions as they played no part in bringing those sanctions in the first place. Such a role is political in any event, but government would be comfortable with that role because the political role was being fulfilled on behalf of the ruling party. It was also interesting to observe how they felt government had betrayed the nation, the trade unions and half of them talked about the decomposition of nationalism and how the country was being signed away into the hands of the politician- “the fat cat” as they all referred to them. For what they believed, they felt it was important that unions’ role be defined according to the issues on the ground and not defined by ZANU PF.

The ILO officials argued that trade unions should be free to decide how they want to conduct their business and that freedom of association was about making such choices. The conflict over the role of unions is also the fight over union autonomy. Government has been accused of denying unions and civil society groups such autonomy over a long time. This seems to be a problem with many governments and not only in Africa but the United Kingdom as well. Ewing (2005, p.2) analysed the Warwick agreement of 2004 and questioned the strategy of the Labour government to influence the future direction of trade unions in a direction that was inconsistent with key ILO conventions 87 and 98. In the case of Zimbabwe participants explained how government was involved not only in forming ZCTU but in forming the Zimbabwe union for journalists (ZUJ) to ensure dissenting voices were not publicised. Thus,

“…For ZUJ, all its founding Presidents and subsequent Presidents were senior journalists at state media groups, hence the leadership was composed of people independent from state influence. There was a time of course when Kindness Paradza from Financial Gazette was the President but most of its leaders were drawn from state publications. As you know, state publications are propaganda apparatus. So as a result of that, the state never allowed ZUJ to exercise any sort
of autonomy by creating institutional weaknesses and as you know, the state uses its intelligence services to ensure this hold of control, (Former official of ZUJ).

Owing to the role ZCTU was playing, the government was perceived as creating splinter unions to destabilise it and ensure that they get a friendly union that would portray a good image of government at international forums such as the ILO Conferences. If unions could not behave according to the wishes of the membership but to those of government, then democratic space automatically shrinks. The effects of this could be numerous or varying. The first is that opposing view is marginalised, and in the context of developing countries, it becomes a matter of whether you are ‘with us or against us, a sell-out or a comrade’. The treatment that comes following such narratives has different outcomes. Second, is that, to sustain such a position, a system of patronage is needed on the part of government in the form of access to resources and other forms of preferential treatment. When that happens, it alienates those on the fringes and they galvanise to form opposition hence the politicisation of civic groups. In the case of the ZCTU, those that claimed to be excluded from the leadership stepped up to oust those who were installed by government. The third effect is that government has to sustain a system of patronage and that might require the formulation of a labour relations regime premised on paternalism. It is therefore not surprising that interviewees talked about the paternalist relations which existed between unions and government following political independence. In short, it appears that any form of patronage and or paternalism breed serious political opposition. It is perhaps not accidental that out of worker discontent, came the most serious political opposition which unsettled ZANU PF government. This explains the acrimonious union-state relations which exist today.

Government officials did not expect an entirely perfect relationship free of conflict. However, when conflict occurs, they wanted unions to use African structures as mechanisms for conciliation and or arbitration in the resolution of any differences instead
of approaching “ILO-Geneva” and involving the West. Every government representative stressed the need to use African regional structures including “ILO-Harare” as one of the key functions of the unions.

“I say why don’t we talk about these issues when we get back home and we resolve any of those concerns and if we fail, then you can say we have failed to resolve these issues, let someone come in and assist us like the ILO Harare. If ILO Harare fails to address their concerns they should approach African Regional structures of SATUC or African Union rather than run to ILO Geneva”, (Senior Official, Ministry of Labour).

“ILO-Harare” was generally seen by government officials as more reasonable and more objective compared to “ILO-Geneva”. Government was therefore more prepared to engage with ILO-Harare who it felt was more in tune with issues on the ground in Zimbabwe. More importantly, this view drew support from the ILO-Harare participants who expressed their concern that the trade unions were not fully exploiting available avenues for consultation and engagement with government. This is significant as it goes to the heart of the causes of the breakdown in union-state relationship. It is also significant in that it brings a dimension to union-state relations which suggest the industrial relations structures in the country are not working properly. Such a failure of the system could be seen in the lack of proper consultation or negotiation taking place between unions and government. An ILO official observed;

“My own assessment is that the strategies the workers have deployed have cost them dearly. The strategies for social dialogue say sit on the table and discuss, agree to differ while on the table, then you meet again and engage. Then you will get to a point where you will agree on certain issues. So it’s a continuous process of engagement but on a few occasions unions had the strategy of either walking out or refusing to participate. But you cannot change things from the outside. That is why government was accusing them of regime change because they were coming from the outside. If you are sitting together at the same table, and
discussing, yes there could be short comings on the part of government, but they will also learn that if we always engage we don’t get into problems. The government that consults its people doesn’t get uprisings. The case of Ireland and Barbados for example, gave the lesson that people need to start talking. But if you say, no, we are not even going to come for the discussion, that's wrong. Trade unions lost the opportunity here and I think even the change in dynamics of having a situation where 3 in 4 jobs are now in the informal sector is a result of their refusal to participate. Unions woke up faced with company closures, retrenchments and no membership. When that happens, as unions, you have no voice. Even now, when you take a closer look, you will see that there is a splintering up of trade unions because they cannot sit down and agree on certain things. So they are weaker today and they cannot bring issues to the table with one strong voice” (ILO Official- Harare).

One of the union functions should be to engage government in order to secure favourable conditions for workers. However, the findings of this study show an absence of dialogue between unions and the state. Strikes were seen as the first instead of the last resort action. For that reason, such strikes were viewed by government officials as politically motivated for they were not emerging out of collective bargaining deadlocks. Unions and government do not share the same view regarding union purposes, functions and objectives leading to strained relations and this undermines the autonomy and independence of unions.

5.6. Politics of the stomach

The argument that unions should be economic and not political is firmly rooted in the seminal work of the Webb’s (1920) and Hoxie’s (1923) business unionism. In the context of Zimbabwe, the single most divisive, contested and heavily politicised issue at the heart
of union-state relations was the involvement of ZCTU in politics. Government officials argued that unions were involved in mainstream politics through the MDC whereas the ZCTU argued that it was involved in politics of the stomach. The degree of intolerance between union officials and government officials on this aspect was alarming. Conflict over this issue was directly linked to trade union functions where their perceptions differed.

All participants were asked the question ‘Should trade unionists be involved in politics? Trade unionists found this question highly provocative as reflected in the following narrative:

“That question should not be asked. It’s a ZANU PF line of thinking, its wrong, its rotten and the problem with you guys, the so called intellectuals or academia, whatever name you call yourselves, is that you try to come up with some abstract theoretical definitions to explain to us how we should see things and how we should react to the challenges that we face. You live in the UK, where everything is available in abundance, where you don’t have to go without food and shelter, where despite government’s neo-liberal policies, they provide whoever cannot afford basic necessities through a sound social or benefits system. Then you come up here and ask us about an existing line that divides politics and trade unionism…” (Senior Union Official and MDC MP).

Another participant argued;

“Well, we sympathise with the academics because you concentrate on cherry-picking, which is quite unfortunate. When you go to the dictionary meaning of politics, it is very clear what politics is. But you want to go further and engage in laboratory analysis of the description of politics which is quite unfortunate in that your knowledge is in trying to tell a human being the demarcations which is very wrong.
Trade unions by their nature are political animals and this is why historically, whether in the Russian or French Revolutions the workers have always been responsible for installing and removing governments. Through POSA, government talks of legitimate trade union activities. Why legitimate trade union business and why not legitimate church business? The churches are not described as being affected by POSA, neither are Weddings. Can you describe a legitimate wedding and tell a difference between a legitimate and an illegitimate wedding? So why legitimate trade union activities? They are doing this because they know President Mugabe was the Secretary of RATA when he was in the teaching profession, Joshua Nkomo was General Secretary of the Railway Workers Union, John Nkomo was also a union official in the Railway, and Jason Moyo was the Secretary General of the Artisans Union. So they know the power of the Trade Unions. Everywhere unions play a political role, (Senior ZCTU official).

The question of union’s political involvement was unwelcome because it is associated with extreme forms of torture, beatings, harassment, surveillance and unnecessary arrests and detentions especially since 2002. They were uncompromising on the role of unions in politics but sought to define precisely that role, that is, they were not involved in party politics but politics of the stomach. Government officials argued ZCTU was involved in ‘mainstream politics, campaigning for the MDC and allying with international civil society groups in order to achieve regime change, including celebrating the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe.

Thus the use of the words “intellectuals” and “academics” in interviewees’ narratives has a special context which goes to the heart of union-state relations. They meant “sell-out” or “an enemy of the suffering masses”; they meant “ZANU PF propagandists”- the people who were re-writing the history of Zimbabwe and marginalising the role of trade unions; the people who were benefiting by throwing away their intellectual capital in order to
benefit from the government's patronage system. These words meant the people who were extremely gifted at creating policies that would benefit the minority in the name of the majority. So the words were used in a derogatory sense and if you were an academic or intellectual, you were popularising government agenda for personal benefits. For that reason, you were an enemy of the suffering people. “Intellectuals” or “academics” were words deployed in describing an MDC faction led by Professor Ncube, which had ‘betrayed the workers’ agenda’ advocated by the “main” MDC party led by Tsvangirai. The other MDC faction was perceived as bent on tarnishing the image of Morgan Tsvangirai and portraying him as uneducated and unfit for Presidential position. But what is the relevance of this MDC factionalism to this thesis? As shall be seen in one of the accounts, ZCTU officials had, at one of the MDC party Congresses expressed their ownership of the MDC. The question is which MDC? The answer seems to be the one led by Morgan Tsvangirai. From this viewpoint, trade unions were seen as participating in party political activities and in both African and Zimbabwean politics, they qualified to be beaten up, arrested and tortured. The words “intellectual” and “academic” are unkind words. Government officials used them to distinguish between the ZCTU leadership and their research wing, LEDRIZ. The ZCTU leadership was uneducated, economically illiterate and narrow-minded. Their lack of intellect made it impossible to engage in dialogue but that made them dangerous because they were selling the country back to the British as they were used to fan worker discontent. Yet, government officials had tremendous respect for the ZCTU research department, the “think-tank” whose great ideas and objective mind was being compromised by the politicised ZCTU leadership.

The intellectual/academic classification was at times used by some participants to refer to the researcher to identify which side of the fence I stood on- ‘a government spy?; ‘a Western-informer’ or a ‘neutral’ and ‘genuine’ student researcher? The significance of this narrative in reference to the researcher is that an academic/intellectual is detached from the reality because s/he is privileged. It meant that without conducting interviews or
distributing questionnaires to the ordinary workers, across the country there was risk of becoming an academic/intellectual who has no input from the suffering workers. The context within which respondents locate their experience was crucial in explaining union’s involvement in politics:

“That is a very important but a wrong question because it is about democracy and is perhaps more relevant to democratic countries. Democracy is a foreign word. In the context of Zimbabwe, it means electing to the ZCTU leadership someone who can withstand the torture at the hands of the state. Someone as strong-willed and courageous as Tsvangirai, Matibenga, Chibebe, Matombo or Moyo, who actually get more motivated after each beating or arrest. So that should show you the nature of state-union relationship. I remember when MDC was being formed, people were asking me why I was not going to be part of the leadership, and my answer was ‘ndichinoroverweyi?’ (For what reason should I get beaten up) But those who saw themselves as rough-riders, were prepared to go and they were saying ndikarohwa kaviri, katatu ndinenge ndava bhoo. (If I get beaten up twice or three times, I will be fine after that, I would have graduated) You look at people like Majongwe from the Teachers’ Union even if he says anything now, government just ignore him, they say he is mad, just leave him. It’s because he graduated. So if you are asking me about whether trade unions are involved in politics, my answer is that it is the government which is drawing unionists into politics by making sure people are hungry and starving and by torturing us for raising those concerns. For me, government is the kingmaker of unionists for political office” (Senior Union Official).

A key benefit of this thesis is its use of interpretative analysis which locates the context within which participants describes their experience of the relationship. In reference to the above narrative, participants were arguing about a particular model that had a historical grounding within the Zimbabwean context, that which saw unions being involved in politics
during the colonial era. The current ZANU PF government was propelled to their leadership positions following their union activities. For that reason, they have no grounds (moral, political or intellectual) to bar the ZCTU leadership from political participation. In fact trade unions in Africa have a long tradition of political engagement beginning with their involvement in anti-colonial movements (Webster 2007) and produced leaders such as Houphouet Boïny in Cote d’Ivoire, Sekou Toure in Guinea, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Leopold Sedar Senghor in Senegal and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania. Therefore government’s insistence on non-political involvement is at variance with African tradition and Zimbabwe’s immediate colonial experiences.

According to unionists and employers, intellectuals/academics had no understanding of the politics of the stomach and the extent of the suffering workers. Unfortunately, intellectuals were in the ZANU PF camp. The politics of the stomach is a war between the ‘educated uneducated’ and the ZCTU representing the suffering masses. In practise, what does the “politics of the stomach” involve? Is it the politics of the stomach or the political orientation of trade unionists? For the ZCTU, it meant challenging those economic policies that affect trade unions and impoverish the workers. Such challenge included taking to the streets to protest against high cost of living and forming a political party to advance worker interests and influence decision-making at the point at which catastrophic decisions which impoverish workers (in parliament) are made. It also meant stopping government elites from “plundering the country while the masses starve”. Others argued that it was ZANU PF that was involving them into national politics by demanding that they accompany them to international meetings to campaign against sanctions and support its “controversial land grab policy”. They were defiant and adamant that such a question should be asked to the ZFTU which was involved in advancing ZANU PF’s interest. Others questioned the logic of ZANU PF’s involvement in trade unionism through forming trade union federations and creating splinter unions from the ZCTU.
Is the ZCTU involved in party politics as opposed to politics of the stomach? The views of a former unionist and now senior MDC Parliamentarian clarify this position;

“ZCTU’s involvement in party politics is a problem, and unfortunately ZANU PF is right. After a decision was made that people who were elected as leaders in the MDC would step-out from the civic group leadership. Tsvangirai, Gibson, Auret stepped out, all of us who were on the national task-force stepped out of our NCA positions and so on. The problem in is even when people stepped out, they are still very much involved in their previous civil society groups particularly those from the ZCTU, who openly say we are the MDC. Don’t forget that ZCTU was very much involved in the formation of the NCA the same way as the MDC and both organizations, Tsvangirai was the leader. So continued political involvement play straight into ZANU PF and you and I know that the ZANU PF mafia will not go down without a fight”, (Interview: former ZCTU Official and -MDC MP).

This narrative reinforces my argument in chapter two on the reconceptualization of unions as civil-society and also shows the character of civil society in Zimbabwe not as independent institutions as viewed in liberal societies. Trade unions were, in terms of leadership headed by the same people leading the ‘National Constitutional Assembly’, the ‘Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe’ and the Save Zimbabwe campaign groups generates conflicts. Such a view plays into ZANU PF’s argument of union’s involvement in mainstream politics. However, some within the ZCTU explained the growing tension between the ZCTU and the MDC arguing that such tension was being caused by the involvement of the ZCTU in the political affairs of the MDC.

Disputes over what constitutes economic and political involvement translated into detentions, beatings, arrests, court actions and demonstrations. The ILO’s viewpoint on this contentious issue was important.

“It is nonsensical to think that there is a difference between politics of economic engines and politics of the recipients of the taxes because we as workers are tax
payers and I am coming from back drop that says taxation without participation is tantamount to tyranny. That follows exactly, we cannot sponsor governments to run our affairs with our taxes and not have a say on how they use those taxes by being denied the opportunity to call them to account. So basically I say politics is an accident of birth. Once you are born into this world, you have no choice you have to fend for yourself at work” (Senior Official of Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions and ILO Application of Standards official)

Employers’ views on political involvement of trade unions were also important given their status in the tripartite relationship. They were asked the question, ‘From your experience of the Zimbabwe situation, do concerns exist in relation to trade unions being aligned to political parties? This question called for their experience of the Zimbabwe situation rather than for them to take a position as to whether trade unions were involved in politics. In the main, they argued that it was impossible to decouple business from politics and to decouple citizenship from politics. As such, unions had a right to political participation. From a business point of view, one has to conduct an environmental scan in terms of trying to appreciate how the various factors are playing in the economy or perhaps in forming some sort of decisions that have to be made right. But as citizens individuals also grapple in struggling to live and will be faced with political issues that they will have to digest and form an opinion. Broadly speaking, employers were sympathetic to unions’ involvement in political activities of the MDC.

The Zimbabwean economic situation had deteriorated and that it was almost impossible to separate political from economic issues, thus making the ‘politics of the stomach’ genuine and an easier argument to sustain. As the economy worsened and so was the increase in the number of strikes, stay-aways and demonstrations by workers. Participants (employers, ILO and unionists) talked of the correlation between an increase in economic hardship and an increase in trade union arrests, detentions and harassments. As such, it
is not easy to dismiss the “politics of the stomach” argument. In fact, mobilisation theory (Kelly 1998) is consistent with the ‘politics of the stomach’ analogy used by trade unions, in that it accepts that a sense of injustice, unfairness or grievance exists which brings together all the working forces to express their displeasure. In the case of Zimbabwe, this displeasure did not only end with demonstrations or strikes but the formation of a political party to address those concerns.

However, government officials dismissed the politics of the stomach argument maintaining that the unions have not supported government’s policies around indigenisation and land reform meant to improve the position of the worker. This is where the government argued that there were several international pressures and the interests of white commercial farmers, backed by America and Britain, which were conspiring with trade unions to go against those policies. COSATU’s view on political participation was important for this thesis for two reasons. The first is the centrality of COSATU as a model federation from which many African federations draw inspiration from. Second, they are in a political alliance with the ANC and that is important to the arguments of political involvement. Thus,

“Our government was saying ZCTU must not be involved in politics and in COSATU we don’t agree to that. It didn’t make sense to us that the ANC recognises our right to political participation and across the border, denies the same right to the people of Zimbabwe. So in 2006, we in COSATU said we were going into Zimbabwe and see for ourselves what was happening because we didn’t want to just get involved without knowing what we were getting into. So we wrote to Mugabe to set up a meeting with him and he refused to answer to our call. So we said, we were getting in and Mugabe allowed us in and chased us away. In response, we proceeded to build blockades in various regions so that Mugabe and ANC would feel it. Yes, in South Africa we are an ally member of the ANC but we take a stand if and when the ANC does what we don’t want. We also campaign for them if the worker stands to benefit. We have always
taken to the street if we believe the worker will be disadvantaged. (Interview- Senior COSATU official and ILO Application of Standards Committee member).

From a critical perspective, the question that needs to be asked is ‘if ZCTU is political, how did they come to be political? What conditions compelled them to be political? A key participant who was directly involved in both the MDC and ZCTU activities explained the politicisation of labour issues;

“When we formed the MDC out of the ZCTU and the Constitutional Movement, there was high political focus for change and since then, as the problems multiply, people have focused on the political resolution of the crisis which is affecting workers rather than any other issues. So a stay-away, which is called by the ZCTU, is now considered a political resolution of their problem. If it is called, let’s say the MDC was mobilising people around the same political objectives, I think it tends to stimulate and energise people even more. So we have got that serious problem. There is nothing wrong for a trade union movement to articulate workers’ issues that are affected by political matters because the workers are affected by national policies, by industrial policies so you cannot say I will only defend workers at industry but when the macro-economic issues then affect those wages not because of the state of the industry but because of the state of the politics of the country, and you expect the workers to defend only one side of it, (former ZCTU Secretary General).

Clearly, socio-economic issues are also socio-political issues and a line appears very difficult to draw. It can be argued that one is more likely to be alive to issues around the politics of his or her country if confronted with socio-economic challenges on a daily basis. After all what is politics? It is also about labour and social development and the life of the people in terms of them affording necessities of life. So from that point of view, even the ordinary person will end up more aware of the political environment in which they find
themselves in. So there is no difference between the bread and butter issues and the mainstream political issues. What are called ‘bread and butter’ issues at political platforms are the very issues that trade unions deal with. Those are the very issues that business also deals with if they care about productivity in their workplaces because the agenda for their workers, particularly organised labour, will always be around those issues.

To conclude the analysis of the politics of the stomach, it is important to point out that the literature on the labour movements in post-colonial Zimbabwe does not deal with the political character of union officials. This thesis argues that the majority of participants who represented government had a history of participation in the liberation struggle. Most of the unionists also participated in the liberation struggle and they have been within the unions since the ZANU PF supported leadership took office in 1981. Participants had a rich history of their engagement with the labour relations context. This long history also suggests differences that originated from the colonial era. Some of the unionists were considered to be on the fringes of the ZANU PF leadership and it may not be entirely wrong to argue about political scores being settled by both parties using state machinery on one hand and using union structures on the other. They mourned about the current government’s “betrayal of independence”; the “decay of nationalism”, “broken promises” “we were building the house together so that if the rain comes, we will all seek refuge, but they went in and locked us out and threw the keys down the drain”, “that they exchanged the AK47, the KAKI Uniform for bank books, ties and suits and mansions” plus a range of other such phrases cannot be ignored as they give a picture of what most commentators on the union-state relations often miss out. That is, the sort of psychological contract that was created between ZANU PF and trade unions and that was to be delivered, perhaps, at a more personal level. Politics of the stomach may be genuine because workers are suffering, but the complexity of union-state relations particularly from the mid-90s suggests there is more to this “politics of the stomach”.
5.7. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that a range of factors contributed to the nature of union-state relations during the period 1980 to 1995. At first, government’s pro-labour legislation made it difficult for unions to develop an independent and autonomous voice that could challenge the state. The first decade reflects the struggle by the state to gain and control all influential groups, including the student movement, the civil-society and unions. From the mid-80s to the period 1995, there was a move towards freeing the labour movement from the state and hence the beginning of strained relations. In other words, state corporatism was substituted by market liberalisation policies, but without an ‘effective infrastructure’ to tolerate pluralism. The issues that defined relations from the 90s were the nature and performance of the economy in particular the continued racial inequalities, the role of civil society and the use of violence, and the contested role and objectives of trade unions. The politics of the stomach and the political agitation around it defined union-state relations during the period 1980-1995.

What seemed to emerge from the interview accounts was that although the policies immediately after independence were aimed at redressing colonial imbalances, the manner in which that was managed showed lack of experience on the part of the state. This weakness appeared to be implied from the composition of the government. Although government officials dismissed this observation, employers and unionists pointed out that the post-colonial state was composed of mainly school teachers who were the educated elite at the time and issues of governance were not something that they were easily comfortable with. As such, in the early years of independence, they had to rely on the apparatus and elements of the old colonial system seeking and retaining intellectual capital in the leadership of the Reserve Bank, the Army, the Central Intelligence Organisation, the Judicial system, Finance and Agriculture Ministries, the Public Services and the Secretary to the Cabinet. Under the circumstances, one can see how continuity
rather than change characterised the state at least in the first decade of independence. Such leadership composition and inexperience is a credible reason unsustainable policy, which would later create union-state relationship problems, were formulated. For example, the Growth with Equity policy resulted in a land resettlement programme which temporarily resolved union-state relations. This is because it created a situation where women and children sustained the worker by providing material wealth (increase in cattle-herd, temporary increase in agricultural production, food staples etc.). This meant that, at least, in the first ten years, workers could easily manage the basic necessities by relying on farm production although they were away working in towns and cities. This was a shaky basis of sustaining industrial relations. This is because in order to sustain increased production in the rural area, the traditional practice of polygamy was extended to a higher level. Gaidzanwa (1982, p. 37) talks about how men were able to acquire unpaid labour-force by marrying more women as it was seen, or rather believed that an increase in the number of children and number of wives increased production. The UNICEF Report (1982, p. 3) explains how the migratory labour system in Zimbabwe had become part of life after independence;

  (...the husband migrates to an urban area, mine or commercial farm for wage employment, usually as an unskilled or semi-skilled worker. The wife and children supplement his meagre wages through subsistence production. The wife as a de facto head of household, family farm manager and labourer subsidises the modern sector by providing unemployment benefits and social security on retirement of the husband”.

