CUSTODIANS OF A TRADITION: REPUBLICAN LEADERS
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY, 1944-1949

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ABSTRACT


A study of the attempt by leading members of the Republican Party to define a coherent Republican attitude to foreign affairs at a time when America's role was being transformed. The principal Republican leaders are identified as Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan and John Foster Dulles, foreign policy adviser to Thomas E. Dewey. The study is based on research in archive collections in the United States, including the personal papers of Dulles, Vandenberg and Herbert Hoover, and on analysis of the published writings of Republican leaders.

Conceptually the study rejects the notion that the Republican record on foreign affairs was "isolationist" and it re-interprets the Republican Tradition as being one of Nationalism. The Internationalists in the Republican Party are seen as a small but disproportionately vocal minority who, unlike the Nationalists, accepted Wendell Willkie's concept of inter-dependence. The dominant leaders, Dulles and Vandenberg, are revealed as pragmatists who consciously avoided close identification with the Internationalists in order to maximize their influence in the Republican Party.

The study demonstrates how a majority of Republicans in Congress had continuing reservations about the direction of American foreign policy. They criticized Roosevelt and Truman for their alleged failure to stand up for American principles and interests at the war-time conferences and
they were opposed to the promotion of post-war policies which stood in the way of the restoration of domestic "Normalcy". Many Republicans were, however, manoeuvred into supporting the British Loan, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan by Administration exploitation of the anti-communist issue, but by 1948 still only a minority had come to accept the underlying assumptions of American post-war planning. In consequence, Republicans tended to press for a policy that was more consistently anti-communist than that which the Administration appeared to be following, whilst at the same time looking for a reduction in economic, military and political commitments. The most prominent articulators of this viewpoint were Hoover and Robert A. Taft, but as this study demonstrates, elements of this apparently contradictory position were present in the thinking of both Vandenberg and Dulles. To the end of his life Vandenberg never lost his concern that the United States might impair its own economy and way of life by over-commitment. Dulles also, who was extremely sensitive to domestic political constraints on foreign policy, tended to emphasize American moral and intellectual leadership and to argue for less costly initiatives such as a world-wide intelligence service and promotion of European unity with the ultimate end of making Europe self-supporting. As the study demonstrates, the surprise defeat of Thomas Dewey in the 1948 election was a blow to Vandenberg and Dulles' leadership; in the aftermath of defeat the initiative although not the final victory belonged to those who, with Taft and Hoover, had had deep reservations about the development of American foreign policy in the post-war years.
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INTRODUCTION

As the Second World War drew to a close, leading members of the Republican Party in the United States began to grapple with the problems inherent in the need to shape and defend the foreign policy record of their party, in a period in which foreign policy came to dominate American politics, and the United States emerged as the dominant power in the world.

An initial assumption of this study is that it makes sense to analyze the foreign policy responses of American politicians in the context of their positions of prominence in the Republican Party. It is recognized that party is not the sole determinant of behaviour; ethnic factors, geographic location, even age, might be relevant variables for a study of foreign policy attitudes. However, the individuals who are the subject of this thesis regarded themselves, and were so regarded by the mass media and fellow politicians, as the leaders of their party. Their careers and their ideological goals were identified to a large extent with the electoral success of the Republican Party. They were dependent on party support and unity, in so far as it was obtainable, to maintain their political credibility, and such support was by no means automatic, but had to be continually earned by argument and persuasion. To a large degree then, their party affiliation affected the symbols they used, their self-image, their image of others of different political persuasion, and ultimately, their general view of the world.
Since the time of Lord Bryce, it has been readily assumed that American political parties are concerned solely with winning elections and gaining power, and that their cohesion on issues and principles is suspect. Bryce's conclusion, based on his observation of American politics in the 1880's, was that "neither party has any principles, any distinctive tenets. Both have traditions. Both claim to have tendencies. Both have certainly war cries, organizations, interests enlisted in their support. But those interests are in the main the interests of getting or keeping the patronage of the government." 1 Recent political science has tended to accept Bryce's view, and to attribute the lack of cohesion and unity of American political parties to the constitutional principles of federalism and the division of powers. Thus James MacGregor Burns has argued that the United States does not have a two-party system at all, but a four-party system with each major party divided into presidential and congressional parties. 2 Others have argued that there are in fact 100 political parties in the United States, one for each major party in each state. 3 It is possible, however, to over-draw the picture. Even Bryce modified his portrait: "...one cannot say that there is to-day no difference between the two great parties. There

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is a difference of spirit or sentiment perceptible even by a stranger. . ." Bryce's rider is still relevant. If American political parties are often demonstrably divided on political issues, this does not necessarily invalidate political affiliation as a method of analysis. This study, then, takes as its definition of the Republican Party, that which is in common, everyday usage. It assumes that if a man calls himself a Republican, he has a sense of identity, which may not be totally rational, with something he believes to be the Republican Party.

A methodological difficulty of this study, which is related to the structure of American political parties, is that of selection of "leaders". There is no clearly defined party leadership in the American political system, especially for a party that does not control the White House. The label "titular" leader customarily accorded to a defeated presidential candidate carries with it no authority or responsibility, and has been described by one Republican of the 1940's as "a newspaper creation. . . a sort of brass ring for the defeated candidate to grab at during the ride." Another Republican, John Foster Dulles, told a Canadian audience in March, 1948, that "no one person can today speak with authority with respect to foreign policy. . . Therefore, any estimate of Republican foreign policy involves an element of guesswork." Dulles' careful disclaimer of "authority"

6 "A Republican's View of U.S. Foreign Policy", address delivered to the Canadian Club, Toronto, March 8th, 1948, Dulles MSS., Princeton University Library.
did not represent a disclaimer of "leadership", however. Whilst nobody outside the quadrennial national convention had the "authority" to speak for the Republican Party as a whole, this did not prevent Dulles and others from seeking to develop a coherent and responsible party policy and image.

For the purposes of this study, leadership is defined in terms of influence, not in terms of constitutional authority. This definition, however, introduces a methodological problem. There is no way in which such influence can be measured. The nearest the social scientist can get to it is to compile a questionnaire which he then circulates to all the members of a particular group being studied; but however skilfully constructed such a questionnaire can do no more than measure perceptions of or reputation for influence. The methods of the social scientist, even with their limitations, are not for the most part open to the historian. In this particular instance, many of the ordinary Republicans whose ranking of leaders might have been useful are dead; for the remainder, the random nature of their survival and the frailty of the human memory renders the exercise less than useful. Ultimately, then, the historian is forced to make his generalizations on the basis of incomplete and fragmentary evidence. Thus the man who carefully commits his every thought to paper and who carefully leaves his papers to posterity may appear more important than he really is.

was, and more important than the man who kept little written record, or whose records were destroyed by a protective secretary or guarded by sensitive relatives. In its selection of leaders this study can make no more positive affirmation than that on the basis of the large and reasonably varied, but not exhaustive evidence studied, the major personalities dealt with here, seem, in the judgement of the present writer, to have been the most important.

A further point which needs early clarification relates to the system of classification used. The words "Isolationist" and "Internationalist", which have often been used to describe foreign policy attitudes have been used imprecisely. There is a particular problem with the word "Isolationism" in that it originated largely as a pejorative term; to accept it "as a neutral descriptive category" and as "a political position with programmatic and ideological dimensions" as one historian has recently argued, does therefore raise definite problems.® Not the least of these problems is that of definition. The writer already referred to made a valiant attempt by defining it as "an attitude, policy, doctrine, or position opposed to the commitment of American force outside the Western Hemisphere, except in the rarest and briefest instances."® The last phrase of the definition reveals the difficulty of finding an all-embracing formula

® Ibid., p. 2.
without losing precision; thus the writer referred to managed to find one which could include both the imperialist Henry Cabot Lodge and the pacifist William Jennings Bryan. Another writer, in a study of that commonly regarded bastion of "Isolationism", the Chicago Tribune, evaded the problem neatly with the comment that "'isolationist' is, at best, a difficult word to define." The present study then avoids use of the term "isolationism" because of its pejorative origins, and because of the related difficulty of definition. An added reason is that none of the Republican leaders studied would have accepted the label "isolationist" as describing their own foreign policy position, although they sometimes used it of others.

The same difficulty does not exist with "Internationalism". Whilst it was a pejorative term to some, there were others who were happy to describe themselves as "Internationalists". "Internationalist" has therefore been retained in this study, although in a rather more precise sense than it was used in the 1940's. Within the Republican Party the Internationalists are taken to be those, such as the 1940 presidential nominee, Wendell Willkie, who believed that ultimately American freedom, security and economic strength was dependent on a liberal world. In this category, which was a minority one in the Republican Party, was also Harold Stassen, the much publicized former Governor of Minnesota who, after demobilization in 1945, campaigned actively both for his own

candidature and for the liberalization of the Republican Party. In Congress only a few, relatively uninfluential Republicans such as Senator Warren Austin (Vermont) and Representative Charles Eaton (New Jersey) can properly be described as Internationalists.

The second category used is that of Nationalist, which like Internationalist was used in the 1940's, and not usually in a pejorative sense. The Nationalist position, which was the dominant one in Congress, was one which placed prime emphasis on the restoration of "freedom" in the United States, and which did not see a liberal world as necessarily essential to this purpose. In this category may be placed virtually the whole congressional leadership, including the de facto Republican leader in the Senate, Robert A. Taft, the majority leader in the House (and Speaker in the 80th Congress) Joseph Martin, and the formidable senior Republican on the House Appropriations Committee, John Taber of New York. Outside Congress, former President Herbert Hoover and the 1936 presidential candidate, Alfred Landon of Kansas, belong in the same category.

For the purposes of this study a third category has been created, the Centre group, to describe/who seemed primarily concerned with developing consensus and compromise. In this group may be placed the three dominant Republican leaders whose careers inter-lock. Arguably the most important was Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, a senior Republican Senator, who had been in the Senate since 1928.
In 1944, at the age of sixty, he seemed to be nearing the end of an unremarkable Senate career, but from his position as a senior Republican on the influential Foreign Relations Committee, was to exercise incalculable influence in the post-war years. Vandenberg, with his impeccable congressional credentials, served as an indispensable collaborator with John Foster Dulles of New York. Dulles had never held political office, but in his late fifties was increasingly drawn into Republican politics as a result of his relationship as friend and foreign policy adviser to the third of the Centre group, Governor Thomas Dewey of New York, presidential nominee in 1944 and 1948. The story of Republican foreign policy leadership in the years 1944-1949 is the story of the relationship between these three very different men, and of their inter-action with the dominant groups in the Republican Party.
Nationalism, Internationalism and the Republican Tradition

By the end of World War II, the Republican Party had been in opposition for over a decade. In this time, the United States had undergone momentous changes to which the majority of Republican politicians remained firmly opposed. In domestic affairs, the majority of Republicans had from the high watermark of Roosevelt's popularity in 1936, become committed to the end of the New Deal and the restoration of a less interventionist government in Washington. The recession of 1937-1938, the Democratic split over Roosevelt's plan to reform the Supreme Court, and the success both of Republicans and conservative Democrats in the 1938 elections had seemed to indicate in the last pre-war elections, that the New Deal was drawing to a close and that the nation was returning to conservatism.¹ This movement was seemingly prevented, however, by the continued personal popularity of Roosevelt, and by the increased and ultimately almost total pre-occupation with foreign affairs after the outbreak of war in 1939. Still, despite the loss of their third successive Presidential election in 1940, the Republicans made significant gains in the 1942 Congressional elections, and seemed set to restore the United States to more orthodox paths once the war and Franklin Roosevelt were removed from the scene.

The question of foreign policy stood in the way of Republican restoration to majority party status in the nation. The majority of Republicans in Congress had opposed Roosevelt's foreign policy initiatives in the years 1939-1941. After Pearl Harbor, they were likewise disturbed at the growing assumption that traditional American policy was out of date, and that a totally new policy was required. For World War II was a time for visionaries: for Vice-President Henry Wallace to talk of the "Century of the Common Man"; for Clarence Streit to promote ideas of union with the British Empire and western Europe; for Henry Luce, the influential Republican publisher, to forecast the coming "American Century"; for Wendell Willkie, the Republicans' charismatic but controversial 1940 nominee, to talk of the inexorability of "One World". It was a time, too, when opinion polls could report that over 70% of Americans were in favour of post-war American participation in an international police force.

The majority of Republican politicians could not share the optimism about the world that was to emerge from World War II: aside from their concern about what the war was doing to the United States, they had no faith in the Soviet "alliance" and were horrified at the growth of "internationalist" sentiment. Herbert Hoover, whose views were representative of the majority of Republicans in Congress, revealed


his disdain in a letter to Alfred Landon: "We are just simply deluged with fantastic and other ideas about peace. They involve all degrees from cooperation to collaboration on one hand, and unions of all sorts and varieties which abandon the sovereignty of the United States on the other. The Americans are the only people who are talking such stuff." For the most part the visions of the war years were not shared by Franklin Roosevelt either. For Republicans, however, they presented a more difficult political problem: if they were to win in 1944 and restore the United States to "Normalcy", they could not afford to seem to be out of step with the prevailing mood in the nation; the problem was aggravated by the dominant image of "isolationism" which had become fastened to them.

With a few noted and largely discredited exceptions, such as Charles A. Beard and the Chicago Tribune, both the academic community and the mass media helped to distort the Republican position on foreign affairs. Thus the New Republic, for example, a late convert to the cause of intervention in Europe, found no inconsistency in attacking

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4 Herbert Hoover to Alfred M. Landon, September 25th, 1943, Hoover MSS. Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.


6 A useful if polemical and unwieldy study of this is James J. Martin, American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941: Liberalism's Press and Spokesmen on the Road Back to War between Mukden and Pearl Harbor, 2 Vols. (New York: Devin-Adair, 1964).
Republicans for having opposed policies, such as neutrality revision in 1939, which the magazine itself had opposed in the form initially presented to Congress. Similarly, in December, 1941, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. suggested that the crisis confronting the Republican Party over foreign policy was analogous to that of slavery which had killed the Whig Party before the Civil War; he predicted that it would go the way of the Whigs unless it gave complete support to Roosevelt's foreign policy. From within the Republican Party's own ranks, the constant criticisms of Wendell Willkie and his supporters also helped to fasten the image of "isolationism" on the majority of Republicans.

The preoccupation of an historically-minded generation with avoiding the "mistakes" of World War I, was central to the perception of the Republican Party as the Party of "isolationism". History, as understood during World War II, showed that the major cause of the present war was American rejection of the League of Nations and the subsequent retreat into "isolation" under Harding. History also indicated, and here memories of Henry Cabot Lodge became fused with Republican opposition to Roosevelt's foreign policy before Pearl Harbor, that the greatest repository of "isolationism" was the Republican Party. At its crudest,

7 Ibid., p. 1236.
8 Ibid., p. 1277.
10 On the influence of World War I on thinking at this time, see Ernest R. May, "Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy" (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 7-18.
"isolationism" seemed to be used to attack anybody who expressed any reservations about the conduct of the war or the need for the United States to protect its own interests; it presented, therefore, an almost insuperable problem for an opposition party in a time of war, but one which had to be overcome if Republicans were to win in 1944. One suggested method of doing this was to develop a bipartisan policy, perhaps by developing a common Republican and Democratic foreign policy plank for 1944. Both patriotism and electoral pragmatism suggested to some that this was a satisfactory solution, but distrust of Franklin Roosevelt's diplomacy, as well as sensitivity to slurs on the Republican Party's record ruled out such a course.  

It is clear then that the majority of Republican politicians dissented from the view of history that came to be accepted during World War II. One of the Republicans who had tried to advance the idea of a bipartisan foreign policy plank came to realize this, and expressed the view that "possibly some of our critics have gone too far in painting the picture that our country was the principal sinner in bringing about the world collapse. It tends to put those of us, who want to have a constructive and positive foreign policy developed, in a wrong position and tends to

11 On the attempt to organize a "bipartisan" election plank, see the letters from H. Alexander Smith to C. Colbourn Hardy, May 11th, 1943, to J. Kionberger Davis, May 13th, 1943, to Clarence Budington Kellard, November 19th, 1943, and to Frank Knox, December 1st, 1943; see also Arthur H. Vandenberg to Smith, November 22nd, 1943, H. Alexander Smith MSS, Princeton University Library. Among the opponents were Hoover and Landon, Hoover to John W. Bricker, August 30th, 1943, Hoover MSS; Donald R. McCoy, Landon of Kansas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1957), p. 500.
stiffen the backs of people who feel that we are considering the interests of other countries before we are considering our own". Some Republicans, it is true, did appear to share the dominant view. Thus Raymond Buell, a former president of the Foreign Policy Association, the author of various books on international relations, an associate of *Time Inc.* and a member of Willkie's 1940 campaign staff, readily drew parallels with 1920 in a memorandum he circulated to Republican Internationalists in 1943. Governor Bricker of Ohio, he wrote, referring to the foremost presidential hopeful from the Midwest, "is no more to be trusted on the international situation than Harding with his promises as to an 'Association of Nations.'" So also Willkie himself was ever watchful for a repetition of history, in the shape of the Republican Old Guard standing "pat" until such time as they could cash in on post-war disillusionment. John Foster Dulles, too, was sensitive to language in the draft of the 1944 platform which to him was reminiscent of 1920. For the most part, however, Republican politicians dissented from a view of history which portrayed the United States, and the Republican Party in particular, as in any way responsible

12 Smith to Brooks Emeny, June 9th, 1944, Smith MSS.
13 Memorandum by Raymond L. Buell, "Notes on the State of the Nation", Raymond L. Buell file, Smith MSS.
15 John Foster Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, May 16th, 1944, Dulles MSS (Supplement), Princeton University Library.
for the holocaust of world war. The development of Re-
publican policy had to take note of these susceptibilities;
it had to be based on sympathy with and understanding of
the thought processes of Congressional Republicans, who
remained predominantly conservative in domestic affairs and
nationalist in foreign affairs. Although as it proved,
congressional Republicans were not strong nor cohesive
enough to control national conventions and to nominate their
own presidential candidate, their views could not be over-
ridden if the Republican Party was to attain the unity
necessary to regain its major position in American life.

The Nationalist Position

If Congressional Republicans had been asked at any time
in the period 1941-1945 to fill in a questionnaire giving
their own description of their position on foreign policy,
the majority would have described themselves as Nationalists.
Such a label would as always have covered a range of dif-
fering views, but nevertheless, it would have been the best
one to describe the dominant set of values which deter-
mined Republican foreign policy. One Republican Senator,
tired of being labelled an "isolationist", set out the
nationalist position in January, 1945, as follows: i) an
unwillingness to surrender American sovereignty; ii) an
unwillingness to allow the United States to interfere
"arbitrarily" in the internal affairs of others; iii) op-
position to a "give away" policy; iv) unwillingness to put
complete dependence on collective security; v) collaboration
with like-minded, sovereign nations; vi) help to other
nations to help themselves; vii) adequate national security;
Such a statement offers no reliable guide to the policy to be pursued in a specific instance, but it does offer an insight into a thought process which was politically significant in the Republican Party, even if intellectually out of vogue at the end of World War II. An understanding of this thought process is essential to an understanding of the development of Republican foreign policy.

Among the most prominent spokesmen for the Nationalists was the Chicago Tribune, published by the anglo-phobic Colonel Robert McCormick, a man of some influence in Republican circles in Illinois and other areas of the Midwest. Endorsing the attempt by Governor John Bricker of Ohio to gain the 1944 nomination, the Tribune commented:

"We don't have to found our foreign policy upon fear of any nation or combination of nations. It is a curious fact that other nations which have far more reason to fear for their safety than we have are here proposing no sacrifices of their sovereign freedom of action in the interest of world peace... Only in America... is there any considerable body of opinion demanding that the nation commit its men and its wealth to the service of other countries on their demand."

Denying that the Midwest was "isolationist" in the sense

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16 Congressional Record, 91, January 22nd, 1945, p. 401.
18 Chicago Tribune, May 16th, 1944.
in which the term was usually understood, the Tribune sprang to the defence of the much maligned interior: "The middle west is well aware both of the problems of the rest of the world and of the fact that the tremendous increase in power that the war has given this nation makes those problems an American concern whether we like it or not". But, recognizing that responsibility accompanied power, that power must be used "primarily for America". That didn't mean that "it shall be used to injure our world neighbours. It does mean that we shall not injure ourselves to benefit others."^9

In 1944, the Tribune commended to the Republican Party the platform adopted by Illinois Republicans. In their platform, Illinois Republicans had set out the bases of American foreign policy as, i) the preservation and protection of American interests; ii) aid in restoring "order" and "decent" living in the world; iii) recognition that the United States should do its full share in helping to secure permanent peace.\textsuperscript{20} It is unlikely that the order was accidental, for the primacy of American interests was a basic premise of the Nationalist position. They were prepared to cooperate with other nations, and to help in restoring and securing a better world, but they did not see this as a vital interest. Convinced of the awesome superiority of the United States over potential rivals, which in the words of the Tribune, made other countries "almost as auxiliaries of no great importance," they demanded "an end to an American foreign policy founded on

\begin{itemize}
    \item[^9] Ibld., May 20th, 1944.
    \item[^20] Ibld., May 19th, 1944.
\end{itemize}
fear and fawning".\textsuperscript{21}

Politically the most important spokesman for the Nationalist cause was Senator Robert Taft. Although not keen to become involved in matters of foreign policy, Taft was frequently to offer a dissenting opinion, and was always a potential leader of opposition to Administration foreign policy in the post-war years.\textsuperscript{22} Although differing in some respects from the Tribune and its proprietor, Taft shared its belief in the invulnerability of the United States.\textsuperscript{23} Given this belief it made no sense from Taft's viewpoint to imperil liberty at home by over-extension overseas.

Taft was prepared therefore, to cooperate with other nations in trying to eliminate war from the world, because war was a threat to the political economy in which he believed, and led in the modern world to big government, the growth of executive power, higher taxes, conscription and economic controls; but he was not prepared to sanction a policy of "Internationalism" which led down the same road...
to what he regarded as collectivism.  

A complex figure, often stereotyped by contemporaries as an "isolationist", Taft's views on foreign policy were less quaint than they were often portrayed at the time. More recent historians, of right, left and centre have been less willing to write him off, as did one early writer, as having no foreign policy, or as simply representing the "psychology of the moat", or the desire to be left alone. Taft's views on foreign policy were a compound of his ardent partisanship, his constitutionalism (in particular his distrust of executive power), his dislike of militarism and imperialism, and his scepticism about the foreign economic expansion which was central to most contemporary thinking about foreign policy. He was also lacking both in sentimentality for Europe and in any sense of mission. "Isolationism", a term which two of his recent conservative defenders have described as an "abusive term coined by the advocates of a grandiose American intervention in Europe and Asia" hardly does him justice.

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27. Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 195-201.

