D'Oro, G ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5990-8089 (2005) Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind. Inquiry, 48 (5). 395 - 412.

[img]
Preview
Text
Idealism and the philosophy of mind (GDoro).pdf - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial.

Download (208kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that as an attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic metaphysics, the idealist alternative bears some similarities to anomalous monism, but that it is superior to it because it is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. I conclude that this idealist alternative should be given serious consideration by those who remain unconvinced that a successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental is compatible with the pursuit of a naturalistic agenda.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: philosophy, philosophy of mind
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment
Depositing User: Symplectic
Date Deposited: 11 Nov 2014 11:45
Last Modified: 17 Dec 2018 11:51
URI: http://eprints.keele.ac.uk/id/eprint/48

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item