But operating such a system, within a policy-making framework which did not necessarily empower women meant that the ‘default industrial relations system’ became unsustainable in the long-run more so, within the context of the neo-liberal reform programme. So as the girl-child started to get access to higher education and securing formal employment, the appeal and relevance of subsistence farming was put to test. That coincided with growing hostility between unions and the state.
“If you want an excuse for being killed, be my guest, go into the street and demonstrate” and “police were right in dealing sternly with the ZCTU leaders during their demonstration …because trade unionists want to be a law unto themselves” (Robert Mugabe addressing the nation on television ahead of a planned ZCTU demonstration (The Zimbabwean, 28th September, 2006)

…”We have degrees in violence” boasted Mugabe in December 2007-ahead of a planned ZCTU demonstration (Zimbabwe Issue, 67)
6.0. Introduction

The above quotation provides the political mood and temperature that became the context within which union-state relations were constructed. The period 1996 to 2008 is a watershed period and closely fits into Webster’s (2007) “divorce typology” for a number of reasons which are summarised in figures 6.1 and 6.2 below. The relationship developed into serious cases of violation of trade union rights, failure on the part of government to comply with High Court and Supreme Court judgements on the treatment of trade unionists. This resulted in the establishment of an ILO Commission of Enquiry in 2008 to investigate the alleged violations. The issues central to the sour relationship are discussed in this chapter and resonate the comments referred to above.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential time-bomb issues</th>
<th>Red-light issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy in persistent declining</td>
<td>1996- ZCTU embarks on stay aways in protest against neoliberal policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner investigates the impact of Operation Murambatsvina</td>
<td>ZCTU, NCA and other civic groups convey the Working Peoples’ Convention and form the MDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defective constitution making process</td>
<td>1996-Police violently broke up a demonstration of workers in support of striking doctors and nurses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order and Security Act (POSA)</td>
<td>1997-Dismissal of bank workers following a strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)</td>
<td>1998- ZCTU demonstration violently disrupted by Police/Former Secretary General, Morgan Tsvangirai assaulted, the General Agriculture and Plantation Workers Unions’ Office burnt down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Codification Act</td>
<td>2000- Investigation of the administration of the ZCTU by the Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State encourages splinter unions</td>
<td>2001- Shooting of striking workers by the Zimbabwe National Army at ZISCO Steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More retrenchments</td>
<td>2002- Government threats to deregister the ZCTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Informalisation’ of the economy</td>
<td>Police arrested, assaulted and detained 9 trade unionists over a planned mass stay-away</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State awards compensation to ‘national liberation war heroes’</td>
<td>2003- Arrest of 555 trade unionists during a national protest against high taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘ZANU PF’ begins land invasions</td>
<td>2004- Mass dismissal of 2479 workers by Net-one Cellular (Pvt) Ltd, Tel One Pvt and Zimpost (Pvt) Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of the MDC in changing political landscape in Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2005-Government appointed individuals to represent the ZCTU at the ILO Conference leaving out the ZCTU leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unlawful investigation of the administration of the ZCTU by the Government of Zimbabwe. Government intended to put what it called a ‘New-Look ZCTU’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrest of 156 unionists in Harare and Mutare for demonstrating against high taxation and harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disruption by police of the commemorations of the World Aids Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006- Arrests, detention, torture, assault, harassment and intimidation of 265 workers by State Security Agents during a ZCTU demonstration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deportation of international delegates to the ZCTU Congress including Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi by immigration authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disruption of May Day activities in Chitungwiza by ZANU PF militia and Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banning of commemorations of the Human Rights Day in Gweru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007- Arrests of trade unionists and confiscation of materials by state security agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZCTU leadership arrested for alleged attempt to overthrow the government during May Day speeches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008- Arrests and detention of 100 trade unionists by state security agents for demonstrating against cash withdrawal limits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disruption of May Day rallies in Rusape, arrests and detention of workers by police and CIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe mentioned in a Special Paragraph in the ILO report of 2008 for trade union violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protests by workers viewed as political and thus torture, arrests, victimisation and brutality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polarised/ politicised work environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Union-state relationship during this period, according to participants’ accounts, need to be understood within the broad policy framework of the neo-liberal economic regime led by the IMF and World Bank. On one hand, government became under pressure to limit social services expenditure and emphasise investment in material production in mining, agriculture and manufacturing. On the other hand, when faced with opposition following ESAP-induced hardships, government did not engage social partners but became hostile to opposition. This is also a period when Zimbabwe went through socio-economic and political meltdown whose peak was argued by unionists and employers to be 2007 and 2008. There were political challenges faced by ZANU PF which threatened its hold to power following the rise to prominence of the MDC. This context, define not only union-state relations but broadly state-society relationship. As shown above, this was a period of traumatic divorce between unions and the state. According to the ILO, unionists and employers, there was complete closure of democratic space which made it impossible for workers to air out industrial relations issues. The combination of restrictive legislation, in particular, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public
Order and Security Act (POSA), led to violation of human and trade union rights. The rest of the chapter follows the broad analytic framework discussed in chapter 3.

6.1. Personality clashes vs. institutional clashes

In developed countries, union-state relations or conflicts are based on some ideological grounds or economic or political imperatives but not on personality clashes between office holders. Yet, there was evidence to suggest that the state was targeting specific people within the labour movement for special attention;

“… if you look at government trend, it targets those in the leadership, demonising, harassing, torturing and arresting them … we have people like Matombo, Chibebe, Matibenga to name a few who are well known in the society, because they hold other positions in civic groups such as Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe, the NCA and those linked to the student movement. Those are the people being targeted … In June 2007, the ILO ruled that unionism and politics were inseparable. Immediately, the ZCTU Secretary General, Wellington Chibebe was told by government officials that he would be made mince-meat if he returned to Zimbabwe. The ILO Conference had to write a protest letter to Minister Nicholas Goche and threatened to get tougher with Zimbabwe if any ZCTU officials were harassed let alone harmed on their return home. This is just to show you that certain individuals are targeted, (Senior ZCTU official).

The ILO's view on the issue of personality clashes supports the unions’ assertion of individuals being targeted. In the context of this thesis, such an observation is vital and needs to be seen within the context of the ILO Commission of Enquiry into Zimbabwe. The ILO Commission did not find personality clashes as a reason for violation of union rights in Zimbabwe; however, those ILO officials resident in Harare were aware and open about it. Hence,

“It is one of personalities, one of conflict between key office holders and not so much of conflicts between the institutions … and this is why I say that everyone
who is in a public office should exercise restraint and control in the way they put across their ideas. One example that I have often given is that you cannot go out there and start beating up people and then jump into your trade union office and say that I am a trade unionist so you cannot arrest me. It’s not like that. There are certain things that I think you can guide your conduct with as an officer. But it is also one of culture, a culture that does not really respect consultation, and sharing of information, ideas and knowledge,” (Senior, ILO officer-Harare).

Considering that all the unionists and government officials who participated in this study also participated in the commission’s enquiry, it raises questions as to the appropriateness of Commissions of Enquiry on matters relating to conflicts between principal actors who have something to benefit or lose following the Commission’s deliberations. Perhaps the ILO Harare Office is better positioned to understand the dynamics through observations and experience of interacting with the industrial relations actors. The input of this office, if considered, would have changed the conclusions and recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry. However a few unionists argued that it was not about personalities but a continuity of colonial regime. They argued that Mugabe was denouncing and crucifying unionists in the same way Ian Smith did.

These personality clashes seem to be rooted in a long history of the struggle for independence. The current ZCTU leadership was also actively involved in resisting the early moves by ZANU PF to establish a one-party system so there are personal scores from that viewpoint. However their long history of activism might also explain why union-state relations have been acrimonious for a long time now.

Although trade unions hold their Congress every four years and elect new leadership, the leadership that is often elected is one that also has a long history of political struggle, except for new professional appointments in areas such as research, legal and general administration and secretarial services. There seems to be less young people interested
in trade union activism so while new leadership comes in, it is perhaps what one would not like to call the ‘new blood’ for purposes of giving an entirely different perspective to trade union activism. The same observation can be seen within the rival trade union federation which is alleged to have been formed by ZANU PF. It is led by Makwarimba who was also involved in the very first ZCTU leadership installed by ZANU PF in 1981. His Deputy, Chinotimba, is a popular war veteran. Within ZANU PF itself, there has been little change in personalities occupying the senior party and ministerial positions and the ‘liberations war heroes’ are part of the technocrats within the civil service. Cabinet reshuffles are broadly a matter of ‘recycling’ the same personalities and shifting them around. For that reason, personality clashes tend to have unusual impact on union-state relations when one compares Zimbabwe to other countries, including those in Africa.

Government officials talked of their desire to “see the forthcoming ZCTU elections” and hoped they will usher a new breed of leaders genuinely committed to worker issues. They argued that the current leadership was making irresponsible statements in denouncing key figures in government, including claiming that they will “prosecute and send to The Hague those they accuse of committing genocide”. In naming specific officials, unionists were viewed as having declared personal wars with personalities within government. As far as government officials were concerned, nothing could be resolved unless ZCTU leadership was ousted.

For the unionists, every industrial relations issue was perceived and defined in terms of a political framework that should oust Mugabe from power emulating other African countries. The major motivation for unionists was that the economic performances of those African countries where a change of Presidents have become the norm were performing better than Zimbabwe. So removing Mugabe and his cronies was the only solution to resolving workers’ problems- that is, “resolving the political question”. One therefore gets the impression that as long as the political succession within ZANU PF is unresolved, union-state relations will for the near future remain strained.
The younger generation of union activists, most of who were from the research wing of ZCTU (LEDRI) were not part of the personality clashes. They did not see the conflict as being one between institutions (state v ZCTU) but one between ‘key actors’. They were concerned that as a structure the ZCTU was at times attacked by government because of the key actors’ involvement in mainstream politics. Such political involvement was giving government an excuse to attack “innocent people” within the labour movement.

6.2. Union independence and autonomy versus political alliances

This section addresses three questions on trade union alliances. The first question asked was “Is your trade union federation aligned to any political party and if so, what is the basis and nature of the alliance?” The second was “Can a trade union effectively represent workers’ interests if it is aligned to a political party?” Third, “Within the Zimbabwean context are alliances with political parties a problem?”

With regard to the first question, it was difficult to establish a common response from the ZCTU. Some argued that the ZCTU had no alliance with political opposition parties. Others stressed the existence of an “organic relationship”, a “mutual understanding and mutuality of goals”, and a “mother-son relationship”. Some simply avoided answering that question preferring to counter with “what is wrong with being aligned to a political party?” Only one unionist admitted to the existence of a ZCTU-MDC alliance.

The range of answers or explanations around this theme could be seen as reflecting a number of things. First, it might suggest a desire not to fall into government trap that unions are aligned to the MDC and are seeking regime change, hence the acrimonious relationship. Given that the MDC has generally been labelled “stooges of the Western interests and sell-outs”, it might be obvious to see why an association to the MDC might be considered a tactical suicide. Indeed within the Zimbabwean context political
opposition is treated as being ‘enemy of the state’ and a threat to national security, thus inviting surveillance and ‘behaviour-modification techniques of a certain kind’. On that basis some might have been reluctant to admit the existence of an MDC-ZCTU alliance. The range of responses reflects policy inconsistency on the decision of political alignment. Within the South African context for example, that would not be an issue as the role of COSATU within South Africa is well publicised and clear. To get some clarity on whether there was policy guidance on the issue of alliance between ZCTU and MDC, I then focused attention on those ZCTU officials who were also having senior positions within the MDC and who were also members of parliament. I also sought the view of those who were previously involved in both the ZCTU and the MDC as well as the leader of the MDC as the former leader of the ZCTU to compare their views. Again, a common position could not be established. These different views are important to present and analyse. The first view pointed out that;

“In 1999, when we formed the MDC, we agreed that those who wanted to go for politics should leave the ZCTU alone and those who wanted to be in the ZCTU should leave MDC alone so that we are seen to be two separate institutions. Let me give you this example; - first, there is Munjoma who used to be President of ZARU. Gibson Sibanda was President of ZCTU. Thokozani Khupe was in ZARU, Enna Chitsa, Milton Gwetu; they all left once they were appointed to the MDC. I was the Woman’s Advisory Chair in ZCTU, I left and so did many of my colleagues at the time. So the government uses this as an excuse to argue that there is no difference between MDC and ZCTU, which is wrong and misleading, (Former ZCTU official and now MDC MP).

Participants who held this view could not be drawn into discussing whether those who resigned from their positions completely withdrew from their ‘previous ZCTU activities’. I have already argued in my methodology chapter, the limitations of accepting uncritically or at face-value accounts offered by senior executives and politicians. One has to triangulate a number of positions and accounts in order to come up with an unbiased view. There was a contradiction between the views of former ZCTU officials who are now in the MDC
and those currently serving on the unions on the issue of whether an alliance exists. The second is the majority view of unionists and it sought to avoid the question altogether by suggesting some form of partnerships on contingency basis rather than longstanding alliances. But it is also a view which sought to justify that people within the ZCTU are allowed to double union positions with MDC positions.

“It’s a question of where minds are meeting, where ideas are converging. And once they converge, we don’t refuse partnerships. And I need also to throw you back to the 1980s, When I first left ZCTU in 1988, the person who replaced me was Florence Chitauro and she was working in the Harare City Council. She was also Provincial ZANU PF leader to the extent that before expiry of her term, she was appointed Deputy Minister of Labour while she was serving as the First Vice President of ZCTU, a position she was elected to in 1985. Those who were deputies to me were doubling up union positions with ZANU PF political positions. One of them was Njekesa who was the Chairman of ZANU PF Chitungwiza District. Why wasn’t it an issue with ZANU PF then? Why can’t somebody in ZCTU double-up positions with that in MDC? , Why does it become a problem now? So these are double-standards and to us that is cheap politics, it doesn’t work. It is quite clear that freedom of association allows everyone to become both a political party person and a trade unionist at the same time …” (Senior ZCTU official).

Doubling up union position with that of political party position was, to many, seen as reflecting the existence of an alliance. Trade unionists were very defiant of government’s concerns that ‘political heavyweights’ were holding ZCTU leadership positions. Government officials argued that since the ZCTU was in alliance with MDC, it had no grounds to complain to the ILO that ZFTU was a ‘yellow union’ aligned to ZANU PF. Clearly the first view which contends that the MDC dissociated itself with the ZCTU is contradicted by the second view.

The third view argues that a ZCTU-MDC alliance is in existence as one pointed out:
“Yes, there is an alliance between the ZCTU and the Tsvangirai formation. Of course if you ask them they will say there is no alliance but from the Stakeholder’s Conference, it was very clear there is an alliance. However, the alliance suffered some real damage when you look at the 18th Amendment because the Tsvangirai faction agreed to the 18th amendment just like we did. The 4 bills that went through before Christmas the POSA, AIPPA, The Electoral Laws and the Broadcasting Act severely damaged that alliance …ZCTU and NCA, had of course come out strongly against the Senate participation, and pressurized the party to boycott them. Matters were made worse when Nelson Chamisa made an issue that one clause which was struck out in pen on the draft, saying a National President must have a degree, was intended to exclude Tsvangirai. From that moment, I believe the party was actually at war with itself, and the war was fanned by certain civil society groups, notably ZCTU, NCA, and ZINASU … Isaac Matombo, then President of ZCTU, made an impassioned speech denouncing the requirement for any leader to have a university degree, and stating ZCTU’s ownership of MDC, (Former ZCTU official and MDC-M MP).

It seems the question that needs resolving is whether the involvement of ZCTU into the activities of the MDC is sufficient to constitute a political alliance or does it simply reflect the political pressure of a union federation that parented a political party, that is, “a parent refusing to let go” of a mature child. What confuses the situation on this issue is that several MDC parliamentarians talked of the “invisible alliance” which only manifested through solidarity of action. But then it raises another question, that is, ‘invisible’ to whom? This issue of alliances needs to be resolved through a policy framework as it opens the labour movement for criticism from the state and more importantly, such an issue needs to be clear to the membership. The South African situation is a typical example of an alliance that is in the open, but one where COSATU does not easily succumb to the interests of the government where worker interests are compromised.
All government officials were concerned of the alliance they felt existed between ZCTU and MDC and perceived the so-called “solidarity of action” by the “invisible alliance” as a ‘tag-team’ working hand in glove to effect regime change. A crucial observation is the view of other union officials, albeit a few, that the autonomy and independence of the ZCTU was being compromised by aligning to the Tsvangirai faction of the MDC. Four unions had already dissociated themselves from the ZCTU but had not joined the rival federation - the ZFTU. The level of knowledge of the inside activities of the ZCTU by government officials was both worrying and surprising. They had details of what would have been discussed in union meetings, knowledge of who was going to campaign for what position and who was not going to stand for elections and the internal political struggles which were not public knowledge. They had knowledge of what was said by participants in private ZCTU Executive meetings, all suggesting surveillance of unions or interference in the labour movements’ activities. More importantly, it reflected a desperate attempt by the government to regain control rather than attacking the federation. A review of documents makes clear the position of the ILO on the issue of alliances and relations with political parties.

“... When trade unions at the decision of their members, decide to establish relations with a political party or to undertake constitutional political action as a means towards the advancement of their economic and social objectives, such political relations or actions should not be of such a nature as to compromise the continuance of the trade union movement or its social or economic functions irrespective of political changes in the country” (318th Report, Case No. 2005, para. 180).

ILO argues that governments should not attempt to transform the trade union movement into an instrument for the pursuance of political aims, and secondly, that government should not interfere with the normal functions of trade unions simply because they established a political party, in this context, the MDC. This position is contested by government which views ILO as facilitating regime change agenda. This is complicated by racial arguments surrounding the agents advocating for political participation of trade
unions. In this case, it is the trade union wing and employer wing of European members at the ILO in Geneva. This position is made worse by some of the decisions made in other cases with respect to the right to strike in particular the view that-

“the right to strike should not be limited solely to industrial disputes … workers and their organizations should be able to express in a broader context, if necessary, their dissatisfaction as regards economic and social matters affecting their members’ interests,” (Digest 1996 para. 484; 300th Report, Case No. 1777, para. 71; and 320th Report, Case No. 1865, para. 526).

This has prompted the government to accuse the ILO for “preparing African trade unionists” for political office. This accusation/view was shared by other African governments thus creating a European against an African camp within the ILO.

The concern regarding the direct involvement of trade unions into political activities is not unique to Zimbabwe but is shared in other parts of the world. In Kuwait (section 73 of the Labour Code) and Swaziland (section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act 1980), there is a total ban on the exercise of political activities by federations and restriction on their activities to consultation and service functions. In light of ZCTU’s political activities some government officials expressed that placing similar legal restrictions is long overdue in Zimbabwe. Two reasons were offered to justify that suggestion. The first is that not every worker who is a member of the ZCTU was a member of the MDC. As such, ZCTU was imposing a political party on its membership contrary to the freedom of association and expression of those workers. Secondly, that there was need to safeguard the employee contributions in case it would be used for political party purposes against the interests of some workers. These two reasons appear reasonable concerns. However, such action is contrary to the ILO which made clear that trade unions should not restrict their activities to employment or occupational issues but should express concerns against government’s economic and social policies which can negatively affect workers, (ILC, 31st session, 1948, Record of Proceedings, p.476). ILO contends that any legislation banning political
activity by unions is as bad as legislation that seeks to establish a close relationship
between trade unions and political parties, (Report of the Committee of Enquiry on
Nicaragua, Ch. III, note 3, para. 544(3)(a). This brings into question the legality of the
South African model of NEDLAC which was created by law to establish a relationship
between unions, business and government. The fact that all participants, including those
at the ILO Harare regional Office are trying to 'model' Zimbabwe's TNF alongside such a
structure reflects a contradiction within the ILO on matters of alliances and political
activities of unions.

Lack of clarity on what constitutes acceptable alliances and political activities of unions is
a problem fuelling the straining of union-state relations in Zimbabwe. A key participant
pointed out:

“I think it's a matter that needs to come back on the ILO agenda, The Digest of
Decisions has dealt with those things in detail it points out that it is extremely difficult
to differentiate the bread and butter issues from the so called the political issues. The
ILO seems like acceding to the idea that trade unions are inseparable from politics, but
at some point, there is the use of the words "purely political agenda", unless they are
‘purely political’ so that you can tell when an organization is engaged in purely political
issues", (ILO official- Application of Standards).

On the basis of the interviews/fieldwork, it appears that it is the failure of knowing how far
they can go regarding political involvement that has often led to a conflict between them
and the government. Unions seemed to be of the view that they should be engaged in the
whole process of government business. Perhaps the ILO needs to bring back to the table
the issue of what constitutes purely "political activities" with regards to union activities
given its centrality in union-state relations.

If a union was to protest against a tax increase whether as a federation or in alliance with
sympathetic civil groups, is this political? And the next question is that 'is it fair for anyone
or trade unions to complain about tax?'- The answer is yes because it affects them. About
the political landscape- ‘to what extent can trade unions become entitled to change that landscape’? That is where the complication of “purely political issues” comes in. Although the Digest attempts to clarify the position by introducing the phrase “regime-change”, it brings another challenge of understanding the meaning of ‘regime change’ in practice. What is regime change? Is it when people talk about constitutional change? Is it still within the purview of trade unions? These are some of the questions that need to be answered by the ILO and provide guidance because they clearly are influencing union-state relations. It will be an injustice to conclude without examining the last aspect of union’s political involvement, which is to address the questions;

‘Can a trade union effectively represent workers when aligned to a political party? And to what extent was that an issue in the Zimbabwean context?’

The case of COSATU in South Africa was often cited as an example where a union federation enters into an alliance with a political party and delivers on behalf of the workers. Whether the conditions that exist in South Africa that led to such an alliance exist in Zimbabwe was not an issue the trade unionists were considering. Second, they also highlighted the relationship in Britain between the Labour party and trade unions, to the extent that unions fund the party. The Zimbabwe situation does not seem to favour alliances. They restrict democratic space and compromise union independence and autonomy. When the ZCTU was formed by ZANU PF, there was some alliance in early years. That was broken by a shift towards neoliberal policies but unions did not fully represent workers because of that alliance/co-optation. However, the MDC which was formed by the ZCTU is equally pursuing neoliberal policies. Tension between ZCTU and MDC was argued to be brewing but suppressed because of the political consequences. Former ZCTU officials who were MDC parliamentarians and who now held Ministerial/Cabinet positions within the Government of National Unity were arguably not delivering for workers. However, the ZCTU was not prepared to publicly go against them, arguing, as one of the union leaders declared,
“… That ZANU PF would have a field day if that were to happen”, (Senior ZCTU Official).

Such a situation is unpalatable and unsustainable, whether it is a deliberate strategy or one imposed by the challenges unions face. Union autonomy and independence is being compromised by aligning to the MDC, but also that the workers’ position is consequently marginalised in this ZCTU-MDC alliance. In the long run, the ZCTU may not hold together and could split as loyalties get divided between the MDC and workers. Workers will lose confidence in the ZCTU and it will cease to be a powerful political and organizational centre that it has been for more than two decades. So while government has attacked trade unions from left, right and centre, the future survival of the labour movement may not be dictated by government’s attacks on trade unions but more so by the nature of ZCTU-MDC alliance. The relationship between the ZCTU and MDC could only survive if MDC continues to be part of government or if it continues to mount sustained political pressure as an opposition party to ZANU PF. Continued ZANU PF victory may see a change in the industrial relations landscape, i.e. a change in labour laws and or consultation structures is more likely to occur. The direction of this change again is difficult to predict as it depends on other factors, for instance, a ZANU PF political dominance could result in a change in loyalties for ZCTU. This is not unusual as trade unions around the world are also known to be opportunistic. Permanent loyalties are difficult to sustain in politics and industrial relations. It may also be difficult for the ZCTU to generate the same momentum that they had prior to forming the MDC, unless the latter manages to get increased support from the urban constituency, thus the benefits could trickle-down to the ZCTU. Another possibility is that, in the wake of ZCTU weakness, the government may actually consider engaging the labour movement more and this has the effect of weakening unions rather than strengthening them.

It was also important to get the view of unions on what their membership felt about the current state of the relationship between their unions and the state. Two views emerged.
The first is a positive one in which they generally stated that members were generally happy that the economy has turned round and relations have improved because of the Government of National Unity. This view was however in the minority and most expressed concern that union members feel let down by state, but that the membership was afraid of being beaten up, arrested or being killed if it confronted the state. While the membership was afraid of taking to the streets in protests over the costs and standard of living, members still expected the leadership to confront the state. They feel they cannot change the government hence ‘kiya kiya’ (engaging in informal dealings) to survive. This informal trading meant that while workers had their full-time job, and alongside it they will be selling ‘commodities’ like sweets, airtime cards, cooking oil, drinks, etc. hiding these in their office lockers or drawers in order to raise money for bus fare to and from work. This is a situation that cries out for increased collective bargaining and negotiation of better conditions of work. In a way, it also shows the resignation by workers to confront the elements that caused the deterioration of living conditions in the first place. Such resignation is damaging for the labour movement. One would expect that this would galvanise people towards agitating for their rights, in the same way as it did in the early days of the introduction of neo-liberal policies in the 90s. A critical assessment of the current state of worker organization in Zimbabwe was offered;

“The educational levels of some of our membership is such that they cannot fully appreciate the causes of union-state relations, and generally, they feel we have let them down because they do not eat agreements arrived at by our federation and the Government of National Unity, but that the want to see action which these guys have not yet delivered”, they have also said that they no longer want us to boycott negotiations but to stay in there and argue our case”, (ZCTU Official).

This view is consistent with that of the ILO-Harare officials who were critical of unions’ strategy of walking out of meetings. In South Africa, regular surveys are undertaken on membership to consult on among other things, what they feel about union-state alliance, who they would vote for in the next elections etc. government cannot therefore target the
leadership for being the mouthpiece of workers. The above narrative suggests a top-down approach as opposed to a mandate-driven approach by the ZCTU. This opens up the ZCTU to criticism that the leadership is acting on behalf of external interests. Related to the issue of union alliance with the MDC is the rationale behind the formation of the MDC. Since the present union-state relations are significantly influenced by the formation of the MDC and the dynamics that followed, it was important to ask the question-'what was the thinking behind the formation of the MDC?' Unlike any other research in postcolonial industrial relations in Zimbabwe, this research's key strength was its ability to access key players who are not easily accessible. It benefited from access to those people who were directly involved in the formation of the MDC, those who were doubling union leadership roles with those of the MDC among other key players.

Participants argued that there was a general breakdown in the rule of law and severe economic meltdown exacerbated by closure of industries, high cost of living, unprecedented inflation running into million percentages and acute food shortages led to the formation of MDC and eventual alliance after its formation. They argued that government was unwilling to negotiate solutions. ZCTU argued that the original intention was to engage and work with government to seek solutions and thrash a social contract rather than form a political party. One participant explained;

“… if I may take you back to November 1998, the ZCTU General Council mandated the Executive to approach President Mugabe to try and come up with the issue of National dialogue. So we went to see Mugabe to present workers' problems but what we received when we got there was –and these were his words 'If you want a fight, I am already in the ring. I was part and parcel of the delegation. We received a threat from him that if you want to fight lets define the principles of the game. This is also when he made the statement that if you want to form a political party, come up in the open and Zimbabweans will not be so stupid to be led by a tea-boy and train driver. So we as young Turks then in the General Council we felt challenged and we pressurised the leadership to take the
challenge-and hence the Peoples Convention and our ZCTU Congress of 7 August 1999 that party was launched and was basically built around the structures of the ZCTU and with other organizations like Women’s Coalition, the NCA playing a critical role as well. So from then on, it has never been the same. So I think that is the historical background, a historical background that set us out in collision course with the government” (former ZCTU Secretary General).

When government declined ZCTU’s participation, union’s second, strategy was to try to push for the introduction into Cabinet of ‘New Turks’ a new breed of ZANU PF politicians. The consensus then was that ZCTU should not form a political party because ZANU PF is the party that liberated the country and most of the participants’ parents and some of those in the ZCTU were in ZANU PF. According to the interviewees, unions pushed hard for the 1995 elections and thought ZANU PF was going to reform. However, they were disappointed when this did not happen, that was the final stroke. This is how relations got strained further to the point that when MDC was formed, it was already using the ZCTU structures.

So the formation of the MDC started as a Constitutional Movement where they wanted a change in constitution because they felt there was not going to be any change in worker’s fortunes without a change in government. But they needed a mandate from the workers. As such, they started a process of consultation which meant they had to send a number of people to every part of the country to get the peoples’ views on the state of the situation in the country. This culminated in what was called the “Raw Data” which was a verbatim report of how the people felt, that is qualitative views of workers were sought after in order to get the magnitude of their concerns. From that consultation, the general view was that people wanted political representation and this was then followed by the “Working People’s Convention” to form the political party. Since then, the issue of alliance aimed at regime change or absence of it became central to union state relations in Zimbabwe.
Some interviewees talked about how the leadership of the unions had tried to avoid forming the party and how the people forced them to do so.