Like his father, President William Howard Taft (1909-13), Taft believed in the rule of law in domestic and foreign affairs, and had been a supporter of the League of Nations as well as of American participation in the World Court. Taft, therefore, found no difficulty in accommodating himself to the revived demands for American participation in some form of international organization which came to the fore from 1943. He was evidently prepared to agree to an organization without a veto, provided the emphasis was on regional rather than universal peace-keeping arrangements, and provided that the new League had no power to interfere in a nation's domestic affairs other than over the question of armaments. Taft saw international organization as an instrument for extending the rule of law, and for developing the principle of peaceful arbitration of disputes, rather than as a system of collective security. He was, therefore, totally opposed to the concept of an international police force, which Harold Stassen and other Republican Internationalists were in favour of. Taft's exaggerated legalism perhaps ignored the difficulties involved in developing the rule of law, but it was consistent with his basic premises: if the

29 Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 78, 140-41.
United States was invulnerable, why sacrifice freedom and independence in pursuit of less than vital goals? His concept of international organization would give the United States a world role in helping to develop peace, without entangling it in every political dispute.

To Taft, it was axiomatic that "the purpose of foreign policy is to insure freedom for the people of the United States, and prevent invasion of this country and foreign wars which might bring destruction to our people and prevent their working out here at home the destiny of the American Republic". The United States was, in his view, not primarily fighting to spread democracy or the Four Freedoms throughout the world:

"We are anxious to help other peoples, but only to the extent that this can be done without involving us in unnecessary wars or endangering the future welfare of our own people. We did not enter the present war in order to crusade throughout the world for the Atlantic Charter or the Four Freedoms. There is no intention on our part to insist on the freedom of India or, apparently, even the freedom of the Baltic States or eastern Poland. We are not fighting for democracy except for our own." The logic of Taft's views could not be faulted. Since American policy must be based on the removal of any threat of external domination, it made no sense in his view to insist on the Four Freedoms in the Soviet Union unless the United States was prepared to commit itself to perpetual war.

33 ibid.
34 See speeches to 6th Annual Conference of the Ohio Federation of Republican Women's Organizations, October 19th, 1945, and to the American Polish Association, March 20th, 1945, reprinted in Congressional Record, 91, Appendix, pp. 4424, 2413.
As far as Taft himself was concerned, he was not prepared to pay the price of perpetual war. In World War I, he had never had any illusions about the "war to end wars"; although he had supported the allied cause, and joined a preparedness parade in 1916. Like Herbert Hoover, under whom he worked in Paris in the American Relief Administration, and whom he was to revere throughout his life, Taft had been horrified by what he regarded as European selfishness, as well as by the morally debilitating results of total war. His own experience then, cautioned him against those who seemed to believe the United States could put the world to rights, and intensified his opposition to intervention in World War II. Even in his difficult re-election campaign of 1944, he was prepared to admit only that he might have been wrong in opposing fighting Hitler before Pearl Harbor. In short, Taft had no enthusiasm for war, or for the use of force to put right the ills of the world. Sincerely interested in preventing the recurrence of war, he was out of step with the nostrums of the times: Willkie's "One World"; Lippmann's balance of power theories, which he felt Dewey swallowed in calling for an Anglo-American alliance in 1943; Luce's "American Century". Taft's views were closest to Herbert Hoover; in 1942, he wrote to Hoover of the way in which the latter's America's First Crusade had brought back "the complete shamelessness with which the Allies went after our money".

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35 Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 69-71, 76-77, 79, 277.
If Taft was the most important political spokesman for the Nationalists, strong intellectual and political support came from the Republican Party's elder statesman, Herbert Hoover. Despite his seventy years, Hoover showed no inclination to quiet retirement, and in fact after Roosevelt's death, he was to come to play a more important part in public life than he had done since his election defeat in 1932. He was sent on missions abroad by President Truman, served as chairman of the Commission on the Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government, and handed out a stream of not always unsolicited advice to Republican Congressmen. Although still a controversial figure because of his public image in the Depression, Hoover was ceaselessly defended by a number of loyal friends who shared his sensitivity to what they regarded as the endless surges on his name. Dewey in particular was to incur the 

37 There is as yet no scholarly study of Herbert Hoover's career, although there are a number of works of hagiography, e.g., Eugene Lyons, Herbert Hoover: A Biography (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1954). President Truman received some criticism for calling on Hoover's services; in 1947 one correspondent suggested that the problems of inflation might be connected with his reappearance on the national scene: "Had Herby been President another term Mhatatmi Gandi (sic) would have been the best dressed man in our country". Howard N. Norton to Harry S. Truman, September 12th, 1947, O.F. 315, Truman MSS., Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. Truman himself reportedly told David Lilienthal, head of the Atomic Energy Commission, that Hoover didn't understand what had "happened in the world since McKinley: and that"he was to the right of Louis the Fourteenth" but he also gave him credit for his work for the Administration on food problems overseas. David E. Lilienthal, Journals; Volume II: The Atomic Energy Years 1945-50 (New York: Harper, 1964), p. 564.
hostility of Hoover's friends for the way in which he made no secret of his desire to have nothing to do with Hoover. It is indeed extremely ironic that the man who, in the aftermath of World War I, had seemed to symbolize all that was modern and enlightened in the United States, should within two decades come to be seen as an unreconstructed reactionary. The "liberal" and "internationalist" of the 1920's who, as late as 1932, had been accused by Franklin Roosevelt of being more concerned about the starving overseas than those out of work at home, was firmly fixed by World War II as an "isolationist" in the public mind. The changes in perception were not the result of Hoover's own vagaries, for his whole career was one of intellectual consistency to the point of rigidity.

Ideologically, Hoover was, like Taft, a classical liberal. His dimensions were "international" in the sense that he believed in the superiority of liberal ideals, and wanted to see them spread throughout the world; but his experiences at Versailles in particular had intensified his belief in the superiority of the American way of life, and had convinced him that the gap between the Old and New Worlds was so great, that there was little chance for the United States to bring about a new, liberal order in Europe. This did not mean that he felt that the United States...
States should not try to promote change in the world, and in particular to oppose collectivism and bolshevism and to try to promote peace, but it did mean that at all costs the United States should avoid getting drawn into another European war. Sharing with Taft the view that the United States was secure from invasion, he opposed the notion of another crusade, or recurrent crusades, to make Europe a better place.

Given these beliefs, Hoover could not accept that involvement against Hitler was necessary for American security; neither could he accept the conclusion that the solution for the future was purely the revival of an International Organization with collective force to keep the peace; and finally, neither could he accept the notion that the United States, by retreating into "isolation", was primarily to blame for World War II. To the contrary, he argued that the real responsibility for the failure of the League and for World War II, lay in the failure of liberalism and representative government on the continent, and the rise of illiberal forces such as bolshevism and fascism. He was extremely critical also of France, both at Versailles and after, for in his view having called into being the forces which took over Germany and threatened the whole of European civilization. In Hoover's view, modern

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history was composed of a struggle between slavery and freedom: liberty had been on the ascendancy after the American Revolution, but had been on the wane since World War I. Hoover was not prepared to allow the trend to continue, but like Taft he was concerned that they should not use methods to defend liberty which in his view would themselves be destructive of liberalism as he understood it.

Hoover's view of the past was an integral part of his foreign policy thinking. In his view, the United States had in the inter-war years, and especially under Republican leadership, played a constructive role in international affairs: it had helped to build representative government in Germany, especially in taking the lead in the Dawes and Young Plans, and the Hoover Moratorium and Standstill agreement; it had pursued policies of disarmament through international cooperation, and had provided moral leadership through the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Stimson Doctrine; finally, in Latin America, it had shown by example the way towards wider international cooperation. Hoover then saw the foreign policy of the 1920's as basically sound, he saw the United States also as the strongest power and as invulnerable to attack, and he was opposed from conviction and experience to war except in cases of a threat.
to vital American interests. In addition, he was concerned about the damage, as he saw it, which the New Deal and World War II had already done to American individualism, and was impatient with the "amateurs" who were arguing for a radical re-appraisal of American foreign policy: in his view, they were innocents by comparison with the Old World politicians. A man of considerable intellectual arrogance, Hoover stood out amidst the utopianism of World War II, for his gloomy view of the future of the United States and western civilization; he could take no comfort from a climate of opinion which encouraged the formulation of grandiose international schemes which in his view were based on ignorance of the external realities, and were dangerous to the United States, the one bastion of liberty left in the world.

The Nationalist position, as exemplified by Robert Taft and Herbert Hoover, shared with the Internationalist position the assumption that the American political-economic system was of universal applicability. It differed, however, in its rejection of the concept of the indivisibility of liberty, and in its acceptance of the alternative assumption that the United States was free from major danger from overseas, and that the major danger to the survival of liberty came in the United States itself. Although this position had been discredited since Pearl Harbor, its proponents

44 Robert E. Osgood described this as "Conservative isolationism" and linked it to the concept of "Fortress America" in the period before Pearl Harbor, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1953), pp. 377-8, 380.
could not be ignored, certainly not by those concerned with developing a Republican foreign policy. The Nationalists' fears about the domestic implications of foreign policy, their unwillingness to consider the use of force as a prime instrument of American policy in Europe and Asia, were to be important domestic factors encountered by American policy-makers in the post-war years. Ultimately the Nationalists could not influence American policy to their liking, but they represented a continuous challenge to American leaders to show "what is in it for the United States" and to base policy on a clear conception of national interest.

The Internationalist Challenge.

The most forceful spokesman for the Internationalist position within the Republican Party was Wendell Willkie. Willkie's surprise nomination in 1940 had never been welcomed by the Party's Old Guard, and his independence of mind as well as his identification with the Administration during the war, completed his isolation from them. Willkie's vigorous support of lend-lease in 1941 marked the beginning of his estrangement from the Party of which he was the "titular" leader; thereafter, he devoted his energies to winning Republicans over to his view of America's world role, and to opposition to any suggestion that the Republican Party should try to reap partisan reward from the anticipated post-war disillusion. Within the ranks of Re-

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publican Congressmen, Willkie had few influential supporters, and his attempts at foreign policy leadership were consistently opposed by Robert Taft. Despite this, the Republican Internationalists made up what they lacked in numbers by a greater volume of publicity. On their side was the almost irresistible feeling that they represented the wave of the future, whilst men like Taft and Hoover seemed by comparison to be relics of a world that was fast disappearing.

Willkie's foreign policy ideas can most easily be demonstrated in relation to his book, *One World*, which gives important insight into the idealistic internationalism of the war years, of which Willkie was the best known spokesman. Largely an account of Willkie's travels in the Middle East, the Soviet Union and China, the central thesis of the book was, as the title suggests, that of interdependence and the necessity for the United States to provide dynamic leadership to help create a truly liberal world. Seeing American "withdrawal from world affairs" as at least a contributory factor both to inter-war economic instability and to the onset of World War II, and arguing that even America's "relative geographical isolation" had been rendered obsolete by air transport, Willkie presented three alternative courses of action: i) narrow nationalism; ii) international imperialism; iii) the creation of a world in which there should be equality of opportunity for every

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47As an indication of its popularity, 1-1/2 million copies were sold between April and August 1943., Barnard, p. 412.
race and nation. Convinced that Americans would choose the latter course, Willkie argued the need for immediate planning, on a global scale, for the extension of political and economic freedom, and for the United States to commit itself in guaranteeing such a world order.48

Although Willkie was certainly aware of the imperfections of the American political and economic system, he was nevertheless convinced of the fundamental soundness of the philosophy on which it was based, and especially convinced that the existence of a large free trade area had been crucial to American progress. His travels demonstrated to him the inevitability of change in the world, especially the non-European world, and he wished to use the great reservoir of goodwill which he found to influence this development along American lines. The creation of a world based on political and economic freedom would, he was certain, bring about greater prosperity, and ultimately world peace.49 Willkie's philosophy then was one of perfect liberalism; its imperfections at home did not lead him in any way to question the society's philosophical roots, whilst his experience of collectivism overseas in the Soviet Union did not apparently cause him great concern. For Willkie certainly, liberalism was the wave of the future, provided the people of the United States recognized their responsibility and opportunity. For, he warned, narrow nationalism would inevitably mean the ultimate loss of

49 Ibid., pp. 16-18, 167-9; see chapter 13, "Our Imperialisms at Home" for his acknowledgement of domestic flaws in application of the philosophy of freedom.
American freedom. There could be no peace in any part of the world unless there was a secure peace in all the world. Even the American standard of living could not be maintained unless the exchange of goods flowed more freely throughout the world. The importance of Willkie's liberalism for his foreign policy ideas lay in his conviction that freedom was not and could not be maintained in one country or geographical area: freedom in his view was indivisible. On his grave in Rushville, Indiana, the following words were inscribed: "There are no distant points in the world any longer—our thinking in the future must be world wide. . . Freedom is an indivisible word—we must be prepared to extend it to every one. . . Only the productive are strong, only the strong are free. It is inescapably true that to raise the standard of living of any man anywhere in the world is to raise the standard of living by some slight degree of every man everywhere in the world."

The idea of the indivisibility of freedom, and acceptance of its full implications for foreign policy, was the essential feature of the Internationalist position, or the "One World" position, as its opponents occasionally referred to it. Because of this premise, the Internationalists often, to the unconverted, seemed to be putting too much emphasis on American responsibilities, both for past failure and future performance. In response to such doubts, the Inter-
nationalists sought to hammer home that they too were concerned about American interests, but their perception of them was different. Thus, fellow Internationalist Harold Stassen argued that "Throughout the world we must constantly emphasize basic human rights more than American rights... if we follow such a broad policy...it will not result in our impoverishment - it will not result in our own weakness. In fact we shall thrive and grow and be happier under the challenge of this course. We shall find that after the decade goes by we have a healthier economy. We shall find that we have access to more raw materials and greater markets than we otherwise would. We shall find that we have a greater measure of good-will throughout the world; that we have more jobs at home; that we are at peace." 52 One of Willkie's greatest admirers and supporters put it even more succinctly. "One World," he wrote, meant that the United States had a vital interest in peace, "because war anywhere in the world means war for us. It applies economically because depression anywhere in the world means eventual depression here. And it applies politically because the maintenance of freedom here requires its maintenance elsewhere." 53

A key proponent of Republican Internationalism was the proprietor of the Time publishing empire, Henry Luce. Luce

52 *New York Times*, November 9th, 1945.
was himself an influential figure in eastern Republican circles, whilst his wife, Clare Boothe Luce, was a Republican Congresswoman from Connecticut (1943-1947). Both Luces had been very much in favour of American support for the allies before Pearl Harbor. Both had also given support for Willkie's candidacy in 1940, and Henry Luce gave the editor of *Fortune*, Russell Davenport, leave of absence to help Willkie's campaign. Luce's *The American Century* (1941) pre-dated Willkie's book, and revealed certain differences of emphasis: Luce, for example, put forward a more explicitly American programme of "internationalism" than Willkie did in 1943; to Luce and his wife, Willkie came to seem rather utopian, especially because of his friendly attitude to the Soviet Union. Despite their differences, however, the published writings of Luce and Willkie were in basic agreement. To Luce, writing in 1941, it was essential that the United States face up to the fact that it was the most powerful and "vital" nation in the world, and that it also dispel the notion that it could make democracy work on a purely national basis.

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54 Westerfield, p. 261-2.  
56 Shadegg, pp. 116-18.  
57 Ibid., p. 193.  
Whilst attacking the Republican Party for its "isolationism," Luce was also critical of Franklin Roosevelt, who he believed had been more of an "isolationist" than Hoover during the first seven years of the New Deal. Luce regretted the fact that the United States had in 1919 bungled its first chance of world leadership, and he wanted to make sure that this time it took the initiative in defining war aims and that it recognized the fundamental indivisibility of the world. Luce wanted an Internationalism which was based on the recognition of the inter-relation between freedom, prosperity and American leadership. In his view, American Internationalism already existed in 1941 in terms of jazz, films, slangs, technology; America was already the intellectual, scientific and artistic capital of the world, he argued, and this, combined with its ideology and the prestige it already enjoyed gave it a unique opportunity to make the next 100 years an "American Century".

Despite its imperialistic overtones, Luce's tract must be seen against the background of 1941; it represented Luce's attempt to appeal to the ideals, the self-interest and the tradition of the American people in the great debate over America's relation to the Second World War. The kind of "internationalism" he wanted, he said, was "a sharing with all peoples of our Bill of Rights, our Declaration

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59 Ibid., pp. 17-20, 26, 29-30.
60 Ibid., pp. 29-31, 33-4.
of Independence, our Constitution, our magnificent industrial products, our technical skills".\(^{61}\) Invoking the American tradition which he identified with "a love of freedom, a feeling for the equality of opportunity, a tradition of self-reliance and independence and also of cooperation", Luce also saw the United States as "the inheritors of all the great principles of Western Civilization - above all Justice, the love of Truth the ideal of Charity". He disputed, however, Herbert Hoover's concept of the United States as a sanctuary of civilization: "For the moment", he commented, "it may be enough to be the sanctuary of these ideals. But not for long." Invoking a sense of destiny and mission, Luce saw it as the time for the United States to uplift the world, not only for the sake of the world, but for its own sake: "Other nations can survive simply because they have endured so long... But this nation, conceived in adventure and dedicated to the progress of man - this nation cannot truly endure unless there courses through its veins from Maine to California the blood of purpose and enterprise and high resolve."\(^{62}\) More even than that, whilst admitting the validity of the conservatives' fear that involvement in war would lead to the end of the American constitutional system, and would threaten the development of collectivism, bureaucracy and national bankruptcy, Luce saw the United States as having no alternative simply because of his basic assumption of the indivisibility of freedom. Ultimately, he did not believe that a free eco-

\(^{61}\)Ibid., pp. 32-3.
\(^{62}\)Ibid., pp. 38-40.
onomic system, or a liberal democracy, could prevail in the United States unless it prevailed elsewhere; but by contrast, "The vision of America as the principal guarantor of the freedom of the seas, the vision of America as the dynamic leader of world trade, has within it the possibilities of such enormous human progress as to stagger the imagination." 63

One World and The American Century were written at different times for different purposes. Luce's concern was to galvanize opinion in favour of an interventionist approach to the War in which America was still not involved; Willkie's concern was more with the post-war world and especially with his worry that the major powers would fall out and fail to apply a lasting peace, as had been the case in World War I. Similarly, Willkie's Internationalism veered towards the utopian, which was much more in vogue in 1943 than it had been in 1941, whilst Luce's Internationalism was, as the title of his book implied, an American programme. Despite this, however, both books and both men shared i) the belief that the conduct of American foreign policy had been insufficiently vigorous and too insular in the past; ii) the conviction that the United States must play a different role in the future, commensurate with the power and prestige, and the opportunities which presented themselves; iii) the conviction that "freedom" was "indivisible", and that the American political-

63 Ibid., pp. 13-14, 36.
economy depended for its success, and ultimate survival, on a truly free world. The co-relationship between these three beliefs represented the basic intellectual challenge of the Internationalists to the Republican Party. In some respects the beliefs of the Internationalists could be reconciled with those of the Nationalists, and this was especially true of Henry Luce's ideas; but the over-all approach of the Internationalists represented a fundamental challenge to the more traditional approach of the Nationalists. The job of Republican leaders was to try to find a consensus which embraced both.

The Centre Group and the Republican Tradition

For the period 1944-1949, three major figures stand out as dominant Republican leaders: Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, John Foster Dulles of New York, and Governor Thomas Dewey of New York.

Arthur Vandenberg, the oldest of the three, aged 60 in 1944, supplied the vital link with the midwestern-dominated congressional party. A former small-town newspaper editor from Michigan, Vandenberg's whole career had been unremarkably and unashamedly small-town American. Vandenberg had, after his election to the Senate in 1928, attracted attention as a member of the Nye committee, and was regarded as the leading "isolationist" candidate for the Republican nomination in 1940. By the end of the war, he was the

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dominant Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, though in seniority ranking below two aged members of his party. Nothing in his past career, however, suggested that he would become a prominent international figure in the post-war years. Apparently nearing the end of an undistinguished Senate career, there was talk of opposition to him in the Republican primary in 1946, but in retrospect it can be seen that he was being imperceptibly drawn into the centre of events. In 1943, he had steered the party through the Mackinac Conference, in 1944 he was to continue his role of party broker, in which capacity he came into contact with John Foster Dulles, foreign affairs adviser to Thomas Dewey. Vandenberg's developing relationship with Dulles, whom he previously considered to be an "internationalist", just as he was himself considered an "isolationist", undoubtedly appealed to Vandenberg's vanity. A loner in the Senate, his relationship with Dulles could only enhance his respectability as a former anti-interventionist (so was Dulles, but fewer remembered) and his claim to expertise in foreign affairs; for his part, his knowledge of the workings of the Senate and his midwestern credentials made him a prized political ally.

65 Vandenberg's vanity has been verified from a number of sources, e.g., Westerfield, pp. 270-1; Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 341.

66 Vandenberg's closest friend in the Senate was probably the conservative Millikin of Colorado, who was also a friend of Taft's. Taft and Vandenberg were not close, especially in later years, when Vandenberg began to draw closer to two up and coming Senators, Knowland of California and Lodge of Massachusetts. "Taft III - His Mind and His Methods", January 9th, 1947; Report, April 30th, 1947, Frank McNaughton MSS., Truman Library; Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 232-3.
John Foster Dulles had by 1944 acquired a great deal of diplomatic experience, stretching back to the 1907 Hague Peace Conference when he had served as official secretary to the Chinese delegation. Like Hoover and the friend of his youth, Robert Taft, Dulles had attended the Versailles conference, where he had been chiefly involved in questions concerning reparations. In the inter-war years, he divided his time between law, international finance and diplomacy, and he represented the United States at the Berlin discussions on the German debts in 1934. In 1939 he published a major study on international relations, War, Peace and Chance. At the same time, Dulles also began to attain prominence as a Presbyterian layman, and during World War II served as chairman of the Federal Council of Churches' Committee to Study the Bases for a Just and Durable Peace. By 1944, as a result of his relationship with Thomas Dewey, Dulles had begun to enter the political phase of his career. A Republican by heritage, his friendships and his voting habits had in the past been bipartisan, but his association with the rise of Thomas Dewey fixed him firmly as a Republican. For the rest of his life, an important element in his foreign policy leadership was to be his perception of domestic political realities, and in particular his perception of and relationship with Republican leaders on Capitol Hill. For, the need to be pragmatic in regard to domestic

57 Dulles once proposed to the girl who later became Mrs. Taft, Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 60.
68 There are two recently published studies of Dulles which supplant all earlier works; Michael A. Guhin, John Foster Dulles: a statesman and his times (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little Crown, 1973).
politics was a "lesson" which Dulles drew from the experience of Woodrow Wilson, a man for whom, like Vandenberg and Hoover, he had some regard. This historical "lesson" seems crucial to an understanding of Dulles' career: as one of his biographers has pointed out, his foreign policy views were similar to George E. Kennan, often regarded as the doyen of the "Realist" school of foreign policy theorists. Kennan, however, as a career diplomat, had scant respect for domestic politicians such as Vandenberg, and found himself increasingly at odds with the direction of American policy. Dulles, on the other hand, was prepared to enter the political fray from 1944, and even more from 1949, as a fully fledged partisan; his association with domestic politics was to bring about noticeable changes in his approach to foreign policy.

