Beyond Borders: Transnational Politics, Social Movements and Modern Environmentalisms

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Abstract

This introduction considers three themes that recur across the various contributions to this collection. The first is the nature of borders and how these have been affected by the increase in transnational collective action and the growth in the power of transnational institutions. The second is the distinction between environmental movements and the social movement forms of environmentalism: meaning that not all forms of environmental movement are social movements. The third is the evidence of the diversity of environmentalisms, which leads us to identify three principal kinds of environmental movement, the postmaterial movements strongest in the USA and Australia, the postindustrial movements that are strongest in Europe and the postcolonial movements of the South.

Reflection on the history of environmentalism since the debates about risk and limits to growth emerged in the early 1970s shows that transnational conflicts over power and ideology have been central from the beginning of the new environmental politics. Limits to growth and ‘overpopulation’ arguments that came mainly from the

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North, while couched in terms of global humanity and nature, seemed to many in the South a further means by which the most powerful and wealthy countries could retain their control of the South. Reflection of this kind also reminds us how quickly things have changed. Many environmental ideas that recently seemed marginal are now mainstream, and some environmental movement organisations previously seen as outsiders have become institutionalised in national and international policy making structures. This has led some to argue that the environmental movement is ‘the most comprehensive and influential movement of our time’ (Castells 1997: 67) but we will argue here instead that it is more accurate to think of the environmental movement as still at an early stage in relation to shaping global politics.

This collection of articles does not aim to provide a full overview of the nature of the environmental movement either in the form of its most important national cases or by assessing and explaining its impacts on national or international political systems. Environmental movements have grown too numerous and trans-national politics too complex for this to be feasible in one volume. Instead, the common focus is on understanding how transnational political processes affect what environmental movements can do, and why they choose to act as they do.

In this introduction we reflect on three questions that recur across the various contributions to this collection. First, we clarify what we mean when we talk of transnational politics. Second, since environmental movements have diversified so much, we discuss what it means to define only some of them as social movements. Third, we assess what ideological differences between different groups reveal about how environmentalism is developing, particularly across the conceptual and geographical borders that divide North and South.

**Environmental movements, transnational politics and border thinking**

The new environmentalism of the 1970s was, from the beginning, global in its analysis, but there was very little evidence of global environmental protest action or of groups working effectively across borders. New organisations such as Greenpeace pursued direct action against national governments and companies that were causing environmental problems, but Greenpeace was and remains a Northern-based organisation with a strongly centralised structure. Furthermore it prefers to frame its
campaigns in moral rather than ideological ways, and so has not been strongly associated with the new Global Justice movement. Other groups such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) predated the new environmentalism but have adjusted to it to some degree, becoming in recent years advocates of sustainable development and tackling poverty as the best means to protect non-human nature (see Rootes, this volume). Nevertheless while the character of WWF does vary a little between countries, overall it is not a radical organisation either in the sense of engaging in regular protest, or in making arguments that challenge the political order. Of the three major international environmental non-governmental organisations only Friends of the Earth International (FoEI) has associated itself with the critique of neo-liberalism and aligned itself with the global justice movement. But despite having member groups in seventy countries, FoEI has few financial resources compared to Greenpeace or WWF (see Doherty, this volume) and in that sense its international organisation is small relative to the others.