6.3. The contested role of the West

The one single issue which all research participants agreed upon was the role of the Western countries in influencing union-state relations, and yet they offered contradictory perspectives to it. Government officials were critical of the role of the Western countries in creating and encouraging conflict in Zimbabwe. They argued that a number of strategies were being used to unsettle all liberation movements on the continent. Unions on the other hand accused western countries for creating and sustaining dictators in Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular a leading unionist argued;

“...it’s the West that has created dictators. They created Saddam Hussein because they were using him to fight the Iraqi war, Mobutu to get resources from Democratic Republic of Congo, Jonas Savimbi for the Angolan oil to sustain the American and British markets when they were facing trouble in the Middle East. They did the same thing with Malawi, Uganda, with Pinochet in Chile, Argentina, and the Philippines. … The West created Mugabe. If they wanted him to go, he would have gone ...What they did these people, when they realised that the military revolution of Zimbabwe was undefeatable learning from their experience of Cuba, Vietnam, Korea, Mozambique and Angola just to name a few, where they failed, they then decided to put into place, long-term strategies, in which they could remain controlling the economy of Zimbabwe- neo-colonialism or neo-liberalism, and Mugabe is the vehicle for that” (Senior ZCTU official).

The above is crucial considering that the unions have generally received support from the West, and second, that they are accused by government of aligning with the Western powers for the destabilisation of Zimbabwe. The purported support to unions by the West was a key issue in the conflict between unions and the government. This political narrative
reinforces claims that the West does indeed have an influence and that to a great extent; it is at the centre of political conflicts not only in Zimbabwe, but other African countries. It is also a narrative that exposes the vulnerability of the African state which makes it unstable and hence its move to restrict any democratic space. Both government officials and union officials were in agreement on one issue, that is, the West never supported the ordinary Zimbabwean in difficult times and only appeared on the scene when white farmers were losing their farms. But this is a statement which had different meanings to the two parties. For government, it meant unions were aligning with the west in order to prevent the empowerment of Zimbabweans through land reform. So there was an ‘unholy alliance’ with the west to sabotage the objectives of the liberation struggle, yet the same western powers were not interested in improving the living and working conditions for farm workers in their commercial farms. Unions’ view was that the west is complacent and happy to side with Mugabe, for as long as he preserved their property and investment interests. However when Mugabe oppresses, tortures, arrests and beat up opponents the West does not care about Zimbabweans.

Government’s point of view was that the role of the western countries was visible in creating fertile ground for political opposition and removing all liberation movements. They pointed out that was ILO conferences were a clear manifestation of the politics of the western countries. They gave several accounts of how the organization was giving too much political space to the ZCTU and other trade unions in the region especially those unionists with political ambition. Allegations were that the ILO was grooming specific trade unionists for political office, and that the organization was not only inconsistent in its operations but was biased against other countries, where Britain and America had special interests. Thus,

“... their use of labour centres in the region started with Zambia where Chiluba was the entry point, they are also trying with Tsvangirai here and there is also talk of trying it in South Africa via Vavi, Secretary General of COSATU and in Swaziland, they want to have Jan Sithole”, (Senior Government Official).
The composition of the ILO Application of Standards Committee was alleged to be instrumental in fuelling ZCTU-union conflict. One needs to be concerned of the Zimbabwe government’s viewpoint because some members of the ILO Application of Standards Committee were sympathetic to that observation, although a context was provided in clarifying the rationale behind those concerns. Thus one explains:

“The reason why our political leaders hate independent and autonomous unions could be to do with the perceived role of Southern African Trade Union Coordinating Council (SATUCC). When it started in 1983, its Executive Secretary was Chafukwa Chihana and amongst other objectives was to democratize where there was no democracy and Chihana was the first to intervene as a Malawian, resulting in the ousting of Banda. And the second candidate from SATUCC was Frederick Chiluba who ousted Kaunda and now in Zimbabwe it is Morgan who was Secretary General of ZCTU and also President of SATUCC and he could potentially oust Mugabe”, (Senior Unionist, ILO Applications member).

Ironically, the above participant has gone on to form a political party in one of the Southern African Countries, allegedly with the support of political elements within the ILO. Recent newspaper reports have linked him to various properties in Geneva, with speculation that he could not have formed a party and bought the houses on his union salary alone. This only serves to reinforce the views of government officials not only for Zimbabwe, but other African governments as well. So we could be seeing a situation where African governments’ relations with unions become more acrimonious out of fear of the power of unions. From government’s view point, it was the current thinking within African governments that trade unions were being used to pursue western interests. Connections were being made by government officials that former President of the ZCTU-Gibson Sibanda, who is the Deputy President of the MDC and Frederick Chiluba former President of Zambia who was former Secretary General of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions were always sharing the same hotel room when they attended ILO Conferences.
For government officials, this was a critical point which showed the ILO’s role in grooming unionists for political office.

But is the ILO necessarily preparing trade unionists for political office and is exposure a bad thing? When one examines African political history, it is clear that most political leaders have a trade union background. This is because it was only in trade unions where blacks were exposed to some resemblance to leadership, acquired some experience and exposure and turned against the colonial administration. If we then say giving people exposure must not happen, because people end up wanting more and bigger things such as political office seems a difficult paradigm to understand and sustain. One can also get exposure and move into business since the exposure can mean the ability to network internationally.

There were arguments that non-trade union issues were presented as violations of union rights for example where unionists were arrested for criminal offences such as attacking a police officer or violating foreign currency laws were brought to the ILO. Since 2005, the Zimbabwe government had been accusing the ILO Application of Standards Committee of deliberately ignoring oral and written evidence it provided in relation to its compliance with conventions.

The ILO officials were however unanimous in alleging that the government was interfering in trade union activities and that senior officials knew too much of the internal issues and problems within the ZCTU. This was viewed as constituting interference. Officials of the Zimbabwe government were arguing that knowing what was happening within the union federation was not interference, since, article 3; paragraph 5 of the ILO Constitution does not bar the government from knowing what happens in trade unions when they appoint nominations to attend ILO conferences. The Zimbabwe government officials strongly argued that members of the Application of Standards committee lacked the basic tools of
analysis and were for the majority of times, especially when it comes to Zimbabwe, ignored principles of natural justice for political mileage.

The composition of the ILO Application of Standards Committee was challenged as predominantly European especially its Employer and Government ‘wings’ and instead of addressing issues, they sought to destabilise liberation movements on the African continent. It is not easy to dismiss these allegations by the Zimbabwe government authorities given that on three consecutive ILO conferences, African government officials stood up in support of the Zimbabwe government cheering for Zimbabwe to defend its sovereignty when Zimbabwe was required to explain non-compliance with key conventions. There was a growing feeling at the conferences that Mugabe represented the concerns of the majority in Africa on matters of empowerment and addressing colonial inequality and was the front for all African politicians who were not strong enough to challenge America and Britain. So what is transpiring is that industrial relations matters or labour market issues are being turned political by the dynamics at the ILO.

Further evidence of the politicisation of the ILO is hereby pointed out:

“…the whole thing had been complicated by the fact that a lot was also happening in the political realm in recent times which Zimbabwe can better explain. Now those things have tended to complicate the situation when issues are debated within the realm of the ILO. There has been that tendency to feel that the country has been unfairly attacked to pursue another political agenda which is way above what is being said here. In other words we, the substructure of ILO are lending ourselves to fighting other peoples’ battles. People have actually expressed that feeling, but whether that is correct or not, Zimbabwe needs to comply with the provisions of the conventions and then see what happens when it does so” (ILO Application of Standards Committee Member).

The above narrative reflects problems within the Application of Standards Committee and helps to sustain allegations by the Zimbabwe government officials. When addressing the
ILO Conference in a plenary session, the head of the Zimbabwe delegation to the applause of the African government representatives pointed out;

“As an organization concerned about the welfare of workers, ILO should be seen to be protecting workers from those individuals who fail to respect their own founding constitutions. Transparency and legitimacy in the labour organization should be promoted. It bears saying here that the interests of workers in our country will never be faithfully served by self-seekers who are paid from abroad to advance alien interests. It is our hope that the Zimbabwe workers will formally democratically choose their true leaders soon”, (ILO 2005, p.2).

There are a few implications arising out of the above view. The first is that the attack on the ILO is clear. The second, the government did not hide that they wished the current ZCTU leadership out of office, reinforcing the view that the conflict is perhaps more to do with personality clash rather than institutional. If personalities change, there may not be any strained union-state relations. But how do government officials know that the ‘new leadership will be genuinely representing workers’ interests if there is no attempt to influence the outcome of Congress elections? Closely related to the role of the West was the timing of ZCTU demonstrations. ZCTU-led strikes and demonstrations were being conducted just before or during major international events leading to claims by the government officials that the West was funding these strategically to place Zimbabwe on the agenda of the international community. But it also confirms government’s views that industrial relations problems in Zimbabwe are directly linked to the role of the West and that the West was directly shaping union-state relations in Zimbabwe. These demonstrations were seen as being planned in consultation with the international trade union federations mostly from Europe. Government officials were critical of ZCTU’s demonstrations, in particular, the timing of them.

“Unfortunately the police fall into a trap and this is where you get concerned about general levels of education of some of our officers. They will arrest them, but that is what they will be looking for so that there is a record of some sort to say so
many have been arrested and that report is sent to ILO, IFTU and circulated everywhere. What if they just ignore them? (Senior official- Ministry of Labour)

This account is indicative of a state apparatus lacking in shared strategies and communication. Officials from the Ministry of Labour were not necessarily in agreement with actions of the Ministry of Home Affairs or the Attorney General’s Office. Unions and the Labour Ministry personnel have a positive working relationship. The problem is the interaction with other arms of the state, allegedly the CIO, the police, prison services and sometimes the army. Union leaders viewed the Labour Ministry as a junior Ministry with no power at all and as such, their strikes and demonstrations were targeted to the above state machinery. The combined strategy of the ZCTU, some Western countries and the international donor community is alleged to be the reason why Zimbabwe was listed in a Special Paragraph of the ILO in 2008 and subsequently led to the setting up of a Commission of Enquiry into trade union violations in 2009.

The placement of Zimbabwe in a special paragraph followed several reports of trade union harassment in particular violations that took place between 2004 and 2009. This period also coincided with the effect of sanctions by the European Union and the effect of the Zimbabwe Democracy Act which was passed in America to block any funding to Zimbabwe. During the same period trade unions received moral and financial support from the western countries and international labour movements namely,- Landsorganisajaneni (Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions), Trade Union Congress (TUC-UK), Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES-Germany) and the Federation of Netherlands Trade Councils (FNV). There was an increase in the number of protest letters to President Mugabe for non-compliance of human and trade union rights.

The placement of Zimbabwe in a Special Paragraph of the ILO worsened the already strained union-state relations. For government, Unions were labelled “saboteurs” who campaigned for sanctions against the people of Zimbabwe. Being placed in a ‘Special
Paragraph’ had serious consequences. It means that a country no longer enjoy the comfort of being among other violators of the conventions and is singled out as having violated International Labour Standards. That is an embarrassment because it resulted in Zimbabwe being discussed as a single country despite other countries having committed some similar offences. An example is what happened to Switzerland in 1997. It was placed in a special paragraph and that affected markets. One such market was the American market through the Generalised System of Preferences, which as a condition, required compliance with International Labour Standards. Placing Zimbabwe in a Special Paragraph was a victory for the ZCTU which had for a number of years complained of gross violation of union rights and other freedoms. But broadly, it was a victory for the MDC in that the ZANU PF government was globally highlighted as a violator of human and trade union rights. But it put the ZCTU and MDC in the same bed given their “alliance” and doubling-up of union positions with MDC positions.

A Commission of Enquiry is worse than being mentioned in a Special Paragraph, so this was seen as another victory of the ZCTU, straining relations even further. It was a serious blow to the Zimbabwe government. In terms of international relations, it meant that Zimbabwe became an unsafe place to invest in and many countries would not want to be seen as doing business with or supporting the government. It also meant that these developments at the ILO combined with what was happening on the political front in Zimbabwe, led to a spectacular collapse of the economy with inflation going as high as 10 million percent at one point. Instead of addressing the problems, the government was seen as militarising all state institutions in order to protect itself against those elements that were considered to be conspiring against state sovereignty. The countries which campaigned and voted for the listing of Zimbabwe in a Special Paragraph of the ILO and the subsequent establishment of a Commission of Enquiry and those who opposed are presented in figure 6.3.below;
Figure 6.3: Voting pattern on ILO penalties/measures against Zimbabwe Government

The above is not intended to show any percentages but just a visual impression of the countries that voted for the listing of Zimbabwe in a Special Paragraph of the ILO and the subsequent Commission of Enquiry into violation of trade union rights. The government members of Cuba and South Africa opposed the move and the other conference members allegedly put pressure on the two, by deploying political history of the two countries. They argued that the Government of Cuba had supported sanctions against Apartheid in South Africa, but that its position regarding the Zimbabwe issue was now considered hypocritical. The same pressure was piled on government member of South Africa, to suggest that South Africa secured independence by taking actions similar to what they were proposing for Zimbabwe and hence they were duty-bound to support a move to punish Zimbabwe. In support of its decision, the Cuban government representative argued that the Cubans sacrificed their lives to fight apartheid in South
Africa and thus its position on Zimbabwe cannot be considered hypocritical. She argued that her government “would not support any decision regarding the application or sanctions against any government before the contacts and technical assistance required had been exhausted …the defiance shown by the Zimbabwe government could be the effect of its dissatisfaction over the results achieved by the Committee” (ILO Minutes of the Conference, 97th session, 2008 pp.8-9). There was an admission from some in the ILO that;

“Zimbabwe’s case took a political aspect particularly its international dimension. It ceased to be a labour-market issue but one of The European Union against Africa, the colonizers against the colonized …it became international politics, the European Union saying sanctions and the African Union saying no this is our brother-we can do certain things to help each other as Africans. They have for long been talking about African solutions to African problems, (ILO official Harare).

Other political developments outside the ILO seem to give credit to the contentious ‘regime change agenda’ purportedly orchestrated by the West. Recent revelations by the former South African President, Tambo Mbeki in an interview with Aljazeera makes the “special interest on Zimbabwe” credible. He pointed out that former British Prime Minister; Tony Blair had put pressure on South Africa for a possible invasion of Zimbabwe to which he responded;

“ …you are coming from London, you say you don’t like Robert Mugabe for whatever reason, why does it become a British responsibility to decide who leads Zimbabwe?”, (Mbeki in the Metro Thursday November 28, 2013 p. 21).

Former Head of Armed Forces in Britain, Lord Guthrie reinforced Mbeki’s view acknowledging to having discussed such an invasion plan on Zimbabwe with Mr Blair;

“… People were always trying to get me to look at it. My advice was ‘hold hard, you will make it worse” (The Metro Thursday November 28, 2013 p. 21).
Against such a background, and considering that Mbeki shares a similar liberation background with Mugabe and that they have a long-term political relationship, and considering that Mbeki brokered the Unity Government agreement between MDC and ZANU PF, the latter would have known about regime change plans allegedly planned by Britain. This would have influenced union-state relations.

The dynamics at the ILO in Geneva has created two perceptions of the organization. Government officials defined these as “ILO-GENEVA” and “ILO-HARARE”. ‘ILO-Geneva was ‘ politicised’, ‘Europeanised’, and ‘racialized’ and ‘anti-national liberations movements’ whereas “ILO-Harare” was blessed with a clear understanding of the situation on the ground and generally fair in their assessment of the situation in Zimbabwe. Unions looked forward to the ILO-Geneva and felt more protection from it than the country office in Harare. Government officials argued that the ZCTU should engage with the African structures first if they are in dispute with the state. This should be followed by engaging the ILO-Harare Office before rushing to Geneva. Following the support the state officials received from other African governments, one can understand why there was a drive to ensure union-state conflicts are addressed at African level instead. Unionists were asked why in their view there was so much support by African governments to their Zimbabwean counterpart.

Some dispute the existence of support for the Zimbabwe government and one argued:

“These African governments are not supporting Mugabe. I can give you a very brief account of the whole dichotomy. You and I attend our cultural parliament and we agree that women should be beaten up so that they could behave and respect their husbands. I will talk about how hard I beat my wife and the other people enjoy it, you see now. But at the end of the day, as clever people, we say, we support the beating of women as long as you are beating your own wife. In the case of Zimbabwe when you look at the land programme. The reason why the African leaders are saying the dispute is between Britain and Zimbabwe, but we support
Zimbabwe as long as the land issue is happening in Zimbabwe. That we support you brother Mutema for the beating of wives for as long as you are beating Mrs Mutema and you are not beating up Mrs Shambare or Mrs Moyo. It’s other people beating their wives. Because if you look at what Mbeki was doing, South Africa is the biggest beneficiary of the whole Zimbabwe crisis …our industries are closing and relocating to South Africa …. This is why the African continent is supporting Mugabe’s policies and at the ILO”, (interview: Former Vice President of ZCTU).

The above narrative gives an indication as to why perhaps, the trade unions are not engaging with the “African labour structures” for the resolution of conflict. In addition, whether genuine or pseudo-support is being offered to the Zimbabwean state, it is clear that union-state support are influenced by international dynamics. There is thus the suggestion that where union rights violations are concerned, African governments would rather team-up in violation than in restraining each other. Others showed frustrations at the inefficiency of African labour regional structures and political systems:

“Did the SADC raise the Zimbabwe issue of human and trade union abuses? The answer is not at all. In the OAU Committee for Social and Labour Commission, we raised this issue but nobody listens …” (COSATU and ILO Application of Standards Committee Member)

Government officials argued that there were many countries where gross violation of trade union rights occur, where unionists murdered at the instance of the state, but they were never treated with as much interest and intensity as the Zimbabwean case where no one has ever been killed for trade union work, where workers take government to courts and receive judgements in their favour, yet ILO Geneva talks about absence of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. They argued that no trade unionist had been murdered in Zimbabwe.

Some unionists were however concerned with Mugabe’s growing reputation within Africa, while professing ignorance of the existence African dispute labour structures.
“We are not aware of any structure. We attended the Addis Ababa activity but that was organised by ILO. It was under the auspices of OATU which is an African thing. Of course what we saw from that gathering was that Mugabe is very popular with Africans. They believe that the issue of human rights in Zimbabwe is not an important one. They believe Mugabe is a Trojan-horse and that giving land to his people is more important than killing his people, and being a dictator. All these are overshadowed by giving land to his people”, (senior union official).

The Zimbabwe Labour legislation neither provides nor mentions the use of African regional structures as part of the labour dispute resolution mechanism, making it unsustainable to argue that they should be used. Overall, ILO-Harare participants argued that the ZCTU had lost an opportunity to engage government at a crucial time when they could have influenced the direction of the economy and policies. The strategy of trying to change things from outside the TNF framework makes it difficult to challenge the regime change accusation. The ZCTU was criticised for boycotting social dialogue meetings within the Tripartite Negotiating Forum, preferring to engage the ILO-Geneva structures instead of the ILO-Harare structures which the government preferred.

6.4. Funding Unions: Funding for Regime Change?

Closely related to the role of the West is the issue of trade union funding. The membership figures were collected and monthly subscriptions computed to show the revenue generation from affiliate unions as shown below:
Table 6.1: Affiliates of ZCTU in 2012 and subscriptions made

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade Union</th>
<th>Total Members (2012)</th>
<th>Dues ($)</th>
<th>Total ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Technical Employees Association</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1,225.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe State Universities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement and Lime Workers Union of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>386.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial workers union of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>6,650.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Mine Workers Union</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>8,050.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Security Guard Union</td>
<td>3,362</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1,176.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Food Workers Union of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1,225.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General African Plantation Workers Union</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2,450.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Workers Union</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>135.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Engineering Workers Union</td>
<td>8,242</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2,884.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union of Clothing</td>
<td>3,679</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1,287.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Artisan Union</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>245.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Association of Enginemen</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>165.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and General Workers Union</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Amalgamated Railwaymen's Union</td>
<td>4,928</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1,724.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Bank and Allied Workers Union</td>
<td>4,779</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1,672.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Catering and Hotel Workers Union</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>3,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Chemicals, Plastics, and Allied Workers Union</td>
<td>3,562</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1,246.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Construction and Allied Trader Workers Union</td>
<td>7,342</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2,569.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Domestic and Allied Workers Union</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>274.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Education and Scientific Workers Union</td>
<td>7,145</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2,500.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Metal Energy Workers Union</td>
<td>8,448</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2,956.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Public Service Association</td>
<td>3,916</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1,370.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Furniture, Timber and Allied Traders Union</td>
<td>9,727</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>3,404.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Textiles Workers Union</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>486.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Pulp and Paper Workers Union</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>330.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Teachers Association</td>
<td>39,950</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>13,982.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Tobacco Industrial Workers Union</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1,400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Urban Councils Workers Union</td>
<td>8,341</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2,919.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Union of Journalists</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>238.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTALS**                                             | **189,880**          | **66,458.00** |

Mwamadzingo and Raha (2010)

At current membership, ZCTU would generate a maximum of USD66, 458.00 in union dues. In 2012/2013, for example, the ZCTU received one third of union dues from its expected membership, which, according to Mwamadzingo and Raha (2010), stood at
6.2% of the workforce. I use the concept ‘expected’ in the sense that the research could not establish explicitly the membership of the ZCTU as these figures seem not be shared amongst the various officials interviewed. Some argued the membership was 300 000, other 350 000 while others put the figure between 230 000-240 000. But according to the ZCTU-LO Norway review of the partnership between the two labour organizations, the ZCTU membership was 238 998 as at 7 May 2010 (Mwamadzingo and Raha 2010) but went down to 189,880 by the end of 2012. This figure was the latest ‘official figure’ used in this thesis.

Access to ZCTU’s financial data was not possible. However by the end of 2009, the union subscriptions were reported to be USD33, 045, which was only 22% of the federation’s expected target for that year. The problem of collecting union dues from its affiliates continued into 2010 where it was revealed that contributions from affiliates “declined from USD 9, 170 in January 2010 to USD 2,685 in March 2010. The union dues received in April amounted to only USD 390, while only USD 100 had been collected as at 7 May 2010”. (Mwamadzingo and Raha 2010, p.18). The revenue generated by ZCTU in the whole year was and is not enough to pay for rentals, salaries, utilities and maintenance, accounting, legal, insurances, conferences and administration for a single month. The exact amount unions spend in legal battles per year was reported by participants to run into hundreds of thousands of dollars per year, yet its revenue streams were way too little. So given that sustainability is an issue, it is clear that ZCTU operation and objectives cannot be achieved by relying on union dues. The first reason why ZCTU is struggling to generate funds is the ‘informalisation’ of the employment landscape. The economy is not creating employment following two decades of severe economic decline. Potential workers have resorted to engaging in the informal sector to start small ‘projects’ as self-employment. Those privileged to have jobs engage in practice that has become known as “kiya-kiya” which means people bringing groceries into work or anything they can manage, and sell it in the normal course of their full-time job to supplement the meagre wages. As such, the ZCTU membership base has significantly gone down. But one has also to look
at this issue from a historical point of view where a trend can be established regarding funding of trade unions. In the whole of Southern Africa, with the exception of South Africa, all unions struggle to generate funding due to the size of the membership. Unlike in the West, for example, in the UK where trade unions are arguably the greatest donor of the Labour Party, trade unions in Africa cannot afford that luxury. In most cases, it is impossible to pay for electricity bills, office rentals and any salaries for those working full-time in trade unions. So that’s a structural weakness which compromises the quality of industrial relations.

Union officials have their full-time jobs elsewhere and they will have to take leave days to organise any union activity or to attend any meetings. Only the Secretary General’s position is a paid up position. The position of President is not a salaried-position. The rest of the positions in the top leadership the position-holders receive allowances for attending meetings. Therefore trade unionism is compromised from this perspective. But government officials were very concerned that despite the ZCTU Constitution clearly indicating that the position of President should not be a salaried position, the ZCTU had gone on to pay a salary for Mr Lovemore Matombo and government officials were very unhappy with this arguing that union funds were being abused and it was government’s duty to ensure that “public funds are protected”. Therefore, getting involved in order to stop that practice was necessary and this does not constitute interference in trade union activities, a view that was not shared by trade unions. But there appeared a different motivation for this. The President in question had been dismissed from his employment with the Post and Telecommunications Corporation, a government parastatal, for organising strike activities in the postal services. His case had been before the courts for a decade without resolution, a tactic which trade union officials argued was always deployed in cases government had an interest. Court cases were seen as delayed until witnesses are no longer available. Given the ‘limited financial base of the ZCTU’ government officials were suspicious as to how the federation continues to “afford paying such expensive bills”, “attend the many international meetings” including “flying to America to receive Bravery
Awards for fighting against Human Rights abuses” hence concerns regarding external funding. Yet, government was accused of financially crippling ZCTU’s activities by not remitting trade union dues. Legal proceedings to resolve non-remittance of union dues were underway at the time of conducting field-work. According to one of ZCTU’s legal advisors,

“The National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) is among the major defaulters, owing the four unions from the railways sector more than US$200 000 in unpaid dues. The Zimbabwe Railways Artisans Union (RAU) is owed US$84 000 in dues and US$57 000 for the funeral fund, making a grand total of US $141 000. Our affiliate, The Zimbabwe Amalgamated Railway Workers Union (ZARWU) is also owed almost US$60 000 by the NRZ. We are owed about USD$80 000 by more than 20 companies. In addition, some of the top companies that owed the union include Lancashire Steel owes (US$23 399), AFA owes US$7 625, ABJ Engineering owes US$6 353) while Almin Metal owes US$5 627. However, more companies including Morewear Industries, Benbar Tromps, Imperial Derby, Tube and Pipe and Farm Quip, owe our affiliates large sums of money. These defaulting companies are clearly breaching Section 54 of the Labour Act, which stipulates that employers should collect union subscriptions and pass them on to the union …”, (officer, ZCTU Legal department).