Dulles' relationship with Thomas Dewey is important to an understanding of his role in the 1940's. From the time in 1937 when they first met, the two developed an exceptionally close relationship; Dulles was one of the small number of advisers who planned Dewey's unsuccessful campaign for the Republican nomination in 1940, and he was at the centre of Dewey's later campaigns for the Presidency as his chief foreign policy adviser. There seems little doubt that so far as foreign policy was concerned, Dulles was the dominant influence in the relationship. Although Dewey

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69 Guhin, pp. 33-4; Hoopes, p. 32.
70 Guhin, pp. 156-8.
72 Transcript, interview with Thomas E. Dewey, pp. 1-2, 4-5, Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton.

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always relied upon group discussion amongst his political advisers before committing himself to any position, he undoubtedly deferred to Dulles in foreign affairs; in later years he was unable to remember any instances of disagreement.  

One of Dewey's advisers has commented regarding the Dulles-Dewey relationship and foreign policy formulation, that "it would be difficult to conceive a situation in which he would take a position diametrically opposed to something that Foster believed in". This is not to say, as some of Dewey's enemies in the Republican Party inferred, that Dewey was a man completely lacking in his own views or convictions. Nevertheless, one not unfriendly writer has concluded that "in the field of foreign policy... Dewey revealed the extent of his political pragmatism". Dulles himself was reported to have told Vandenberg in 1948 that Dewey was "a man who acquires convictions and principles by experience... but he is also a man whose experience has fundamentally been pretty limited". Hugh Gibson, a friend of Herbert Hoover and a neighbour of Dewey's in Pawling, the New York community where Dewey farmed, found during 1944 that the Dewey entourage was very sensitive about the general assumption that Dulles was the dominant influence. This sensitivity, which was a

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73 Ibid., pp. 28-32.  
74 Transcript, interview with Elliot V. Bell, p. 24, Dulles (Oral).  
75 Taft and Willkie shared this view, see Barnard, pp. 329-36; Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 270-2, 378.  
78 Hugh Gibson to Hoover, August 17th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
feature of Dewey's relationship with the press, as well as with later historians, makes it difficult to arrive at a definitive judgement. From what evidence is available, however, it would appear that Dewey's importance was not as a foreign policy formulator, but as an effective vote-winner, and as the head of the most efficient political organization in the Republican Party. Despite the undoubted personal closeness of the Dulles-Dewey relationship, Dewey's importance to Dulles derived from his political expertise; arguably the relationship was mutually beneficial, and both men learnt from each other. 79

In terms of the actual development of foreign policy ideas then, the principal leaders were Dulles and Vandenberg; to them fell the major job of bridging the gap between Eastern and Midwestern Republicans, and of bringing to an end the internecine warfare symbolized by the conflict between Taft and Willkie. For an understanding of how and why they were able to do this, it is useful to analyze the development of their ideas in the context of what may be called "The Republican Tradition". To do so seems additionally appropriate since, as has already been emphasized in this study, perceptions of history and the formulation of foreign policy were inextricably bound together.

In a sense there was no such thing as a "Republican tradition" in foreign affairs, there was an American tradition. Historically, however, Republicans had always tended

79 As yet there is no biography of Dewey; his personal papers at Rochester, New York, are not yet available for general research.
to see themselves as the representatives of true Americanism, whilst the Democrats had been the representatives of southern rebellion, and more latterly, of the heterogeneous urban ethnic groups. At the same time, the Republicans had dominated American politics for most of the time since 1860 and, despite the unpleasant interlude since 1932, still tended to see themselves as the natural governing party. In short, Americanism and Republicanism were regarded as almost inter-changeable terms.

The key figures in the development of the tradition were Alexander Hamilton, Captain Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge, plus the dominant Republican of the inter-war years, Herbert Hoover. In the view of C. A. Beard, Secretary of Commerce Hoover (1921-1923) represented the high water-mark of the "Federalist-Whig-Republican" concept of American national interest. As Beard saw it, this concept was concerned with the vigorous expansion of markets, especially in Asia, a strong navy, and dominance of the western hemisphere. It was a concept which envisaged the United States spreading its economic and ideological influence over the world, whilst retaining to itself maximum (but not necessarily complete) freedom of action and independence. This tradition was, therefore, not incompatible with world leadership, but the emphasis of world


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leadership was seen in moral and economic terms, rather than in terms of external military and political commitments. Even the Rough Rider, Theodore Roosevelt, hesitated at the thought of fighting a land war against Japan in Asia for interests that he considered less than vital. On the other hand, Roosevelt despaired of Wilson's attitude to World War I; here he saw a clearer threat to American interests, and when war did come he saw it as being made necessary because Germany had murdered unarmed American citizens, not because the United States wished primarily to reform the world. The tradition then required, in the language of the 1940's, a policy which stood up for America, a policy which defended American interests and refused to compromise American principles, a policy in which the costs (moral and material) were carefully weighed against the objectives. Agreement on these fundamentals could not guarantee agreement on specifics; there could be no foolproof way of calculating national interest, nor of deciding the relative costs and merits of alternative actions. At the very least, however, Republican leaders had to be seen to be looking at foreign policy in these terms if they were to keep the support of the Party in Congress. Most congressional Republicans were ill-disposed to imperil what with Taft and Hoover they regarded as the last bastion.

of liberty in the world, unless they could be convinced that there was something in it for the United States.

Much of the secret of Arthur Vandenberg's success stemmed from the fact that he shared and understood the thought processes of midwestern Republicans. He was a fundamentalist, in Republican terms, a traditionalist and a Nationalist. In his younger days as a Michigan newspaper editor, Vandenberg had been a convinced imperialist, and an enthusiastic supporter of war once the United States was committed; he was even instrumental in keeping LaFollette from speaking in Grand Rapids against the war. As late as September 1918, he was a supporter of the League of Nations, given reservations protecting constitutional process, immigration policy, tariffs and the Monroe Doctrine.

To William Howard Taft, he wrote on September 18th, 1919: "As I see the situation, the great danger now is that persistent refusal on the part of President Wilson and those who follow him to agree to any reservation is so irritating to popular opinion that the first thing we know the pendulum will swing to the other extreme and we shall confront a situation which will produce complete rejection of the whole undertaking - a thing which I entirely and heartily agree would be a dire calamity." 83

In 1926, Vandenberg published The Trail of a Tradition, in which he revealed his adherence to Nationalism, as well as his admiration for Alexander Hamilton. In the book he

83 Tompkins, pp. 15-20, 22-4.
outlined how he felt Wilson had departed from the American tradition. Contrary to Wilson's rhetoric, he argued, with Theodore Roosevelt, that the United States did not fight to make the world safe for democracy: "There was one reason, and one reason only, why we made our declaration and took up the sword - and that one reason was the defense of violated American independence and the legitimate defense of American life and property thereunder. It is manifest that if these rights had not been ruthlessly and persistently violated, we would not have entered the war".  

He also argued that Wilson had departed from the American tradition when he gave way on matters of principle in order to secure his concept of international order, and when he did so without consultation with the Senate. Not only had he infringed upon the prerogatives of the Senate and departed from American principles of justice, he had also, against the advice of the Farewell Address tried to commit the United States to an entangling alliance.  

Approvingly Vandenberg quoted Henry Cabot Lodge: "The independence of the United States is not only more precious to ourselves, but to the world, than any single possession. . ." Like Roosevelt and Lodge, Vandenberg was not prepared to sacrifice

85 Ibid., pp. 374-5.
86 Ibid., p. 388.
national interests to collective security; Woodrow Wilson, on the other hand, had appeared not to recognize the possible conflict between the two. 87

The tradition which Vandenberg elaborated was, he said, a tradition of "intelligent, tenacious 'Nationalism', its implications and autonomies, as distinguished from emotional 'Internationalism' in all its threats, dilutions and impracticalities". 88 It was not a tradition of "Isolation", neither did it proscribe humanitarian enterprise, in certain circumstances "within our normal spheres of contiguity", as in the Spanish American war. 89 Neither did the tradition, in Vandenberg's view, exclude American action in Europe, although it had to be recognized that the American way of life and standards of government were totally different from Europe, and the Old World still had "a set of primary interests" distinct from those of the United States. 90 Still, he quoted Lodge again: "...Whenever the preservation of freedom and civilization and the overthrow of a menacing world conqueror summons us, we shall respond fully and nobly, as we did in 1917. He who doubts that we should do so has little faith in America. But let it be our own act, and not done reluctantly by the coercion of other nations, at the bidding or by the permission of other countries". 91

As a Senator from 1928, Vandenberg's views perhaps underwent some change. As a result of serving on the Nye Committee, he became convinced that World War I had been a monumental

87 Tompkins, p. 22.
88 Vandenberg, Trail of a Tradition, p. V.
89 Ibid., pp. V, 314.
90 Ibid., pp. XVII-XIX.
91 Ibid., p. 86.

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error for the United States; it seemed to him, as to many contemporaries, that the United States had become involved because it had failed to follow truly neutral policies. His disenchantment with Wilsonianism was now complete. In 1935 he visited Europe and became convinced that another war was on the way. He was in no doubt that this time the United States must avoid involvement. Like Taft and Hoover, his disenchantment with World War I had a marked impact on his conception of foreign policy; the main aim of policy now became the avoidance of war. If, however, Vandenberg now emphasized the non-entanglement side of the tradition at the expense of his earlier advocacy of a strong defense of American national rights, he still (with Taft and Hoover) believed in international cooperation, including membership of the World Court, given due reservations for American sovereignty. Three months before Pearl Harbor, although still "opposed to any sort of foreign entanglements" he favoured some "rational formula...underwritten by all the major powers of the World..."and preferred "to join in guaranteeing a just European peace than to join in a European war." On the face of it, John Foster Dulles had nothing in common with either Vandenberg or midwestern Republicanism. Yet Dulles' views on international affairs were too complex for him to be categorized simply as a Republican Internationalist, though in his work with the Federal Council of Churches he did veer towards utopianism at times during World War II. At the same time, it would be inaccurate...
to describe Dulles as a Nationalist: despite being an opponent of intervention in World War II, he refused to join the America First organization on the grounds that it was the product of exaggerated nationalism.\(^{96}\) Neither, despite his later reputation, was Dulles a moralist in the early years. His moralism was the result of his emergence as a national political figure; only from the early 1940's did the concepts of moral law, righteous faith, and spiritual and moral power, enter into his rhetoric.\(^{97}\) In fact, in the inter-war years, Dulles seems to have seen nationalism and moralism as two sides of the same coin.\(^{98}\)

Like Hoover and Taft, Dulles was disillusioned with the allies at Versailles, especially for their short-sighted and selfish attitude to reparations. He also became disillusioned in the 1920's with the United States for a policy too attuned to narrow self-interest: in particular, he was critical of the failure to join the League, of the attitude to the war debts, and of American policies on the tariff, monetary control and immigration. Seeing himself as a liberal, and disenchanted with what he regarded as the extreme conservatism of Harding and Coolidge, Dulles had in 1924 supported his friend John W. Davis, the Democratic nominee.\(^{99}\)

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\(^{96}\)Ibid., pp. 75-6.

\(^{97}\)Ibid., pp. 121-2; Guhin attributes the moralism to the need to rally domestic support for decisions, and to Dulles' fear that the United States might become a complacent status quo nation (pp. 1-4, 124-8).

\(^{98}\)His objectivity and emphasis on shared guilt made him seem insensitive to the rise of Hitler, Guhin, pp. 46-7; Hoopes, p. 47.

The central concept of Dulles' view of international relations was that of change. In his view the essence of international relations was the need to find some way of making it possible for change to take place in the international community, as in the nation, without physical conflict. In *War, Peace and Change*, he analyzed the principal schools of thought current at the time. The "isolationists" he felt, concluding that international conflict could not be controlled, wanted to restrict conflict by restricting all kinds of contact; the "internationalists", feeling that restrictions of contact were impossible, wanted to create some kind of world authority to remove conflict; the remainder accepted the present system, accepting the benefits of international contacts and accepting the burdens of what he called "the war system". Dulles saw himself as falling in none of the categories. "Isolationism" was an alternative he does not appear to have taken seriously, it was contrary to his liberal heritage and to his view of the American heritage; for Dulles an isolationist America was a contradiction in terms. But in the context of 1938-41, "isolationism" did not seem to him to be a bad path to follow. In 1939, he told the Foreign Policy Association: "I dislike isolation, but I prefer it to identification with a senseless repetition of the cyclical struggle between the dynamic

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and static forces of the world". He believed then that if the United States got involved it would be for the wrong reasons, it would not be able to extend the democracy and equality of opportunity which, on the international as the national scale, he saw as fundamental to peaceful, human progress. In March, 1939, he wrote, "...it seems to me best that we should concentrate upon keeping alive if we can, within our own borders, the flame of liberty".

As regards "internationalism", Dulles was always a pragmatist and a sceptic. In War, Peace and Change, he tentatively advocated a permanent agency constantly studying and making recommendations on international situations before crises developed; but such an agency he felt should be based on distinctive geographical areas: hemispheres, continents, or even smaller units. The notion of a world state he saw as utopian and totally impracticable. In the League of Nations, he had no hope whatever, seeing it as having, under French influence, become an alliance to maintain the status quo rather than an instrument of peaceful change. In this regard, he was regretful that Article 19 of the League Covenant, providing for reconsideration of treaties, had never functioned; had it done so it could have provided the flexibility which might have made peace-

101 Guhin, p. 45.
102 Speech of March 22nd, 1939, quoted by Edwin L. James in New York Times, September 3rd, 1944. Compare the following by Herbert Hoover in October, 1939: "Our greatest service to civilization is to put our house in order and maintain true liberty on this continent. For it may be that otherwise liberty will sink for centuries in the night of despair.

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ful change possible. Where Dulles could find some common ground with the internationalists was over the question of sovereignty. His major prescription for peace was the weakening of people's emotional dependence on the nation, which would prevent them seeing other nations as villains; the development of a spiritual ideal transcending nationalism would create greater international opportunities, and thereby lessen the frustrations which gave rise to war. To avoid war, then, he argued for the need for nations to give up certain elements of sovereignty, for a lessening of the paternalistic role of the state, and the creation of greater international opportunity. What he wanted was not the abolition of national boundaries, "but that safety valves be cut through the barriers of boundaries so that human energy will diffuse itself peacefully and not be suppressed and compressed within a rigid envelope until a bursting pressure is attained".

On the face of it, Dulles' mild "internationalist" ideas might seem to be irreconcilable with the Republican tradition. In 1940, he took the nation to task, for example, for being a status quo nation, trying to hold on to "the richest


and most productive area of the world. . . as our exclusive preserve". In 1941, he asserted that if the United States were to attempt to preserve the practice of self-centred sovereignty, it would and should succumb in the long run. 105 Against this, it must be remembered, however, that the Republican tradition was not one of narrow nationalism. Mahan, Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt were the Internationalists of their day, in so far as they advocated the expansion of American political, economic and ideological interest. Herbert Hoover's career and intellectual orientation was very much "internationalist" in the same sense. The tradition was entirely compatible with the quest for a liberal world order; where the exponents of the tradition had criticized Wilson was in sacrificing far too much freedom of action in return for obtaining far too little progress towards the liberal world order. 106

The contradictions between the Republican tradition and Dulles' ideas were in fact never very great. In a sense, as he appreciated full well, the idea of America and the triumph of American nationhood had always had international significance. Henry Cabot Lodge in opposing the League had referred to United States independence as being of supreme importance to the world. 107 Dulles was in agree-

105 Guhin, pp. 48, 77.
106 Both Hoover and Dulles had been critical of the conference at Versailles for having failed to counter what they regarded as the nationalism, militarism and plain selfishness of the European states, and for having allowed the League to become a defense for an outmoded and inherently unstable European state system., Dulles, "Problems of Peace", p. 152-4; War, Peace and Change, pp. 80-5; Hoover and Gibson, pp. 249-50.
107 See page 38 above.
ment with this axiom. In fact, an examination of Dulles' writings suggests that his view of world affairs was based on the desire to Americanize the globe, not in terms of old fashioned empire, but in terms of the dominance of American ideas.108

On the American continent, according to Dulles, the United States had shown how diverse peoples scattered over a large area could live in peace and relative prosperity. In his view, the Constitution was "a multilateral treaty" which had taken from the sovereign states the right to interfere with inter-state commerce, and to aggrandize themselves at the expense of others; from the American experience, he concluded, the Civil War notwithstanding, that peace did not require the abandonment of sovereignty, and that some international equivalent of the inter-state commerce clause would be sufficient to "diffuse" human energy and bring about a peaceful world.109 In some ways, he felt that Britain's experiences with the Dominions were instructive examples to the world of peaceful change, a fact which he suggested had something to do with the notion of common law in Britain and the United States. He argued that "peaceful and non-disturbing evolution could occur in the world as a whole if we had fewer treaties, and if those which we had were less permanent and more conducive to the develop-

108 In this respect he might seem close to Henry Luce, but Dulles combined his sense of mission with an enduring sensitivity to the dangers of empire and militarization, Guhin, pp. 107-8.
ment of a flexible body of international practice which might ultimately become so grounded in the mores of the world community as to attain the status of law.\(^{110}\)

Dulles' writings in the 1930's were written from the perspective of an objective student of international relations, seeking to deal with the problems posed by the challenge of the three "have-not" or "dynamic" nations, Germany, Italy, and Japan, who posed a threat to the status quo. They also reveal the impossibility of complete objectivity. They were in the classic liberal vein. Their spirit of reasonableness and gradualness might be expected to be more appealing to those who had more to lose from the holocaust which everybody foresaw. Dulles himself admitted as much. The existing "war system", he said, posed an ultimate threat to the survival of democracy and religion; it posed far less of a threat to the values of either fascism or communism.\(^{111}\) He was, therefore, looking for some system of peaceful change which would enable gradual changes to the status quo; he had no patience with those who thought solely in defence of the situation as it existed. To the Foreign Policy Association in 1939, he spoke deprecatingly of phrases such as "sanctity of treaties", "law and order", "resisting aggression", and "enforcing morality"; these, he said, "have always been the stock in trade of those who have vested interests which they wish to preserve against those in revolt against a rigid system."\(^{112}\)

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\(^{110}\) Dulles, War, Peace and Change, pp. 156-8.


\(^{112}\) Guhin, p. 45.
Dulles' aim then was an open, flexible world system, in which vigorous individuals and groups would have the opportunity to prosper. This meant the establishment of stable monetary exchange, the removal of trade barriers, the removal of immigration restrictions (although safeguards against cheap, contract labour were, he felt, necessary), enactment of the mandate and open door principles in colonial areas, and the opening up of resources to the "have-not" nations". On the use of sanctions to enforce international order, he was extremely sceptical, seeing sanctions as contrary to his aims of developing the exchange of goods, ideas and people. In 1939, he wrote to Hoover praising a recent proposal Hoover had made that the movement of food should be uninterrupted in war. Although the idea was not practical, he said, it had recognized that "one of the fundamental causes of nations reaching out for more territory and more areas of influence" was "the desire to free themselves from subservience to other nations which might be in a position to impose economic sanctions on them. As you will see, if you read my book, I feel that the threat or use of economic sanctions merely intensifies the efforts of certain powers to attain self-sufficiency. I feel a good deal concerned about the present administration's predilection toward economic sanctions."  

The concept of world order which Dulles envisaged

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114 John Foster Dulles to Hoover, January 3rd, 1939, Hoover MSS.
was very close indeed to that of Herbert Hoover; what was not clear was exactly what methods Dulles felt the United States should be prepared to employ to bring it about. Apparently entry into the war had already been ruled out. The confidential statement of an American foreign policy, which he prepared with his brother in September, 1940, did not make things much clearer. Calling for a foreign policy based on the principles expressed in the Federalist Papers, the statement lauded the Constitution as "an 'open-end' instrument under which peoples and areas might increasingly become so inter-connected as to prevent wars, improve their power of common defense and preserve a large measure of local autonomy." For 100 years, until the defeat of Taft's attempt at reciprocity with Canada, this had been the way the Constitution had worked, but since then the world had moved towards the system of national closed economies which the framers of the Constitution had "repudiated as inherently inconsistent with durable peace". The solution, however, was unclear; the statement argued that the Constitution was now too centralized to extend further but that policy should be based once more on the principles underlying it. These principles would have to be extended "to bring more and more of the world into a related area of common defense and of equal opportunity". But an element of caution was added: the United States must not take on commitments which made its own defense more burdensome.

extension must be based on geographical propinquity and natural economic ties. ¹¹⁶

The traditionalism of Dulles' thinking is clear. The desire for America to lead the way in the creation of a more liberal, inter-dependent world, was not incompatible with traditional reservations about freedom of action or the basic essentials of sovereignty. Dulles appeared to have little difficulty in speaking to the Old Guard in terms they could understand and identify with. To Hoover's suggestion that Dulles write a reply to Walter Lippmann's U.S. Foreign Policy, Dulles wrote of the impending speech he was going to deliver in the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, to inaugurate the Federal Council of Churches' Christian Mission on World Order: "The theme is a righteous America playing its part for world order in accordance with our historic strength."¹¹⁷ The fusion of mission and self-interest, of international cooperation and self-reliance, was perfect. Dulles seemed to be moving towards a reconciliation of nationalism and internationalism; by the 1940's whether in the Republican Party or in the Federal Council of Churches, he was a participant rather than an observer; both organizations required a degree of adaptation by him if he were to use them to attain the great goals he set for himself, the United States and mankind. Thus it was that he became identified as an Internationalist by many Nationalists, whilst many Internationalists were suspicious

¹¹⁶Ibid., pp. 4-5.
¹¹⁷John Foster Dulles to Hoover, October 5th, 1943, Hoover MSS.
of him. Like Willkie, Dulles was a "universalist" or a "One Worlde" in his ultimate visions, but his immediate foreign policy aims were more limited and pragmatic. To a friend in 1945 Dulles wrote that the aims of foreign policy were to secure the United States from attack, and to enrich American lives "materially and spiritually through trade, investment and travel abroad." To another correspondent who was worried by Vandenberg's great emphasis on self-interest as the basis of policy, he replied equivocally: "Certainly the American people, as individuals, have a tremendous interest in the welfare of other peoples and a desire to spare them suffering. Whether those in a trustee capacity as representatives of the American people, have a right to act other than in the national interest is an extremely difficult philosophical and juridical problem."