Prior to the late 1990s, most national environmental organisations lacked either the money or the time to be able to engage in consistent international activity. However, there is evidence that transnational environmental action is on the increase. According to Bandy and Smith in 1973 there were 17 transnational social movement organisations (TSMOs) in the environmental field, whereas in 2000 that figure had risen to 167. Environmental groups made up 17% of all TSMOs, second only to human rights groups at 26% (2005: 16). Alongside this quantitative increase, which in part reflects the institutionalisation of environmentalism in the spread of formal organisations, there were also changes in environmental agendas. There is an increased ‘tendency for groups to adopt multi-issue rather than single issue frames for their struggles and groups were more likely to identify the linkages between issues such as between environmental protection and human rights…’ (2005: 16). Smith’s (2005) research on the spread of regional organisation in transnational social movements since the 1980s showed that groups in the South were more likely to retain ties with groups outside their regions than those in the North and valued being part of transnational networks. While, as Smith acknowledges and as we discuss below (see Doherty and Routledge, this volume; Doyle 2005 and Wood 2005), there are many ideological and organisational tensions between Northern and Southern groups involved in transnational alliances, Southern groups in Smith’s survey were
positive about the benefits of trans-national alliances, since they provided them with resources and legitimacy. The cases of Madagascar, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Hungary analysed in this volume (see Duffy, Fagan and Kerényi and Szabó) reveal how trans-national alliances and rent-seeking behaviour can lead to organisations which are structured to meet the expectations of western funders. This may be an important extra part of the explanation for Smith’s findings on the growth of transnational networks. It is not surprising in the more radical networks such as People’s Global Action (PGA Routledge, this volume; Wood 2005) and FoEI that the internal power relations within the networks have been addressed most self-consciously, although without pretending that these can be fully surmounted. Thus in examining the growth of TSMOs we need to be aware of the financial dependence on transnational funding of most environmental organisations outside the wealthiest countries.

The growth of protest against global neo-liberalism has been the most important impetus for new attention to trans-national environmental politics. Prior to the 1990s the focus on global civil society in international relations was on the role of formally organised NGOs in policy-making as there was little transnational protest witnessed. When major trans-national protests against the ‘Washington Consensus’ and neo-liberalism began in the late 1990s, however, this changed because these protests were new in important respects. There is a long history of transnational protest going back to the antislavery movements of the early nineteenth century, but these were still rooted in national politics. Tarrow and della Porta (2005) argue that transnational politics took three forms. First, diffusion of ideas or actions from one country to another, as for instance in the way that sit-ins spread from the US Civil Rights Movement to European student movements in the 1960s; Second, the domestication within national politics of conflicts that had external origins, such as protests against national governments for accepting structural adjustment programmes imposed by international financial institutions. Third, externalization, in which external institutions were challenged to intervene in domestic affairs, as in the advocacy coalitions through which Brazilian rubber tappers and NGOs worked with Northern environmental groups and put pressure on the World Bank to hold the Brazilian government to account for development projects in the Amazonian rainforests (Keck and Sikkink 1998). What is new in the recent and diverse multi-
national protests against neo-liberalism is that these protests target transnational institutions (including, but not limited to, the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) through coordinated transnational protests. Thus, new transnational global justice networks of protest movements and social forums have been inspired by the evidence about unaccountable and unjust transnational sites of power. They are also facilitated by two further developments: first, the break up of the USSR has removed the tendency to see all post-1945 conflicts in bi-polar terms; second, cheaper communications in the form of phone and fax the Internet and email, have transformed the ease of transnational exchange of information and co-ordination of action. Also vital has been the reduced cost of air travel in facilitating face-to-face networking. While it is an uncomfortable truth for environmentalists given the contribution of air travel to CO2 emissions, face to face networking is vital to effective transnational campaigning as it is through sustained presence that the deeper relationships of trust and solidarity are most likely to develop. This was evident in the negotiation of a crisis of identity by key figures in FoEI (see Doherty, this volume) and also allows cosmopolitan activists to cross borders regularly to engage in the kind of ‘imagineering’ work that Routledge et al. (this volume) identify as essential for grassroots global justice networks.

This is not, however, a book about the globalisation of environmentalism. There is no evidence of a single form of environmental movement emerging, nor of national borders becoming irrelevant. The analysis in this collection is linked by a concern with three questions raised about environmental movements in connection with new and older transnational forms of power. First, how do inequalities, including the legacy of colonialism, affect the context in which environmental movements work? This affects the power relations within transnational social movement networks (such as FoEI and PGA Asia) and the governance networks that shape the opportunities available to environmental NGOs as in Madagascar and Bosnia. Second, how do different parts of national environmental movements engage with transnational institutions and what is the relationship between national bases of operation and transnational action? This is the focus of the contributions on Hungary, Britain and France. Third, in what ways do national and other borders remain significant? In respect of this question it is salutary to compare environmentalism in
Iran and Burma (see Doyle and Simpson, this volume) with other cases examined in this collection. In Iran the Islamic government, as a means of improving environmental governance, has encouraged environmental NGOs, but they are not permitted to work as political groups in any way that might challenge the regime. When Iran held a major international environmental conference in 2005 it did not invite any NGOs from Iran or abroad in case they asked questions that the regime did not want to answer. In Burma the military regime has exploited its gas reserves at the expense of violent repression of ethnic and religious minorities. Resistance groups among the Karen peoples have developed the concept of ‘earth rights’ to describe how environmental and human rights are both being repressed. Environmentalism has crossed the borders of both countries, but the borders matter, regime types matter, and radical green ideas in both countries are accessible mainly through satellite broadcasts and websites run by dissident exiles.