The defaulting companies are seen to have been ‘militarised’ from the top, with either retired Army officers or Generals are in charge of those parastatals making it easy to financially cripple ZCTU’s activities. LO-Norway was accused of funding the ZCTU at an alarming proportion in order to achieve regime-change. However, LO Norway started funding ZCTU’s activities since 1981 when unions were subordinated under ZANU PF. There were no complaints regarding the ZCTU-LO Norway partnership until 2009. That on its own raises issues. Are we to assume that the objectives of the cooperation of these two union organizations had changed and that there was now a regime-change agenda?
Or is government simply suspicious of any relationship between the ZCTU and any of its international allies?

A range of documents on donor funding shows how critical the LO-Norway has been of ZCTU’s financial management systems. One report identified unprofessional accounting and financial management systems and the inability to generate its own revenue. It was difficult to see anything that could point to a regime change agenda. The LO Norway-Zimbabwe Report 2010 clearly insisted that the ZCTU should;

“Increase membership by at least 10% annually from the 2005 figure through the affiliated unions; establish effective structures at various levels for effective service delivery, and raise income from subscriptions by at least 150% over the 2005 level. More importantly, that ZCTU should ensure sound financial management and eliminate the organizations internal inter-fund borrowing and that central to all that was that it should ensure internal democracy”, (Project NZ13, 2010).

In the medium to long-term, the LO-Norway insisted that the ZCTU must aim to secure and retain a minimum of 50% unionization in the country. That way, it will be in a position to achieve financial self-reliance which could then lead to the redeeming of ZCTU’s overall debt. Achievement of the above objectives or targets was the condition on which the continued support by LO-Norway was based. It is therefore difficult to see how a regime-change agenda could be visible when one examines the above objectives. The argument for regime change, seen from donor funding appears difficult to sustain, but is it a claim without basis? Trade unionists were not ignorant of the fact that some donors try to attach political strings, but that they will not be influenced by such donors.

“Of cause from my experience through general life and readings, I am aware of the West's own interests in Africa, no doubt about that but you can’t take away the fact that my government is misgoverning. To say if I speak-out, it’s not me who is talking, but someone who is behind … is unfortunate and unfair of our black brothers (Interview: senior ZCTU Official).
On one hand the above narrative confirms that the western countries have particular interests in the developing countries, Zimbabwe included. That is consistent with government line of arguments. So contentious was the issue of donor funding that some union officials reacted angrily to government’s suggestion that LO Norway was funding for regime change:

“For lack of a better expression, that’s an idiotic assumption. LO Norway has been funding ZCTU activities in terms of the Woman’s Emancipation, Organising and Structures since 1994. On one hand to you hear LO Norway on the other hand you will hear USA and on the other hand, the third hand you hear British but what they don’t know is that unions the world over work as a family and we have got a slogan which is ‘an injury to one is an injury to all’. What they don’t tell the world is that they are also receiving assistance from the Norwegian government, Save the Children-Norway and we have projects in Zimbabwe of magnitudes running into millions of US dollars yet the ZCTU maybe is getting something like 50,000 per year from LO Norway. In fact LO Norway also supports Chinese, Palestinian, Ethiopian, Eritrean, and Malawian, Mozambique, Brazilian unions and COSATU … (Interview: senior ZCTU official).

The position of the ILO’s is important on funding of unions. Unions should be free to receive funding from outside the country,

“…However, unions should restrict this to the field of activities of their occupational and trade union activities. Governments should refrain from interfering with the activities of trade unions. Provision imposing a general restriction of political activities on trade unions is not acceptable because it is up to the trade union to decide whether or not it shall receive funding for legitimate activities” (ILO officer, Harare).

Documentary analysis shows that the control exercised by the governments over trade union finances should not normally exceed the obligation to submit periodic reports.
Governments should not use their discretionary power to conduct inspections or request information at any time. This is seen as amounting to interference in the internal affairs and administration of trade unions. It is for the trade unions themselves to decide whether they shall receive funding for legitimate activities to promote and defend human rights and trade union rights. (See 332nd Report, Case No. 2258, para. 515.). Zimbabwe’s social partners do not share the same view on what constitutes legitimate trade union activities.

The ILO’s position is that “all national organizations of workers and employers should have the right to receive financial assistance from international organizations of workers and employers respectively, whether or not they are affiliated to the latter” (See ILO’s 305th Report, Case No. 1834, para. 380; and 321st Report, Case No. 2031, para. 172.) In the Zimbabwean context, this ILO position is equally contentious because it mentions international organizations and not countries. Government’s viewpoint has been that the western governments are sponsoring the ZCTU directly through their governments but also using their federations to put pressure on the Zimbabwean government.

Further, the ILO’s position is that any assistance or support that an international trade union organization might provide in setting up, defending or developing national trade union organizations is “a legitimate trade union activity, even when the trade union tendency does not correspond to the tendency or tendencies within the country”, (300th Report, Case No. 1831, para. 397). This created problems because trade union centres for example, the American Centre for Trade Unions funded ZCTU’s programme for voter education since 2001 and coinciding with its radicalisation and ultimately the formation of the MDC. In addition, to say “any assistance” is legitimate is too broad and precise boundaries of what is legitimate support are crucial in resolving union-state disputes. Legislation prohibiting financial assistance from an international worker organization to which it is affiliated infringes the principles concerning the right to affiliate with international organizations of workers (See the 1996 Digest, para. 632; 305th Report, Case No. 1834, para. 380; and 325th Report, Case No. 2090, para. 168). Finally, the ILO officials argued that it is a violation of union rights to demand prior authorization to receive
international financial assistance. Soon after independence, the ZCTU received international financial assistance but this did not cause problems as such funding was coming with the blessing of government.

6.5. Oppressive Labour Legislation

It was argued that unions, employers and other national stakeholders are not consulted in the formulation of laws which affect their operations. Historically in Zimbabwe, there was no stakeholder consultation in formulating labour legislation. The purpose of labour legislation was curtailing basic freedoms, so consultation was the wrong vehicle for transporting such legislation. After independence, trade unions continued to be sidelined in formulation of labour laws but at the time union-state-state relations were generally positive, (Sachikonye 2001; Beckman and Sachikonye 2000). They granted a range of trade union rights and made it difficult for employers to fire workers. There were no concerns regarding the right to freedom of association, the right to strike, the right to organise and the right to collective bargaining because state was performing trade union functions. It was only after the economy started to nose dive that questions started to emerge around these issues. Unionists and employers talked about the introduction of a ‘plethora of legislation’ or ‘reactive legislation’ aimed at entrenching ZANU PF’s grip on the population and all societal groups. This was allegedly achieved through amending the constitution each time trade unions win a court case of constitutional grounds. Using its majority in parliament, it was seen as reversing all political and human rights gains made by Zimbabweans against the state. Other participants chose to talk about how the judiciary was weakened by the government through appointment of judges sympathetic to the government. Others narrated their observations relating to the allocation of those court cases to judges also viewed as sympathetic to the government. There was that strong feeling that whenever unions successfully challenged government in courts, government would respond by creating more restrictive legislation by either amending the constitution or through Presidential Emergency Powers. Where the courts had made orders in favour
of trade unions, the police were perceived as reluctant and at times refused to enforce those decisions. So participants felt that they were not guaranteed court protection where the state has an interest.

ZCTU officials and employers argued that freedom of association, freedom of assembly and a range of individual rights were trampled upon through a series of constitutional changes. Further, that the powers of the courts to enforce individual rights were incapacitated by constitutional changes effected between 1980 and 1986. Those with a legal background argued that in total, fourteen (14) amendments in those six years reflected the lack of stakeholder participation. Amendment 1, 2 and 4 of the constitution increased Executive Control over the Judicial Appointments whereas Amendment 7 removed the power of the courts to review Presidential prerogatives. So presidential powers were now used as emergency powers to control worker unrest. This was considered as evidence for the reactive legislation the government passed.

Amendment 9 allowed the Bill of Rights to be amended by two-thirds Parliamentary majority. This was a calculated move because ZANU PF was always able to secure the required number due to the de-facto-one-party state. Also problematic was Amendment 11. This allowed corporal punishment of juveniles as a judiciary imposed sentence and declaring hanging not to be cruel, inhuman or degrading. This was in response to a Supreme Court decision which declared corporal punishment as unconstitutional and another pending case that was challenging the constitutionality of hanging as a means of execution. So the message was clear in the nature of amendments that a heavy-handed approach was being adopted by the government, and trade unions were soon to become victims. Also significant was amendments 12 and 13 to do with land acquisition. These amendments sought to restrict courts from inquiring into the compensation for acquired land. The issue of land reform later became a contested issue central to union-state relations. Unions were seen as siding with the white farmers to prevent the distribution of land and labelled “imperial stooge”. In addition, Amendment 13 allowed delay in the
carrying out of executions. However, this was a response to the Supreme Courts’ finding that such delays were inhuman and degrading.

Finally, Amendment 14 sought to deprive foreigners married to Zimbabweans an automatic right to residency. Again this was a reaction to a Supreme Court ruling that foreign husbands of Zimbabwean women had the same residency rights as foreign wives of Zimbabwean men. This may not be seen as an attack on trade unions but when one examines the socio-economic and political history of Zimbabwe, it becomes clear that foreigners constituted the majority of workers in mines, farms and industries—people who had once been referred by Mugabe as “totemless” and who should be deported back to their countries when it was found that the majority did not support ZANU PF. They were ‘emigrants’ from Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa who had established themselves as Zimbabweans during the colonial era. Participants therefore questioned government’s strategy of amending the Bill of Rights each time a Supreme Court judgement is made against it referring to it as a “mutilation of individual rights”. So claims by trade unionists that they were targeted by the government through restrictive laws were given against that context of reactive legislation.

Some participants pointed to worker assault through court judgments aimed at entrenching neo-liberal economic policies. In cases involving union leaders, there was a strong concern of bias against the labour movement in higher courts which were seen as reversing favourable judgements of the lower courts or those of the Labour Court. The labour movement argued that it was on record for publicly condemning the award of farms to judges in a controversial land reform, and felt anti-labour judgements were a backlash.

Unionists’ views were shared by some business leaders who however were more cautious

“Well I don’t want to say anti-union or anti-business but I want to say our judiciary to my reading is no longer independent and I come to that conclusion on the basis of two aspects. The first one is that a lot of these judges, even the chief justice,
were given free farms. When you get those farms it is with strings so your independence becomes questionable. Primarily that’s what has led to that conclusion, and of course you also follow certain cases and see the judgments that come out of certain cases particularly cases of a political nature whether it is to do with elections, and you can’t organise, you are not allowed to have this rally and so forth and so forth. You come to the conclusion that sees bias, and that is my reading, but I can’t say laws are anti-union- but in the process, I think unions can also be caught up in the cross-fire” (Senior EMCOZ official).

Some argued that the labour laws were not the problem but other laws brought in as security laws, were the ones curtailing union-freedoms. Broadly speaking, participants argued that labour law was seen as crafted in a way that focuses more on labour control, coercive compliance, power preservation and domination. It has been largely exclusionary in that the Labour Act was crafted in a divisive and heterogeneous way that excludes civil servants; workers in export processing zones, university staff, and others from its coverage. This approach keeps unionised worker numbers low. Where it gives room, law enforcement agents such as the police and CIO were alleged to have become a law unto themselves seriously curtailing union freedoms such as those enshrined in ILO Conventions 87 and 98. Sections 24 (5), 41 and 46 (j) of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) have been violated to create an unlawful scenario which gives the erroneous impression that POSA applies to the ZCTU and its affiliates. Indeed, ZCTU’s bona-fide activities such as labour forums, workshops and General Council Meetings have been illegally disallowed, banned or violently disrupted by the state. The State President and the Labour Minister possesses massive sweeping powers over labour relations matters including powers to deregister trade unions. In the majority of the cases cited by participants, it is the freedoms of assembly, movement, expression and association that have been the state’s targets under POSA. There were also concerns that strike law, for example, was too restrictive to the extent that the only way to have a legal strike in
Zimbabwe is for ZCTU to go on an illegal strike. Workers could be prosecuted for exercising their labour right of going on strike as the immunity which used to be enjoyed by striking unions and workers was arbitrarily stripped by the government albeit to suffocate union activities. The State President has on two occasions invoked his Presidential Executive Powers vested in him by section 2 of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act [Chapter 10:20, to promulgate draconian laws that regulate ZCTU issues. Unionists were adamant that presidential powers were used to victimise and curtail trade union activities in the very same way the then Rhodesian white rulers such as Ian Smith used to do it. The fact that the current ZANU PF government was using the same laws they were fighting against during the colonial struggle was used as evidence that the government was targeting ZCTU in order to deal with increasing worker militancy, especially at the national level, government adopted the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Labour Relations) Regulations of 1998 (Statutory Instrument 368A of 1998). These measures, which came into effect for 6 months from November 1998 following threats by the ZCTU to go on further weekly stay-aways, imposed heavy penalties on employers, employees, trade unions and employers’ organizations that incite or facilitate strikes, stay-away and other forms of unlawful collective action.

The ILO’s position was that Zimbabwe needed to amend the Labour Act and the Public Service Act in particular, Article 2 to ensure that prison staff and public servants enjoy the right to join trade unions and thus enjoy the right to organise. The same right should be accorded to managers since under the current Labour Act, managers are considered employers. As such, they cannot enjoy the right to join unions. From the union’s viewpoint, the Act starves unions of highly educated and experienced personnel who could contribute immensely to the success of unions. Second, Article 3 needed amending to ensure that unions and employer organizations can employ their members without interference from the Minister of Labour. The current Labour Act gives the Minister the power to supervise elections of union members and employer organizations. More
contentious is section 51 of the Labour Act which gives power to the Minister of Labour to regulate union dues as well as regulate staffing issues in particular how much the unionists could be paid in salaries and allowances as well as property and equipment that might be purchased by unions. The minister also has powers to appoint an investigator who could at any time walk into the ZCTU offices and take any records for purposes of monitoring union activities and protecting the workers’ interests.

6.6. ‘Unfit-for-purpose’ Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF)

When asked whether or not the TNF has achieved its objectives, none of the participants gave a positive view. There were serious issues to do with lack of trust, lack of commitment from all parties and a lack of consultation and stakeholder participation. The use of inflammatory language and intolerant behaviour among the partners were major obstacles. As a result, despite meeting on several occasions, the TNF failed to agree a social contract to address Zimbabwe’s economic problems. A number of protocols were established the main of which were, the ‘Protocol on Restoration of Production Viability’, ‘Protocol on the Mobilisation’, ‘Pricing and Management of Foreign Currency’, Incomes and Stabilisation Protocol, Founding Principles of the Tripartite Negotiating Forum and The Kadoma Declaration. These Protocols were signed on the 1st of June 2007 by Government, Business, Apex (representative of civil service workers), and the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions, however, the ZCTU declined to sign any of these documents, arguing that the timing for signing of the documents was a cover-up of gross human rights and trade union rights abuses being committed by government. Most of those in the ZCTU leadership still had pending criminal charges for leading demonstrations and they did not see the logic in signing documents that “preach about trust and tolerance”. They also contended that the documents were brought forward on an emergency basis, on the eve of going to the Geneva ILO Conference. As such, they were perceived as a public relations exercise by which government was sprucing its image ahead of the ILO Conference. The ZCTU insisted on signing one protocol at a time, monitor progress
before signing another to see if government was genuinely committed. It also argued that
the presence and participation of the ZFTU was an infiltration into the negotiation process
where a “yellow federation” was being brought in to “sing praises for the government”,
thus weakening the workers’ voice.

A number of factors have contributed to the failure of the TNF, in particular, the
progressive decline in several governance indicators notably freedom of association and
expression, accountability, regulatory quality, corruption, political intolerance, policy
contradictions and restricted stakeholder participation, (interviews: several unionists,
employers and ILO officials). A key participant pointed out:

“What we saw in Zimbabwe was that the very basic and thus indispensable
conditions for the partnership between business, government and trade unions
were never in place from the beginning. The parties were not sharing the same
understanding regarding the causes of the Zimbabwean crisis, there was no
shared strategy and there was no shared development path”, (Interview: former
ILO Director-Geneva).

The Kadoma Declaration was an attempt by the TNF partners to create a shared vision of
the causes of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe. It intended to delegate specific
responsibilities to each social partner in order to ameliorate the country’s deepening
economic problems. The table below captures participants’ understanding of the country
risk factors and their ‘sectorial’ obligations.
### Table: 6.3. Country risk factors – (author’s construct 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUSE OF COUNTRY RISK</th>
<th>ACTION TO BE TAKEN</th>
<th>BUSINESS</th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Politicisation and failure of governance institutions</td>
<td>Apply rule of law, depoliticise governance institutions/ workplaces and, no collection of money for political parties at work places</td>
<td>Depoliticise the workplaces, stop fundraising for political parties at work places</td>
<td>Depoliticise the workplaces, stop fundraising for political parties at work places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mismatch between policy and action</td>
<td>Must commit to implement its own policies and any other agreed policies</td>
<td>Must support implementation of agreed national policies</td>
<td>Must support implementation of agreed national policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Delay in policy implementation</td>
<td>Must timeously implement policies</td>
<td>Identify and utilise opportunities in government policies and agitate for their implementation</td>
<td>To agitate for policy implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Continued racial imbalance in ownership and means of production</td>
<td>Implement deliberate policies of social equity and empowerment in a legal, transparent and systematic way</td>
<td>Exploit business opportunities in land redistribution and Indigenisation</td>
<td>Identify empowerment opportunities for workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Activities of Civil and Pressure Groups</td>
<td>Ensure that Civil and Pressure Groups do not usurp the powers of Constitutional and Statutory Institutions of Governance</td>
<td>Engender good Industrial relations and desist from any action that increases the prospects of violence</td>
<td>Engender good Industrial relations and refer disputes to appropriate legal channels timeously</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Lack of political tolerance</td>
<td>Apply the law on those who incite and perpetrate violence; ensure free and fair elections</td>
<td>Depoliticise workplace and organization structures</td>
<td>Promote political tolerance in the workplace and trade union structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Corruption in the Public and Private Sectors</td>
<td>Making the Civil Service professional and better paid</td>
<td>Prevent and fight corruption; Report corruption to relevant authorities</td>
<td>Prevent, fight and report corruption to relevant authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Contradictory Statements by and among Social Partners</td>
<td>Enunciate clear, consistent policies; Speak with single voice on agreed issues of national importance</td>
<td>Speak with single voice on agreed issues of national importance</td>
<td>Speak with single voice on agreed issues of national importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Unstable macro-economic fundamentals:</td>
<td>Prioritise issues of macro-economic stabilisation/comply with budgetary limits</td>
<td>Support an agreed macro-economic stabilisation programme</td>
<td>Support an agreed macro-economic stabilisation programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Bad country image</td>
<td>Ensure good governance</td>
<td>Promote good corporate governance</td>
<td>Promote good corporate governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There was a broad agreement on the country risk factors but not necessarily on the causes of the economic crisis. For example, bad country image was a reason for lack of investment but what was causing the bad image was up for contest. Government would point to an "evil partnership" between business and unions in advocating for sanctions, not supporting land reform and irresponsible statements aimed at bringing regime change. Unions and business on the other hand would point to the unilateral decision-making by government in key areas hence the lack of stakeholder support at implementation stage. Political intolerance, irresponsible and inflammatory statements by all TNF partners, and contradictory statements to the press by social partners created serious trust issues which translated into confrontational actions, thus worsening relations between the periods 2001 to 2013. Discussion around the country risk factors started around 2001 but the signing of the Kadoma Declaration was only achieved in 2007. However, the ZCTU did not sign the Kadoma Declaration arguing that some of its officials and members were still facing criminal charges. In addition, they did not accept responsibility for causing any of the country-risk factors. They argued that the mismatch between policy and action, politicisation of governance institutions, corruption in civil service, unstable economic fundamentals, the skewed nature and racial imbalance in wealth distribution and breakdown in rule of law were all responsibilities of the state and not the ZCTU. Part of the commitments required them to support the land reform and indigenisation policies which they had for a long time campaigned against and labelled “land grab” and “factory invasions” respectively. The government officials accused the ZCTU of pursuing an agenda of the MDC thus there was a conflict of interest. Government questioned the sincerity of the ZCTU in addressing Zimbabwe’s economic problems. Government officials argued that ZCTU wanted the economy to get worse because that would drive people to support the MDC as an alternative to ZANU PF. Broadly speaking the TNF was not achieving its objectives because of deep-rooted and entrenched position between the tripartite partners. Consultation was not genuine and sincere and some participants
referred to the TNF as a “talk-shop” or a “toothless dog, just barking without any concrete actions”. Labour-market issues were easily politicised.

A number of meetings and workshops between the ILO, Business, Unions and government were convened to educate actors on the South African model (NEDLAC) with a view to borrow the concept and introduce it in Zimbabwe. A visit to South Africa by the TNF delegation took place at the end of 2012 to learn how the structure works. Government officials were not however enthusiastic about the NEDLAC Model. They did not favour the idea of creating an Independent Secretariat, which was legal and tasked with economic management responsibilities. Such a model, ‘usurps’ the role of Cabinet which was ‘an elected chamber’ yet the TNF members were a privileged class who cannot be a substitute for Cabinet. Government further stressed that business leaders got into the TNF structure on the basis of being rich, owning businesses and or managing big businesses and they do not necessarily reflect the views of the indigenous Zimbabweans. So while government acknowledged that there was need for social partners to participate in economic reforms, it was clear this ought to be alongside the lines of consultation rather than taking over the function of cabinet. Overall, there was simply no political will to see the structure work from all members of the TNF yet there was strong support for adopting the NEDLAC System. What does the South African model offer which was appealing to the majority actors? It looks a model geared to address the lack of political will to engage, to consult on labour law reform, economic policy reform and implementation are all addressed through the NEDLAC Act which recognises the formal participation of four groups in those matters. The Act makes clear the objectives of NEDLAC and goes on to set-up its structure. It is important to briefly outline these objectives. According to section 5(1) of the Act the Council shall –

“strive to promote the goals of economic growth, participation in economic decision-making and social policy; seek to reach consensus and conclude agreements on matters pertaining to economic and social policy; consider all proposed labour legislation relating to labour market policy before it is introduced
in Parliament; consider all significant changes to social and economic policy before it is implemented or introduced in Parliament; and finally, encourage and promote the formulation of co-ordinated policy on social and economic matters”

There is thus a serious intention through an Act of Parliament and the commitment to negotiation is almost guaranteed. The fieldwork interviews showed how business and labour accused government of coming with a plethora of economic blue prints which either showed lack of understanding of the economic fundamentals or coming up with populist policies that had a longer term negative impact on the country. Unions also accused government of coming up with anti-labour legislation. The NEDLAC structure by guaranteeing participation in labour legislation and labour market policy formulation, in theory, addresses Zimbabwe’s’ stakeholder concerns. However, one needs to appreciate the uniqueness of the South African model. It arose out of a historical context which completely different from Zimbabwe’s history of union-state engagements. Although NEDLAC was only established on the 18th of February 1995, there already existed conditions and a history of Tripartism in South African industrial relations system. This history, according to Parsons (2002, p. 5) was the

“… Watershed Wiehahn Commission report in 1979. The acceptance of most of the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission by the National Party Government of the day was significant, because it paved the way for the legitimising of black and multi-racial trade unions in South Africa and their subsequent recognition by commerce and industry …the power relations within South African economy started to shift from a highly paternalistic framework which essentially had government deciding what was best for the workers towards a more inclusive and consensual framework of decision making … the experience gained by both organised business and organised labour in the post Wiehahn industrial relations system … equipped individuals within each of these constituencies with the necessary tools to act as facilitators, mediators and
negotiators and in doing so, made a more collaborative decision-making process possible …"

So one can see that about fifteen (15) years before independence the South African social dialogue system was already in motion. Whereas in Zimbabwe, social dialogue, through the TNF only came into existence eighteen (18) years after independence, but only as a revolt to the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF) set up by President Mugabe but constituted of self-appointed individuals who had no institutional mandate. Not only does South Africa have a longer history of tripartite participation, but right from the beginning, it adopted its model by incorporating aspects of successful social dialogue institutions especially Ireland and Holland. Based on the interviews there is no guarantee that such a model will work because Zimbabwe’s problem is one of ‘malnutrition’, the lack of appropriate diet to make any system work. As noted by Fukuyama (1995), where institutions exist, there is need for trust and that is an expensive and unaffordable attribute at the moment.

All participants, except the ILO officials argued that the TNF was a dismal failure. Because from its formation, there was no shared set of vision, shared concern thus no common strategies could be implemented. The negotiations that took place from 2000 were not done in good faith resulting in little or no progress at all. There were doctrinaire positions held by each of the parties. The government thought the trade unions were intransigent and were ‘tools of the West’. Some argued that “government viewed ZCTU an enemy of the state …to them negotiating with ZCTU is similar to negotiating with Tony Blair or George Bush. There is total mistrust…” (Former ZCTU senior official and MDC MP) The relationship between the ZCTU and the government was therefore a crucial factor in the success of the TNF. Unions and business branded government as “dictatorial” and not listening to the voices of the people resulting in unprecedented acrimony.
Employers had no belief in the TNF arguing that identifying deep-rooted, unresolved political questions was crucial for consultation systems to work in Zimbabwe as one pointed out:

“…The TNF has not achieved its objectives because there are little wars going on between ministries. That’s where personalities come in. People are competing for a good name with their Principal-Mugabe and if X manages to get the social contract signed, the issues of the social contract have to be implemented in terms of the framework agreed to. And therefore kudos goes to X and his Ministry. Y also sees that this is an opportunity. So that’s one of the factors bringing all sorts of confusion …despite her lack of education Vice President Joyce Mujuru, in terms of listening, understanding issues and so on; she was doing a damn good job. But my reading is that at the time of being appointed Chairperson … she was in good books with the boss-Mugabe. Political developments around succession started happening and she could no longer be trusted because the husband- Solomon, was now in one camp and Emerson Munangagwa was in another camp” (Senior EMCOZ official).

ZANU PF succession issues were also viewed by unions as challenges to the success of the TNF. Employers argued that there were need for political change but did not want to be seen as advocating for regime change so they provided the rationale as context;

“…the old man has a lot of baggage now to a point where you wonder which body out there can be sympathetic to the Zimbabwean cause. He can call it sanctions. He can call it whatever he wants but the fact of the matter is he has too much baggage. Maybe you can say what happens if he stands down and gives way to another ZANU PF functionary. Yes that will be a positive move but the international community will play a wait and see game to try and understand whether the new leader or leadership is indeed renewal and committed to a certain direction and the gestation period for turnaround becomes longer. Juxtapose that with a change from ZANU PF to MDC. There can be issues about Morgan himself
as a leader and his shot-comings and so forth and so forth but three is so much good will out there that would say Zimbabwe at one stage was a jewel of Southern Africa. We want to assist her to reinstate that status in Southern Africa. Investors are saying Zimbabwe is a very good investment destination and so forth and so forth...” (Interview: Senior official EMCOZ).