The dilemma in his own mind between universalism and narrower self-interest, Dulles seems to have resolved by his faith in moral leadership, which became part of his stock in trade by the 1940's: from the perspective of Republican politics, such leadership had the advantage of being a cheap way of advancing less than vital American interests and helping to save the World; it was also very traditional. On foreign aid, for example, Dulles felt that the United States must use it carefully to advance national interests, but he argued that it could do far more useful

118 To Willkie's widow, Dulles expressed his regret at Willkie's death in characteristic terms: "He was a great American. His personality made him outstanding and he devoted himself to great goals. He did much to bring to this nation a vision without which the people perish," Dulles telegram to Mrs. Willkie, October 8th, 1944, Dulles MSS.
119 Dulles to Ferdinand Mayer, February 28th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
120 Dulles to Emily G. Balch, February 8th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
things to help the world: "There is a severe limit to the material aid which our government ought to extend, and it is small in relation to the need. There is, however, no limit to the moral leadership which we could give, and that is equally needed. Our nation was designed to help others in that way".  

To his surprise, Arthur Vandenberg found it not at all difficult to establish a rapport, and ultimately a firm friendship with John Foster Dulles. Meeting for the first time in 1944, by January, 1945, Vandenberg was writing to Dulles in glowing, mutually congratulatory terms: "... it is the best example I know of that we must clear our minds of old 'labels' in searching for this common ground. You were supposed, out our way, to have been a so-called 'internationalist'. I was supposed, out your way, to be a so-called 'isolationist'. But after we had been together for half an hour in our initial discussion, we discovered that we believed in precisely the same theme".  

Despite the seemingly large differences of background, Vandenberg and Dulles had a great deal in common. Both had a profound respect for the Founding Fathers, especially for Alexander Hamilton, the hero of Vandenberg's book. Both saw the United States in liberal, expansionist terms. Both had a great deal of early respect for Woodrow Wilson. Both were

121 Draft of address to 50 Annual Congress of American Industry, December 7th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
122 Arthur H. Vandenberg to Dulles, January 4th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
opposed to intervention in World War II, although not to international cooperation, until Pearl Harbor removed the choice. Both in the war years determined that the United States must play a stronger role in world affairs, and both shared a common view of the world order it must seek: a world based on justice, self-determination, economic liberalism, but also a world in which the United States would not lose its sovereignty or freedom of action in any vital matter. Both also shared a desire to see a halt to the drift toward collectivism, not only in the world, but also in the United States, and looked to the Republican Party to be an instrument in this reversal. What is striking is the extent of common ground that both men also shared with Hoover and Taft. The differences between them were differences of emphases, not of fundamental principles.

American national interest, not abstract international idealism, was the basis of the Dulles-Vandenberg synthesis. Nationalism, of the enlightened sort, was implicit in the world order they envisaged. It would be illogical to insist on the application of self-determination in Asia, Europe and Africa, and deny its applicability to the United States. To Vandenberg a more vigorous foreign policy was necessary because he no longer believed that the United States could insulate itself from war, as he had hoped in the 1930's. To Dulles it was part of America's destiny and mission, whilst the world order of justice, freedom of movement and trade was clearly also in America's interests. The synthesis was intellectually satisfying:
by exerting moral leadership in the world, the United States would be asserting its independence and fulfilling its divine mission to create a better world; the creation of this better world would be in the interests not only of the rest of the World, but also the United States, spiritually, morally and economically, and it would keep it out of war. The latter point was important. Quite naturally, by the end of World War II everybody was looking to find a way of avoiding another war; the Republican consensus seemed to be that the United States could best contribute to this by doing what Woodrow Wilson had failed to do, that is to stand up for American principles, which if applied universally could be universally beneficial; the strength of the Nationalists eliminated certain means to being this situation about, including large scale economic aid, entangling alliances or the permanent commitment of troops to the Asian or European mainland. By comparison with these, a new League was uncontroversial, although such was the memory of Wilson, Lodge and Harding that it was seen as all-important in 1944-5.

In 1944-5, then, the tradition was not to be severely strained. Arthur Vandenberg, one of the foremost exponents of fundamental Republicanism was well satisfied. To Dewey in 1944, he wrote, "Reduced to the most elementary vernacular, I should say that my Republican Mid-West is perfectly willing to sanction 'international cooperation' just as long as it knows that we aren't going to 'haul down the flag' and that we aren't going to be international 'saps' in

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'giving America away'. But it demands this constant re­
assurance".123 Vandenberg was convinced that with Dulles he had found the formula. He remained a nationalist; but as "intelligent" nationalist and an "intelligent" inter­
nationalist were not very far apart.124 He was convinced that he spoke for the average American, who he felt was neither an "isolationist" or an "internationalist" but wanted a just post-war world, and was prepared to do his bit to get it. He was sure also, that the average American was "perfectly sure that no one is going to look out for us. . . unless we look out for ourselves".125 According to his formula, he said on the eve of the 1944 Convention, "We preserve America and we cooperate with a free world".126 In March, 1945, he expressed the view that Clare Boothe Luce's phrase, "America First Internationalism", best de­
cribed the views of the average American who had fought in the war.127 The soldiers who had fought in the war would be convinced, he said, arriving at San Francisco in April, 1945, that peace required collective security, and that it was in American interests to play its part, but this did not mean that they wanted to haul down the flag from the capital or ignore American interests in the pro­
cess.128

124 "In Booth Report, "Senator Vandenberg", April 19th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.
125 Tompkins, p. 192.
126 Chicago Tribune, June 24th, 1944.
127 Report, March 16th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.
The partnership between Vandenberg and Dulles was perfectly complementary. Vandenberg could provide the contacts with the midwestern dominated Congressional Party, as well as the constant reassurances which he felt the Midwest needed. For his part, Dulles could supply a diplomatic pedigree, contacts with the Northeastern Establishment and a general intellectual quality which was otherwise lacking. Their rapport was undoubtedly aided also by Dulles' pragmatism, as well as by the fact that, despite his reputation as an Internationalist, his thinking on foreign policy was compatible with what has been described as "The Republican Tradition". It is clear that in 1944, Dulles, despite his sense of mission, was not an Internationalist in the sense of believing in the indivisibility of freedom as a first principle on which American foreign policy must be based. It is true that he shared the desire of Willkie and the Internationalists to see the liberal world order established; but his vision was tempered by an emphasis on the maintenance of internal strength, both physical and moral. No more than Vandenberg could Dulles take the "One World" philosophy as an act of faith; his view of foreign policy, like Vandenberg's, was based on pragmatic and enlightened Nationalism. Both men then were ultimately prepared to reassure apprehensive Republican Congressmen that primary reliance would be placed on an independent strong America, and that, consistent with the "Republican tradition", international cooperation would be an adjunct, for the protection of less vital interests, and as a means to attain the liberal world order which all could share as
a final aim. Such reassurance, as Vandenberg well knew, was essential for those who wished to guide the Republican Party through a re-examination of the bases of American foreign policy.
CHAPTER TWO

1944, The Internationalist Challenge Contained: the emergence of consensus

"... only Willkie packs a wallop in both fists. Roosevelt's right arm is in a sling labeled 'domestic shortcomings'. In a sling too is the left arm of every Republican challenger except Willkie, and this sling is labeled 'no foreign policy'. -Governor Wills (Vermont), January 8th, 1944;

"Anyone who gratuitously raises so much as a doubt as to the unswerving determination of our party to build a great peace trifles with the truth and with his country's future." -Thomas E. Dewey, February 12th, 1944.

The 1944 presidential election provided the focus for the Republican Party's war-time deliberations on foreign policy. Unless Republicans could find a solution to their dilemma, then it was agreed on all sides that their hopes of securing electoral success in 1944 were non-existent. This problem apart, the political omens seemed very much in the Republicans' favour. The New Deal was clearly running out of steam, and even Franklin Roosevelt was reported to be losing the respect of many Democrats on Capitol Hill except as a vote getter whose popular appeal alone seemed able to offer the chance of victory in 1944.2 Asked what would happen to the Democrats in New England if Roosevelt were not re-nominated, a senior Massachusetts Congressman told the Time correspondent, "Now you can't quote me on this, but we wouldn't carry a damned state. ...and we'd carry

1 New York Times, January 9th, 1944; ibid., February 13th, 1944.
2 Report by Sidney Olson, January 19th, 1944, McNaughton MSS.
Opinion polls also suggested a political trend back to the Republican Party. Outside the South, the Republicans were placed in the lead in a February Gallup Poll. Later Gallup Polls indicated that the Republicans could win in November if the war was over, and if they could focus attention on post-war domestic problems rather than matters of world peace where they were at a disadvantage. In Washington itself, Republicans could draw further comfort from the fact that the Democratic membership in the House of Representatives was down to its lowest level since the beginning of the Roosevelt era. The prevailing view on Capitol Hill was that the Republicans were bound to carry Congress in 1944. In addition they could derive added comfort from the increasing dissatisfaction of the South within the heterogeneous Democratic coalition.

Whilst the political omens were good, the fact remained, however, that the Republican Party was known to be divided over the question of foreign policy. An added difficulty stemmed from the personality and tactics of their 1940 nominee, Wendell Willkie, who had from 1942 begun a vigorous campaign

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3 Report, March 29th, 1944, McNaughton MSS.
4 Norman D. Markowitz states in The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism 1941-1948 (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1973) that the "general trend toward the Republicans during the war was evident in the polls in the President's Secretary's File."
5 New York Times, February 26th, 1944.
6 New York Times, March 26th, 1944; April 23rd, 1944.
7 Ibid., February 6th, 1944. Report by Sidney Olson, January 22nd, 1944, McNaughton MSS.
8 Hoover to William E. Barrett, March 17th, 1943, Hoover MSS. For a different perspective on divisions within the Democratic Party, culminating in the rejection of the re-nomination of Henry Wallace as Vice-President in 1944, see Markowitz, pp. 92-93.
to win the Republican Party over to his Internationalist views, and to secure the 1944 nomination. By early 1944 Willkie's challenge had been virtually resisted, and the way was prepared for the emergence of a new set of leaders more prepared to compromise with the Nationalists than Willkie had been. The emergence of the 'Centre' group therefore needs to be seen against the background of the Nationalist reassertion both against Willkie and his ideas, which dated back at least to the National Committee Meeting at St. Louis in December 1942. At that meeting, the attempts of the National Committee to elect a successor as National Chairman to Joseph Martin brought the fierce hostility of the Old Guard towards Willkie out into the open. Although/resolved by a compromise choice, Harrison E. Spangler of Iowa, the failure of Willkie to get his own candidate elected, allied to his inability to get his own power base, or at the very least to prevent the election of Thomas Dewey as Governor of New York earlier in the year, can in retrospect be seen to have seriously undermined his chances of re-nomination.

The dislike which the Old Guard had for Willkie was not merely the reflection of an ideological split. Perhaps his real sin was his lack of deference to the established leaders, his unwillingness to compromise and conciliate. The rumours about him which abounded described him as anti-British (not in itself a sin among Republicans) and pro-communist, and

9Barnard, pp. 382-5; Joseph Martin, pp. 133-5.
above all as too close to Roosevelt. "He is the White House choice for Republican candidate", concluded one memo on him, "The future of the Republican Party lies with the Jeffersonian Democrats, and they will have none of Willkie." His foreign policy was dismissed as "One World" of love and kisses to Stalin, and Roosevelt's foreign policies. In 1944 one particularly wild allegation, based on an apparently forged letter from Harry Hopkins, suggested that he had a secret bipartisan alliance with Roosevelt. To the Chicago Tribune however, he represented simply the barefoot boy from Wall Street, the big business candidate for President, a midwesterner by birth only, and in reality a tool of eastern money interests. Herbert Hoover, was prominent in organizing opposition to Willkie, along with Alf Landon and former national chairman, John D. Hamilton. Harrison Spangler, the so called compromise choice as national chairman in December, 1942, was also involved, as was apparently his predecessor, Joseph Martin. The strategy of the anti-Willkie forces was not to focus on any particular candidate, but to encourage all potential candidates to go into the field to tie up delegates. To Raymond Buell, regarded as an eastern internationalist, Hoover spoke favourably of the candidacy of Thomas Dewey. At the same time, however, he was apparently using what influence he had in California to encourage Earl

13 Chicago Tribune, February 11th, 1944.
Warren, Governor of California, to enter the race. In June, 1943 he suggested that Warren make a broadcast address to Republican senators and congressmen on foreign affairs, which would enable him to give the "Pacific point of view" and to "show your comprehension of more than local issues". Not easily reassured by Alf Landon, who advised him against circulating a letter organizing opposition to Willkie, Hoover in July wrote to John D. Hamilton, "I don't like the Willkie situation". By the end of 1943 however, the Old Guard strategy was beginning to pay off. With Warren, although not considered a dependable ally, announcing his candidacy in California, added to Dewey's control of New York, Governor Bricker's candidacy in Ohio and other midwestern states, Dirksen's announced candidacy in Illinois, and the announcement that Pennsylvania would remain uninstructed, over a third of the votes at the 1944 Convention were already out of Willkie's control. "Despite all the clatter, Willkie is not making any substantial progress," wrote Hoover. In January 1944 Hoover was writing to another friend asking him to check a "weird story" that Willkie's supporters, "despairing of getting anywhere", were trying to make a deal with Bricker in return for a promise that Willkie would be made Secretary of State. By the early New Year, however, it seemed certain that Willkie's chances of getting the nomina-

16 Hoover to Earl Warren, June 7th, 1943, Hoover MSS.
17 Alfred Landon to Hoover, June 8th, 1943, Hoover MSS; Hoover to John D. Hamilton, July 26th, 1943, Wendell L. Willkie folder, Hoover MSS.
18 Barnard, pp. 442-3.
19 Hoover to Ben S. Allen, October 30th, 1943; Hoover to Paul C. Clapp, January 5th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
tion were extremely slim. On 1st January he announced his decision not to enter the California primary, which, after his exclusion from New York, removed the last major state from his possible control.\(^{20}\)

Whilst party leaders were moving to exclude Willkie, so the opinion polls also suggested that he was losing popularity. In March 1943, at the height of his popularity, 69% of Republican voters were favourable to his nomination. By January 1944 only 23% favoured his nomination as compared with 42% for Dewey.\(^{21}\) All the signs were then that Dewey would get the nomination. The National Committee meeting in January reportedly reflected pro-Dewey and even pro-Bricker sentiment over Willkie.\(^{22}\) Possibly a sign of desperation in the Willkie ranks was reflected by a public attack in January by Governor Wills of Vermont on Landon, Hamilton, Pew, Nye, Gerald L. K. Smith and the McCormick-Patterson axis for their destructiveness.\(^{23}\) Willkie for his part remained determined to fight on. He refuted vehemently the suggestion that the Chicago Tribune would influence the Convention since it was to be held on its home ground: not even "a taint" of such influence, he said, should be allowed in the Party's platform or candidate.\(^{24}\) In February he campaigned in 12 western states, making clear his commitment to international organization (over which he said he had

\(^{20}\)New York Herald Tribune, January 24th, 1944.

\(^{21}\)Barnard, pp. 422-3, 443.

\(^{22}\)O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, January 15th, 1944, O'Laughlin MSS, New York Times, January 1st, 1944; January 11th, 1944; January 13th, 1944.


\(^{24}\)New York Times, January 8th, 1944.
left the Democratic Party) and expressing his dislike of the
governmental methods pursued by Roosevelt.  But in reality
he was making little progress. In March Herbert Hoover
wrote to Landon, "We are having a curious development over
the Convention situation. That is, probably six hundred
deleagtes or more are going there pledged anti-Willkie. As
far as I can recollect we have never had a convention where
the major split was anti some particular person".  

The showdown with the Old Guard, which Willkie consis­
tently sought, appeared to be in the offing in the Wisconsin
Primary; that he sought to bring matters to a head in un-
favourable territory was in many ways typical. But even in
Wisconsin the issues were to be blurred. Faced with candi­
dates pledged to Thomas Dewey and General MacArthur, Willkie
was exceedingly upset by the entrance into the contest of
candidates pledged to Harold Stassen, with whom relations
had been poor for over a year, and whose supporters had ar­
gued that Willkie was no longer a serious contender.  

Given the proliferation of candidates, that none of them but Willkie
appeared in Wisconsin, and that Dewey even tried to get his
to withdraw, Willkie's effort to make the election a test
of the "isolationist" issue was bound to be difficult.  

Willkie tried to exploit the fact that Dewey's ticket in
Wisconsin was headed by a former member of America First,
and that Gerald K. Smith, the head of the America First Party,
was prepared to support Dewey (as well as either Bricker or

25Ibid., February 13th, 1944; February 23rd, 1944.
26Hoover to Alfred Landon, March 16th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
28Dewey was still officially not a candidate. New York
   Times, February 24th, 1944; February 26th, 1944.
MacArthur). Nobody with Smith's support could possibly be elected President of the United States, Willkie commented.\textsuperscript{29}

The essential theme of Willkie's campaign in Wisconsin was that the Republican Party had no hope of winning in 1944 if it turned its back on him, a move which if it happened he would see as being a sign of its disavowal of international cooperation. In the event, his defeat in Wisconsin caused him to withdraw immediately from the race; he was convinced that "isolationism" had won.\textsuperscript{30} Certainly Willkie's defeat was a blow to the "Internationalists" as a saddened Senator Austin of Vermont indicated in his comments after Willkie's withdrawal; but as Arthur Krock commented, in order to win, the Republicans could not afford to go against Willkie especially in the formulation of their foreign policy plank.\textsuperscript{31} If the Internationalists were disturbed by Willkie's defeat, his withdrawal caused some satisfaction among the Nationalists.\textsuperscript{32} Herbert Hoover, who undoubtedly derived great satisfaction from the event, denied that it was a victory for "Isolationism": "The Willkie people accused Dewey of wild internationalism for proposing a military alliance with Britain (for the attention of the vote of those of German descent); Stassen was the advocate of the most global of internationalism ever invented; MacArthur could not be called an isolationist in view of his present occupation".\textsuperscript{33} "The people just wrote that gentleman off as a phoney", he concluded.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., March 22nd, 1944. 
\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., April 6th, 1944. 
\textsuperscript{31}Johnson, p. 281; New York Times, April 4th, 1944. 
\textsuperscript{32}O'Laughlin to Hoover, April 8, 1944, O'Laughlin MSS. 
\textsuperscript{33}Hoover to Eugene Lyons, April 8th, 1944, Hoover MSS. 
\textsuperscript{34}Hoover to Cal O'Loughlin, April 10th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
As the Republican Party moved towards the inexorable nomination of Dewey, Willkie reserved his position as to whether he would support the nominee. His lack of respect for Dewey was no secret. In the Wisconsin Primary, he and his supporters had attacked Dewey as a "politically faceless candidate", and attacked the notion that a Republican could get elected without any discussion of the issues. Those who avoided discussion for fear of offending divergent groups were not master politicians, said Willkie, but were amateurs by contrast with the Democrats: "We had better get into a contest which we have some chance to win." Disturbed by Dewey's compromises with the Old Guard, Willkie saw similarities between Dewey and those elements in the Republican Party who in his view had been responsible for keeping the United States out of the League in 1919 and 1920; this he was determined should not happen again.

Parallel with and related to the movement to eliminate Willkie's influence and to unite the Republican Party for the 1944 election, was the effort at Mackinac in September 1943 to develop a distinctive Republican stance on foreign affairs. To forestall Willkie's supporters, and to unite the Party on more moderate ground, National Committee Chairman Harrison E. Spangler announced on May 31st, 1943 the formation of the Republican Postwar Advisory Council, a group consisting of the Party's 24 Governors, as well as 6 Senators, 13 members of the House of Representatives, and 6 National

35 New York Times, April 11th, 1944.
36 Ibid., March 19th, 1944; March 21st, 1944.

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Committee members. Spangler’s membership formula excluded all three living presidential nominees: Hoover, Landon and above all, Willkie. The fact that chairmanship of the all-important foreign policy committee at the Post-War Advisory Council’s conference at Mackinac was to be held by Arthur Vandenberg was a further blow to the Internationalists. Before the announcement of Mackinac, Vandenberg was already deeply involved in the question of post-war policy by virtue of his membership on the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, which had been appointed to deal with the Ball, Burton, Hatch, Hill resolution, a bipartisan Internationalist resolution strongly supported by Wendell Willkie and Harold Stassen.

Vandenberg’s experiences on the Foreign Relations Subcommittee helped to clarify his own approach to the question of post-war policy. He was “hunting for the middle ground between those extremists at one end of the line who would cheerfully give America away and those extremists at the other end of the line who would attempt a total isolation.”

To Vandenberg, Mackinac offered the opportunity to develop a distinctive Republican foreign policy founded on the bedrock of American nationalism. Not willing to “pre-commit America in respect to a peace which as yet is totally in the dark” and having “no sympathy whatever with our Republican Pollyannas who want to compete with Henry Wallace,” Vandenberg wanted to use Mackinac “to differentiate between Republican

38Report, February 1st, 1944, p. 6, McNaughton MSS; R. A. Divine, Second Chance, pp. 105-7.
40Ibid., p. 55.
and New Deal foreign policy by asserting . . . (1) that we shall remain a totally sovereign country . . . (2) that we shall make all of our own decisions for ourselves by constitutional process; and (3) that we intend to be faithful to American interests . . . We must beat the 4th Term. It is the "last roundup" for the American way of life. I do not believe we can beat it if we split the Party (and its Jeffersonian Democratic Allies) by going either to an isolationist extreme or to an internationalist extreme . . . "

Despite the exclusion of Willkie, the Mackinac conference was to prove a testing time for Vandenberg's skills of leadership and compromise. Senator Austin of Vermont, an Internationalist and a Willkie supporter, and Charles Eaton of New Jersey, ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, allied with a number of governors to force Vandenberg to hold open hearings. Austin even threatened to write a minority report unless Vandenberg agreed to include in the report some reference to post-war membership of an international organization. In the event Vandenberg made the necessary adjustment without sacrificing the essentials of his position. The reference to post-war international organization was left deliberately vague; Vandenberg would not go beyond "a post-war cooperative organization". He also insisted on retention of specific mention of the protection of American "sovereignty". Finally, the report expressed the hope that security and peace would be "ultimately established upon other sanctions than force". 

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41 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
42 Westerfield, pp. 152-3; Divine, Second Chance, p. 131; Tompkins, p. 211.

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The Mackinac conference was an important milestone in the development of Republican policy. Vandenberg himself was extremely proud of his labours, and convinced that the formula arrived at was sound.\(^43\) For the first, but not the last, time Vandenberg had displayed his skills as a party conciliator. Inevitably not all Republicans either at Mackinac or absent shared Vandenberg's euphoria: apart from the expected complaints from Willkie, there were reports that 19 of the Republican Governors were dissatisfied with it.\(^44\) Herbert Hoover also, whose publication with Hugh Gibson of *The Problems of Lasting Peace* in 1942, had renewed his influence in the Party and presented an alternative approach to that of Willkie and the Internationalists, was somewhat disappointed that the resolution he submitted to Mackinac was not considered.\(^45\) Hoover had wanted the Republican Party to accept his proposal of a transition period, in which the United States would be able to take a look at the kind of peace that emerged before committing itself to specific post-war structures, and before committing itself to a peace which, as in Hoover's view had happened in World War I, might within itself contain the seeds of further conflict.\(^46\) Told by Taft of the difficulties which Vandenberg had had in getting "Austin and his group" in line, and

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\(^{43}\) Vandenberg, *Private Papers*, pp. 59-60; Tompkins, p. 212.