Mignolo (2000) has coined the term border thinking to describe how borders of various kinds, both national and social are altered by the transnational changes that we identified above. It is not that national borders disappear as transnational sites of power become more significant, but rather that they gain a new meaning in an era of increased transnational flows of people, finance and communications. The article on France by Hayes illustrates this well. Environmental protest in France has taken a novel turn to civil disobedience, following forms of protest that were common a few years earlier in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Yet, rather than direct diffusion from other countries, which is, as Hayes says, probably minimal, what matters most in France is how these forms of protest were redefined in French Republican terms. Thus destroying GM crops is for Jose Bové, the internationally famous leader of the Confédération paysanne (CP), a form of ‘civic’, as opposed to civil, disobedience. He frames this citizenship as a call on the national state to protect aspects of French culture, in which food and its production loom large, against the flattening forces of neo-liberalism by standing up to the World Trade Organisation and refusing to grow or import GM products. Trans-national political forces were at issue in this case but they were not unchanged by crossing borders. Thus we still need comparative national analyses because even when environmental movements in different countries are subject to the same global forces, they do not all react in the same way. In this volume comparisons between Bosnia and Madagascar show that in both cases
trans-national networks of governance have imposed environmental policies based on mistaken assumptions about the weakness of local civil society, but also that each differs because of nationally specific conditions.

Given the unevenness of environmental movements, differences between movements and the importance of power relations between them, we are cautious about the use of the terminology ‘global civil society’ to describe the transnational networks developing between environmental groups. This is partly on historic grounds, since as is well known, even if there are new forms of transnational power, anti-colonial and post-colonial movements have always worked trans-nationally. The anti-apartheid movement (AAM) is a good example of a movement that crossed borders, even while South Africa was a closed society for most of its population (Thörn 2006). The AAM began in the early 1960s before the emergence of the New Left, to which some trace the origins of the Northern movements in the new transnational contention. The better accounts of global civil society include recognition of this long historic context (Keane 2003, Edwards and Gaventa 2001). But to us, global civil society still suggests a stronger and abstracted unity than seems to be evident given the differences within and the limits, as yet, of transnational environmentalism. We prefer the term used by Torgerson in his article in this collection (see also Torgerson 1999) - 'the green public sphere. The key point about the public sphere is that it is a space of dialogue and debate and does not presuppose a unified movement or society simply in need of a single common strategy. One point of criticism of the concept of public sphere is that its Republican origins seem to privilege the abstract public citizen, disembodied from bodily characteristics or historic influences (Iris Marion Young 2002). Torgerson, however, like Nancy Fraser (1990) argues that public spheres can be multiple rather than a single transnational space. Thus in his article here, he identifies a postcolonial dimension to environmentalism which needs to be addressed within the public spheres that are constituted by debates between environmentalists across borders. This is a theme we will return to below. Next, however, we need to explain what we mean by the terms environmental movement and social movement. How these terms are defined theoretically is important for the task of explaining the differences between different kinds of environmental movement.
The social movement in environmental movements

The concept of social movement is an analytical construct not a description of a given empirical phenomenon. There is no clear consensus on how to use the term and so at best the criteria that various definitions set out provide a heuristic device, which we argue can be used as a Weberian ideal type to understand and interpret real cases. This means that we should not accept at face value that all groups that call themselves environmental are necessarily part of a single environmental social movement.