From a business perspective, a change of government made sense. Success of the TNF also depended on a change of government. That view plays into government’s argument that both the unions and employers had ‘teamed up’ to create economic sabotage to facilitate regime-change hence the label of “evil partnership”. Everything to do with participant’s understanding or experience of union-state relationship was always described within a broader political governance framework rather than an industrial relations context.

6.7. Politicisation of workplaces

Union-state relations worsened to the point of being visible within many workplaces. This is because of the politicisation that manifested in the form of political intolerance at work. Job promotion in particular, within the civil service was seen as based on political lines. If you were a ZANU PF sympathiser, you were most likely to be promoted and if you were MDC you were most likely to lose your job. Parastatal bodies were viewed as both politicised and militarised where the top leadership in organizations such as the National Railways, were now drawn from retired Army Generals or retired senior police officers or members of the Intelligence Organization. These ‘parastatals’ then established a pattern where they would not remit union dues to the ZCTU affiliated unions leading to accusations that the state was simply closing down any democratic spaces- “companies partly-owned by the state” could not be seen to facilitate the financial activities of the ZCTU. The same organizations were also accused of promoting ZCTU officials to managerial positions if terminating their services was not a viable option. This may not be
viewed as an attack on trade unions but promotion of ZCTU officials is indeed an attack because Zimbabwe’s labour laws distinguish between an employee and a managerial employee. A managerial employee refers to workers with management responsibilities over a group of employees and do not therefore qualify to be trade union members because they are employers. So a union member who has significant influence over the activities of the union at the company is disempowered through promotion.

Politicisation was alleged to have resulted in the creation of “ghost workers”, that is, people who were on government payroll, masquerading as teachers, nurses, or in any other capacity within the civil service. They were perceived to be “mercenaries created to cause havoc but were being paid from public coffers” resulting in a “blotted, inefficient, partisan and not fit for purpose” civil service. This was not only crippling governance institutions but was creating a system of patronage which militated against any economic recovery efforts.

The lack of the rule of law was also blamed on the politicisation and militarisation of state institutions in particular, the army, the police and judiciary. Farms were allegedly allocated to senior police, intelligence, army personnel and to judges. They argued therefore that it was not surprising that one Army General had addressed the media to explain that the army was not going to salute anyone whose liberation credentials they did not approve, a statement that was seen as directed to Morgan Tsvangirai, the opposition leader who is not a war veteran. While both unionists and employers made it clear that the bench was composed of very competent people, they, with great unanimity, claimed that their professionalism was greatly compromised in cases which involved the government against trade unions and opposition political parties. They also felt that, the composition of the bench in matters where the state had interests was also questionable, claiming that those members of the bench who were considered “too objective”, were excluded from landmark cases. In the private sector, employers were accused of encouraging workers to vote against the government and to encourage them to go on strikes whilst guaranteeing them full salaries. Employers were allegedly convincing workers that they were prepared
to pay high wages but that government policies through Price and Wage Freezes made it impossible for them to do so. Some would allow their premises to be used for political mobilisation mainly on behalf of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to great disapproval by government.

The industrial relations processes including grievance procedures collapsed during this period as everything was defined in political terms. The resolution of workplace issues and disputes took a more confrontational approach with rival union federations battling for supremacy. There were allegations that instead of dialogue, weapons such as machetes were used to confront those employers who were seen as sympathisers of the opposition but who were also seen as committing unfair labour practices. So the employers were now divided into, those who were pro-government (pro-ZANU PF and ZFTU), those who were anti-government (pro MDC and ZCTU) and those who did not want to be associated with any of this squabbling but who had to play the game right in order not to be on the wrong-side of action.

TNF partners were selling party political cards at work. In government offices some civil servants were seen selling ZANU PF party cards, were wearing ZANU PF party regalia and were fund-raising for ZANU PF activities. The alleged ‘ghost workers’ were seen as instrumental in this. The same was happening in private companies where employers and workers were alleged to be fund-raising for MDC using ZCTU structures to do so as well as selling and wearing party-regalia. Such political polarisation made workplaces a battleground between ZANU PF in alliance with ZFTU and MDC in alliance with ZCTU. Politicisation of workplaces was also seen as interfering with freedom of expression as workers’ issues at workplaces easily became politicised. The government’s response to worker militancy and mobilisation in workplaces was to introduce Price and Wage Freeze through Presidential Emergence Powers. This resulted in the fixing of prices for basic commodities and ‘groceries’. This resulted in acute shortage of the products, prompting “state-led and state-supported physical attacks and arrests of employers” for charging exorbitant prices. Most of these products were now being imported from neighbouring
countries in particular South Africa and Botswana, so businesses needed to charge competitive prices that took into account costs of transportation, import duties and foreign currency charges in order to remain viable. The government assault meant most had to close-down businesses, which was seen as sabotage by the government, (interviews with unionists and employers) “government was pointing at empty supermarket shelves asking -where are the goods?” -many employers were arrested and prosecuted for attempting to orchestrate regime change.

The Pricing policy (Price freeze) was a major blow to the ZCTU which could not mobilise against such a policy because a price freeze is good for workers whose salaries were below poverty-datum level. However, such a policy was unsustainable because no commodities could be imported by businesses to be sold at economically unsustainable prices. So this worsened business-state relations as much as they did to union-state relations, and that is also how dialogue within the TNF collapsed as unions and employers were being accused of forming an alliance to oust the government- the ‘Evil-Alliance”. Government media was seen as crucial in popularising this view-point but employers accused government of misleading the nation, on the causes for the shortages, as a key official pointed out;

“We as business decided to actually seek audience, with the State President, where we had put together a paper in order to turn around the economy and we were very confident to say that if these measures are taken on board as a package, not cherry-picking, the economy would turn around within 90 days. That’s how bold we were putting our backs on the chopper. In the process of presenting the paper, we analysed the causes, and highlighted the issues. Because our paper didn’t mention or identify sanctions as a reason for the state of affairs of the economy, Ehh, unozvionaka! (You haven’t seen anything like that!!), that was one from that particular episode. There was a second one from the episode. The paper from business didn’t highlight indigenisation as a vehicle for economic turnaround … Mugabe fumed accusing us of being British and American
puppets and for trying to orchestrate regime change. There was a spate of arrests of business leaders largely around a price blitz accusation … so we started discussions in one of our business meetings to say, should we continue to engage or not. We could have stopped discussions but what could have been the implications? Our reading was, to start off, there is no alternative and we will not know government’s thinking if we don’t engage. If we don’t go there and listen to even the very stupid idea they have. You can only begin to change something that you fully understand. In addition, no-one was more Zimbabwean than the next person. This is our economy. We are not business leaders by proxy but because we are business leaders in our country. It’s a national issue. So we will go and talk to them. But again that’s where perhaps you end up with lip-service on the part of the government … they would talk to you when it suits them and so forth so forth, (senior official, EMCOZ).

The role of employers in influencing union-state relations is not a clear one. And some ILO-Application of Standards participants were critical of the rather passive role being played by the Employer delegation from Zimbabwe each time the Zimbabwe case is being discussed at the ILO conference. The passive role was seen to be typically one where they stand to benefit from the conflict so doing something about it was perhaps not in their best interest. Contrary to that view, employers saw themselves as victims arguing that “whenever two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”.

However, a critical historical analysis of the socio-political factors reflects the passive yet lethal contribution of employers to the union-state relations. Under Lancaster House Agreement, white capital’s economic interests, property and land rights were guaranteed. However, there was a corresponding obligation to continue producing staple food for the economy, (maize and wheat) the prices of which were to be regulated by government so that the majority of the population can afford basic necessities. Employers however shifted the goal-posts and in league with the IMF, World Bank and WTO advocated for the
introduction of SAPS. SAPs led to an end of free education, transport allowances, generous pension’s schemes, and medical aid assistance for workers, to name a few losses. More strategically for employers, it meant prices were no longer regulated by government but by market forces and their obligations from the Lancaster House Agreement came to an end through the back door. Employers started charging higher prices and when government stopped that and enforced price controls; the farmers responded by stopping the production of staples thus creating shortages and unaffordable prices for the farm produce. So they started to produce flowers for the European markets instead.

So the higher prices made it unaffordable for the workers and this lead to civil unrest which manifested itself in the form of food riots in 1998. Seen from this perspective, the employers created fertile conditions for people to turn against the government. The workers, because of their reliance on rural subsistence farming to supplement their meagre salaries were the hardest hit by the high cost of living and it was therefore easier for the ZCTU to mobilise around the bread and butter issues and thus the ZCTU’s rise to prominence was aided by employers, especially white commercial farmers. This led to a fall-out between unions and government but then in an unprecedented move, created an alliance between ZCTU and capital. Key participants explained how a union-employer alliance against the state grew and its effect;

“...To make matters worse, ZCTU and white capital formed up an alliance against the state. This is the first time that in the history of Zimbabwe, labour forms an alliance with an employer who is underpaying him/her against the state. This is because the employers were saying it’s not our problem. If you need 20% or more, we can pay you but the problem is beyond us and it is to do with your government. From another corner government saw farmers donating cheques to Tsvangirai so its reaction was that these guys want to remove us by force ...they invaded ZCTU offices to have an idea of where the money was coming from. But given the relationship that now existed between ZCTU, MDC, and the donor community and capital, they had to find out other
strategies to ensure that the money was not traceable” (former ZCTU official and MDC MP).

The above is significant for a number of reasons. The first is that union funds are audited and if monies come in and not properly accounted for, the financial transparency and discipline is impossible to ascertain. Second, it is a narrative reinforcing an alliance thus sustaining government’s arguments. But why is it that these parties were adopting such strategies? Is it because of a regime-change agenda or is it simply a result of the closure in democratic space? This is open to contest but it does make controversial the role of employers in relation to ZCTU’s rise to prominence as a political force. Employers, in their defence argued that they did not support the activities of the ZCTU but that workers and business alike were affected in similar ways by government’s disastrous economic policies. They did not support workers’ strikes but that historically, whenever strikes occurred, employers’ properties and premises would be destroyed or vandalised if they were open for trade during strike action. There was little protection from the police so closing for business was just safeguarding property rather than support ZCTU-led strikes.

From government’s view-point, it was unthinkable and unacceptable that workers would team up with farmers and capital against government despite the former underpaying them. The state quickly made connections to the international dimension of the conflict. Government pointed to a deliberate attempt to starve the workers and entire population to create civil unrest for people to turn up against government. They further argued that the first people to criticise the government and in particular Robert Mugabe for starving the people of Zimbabwe were the European countries who were also the beneficiaries of cash crops like flowers when the farmers decided to ‘sabotage the government’ by not growing staples. The issue of structural adjustment which has already been discussed was brought in as part of the equation that says;

‘White commercial farmers + ZCTU (stooges/sell-outs) + European Union =Regime Change Agenda’. This equation then brought about a response that says; ‘
War Veterans + ZFTU + ZANU PF = State Sovereignty or 3rd Chimurenga (War of liberation). Then the gloves were off.

The conflict was exacerbated by the refusal of the ZCTU supported by the white community including commercial farmers to resist payment of a War Veterans Levy in 1998. Because of the high cost of living, the combatants, the majority of whom were unemployed were failing to afford the basic necessities so they approached the government for gratuity payments and pensions for their participation in the liberation war (Interviews: government officials). However, since government had not budgeted for this expenditure it proposed to pay through a levy on workers, who were also experiencing difficulties due the high cost of living and the shortage of staples. The ZCTU resisted this and organised countrywide demonstrations and government resorted to borrowing money. But the complexity of the matter is that the war veterans were angered by the support offered to the ZCTU by commercial farmers to resist this levy (several interviews with both government and unionists). There is an important political dimension which emerged from the interviews. Government officials argued that the white community including commercial farmers showed double-standards in supporting the resistance of paying gratuities to war veterans because the Lancaster Agreement guaranteed the whites pensions in hard currency to be paid in a bank account in a country of their choice. So their opposition to pensions and gratuities payments was, in the context, not taken lightly and took a serious political dimension and brought into the dynamics confrontations aimed at resolving the unfinished agenda of the liberation war.

6.8. Attacks on Freedom of Association and of the Right to Organise

As union-state relations worsened so was an increase in instances of restrictions to freedom of association and the right to organise. Most participants argued that there was now a reversal of the gains of independence to the same conditions as existed during Ian Smith’s colonial regime. Trade unions for black workers were then not allowed the rights
to organise, assembly and associate. The Labour Relations Act 1985 had changed this position and in 2003, the government ratified Convention, 1948 (No. 87) thus making an undertaking to ensure Zimbabweans enjoy this right. It also signalled its preparedness to comply with the international norms on this convention.

Except for government officials, every participant expressed concern that freedom of association was no longer respected and that several measures to curtail the exercise of this right by unions were put in place by government. These ranged from banning union meetings, interfering with union meetings, workshops and training programmes, and stopping unions from organising strikes or peaceful demonstrations. Unions have on many occasions taken government to court and to the ILO for alleged violation of the right to freedom of association. Several reports of the ILO are also indicative of the extent of conflict surrounding the exercise of freedom of association. Starting way back in July 1997, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act was invoked in order to deal with and contain demonstrations by war veterans who demanded compensation and gratuities. In December 1997, the ZCTU secured a court order prohibiting the government from interfering with planned demonstrations against a range of taxes, but in defiance of the order, the police violently disrupted the demonstrations. Following this demonstration, the then Secretary General of the ZCTU, Morgan Tsvangirai was beaten unconscious, in his office in broad daylight by known attackers who seventeen years are yet to be arrested and brought to justice, (unionists and employers interview accounts). This attack was seen as evidence that violence against unionists was ‘sanctioned from the top’. Union-state relations which were further strained by the introduction of SAPs worsened between 2003 and 2009 and participants argued that violent repression of unions was government’s way of sending a message that opposing views were unwelcome.

The political developments which included the growing into popularity of the MDC, the political mobilisation by civil groups and unions created political polarisation and intolerance of the highest order which made it problematic to recognise the right to
organise and freedom of association. Another contentious issue was that unions were arguing that the right to strike arises out of freedom of association and expression, a view not shared by the government. The ILO accepted however that the right to strike was not explicitly stated in either convention 87 or 98 but that the decisions of the ILO decision-making organs on this issue have consistently clearly established the right to strike. However, ILO officials were inconsistent as to whether the right to strike arises out of the right to freedom of association or not. Unionists were arguing that the right to freedom of association was a human right thus making the right to strike a human right too by virtue of originating from freedom of association. For government officials, freedom of association was a political right and included the right to assembly. As such, they are not absolute rights as they have to be enjoyed with due regard to or in consideration of the ‘national public’. One cannot assemble “anywhere anyhow” and claim freedom of association while in violation of other peoples’ rights.

A closer analysis of the right to strike is presented below.

6.8.1. Right to strike in Zimbabwe

The right to strike in Zimbabwe is at the heart of union-state relations or disputes because there are collective bargaining agreements which are not being honoured by business organizations, especially those ‘parastatals’ where government has a stake. It appears that the parties are concentrating on contesting legislation to do with strikes rather than the mechanisms of dealing with issues arising out of the collective bargaining process. Due to their disruptive nature, strikes need to be seen as symptoms of a problem, a systemic failure of the process of addressing the working conditions through collective bargaining. That should be the ultimate objective. If we accept that strikes are indicative of a defective collective bargaining mechanism in Zimbabwe, those wider political, social and economic issues which in the first instance would have influenced the collective bargaining outcomes will always trigger strikes regardless of whether there is legislative
restrictions on the right to strikes. The majority of participants indicated that there has never been a legal strike in Zimbabwe since 1980 but strikes have always been conducted and always heavily suppressed by the state. There were concerns and narratives to argue that since independence in 1980, of all the strikes conducted, none of them was legal. The ILO’s position is not very helpful and rather complicates disputes arising out of the right to strike where parties claim that the right to strike is part of freedom of association.

A fundamental weakness is that the ILO does not explicitly guarantee in its Constitution or in the Declaration of Philadelphia in key Conventions (87 and 98) the right to strike. Yet, in disputes brought before it, its response has been to argue that the right to strike exists, under Freedom of Association and collective bargaining. For a long time now, it has been taken for granted to be in existence simply because in the first report prepared in discussing Convention No 87 the right to strike is mentioned with so much frequency that participants have for long taken it for granted that the right was mentioned in the context of problems of freedom of association. Another weakness of the ILO mechanism arises from the fact that the ILO report (ILC, 30th session, 1947, Report V11, Freedom of Association and Industrial Relations) despite the concerns arising out of the right to strike, the discussions at both the Conference in 1947 and 1948, the committee did not expressly establish or deny the right to strike. Up to this day, only Article 1 of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) and paragraphs 4, 6, and 7 of the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, 1951 (No. 92) mention strike action but very vaguely. Elsewhere, the right to strike is implied as part of unions’ activities not necessarily as a right. In other international instruments for example, in Article 8(1) (d) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right to strike is supposed to be exercised in conformity with the laws of the relevant country, making it a contingent right yet ZCTU argued that it was a human right.
A third weakness arises out of misunderstanding of the way the ILO supervisory organs work. With respect to freedom of association, there are three important structures relevant to freedom of association and the right to strike. These are the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) and the Committee of Experts, and the Application of Standards Committee. The first two organs are not truly legal in nature. The trade unions have taken the broader views and opinions of the Committee of Experts and the Freedom of Association Committee as legal positions on the right to strike emanating from freedom of association. This position is not correct and the ILO itself has not taken measures to correct that position. A critical analysis of ILO’s supervisory mechanisms, in particular, their functions, it is clear that the Application of Standards Committee is the most authoritative on the application of conventions. This substructure of the ILO has not concluded that the right to strike exists and originates from freedom of association. This structure is tripartite, that is, it is composed of Employers, Unions, and Government representatives. Tripartite support is essential for conventions to be in force. However, there is no historical evidence to suggest the existence of tripartite support for a right to strike within the Application of Standards Committee. Therefore the right to strike in international freedom of association principles is an unresolved matter, no wonder why ILO officials did not share the same view on freedom of association and the right to strike.

Labour legislation in Zimbabwe recognises the right to strike. However, conflict arose to do with the long procedure to be undertaken for a legal strike to occur. Prior to the new constitution passed in 2013, there has existed a blanket ban for strikes within the Public Services which was inconsistent with ILO provisions as every job within the public service was defined as an “Essential Service”. Several ILO reports requested the government to review strike laws, a position resisted by government over the years. But in a move that surprised unions, the right to strike has been explicitly provided for in the new Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 20) 2013. Employers argued that the government has only accepted to make this “wonderful gesture” simply because unions are now weak due to the “informalisation of the economy”, so in practice, there are no workers to grant the right
to strike. By spelling out the right to strike in the constitution, the government has gone beyond the norm in developed western democracies. The Constitution provides, in Section 65 (2), as follows:

“Except for members of the security services, every person has the right to form and join trade unions and employee or employer’s organizations of their choice, and to participate in the lawful activities of those unions and organizations. (3) except for members of the security services, every employee has the right to participate in collective job action, including the right to strike, sit in, withdraw their labour and to take other similar concerted action, but a law may restrict the exercise of this right in order to maintain essential services ...” (Zimbabwe Constitution at p.32).

So rather than the previous restriction of strike to the entire Public Service, the constitution now restricts strike action by security services. The Labour Act 2007 will now need to be amended to recognise the constitutional changes. Of greater significance is that the new constitution recognises political rights of every Zimbabwean citizen. The political rights of individuals were a central issue in union-state relations, that is-, government was previously unwelcome to the idea of trade unionists participating in politics. Section 67 is very clear that,

“(1) Every Zimbabwean citizen has the right to (b) make political choices freely, (2) (a) to form, to join and to participate in the activities of a political party or organization of their choice; (b) to campaign freely and peacefully for a political party or cause; (c) to participate in peaceful political activity; and (d) participate individually or collectively, in gatherings or groups or in any other manner, in peaceful activities to influence, challenge or support the policies of government or any political or whatever cause”, (The Labour Act 2007, p. 33)

There are a number of observations from the above provisions of the constitution. First, the constitution addresses the socio-political issues that have been at the heart of union-
state relations in Zimbabwe which have been at the heart of the conflict. It needs to be emphasised that, the right to strike was at the centre of union-state relations. Trade unions were arguing that in practice, there was no right to strike as the Labour Act had too many restrictions and that the right was not explicitly stated in the constitution. Trade unions actively participated in the constitution-making process although prior to this, they had strongly argued that government unilaterally changed laws, and was making laws specifically to deal with those who were seen to be a challenge to ZANU PF rule, for which trade unions were seen as such. So was this a victory for the unions? Does this show that government genuinely listened to the various interest groups who made their contribution in the constitution making process and referendum? Does this mean we are seeing a more accommodating and compromising government which is happy to ensure the participation of different civil groups?

I now address these questions. Could the introduction of the right to strike and to the formation of trade unions, and political participation be seen as a victory for the trade unions? The view here is that one has to examine the political context within which the constitutional change took place. The rise to prominence of the ZCTU also ushered the rise to prominence of the MDC. The current situation is that the popularity and influence of the MDC has been incapacitated by the failure to win significant parliamentary seats. This appears to have filtered down to the ZCTU which is clearly having a number of organizational problems. ZCTU is not at the moment considered a force in the political sphere in Zimbabwe. To the extent that it doesn’t pose any more threat to the ZANU PF government, one can conclude that the timing of agreeing to their participation and to conceding to their demands is a statement the government is really making about the position of labour in Zimbabwe. That’s is, it no longer considers it as a threat to government even if granted the right to strike and the right to political expression collectively or in groups or to challenge government policies. This is the same government that has, in interviews, consistently argued that the unions should not engage in political activity and that they should not engage in gatherings that could be seen as conducive to
political action and or engage in activities that support the MDC. It is the same government whose officials had argued at the ILO that the participation of the ZCTU in the political activities of the MDC was making government treat them as political opposition. Trade unions, in particular, those under the ZCTU were being subjected to the application of Public Order security Act (POSA) which effectively made union meetings and workshops political fora which required the presence of the police and or the police’s permission. So to concede to making these constitutional changes in favour of unions raises a paradigm shift which is not only interesting, but which would soon require some research into. It may not be a victory for the ZCTU that these rights are now recognised in the constitution. It seems to me that the rise to prominence of the ZCTU was facilitated by the ZANU PF government’s assault on trade unions. As such, it would appear logical, to conclude that the absence of these rights in practice and in constitution, made trade unionism stronger. Constitutional guarantee creates an absence of a rallying point for workers. Not only that, but it makes redundant the role of civil organizations, in particular, the human rights groups which had previously provided moral, financial and intellectual capital to trade unionists against the government. So trade unions are bound to be much weaker and in and economy that is now very highly ‘informalised’, the role of trade unions in Zimbabwe is now open to challenge.

Another way of looking at these constitutional changes is to argue that government was trying to silence the ZCTU and yet at the same time creating constitutional rights for those trade unions under the ZFTU. This is because the constitution does not only provide for unions to challenge the economic policies of the government, but to also demonstrate in support of government policies. From this view-point government may have succeeded in entrenching its labour interests through the ZFTU or any other such future federations. A final perspective on this issue is that government may have appeased labour in order that labour could compromise on the inclusion of rights to agricultural land. The issue of land was another contentious matter in union-state relations. Government officials argued that the ZCTU’s position on land was being influenced by the MDC which was working in
league with white commercial farmers to protect their interests. With virtual unanimity, trade unions and employer representatives argued that government’s policy on land was that of land grab as opposed to land redistribution. Thus they didn’t support the reforms. But government succeeded to make it constitutional to acquire land without paying any compensation. Section 72 (1) (7) (c) thus provides,

“the former colonial power has an obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement, through an adequate fund established for the purpose; and if the former colonial power fails to pay compensation through such a fund, the government of Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement”, (p.37).

I earlier on argued that trade unions may have lost some of their impetus by gaining constitutional rights to strike, to political participation and to a range of union rights. In this case, it may also be important to raise the same arguments against government. Has the government gained or lost something given that it succeeded to entrench its position regarding land in the constitution? If trade unions and employers have been economic saboteurs, if they were puppets of white capital, if they were sell-outs-as vehemently claimed by government, what is their position now that they have accepted that the constitution should guarantee the right to land? If this was an excuse for government to attack trade unions, what other excuse will be available for violation of trade union rights and for contesting the political character of the ZCTU? Could these developments signal an end to the confrontation between trade unions and government? It is important to now examine the right to strike in a global context.

6.8.2. The Right to Strike in the Global Context

What makes the right to strike contentious is that it is an unusual right in the sense that it is a right to force others to do things that they would not do on their free will. Secondly, this right is capable of many interpretations and each country seems to interpret and offer
this right differently from its neighbouring countries. As noted by Rubin (2005) in the Code of International Labour Law, there is no systematic and clear international code on the right to strike. The problem is that the international labour standards are worded in such flexible and open-ended manner that they leave it pretty-much to countries to decide on, say, the regulation of essential services and or public services. This open cheque is problematic and is one of the conflict areas between the government and the ZCTU. In the context of Zimbabwe, the government seems to examine a range of political, social and economic challenges in defining the parameters for enjoying the right to strike. That in itself is contested and it is often accused of either coming with reactive legislation or strategically limiting the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining. Rubin (2005) goes further to argue that the international and regional instruments each have their own history and are locked into particular political and institutional frameworks. On the historical element, he argues that the right to strike, or its contested nature as a right, is a result of the lasting legacy of the separation of economic and social rights from civil and political rights. Thus he argues,

“in the atmosphere of the Cold War in 1947 and 1948, when the ILO Conventions No.87 and 98 were being debated, western governments were not enamoured of the idea of enforceable economic and social rights, a sphere in which the communist countries claimed superiority, The Anglo-American tradition, which was dominant in the ILO at the time, saw freedom of association as a civil or political right, while the right to strike was viewed as being socio-economic”, (Rubin 2005, p.202).