\(^{44}\) Tompkins, p. 211-212.

\(^{45}\) For assessment of Hoover's influence related to his book, see "Notes on the State of the Nation" by R. L. Buell, p. 25, R. L. Buell file, Alexander Smith MSS. For text of Hoover's resolution(s) see Hoover to John W. Bricker, August 30th, 1943; Hoover to Bricker, August 31st, 1943. For his reactions, see Hoover to Robert A. Taft, September 25th, 1943, Hoover MSS.

\(^{46}\) The proposal reflected Hoover's criticism of the tendency to concentrate too much on International Organization; in his view the political, territorial, military, economic and ideological settlements which would follow the war were far more important. Hoover and Gibson, pp. 291.
securing "unity on a statement which asserted the continuing sovereignty of the United States", Hoover had by October come to see Mackinac as having strengthened the Party: "It demonstrated to the country, that we had leadership and cohesion in the Party". As I see it," Taft commented, "the plank excludes extreme isolation on one side and the Stassen international state on the other. Between those extremes the permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs is expected to work out a more detailed program for the Republican Convention of 1944." Mackinac then was important in securing Republican unity within certain loosely defined guidelines. The Internationalists had been conciliated, but the control of the Party by Willkie or Stassen had been effectively ruled out. In terms of Party leadership, Mackinac was crucial in that it assigned to Arthur Vandenberg a central role over the development of Republican foreign policy, one which he was to exercise until 1949. Mackinac also brought into the spotlight the Republican governors, who were frequently seen as representing the real hope for advancement in the post-war years.

Important among these was Thomas Dewey, who despite his official non-candidacy was already becoming the favourite for the 1944 nomination. Looked on kindly by both Landon and Hoover, Dewey caused a few palpitations by arriving late.

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47 Robert A. Taft to Hoover, September 23rd, 1943; Hoover to John W. Bricker, October 1st, 1943, Hoover MSS.
48 Robert A. Taft to Hoover, September 23rd, 1943, Hoover MSS.
49 See for example the editorial in the New York Herald Tribune, January 8th, 1944.
50 Barry K. Beyer, "Thomas E. Dewey, 1937-1947: A Study in Political Leadership" (PhD thesis, University of Rochester, 1962), argues that Dewey was in August receptive to Vandenberg's desire to nominate MacArthur, but that he came to see the argument that his own candidacy would prevent Willkie's and thereby avert a party split, (pp. 67-69).
at Mackinac and appearing to advance the idea that the United States should enter a post-war alliance with Britain, and perhaps also Russia and China. Both Herbert Hoover and Alfred Landon were somewhat concerned at this statement.

"I am sorry Dewey got off wrong on this line," wrote Hoover. "It was not helpful either to him or the country." To John Foster Dulles, Robert Taft confided that Dewey had not created a good impression at Mackinac, and that he felt that party leaders would prefer a candidate they would find easier to work with. Dulles, Dewey's foreign policy advisor, sought to reassure those whose confidence had been shaken. Dewey's statement, he wrote to a friend in Colorado, "did not reflect any well-thought-out conviction that we should for a long period of time make military commitments which would ... put our destiny in the hands of some other nation." It had simply reflected Dewey's goodwill for Britain when he had been "put on a rather difficult spot by the reporters."53

Like Vandenberg, Dulles was in 1943 emerging as something of a party broker. In April he had apparently met with Willkie, Stassen, John Bricker of Ohio and National Chairman Harrison Spangler. In September he had a further meeting

51 Beyer, p. 51; "Notes on the State of the Nation" by R. L. Buell, p. 25, R. L. Buell file, Alexander Smith MSS; McCoy, Landon, p. 497.
52 Hoover to Alfred Landon, September 20th, 1943; Alfred Landon to Hoover, September 15th, 1943, Hoover MSS.
53 Dulles to Mrs. Albert G. Simms, September 21st, 1943, Dulles MSS (Supplement). Dewey himself apparently also wrote to Mrs. Simms on the question, which suggests that he was concerned about the political consequences of his action, and also makes nonsense of his official non-candidacy; Dulles to Mrs. Albert G. Simms, October 20th, 1943, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
with Willkie, as well as with Taft and Hoover. Although maintaining his own non-involvement in politics on the basis of his church commitments, his correspondence reveals a clear commitment to the candidacy of Thomas Dewey and the Republican cause. Parrying Willkie's request that Dulles help him, Dulles found a large degree of common ground with Taft and Hoover. Hoover at least found the meeting with Dulles enjoyable; "sanity is rare", he wrote to him afterwards. In the climate of 1943, with Internationalist pressures for American commitment to post-war international organization finding expression in the Fulbright and Connally resolutions, Dulles found it relatively easy to talk the same kind of language as Hoover, Taft and Vandenberg. Prepared to make clear his opposition to concepts of a "world state", which struck fear into the middle western wing of the Republican Party, Dulles believed that the only policy was one of building "a cooperative relationship" between nations. If the Republican Party made its stand on international cooperation, thus avoiding the false issues of "isolation" versus "collaboration", wrote Dulles, it could also emphasize the complete impracticality of the "United States merging its identity into some supranational agency". By presenting the issue in this way, he suggested, "the Republican Party might get away from the tentacles of a false issue which had been imposed upon it by its political enemies and substitute an issue with respect to which its position, I am convinced, is the only practical

55 Hoover to John Foster Dulles, September 30th, 1943, Hoover MSS.
56 Dulles to H. Alexander Smith, August 10th, 1943, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
one, one which is thoroughly sound and as to which the over­whelmed majority of the American people would be in agree­ment."^7

Dulles' remarks reveal his political sensitivity to the difficulty which its foreign policy image presented to the Republican Party; they also reveal why he was, unlike Willkie, able to conciliate the Nationalists and to emerge as a consen­sus builder. In the months after Mackinac, however, Dulles was not to play a major role, except in an advisory capacity to Thomas Dewey. The principal job, that of helping to develop Republican unity prior to the formulation of its platform at Chicago, belonged to Arthur Vandenberg. Like Dulles, Vandenberg was very much aware of the way in which Republican foreign policy formulation was "complicated by the everlasting re­currence of the 'isolationist' theme" and of the need, therefore, to develop a foreign policy position which removed this poli­tical disadvantage. In his negotiations over the draft Republican Platform with Senator Austin, the leading Internationalist spokesman on the Mackinac Foreign Affairs Committee, Vandenberg opposed specific description of the nature of the world organization which the Republican Party was prepared to support. A master of the ambiguous phrase, Vandenberg insisted on in­clusion in the draft of a sentence committing the Republican

\[57\] Ibid.
\[58\] Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 55-6.
Party to "organized international cooperation" and proscribing "joining a world state". To Austin he explained the need to keep the midwestern wing of the Party content: "I want to go in this particular document far enough to clearly establish our good faith in respect to post-war international cooperation; but I want also to remember that this is primarily a political document which must win the approval of my great Middle Western country (as we did at Mackinac)."

Vandenberg was also in consultation with Dewey "as an important member of the Mackinac conference", although perhaps more plausibly as the likely presidential nominee. John Foster Dulles, whom Dewey consulted, warned Dewey against accepting Vandenberg's reference to a "just" treaty, which was, he felt, "designed to provide an alibi for not joining in organized international cooperation on the theory that this would tend to perpetuate 'injustice'". "That," said Dulles, "was very largely the Republican line in 1920. . . I think it very important to avoid getting this 'joker' into the platform." In addition Dulles and Elliott Bell recommended a number of other changes in the draft, including the deletion of specific material on international organization which had been put in at Austin's insistence. Vandenberg in reply sought to emphasize the degree of common ground between them, and he "emphatically" agreed with the comments

59 Memorandum attached to letter from Vandenberg to Warren Austin, May 8th, 1944, Vandenberg MSS.
60 Vandenberg to Warren Austin, May 8th, 1944, Vandenberg MSS.
61 Vandenberg to Thomas E. Dewey, May 10th, 1944, Vandenberg MSS; Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, May 16th, 1944, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
made by Dulles-Bell-Dewey suggesting "that we must maintain a strong United States at home in order to be effective abroad". Undoubtedly Vandenberg was surprised to receive such strong support for the bedrock of a strong America from New York. He did, however, express the hope that the platform should refer to the importance of an "effective" (rather than the previously suggested "enduring") peace. "I think it is important that we should thus emphasize the fact that not even a good League can survive a BAD peace."62

To Dewey as to Austin, Vandenberg wrote of the necessity of satisfying the Midwest: "... I should say that my Republican Mid-West is perfectly willing to sanction 'international cooperation' just as long as it knows that we aren't going to 'haul down the flag' and that we aren't going to be international 'saps' in 'giving America away'. But it demands this constant reassurance".63 To Governor Green of Illinois, however, he wrote reassuringly of the way in which Eastern Republicans had been prepared to compromise, regarding the draft platform as better from the Midwestern point of view than Mackinac. He had, he said, expected some trouble over his inclusion of the statement barring membership of a world state: "Personally, I think our viewpoint (yours and mind) (sic) is completely protected".64


63 A. H. Vandenberg to Thomas E. Dewey, May 22nd, 1944, Dulles MSS (Supplement).

64 Vandenberg to Governor Green of Illinois, May 26th, 1944; Vandenberg to Governor Green of Illinois, June 10th, 1944, Vandenberg MSS.
By the time of the Republican Convention in June, Vandenberg had secured wide agreement on the draft foreign policy plank to be presented to the Resolutions Committee. His consultations did not include Willkie, however. Despite press reports that Senator Austin was satisfied with the draft foreign policy plank, a number of Internationalists, including Governors Edge (New Jersey), Sewall (Maine), and Senator Ball (Minnesota) were suspicious. Edge announced his intention to oppose a "wishy-washy" foreign policy plank. Sewall asked the resolutions committee to express firmly a willingness to give up some sovereignty in order to achieve a worthwhile international organization. Senator Ball wanted Vandenberg's phrase, "and not by joining a world state", omitted from the platform. It was clear that the main stumbling block was the issue of commitment to international organization. The Internationalists wanted a commitment to American participation in post-war collective security. Governor Sewall told the foreign policy subcommittee that any declaration which closed the door on the possibility of policing the peace would be meaningless. The draft platform prepared by Vandenberg and Austin went no further than supporting "peace force", however. "What the devil is 'peace force'?" demanded Governor Edge. "If it is force, it's force and it's better to tell the public about it, and not kid them." Senator Vandenberg warned Edge that if he tried to take his fight to the Convention floor, he might well get the very kind of plank he most feared. Edge was unimpressed:

65 Vandenberg to Charles Eaton, May 26th, 1944; Vandenberg to Charles Eaton, June 10th, 1944; Vandenberg MSS.
67 Ibid., June 23rd, 1944.
68 Ibid., June 26th, 1944.
"Either we take the responsibility to maintain the peace, or we do not, and all this talk of 'peace force' is silly. We cannot escape a very leading position in world affairs. It is better to be a party to preventing war than a party to war with its mass murder, and I believe that the eastern coastal states feel that way about it. I'm sorry about the Midwest. But let's give our nominee a platform that the eastern and coastal states will be proud of".69

Although not at the Convention, Willkie added his criticism to those of Governor Edge. The platform was, he said, very like that of 1920, ambiguous, and capable of being used to prevent effective world cooperation.70 Meanwhile 16 Republican Governors feeling apparently that a Congressional dominated "oligarchy" had presumed to speak for its party, whilst they themselves had spearheaded the Republican resurgence since 1941, demanded a less ambiguous platform and in particular that it express an unequivocal commitment to international sanctions. Senator Taft, chairman of the Resolutions Committee, resisted their demand.71 In the event, the revolt blew over very quickly. Austin reassured the Internationalists. Edge decided not to take his fight to the Convention floor, having been reassured by Austin that "peace forces" included military force, if necessary, to keep the peace.72 So effective in fact were Austin's reassurances, that a number of Inter-

69Ibid., June 27th, 1944.
70Ibid., June 27th, 1944; McNaughton Report; "Overall convention", June 29th, 1944, pp. 6-7, McNaughton MSS.
71Ibid., June 27th, 1944; McNaughton Report; "Overall convention", June 29th, 1944, pp. 6-7, McNaughton MSS.
72New York Times, June 28th, 1944.
nationalists promptly disassociated themselves from Willkie's public criticisms of the platform.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, June 27th, 1944.}

The Republican platform agreed upon at Chicago was a victory for consensus politics. As at Mackinac, the Internationalist challenge had been contained; the Internationalists had to defer to the sensibilities of the Midwest as articulated by Vandenberg. The \textit{Chicago Tribune} in its editorial on the opening of the Convention had tried to set the mood: 

"... We see an egotism so great that it cannot be satisfied within a single continent, seeking to pledge the power of the American nation, in perpetuity, to the service of other nations without compunction and without regard for the interests of the American people whose sons and dollars must redeem those pledges." "This Convention must be sternly American. It is useless to attempt to appease the noisy, sectional minorities that would put America second."\footnote{\textit{Chicago Tribune}, June 26th, 1944.}

The platform and the speeches revealed a dual concern: on the one hand, Republicans were concerned that they should not be identified with opposition to the war and with obstructionism in foreign policy; on the other hand, they were concerned that the United States should not because of misplaced idealism neglect its own interests. Governor Green of Illinois, in welcoming the Convention, denied that there was any "win the war" party and suggested that military leaders would get less interference from Republicans; Earl Warren, in his keynote address listed the important contributions
which 'Republican states' were making to the war effort; 76% of the ships, 81% of all aircraft, and reiterated the importance, if the United States was to retain respect among the rest of the world, and "if we are to be able to keep our commitments and to compel recalcitrants to keep theirs" to "... keep America ever strong and self-reliant". 75

The most significant statement of Nationalism at the 1944 Convention came from Herbert Hoover, who, according to the New York Times brought an enthusiastic response from the audience when he commented that Nationalism was the motivating force behind Russian and British policy, and reiterated that when Republicans came to power they did not intend to liquidate the economic welfare or the independence of the United States. Pulling no punches in his attack on the Administration, Hoover also re-echoed a phrase often quoted by Vandenberg: "A good league can never cure a bad peace". He proposed again his idea of a transition period until the shape of the peace had emerged, as well as the view that under the proposed new international organization, primary responsibility for peace-keeping should devolve on regional councils. Anne O'Hare McCormick commented in the New York Times: "In Chicago it is plain that the undertow of nationalism is strong. Nothing appeals to this assembly of worried Americans so surely as even an oratorical promise to end the war quickly and get the boys home. But a promise to keep the boys from going to war again has even stronger political appeal". 76

Given the strength of Nationalist sentiment at the

75 New York Times, June 27th, 1944.
76 Ibid., June 28th, 1944.
Convention and in the Republican congressional party, it is clear that the Old Guard turned to Dewey for purely pragmatic reasons: he was better than Willkie, whom the Old Guard had worked ceaselessly to defeat, and he had shown his vote getting potential. At the same time, and vastly important, further struggle to agree on a nominee would have been fatal to chances of victory. Still, however, the Old Guard embraced Dewey with little enthusiasm. Both General MacArthur and Governor John Bricker evoked more excitement, but neither would have been acceptable to eastern Republicans. MacArthur would have been a popular choice among Congressmen, many of whom felt he was being starved of supplies by Roosevelt, who was following a misguided Europe first policy. Certainly MacArthur had a strange fascination for many Republicans both during and after the war: he was, recalled Joseph Martin, the most recognizably Republican of the war-time generals, a man who shared Republican beliefs and ideals. Amongst his best known supporters for the 1944 nomination, until the release of correspondence critical of the Administration in April effectively ended his chances, was Arthur Vandenberg. Despite the attractions of nominating MacArthur for what Clare Luce called: the "party of the Pacific", MacArthur's

77 For lack of enthusiasm for Dewey personally, see New York Times, June 18th, 1944. See also J. F. Dulles to Mrs. Albert G. Simms, September 21st, 1943, for account of talk with Taft regarding Dewey's lack of personal appeal, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
80 The best account of the attempt to draft MacArthur in 1944 is in Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 75-89.
chances were probably never very great, precisely because of the difficulty of waging an effective campaign for him without becoming involved in open denunciation of the Administration in war-time. At the National Committee meeting in January, by which time Dewey had emerged as the favourite candidate, there was little evidence of support for MacArthur's candidacy. After his withdrawal, at least one of his supporters still held out the hope that he might nevertheless be appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief, presumably to compensate for Dewey's inexperience and to provide a genuine Republican command.

The candidacy of John Bricker, although only half-heartedly supported by Robert Taft, who had no love for his Ohio colleague, was a more serious effort. Popular in the Midwest and among Republican Congressman, Bricker was continually encouraged and supplied with material by Herbert Hoover, and many of Hoover's foreign policy ideas appeared in the Bricker campaign. Bricker in fact developed in his campaign for the nomination the essence of the Nationalist position. America could, he said, cooperate with the rest of the world, "But not at the expense of her principles, her honor, her ideals or her form of government". America had never been

81 This was Vandenberg's assessment by the end of April, 1944, ibid., p. 85. One senior Democratic Congressman interpreted Vandenberg's advocacy of MacArthur as "a safe and popular thing to do, so he can maintain freedom of action in the convention". Report, March 29th, 1944, McNaughton MSS. For Clare Luce's description of the Republican Party in terms of its identification with the Pacific, see New York Times, January 8th, 1944.


83 O'Laughlin to General MacArthur, April 29th, 1944, O'Laughlin MSS.

84 Dulles detected the lack of enthusiasm which Taft had for Bricker, J. F. Dulles to Mrs. Albert G. Simms, September 21st, 1943, Dulles MSS (Supplement). See also, Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 155, 206-8, 377.

85 Statements from 100 Congressmen supporting Bricker's views,
an "isolationist nation", he said, the term "internationalist" was also absurd: the United States must seek world leadership, but nobody could say in advance what post-war commitments the United States should enter into, except that such commitments would not be at the expense of American sovereignty and freedom of action. In his campaign he pushed also the idea of a transitional arrangement, which Herbert Hoover had advocated, and like Hoover he blamed the Administration for appeasement in the 1930's, as well as publicly casting doubts on the commitments being made at the various war-time conferences. In February, after Bricker had made a speech to the National Press Club, Hoover wrote to encourage him: "I just want you to know that I receive many signs that the tide is turning in your direction". In fact, the Dewey "draft" was already forging ahead by the time Hoover wrote. Probably one of the Old Guard concerns, which perhaps made Bricker's candidacy all the more welcomed, was the fear that if Dewey got the nomination by default, he might prove too independent. Dewey in fact began in the pre-Convention period to make limited conciliatory gestures to the inter-

were obtained for circulation at Chicago; clipping from Cincinnati Enquirer, June 18th, 1944, Clarence Brown MSS, Ohio State Historical Society, Columbus. For evidence of dependence on Hoover, see Harriet W. Bricker to Hoover, December 18th, 1943, Hoover MSS.

86 Speech at Philadelphia, September 17th, 1943; copy in Bricker file, Hoover MSS. Speeches in Washington, (February, 1944), New York (April) and Milwaukee (May); New York Times, February 12th, 1944, April 26th, 1944, May 14th, 1944.
87 Hoover to John W. Bricker, February 12th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
88 O'Laughlin to General MacArthur, April 6th, 1944; April 29th, 1944, O'Laughlin MSS.

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nationalists, presumably on the assumption that he already had the nomination sewn up, and that midwestern Republicans would vote the Republican ticket whatever the circumstances in the fall.

An indication of this was the major foreign policy speech to the American Newspaper Publishers Association in April, a speech which he later claimed was designed to see if the Republicans still dared to nominate him after hearing his position.\textsuperscript{89} Prior to this speech, his advisor, John Foster Dulles, solicited the advice of Walter Lippmann, who apparently urged Dewey to speak out on the questions of post-war relations with Germany and Russia. "He feels," wrote Dulles, "that if you can cover these two points, you will have done more than any other prominent political figure, but that if you do less, on account of the public impression that has been created about you, the impression created will be one of negation and of strong tendency toward isolation."\textsuperscript{90} The speech duly committed Dewey to support of organized international cooperation "backed by adequate force to prevent future wars", and to "durable cohesion between Great Britain and ourselves, together, I hope with Russia and China."\textsuperscript{91}

Dewey's apparent move toward the Internationalists caused some concern amongst the Nationalists. The \textit{Chicago Tribune} took him to task for accepting Roosevelt's concept of the Big Four, and called for a ringing attack by Republicans on

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{89}Beyer, p. 72.
  \item \textsuperscript{90}Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, March 30th, 1944, Dulles M3S (Supplement).
  \item \textsuperscript{91}\textit{New York Times}, April 28th, 1944.
\end{itemize}
Roosevelt's diplomacy. It later suggested that had Dewey been more forthright before the Wisconsin Primary, he would not have done so well.92 By the time of the Convention, the Tribune had come to feel that Dewey's nomination might be a repetition of 1940: "If the delegates should nominate him they face the possibility that they will have bought another pig-in-a-poke".93 Arthur Sears Henning, the Tribune's Washington correspondent, and frequently a reflector of the views of Republicans on Capitol Hill, commented that Dewey's hopes of a first ballot nomination seemed to be fading from the peak reached before the New York address.94 Not for the last time, however, the Old Guard was to find itself buried by the slickness and professionalism of the Dewey organization. Bricker's supporters succumbed at the Convention to pressure to make the nomination of Dewey unanimous by withdrawing Bricker's name. "Now," said Senator Burton, "if Mr. Dewey loses, it won't be Ohio's fault. We are going all out for him, and if he loses it won't be because of anything Ohio did to him."95 Dewey was received without enthusiasm: chosen for his ability to compromise and his electoral potential, rather than for identification with any particular set of ideas.96

92Chicago Tribune, April 29th, 1944; May 9th, 1944.
93Clipping from Chicago Tribune, June 22nd, 1944, Thomas E. Dewey file, Democratic National Committee Library MSS, Truman Library.
94Chicago Tribune, June 12th, 1944.
95Report, June 29th, 1944, McNaughton MSS.
96The leaders of the draft Dewey movement reportedly stressed his vote getting potential at the Convention, New York Times, June 26th, 1944.
Like the platform then, Dewey's nomination was a victory for consensus. He had got the nomination because he offended the Old Guard less than Willkie, and had a much better chance of getting elected than Bricker. His difficulty, however, was to continue to keep the Party united in a campaign where the whole sensitive question of the war, foreign policy and "isolation" was likely to be dragged up. Of necessity tied to the fundamentals of traditionalism outlined in the party platform, he had at the same time to prevent wholesale 'Internationalist' defection. Apart from the inherent difficulties of fighting the Commander-in-chief in war-time, Dewey's campaign was also likely to be fought against the background of Harding, Lodge and 1920.97

In his acceptance speech, which Frank McNaughton of Time described as "one of the most cleverly drafted political speeches it has been the country's fortune to read in a long time ", Dewey laid down the guidelines of his campaign,98 His intention appeared to be to remove the war as an issue, insofar as possible, as well as to concentrate attention on the dynamism and efficiency of the Republicans, by contrast with the bureaucratic bungling of the New Deal. On the

97In February the publicity officer at National Committee Headquarters reportedly described the feeling that the commander-in-chief was unbeatable in war-time as "a public psychosis". Report, February 2nd, 1944, p.1, McNaughton MSS. A Gallup Poll in April had indicated that Dewey could win in November if the war was over, New York Times, April 23rd, 1944.