We identify four elements characteristic of social movements. First, a movement must have some common identity which is not simply based on ideas, but also expressed in the taken for granted practices and culture developed over time by participants in collective action (what Bourdieu calls its habitus). Social movements in this sense are not momentary coalitions but develop their collective identity over time as they face the question of defining ‘who are we?’ ‘what do we believe?’ and ‘how should we act?’ A second feature of social movements is that we can assess who is in the movement empirically by assessing its network ties as opposed to membership of organisations. Put most straightforwardly, movement involvement requires regular interaction with others. Mapping this through network ties can show which groups and individuals take common action or exchange ideas or resources. This means that we can also distinguish between more or less active and central and peripheral actors in the movement. A focus on networks also means that there is no type of organisation that defines a social movement. Movement organisations can be hierarchical and centralised, or the opposite. Or, as in the environmental movement, and the transnational networks examined by Routledge et al, they can be a combination of both. A third feature is that parts of this movement network are involved in public protest, which we regard as essential to the public political dimension of movement action, although this can also be combined with countercultural lifestyles. The fourth criterion is that movements challenge some feature of dominant cultural codes or social and political values. In short, they argue for social and political change that goes beyond policy change. Social movements are therefore radical and this means that they can be of the left or the right. In the social movement parts of the environmental movement, however, the influence of the left-wing heritage has been over-whelming (Doherty 2002).
This is a complicated definition since we have to apply four criteria separately to actual groups that are in the process of constant change. Also, different analysts of movements tend to give different weight in applying these criteria to empirical cases. For instance, we argue that network ties alone are not enough to define the movement as many groups can take joint action against the same targets without developing a common identity. Groups that develop common frames and culture through regular interaction, however, can develop common identity, over time. We give more weight than others to questions of collective identity, but because we also stress the challenge to dominant cultural codes, and use of protest, in relation to the environmental movement, we see the strongest social movement dimensions in the more radical and self-consciously ideological environmental groups. In contrast, Rootes defines the identity of the environmental movement broadly as a common commitment to the importance of environmental concern (2004: 612) – which entails a very inclusive definition of the environmental movement able to include groups that never take protest action, and do not challenge the political order ideologically. These are clearly not black and white questions and exist on a continuum: the observer has to decide not only whether a movement has a collective identity and interacts, but what degree of interaction and evidence of shared ideas are required.

The emphasis on critique as central to social movements is part of the European tradition of social movement theory associated with seeking to understand why new social movements emerged in the wake of the New Left (Melucci 1996). It can be contrasted with a more nominalist approach to explaining social movements with its origins in the USA which focused on understanding how they mobilise and explain patterns of protest (Tarrow 1998). These are not so much different theories of social movements as approaches to different questions about collective action: the European tradition emphasising understanding ideology in relation to social structure; the US tradition focused on explaining specific protest actions. Thus, while the application of the term social movement remains contested, it is quite possible to draw on both European and US traditions in social movement theory and remain consistent.

What does this understanding of social movement mean in relation to the environmental movements that are discussed in this volume? First, we argue that not all environmental groups have strong elements of a social movement. Kerényi and
Szabó describe the predominance in Hungary of a narrow single-issue environmentalism in the 1990s, which became completely integrated into the new structures of government and failed to develop any capacity to mobilise an environmental constituency. In 2004 new groups and more radical ideas emerged through a protest campaign to protect a valued hill (Zengő) from being damaged for a NATO military site. This campaign included urban environmental activists with ties to global justice groups in other countries and the Hungarian branch of Friends of the Earth, which was able to use its international network contacts to put pressure on NATO and the EU. Using our approach it could be said that the parts of the Hungarian environmental movement that participated in the Zengő campaign increased their social movement dimensions. In contrast, in Iran, the narrow and state approved confines within which nearly all environmental NGOs are required to operate, is a good example of why not all environmental groups have a social movement dimension.