A second reason for the failure to elaborate an explicit right to strike in the ILO instruments was expressed by Novits (2003). She argues that there was a lot of fear among the majority of workers’ delegates that entrenching the right to strike within the ILO Conventions would unavoidably lead to the setting of limitations on this right. She explains,
“By the end of World War II, worker organizations had consolidated their *de facto* position and strength in most ILO Member States. Trade unions, use of industrial action, and the political wing of the labour movements had secured workers unprecedented rights (or immunities). Owing to the tripartite structure of the ILO, worker delegates were often forced to compromise in order to secure the vote of employer and government representatives. If a detailed right to strike were to be incorporated into any Convention, the necessity of compromise meant that this right would be more limited than that already recognized in many States. Therefore workers’ reluctance to see a lesser right guaranteed in the international sphere may account for the failure to incorporate a right to strike into Conventions 87 and 98” (Novitz 2003, p.118).

The ‘relevant ILO machinery’ has never concluded that the right to strike is guaranteed through freedom of association as a matter of international law contrary to the view offered by some ILO participants interviewed in this research. It will be erroneous to argue that the right to strike arises out of freedom of association because to begin with, “The ILO is not a monolithic institution and that as a source of law, it is far from analogous to a court. The ILO has several “supervisory” bodies that play a variety of roles, many of which are not truly legal in nature, (Adams 2008, p. 321). The fact that these supervisory bodies are not truly legal is a fact that is misunderstood certainly by the Zimbabwean social partners and perhaps by a number of industrial relations actors across the globe. What further complicates matters is the apparent position taken by the Committee of Experts and the Committee for Freedom of Association on the issue of strike as a right. These bodies are far from being authoritative legal bodies and their opinions on matters regarding non-compliance of convention 87 and 98 should not be seen as authoritative and these cannot take the role of the Application of Standards Committee as the main policy-making committee for which decisions of the ILO are taken. It is clear that the labour movement in Zimbabwe has taken the views expressed by the Committee of Experts and the Committee for Freedom of Association as legal. On many occasions the
unionists kept referring to the views of these committees on the contentious role of trade
unions, that is, should they engage politically and should there be a separation between
the economic arena for unions and the political arena for political parties? Since these two
committees had concluded that there was no difference between politics and trade
unionism, it compounded the conflict between unions and government and also between
government officials and the ILO.

From the ILO Digest of Decisions and the interviews conducted, there seems to be no
definitive position regarding the right to strike and more so, whether this right arises out of
freedom of association and collective bargaining. To resolve this problem, one has to
examine the origins of the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The
Application of Standards Committee is tripartite in nature, which is it is constituted of
government representatives, employers and trade union representatives. It is this
committee which is the main authority in the interpretation of conventions. Right from the
discussions of the right to freedom of association, the employer members have
consistently and vigorously opposed an interpretation which suggests that the right to
strike emanated from freedom of association. The absence of tripartite consensus makes
it impossible and erroneous to conclude that freedom of association gave birth to the right
to strike. While the government officials argued that the right to freedom of association
was a constitutional right in Zimbabwe, it was also not an absolute right and has to be
exercised within a context that does not violate other people’s rights as well, suggesting
that it can still be suffocated as a right. Until this position is revisited by the ILO, there will
always be problems in the exercise of this right. My concern is that the ILO Commission of
Enquiry in 2009 recommended that there should be training of senior government
personnel on freedom of association without examining the origin of the problems. The
origin of the problem lies in the confusion arising out of the role of the various ILO
institutions and of ILO interpretations of freedom of association. It is very clear that
tripartite support for a right to strike simply does not exist within the Application of
Standards Committee, to the extent that until the matter is resolved, it is not proper to
claim that such a right exists from freedom of association. It should thus be argued that until the ILO revisits this issue, it is underestimating the centrality of interpretations that arise out of other ILO substructures. These sub-structures are, in the Zimbabwean context, contributing or fuelling union-state conflicts.

6.9. Increase in brutal attacks on unionists since 2000

These attacks have manifested themselves in a number of forms. These include public attacks with the President of the country apparently appearing to condone the attacks. Trade unionists and some of the employer representatives’ referred to a number of public remarks by the President as evidence for state and or government brutality. The coordination of the state security system on matters involving managing trade unions and responding to any challenge they could present was also evident through a public statement issued by the Police Assistant Commissioner, Mr Wayne Bvudzijena who echoed;

“… like the police have since warned, we will not hesitate to deal with cases of unlawfulness. Although I can not divulge details of the strategies we have put in place, people should be rest assured that we are ready for the protests”.


These comments by senior government officials suggests that whatever is happening to trade unionists in Zimbabwe does happen with the full knowledge or instruction from ‘the hierarchy’. The unionists talked about how easy this made the task of presenting their case to the ILO Commission of Enquiry as they only needed to show the evidence. For example, one interviewee talked about their challenge in presenting the cases of trade union rights violation prior to 2006;

“Previously, we used to explain to the ILO that we are being harassed and beaten up. We had no evidence. But this time we had all the evidence. We had sent it to our fraternal partners, our sister unions. We had evidence of photos and videos of police in full action beating us up, bundling us into the police vans, photos of
deformed and damaged skin, and doctors’ reports indicating fractures suffered all the head injuries—we had it all for the world to see” (former ZCTU Vice President and MDC MP).

Some trade unionists provided medical reports as evidence of police brutality in support of their interview narratives, as indicated below; I will quote at length because of its significance in corroborating the accounts of unionists and also in so far as it shows how union-state relations have broken down;

“I first saw the ZCTU activists on Thursday evening (September 14) … I got to Parirenyatwa Hospital around 8 pm. The ZCTU activists pitched up at 9pm. They came in 2 cars. There were many of them, (the police), some in riot gear. There appeared to be one of each for the 15 and one of two senior commanders. ZCTU Secretary General was in a bad way. His arm was obviously fractured. He was holding it against his chest. They (the activists) were in obvious pain. They were shuffling, which to me was an indication that they had been shackled at some point in time. Chibebe’s shirt was covered in blood. I overheard one of the medical casualty officers at the hospital say that ‘these are prisoners. It is not urgent. We will treat them tomorrow’. I had to speak to him and eventually he agreed to check them. He was quite shocked by what he saw. X-rays were carried out and they revealed that most of them had fractures. I was there at the hospital until 3.30am. I was really shocked and taken aback by what I saw. To me, the injuries showed me that they were trying to protect themselves. They were trying to protect their heads using their raised arms. They had fractures to their arms, wrists and fingers. They all had defensive injuries. The blows were coming to their heads. Chibebe had cuts to his head. Most of them have severe bruises. They were black and blue and swollen all over their bodies- on the buttocks, everywhere. Even those without fractures were limping and in pain. There were severe soft tissue injuries in all of them. Chibebe has a shattered fracture. It is not a clean fracture, which shows that extreme force caused it. I have never seen anything like this before … they were
denied medical access for more than 24 hours. The beating was so callous and hard” (cited from the Human rights Watch 2006).

The above was also part of the evidence and testimony in Court proceedings on September 15, 2006. But what is striking about this particular incident is that the activists were bed-ridden on the 14th of September. However, police were alleged to have “smuggled all but three back to Harare Central Police Station without the knowledge or consent of the hospital authorities” and this forced the lawyers to rush to the High Court and make an Urgent Chamber Application. The accounts of events offered by unionists were not only consistent form one interviewee to another but were also consistently corroborated by documentary evidence in the form of court submissions, witness statements, professional witness statement such as medical reports and accounts by the legal team of the ZCTU. The trade unionists talked about such pattern of harassment to be on the increase since 2000. However, they made in their view, the years 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 were the worst since political independence. They also felt that the year 2006 was the worst year when one looks at both the colonial and post-colonial era. The government officials from the Ministry of labour did not make any attempt to deny the alleged beatings, torture and harassment. As if they had a rehearsed answer, they all talked about how these issues were not at all labour matters. As such, the labour ministry cannot interfere with the jurisdiction of other ministries and arms of government simply because these people were trade unionists. They argued that the state security ministries had a duty if not an obligation to ensure that security laws in the country were observed by every citizen whether they were trade unionists or not. They were not prepared to be drawn into discussing these cases as they were not labour matters. These cases as far as they were concerned reflected the relationship between trade unions and other government organs and not the relationship between unions and the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Services for which they interface with in discussing employment matters. What was also interesting is that all other participants, that is, the ILO, employer representatives and trade unionists seemed to support the views of the
Ministry of Labour officials on this issue. They felt the Labour Ministry was in most cases genuinely unaware of what was happening. They did not know what the other arms of government were doing to the trade unionists. While a specific figure of those harassed or tortured during the period 1996-2008 was not available, it is important to show a summary of injuries sustained by trade unionists while in police custody following a demonstration in September 2006. This is because a particular pattern of injuries seems to emerge and this shows a centralised and co-ordinated assault.

Table 6.4: Summary of Injuries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>FRACTURES</th>
<th>SOFT TISSUE INJURIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nqobizithi Khumalo</td>
<td>Sustained a fracture on the left hand, 5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; finger</td>
<td>Extensive bruising on back and buttocks due to blunt object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Nkiwane's</td>
<td>No fractures</td>
<td>Soft tissue haematomata. Multiple linear marks on thighs and buttocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington Chibebe</td>
<td>Fractured Radius, Ulnar and Phalanx due to blunt object</td>
<td>Lacerations on the head, as well as bruises all over the body from blunt object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucia Matibenga</td>
<td>No fractures</td>
<td>Extensive bruising at the back, buttocks, legs, thighs and chest wall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toendepi Shone</td>
<td>Fractured finger on the left hand and below the knee</td>
<td>Extensive bruising on both sides of the body, left fore-arm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tererai Todini</td>
<td>Fractured finger on the right hand</td>
<td>Extensive bruising at the back and fore arm due to blunt object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lovemore Matombo</td>
<td>Linear fracture of right small finger</td>
<td>Extensive bruising at the back, buttocks, upper and lower limbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonderai Nyahunzvi</td>
<td>No fractures</td>
<td>Soft tissue bruising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwatipedza Chigwagwa</td>
<td>Fractured radius and ulna</td>
<td>Multiple erythematous lesions on face, back, buttocks and upper limbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tichaona Basket</td>
<td>No fractures</td>
<td>Multiple bruises and swelling on the back and right wrist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Gumbi</td>
<td>No fractures Buttocks and erythematous</td>
<td>Septic traumatic wounds of the back and thighs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ian Makone</td>
<td>No fractures</td>
<td>Multiple erythematous lesions on face, back, buttocks and legs. Abrasion on left leg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis Chiwara</td>
<td>Fractured left fibula and crushed injury of left foot</td>
<td>Extensive bruising of thighs, back and buttocks. Tenderness on right elbow joint and left ankle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moses Ngondo</td>
<td>Fracture of left ulna and ankle</td>
<td>Right shoulder and leg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extracted from the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum September 2006 Political Violence Report
There were concerns in interviews from unionists and employers that all political activity outside the realm of ZANU-PF was unacceptable and illegitimate. For that reason, any opposition of any sort, whether on the grounds of human rights, trade union rights were prone to violent attacks. Reference was made to senior ZANU PF officials who had publicly boasted, that

“...the area of violence is an area where ZANU-PF has a very strong, long and successful history”. (Shamuyarira, Nathan quoted in ‘The Financial Gazette, Harare, 5th -11th October 2000).

The period 2003 to 2007 saw an increase in the number of trade unionists from other countries either working in partnership with the ZCTU over some projects or those wishing to show their solidarity with the ZCTU on alleged matters of human and trade union rights. While entry into a country is at the prerogative of every sovereign country, there were concerns that a criterion that excluded trade unions from other countries was aimed at preventing them from conducting trade union activities. This is viewed as a violation of trade union rights. According to the ILO, it is a fully legitimate trade union activity to seek advice and support from other well-established trade union movements in the region to assist in defending or developing the national trade union organizations, even when the trade union tendency does not correspond to the tendency or tendencies within the country, and visits made in this respect represent normal trade union activities, (337th Report, Case No. 2365, para. 1667).

6.11. Treatment of ZCTU activists and officials when arrested

There were concerns regarding the treatment of trade unionists while in police custody. Participants gave detailed accounts of how some were forced to remove all their clothes and being severely assaulted and forced to eat their stool. The descriptions of inhuman and degrading treatment were corroborated by documents and reports held at the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights in Harare, (see Access to Justice Series, 1996-
There exist photographic evidence showing police in action attacking trade unionists, photographic evidence of injuries sustained by trade unionists following demonstrations and custody in police cells. This evidence was supported by several letters of complaint to the Zimbabwe government. These letters were from the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, the Doctors for Human Rights in Harare and the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. There were also medical reports which were submitted as evidence in cases that were before the courts. There is a high degree of agreement between the testimonies of trade unionists and the documents examined.

There were also widely reported cases of unionists being denied access to food and access to legal representation. Not only were some denied access to lawyers, but the police would proceed to court without affording the detainees access to legal representation. In one case that was before the courts, some trade union activists were denied access to anti-retroviral drugs for their HIV aids condition. This is seen as an attempt at denying the right to life.

Where court orders were granted in ZCTU’s favour, it was argued that the police had often refused to comply with such orders. Cited as an example was the case involving the Secretary General of the ZCTU Wellington Chibebe, Nancy Kachingwe and the Zimbabwe lawyers for Human Rights vs Minister of Home Affairs and the Commissioner of Police SC 145/05. In this case, the Supreme Court directed that certain improvements be made to the Highlands and Matapi cells before they could be habitable. This is where trade unionists are frequently detained at. There were also claims that the police could not provide the detained unionists with clean sanitary facilities. No improvements have been made and concerns were strong that they continue to be used, especially for those considered to be of a political challenge to the government. Participants (employers, ILO and trade unionists) talked about how the government had at times failed to comply with court orders where the position was made clear that the activities of trade unions should not be subjected to provisions in the Public Order Security Act (POSA), which require that
the police give permission where they have security concerns. One participant had this to say about failure to comply with court orders;

“We were in possession of a court order that our procession had to go on. Police simply came and said that everyone should disperse. I showed him the court order in which case he responded that he does not follow court orders but follows police orders. He even said, in case you think I might refuse that I said the words, give me that order and I will sign my name and you can take it back as evidence that we don’t respect the court order. To his word, he took the order and signed it and then ordered us to disperse”, (official, ZCTU Legal department).

On the basis of such accounts and evidence, one could easily see why the ILO Commission of Enquiry in 2009 concluded that there was “systemic violation of trade union rights and this is happening at the hands of the state”. But this also raises questions regarding how the police operate. Do court orders have to come down as police orders for them to be implemented? If so, to what extent does this open the government up for criticism, in particular, that the rule of law was not being followed?

There were reported break-ins and confiscation of office computers from ZCTU offices ahead of planned demonstrations and arrests and detention of union leaders on suspicion of planning a demonstration. Government officials dismissed this as ordinary theft activities which are always properly investigated by the police with any perpetrators found being brought to book. There was also a strong feeling on the part of unionists that the people doing these break-ins were known security agencies and even where crimes against unionists had been committed by known assailants, no action has ever been taken leading to the claims that the activities were initiated and or co-ordinated by the state.

These accounts were also supported by accounts of Human Rights Groups such as the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, the Zimbabwe association of Doctors for Human rights (ZADHR), statements and letters of
protest to the State President from COSATU, the International Bar Association (IBA), the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (SCPE), the United Nations Country Team, the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU), the Malawi Concerned Civil Society and several other statements which were issued by the diplomatic community imploring the brutality of the state. All these reports corroborated the accounts of unionists and employers.

6.12. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that a range of factors contributed to the nature of union-state relations during the period 1996 to 2008. These issues are; personality clashes between union and government officials, attacks on union autonomy and political alliances, interference in union’s political activities, the influence of the western countries in fanning conflict, the listing of Zimbabwe in a Special Paragraph of the ILO report and the funding of unions. Oppressive labour legislation, failure of the TNF to resolve conflicts through dialogue, the politicisation and polarisation of work places, the partnership between unions and capital, attacks on the right to freedom of association and the right to organise, brutal attacks on unionists, entry restrictions and deportation of unionists from other countries and the treatment of trade unionists while in police custody all conspired to create extremely confrontational industrial relations. This was argued to be the worst period in terms of violation of union and human rights, thus represents the darkest period of union-state relations in post-colonial Zimbabwe. The intensification of or increase in state repression of unions and civil society and opposition political parties clearly ran in tandem with economic melt-down in a way that marginalised the development of industrial relations institutions in the country. But that situation became unsustainable for all parties involved which led to developments for the next phase of the relationship.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Concluding Reflections: Towards pluralism (2009 to 2013)

‘The coming into play of the inclusive government and its economic policy framework on economic empowerment, indigenisation and diamonds policy’
7.0. Introduction

This chapter has two broad aims. First, it identifies the themes that are emerging to shape union-state relations. Since the period is too brief to sustain any clear patterns, the few themes are deployed to inform conclusions on the future direction the relationship is likely to take. Second, the chapter uses the key milestones of the relationship for the entire post-colonial period to show the overall pattern of the relationship thus informing future analysis of the relationship. Further, the chapter concludes the thesis by examining the extent to which it has achieved its goals. This thesis sought to analyse union-state relations in Zimbabwe. It was not restricted to studying the experiences of government officials and trade unionists but extended its scope to analyse the views of other actors namely the International Labour Organization Officials (ILO) and the Business Leaders/employer Organization representatives.

The specific research questions were:

(a) What is the nature of the relationship between unions and the state in Zimbabwe and how and to what extent has union-state relations changed since political independence?

(b) Based on current literature and empirical evidence what are the key milestones that define the developments in the relationship and to what extent do these issues influence the success or failure of the employment relations systems?

(c) To what extent if any, does the nature and extent of union-party relations in Zimbabwe affect the independence and autonomy of unions?

(d) What are the objectives and functions of trade unions and to what extent is their role consistent with government’s expectations of the role unions should perform in contemporary Zimbabwe?
In addition, I will briefly summarise the broader theoretical framework (literature) and show how it helps answer the research questions above. I also explain how such answers relate to any work that has appeared since the study began.

My key conclusions are also informed by any recent developments or information that became available after completing fieldwork, in particular, as this might point to the direction union-state relations might take.

I reflect on what will be done differently if I was to do this study again, that is, the lessons learnt from conducting the study. The implications for policy and practice this thesis has, as well as the nature of research that might follow from this research’s findings and methods.

7.1. Brief overview

The Zimbabwe situation is very unpredictable and is always changing -it is in a state of flux. But the period 2009 to 2013 show signs of a new strategy by government. This strategy seems to be a movement away from direct forms of heavy handed approaches towards unions. It is not clear whether or not this was the effect of the Government of National Unity between ZANU PF and the MDC. It needs to be stressed however that the government of Zimbabwe did not accept the findings of the Commission of Enquiry into trade union violations but they accepted the recommendations. That in itself is unusual. A closer analysis of such acceptance of the recommendations tends to suggest that the issues so recommended by the commission-, are the same issues for which the transitional government had in broader terms agreed upon in the Global Political Agreement (GPA). The second, the results of the Commission were released at a time a transitional government was running the country. It was not ZANU PF per se, that was accepting those recommendations although one could argue that the technocrats continued to be in the same key positions.
From the ILO’s viewpoint however, there were signs of cooperation from the state which was perceived as pushing for the Commission’s recommendations to be implemented. The state was seeking funding in order to implement the Commission’s recommendations. The police have been sending more documents and information to the ILO, and seeking advice on a number of issues.

There seems a shift by government towards accommodating the ZCTU and the Employer Federation. This shift is seen in accommodating their concerns in constitutional reform, in labour law reform and in resuscitating dialogue through the TNF. The Labour Court, The High Court and the Supreme Court which had previously declined to incorporate international labour standards on the grounds that they were not ‘domesticated into Zimbabwean law’ are referring to ILO standards in their judgements. Senior unionists were suspicious of this development however;

“There is a catch somewhere. Something must be brewing in the backyard because this is unlike ZANU PF. In the last three months we have been talking to these ZANU PF ministers. They have been inviting us to their offices and it looks like we are going to have our demands met at a time we are not pushing for those demands”, (senior ZCTU official).

The ZCTU was invited to be a formal observer of elections in 2013, yet previously, their alleged alliance with the MDC earned them the label of “stooges”, “Western imposters” or “puppets of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown”. They had been a strong critic of ZANU PF’s election tactics, alleging voter intimidation, harassment, rigging of elections and state-sponsored violence against opposition supporters.

President Mugabe also announced that a Bill to harmonise labour laws in the country was to take place before the end of 2013. This meant that public service and private sector
workers would now be regulated by one piece of legislation. This change in practice and policy orientation, despite the short-term it has happened, is worth noting.

After fieldwork, and following MDC’s loss in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013, the new minister of labour was now clamping down on unregistered trade unions, calling them illegitimate. Previously, these unions were part of the state apparatus for weakening the ZCTU. Zimbabwe seems to be moving towards a more pluralist type of industrial relations system (Burchill 2014, p. 8) one that accepts that conflicts will be inevitable, but also one that accepts that it has to be managed through dialogue. But it is too early to tell as ZANU PF had previously shown to be friendlier to ZCTU towards elections to prevent giving any political mileage to the MDC. In the past, the Labour Act was amended through the Labour Relations Amendment Act no 17 of 2002 which harmonised the labour laws and ensured that the civil servants and private sector were governed by the same laws. However, this was changed immediately after elections in 2002. There is reason for being sceptical and cautious regarding the nature of labour relations system that might be emerging.

It is positive that the ZCTU has continued to criticise ZANU PF’s indigenisation policy, the politics surrounding Zimbabwe diamonds, the state’s involvement in controlling the media as well as the political violence that exists in urban areas. This appears to be tolerated by the state since it has not responded negatively as in the past. Figure 7.1 and 7.2 below illustrate the emerging issues influencing union-state relations in Zimbabwe during the period 2009 to 2013.
Figure 7.1: Key issues defining union-state relations (2009-2013) - Authors construct 2014

Amber Issues
- Critique of Indigenisation policy
- Kimberly Process Monitoring (KPM) declares Zimbabwe Diamonds as ‘Blood Diamonds’
- Perceived increased muzzling of the media by the state
- Alleged Political violence and intimidation in urban areas
- Commission of Enquiry established to investigate violation of trade union rights in Zimbabwe.
- ILO Commission finds government to be in contravention of Convention 87 & 98
- Intensified militarisation of State-Owned enterprises
- Continued selective application of the law
- Promotion of ZCTU officials
- Non-remission of union dues by quasi-government organizations
- Militarisation of workplaces
- Role of war veterans in resolving employment issues/disputes

Issuers where cooperation existed
- TNF signs Shared Economic and Social Vision
- ZCTU made an Official Observer in the National Elections
- ZCTU and civic groups participate in crafting of new Zimbabwe Constitution
- More engagement of ILO, ZCTU and employers by the state
- Capacity-building workshops conducted involving all tripartite partners
- Training for senior police officers, judges of key ILO Conventions
- Reference to ILO standards in Labour Court, High Court and Supreme Court Judgements

Red Issues
- 2009- Arrests and detention for 4 days of trade unionists for commemorations on International Women’s Day
- Police shot and injured 3 workers at Shabani Mine
- Arrests of several others for striking against non-payment of wages
- Dismissal of 23 workers representatives at ZIMASCO Kwekwe Division for participating in a strike
There is an indication, tactical or otherwise, that the Zimbabwe government is moving towards the 'right' and showing a willingness to engage in dialogue and a desire to learn. Time will tell. MDC is no longer part of the Government of National Unity after controversially losing national elections and as such, its absence may as well give a different dimension to union-state relations. It is critical to recognise that the state’s 'accommodation strategy' is taking place at the time the European Union has accepted that the Zimbabwe government legitimately won the 2013 elections. Secondly, the decision by the European Union to suspend sanctions against Zimbabwe on 19 February 2014, (see EU letter in appendix) coincides with what appears to be a 'soft approach' towards opposition elements in Zimbabwe. This confirms that the labour relations issues in Zimbabwe are so dependent on the political temperature of the international community'. Any perceived political threats from the international community will be followed by a heavy-handed response to silence internal voices of discord. The key issues in the ZCTU-state relationship are shown below (Figure 7.2):

Figure 7.2: 1980-2013: An overview of key issues
To understand union state relations, one needs to appreciate the range of factors that generate conflict. This means understanding of both the local and international elements that conspire or connive to ferment that conflict. The poor performance of the economy and the failure of companies to pay poverty datum wages naturally make any material incentive to be a key influence of union state relations. The evidence from the fieldwork support this conclusion, in particular the fact that some Western Countries were prepared to fund unions way above their necks, in order to advance human rights and good governance agenda. But the political dimensions at the ILO Conferences were also a critical international dimension to the union-state conflict in Zimbabwe.

In the case of Zimbabwe, unions are recipients of that support aimed at capacity building so that they could effectively confront the state. The media coverage outside Zimbabwe has also tended to focus on the negative aspects, some of which reported without evidence to portray the state in bad light. Several positive things and projects that are taking place and implemented in tripartite fashion- all actors included are never publicised. Where financial support has been offered by the international community in a transparent manner and for joint capacity building workshops or activities, there has been no problems created. So the political and material incentives made available to the labour market actors in Zimbabwean are crucial to understand as they are capable of generating tensions with the state.

It is only where funding only gets to civic organizations, trade unions and human rights based organizations that claims against interference in state sovereignty or regime change are bound to be made, thus straining relations.
Despite reduced incidents of direct union harassment and a shift towards more accommodation of unions by the state, it is clear that Zimbabwe's industrial relations system is at the crossroads. The industrial relations system is not capable of responding to the current challenges posed by the labour-market. Labour law reforms have not taken place fast enough to anticipate and address challenges. Yet, security laws have been passed in quick succession to deal with the unrests created by the failure in labour-market regulation. Critical questions now need to be asked and answered urgently. The first is, ‘is the ZCTU’s proximity to one of the MDC factions leading to the neglect of workers on the shop floor? To what extent has the ZCTU become distracted by the MDC factionalism and what are the implications for the shop floor? The second, ‘how might unions engage a state that commit violation of union rights and yet walks out of international fora which are aimed at resolving the acrimonious union-state relations? The third, is, ‘What are the
specific and effective strategies for ‘depoliticising’ and ‘depolarising’ workplaces where individual promotion or redundancy outcomes are determined by perceptions of which political party a worker supports’? The fourth, ‘how can financial support from international unions be provided to improve industrial relations without straining union-state relations? Fifth, ‘what strategies are appropriate to ensure union’s alliances with political parties do not compromise workers’ interests’? Sixth, ‘what are the connections between ZCTU’s strategies and state repression of unions? More specifically, what is the relationship between violent state repression and the tactics and strategies of unions supported by segments of the international community? The seventh, question is ‘what are the opportunities that could arise from an acrimonious union-state relationship given Zimbabwe’s recent history? To what extent can the industrial relations system benefit from this conflict?’