98McNaughton Report: "Overall convention", June 29th, 1944, p. 5, McNaughton MSS. Dewey's careful drafting was well-known; he later admitted that for the 1944 campaign he spent an hour of preparation for every minute of actual speaking time. Transcript, Thomas E. Dewey Interview, p. 30, Dulles (Oral).
potentially divisive issue of international organization
he took a characteristically cautious line: "There are only
a few, a very few," he said, "who really believe that America
should remain aloof from the world. There are only a rela-
tive few who believe it would be practical for America or
her allies to renounce all sovereignty and join a superstate."
The Republican Party, he said, was firmly united in favour
of international cooperation, but he added: the United
States could not play its part in world affairs unless it
was strong, healthy and vigorous at home.99 And so, his ar-
gument returned full circle, back once more to the New Deal,
which was portrayed as divided, quarrelsome and lacking in
faith in America's future, and to the Republican Party,
with its rising leadership of young governors, exemplified
by the young nominee himself.100

In the campaign itself, Republicans seemed agreed that
insofar as they could deal largely with problems of peace,
rather than with the conduct of war, they would politically
be on much safer territory. In early September, Herbert
Brownell, Dewey's campaign manager, confidently predicted
that the approach of peace was one factor which would lead
the country to elect the Republicans. They realized, he said,
that the G.O.P. would be better able to cope with peace-time
conditions.101 Brownell's view, which was in accord both

100 This analysis follows very closely that of Frank McNaughton's
report from Chicago to Time magazine; McNaughton Report,
"Overall Convention", June 29th, 1944, pp. 1-5, McNaughton MSS.
101 New York Times, September 2nd, 1944. See also for earlier,
private expression of same view, Herbert Brownell to Hoover,
August, 17th, 1944, Hoover MSS.

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with opinion poll findings, and with the strategy which Dewey had revealed in his acceptance speech at Chicago, was to be repeated during the campaign. Dewey, whose faith in opinion poll techniques was second to none, sought during the campaign to try to hammer home that the American people were not being asked to decide on basic questions of foreign policy or the conduct of the war, but that the next administration would be largely a peace time administration; it followed of course, from Republican philosophy that a strong, productive America with faith in itself was essential to an effective foreign policy. In October, to allay doubts about changing horses in mid-stream, Dewey's advisors let it be known that Dewey would wish Secretary of State Cordell Hull to help to maintain continuity in the conduct of foreign relations for a period of time after Dewey's inauguration.

As part of the strategy of removing the Republican Party's disadvantage over the war and foreign affairs, Dewey and Dulles negotiated with Cordell Hull a limited bipartisan agreement during the conference at Dumbarton Oaks in August. The agreement came after Dewey had initiated an attack on the conference, by referring to rumours that it was planning to subject all the nations of the world to the four participants: the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union and China. Possibly devised in order to identify Dewey with the

102 See for example speech at Philadelphia, New York Times, September 8th, 1944. For Dewey's faith in opinion polls, and especially in the work of George Gallup, a Republican whose base of operations was in Princeton, see Beyer, pp. 114-121.
103 New York Times, October 9th, 1944.
104 Beyer, p. 363.
interests of small nations, and as likely to pay off with Polish, Italian and Greek Americans, Dewey eagerly took the opportunity of gaining further identification with 'International issues' by seizing on a remark by Cordell Hull at a press conference to send John Foster Dulles as his representative to Washington to try to sort things out. From the whole affair Dewey and Dulles gained a great deal of publicity; and in the ensuing weeks, Dewey and his advisors were not slow to take credit for having taken the initiative in trying to remove the question of international organization from the political arena. Herbert Brownell, for example, claimed in Chicago that Dewey had gained a great deal of popularity for his nonpartisan attitude to international organization, as well as for his insistence on keeping the American people informed on peace plans (a reference to the secret nature of war-time diplomacy, including Dumbarton Oaks itself) and for his defence of small nations and minorities. The latter was a point which was worth mentioning in Chicago. Dewey himself was not too modest to point out that "...I have taken the unprecedented action of promoting the nonpartisan character of the conferences now in progress". Whether the manoeuvre was totally successful is doubtful. The attempted rapprochement with Willkie prior to the meetings with Hull and Dulles proved abortive. He and Dulles

105 Hull was asked by "Scotty" Reston if he would be willing to talk things over with Dewey, Report, August 17th, 1944, McNaughton MSS.; New York Times, August 20th, 1944; R. A. Divine, Second Chance, pp. 216-219.
107 Ibid., September 9th, 1944.
met, somewhat reluctantly on the part of Willkie, who had earlier refused to meet Dewey and Dulles at Albany, and saw the meeting as a plot to associate his name with Dewey's candidacy. They disagreed, however, over Willkie's assertion that the United States should seek to establish an international police force. In a public statement, Willkie also rebuked Dewey for his attack on Dumbarton Oaks; he himself, he said, had also been concerned about the rights of small nations, but had made a private enquiry about it. "I have been equally concerned," he added, "that there should not arise among our Allies the notion that our party would in any way obstruct or endanger the success of an international conference."108 Therefore, insofar as the move was intended to win over Internationalist opinion, it failed because of Willkie's refusal to give his support.109

At the same time, the meetings with Willkie and with Hull, caused apprehension amongst the friends of Herbert Hoover as well as with other Nationalists. Much of the dissatisfaction came as a result of the fact that Dewey had made it clear that he did not wish to be identified with Hoover during the campaign. One of Hoover's friends commented:

109 Willkie and Dulles put out a joint statement which was significant for what it left out: "We have conferred extensively about various international problems bearing on world organization to assure lasting peace. There was a full exchange of views not animated by partisan consideration or having to do with any candidacy but by the desire of both of us that the United States should play a constructive and responsible part in assuring world order." Joint Statement of Mr. Willkie and Mr. Dulles, August 21st, 1944, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
"I think that Dewey made a mistake in kowtowing to Willkie and giving him an opportunity to refuse to confer with him at Albany... while Dewey was eager to talk with Willkie he did not seek Hoover's views on the security program. It is clear he will have nothing to do with the Chief, and thus avoid giving substance to the Democratic charge that he is running as another Hoover".\footnote{O'Laughlin to Charles Hilles, August 30th, 1944, O'Laughlin MSS.; Hugh Gibson to Hoover, August 18th, 1944, August 30th, 1944, Hoover MSS.} In general, the Nationalists were apprehensive of the implications of too close ties with the Administration. The \textit{Chicago Tribune} gave public expression to these concerns. Whilst applauding Dewey's attack on power politics and secret diplomacy, it criticized his acceptance of international organization and the Big Four. The conference between Hull and Dulles, it said, "... presages nothing beneficial for America. Mr. Hull... represented the views of the British foreign office. Mr. Dulles is the impersonation of the big dough of Wall Street".\footnote{\textit{Chicago Tribune}, August 18th, 1944; August 21st, 1944.} Senator Brooks of Illinois, a member of the foreign affairs sub-committee at the Chicago Convention, whilst congratulating Dewey and Dulles for their determination not to enter any treaties designed to coerce minorities and small nations, also publicly urged them to continue to maintain American sovereignty, constitutional processes, and American military and economic strength in all negotiations, as well as to demand more outlying bases.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, August 23rd, 1944.} Senator Taft, too made it
clear that while Republicans might agree "to the setup of a vehicle for international cooperation", they were "not going to condone New Deal dissipation of American resources thru loans, peacetime lend-lease and similar proposals from the White House".113

The dissent of the Nationalists highlighted the dilemmas of the Republican campaign; it seemed to substantiate the Democratic argument that following the elimination of Willkie, the 'isolationist' Old Guard were in the saddle.114 Repeatedly Democratic orators were to portray Dewey as a front man for the Old Guard, as a man of youth and no significance beside the commander-in-chief. He is, said Senator Pepper, "a 42-year-old boy who has never commanded anything but the National Guard".115 As part of the same theme, attention was focussed on Congress, and on men such as Senator Hiram Johnson, Representative Joseph Martin and others who would exercise power

113Ibid., August 25th, 1944.
114Senator Thomas of Utah was quoted at the end of June as commenting, the "shoving of Willkie into the background and bringing Herbert Hoover into the front means the Republican Party will remain the GOP of the Nineteen Twenties"., New York Times, June 29th, 1944. Sidney Hillman of the CIO described Dewey as the "mouthpiece of Herbert Hoover and the GOP Old Guard"., Ibid., July 12th, 1944.
115Ibid., October 11th, 1944. Dewey's convention speech in which he put the emphasis on youth and dynamism by contrast with a tired and worn out Administration was an attempt to nullify this anticipated line of attack, McNaughton Report, "Overall Convention", pp. 4-5, McNaughton MSS. An amateur cartoonist sent to a Democratic Congressman in May a cartoon depicting a diminutive, puzzled-looking Dewey sitting round a conference table with Stalin, Churchill and Chiang Kai Shek; the cartoon was meant to illustrate "what happens to 'little boys' when they undertake to play international politics with masters in the game". Jules Schatzman to Representative John J. Cochran, May 11th, 1944, with accompanying cartoon, Thomas E. Dewey file, Democratic National Committee Library MSS.
over foreign policy legislation should the Republicans win the election; and who it was assumed would provide a repetition of 1920. The Democratic vice-presidential nominee even called upon Dewey to oppose the re-election of eight 'isolationist' senators, including Taft. If he doesn't, said Truman, "the people must assume he is another Harding". 116 Roosevelt, toward the end of the campaign, in Chicago, also skillfully raised doubts about the Republican Party's conversion from 'Isolationism'; the Republicans, he said, were claiming to support new policies designed to bring about lasting peace, "But," they whisper, "we'll do it in such a way that we won't lose the support of even Gerald Nye or Gerald Smith, and, and this is very important, we won't lose the support of any isolationist campaign contributor. Why we will be able to satisfy even the Chicago Tribune". 117

At Minneapolis in October, Dewey read out telegrams from Republican Congressional leaders, White, Vandenberg, Austin, Taft, Whery, Martin, supporting Dewey and backing up his plans for world leadership. 118 Earlier, in a letter released to the press, Dulles had written that on the basis of talks with Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee, he thought they would go a long way to back up a Republican President, "but I'm pretty skeptical as to what will happen if Mr. Roosevelt is elected, in view of the very bad relations which exist between him and both houses of

116 New York Times, October 24th, 1944. See also speech by Franklin Roosevelt in New York at the Foreign Policy Association, Ibid., October 22nd, 1944.
117 Ibid., October 29th, 1944.
118 Ibid., October 25th, 1944.
Congress". Despite the efforts of the Congressional leaders to assure their support and Dulles' comment, the Dewey campaign was on difficult ground in matters of foreign policy. Dewey himself was convinced that Roosevelt had broken the bipartisan agreement by questioning Republican sincerity over international affairs. Ultimately the Republicans could not get away from the negative foreign policy image. If Dewey attacked Administration foreign policy he would fall foul of the 'Internationalists', who would come to see him as an 'Isolationist'. If he sought too close an association with the Administration, he would alienate the Old Guard as well as fail to give the party a distinctive image. For the most part, the strategy was to play down foreign affairs. Taft, writing in the New York Times Magazine, emphasized that apart from a few details, there were no major differences between the parties over foreign affairs; the major differences, he said, were in domestic affairs. This was in contrast to Senator Pepper, who was invited to write the Democratic Party article: "The Republican Party is the party of big business and isolation. The Democratic Party is the party of the people and international collaboration. The simple question to be decided by the electorate of the country in November is, Shall the mistake made at the end of World War I be repeated - the Republican Party substituted in power for the Democratic Party and the United States set again upon a course which led last time to depression and war?"

119 Ibid., October 9th, 1944.
122 Ibid.
Dewey himself seemed on far happier ground when discussing domestic affairs and peace-time problems. At times he seemed to be charging that the Democrats preferred war because they had no peace-time solutions: they were, he alleged, afraid to release soldiers, because they could not provide jobs. In addition, they proposed to "try to buy the good-will of the world out of the goods and labor of the American people. They propose to buy for themselves international power out of our pocketbooks"; they wanted "an American WPA for all of the rest of the world". By contrast, the Republicans offered their dynamic approach, centred in their domestic competence: they would by restoring faith in America, by "conduct and example, give leadership and imagination to all the world". The Dullesian rhetoric was clever, it synthesized the global vision of the Internationalists with the restrictions imposed by the Nationalists' unwillingness to use the physical resources of the United States for global ends.

But ultimately the issues of foreign affairs could not be avoided in the way in which Dewey wished. The determination of the Internationalists, Republican, Democratic and Independent alike, to avoid what they saw as the tragedy of 1920 was too strong. The New York Times announced its endorsement of Roosevelt in October, largely because it felt that Dewey's failure to stand up to the 'isolationists' had left doubts as to whether the 'international' faction was in complete control. Walter Lippmann, hardly a Wilsonian

123Speeches at Philadelphia, September 7th, and Louisville, September 8th, New York Times, September 8th, 1944; September 9th, 1944.
124Ibid., October 16th, 1944.
internationalist, was upset by an attack by Dewey on the Rumanian armistice, and endorsed Roosevelt because he felt Dewey was too inexperienced for the negotiation of peace. Lippmann's endorsement annoyed Dulles, especially because of Lippmann's comments on Dewey's attitude to Poland and Rumania. Dulles concluded that Lippmann did not share their belief in universal moral force; "you do not believe," wrote Dulles, "that the United States should have any policies at all except in relation to areas where we can make those policies good through material force".

More damaging, however, was the disaffection of certain Republicans, including Senator Ball of Minnesota, a Stassen supporter, one of the 8 senators, who had in fact seconded Dewey's nomination at Chicago. In September, Ball called for the defeat of 11 'isolationist' senators, eight of whom were members of his own party. Subsequently he expressed his unwillingness to support Dewey until Dewey's attitude to certain foreign policy matters had been cleared up. In particular he wanted Dewey to make it clear where he stood on the question of whether the U. S. should join an international organization before the peace settlements were reached. He also wished to know his reaction to the question of whether Congress should exercise a virtual veto over world security council decisions to meet aggression. In raising these issues, Ball was challenging head-on the Republican consensus.

125Clipping from New York Herald Tribune, October 21st, 1944, Thomas E. Dewey file, Democratic National Committee Library MSS.
126Dulles to Walter Lippmann, October 22nd, 1944, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
Both Vandenberg and Hoover in particular had urged that less attention should be given to the structure of international organization, and prime attention be given to the structure of the peace; the consensus also stood firm on the American Constitution, including the Congressional right to declare war. Ball was, however, suspicious of both positions, seeing them both as devices by which American membership of a new league might be prevented or watered down. Ultimately, despite pressure from other Internationalists, including Henry Luce, Ball endorsed Franklin Roosevelt. To Luce he replied that, although he was confident of Dulles' views, he did not know exactly where Dewey and his campaign manager, Herbert Brownell, stood, and he was extremely worried by the "straight isolationist" appeals of John Bricker and Everett Dirksen (Illinois).\(^{129}\)

Added to the disaffection of Senator Ball was the fact that Wendell Willkie died in New York in October leaving a question mark over whether he would have supported Dewey. A number of his supporters had already come over to Dewey, but a number still held out, adding to doubts about Dewey's 'internationalist' credentials. In California and New York, Republican organizations for Roosevelt were organized by former Willkie supporters. In New York the Independent Republican Committee was chaired by Willkie's old associate, Russell Davenport, who was openly critical of Dewey and cast doubts on his ability to deal with international situations.\(^{130}\)

\(^{129}\)Henry R. Luce to Joseph H. Ball, October 21st, 1944; Joseph Ball to Henry R. Luce, October 23rd, 1944; copies in Dulles MSS (Supplement).

\(^{130}\)Advertisement in New York Times, October 24th, 1944; Ibid., November 7th, 1944.
Faced with the defection of Ball and other Internationalists, Dewey hit back in Ball's home state towards the end of October, 1944. Repudiating the label of isolationism, which the Democrats were pinning on the Republicans, he recalled the three "great" Republican secretaries of state of the 1920's; Hughes, Kellogg and Stimson, and reminded his audience that in 1933 Roosevelt had inherited a peaceful world situation. In the 1930's, said Dewey, the international cooperation of the 1920's was eroded, partly because of the policies of the United States, especially Roosevelt's scuttling of the 1933 London Economic Conference, which Dewey described as "the most completely isolationist action ever taken by an American President in our 150 years of history". "I thought Dewey's speech in Minneapolis was a winning speech - perhaps the winning speech," wrote Henry Luce to Dulles. The New York Times, however, was unimpressed: Mr. Dewey was now trying to prove that "the people whom he used to call "the interventionists" have been the isolationists all along".

In the course of the campaign, Dewey had clung tenaciously to the middle ground developed by Hoover, Vandenberg and Dulles. Prepared to conciliate the Internationalists, he was not prepared to make the wholesale repudiation of his Party's traditions, and many of his Party's candidates, which many of the Internationalists appeared to want. Although he lost the election, it is doubtful whether other tactics

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131 Ibid., October 25th, 1944.
132 Henry R. Luce to John Foster Dulles, October 25th, 1944, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
133 New York Times, October 26th, 1944.
would have won it. Taft at least, although not enamoured of Dewey, and distressed at finding that there was "too much New York atmosphere around headquarters" and that Herbert Brownell did not know "much about national politics" was still not disposed to blame Dewey for defeat. In 1944 he felt, with many others, that the commander-in-chief was unbeatable. Some of the Old Guard disagreed. Herbert Hoover felt that the election could have been won with different issues and tactics. Having seen the election as a test as to "whether the American people are going down the world-wide slide to the left", he could derive "some sad consolation that the New Deal will have to take the bumps for 4 years". "We do need for our younger Republicans to stop fighting their elders," he wrote to Alf Landon. The Chicago Tribune not surprisingly blamed Dewey's defeat on his having failed to attack Roosevelt's foreign policy. Journalist Arthur Krock, whose Republican sympathies were no secret, also felt that Dewey could have won by exposing the fact that the Administration had no foreign policy.

If the Old Guard were unhappy with the Dewey campaign, eastern Republicans took an opposing view. The New York Herald Tribune felt that many Republicans had been a millstone round Dewey's neck in foreign affairs, and that the

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134 Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 270-2, 283; R. A. Taft to Henry P. Fletcher, Henry Fra ther Fletcher MSS., July 27th, 1944, Ohio State Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.
135 Hoover to John Cowles, October 10th, 1944; Hoover to Alfred Landon, November 14th, 1944; Hoover to Mrs. Adele Smith, January 17th, 1945; Hoover MSS.
136 Chicago Tribune, November 11th, 1944.
137 Charles Hilles to O'Laughlin, November 13th, 1944, O'Laughlin MSS.
Party had not shown itself in a very good light in the confusion that had surrounded its foreign policy plank at Chicago. The Dewey entourage were reported as feeling the same way, but took some pride in the fact that the Party was more united than for many years. Some of the most 'obstructionist' members of Congress had been defeated, whilst the Congressional leadership had endorsed Dewey's foreign policy leadership. John Foster Dulles was not surprised by defeat and was gratified that they had established an important precedent in keeping the issue of international organization largely out of the election.

Arthur Vandenberg had played virtually no part in the campaign, but at least had been consulted, and did not share the outrage which many older Republicans felt about not having been called upon. Despite his agreement that the campaign had been "too far to the left", and his lack of personal warmth for "little Tom", he felt that Republicans must continue to be constructive, not negative. Although a fundamentalist by conviction, Vandenberg was pragmatic enough to trim his sails to the wind; he could see no political or any kind of future in negative tactics. Many of the Old Guard dissented from Vandenberg. Hoover could find comfort only in the campaign of vice-presidential nominee, John

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138 New York Herald Tribune, November 9th, 1944.
139 New York Times, November 9th, 1944. Senators Danaher (Conn.) and Nye (North Dakota) had lost their seats, as had Representative Hamilton Fish of New York. Arthur Krock noted that of the 14 original opponents up for re-election to the Senate, only 5 were re-elected, and Senator Taft only narrowly so. Ibid., November 10th, 1944.
140 John Foster Dulles to Allen W. Dulles, December 20th, 1948; Dulles MSS.
141 Vandenberg to S. R. Banyon, December 4th, 1944; Vandenberg to James H. Sheppard, January 2nd, 1945; Vandenberg MSS.
Bricker, who he felt "saved a much worse defeat". "There is much to do," he wrote to Bricker, "if we are to save the country." 142

Whilst in the campaign aftermath the Chicago Tribune was reading Dewey out of the party, Senator Wherry of Nebraska publicly called for Herbert Brownell to resign as National Chairman, or to devote all his time to the job. Like other Senators, including probably Taft and Vandenberg, he wanted a full-time chairman who was not regarded as the devotee of any particular presidential aspirant.143 In December, Dewey invited Taft, Vandenberg, Wherry and White, and three House leaders, to his New York apartment to try to get agreement on a statement of party principles to be issued in advance of the State of the Union. Congressional leaders were, however, as resistant to Dewey's leadership as they had been to Willkie.144 The Old Guard were clearly not inclined to believe Dewey's denial of Presidential ambitions. 145

In the aftermath of the 1944 election, news from overseas seemed to suggest that the bipartisanship developed during 1944 had been a mistake. Controversies between the allies over Italy, Greece and Poland, not to mention a military reverse on the western front, revealed that the difficulties which Hoover in particular had long predicted were

142 Hoover to John W. Bricker, November 8th, 1944; Hoover MSS.
143 Chicago Tribune, December 20th, 1944. See also New York Times, December 17th, 1944.
144 Best account of the meeting of Congressional leaders with Dewey is in Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 126-7; see also New York Herald Tribune, December 22nd, 1944; December 25th, 1944; McNaughton Report, December 29th, 1944, McNaughton MSS.
145 "My prediction is that Dewey will not release the reins," wrote Charles Hilles to O'Laughlin, December 26th, 1944, O'Laughlin MSS.
not to be easily surmounted.\textsuperscript{146} International developments then tended to discredit the direction of Republican leadership in 1944. The \textit{Chicago Tribune} commented in the New Year "Mr. Roosevelt's vaunted foreign policy carried him only as far as the polls and then blew up. Poland and Greece demonstrated its emptiness and fraud. The Republican opposition in Congress should be making political capital of this, but the majority of the Republican members are still cowed and bewildered by the beating they took at the hand of their own Presidential candidate."\textsuperscript{147} Welcoming the refusal of Congressional leaders in December to sign Dewey's proposed policy declaration, the \textit{Tribune} had commented, "It is no answer to say on Mr. Dewey's behalf that he didn't know that Europe was to be divided into spheres of influence. Shrewder and more experienced observers than he is told him what was the making and he rejected their information and their advice. He cannot expect them to have any more use for him as a leader".\textsuperscript{148} Even a self-confessed Internationalist such as Raymond Buell was looking in the post-election climate for a move away from nonpartisanship towards the development of a distinctive and constructive "party attitude" to foreign as well as domestic issues, though it is unlikely that he would have found much agreement with those of the \textit{Tribune}'s persuasion.\textsuperscript{149} All conservatives could see after the election

\textsuperscript{146}Journalist David Lawrence suggested that in view of these developments, Dewey was lucky he had lost. \textit{New York Times}, December 23rd, 1944.
\textsuperscript{147}\textit{Chicago Tribune}, January 6th, 1945.
\textsuperscript{148}\textit{Tbid.}, December 27th, 1944.
\textsuperscript{149}Raymond L. Buell to Frederick E. Baker, December 15th, 1944, copy in Alexander Smith MSS.
was a world which, the United States included, was steadily moving to the left. Herbert Hoover, who saw the only salvation for the United States and the world in the opposite direction, was "considerably in the dumps", seeing "no island of safety in the world" and fearing that "we shall edge further into a collectivist system in this next four years". His hopes were pinned, "if this country is to be saved", on a "coalition of the conservative forces".