A second consequence of this approach to social movements is that it makes allowance for the diversity of environmentalisms. Not all those engaged in environmental action are necessarily part of the same social movement. It is only to the degree that they interact regularly, taking joint action and discussing and revising their common identity, that groups are part of the same movement. Thus social movements are not fixed entities with stable memberships and fixed ideologies but are constituted through ongoing debate and interaction. Nor are organisations or groups necessarily always definable only as part of a single social movement. The Confédération paysanne, as discussed by Hayes, is part of an international radical farmers’ network known as La Via Campesina, as well as being part of global justice networks, particularly in the European social forum. CP members took action with those who defined themselves as greens, in France against GM crops and may be developing a shared identity through regular joint action. However, in general it makes sense to define the CP as taking environmental action without being central to the French environmental movement. PGA Asia is part of an even broader coalition: like other branches of People’s Global Action, the participants are linked through their opposition to neo-liberalism. However, the process of debate within the PGA network is helping to define both a movement culture and a common identity, hence the emphasis that Routledge et al. place on the work of those individuals who seek to
push the movement to keep debating. In Burma, groups from the Karen people were
driven by the brutality of the Burmese army to define the harm they experienced in
ways that combined damage to the environment with the violence meted out to their
people. This led to ties with a variety of international networks of indigenous peoples,
human rights and environmental groups. Again, these links with other groups are too
complex to define simply as either environmental or human rights.

In the conclusion to this volume, we develop the emphasis on the importance of the
differences between forms of environmental action further, making a general and
more normative distinction between emancipatory environmental groups and
governance environmental groups. The emancipatory environmental groups
necessarily have a strong social movement dimension, although it does not follow that
all social movement groups are emancipatory. The governance groups are those that
offer no challenge to environmental injustice and are in general reproducing forms of
inequality through their participation with governments, financial institutions and
transnational corporations in transnational structures of governance. One example
discussed by Duffy is groups such as Conservation International that seek to move
people out of national parks in the South, using their influence with international
financial institutions to pressure Southern governments to adopt this policy. All of this
suggests the need to separate out the empirical phenomena of organisations and
groups that call themselves environmental from the social movement dimension in
environmentalism. The latter can be found across diverse social movements and in
different forms across and beyond borders. If social movement environmentalism is
much more diverse than it was 30 years ago, are there any ways to understand its
principal forms? It is to this question that we turn in the final section.

North-South or Three Posts?
When the ECPR workshop - the forerunner to this special edition - was originally
proposed by us, a major aim was to investigate differences, similarities and
transnational crossovers between environmentalists operating in those opposing
hemispheres of geopolitical imagination: North and South. Much of our discussion in
the workshop showed that this division was overly simplified. Not only is the South
too diverse to be easily defined in terms of shared experience, but also other regions
such as the post-socialist states do not fit easily under either heading. And yet, in the
absence of any other way of mapping major differences between ‘the West and the rest’, this theme remains an important one ‘after the fact’, as it were, in the revised versions of these articles.

The contributors use the terms North/South, First World/Third Worlds, developed/developing worlds, and minority/majority worlds interchangeably. Most of these dualistic divisions are oriented around poverty and development issues. We acknowledge that all these terms are imperfect categories. It is a problem to define entire hemispheres as being rich and poor. There is huge variance in levels of poverty in countries classified as part of the South. Sometimes, the World Bank uses the term ‘Fourth World’ to differentiate between the poorest nations and the simply poor nations of the Third World. On other occasions, it has taken out the oil-rich nations of the Middle East from its ‘South’ categorisation. There are also classification problems when considering recently industrialising countries versus those who are yet to undergo significant industrialisation. In some ways, one can follow the advice of the Calverts in their text devoted to discussions of the environment and North-South and simply say that the South is ‘taken to mean all the countries of the world not defined as Advanced Industrial Countries (AICs)’ (Calvert and Calvert 1999: 6). The problem with this approach, as Calvert et al accept, is that enormous discrepancies of wealth exist within nation-states. In the Australian aboriginal situation, for example, with indigenous peoples living a fourth world existence within a first world nation-state, it becomes obvious that the South can exist within the North. Of course, the opposite is also true: elites in the South can enjoy wealthy lives akin to what is generically expected in the North. Another example is found in the United States: the forest preservation movements of the North West of the United States most obviously comprise a minority world environmental movement; whilst the U.S. environmental justice movement, born in communities of colour, originally in deliberate juxtaposition to what it perceived as the ‘white elite’ environmental movement, can be usefully designated as a majority world experience. In any study of social movements, terminology must be employed which is not wholly based on a discourse relating to nation-states for, as aforementioned, social movements often traverse nation-state boundaries.
Of course, as already stated, this is an overly dualistic and simplistic, but useful broad-brush technique of highlighting differences. It is reminiscent of Guha and Martinez-Alier’s construction of the ‘environmentalism of the poor’ (Guha and Martinez-Aliez 1997) as distinct from that of the wealthy. On the one hand, the environmentalism of the minority world is constructed as largely post-materialist: more interested in the rights of ‘other nature’, which are implicit in conservation, threatened species and wilderness campaigns. Contrarily, the issues we have described above, far from being post-materialist, are issues for survival. Elsewhere, Doyle (2005) uses this simple dichotomy of the minority world and the majority world. One criticism levelled at this work, as well as that of Guha and Martinez-Aliez, is that it unfairly and inaccurately represents green concerns in many parts of the industrialised world.