7.2. Conclusion on the theoretical context

This thesis relied on a range of literature to inform an historical account of the union-state relations in Zimbabwe. The neoliberal economic ideology marked a turning point in the relationship. Not only was it in conflict with the socio-economic and political background, but it was an ideology not fit-for-purpose as it was not home-grown. In the case of Zimbabwe, it represented a betrayal of both workers and the state and has come to be seen as neo-colonialism. Neoliberal economic policies ushered harsh labour legislation which unions had to challenge, but which government had to enforce in order show capital that its interests will be protected and thus encourage them to invest. As such, analyses of union-state relations have tended to concentrate on the authoritarian nature of the Zimbabwean state without examining the context within which such an authoritarian character was created. The neoliberal agenda was carefully constructed to ensure the entrenchment of western economies into the socio-economic infrastructure of the African countries but also in a way that destabilised the state. Neoliberalism, through Structural Adjustment was facilitated by the ILO through its ‘Decent Work Agenda’. As demonstrated
in the data chapters, the role or influence of western countries/powers influenced the political dynamics at the ILO conferences.

One can conclude that as long as the interest of the western powers in Zimbabwe are threatened by the state, then the international politics become steeped in a way that creates internal and external pressure on the government. Trade unions are seen as that weak link that could be used. From this viewpoint one can therefore conclude that the Zimbabwean state is in fact a vulnerable state. Political analysts tend to argue that it is an extremely authoritarian state which has no respect for human rights, trade union rights, the rule of law and many other descriptions along those lines. But it is argued here that its vulnerability was first exposed by its powerlessness to challenge neo-liberal hegemony. Therefore, the socio-economic challenges that resulted were not entirely the creation of the state. As such the state was a victim of SAPs. This is because in a country where the economy is agro-based one cannot liberalise other elements without liberalising land, 80% of which remained in the hands of 2000 commercial farmers whose property rights remained protected by the Lancaster House Agreement. The state could not distribute its own resources due to forces beyond its control. The recourse to violence, not that one should justify it, is indicative of a state seeking to survive or shield itself. So legislation such as POSA, AIPPA and restrictive labour laws were crafted to shield the state from ‘perceived elements’ which sought to undermine its sovereignty. Trade unions were viewed as part of that equation that sought to undermine state sovereignty. While there is little argument on whether the state is authoritarian, there is need for researchers to identify and consider those factors which make the state authoritarian.

Researchers ought to ask the question- what sort of threats (internal or external) is the state responding to when it deploys violence on sections of its citizens. In the context of union-state relations, it helps locate the problems, their scope and significance. What is happening on the political front is a reflection of the international political relations. The politicisation of workplaces, solving of industrial relations problems using violence and
machetes to force a settlement, singing of party slogans, selling party cards and T-shirts, wearing political party regalia and conducting rallies at workplaces do not only set a dangerous precedent but shows how multifaceted and complex union-state relations have taken in Zimbabwe. The neoliberal agenda is not seen as different from the role of western countries and the ILO in influencing union-state relations. It is concluded that to ignore the dynamics at the ILO in Geneva and the international political relations in the analysis of union-state relations only leads to a partial understanding of what is happening in Zimbabwe.

7.3. Human rights discourse

This thesis argues that the discussion of human rights in Africa and other developing countries is contestable, despite the importance of human and trade union rights. What exactly does human right mean? Whose right should we be talking about, the individual’s or the society’s? These questions are not easy to address because they are perceptual and have an historical aspect. The introduction of human rights discourse was first aggressively pursued in Africa only after the Western powers had retreated from direct colonial domination of the continent. This is when the West were keen for Africa to remain within their sphere of economic and political influence and when military might was deployed to ensure that they did so, within the period of the Cold War. Today, more and more, politics appears as ‘the continuation of war by other means’. In this context, one is bound to ask whether economic and political liberalism are not complementary, and whether militarism is not a way of ensuring the dominance of both. Doesn’t such militarism tend to give rise to nationalist militarist thinking among the dominated, and as a result, aren’t the possibilities of genuine democracy and not just of human and trade union rights being sacrificed as a result of the relationship between those championing human rights and the western counterparts?
Human rights issues easily take a racial dimension in that the logic of this discourse is easily lost simply by looking at the colour of the person advocating for it. And since it is somehow connected to race, it ignites hotly contested debates about national liberation and threats to state sovereignty. On this point therefore, this thesis confirms the view held by Buhlungu (2010) on the reason why liberation movements tend to do well in bringing out the discourse of national liberation long after political independence was won. The contribution of the thesis however is that Buhlungu sees the need for self-determination and independence as the reasons for invoking the discourse of national liberation. This thesis however shows that it is neither the struggle for self-determination nor struggle for independence that makes the discourse of national liberation relevant. But it is the struggle for access to state/national resources or the threat to such access which is indirectly used to deploy the discourse of national liberation. The so-called politics of the stomach which has been argued for by unions as a reason for confronting government is not necessarily a bread and butter politics of engagement, but is a fight to access those resources being monopolised by ZANU PF at the expense of every worker and citizen. This is why human rights and good governance discourses appeal to unions.

Can trade unions succeed in their objectives to ensure that the state secure human and trade union rights for all workers? What is the party’s response to this trade union objective? To discuss the potential for trade unions to contribute to the realisation of human rights in Commonwealth Africa, it is first necessary to analyse some implicit assumptions about the relationships between human rights, trade unions and revolution which are generally not articulated, but which nonetheless dominates Marxists thinking on this question. Given that ZANU PF has in the early years of independence portrayed itself as a Marxist-Leninist party, it is important to conclude by briefly visiting Marxists conception of human rights.

Pagels (1979) attacks Marxists by arguing that they have no concept of human rights. Marxists, she argues, take the position that “only as one contributes to the community can
one expects to derive benefits from it”. Marxism contains, as liberalism does, a concept of human justice,

“But it is not grounded in a concept of rights as inalienable claims by the individual on or against the state. Rather, Marxism grounds its concepts of justice in claims by groups (social classes) against other groups (classes); and it assumes that once the correct group, that is the proletariat, controls the state, the right to make claims on or against the state will no longer be necessary” (Pagels 1979, p.4).

In the liberal tradition, human rights are rights which people enjoy merely because they are human: no other qualification is necessary. But Marxist tends to exclude some social classes from the enjoyment and protection of rights on the grounds that they take from, rather than contribute to, the wider community. The bourgeoisie, in Marxist theory, ought not to have a right to the private ownership of the means of production; in practice, under socialist rule, real or alleged members of the bourgeoisie are deprived of all other rights as well, thus people accused of economic crimes (for example, in Tanzania), are frequently imprisoned under the Preventive Detention Act, without basic civil rights such as the right to trial (Howard 1988).

The liberal interpretation of rights as inherent in everyone solely because of their human status is, in fact, more radical, than the Marxist interpretation. It forces consideration of whether or not and how the whole range of human rights can be guaranteed to all people, regardless, for example, of sex, ethnic origin, or class position. It demands that rights be revoked only under carefully adjudicated and circumscribed conditions and does not permit A’s violation of B’s rights (e.g. a property owner’s violation of someone else’s right to eat) to be used by C (state) to deprive A of all rights (e.g. the right not to be executed or tortured) in retaliation.

The entire range of human rights elaborated in the two 1966 United Nations Covenant is adopted with some modifications in the recent African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. But the African Charter also includes a communitarian interpretation of the
relationship between rights and duties which resemble the Marxist’s view of class based justice. Part 2 of the African charter states inter alia that “every individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the state and other legally recognised communities” (article 27.1), and further that,

“The individual shall also have the duty ... to serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its services”, (article 29.2).

The effect of this tying of rights to duties, or to contributions to the wider community is to ease the subordination of trade unions to the state in Africa (Claude et al., 1990). The community as such does not exist: it is represented by the state. But is the state a neutral entity? Clearly it is not. The state is composed of a body of people promoting their own class interests. Thus Marxism’s implicit concept of human rights, meant to protect the wider (proletarian) community against abuses by the (capitalist) few is turned on its head to protect the emerging African ruling class against one of the few institutions capable of effectively representing parts of the wider communities, trade unions.

In the broad general outlines of its argument, then, Marxist theory does not have a concept of human rights. There is further difficulty that Marxist theory has been used, and corrupted, by allegedly socialist governments in Africa to justify denial of human rights and repressions of organizations seeking to attain human rights, especially trade unions, in the name of so-called “development dictatorship”, (Sklar 1983, p.11). Zimbabwe has seen violence, torture, arrests and detention of trade unionists as well as those who advocate for human rights.

7.4. Failure of social dialogue and Industrial relations dispute resolution mechanisms

What one can see about Zimbabwe’s industrial relations system is the failure of social dialogue between the labour market actors, (state, unions and business). Issues that should be resolved through dialogue and via the tripartite negotiating forum either do not get to that level, or they get to that level but never fully addressed due to lack of trust. It is almost impossible to develop any form of trust when one considers the level of violence
against union leaders which state officials reluctantly accepted as happening. At the same time, the question of how sincere is labour in the negotiations at the TNF level in resolving the country’s problems is one that is difficult to ascertain at this point. If they are part of the MDC which is seeking to oust ZANU PF, does full participation and commitment to resolving the country’s problems amount to the weakening of the MDC and prolonging ZANU PF’s stay in power? On the other hand, how does one have trust in a system that is violent against him or her? Yet these are relevant questions in the context of this study.

The politicisation of labour issues results in a reluctance to consult by all parties involved. A unilateral approach to addressing labour market issues by the state seems to be the norm. What is happening at the TNF level is indicative of the ‘shop floor’. The systems of conciliation, arbitration, mediation and collective bargaining which should be central to dispute resolution are not functioning properly, if at all. Issues that should be resolved at the workplace are finding their way to the country President’s Office making the state a direct and first point contact in labour matters. Whereas the industrial relations tradition tends to focus on union-management relationship with the government being involved only to level the playing field. The fact that the rival union federation, the ZFTU had resolved wage disputes between workers and management using machetes is clear evidence of a system that is failing. Wage negotiation does not use such extreme coercive mechanisms. The dispute resolution process is too long and also fraught with many challenges which include the absence of an enforcement mechanism for conciliation, awards and orders from the Labour Court. On many occasions there arises a frivolous appeal against arbitration awards which defeats the finality of arbitral awards. Finally, there is within the labour movement, a disappointment arising out of judgments from the Supreme Court which calls for the establishment of a Labour Appeals Court.

The failure of social dialogue and dispute settlement procedures is also compounded by the nature of labour legislation on the right to strike. Workers are required to give a notice of 14 days after several weeks or months of negotiations. As a result of the restrictive
provisions it is impossible to see how a legal strike can be conducted. More often than not, any strike that takes place is then labelled political. So instead of parties worrying about what is political and not, it seems clear that if the procedure for conducting strikes is relaxed, that would force unions and management to negotiate and agree on a number of issues so that strikes could only be limited to failure to implement collective bargaining agreements. This will depoliticise the workplaces and the political polarisation that has affected industrial relations will improve. Consequently, union-state relations will also improve.

What one finds is the criminalization of the right to strike in Zimbabwe. The current provisions relating to damage caused to property through an ‘illegal strike’ imposes criminal sanctions on workers’ representatives who would have facilitated the strike. There is no immunity for union representatives. While the intention of a strike might have been to weaken unions and ensure the leadership is arrested, within the polarised and politicised workplace, it only serves highlight violation of union rights. The TNF would need to visit this issue and agree on a common mutual position.

7.5. ZCTU-MDC alliance

ZCTU needs to rethink the sort of relationship it should have with the opposition political party. Two things could help here. The first is to seek the view of the membership on the issue of union alliances with political parties, in particular deciding which MDC faction it will align with. Secondly, to decide what sort of linkages should exist between it and international partners and make that clear. This will address the alleged political character of the ZCTU officials. What has happened in the last six months following Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe strengthens this conclusion. There are a number of ZCTU officials who won parliamentary seats on the MDC ticket and decided to resign from the labour movement so that they could pursue a political career. This can only help clarify the political character of the ZCTU. This move, in a way, weakens the state’s position
since it had used the politicisation of ZCTU structures as a reason for attacking it. Opposition political parties are seen as enemies not partners in economic development and as such, they have to be arrested, beaten up, imprisoned, and detained to keep them in check. It is unfortunate that at the moment, unions are seen as enemies and the formation of the MDC does not help matters. So the separation of unions from political parties is at the moment the best thing for the labour movement. It must be stressed that this conclusion is supported by the views of the younger generation of unionists who felt there was need to move away from mainstream politics. It also comes as no surprise that those who have renounced their union positions and continued as MDC parliamentarians are the younger generation of unionists. I can therefore see a change in union-state relations, that is, one that will be positive not because of a significant change in ZANU PF’s ideology or philosophy but simply because some parliamentarians would not want the hustle of being attacked for doubling-up. Doubling-up union positions and parliamentary role makes ZANU PF uncomfortable. It means easy access to workers via union structures hence the politicisation of workplaces. The political dimensions that result become multi-faceted thus further complicating union-state relations.

Although there is a history of political engagement by unions, this experience was during the colonial period where they were part and parcel of the liberation movement. After independence political agitation was ‘neutralised’ by the nationalist movement (Cooper 1996; Buhlungu 2010; Beckman and Sachikonye 2002), and the government does not seem ready for this transition yet. I have already argued that democracy has not properly consolidated in Zimbabwe. However, this is also partly because both the ZCTU and ZANU PF have not really renewed their structures. ZANU PF is still very much a liberation movement with a ‘guerrilla outlook’ still at war, unfortunately sometimes against its people. Several narratives from government officials who were interviewed support this conclusion. The labour movement has also failed to renew itself despite several elections. Half the interviewees from the labour movement were with the ZCTU prior to 1986 and two of them were involved in its formation in 1981. An argument that there is a historical
fall-out between some key participants leading to strained relations is directly linked to the conflict between personalities theme which emerged from the data analysis. ZCTU argues for pro-poor policies. On the basis of the field-work, such policies will never be achieved with an alliance with the MDC. Neither will such an ‘ambition’ be matched with an association or alliance with ZANU PF. These political parties very much neo-liberal in outlook and they do not seem interested in advancing the workers’ cause. For both, it appears, they view unions as privileged which to some extent is consistent to the “urban Bias thesis” (Toye 1990). Divisions in the MDC are bound to lead to divisions in the ZCTU as the political factions fight to ensure that the leadership of the labour movement reflect their interests. Equally, post-independence history has also showed how ZANU PF marginalised unions and workers.

Lessons from the neighbouring countries need to be taken for example in Zambia and South Africa. The Chiluba government backed by unions immediately turned against workers once the former unionists assumed political office. Currently in South Africa, the former veteran unionist, Cyril Ramaphosa called for action against workers at Marikana and there is plenty of such evidence where association with political parties will certainly lead to losses rather gains for the labour movement- at least, within the African context. This suggests that, as a model, political engagement in the form of alliances and partnership with government and or political parties, at this stage in Africa’s political development, does not work for unions. Whether that is because of problems on the trade union’s part or that of governments, is still a contested matter. The fact of the matter is that unions need to reconsider their policy on alliances.

7.6. Union autonomy and independence

Are trade unions independent and autonomous in Zimbabwe? This thesis concludes that unions are not independent at all. One has to look at the agenda that influences union objectives. Donor funding dictated union objectives. The agenda seems to have moved
from collective bargaining and shop floor activities to voter education, voter rights, human rights and while these are noble things to be pursued to achieve democracy they are more to do with political contestation with/against the state and not necessarily worker representation. So what we see is that an alliance with civil-society groups and international donors to drive the political agenda has played into the hands of the state which has effectively used it to justify its attacks. All the government officials interviewed did not attempt to conceal the fact that arrests, beatings and detentions of ZCTU leadership, was taking place. However, they sought to justify it on the grounds of political involvement.

Focusing on voter education, national elections and human rights for example, at a time when the economy is not performing well and jobs are increasingly becoming informalised and people losing jobs seems strange. One would expect unions to focus on engaging social partners to address the economic problems. The fact that companies cannot afford paying a minimum poverty datum wage is clear evidence of where the union’s immediate priorities should be. However, it seems clear that unions cannot focus on the immediate issues because they do not have the resources to drive their own agenda. In the findings chapter, I discussed how meagre union subscriptions are. It is impossible to meet the day-to-day union expenses from the unions’ dues, let alone the legal battles unions have been involved in. Against this background, it is difficult to sustain claims for union autonomy and independence in Zimbabwe. Secondly, this thesis concludes that the ZCTU leadership was not prepared to criticise their MDC colleagues who now held positions in the Government of National Unity. This was despite concerns that they were not delivering for the workers arguing that “such a move will give ZANU PF a field day”, compromises the position of workers and the future of trade unionism in Zimbabwe, and is clear evidence of lack of autonomy and independence. This loss of autonomy is taking place in the context of a growing anti-labour sentiment/voice within the MDC thus stressing the need for the ZCTU to rethink its alliances.
Freedom of association is a contentious right. Because it is not, within the historical context of Zimbabwe, a trade union right but a political right. In the colonial period, both freedom of association and freedom of assembly were political rights offered to whites and not blacks and their associations. Most of the current senior leadership of ZANU PF thus have a difficulty accepting that this is indeed a trade union right. It is hard for political parties in government which still see themselves as liberation movements to freely give this right especially when the agenda is seen to be driven by former colonial masters. One other conclusion related to this is the issue that the majority of government officials interviewed presented themselves as Christians, the product of the Catholic Church value system and were not interested in violence. That seemed contradictory for a system that was known to be committing violation of trade union rights. What is the connection between the church and the manifestation of violence? On reflection, two conclusions can be arrived at regarding the line of thinking. First, the church taught about rights and it was instrumental in educating a number of nationalist politicians who were operating as trade unionists during the colonial era. The church recognises freedom of association as a human right (see ‘Laborem Exercens’ 1981). However, Pope-John Paul II in ‘Rerum Novarum’ (1981) makes clear the point that unions should not be involved in political activities. Political strikes are thus denounced by the church. These two positions should appeal to ZANU PF old veterans who, on many occasions during interviews, portrayed themselves as true Christians of the Catholic denomination.

Clearly, the right to organise was seen by government officials as a political right and that directly relates to how such a right was viewed during the colonial era. The right to organise and the right to freedom of assembly were then seen as political rights and government officials could not understand, let alone accept extending such a right to unions. But the church also taught discipline and dealt with any deviant behaviour in a heavy-handed manner. It also taught unquestionable subordination and compliance with its doctrine. It sounds far-fetched but it is not surprising why the products of such a system are reluctant to offer such freedoms to unions. In this thesis, I have already argued that
both ZANU PF and ZCTU have not reformed and kept a great number of people who were part of the liberation struggle in key positions. So unless this changes soon, there will always be, in practice, challenges to do with freedom of association and the right to organise. The following is a summary of research findings:
Table 7.1: Summary of key research findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Summary of findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. What is the relationship between unions and the state in Zimbabwe and how and to what extent has union-state relations changed since political independence? | - Relations were cordial in immediate post-colonial period, the linkage/bonding created during liberation war.  
- Prime Minister Mugabe used to attend all May Day celebrations, announcing minimum wages with unions demanding to share offices with ZANU PF and to have a union member in parliament representing workers.  
- Relations began to sour when unions opposed a one-party-state infinitive by ZANU PF. Unions declared their autonomy and independence from the party.  
- Relations worsened with the adoption of SAPs which weakened unions, through massive job losses and the loss of social benefits system for workers.  
- A number of economic and political reasons have strained relations further.  
- Gross violation of trade union and human rights including arrests, detention, beatings, torture of trade unionists- resulting in ILO Commission of Enquiry.  
- Inflammatory/irresponsible/provocative public statements by some trade union and some government officials’ thus damaging trust needed for consultative structures to work efficiently and effectively.  
- Serious confrontations arise regarding trade unions’ participation in politics  
- Alliance between MDC and ZCTU damaging to the state-union relations.  
- The ILO Conference has become a battleground between the unions and the government.  
- The continued leadership of the MDC and civil-society organisations (human rights organisations) by senior union officials has fuelled conflicts around regime-change agenda.  
- Deportation of international trade union officials for their support to unions. Some of these labelled “enemies of the state” include officials from LO Norway and COSATU.  
- All strikes led by unions are regarded as political not labour-market based.  
- The relationship between unions and employer organisations considered an “evil alliance”. |
2. Based on current literature and empirical evidence, what are the key milestones that define the developments in the relationship and to what extent do these issues influence the success or failure of the employment relations systems?

- Political independence marked the beginning of corporatist strategies/subordination of unions to the party/state. The party formed the federation of trade unions and installed party loyalists into the union leadership.
- The introduction of SAPs was a turning point in union-state relations.
- The opposition of a one-party-state 'project' by unions was the beginning of a series of ideological and physical battles with the government.
- The rejection of the government-sponsored constitutional changes in a referendum led by unions and civil society groups further strained relations.
- The “controversial land reform” not only marked a change in unions’ position on key national questions but saw government sponsor the formation of a war-veteran led union federation (the ZFTU) to counter the ZCTU.
- Economic sanctions against ZANU PF government officials coincided with unprecedented inflation (over 1 000 000%) and acute shortage of basic commodities prompting claims of poor governance/human rights.
- Resulting political confrontation has politicised the TNF and polarised workplaces.
- Lack of sincerity/trust in TNF compounded by the fact that the opposition political actors are also leaders of unions and civil-society organisations and finally, the TNF used for political purposes particularly at ILO Conferences in Geneva.

3. To what extent if any, does the nature and extent of union-party relations in Zimbabwe affect the independence and autonomy of unions?

- The reliance of unions on international financial sources/donors/civil society is undermining union independence and autonomy.
- Security laws not Industrial Relations legislation is undermining autonomy and independence of unions.
- Relationship between unions and civil society organisations has redefined union aims/goals and purposes.
- ZCTU is politically linked and aligned to MDC–Tsvangirai faction and human rights civil organisations. It campaigns and politically agitates on its behalf (similar to the internal lobbying type typology by Ludlam et al (2001).
- ZFTU (although without union affiliates) is politically linked/aligned to ZANU PF and as war veterans, they campaign and politically agitate for ZANU PF (similar to an external lobbying-type typology by Ludlam et al (2001).
- State-union relations to a great extent undermine autonomy and independence of unions. Collective bargaining is subject to ministerial approval. Union meetings and public fora require police approval/clearance due to harsh security laws.
Unions struggle to collect union dues, that's is, they require in some cases government bodies (parastatal) to remit union dues which is problematic in recent times thus undermining union autonomy and independence.

In some situations police and central intelligence personnel have demanded to see copies of minutes of union-meetings.

Autonomy and independence of unions are undermined by the unwritten alliance between ZCTU and MDC-T faction.

However, the single most determinant of union-autonomy and independence seems to be the role and impact of civil society and international donor community in directing union goals and purposes.

The nature of political participation by unions undermines autonomy and independence- i.e. the demands for higher wages had been replaced by demands for a change in government, a change in constitution, transparent and fair elections resulting in broader coalitions with civil groups not based on any ideological basis yet undermining autonomy and independence.

The failure by unions to generate own revenue from membership is undermining autonomy and independence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. What are the objectives and functions of trade unions and to what extent is their role consistent with government's expectations of the role unions should perform in contemporary Zimbabwe?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two views were dominant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union perspective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Assume a broader scope including political participation and representing any person in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ To create political space for good governance and observance of broader human rights including trade union rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Organise strikes and protests against an authoritarian regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ To lead/participate in democratisation, monitor elections, voter education and ensure free, fair and transparent elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ To represent working people at international fora.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government perspective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Government felt the unions were there to represent the economic needs of workers (this view is consistent with Business Unionism advocated by Hoxie 1923; Webb's 1920).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ To support government policies especially around land redistribution, indigenisation and empowerment policies (in line with Marxist thinking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ To campaign against sanctions imposed on government officials.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NB:** the role unions play is inconsistent with that expected by government

Author's construct 2014
7.7. The future … final observation regarding union-state relations

It seems fair to say that the state is seeking and moving closer to establishing good relations with the ZCTU the more it neutralises the political threat from the MDC. In other words, the more the MDC is weakened, the more government will seek to recapture the ZCTU in the same way it did in the early 1980s. The recent developments which have taken place since completion of fieldwork tend to support this view. The first is that government has requested from the ILO, handbooks on International labour standards to use in the training by various actors in the labour market.

Secondly, all cases against trade unionists which arose out of the controversial legislation—Public Order and Security Authority (POSA) were being dropped. Having agreed with other tripartite partners on the principles for the harmonisation of labour laws, the government has agreed to ensure that Public Servants and all other categories of workers in Zimbabwe enjoy the same rights. They would not have agreed to this if in their assessment, unions and the MDC were still posing the significant political threat/opposition as they used to do in the last decade.

Not only is the judiciary (Supreme Court judges, magistrates, arbitrators and lawyers) participating in training courses on international labour standards and ethics for judges, but that the court judgements on labour matters are now referring to the international conventions and recommendations despite the fact that Zimbabwe has not yet been domesticated conventions into national legislation. These developments represent a strategy of non-confrontation which seems to be emerging in the past few months. However, there are still attempts to weaken unions. The current non-confrontational trend is to influence the promotion of trade unionists into management positions. Ordinarily, it is good human resource management strategy to promote people on the basis of their performance. But this is an unusual promotion. The employers who are sympathetic to the state work hand in glove with the government officials to ensure that those trade unionists
who continue to pose a challenge to the government are promoted. The technical aspect here is that the Labour Act (2007) defines a managerial employee as an employer. As such, s/he cannot join a trade union. This ‘soft strategy’ is impossible to take to courts of law. One cannot be seen as suing an employer because they got promoted. In practice, promotions weaken unions and deprive them of a strong voice and intellectual capital as members move up into management positions.