In many ways then, the 1944 election had been a turning point. Up to the 1944 election, the main impetus of the Nationalists had been to defeat Willkie and to check what they considered the totally unrealistic desires of the Internationalists for their "world state". By the end of 1944, the debate was beginning to change, away from mechanistic international organizations, to the structure of the peace. In the Republican Party, 1944 had seen the emergence of the pragmatists, Vandenberg, Dewey and Dulles, who were concerned to forge party unity and to develop the common ground between eastern and midwestern Republicanism. Despite this, however, the strength of the Nationalists had been revealed during the campaign, and in the aftermath in the blunt rejection of Dewey's attempt to define a coherent party programme. The essentials of the Nationalist position had been protected.

150 "...we, with England, are about the last bulwark against a communistic state. And I'm not so sure of either." Frank C. Page to Harry C. Butcher, November 18th, 1944, Harry C. Butcher MSS., Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

151 Hoover to Homer B. Mann, November 20th, 1944, Hoover MSS.

152 Note that to Hoover's regret, Taft declined to take a seat on the Foreign Relations Committee. Hoover to Robert Taft, December 12th, 1944; R. A. Taft to Hoover, December 14th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
by the Chicago platform, partly as a result of the spokes-
manship of Arthur Vandenberg. Vandenberg himself had so far
done nothing to cause revision of his image as an unremark-
able, small-town, midwestern Republican, extremely sensitive
to the interests of the United States amidst all the Utopian-
ism of 1943-1944. He had, however, forged the beginnings
of a relationship with John Foster Dulles, which was to be
a central feature of Republican leadership in the immediate
post-war years.
"A Strong America" and a Multilateral Peace

A useful and much-used rhetorical phrase which affords insight into the Republican consensus on foreign affairs is that of "A Strong America". The phrase was a kind of political code-word, used by those who wished to affirm that they were not Internationalists (or "One Worlders" or New Dealers) who wished to "give America away". "A Strong America" was, therefore, a code-word for the Nationalist position. It was used by those who for the most part took as their basic premise the belief that the United States could best serve the world by maintaining the fundamentals of the American political-economic system; that this system was superior was unquestioned, as was the unanimous agreement that it had been weakened by the New Deal. To Nationalists, Henry Wallace's call for the internationalization of the New Deal, often referred to sarcastically as the establishment of an "international W.P.A.", could serve no useful purpose, and would in fact weaken the essential fabric of American life still further.\(^1\) Before the United States could save the world, so the argument ran, it had

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\(^1\) Henry Wallace, the Republican bogeyman, who mistakenly was taken to be the spokesman for the New Deal, in the view of Markowitz put his faith in "the union of an expanding progressive American capitalism with a world social revolution.", (p. 56). Others have seen Wallace as a more traditional advocate of American expansion overseas through promotion of the "Open Door"; Ronald Radosh and Leonard P. Liggio, "Henry A. Wallace and the Open Door" in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971).
first to put its own house in order, by restoring its system to truly American principles, which alone could be the basis for a healthy system, at home and overseas. 2

Thomas Dewey, in his unsuccessful Presidential campaign in 1944, had pressed the same theme. 3 In his major policy speech at Louisville, Kentucky, for example, he had called for a renewal of faith in America, and for an end to the 12 years of defeatism which he saw as characterizing the New Deal: "Good-will cannot be bought with gold. It flows to the man who successfully manages his own affairs, who is self-reliant and independent, yet who is interested in the rights and needs of others." "We shall want to help," he continued, "...we will seek to work out conditions that will lead to an ever-wider exchange of goods and services without injury to our own people. We look toward a more general access to the raw materials of the world as to an ever-widening opportunity for all to contribute most effectively their best to the production of the goods needed by all." But having affirmed his basic principles, his belief in independence, self-reliance and help for others, and his belief in world economic expansion, he returned to the core theme:

2 Hoover was the most consistent articulator of this thesis; in his view, world peace could only be assured if the United States committed itself to economic freedom both at home and overseas; Hoover and Gibson, pp. 298-9.

3 In 1940 he had in his first attempt at the nomination emphasized the importance of America remaining strong, economically and defensively, and had opposed intervention in the war; Beyer, pp. 421-2. Whether he thought through the economic implications of the Nazi conquest is unclear; possibly, as in Dulles' case, he saw "isolation" as a temporary expedient.

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"Beyond that, we know that we shall be able to help in keeping this long peace we pray for, only if we are strong at home. We can no more separate our armies in the world from our domestic affairs than our armies can fight without our production at home. If we at home are to be torn by internal strife; if we are to have leaders who set groups of Americans against other groups of Americans; if we are to be governed by the philosophy that America is overbuilt and is done; if we cease to be a land of opportunity for our own people, then we shall fail both at home and abroad."

To this he had added the charge that the New Deal, afraid of peace and the unemployment that it anticipated, preferred to keep men in the armed forces after the war.4 It is possible that by 1944 Dewey himself had changed his views on foreign affairs a great deal from his 1940 advocacy of a "Strong America".5 As a pragmatist, however, in a Party in which the Nationalists were dominant, his rhetoric was understandable even if his view of the Administration was not totally plausible: the conservative director of the Office of War Mobilization, James Byrnes, chided that some people "talk as if it were more important to put an end to the New Deal than to put an end to the war".6

For purposes of analysis, the concept of "A Strong America" may be subdivided into four components: i) protection of the American Constitution, ii) protection of American


5 In later years, Dewey claimed that he and Dulles had fewer adaptations to make in their position than most, transcript, interview with Thomas E. Dewey, p. 51, Dulles (Oral).

6 New York Times, October 31st, 1944.
security, iii) protection of the American social and economic system, iv) protection of American moral integrity. All were constraints which had to be borne in mind, especially in the final year of the war, by those concerned with developing Republican policy. The first three constraints were domestic in orientation, and reflected the deep Nationalist concern that the United States should not in its foreign relations imperil any of the essentials of freedom at home. Thus, shortly before the San Francisco Conference establishing the United Nations in 1945, a midwestern congressman wrote to Vandenberg of the need to ensure four foundations of peace: I - American security must be safeguarded; II - American solvency must be preserved; III - American "sovereignty" must be safeguarded; "should we lose our identity as a Nation, we lose our opportunity for world leadership"; IV -democratic processes must be preserved.7 A Pennsylvania National Committeeman put it even more simply in offering a fool proof guide to both domestic and foreign policy formulation: "Is it constitutional and can the nation afford it? The essence of Republican conviction on a national policies is expressed in these two questions. What runs counter to them are proposals which the Republican Party cannot accept, however attractive they may seem".8 The fourth constraint was one which the Nationalists could to a large degree share with the

7Karl E. Mundt to Vandenberg, April 3rd, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
Internationalists: that in its external dealings the United States should operate within a moral code of behaviour, based on the perception of the United States as a bastion of liberty. In the eyes of Republican leaders, Franklin Roosevelt had offended all the precepts of "A Strong America". He had spread American resources around the globe, he had ridden rough-shod over the Constitution by undermining the division of powers, and especially by the use of personal diplomacy and executive agreement, and he had not revealed sufficient concern either for the fundamentals of American security, or for the establishment of a world based on American moral principles. "I do not know why we must be the only silent partner in this grand alliance" Vandenberg told the Senate in the speech in January, 1945, that was to be taken by the press as signalling an end to his "isolationism". The assumptions behind Vandenberg's critique of Roosevelt were recognizably those of the Nationalists: unfairly or not, Roosevelt was not seen as a man who would put American interests and moral principles first.

The 1944 platform, so largely the work of Vandenberg, building on his Mackinac triumph, contained all the fundamentals implicit in "A Strong America".

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9 Congressional Record, 91, January 10th, 1945, p. 165.
Thus Republicans committed themselves to fight the war firstly for American security and welfare, secondly in order to render the Axis powers impotent, and thirdly to attain "Peace and freedom based on justice and security". It is unlikely that the order was accidental. To emphasize primacy of self-interest, the section on general foreign policy aims concluded with a re-iteration of the first proposition - "We shall at all times protect the essential interests and resources of the United States". The section on national security reflected similarly careful drafting: Republicans would maintain adequate military strength to defend the United States, its possessions, and the Monroe Doctrine, as well as meeting any further military commitments "determined by Congress".¹¹

References to protection of both sovereignty and the Constitution were scattered through the platform. Republicans would (contra F.D.R.) keep the American people informed of all agreements with foreign powers, and would sustain the treaty-making power of the Senate.¹² Vandenberg's disclaimer of any intention to join "A World State" was included, and the platform recommended that peace and security be attained through the use of public opinion, re-

¹²Ibid., p. 407. The section on domestic affairs similarly committed Republicans to a reversal of the centralization of power in the Presidency which, if continued, would make the United States "a Republic only in name". (p. 408)
ciprocal spiritual values and international law. Such means posed no threat to the Constitution, American security, or its economy, they were in short, compatible with traditional reservations about external commitments.

Economically the Republicans committed themselves to sound financing as a fundamental: internally and externally they would cut out the waste and inefficiency of the New Deal. They were prepared to advance emergency relief, and credits to enable foreign countries to buy American goods so as to bring about their own economic revival; they were prepared to try to bring about the removal of trade barriers, "always remembering that its primary obligation. . . is to our own workers, our own farmers, and our own industry. . ."13 Committed then to a restoration of the United States to a time when government took less in taxes and balanced its budget, it was logical that they should insist that foreign policy should be based on the same principles. Governmental expenditure overseas they saw as likely in the long run to be a cure worse than the disease, in so far as it would weaken the social fabric both of the beneficiaries and of the United States itself.

The commitment to moral principles was not stressed in the platform as much as in the Convention by Herbert Hoover: the main function of the platform was to act as a restraint on utopian internationalism by a reassertion of traditional constraints on policy. The commitment to a liberal world order was, however, a part of the tradition, and on this

13Ibid., pp. 408, 411, 413.

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note the 1944 platform had ended: "The essential question," it said, at home and overseas, was "whether men can organize together in a highly industrialized society, succeed, and still be free". The party of Lincoln, therefore, "when moral values are being crushed on every side," pledged itself "to uphold with all our strength the Bill of Rights, the Constitution and the law of the land. We so pledge ourselves that the American tradition may stand forever as the beacon light of civilization." 14

The Administration and a Multilateral Peace

Whilst Republican leaders were developing a consensus based on the concept of "A Strong America", the Administration, or at least the State and Treasury Departments, were engaged in more detailed planning for the post-war world. 15 The essentials of the peace for which the Admin-

14 Ibid., p. 413.
15 Day to day relations with foreign governments were conducted largely by Roosevelt. Dean Acheson was later to argue that the division between diplomacy and post-war planning left Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, "absorbed in platonic planning of a utopia, in a sort of mechanistic idealism". Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p. 83. Acheson's judgement seems rather harsh: the planning of Hull and others took place on the basis of widely accepted "lessons" drawn from previous experience of World War which taught i) that the United States had been unprepared at Versailles; ii) that it had been a serious mistake not to join the League of Nations; iii) that the major cause of the breakdown of the peace constructed at Versailles was economic; Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 4.
istration planned were no different from those which Republican leaders wished to see established. The aim was a liberal world, based on the Four Freedoms of June, 1941, and on the more detailed provisions of the Atlantic Charter. The term often used to describe the world order aimed at, is that of multilateralism; used more often in the economic than in the political context, the term in its simplest suggested a world in which decisions would be taken by nations in concert, rather than by the development of limited alliances and agreements (bilateralism) or by unilateral action. Such a concept meant that the United States would be required to surrender a degree of freedom of action, although it would remain easily the strongest and most influential power in the world. Most Administration critics could concede that such a world order would benefit all the world, including the United States; difficulty however stemmed from reservations as to its practicability, and from the sacrifices which would have to be made by the United States in order to try to bring it about.

The cornerstone of American planning was the proposed new international organization, which, though Franklin Roosevelt was unenthusiastic about it, had formed the basis of planning even before Pearl Harbor. By the end of 1943,

16 See Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-1945 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1958). Roosevelt personally put more faith in the concept of the '4 policemen', Divine, Roosevelt and World War II, p. 65; it is unlikely however that he had any clearly defined view of the nature of the peace he expected to emerge, any more than he had had in terms of domestic policy in 1932.
as a result of public pressure, Congress had declared in favour of membership in such an organization through the Fulbright and Connally resolutions, whilst the Republicans had made a nod towards the concept at Mackinac, and Stalin had given his assent to it at Teheran. At Dumbarton Oaks in the summer of 1944, a series of meetings between the United States, Britain, the U.S.S.R. and China secured basic agreement on the structure of the international organization, but left unresolved the question of voting procedure in the Security Council. Subsequent discussion in 1945 at Yalta and San Francisco preserved the unanimity rule in cases of United Nations action, but blocked a Soviet attempt to require it also prior to discussion of threats to the peace. A blend of the idealistic and practical, the United Nations retained the essentials of American sovereignty, whilst at the same time it afforded a potentially useful instrument for the attainment of a liberal world. At the very least, the United Nations could not weaken American attempts to attain a liberal world order, and it was a less costly instrument than unilateral force, economic loans, or political and military alliances.

Scarcely less important than the United Nations were the proposals for post-war economic order developed by the Treasury Department. Under this planning, international

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17 For background to public discussion on post-war international organization, see Divine, Second Chance, passim.
18 R. N. Gardner argues that the "exaggerated emphasis on economic policy" was a symptom of the unreality of post-war planning; he does, however, recognize the fundamental importance in Cordell Hull's philosophy of the belief that trade expansion was necessary to avert war, and also of the importance which Treasury Department planners assigned to it from the standpoint of American economic interests; (pp. 8-12). Recent writers have seen the emphasis on
institutions were designed to preside over a world in which barriers to trade and to exchange and convertibility of currencies would be reduced to a minimum, and in which all such barriers should be non-discriminatory. Such a world, it was argued, would increase total world production by promotion of an international division of labour, thereby strengthening free enterprise, in the United States and elsewhere, and at the same time creating political conditions conducive to world peace. As a first step in its economic planning, the United States sought the agreement of Britain, whose Imperial Preferences and controls on convertibility posed a major obstacle to the achievement of the multilateral world. In addition to its efforts to secure freer trade, the Administration also secured British agreement to the International Monetary Fund, largely the brain child of Harry Dexter White, Assistant-Secretary at the Treasury Department, who saw fixed exchange rates banked by an international institution with the power to make short term loans, as the remedy for the economic fluctuations which...
had led to international economic breakdown in the inter-
war years. Alongside the IMF, which was created at the
Bretton Woods conference in 1944, was added the World Bank,
an ambitious proposal to provide funds for world economic
reconstruction.20

The central characteristic of post-war planning was
its reliance on mechanistic international organizations
in which the United States was prepared to invest both
resources and freedom of action, in return for the commit-
ment of other nations to basic American political and eco-
nomic principles. Although there was an element of
idealism in the planning, the over-all concept was hard-
headed, a fact which caused some resentment in British
governmental circles.21 The advocates of the post-war
policies were aware of the difficulties, but they were pre-
pared to accept that as the world's strongest power, the
United States must take the lead, and bear most of the
initial burden of reconstructing the kind of world they
wanted; ultimately, however, perhaps in order to win
support at home, they raised hopes too high. In the poli-
tical sphere, mechanistic internationalism was to be ren-
dered impotent by Big Power disunity by 1946. By the end
of 1945, the economic programme had to be supplemented with
a major financial loan to Britain: the advocates of multi-
lateralism were to find themselves advocating a bilateral
loan agreement in order to keep alive hopes for a multi-
lateral world.

20R. N. Gardner, pp. 72-7, 110.
21See, for example, the account of war-time diplomacy over
lend-lease, air routes and other economic matters, Lloyd
270-80.
The concept of multilateralism was not irreconcilable with that of a "Strong America", broadly speaking the State and Treasury planners wanted the same kind of world order as Republican leaders. The difference was largely one of emphasis. Sceptical of the possibility of creating the multilateral world, most Republican leaders tended to stress the dangers of over-commitment by the United States in seeking to bring it about; to them it seemed that the Administration had made the world order an end in itself, rather than seeing it as one, and not the most vital, of the aims of American foreign policy. An added difficulty, was that the Treasury Department planners, Henry Morgenthau and Harry Dexter White, seemed to be determined to erect an international economic structure in which the American government, through international agencies, became the financial centre of the world, supplanting private finance in both London and Wall Street. This they saw as necessary to achieve a liberal world order which would avoid the weaknesses of the pre-war international system, and to create a climate of economic expansion.

As Richard N. Gardner commented: "...the liberal system could no longer be automatically achieved. After the havoc wrought by two world wars and the Great Depression, the reconstruction of a liberal world economy was bound to re-

22 Lloyd C. Gardner argues that after its initial experimentation, the New Deal followed foreign economic policies in line with those pursued by Herbert Hoover in the Republican era, ibid., pp. 7-13.
23 R. N. Gardner, p. 76.
quire government intervention. Such an effort, especially if it involved active participation by the United States, would arouse determined opposition from the same American groups who opposed the extension of government activity in the domestic sphere."

The framework of contemporary debate then was not over the nature of the world order that the United States should aim at, but over the degree of commitment the United States government should or could afford to make to further its attainment. An important factor in shaping Republican attitudes was the image the Nationalists in particular had of the New Deal, for the term implied extravagance and a lack of real concern for the welfare of the United States. "New Dealers" (and "One Worlders") were suspected both of selling out American interests and of harbouring notions of world domination for which the American people would ultimately have to pay. Thus J. Reuben Clark, Jr., author of the Clark Memorandum, wrote to Herbert Hoover in 1943: "One of the things that disturbs me very much is the plan which seems to be in the making for us to occupy militarily, for a period of years, the whole world after this thing is over, with the sublimely egotistical thought that our present mode of national life is a glorious success and that we should now bring to the world our way of New Deal life. From all that I hear I feel very sure that this thought permeates the Army personnel, at least the officers..."

24 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
25 See Chicago Tribune comments at beginning of Republican Convention in 1944, June 26th, 1944.
I note that the other day the lady who has no responsibility but apparently speaks with authority, made some comment about the great sacrifices that we are called upon to make after the war with the intent of carrying out such a program. The monumental self-sufficiency and self-complacency in such an attitude breeds in me a feeling akin to despair."26 So strong was this notion, that Herbert Hoover's first reaction to the news of the explosion of the first atom bomb in 1945 was to dwell gloomily on the prospect that the New Dealers would now use it to erect their "world state".27

Arthur Vandenberg, the emerging architect of the Republican foreign policy consensus, deferred to no-one in his opposition to and suspicion of the global illusions of the Administration. In 1945, during the debate over the renewal of lend-lease, he gave vent to suspicions widely held by his Republican colleagues:

"I suggest no intention that we shall not do our full part in helping the United Nations to reconstruct a healthy, happy world. But I do suggest that we are neither big enough nor rich enough to become permanent almoners to the whole earth. I add that we face no such obligation, moral or otherwise, despite a tendency in some places, at home and abroad, to assign us automatically to this role almost as though we owed reparations to our allies in return for having made colossal contributions to their victory. I speak in no spirit of complaint. I speak only in a spirit of candor which believes that our very precious international friendships will best survive the post-war strain if we frankly understand each other's problems before they come to crisis."28

26 J. Reuben Clark, Jr. to Hoover, January 15th, 1943, Hoover MSS.
27 O'Loughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, October 12th, 1945, O'Loughlin MSS.
28 Congressional Record, 91, April 9th, 1945, p. 3199.
Vandenberg's concern that American policy be explicitly attuned to American interests, that it "stood up for America", represented both conviction as well as understanding of the nature of his own party. The multilateral world could best be sold to Republicans in Congress, apart from the Internationalists, if it were harmonized with tradition and fundamental American principles, and if it could be shown that the advantages of such a world order to the United States, outweighed the costs of setting it up. This was to prove easier in the political than in the economic sphere. As finally constructed, the United Nations cost little, in terms of traditional reservations about foreign entanglements and the Constitution, or in economic terms. The financial institutions created at Bretton Woods, and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme proved less palatable. To the majority of Congressional Republicans, there appeared, in the words of Senator Brooks of Illinois, a disposition "to give America away on the basis of an hysteria of good will." So also Representative Dewey Short commented, "...I realize in these strained and troublesome days it is unpopular for any of us to speak a word for America or in defence of our own country. The fashionable thing in these trying times, particularly in pink-tea circles and among the striped-trouser boys in the Diplomatic corps, is to think of the ills of all the world and to ignore our people at home. ...One would gather the final impression that we are responsible for most of the world's ills and woe". 

29Ibid., July 18th, 1945, p. 7677.
30Ibid., December 6th, 1945, p. 11571.
To many it seemed that the United States, out of some misguided guilt-feeling, was being asked to make undue sacrifices. They wanted the United States to show more concern for its own interests. "Only a sound, solvent, free America can command the respect and deserve the leadership of the world," Joseph Martin, minority leader, told the House in May, 1945. "If those who would serve the world recklessly weaken this Republic, the best hope for enduring peace and the future freedom and progress of man will come to naught."\(^{31}\) In 1945, the vision of a multilateral world could not, in the eyes of most Congressional Republicans, supplant the more traditional vision of a "Strong America" as the best hope for peace.