In the minority countries of the New World – particularly the USA and Australia - there can be no doubt that post-materialist issues have dominated environmental agendas over the past generation. The political ecology movements of western Europe, which combined post-materialism with a broader New Left-derived analysis of power developed a significantly different green ideology, and alongside traditional nature conservation issues, wrestled with questions of structural change and multiple forms of social inequality (gender, race, sexuality and class, and bureaucracy), from their inception. In the USA and Australia these issues were in a subservient position to post-material environmental issues, which have been interpreted in a particularly apolitical manner by the largest environmental organisations (Dowie, 1995; Brulle and Jenkins 2006). Building on the North-South dualism, it may be more accurate to construct a tripartite system of characterisation for contemporary environmentalism: postindustrialism – depicting the European traditions of political ecology; postmaterialism – depicting the largely non-anthropocentric concerns of nature conservation which have dominated in the New World; and postcolonialism – descriptive of the experience of the majority of the earth: the South.

Environmentalism, then, crosses a vast range of theoretical material. It can be understood in a post-materialist frame, championing the politics of ‘other nature’; the protection of wilderness areas; and the saving of threatened species. Through a post-industrialist lens, environmentalism challenges the excesses of the industrialist
project; the rights of corporations to pollute and degrade; and the dwindling of the earth’s resources as they are fed into the advanced industrial machines. Using post-colonialism as the narrative frame, green concerns are cast in the light of the coloniser versus the colonised; the dichotomous world of affluence and poverty; along structuralist lines between the haves and the have-nots. In different parts of the world, these frames, or story lines – and combinations of them and others – are used more often to explain the causes and effects of environmental issues and problems. In the South, the frames of post-colonialism and structuralism usually dominate. In many parts of Europe, post-industrialism is deep-seated; whereas in New World cultures in North America and Australia, post-materialism, can usually be employed to interpret environmental politics.

Traditional social movement models based on Marxist – and most particularly structuralist – accounts of power enjoy enormous currency in the South. As the article by Routledge (this volume) testifies, large numbers of environmental activists in the developing world identify themselves as Marxists, seeing the key cause of environmental degradation being that resources and production are in the hands of a ruling class. Solving these problems does not lie necessarily in better management or more efficient and sustainable practices. Rather, the first part of the answer lies in local people gaining control over their own resources, their own lives.

Unlike some forms of postmodern and post-positivist analysis, then, we still find the binary mega-division between majority and minority worlds – though imperfect - a useful one, as it continues to match and describe the ‘empirical reality’ as we have encountered it; as long as it is understood that these great divisions are neither necessarily geographically-oriented, nor nation-state specific. Rather, there is an immense gulf in the context of comparative environmental movements between the experiences of the majority of the earth’s people (the South), when contrasted with those encountered by a small minority (the North). A rather simple, often quoted, equation needs to be spelt out here. Approximately 80% of the Earth’s resources are either consumed or owned by approximately 15% of the Earth’s people. On the other hand 85% of the Earth’s people have access to only 20% of the Earth’s resources (Doyle and McEachern 1998).
But no sooner do we arrange some neat form of tripartite categorisation, than environmental movements, with their almost pathological need to cross borders - whether they be conceptual, cultural or geographical - make nonsense out of such feeble positivist attempts to understand what is a diverse and changing phenomenon. Movements have sought to work across these divides. In Doherty’s, Rootes’, Hayes’ and Routledge’s articles, mention is made of the Global Justice Movement which intersects with social movement environmentalism; demanding that the South must gain fair and equitable access to resources; challenging the over-consumption patterns of the North; whilst also critiquing ways in which Northern development interests act in ways which maintain the dependency of the South. Yet such border crossings do not create a pure sphere of transnational civil society. Contributions to this collection and others have examined how transnational networks reproduce inequalities, even in those most committed to challenging them (Anheier and Themudo 2002 Bob 2001).