All the unionists interviewed were happy that the Commission of Enquiry found the government to be in gross violations of Human and trade union rights. There was a sense that their allegations had been proven and so it was a victory for them against the government. That in itself defines the future direction of the relationship. As argued already, the government did not accept the findings of the Commission of Enquiry but chose a strategic position of accepting its recommendations. In my view, unions should not celebrate the findings of the Commission as a victory for them but rather as a loss for the labour movement. This is because, from the interviews with government officials, I got the sense that just as they did in agreeing to the Government of National unity, accepting the Commission’s recommendations indicated a stroke of genius on the part of Mugabe’s leadership at crucial times when the party and government were under severe pressure. It looks to me that government officials privately celebrate this as political maturity, that is demonstrating the knowledge of when to negotiate, when not to negotiate and when to accept and not accept Commissions of Enquiries. I have no doubt that the government will capitalise on every ILO technical support opportunity while ensuring that unions’ capacity is weakened. The unions are already fragmenting, creating factions and taking each other to court while the ZANU PF led government creates labour friendly regulations, and guaranteeing constitutional rights and freedoms for unionists. As unions disintegrate and as MDC for which the unions have shown loyalty to also disintegrate into factions, ZANU PF will be consolidating its hold on power and may even strengthen the tripartite negotiating forum knowing that unions are divided.
7.8. Implications of the thesis

There are several implications from this thesis. I will analyse the implications for the four actors who participated in this study.

7.8.1. To the ILO

The Zimbabwe government accused the ILO of preparing trade unionists for political office in the manner through which cases are selected and handled for discussion within the ILO dispute settlement mechanisms. This view seems to be held by other African countries as judged from the accounts of those on the Application of Standards and Committee of Experts. Of significance is that the African government members voted and elected Zimbabwe to be in the ILO Governing Body for the period 2011 to 2014 against the recent history of committing gross violation of trade union rights and without significant improvement in the trade union situation in Zimbabwe. This should be seen as a protest vote by the ‘African contingent’ and this has implications for the ILO. In particular, this thesis points to the new direction research should be undertaken, conducting research on the extent of change needed within the ILO Supervisory and Governing machinery (reforming the composition and work practices of the Application of Standards Committee, the Committee of Experts and Committee on Freedom of Association). A system that is not perceived to be mainly ‘Eurocentric’ in nature might help achieve better acceptance of the role of and decisions of these committees. It is bound to improve government’s cooperation with the ILO organs but more importantly, might improve the quality of employment relations in developing countries where union-state relations are contentious. The state-union relations situation in Zimbabwe presents a test-case on a range of contemporary challenges for which the ILO need to address, in particular, the extent to which trade unions are allowed/expected to pursue/assume a political outlook/agenda. The Zimbabwe situation has demonstrated the urgent need for clear operational guidance on what constitutes a ‘regime-change-agenda’ from what is considered ‘genuine political participation’ by trade unions. These concepts were clearly elusive to those in the ILO let
alone to trade unionists and government officials. If the ILO is to continue to be relevant to the needs of all stakeholders, there is urgent need to facilitate the growth of trade union organisation within the informal sector and safeguard workers’ interests in the precarious jobs they are working on. Participants’ narrative around the growth of the informal economy suggests this is the next potential source of conflict between unions and the state. There is urgent need for research in this area.

7.8.2. To the unions

The implications of this thesis to the unions are several but a few are worth noting here. The first is to do with the future direction the unions should take. The second is to do with the autonomy and independence of the unions. The third is to do with alliances with international organizations, political parties, civil society organisations and donor community.

The findings of this research point to the urgent need for the labour movement to consult and seek a mandate from the workers on the levels and extend of political participation expected as is the case with COSATU in South Africa (Webster 2007; Kanyenze 2007). There is no doubt that the unions face major financial challenges. As long as unions depend on foreign donors for survival, this will always compromise the direction and objectives of the labour movement. There is need to broaden the membership base, get into the informal economy and unionise workers. The brutal message is that for as long as they depend on a sympathetic hand, union-state relations are going to be influenced by the state’s perception of whose sympathetic hands it sees and what motives are allegedly harboured.

Similar to ZANU PF’s failure, the ZCTU has failed to transform itself from a union federation that was so successful organising blue-collar workers between the late 80s and early 2000s. The current trend where the economy is more “informalised” or “Kiya-Kiya”
as it is presently coined has resulted in a reduction of blue-collar jobs in comparison to white-collar jobs and thus presents a challenge to convince this group of workers that a union is worth joining. So organisationally, the resistance previously offered by unions is weakening and unions’ vulnerability to the state is increasing. Research participants’ accounts of the relationship suggest that union-state conflicts are arising partly from the fact that neither party (ZCTU nor ZANU PF) seems to be able to adjust appropriately to the increasing challenges of globalisation and changing labour market complexities. The lack of tripartism or its deficiencies are symptomatic of the failure to respond to such challenges.

Despite gross violation of union rights, unions need to move from resistance to engagement. So far, unions have resisted the majority of government policies even though some have great potential to benefit workers, notably, the indigenisation, empowerment and the land reform policies. Controversial and populist as these policies might be, there is plenty of opportunity to support and cooperate with government in their implementation and strongly challenge from within the tripartite structures, any anomalies, corruption, nepotism and other forms of anomalies that might characterise the implementation process. But to ‘out-rightly-oppose’ everything on the grounds that such policies will benefit ZANU PF sympathisers and Mugabe’s cronies does not appear a workable solution. It places the union movement in a precarious position not only in relation to the state, but also in relation to some working poor who might want to benefit from such government policies. The labour movement represent workers who belong to different political parties. Therefore, the ‘nonstrategic resistance’ limits opportunities associated with engagement hence the unions are in danger of marginalising themselves.

As a result, they will fail to provide an effective voice for the working poor in Zimbabwe and thus face a crisis of representation which potentially creates opportunities for the rival federation- the ZFTU. The current splintering of unions is also linked to policy response strategies. The long-term effect is that increases in smaller unions further affect industrial relations. This is because EMCOZ and other employer organisations will find it too
challenging and complicated to deal with several splinter unions. It is hard enough for employers to deal with the rivalry between ZCTU and ZFTU. Too many splinter unions ultimately affect collective bargaining and divide worker loyalties and weaken their capacity to champion their interests.

The Zimbabwe Constitution has conferred constitutional rights and freedoms on trade unions. It is important that in the light of such development, unions do take advantage and strategize, find ways of engaging both employers and the government for the benefit of workers. Despite constitutional progress on the labour front, the nuances in the narratives of both the ILO and employer organisation representatives suggested that for a long time, workers have been overprotected by labour legislation to the extent that workers and trade unions take for granted that certain job benefits are rights. Many trade unionists and workers in Zimbabwe believe that incentives offered by employers such as bonuses and, transport allowances are rights conferred by law and this is going to be the next issue for contest which is going to strain employment relations in Zimbabwe. There is need for education. Finally, there were concerns of bias against unions in employment relations cases involving the state or where the state has an interest against unions. In addition, there were concerns suggesting inordinate delays in the handing down of judgements in labour cases where the state has a direct interest, in particular, in parastatals where employees go for more than three months without receiving their salaries. This situation is unsustainable and unions have an opportunity here to reinvigorate strategies and stop the splintering and efficiently and effectively represent workers’ interests otherwise as institutions, they become redundant and irrelevant. The employer-union alliance which has been referred to as “unholy-alliance” is unsustainable for two main reasons. The first is that such an alliance is built on unstable foundation, that is, the desire to see Mugabe leave office not the desire to improve the employment relations situation in the country. The second, based on interview narratives, is a strong concern that the judiciary system in Zimbabwe is increasing being constituted by people who are now business owners, who are farm owners and they will bring a neoliberal orientation to labour relations disputes. In
the likely event that this will happen, to what extent are unions capable of constructively engaging with employers, the state and the ILO for the benefit of workers?

7.8.3. To the employers

The role of the employer in the tripartite negotiating forum was a docile one. It was not clear to me why that was the case. Business need to engage both the state and workers in order to create a worker friendly environment conducive to business success rather than a ‘politicised’ and ‘polarised’ workplace. Its relationship with the labour movement needs to be clear to avoid the “unholy alliance” tag. Employment premises are not ideal places for selling political party cards, T-shirts. There needs to be a well-defined ideology for engaging unions, political parties and government in a way that does not compromise productivity.

The employers’ position in Zimbabwe needs to change and there is urgent need to invest in ways that ensures efficient and effective management of organisations including corporate governance. The current situation where employees remain unpaid for several months without receiving their salaries is unsustainable and counter-productive likely to worsen the employment relations situation in the country.

7.8.4. To the state

The implications for this thesis to the state are to do with policy reform processes of dispute resolution and dialogue within the TNF structure. There is need to develop the infrastructure for stakeholder participation so that even the toughest government policies could gain acceptance and ensure easy implementation. Being mentioned in the ILO Special Paragraph and subsequently being found to be committing grave violations of trade union rights obviously has implications in terms of bilateral support, technical support as well as funding on key labour-market issues which in turn further hurt the economy. It thus becomes obvious that policy makers need to revisit both the practice and legislation around managing the labour market. Either through its own fault or through
forces beyond its control, the ZANU PF government has failed to transform from a liberation movement that is anti-colonial to one that is properly located within the framework of the state. The TNF is a very good mechanism for engaging other labour-market actors and this can only work with proper and genuine guidance and commitment of government (Fashoyin 2009). After making significant progress in providing for the constitutional rights of workers, there is need to find ways and formulate policies that prevent the exploitation of workers within the informal sector where trade union influence and organisation is at the moment non-existent.

7.9. Things to do differently in future research

This thesis has contributed methodologically by extending the category of research participants. Literature on union-state relations has tended to focus on two parties, that is, unions and the party. This study has broadened the range to include the ILO and Business. It has benefited from their experience of the relationship since they are part of the labour market partners. With regards to the ILO, it has benefited from the participation of both the country office representatives and some members who are on the Applications of Standards committee. No study to date is known to have included these parties. In light of findings which showed the centrality of business and ILO in influencing union-state relations in Zimbabwe, it is vital that future research follows this direction but improve on it. It needs to be emphasised that the ILO-Application of Standards members that participated were all from the employee wing of that substructure of the ILO. It is important to understand the views of the employer wing and government wing of that structure considering that the findings of this research pointed to these sections as fuelling union-state relations. To the ILO, this research is capable of influencing policy, structure and composition of the ILO dispute settlement systems. Future research should also focus on observing the conference meetings of the ILO Conference, Application of Standards committee as well as the Committee of Experts Meetings to gain a fuller understanding of union-state relations. This is even more important given that after completing field-work,
the Zimbabwe government successfully lobbied other African governments to vote for it to be on the Governing Body of the ILO. So not only are the dynamics of the ILO increasing being politicised, but it shows how other African countries feel about Zimbabwe, that is, to vote for it a couple of years after an ILO Commission of Enquiry found it to be in grave violation of trade union rights.
Bibliography


Baker, S.E. and Edwards, R. (2012) ‘How many qualitative interviews is enough’? Expert voices and early career reflections on sampling and cases in qualitative research. NCRM


Blackburn, R.M. (1967). ‘Union Character and Social Class’, London; Batsford


Collins, H (2011) Theories of Rights as Justifications for Labour Law, OUP, SPI


Eizenstat, S. et al (2005) “Rebuilding Weak States,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2005);


Fanon, F., (1963) 'The Wretched of the Earth', Great Britain: Macgibbon and Kee.


Ibhawoh, B. (1999). Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. X1X No.1


Kalula, E. (2003). Present at the creation or another false start in Africa? Labour market regulation, social protection and the future of labour law in Southern Africa, Inaugural lecture, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town, 30 July 2003


MacNeally, M., S., (1999) Strategies for Empirical Research in Writing; Allyn and Bacon


Marx, K. (1970). Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Cambridge: CUP (Originally Published in 1843)


Moyo, S., Makumbe, J. and Raftopoulos, B (2000) NGOs, the State and politics in Zimbabwe, Harare: SAPES Books


Mtshiyha, J.N. (2007). Labour briefing; Update on the Labour Court, IPM (Z)


Mutandare, J.S. (1987). ‘May Day Speech by the President of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions’ ZCTU


Phimister, I (1994) Wangi Kolia; Coal, Capital and Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, Harare


Robson, Z. (2002). Real World Research, 2nd Edn, Blackwell,


Roth, G. (1968). Personal Ruler-ship, Patrimonialism and Empire Building in the New States; World Politics XX (2)


Commentaries and selected Statutes (Cape Town, Labour Law Unit University of Cape Town), B1


The Zimbabwe Issue, 67, the Institute of War and Peace


Webb, S., and Webb, B. (1897) Industrial Democracy; London


Wood, G. and Brewster, C. (Eds.), (2007) Industrial relations in Africa; Bassingstoke, Palgrave


**Official documents consulted**


Green Paper, DfES, the Learning Age (1998)


Government of Zimbabwe; Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act, Chapter 10:20, Government Printers


Government of Zimbabwe (1981); Annual Review of Manpower Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare (MLMPSW), Government Printer, Harare


Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development; Manpower Survey’ 1984

Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development; Manpower Survey’ 1986

Government of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe issue, 7 Government Printer

Mid-Term Progress Report, Harare: UNDP/Government Publications


ILO (2005) Application of International Labour Standards (LibSynd); International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Interim Report on Zimbabwe- Case 2365, Geneva


ILO (1993a) International labour standards and technical co-operation; Paper submitted to the 252nd session of the governing Body, Geneva, 2-6 march 1992 (GB.252/15/1)

ILO (1993b) Statement of guiding principles for ILO field activity on Structural Adjustment, Geneva, ILO May

ILO Bureau for Workers, (2002), Labour Education, no 123


Minimum wages Act 1980, Zimbabwe; Government Printers

MMPZ, 2005- Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe Report

Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Data (2007) Government of Zimbabwe Printers


ZANU (1979) “The role and history of Zimbabwean women in the National Liberation struggle” ZANU Women’s Seminar, Xai Xai,


ZCTU, (2010), ZCTU input into the Fiscal review statement and budget Review, ZCTU

ZCTU (1990), ZCTU’s 1990 congress: Exposing the capitalist reality beneath Zimbabwe’s Socialist Rhetoric.

ZCTU (1991)


ZCTU, (1996) Beyond ESAP; Harare, ZCTU

ZCTU: Workers' Position on the Labour Relations Amendment Bill No 24 of 2000. ZCTU

ZCTU on the Investment Code: Its Implications to National Independence and to the position and conditions of the working people, Harare, 1989

**Government Acts and Bills**

Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act of 2002

Broadcasting Services Act of 2001

Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Bill of 2003

Constitution of Zimbabwe

Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act of 2004

Electoral Act (updated to 17 March 2008)

Global Political Agreement, 2008

Industrial Conciliation Act, 1934

Industrial Conciliation Act, 1969

Law and Order Maintenance Act, 1960


Labour Relations Act 1985-Zimbabwe Act No. 16. Chapter 28:01

Labour Relations Amendment Act, No. 12 of 1992

Labour Relations (Workers committee) (General) Regulations, 1985 (SI 372/85)

Land Apportionment Act, 1930

Land Tenure Act, 1969

Non-Governmental Organization Bill, 2004

Pass law 1902

Unlawful Organisations Act 1971

The African Labour Regulations Act 1911

Political Parties (Finance) Act of 2002

Public Order and Security Act of 2002


Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, 2001
Doctoral Thesis Consulted


Newspapers consulted

COSATU Daily News 2001
Green Lefty weekly, 16 July 2000
The Herald, 29 April 1992
ZCTU Issue: September 2008
ZCTU Issue, December 2008
Zimbabwe Independent; 29 April 2005
The Financial Gazette, 19 November 1998
The Financial Gazette, 3 December 1998
The Financial Gazette, 5th -11th October 2000, Zimbabwe
The Worker, February 2001
The Worker, August 1994
The Herald, 14 January 1995
The Worker, No. 1 March 1993
The Herald, 28 February 2002
The Herald, 31 October 1981
The Herald, 1 May 2001
The Herald, 13 April 2005
The Standard 15 May 2005
The Zimbabwean, 28 September 2006
Socialist Worker, February (1998) Published the ISO (Zimbabwe)
South African Mail and Guardian, 11 December 1998
Sunday Mail, 27 November 1988
Sunday Mail, 6 February 2005
Trade Union Officials: Interview Questions

Intended Participants: Trade Union Officials

Research Title: Assessing the changing relationship between the Trade Unions and the State in Zimbabwe

1. What is the role and objectives of trade unions in Zimbabwe?

2. What is the current thinking within the trade unions regarding the role the state expects trade unions to play and to what extent are trade unions playing that role?

3. Is this an issue between the unions and the state?

4. Should trade unions be involved in politics?

5. Is your trade union federation aligned to any political party and if so, what is the basis and nature of the relationship?

6. Can a trade union effectively represent workers’ interests if it is aligned to a political party? Is this an issue within the Zimbabwean context?

7. What is your view of how your members feel about the current state of the relationship between their unions and state?

8. In one of your recent Quarterly Publication- ‘The Worker’, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) stated that it is not involved in national politics but rather, in “politics of the stomach”. What exactly does that mean and how does it shape your relations with the state.

9. What constitutes appropriate political action by trade unions within the Zimbabwean context?

10. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) recently facilitated the formation of an opposition political party –the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).
   (a) How did your federation become involved in the formation of the MDC?
   (b) What was the thinking behind its involvement in the formation of the MDC?
   (c) To what extent, if any, has this changed the relationship between the trade unions and the State?

11. What are your major sources of financial support?

12. In the first 16 years of Zimbabwe’s political independence, reports show that your trade union federation submitted no complaints to the ILO regarding non-compliance of labour standards and recommendations. However, in the last 10 years, your federation submitted several complaints. Could you please shed some light on the reasons for this development?

13. Are trade unions consulted in the formulation of labour legislation in Zimbabwe?

14. Some parts of the media have, on occasions, referred to the relationship between your federation and the employer organisation as “an evil partnership”. What do you think that description means and does it, in your view; represent a true description of the relationship between your organisation and trade unions?

15. A Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) comprising government, trade unions and employers exists in Zimbabwe. To what extent has this forum achieved its objectives?
16. Can you recall any instances where the effort of the TNF has had positive impact on labour relations?

17. To what extent has your relationship with the state been central to the success or failure of the TNF?

18. In your view, has the Zimbabwe Industrial relations system benefited from the performance of the TNF?

19. On reflection, is there anything that trade unions regrets doing or not doing that can further improve union-State relations in Zimbabwe?
Government Officials: Interview Questions

Intended Participants: Government Officials

Research Title: Assessing the changing relationship between the Trade Unions and the State in Zimbabwe

1. Should a relationship exist between trade unions and the State in Zimbabwe and if so, what should be the basis for such a relationship?
2. To what extent, if any, has the relationship between trade unions and the State changed since political independence?
3. Is the government concerned with the relationship between trade unions and the employer organisation?
4. What is the view of government regarding alliances or relationships between trade unions and political parties in Zimbabwe?
5. Do trade unions rely on the state for financial survival?
6. What is the current thinking within government regarding the relationship between trade unions and their international allies?
7. What role does the state expect trade unions to play and to what extent are trade unions playing that role?
8. Do concerns exist as to the role trade unions are currently performing?
9. A Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) comprising government, trade unions and employers exists in Zimbabwe. To what extent has this forum achieved its objectives?
10. To what extent has the relationship between trade unions and the state been central to the success or failure of the TNF?
11. Can you recall any instances where the effort of the TNF has had positive impact on labour relations?
12. Is the government concerned about trade unions being aligned to political parties?
13. In the context of Zimbabwe, can a trade union represent the interests of workers without being political?
14. What constitutes political action by trade unions within the Zimbabwean context?
15. What is the role of the newly created Labour Court of Zimbabwe and to what extent, if any, has this court helped in resolving labour relations issues?

16. Zimbabwe was recently mentioned in a Special Paragraph in an ILO Report on the application of labour standards. Could you please shed some light as to the reasons and the current position on the matter?

17. On reflection, is there anything that the state regrets doing or not doing that can further improve union-State relations in Zimbabwe?
EMCOZ: Interview Questions

Intended Participants: Employer Organisation Officials

Research Title: Assessing the changing relationship between the Trade Unions and the State in Zimbabwe

1. In your view, does a relationship exist between trade unions and the state in Zimbabwe and if it exists, on what foundation is this relationship built upon?

2. What sort of a relationship should exist between trade unions and the State?

3. Is there a relationship between trade unions and political parties in Zimbabwe and if there is, at what level, do you think, union-party links exist (i.e. at the level of representative or executive bodies?)

4. Some parts of the media have, on occasions, referred to the relationship between your federation and the ZCTU as “an evil partnership”. What do you think that description means and does it, in your view, represent a true description of the relationship between your organisation and trade unions?

5. In your view, has the relationship between trade unions and the State changed since political independence? If it has, how has it changed?

6. A Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) comprising government, trade unions and employers exists in Zimbabwe. To what extent has this forum achieved its objectives?

7. To what extent has the relationship between trade unions and the state been central to the success or failure of the TNF?

8. In your view, has the Zimbabwe Industrial relations system benefited from the performance of the TNF?

9. What role does the Employer Organisation expect trade unions to play and do you think trade unions are playing that role?

10. From your experience of the Zimbabwe situation, do concerns exist in relation to trade unions being aligned to political parties?

11. What constitutes appropriate political action by trade unions within the Zimbabwean context?

12. Could you please describe specific instances when the TNF is effective in influencing industrial relations in Zimbabwe?

13. What is the role of the newly created Labour Court of Zimbabwe and to what extent, if any, has this court helped in resolving labour relations issues?
ILO Representatives: Interview Questions

Intended Participants: International Labour Organisation Officials (ILO Officials)

Research Title: Assessing the changing relationship between the Trade Unions and the State in Zimbabwe.

1. What is the view of the ILO regarding the relationships between trade unions and the state in Zimbabwe?

2. Zimbabwe was recently mentioned in a Special Paragraph in an ILO Report.
   (a) What does being mentioned in a Special Paragraph mean?
   (b) Could you please shed some light as to the reasons and the current position with regards to this?

3. ILO reports show that no complaints were submitted to any committee in the first 16 years of Zimbabwe’s political independence. Could you please shed some light on the reasons why this situation appears to have changed?

4. What is the view of the ILO regarding trade union involvement in politics?

5. From your experience of the Zimbabwe situation, would you say trade unions are involved in politics and, if yes, how and to what extent, if any, does this explain the current union-state relations?

6. In your view, can a trade union effectively represent workers’ interests if it is aligned to a political party? Is this an issue within the Zimbabwean context?

7. What sort of a relationship should exist between trade unions and the State?

8. A Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) comprising government, trade unions and employers exists in Zimbabwe. To your knowledge, to what extent has this forum achieved its objectives?

9. To what extent has the relationship between trade unions and the state been central to the success or failure of the TNF?

10. In your view, what are the chances that a social contract between unions, employers and government will be concluded in Zimbabwe?

11. Can you recall any instances where the effort of the TNF has had positive impact on labour relations?

12. Could the ILO have done anything more with regards to the union-state relations in Zimbabwe?
Dear Sir/Madam

Research Title:
**Assessing the changing relationship between the trade unions and the state in Zimbabwe**

My name is Zedias Mutema. I am a PhD research student in Human Resource Management (HRM) and Industrial Relations at the Institute of Social Science, Keele University; Staffordshire, United Kingdom. I am currently carrying on my research project by focusing on the changing relationship between two actors in the industrial relations system in Zimbabwe; namely, Trade Unions and the State.

The research will include reviewing some documentary material and observation of meetings but the main method of gathering primary data will be interviews involving a selection of senior trade union officials and rank and file members (affiliates), employer organisation of Zimbabwe officials, government and ILO officials. You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study on developments in the relationship between trade unions and the state in Zimbabwe, which is being undertaken solely by me under the supervision of Dr Alhajie Saidy Khan, a lecturer in HRM and Industrial Relations in the Keele Management School at Keele University.

You are being invited to take part in an interview in the expectation that you have some knowledge of and or involvement in the history of trade unions in Zimbabwe and their relationship with both the colonial and post-colonial governments. Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to understand why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read this information carefully and discuss it with any colleagues in your organisation if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is unclear, or if you would like more information.

I can assure you that your participation involves no risks that I am aware of, and I hope the interview will give you the benefit of an opportunity to express and discuss your views about the specific and general issues and matters relating to the subject of research. You are free to decide whether you wish to take part or not. If you do decide to take part you will be asked to sign two consent forms, one is for you to keep and the other is for our records. You are free to withdraw from this study at any time and without giving reasons. If you agree to take part, you will be asked to take part in an interview that will last no more than 45 minutes and involve questions about the history of the trade union movement in Zimbabwe and developments in the relations between trade unions and the State. You are free to refuse to answer any questions that you do not wish to answer, and you can withdraw your participation at any stage of the process.

If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to me, and I will do my best to answer your questions. My contact details are:

Zedias Mutema  
Keele Management School, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire ST5 5BG, UK  
Email: z.mutema@keele.ac.uk  
Telephone: 0044 7949108929
You can also contact my supervisor Dr Alhajie Saidy Khan at the following address:

Dr Alhajie Saidy Khan  
Keele Management School  
Darwin Building  
Keele University  
ST5 5BG  
Email: a.saidy.khan@keele.ac.uk  
Tel.: 01782 733607

If you remain unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any aspect of the way that you have been approached or treated during the course of the study, please write to Nicola Leighton who is the University’s contact for complaints regarding research at the following address:

Nicola Leighton  
Research Governance Officer  
Research & Enterprise Services  
Dorothy Hodgkin Building  
Keele University  
ST5 5BG  
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk  
Tel: 01782 733306

I can assure you that any information gathered during the research will, if requested, be treated anonymously and in strict confidence. This can be guaranteed by ensuring that neither your details, nor the identity of your organisation (or employer) is included in the assignment or any reports that result from the research.

I would like to invite you to participate in the research, and if you decide to take part you will be asked to sign a consent form a copy of which will be kept by you and the other by me for my records.

[1 copy for participant]
CONSENT FORM

Title of Project:
Assessing the changing relationship between the trade unions and the state in Zimbabwe

Name of Principal Investigator: Zedias Mutema

Please tick box if you agree.

1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

2 I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw at any time.

3 I agree to take part in this study.

4 I understand that data collected about me during this study will be anonymised before it is submitted for publication.

5 I agree to the interview being audio taped

6 I agree to be contacted about possible participation in future research projects.

7 Please indicate how quotes for this research might be used (tick one):
   I am happy for any quotes to be used anonymously □
   I don’t want any quotes to be used □
   I want to see any proposed quotes before making a decision □

________________________________________  __________________________  __________________________
Name of participant  Date  Signature

________________________________________  __________________________  __________________________
Researcher  Date  Signature

[1 copy for participant; 1 for researcher]