Indeed, one of the critical traits which Calvert et al list as a characteristic of the South is the fact that almost all states are former colonies. This element of colonisation is taken up by Doug Torgerson in this edition. He agrees that an image of a ‘divided planet’ in terms of rich and poor, or ‘Eurocentric planet’ is a needed correction to the concept espoused by Ward and Dubos’ *Only One Earth, commissioned for the UNCED Conference in 1972*. Torgerson goes further, arguing that the divisions of the planet bear the ‘unmistakeable mark of the legacy of colonialisation’, and ‘as concerns are voiced from formerly colonised regions of the divided planet, the many environmentalisms tend to converge in the focus with the Global Justice Movement, a “movement of movements”’.

One of the trends to emerge from green globalisation has been for Northern groups to attempt to incorporate those very different concerns expressed by their Southern compatriots. There is no doubt that increasingly, diverse interpretations of green identity are under increasing pressures to homogenise. This issue will be developed more fully later when we address the concept of global green public sphere. But we must accept that, despite these recent trends at conceptualising and sharing grand green narratives, the actual environmental issues on the ground are profoundly different in the South than the North. Movements, therefore, which surface in countries like India, Bangladesh, Chile or Somalia – in the majority world - will be
more oriented around issues of environmental security: that is, the rights of people to
gain access to the fundamental resources for survival: air, water, earth, and fire. The
most pressing environmental issues in the Indian Ocean region, for example,
comprising one-third of all the peoples on the earth, are almost all anthropocentric:
people fighting for food and water security; struggling for adequate admission to a
market which provides health care and adequate shelter; providing a society to live in
which is not consistently ravaged by wars – such as Afghanistan, Palestine or Angola
– and wave after wave of colonialism, in all its forms, creates catastrophic tsunamis of
human-making - (Doyle and Risely 2007). Whereas, in many parts of the North these
issues, however compassionately understood, are literally worlds apart from the lives
of the wealthy minority, most of whom will only ever experience the lives of the
majority – what Toffler (1971) calls the Living Dead – through the vicarious
experiences offered by travel and lifestyle programs on television and the internet.

As aforesaid, after more than thirty years of new environmentalisms we are still only
at the beginning of addressing the fundamental environmental problems, which are as
rooted in transnational structures of power as they were three decades ago. The key
difference is that new transnational structures of governance have split environmental
movements between those that have become governance movements, integrated into
policy making, and those that remain closer to social movement and emancipatory
forms of environmentalism.

Order of Exposition

Let us now outline the order of specific contributions presented in this volume,
and briefly review the content and argumentation included in each chapter.

Torgerson addresses the nature of postcolonial thinking about the environment and
argues for the need to recognize postcolonial political ecology as a distinct part of the
green public sphere. Recognition of this means greater attention to the inescapable
conflicts that divide green politics. But he also argues that the challenges ‘to the tenets
that nature is to be dominated and the earth, conquered’ provide a basis on which a
postcolonial political ecology can develop. The volume then examines three cases
from the South. Duffy’s analysis of the interaction of international NGOs, international financial institutions and local NGOs in Madagascar demonstrates the importance of structural power and the power of transnational institutions over a Southern government, but it also shows how a limited form of autonomy has been carved out by local NGOs even within the neo-liberal confines of the ‘governance state’. Environmental groups in Burma and Iran are compared by Doyle and Simpson. Both Iran and Burma are authoritarian and repressive regimes, but the structure of power of each regime is different. In Burma the state’s territory is less effectively controlled by the military dictatorship and repression is used to control resistance groups, including those who oppose the regime’s environmentally and socially catastrophic energy export projects. In Iran, the regime encourages apolitical forms of environmental organisations that function as a release valve for parts of civil society.

Rootes then, explains how the three British environmental organisations most oriented towards global agendas differ in their approach WWF UK has become increasingly committed to an agenda of sustainable development, which enables it to work both with government, business and with other institutionalised environmental and development organisations. FoE has adopted a more ideological agenda of transnational environmental justice, which has been influenced by its stronger ties with other non-environmental organisations. Greenpeace, originally the organisation with the most international focus has changed least, since its strategy is to work less through coalitions and to avoid broad ideological commitments in favour of clearly specified issue based campaigns.

The next three contributions examine other national environmental movements in Europe that differ in that each case is characterised by a progressively stronger green public sphere. In Bosnia, external funding after the civil war has been directed to the creation of civil society groups, but the result has been the creation of the kinds of organisations best suited to meeting the rubric of funding regimes. These are groups of technical specialists who tend to avoid political controversy and debate over
environmental principles and have stronger ties with funding agencies than with Bosnian publics. This side of Bosnian environmental governance has many similarities with Madagascar. Although political authority is fragmented in Bosnia, Fagan argues that the policy that drives reconstruction mistakenly assumes that Bosnians never had a capacity to mobilise on issues such as the environment. The case study of a local environmental campaign shows that grassroots environmental groups can work in Bosnia, but these are not the groups that get funded.

Bosnia and Hungary, provide evidence that post-socialist states do not automatically follow a western path to modernisation, contrary to the assumptions of many policy makers. In Hungary, according to Kerényi and Szabó, environmentalism was a major part of the opposition to the Communist Party in the later years of the regime. This ‘heroic moment’ did not translate into a strong post-socialist environmental movement as after 1989 environmentalism was fragmented and institutionalised through funding regimes from the USA and EU. It was after EU accession in 2004 that a new kind of environmentalism developed in Hungary through the campaign to defend Zengő hill. An ideologically diverse coalition of urban counter-cultural greens, local people and transnational environmental organizations was able to pressure the national government through the EU and NATO, to change its plans.

France has a stronger history of protest than Hungary and Bosnia, and has seen new forms of protest develop that reflect the decline of the organised left in recent years. In relation to the environment, this has taken the form of ‘civic disobedience’ by diverse and partly overlapping networks of activists in defence of trees, against gas guzzling 4x4 cars, and against GM crops. Although similar repertoires have developed in other countries, the way in which they are justified and used in France is distinctive, insofar as this takes place with reference to French Republican values and against externally imposed neo-liberalism.

The final two cases examine cases of transnational networking. Routledge, Cumbers and Nativel compare two contrasting international networks that play a role in the global justice movement: People’s Global Action (PGA) Asia and the European arm of the International Federation of Chemical, Energy and Mining Workers (ICEM). Neither network would usually be classified as part of the environmental movement
although both campaign on environmental issues. Including them here is consistent with our argument that social movement environmentalism can also be found in groups outside those usually defined as the environmental movement. PGA Asia is a network of predominantly peasant movements ‘engaged in struggles for land and water rights, food sovereignty, economic and cultural survival, and environmental sustainability’ while the ICEM is engaged in campaigns for environmental regulation in industries that are key sources of environmental problems. A central role in constituting both these networks is played by ‘imagineers’: key activists, who have to relate the international work to the realities of the daily struggles of the grassroots groups that work principally at local level. The latter often find it difficult to see the relevance of international networking. This means that the success of transnational emancipatory networks depends on how successfully the imagineers are able to link transnational social movement work to that rooted in local places. This is in some ways also the challenge for Friends of the Earth International (FOEI). FOEI is a loose federation of 71 national FoE groups with very different histories, resources and national contexts. Doherty examines how FoEI faced major divisions on North-South questions. Many other transnational social movement networks have also found North-South differences hard to overcome. For FoEI this was particularly important because it had built its common identity on a commitment to global environmental justice. It was able to resolve differences because the key actors had developed a distinctive culture and relationships of trust over regular international meetings. The key challenge for FoEI is to whether it can work effectively in practice despite differences of power and ideology between national groups, which it is unlikely to be able to overcome completely.

The concluding chapter draws out from the volume a split between logics of emancipation and logics of governance in the actions of the diverse environmental groups dealt with in the different contributions to the volume. Ultimately, we conclude that the transnational politics of modern environmentalism takes place within and without social movement frames and, as such, can be understood simultaneously as politics of liberation and repression; emancipation and disciplined conditionality.

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