**The United Nations**

Under pressure from the Internationalists, and sensitive to electoral realities, the Republican leadership had by the end of 1944 come to accept the notion of American membership in post-war international organization. To the historian, Mackinac and Chicago, and the meetings between Hull and Dulles during the 1944 campaign seem inexorably to lead to San Francisco and the founding of the United Nations. In reality, however, there seemed no such certainty at the time. The Mackinac Charter after all had not specifically committed Republicans to membership of an International Organization, and it had spelled out the hope that peace and security would be based on means other than force. Arthur Vandenberg, the architect of

\(^{31}\)Ibid., May 24th, 1945, p. 4983.
Mackinac, whilst making claims for the courageous statesmanship of his Party, was also regarded, with some justification, as a potential opponent of international organization. Extremely suspicious of the shape of the peace which was emerging from the military campaigns and Head of State diplomacy, he was unwilling to appear to give the Administration a blank check to negotiate with its allies, over the United Nations or anything else.\(^{32}\) His insistence that Lone Progressive Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin, a Nationalist in foreign policy, be a member of the secret bipartisan committee on international organization in 1944 was a sign of his unease. That he was less than enthusiastic about the action of Senator Connally in placing on the committee of eight, the Internationalist Warren Austin, was a further sign of his unease.\(^{33}\) In the event he was surprised that the Administration's proposals were very "conservative" from a nationalist standpoint.\(^ {34}\) Nevertheless, as late as August 1944, he and LaFollette reportedly gave the timid minority leader, Internationalist Wallace White, a rough going over on the question of whether he was prepared to vote for military sanctions to be decided by the United States representative on the Security Council.\(^ {35}\)

Increasingly in fact, the biggest problem for Republican leaders was the build up of support for an international organization which was not to be merely a con-

\(^{32}\)Vandenberg, *Frdale Papers*, pp. 91-5.
\(^{33}\)Ibid., p. 95.
\(^{34}\)Ibid.
\(^{35}\)Poole, pp. 54-5.
dilatory and judicial body, but which was equipped with the means to ensure peace. The concept of an international police force, which was strongly supported by Willkie and the Internationalists, had from opinion polls appeared in 1943 to command widespread support among Republican voters. Apart from Willkie and Stassen, however, it received little support from leading Republicans. At Chicago the Internationalists had threatened to rebel over the unwillingness of Taft and Vandenberg to make explicit reference to the development of such a force. In the event, they accepted the straddle developed by Vandenberg: the new League should "develop effective cooperative means to direct peace forces to prevent or repel military aggression". It had, however, in the spirit of Mackinac, added, that "peace and security do not depend upon the sanction of force alone, but should prevail by virtue of reciprocal interests and spiritual values recognized in these security agreements". The League should "promote a world opinion to influence the nations to right conduct, develop international law and maintain an international tribunal to deal with justiciable disputes".

In succeeding months, there was a noticeable tendency by leading Republicans to play down the "force" aspect of

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37 Porter and Johnson, p. 407. To Dulles, Vandenberg insisted that the word "direct" should be used instead of "mobilize", which, he said, sounded too much like international police force; Vandenberg to J. F. Dulles, June 14th, 1944, Vandenberg MSS.
the proposed organization. Dulles, for example, told the Federal Council of Churches in November that the "force proposals" were mere "scenery", that he did not think they would prove effective, and that they should not therefore be regarded as an obstacle to acceptance of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Vandenberg clearly shared Dulles' doubts. During the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, he commented, "I am one of those who do not believe that our greatest hope for peace lies in trying to put peace in a steel straight-jacket. I doubt whether any hard and fast international contracts looking toward the automatic use of cooperative force in unforeseeable emergencies ahead will be worth any more, when the time comes, than the national consciences of the contracting parties when the hour of acid test arrives". Clearly both Vandenberg and Dulles saw the new League as a device for mobilizing world opinion in favour of certain principles, rather than as an instrument of collective security: in this regard it would be a far less costly means of attaining the liberal world order. Dulles, in particular, had come to put great emphasis on the development of moral force to exert American influence in areas where it could not bring military power to bear. It is also relevant to note that Hoover and Gibson in their book published in 1942 had argued that the international community was too divided to act as a "policeman".

39 Address to Biennial Meeting of Federal Council of Churches in Christ in America, Pittsburgh, November 28th, 1944, Dulles MSS.
40 Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 114.
41 Dulles to Walter Lippmann, October 22nd, 1944, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
Although most Republican leaders could agree in giving the idea of international military force a very low priority, the issue could not be suppressed. At their meeting in August, 1944, Willkie and Dulles found themselves in disagreement over the issue, whilst it, and the related issue of whether Republicans were prepared to empower the United Nations representative on the Security Council with the power to commit the United States to military action, were to be raised in the campaign by Senator Ball, the much publicized, dissident Republican Internationalist. Dewey, after his nomination, made clear his opposition both to the concept of an international police force, as well as to any surrender of the right of the United States, in Congress, to make war. Although he later made clear his belief in membership of an International Organization with the means, including force, to prevent or repel aggression, his insistence that "Congress, and only Congress, has the constitutional power to determine what quota of force it will make available and what direction it will give our representative to use that force", was not enough to free the Republicans of a crucial, but probably false, issue.

The question of Congress' right to declare war was one which could not be avoided. Defense of the Constitution was a fundamental of a "Strong America". In line with the Party's heritage as the custodians of the Whig tradition,

43 Divine, Second Chance, p. 218, 238-40.  
44 Graham, pp. 102, 99-100; New York Times, October 25th, 1944.
most Republican leaders could not easily accept the notion that an appointee of the President should have the authority to commit the United States to collective military action. Vandenberg, however, was looking for compromise. Well aware of the fact that the President had often in the past used force without a declaration of war in the Caribbean area, he was prepared to accept that under the United Nations, the United States might accept the western hemisphere as its primary responsibility; only for declaration of war outside the hemisphere would he insist on a reference to Congress. By the end of 1944, however, no ready solution to the problem had been found. Writing to Dulles shortly after the 1944 election, Vandenberg declared:

"...I still lack a practical formula to implement the constitutional requirement that only Congress can declare war. I fear that this point may be crucial in our public discussions - although as a practical matter...the ultimate use of force against a major aggressor...shall become quite remote." The tone of his letter indicated that a change had come over Vandenberg since the spring: for whatever reasons, he was by the end of 1944 less concerned about the threat which the proposed international organization posed to the fundamental traditions of the United States, and far more concerned about its potentialities as a still relatively cheap instrument for attaining the liberal world order. Rather than emphasizing, as he

45 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 115-19.
46 Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, November 1st, 1944, Vandenberg M33.
had in the past, that a good league could not cure a bad peace, he was coming to see how the right kind of league might indeed help to bring about the kind of peace he desired.

Whilst Vandenberg was undergoing his not unusual conversion from sceptic, to increasingly enthusiastic and constructive supporter, his public image remained unaltered. Despite the results of the 1944 election, which saw the Republican Internationalists in the Senate strengthened by the election of Alexander Smith (N.J.), Wayne Morse (Oregon), and Leverett Saltonstall (Massachusetts), nobody saw membership of a new league as a foregone conclusion: the memory of Henry Cabot Lodge was too strong. Despite the cooperation already achieved, the Administration was distrustful of Republicans such as Vandenberg who had in the past been highly critical of national policy.\(^{47}\) Roosevelt in particular disliked Vandenberg, and wanted Senator Austin to be the Republican representative at the San Francisco Conference.\(^{48}\)

It was against the background of fears that 1945 would see a repetition of rejection of the League of Nations, that Vandenberg rose in the Senate in January to make the speech which in the public mind was to signal his conversion

\(^{47}\) Representative Celler of New York, speaking at a Forum for Democracy meeting listed some 12 remaining "isolationists" amongst Senate Republicans; on his list were Vandenberg as well as two who in the post-war years were to be classed as Internationalists, Aiken (Vermont), Tobey (New Hampshire)., Congressional Record, 91, Appendix, p. 20. Divine, Second Chance, p. 270-1. Note that Austin was very much an administration favourite: Senator Connally had put him on the committee of eight, and he was in 1946 to be appointed to the U.N. Security Council by Truman. In April, 1945, Austin was sent a letter by the President designed to continue to secure his support on foreign policy matters, Truman to Warren Austin, April 25th, 1945, and attached memo, W.D.H. to Mr. Connally, PPF 322, Truman MSS.
from "isolationism". Some of the Internationalists re-
mained sceptical, perhaps regarding him as a Johnny-come-
lately, and perhaps also because they still could not de-
tect a prime commitment on his part to American membership 
of an international organization, nor a willingness to give 
the representative on the Security Council authority to 
vote for action without resort to Congress. Despite these 
reservations, however, they were aware that Vandenberg's 
support could probably carry another eight or ten Repub-
licans in support of a new international organization. 49 
Senator Smith, who was taking a leading part in organizing 
freshmen Senators in support of international organization, 
recognized that Vandenberg's speech had made him a poten-
tial Republican nominee in 1948. 50 

Although the main intention of Vandenberg's speech had 
probably been to criticise the policies of the Soviet Union, 
this was not the way in which it was interpreted. 51 In pro-
posing a treaty to keep Germany and Japan disarmed, thereby 
removing any excuse for Russian domination of the Baltic 
or Eastern Europe, Vandenberg appeared to be making a major 
break with tradition. John Foster Dulles, however, whilst 
praising Vandenberg for being "constructive and positive" 
and for having avoided "the easy way of merely criticizing 
the Administration", pointed out that, "his proposals are 

49 Report, January 12th, 1945, McNaughton MSS. Raymond L. 
Buell to Alexander Smith, January 13th, 1945, Smith MSS. 
51 Tompkins, p. 238.
not sporadic but coalesce with and push forward a pre-existing Republican program." In essence, Vandenberg's proposal would, if implemented, separate the job of policing the Axis from that of establishing the new International organization. By so doing, the international organization would be brought more into line with Republican thinking: it would not be so subject to Big Power domination, it would not primarily be concerned with force or collective security. Dulles, whose relationship with Vandenberg had begun to develop, penetrated right to the heart of this: "The more we free our minds of fear of the German and Japanese menace, the more we will practice the idealism which is an essential ingredient of any worthwhile victory".  

As Dulles remarked, the idea of separating international organization and policing activities was not a departure from Republican policy. Dewey had in fact advanced the idea during the campaign. The idea was also implicit in Herbert Hoover's concept of a "transition period". What Dulles, Dewey, Hoover and Vandenberg had all opposed, was the Internationalist notion that all that was necessary to prevent a recurrence of the cycle of the last twenty years, was to secure membership of a new League. Disturbed by rumours of the peace that was emerging, a number of Republicans had in 1944 echoed Hoover in urging that the

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52 Press release, January 11th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
53 Ibid.; Divine, Second Chance, pp. 217-8; the idea of a division between the policing and International Organization had been developed at the Dewey-Dulles press conference, August 19th, 1944; State of New York, Public Papers of Thomas E. Dewey, Fifty First Governor of the State of New York, 1944.
United States hold off from committing itself to any international organization until it had seen the shape of the peace. Such urgings, however, were far too reminiscent of 1919-20, and widely interpreted as "isolationism"; in response to pressure, Thomas Dewey had gone beyond this in his commitment to international organization in the campaign, whilst also advancing the notion of a separate treaty to keep the peace.

The attractiveness of the idea of separating the keeping of the peace from the United Nations was then that it was in harmony with the concept of "A Strong America". Vandenberg, in offering the Russians a defense treaty, had not, as some Internationalists readily understood, suddenly become converted to the philosophy of "One World". He certainly had no more desire than ever to see American identity and interests subsumed in an all-powerful international organization. By his formula, Vandenberg seemed to have found a way of maximizing American influence and bringing about the kind of liberal world order all wanted. In all essential matters, the United States would still retain freedom of action; he was neither ready to disavow independence or self reliance, any more than he was ready to commit large scale resources to attain the liberal world, but a treaty to disarm Germany and Japan was a small price to pay if it would ensure a "just" peace, and an inter-

54 Wayne Morse described Vandenberg's speech as "sloppy thinking". Report, January 12th, 1945, McNaughton MSS. The Internationalists, led by Austin, were worried that Vandenberg's and similar initiatives might block Dumbarton Oaks; Diary, January 10th, 1945, Smith to John Foster Dulles, Smith MSS, January 19th, 1945.
national organization concerned primarily, not with collective security, but with the pursuit of international justice. According to the report, Franklin Roosevelt was impressed, but sceptical: "I'm in favor, too, of a treaty for perpetual disarmament of Germany... but it's a lot easier to write in a speech than on a paper with a seal on it."  

Vandenberg's speech marked his emergence as the principal Republican spokesman on foreign affairs, a role which undoubtedly appealed to his vanity, as well perhaps as giving him an opportunity to remove his "isolationist" image, and to counter the opposition he was likely to meet in the 1946 primary. Although it would be uncharitable to seek to explain conduct solely in those terms, it would be foolish to ignore the fact that Vandenberg was up for re-election in 1946, that he had seen in 1944 what happened to Senators with an Isolationist reputation, and that there were some 400,000 Poles in Michigan to whose interests he had for some time been sensitive. In December, he had written to a political associate in Michigan regarding rumours that he was not going to run, and rumours of opposition to him. "I do not intend to make it easy for any other Republican to undermine me," he wrote.  

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55 It is unlikely that Vandenberg envisaged a major policing role under his proposed treaty; the Republican platform and Dewey's campaign had in 1944 committed Republicans to bringing the troops home as soon as possible; at Yalta, Roosevelt intimated that they would not stay in Europe more than two years.  
56 Report, January 12th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Vandenberg to S. R. Banyon, December 4th, 1944, Vandenberg MSS.
regard to Dulles' impending visit to the Economic Club in Detroit, that he would "selfishly" like his constituents to hear from Dulles that he (Vandenberg) was "highly placed" on the small special committee cooperating with the State Department and was "trying to take a thoroughly constructive viewpoint in respect to it. I frankly (and probably selfishly) hope that you can refer to our relationship as a fine example of the fact that there is a sound middle ground (between extremists at the right and left) upon which we can hope to proceed in organizing the postwar world for peace." In becoming a "statesman", Vandenberg did not abandon his skills as an astute politician.

In his Senate speech, Vandenberg had taken his beloved "middle position". What he might lose in support from followers of the Chicago Tribune, disturbed at his advocacy of an entangling alliance, he had partially offset by the emphasis he had put on the speech in standing up for American interests and principles, as well as in his thinly disguised criticism of the Soviet Union. Such, however, was the mood of the time, that the speech was seen, not as a pragmatic reassertion of American national interests, but as a sign of Vandenberg's conversion from "isolationism", and as a good omen for American membership of a new league. Vandenberg himself was surprised by the effect the speech had; like Dulles he did not see it as a radical departure from previous positions, and he expressed to his wife the quaint wish that "somebody would

59 Vandenberg to Dulles, January 4th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
60 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 138-44, deals with press reaction; the Chicago Tribune felt that the Republican Party was breaking up, January 12th, 1945.
psychoanalyze it. Psychoanalysis, although outside the scope of this study, might perhaps have been more profitably applied to the journalists who publicized the speech. It is ironic in the extreme that Dewey in 1944 should by advancing a fundamentally similar position in relation to America's allies and international organization, have been seen as potentially another Harding, whilst Vandenberg was now inclined to be seen as another Wilson. The only way in which Vandenberg had gone further than Dewey was in his proposal that under the treaty to disarm Germany, military enforcement would not be dependent on Congress declaring war. Even this, however, had not been precluded by Dewey in 1944. From the Nationalist viewpoint, Vandenberg's proposal had advantages, for a limited treaty circumventing Congress was preferable to an international organization in which all collective action was exempt from Congressional assent.

Vandenberg's speech was probably most important because of the fact that it confirmed his emergence as a leading Republican spokesman on foreign policy. By making him a figure to be bargained with, it forced Franklin Roosevelt to include him as a delegate to the San Francisco Conference despite Roosevelt's personal preference for the Internationalist, Warren Austin. Two Republican Internation-

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61 Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 144.  
62 Dewey, at Minneapolis in October, 1944, had left the matter open, emphasizing that the decision on the quota of force and the discretion Congress would give the United Nations was for Congress alone to decide. All he had warned against was any attempt to ride rough-shod over Congress as he alleged had been tried in 1919., New York Times, October 25th, 1944.  

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alists were, however, invited, Charles Eaton of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Harold Stassen. The latter's appointment was controversial: he ostensibly was chosen to represent young servicemen, but his appointment was seen as a slight on the Dewey entourage, and it also caused some concern to the Nationalists who were hostile to Stassen's advanced Internationalism. Stassen himself reportedly regarded his selection as a political liability, but to confirm his party regularity let it be known that he would consult with leading Republicans, including Vandenberg and Dewey. The invitation to Vandenberg, though unavoidable, put Vandenberg also into a quandary. Aware that he could not afford politically to refuse, he was also concerned that he should not go along as a stooge, and was especially sensitive to the Polish situation. "He is sweating plenty," Senator Burton Wheeler (Dem. Montana) was reported as saying, "He doesn't like it, but he'll have to go along now". To Dulles he wrote, undoubtedly embarrassed by the failure of the President to invite either Dulles or Dewey, "I do not think the Republican Party can make a graver blunder than to decline Senatorial cooperation (under appropriate circumstances) when it is tendered by the President in a critical case of this nature and at such a critical moment." "The fact is," commented Cal O'Laughlin, "he could not be kept away from San Francisco."

63 Arthur Krock column, New York Times, February 23rd, 1945; Report, February 22nd, 1945, McNaughton MSS; Chicago Tribune, March 11th, 1945; O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, February 17th, 1945, O'Laughlin MSS.
65 Report, February 16th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.
66 Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, February 17th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
67 O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, February 17th, 1945, O'Laughlin MSS.
Vandenberg's stipulation that he be given assurances of freedom of action at San Francisco, especially in view of his concern at the Polish situation, was initially ignored by Franklin Roosevelt. Vandenberg, however, delayed acceptance until he had received explicit assurance early in March.\(^{68}\) At the same time, Vandenberg helped to engineer the appointment of his by now close friend, John Foster Dulles, as an adviser to the delegation. To accentuate the political nature of his appointment, Dulles resigned as chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, and made it clear that he was not attending as a church representative.\(^{69}\) Thus, by holding out for full freedom of action, and by securing the appointment of Dulles, Vandenberg had significantly altered the balance of the Republican delegation at San Francisco away from the Internationalists; the manoeuvrings with Franklin Roosevelt had confirmed what the 1944 election and Vandenberg's January speech had suggested, that Republican cooperation could not be attained if the Internationalists were to be taken as representatives of the Party.

Vandenberg's attitude to international organization had undoubtedly developed since early 1944, but this did not represent a fundamental change in his conception of foreign policy. Agreeably surprised even in 1944 by the "conservatism" of the Administration's thinking, he had come to see international organization as a useful instrument to help to bring about the liberal world order, rather than as a

\(^{68}\)Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 149-54; Report, March 1st, 1945, McNaughton MSS.

\(^{69}\)Divine, Second Chance, p. 273.
threat to the enduring fundamentals of "A Strong America". To a friend in March, he defended his decision to cooperate with the Administration in terms of the national interest:

"I agree with you that America must consult her own self-interest in all these ramifying postwar international enterprises which are on the trestle board. I do not intend to see the whole picture before we proceed. I do not intend to sacrifice America to a world dream. I do not propose to part with any essential 'sovereignty' and I do not say that any such surrender is involved so far as Dumbarton Oaks is concerned. I heartily join you in the thesis that we are not rich enough to endow the earth. I shall hope to continue on guard against any such jeopardies. At the same time, I cannot make it too clear that I think America has a supremely great 'self-interest' in preventing World War 3 and I am prepared to go a long way in the prevention of that calamity."

Convinced that the United States could not by purely unilateral action insulate itself from another war, which technology would make even more of a threat than the present war, Vandenberg had come to see international cooperation as the best solution. In addition, he had gone some way towards the internationalist position in his willingness, as he indicated in the above letter, to commit some resources, as opposed to mere words, to international cooperation; but the other side of the coin was to be his insistence that the United States protected its own interests, and no longer hesitated before expressing its point of view. In this sense, Vandenberg had not departed from the concept of "A Strong America": as he repeatedly made clear to those of his associates who questioned his action, he was not going to San Francisco to betray his principles.

Vandenberg to Harry G. Hogan, March 26th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
Increasingly, in fact, in the face of criticism, Vandenberg sought to emphasize that he and other Republicans intended to make "justice" their contribution to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals: "If there is any difference in the approach of the two major parties toward this new Peace League," he wrote, "I have been trying to identify "JUSTICE" as the Republican demand and the Republican contribution."\(^7^1\) In the aftermath of Yalta, this was a sound political tactic, which was echoed by both Dulles and Dewey in public.\(^7^2\) By participating, Republicans could avoid what Vandenberg described as "just about equivalent to committing suicide in public"; by identifying themselves with "justice", they could claim both to the Nationalists and to distressed ethnic groups, that they had not sold out their principles.\(^7^3\)

The pursuit of justice overseas was both politically sound and consistent with the Republican tradition. Dulles in the 1930's had been sceptical about its place in diplomacy, describing phrases such as "enforcing morality" as the "stock in trade" of those seeking to defend vested interests; at the same time, he had seen the development of an intelligent public opinion, "as a moral force" as valuable, and the use of moral condemnation by governments as useful at times for protecting a nation's interests.\(^7^4\)

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\(^{71}\) Vandenberg to James S. Kemper, April 13th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.

\(^{72}\) See Dewey's Lincoln Day speech in Washington D.C., February 8th, 1945, New York Times, February 9th, 1945. Dulles told the Foreign Policy Association in March that Dumbarton Oaks should be amended by the addition of "an ethical spirit of justice"., March 17th, 1945, Dulles MSS.

\(^{73}\) Vandenberg to Harry G. Hogan, March 26th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.

\(^{74}\) Gahin, p. 45; Dulles, War, Peace and Change, pp. 87-8.
By 1944 his apparent earlier contradictions had been resolved: to Walter Lippmann, he had written of his conviction of the necessity of the United States using moral force, even where it could not use physical power. In fact, Dulles' earlier analysis was more honest: concepts of "justice" are not universal, in so far as any nation or group of nations seek to extend its or their concept of "justice", it will inevitably bring itself into conflict with other organizing principles. This was essentially what was at issue in 1945. By insisting that the United States amend Dumbarton Oaks to satisfy its concept of "justice", Vandenberg and other Republicans were insisting that the Administration do what, in their verdict, Wilson had failed to do, that is, stand up for American interests and principles. In return, Vandenberg could assure the Administration, and other nations prepared to cooperate, that under his leadership the Republicans would not obstruct American participation in the new league. Since there was no real disagreement in the United States over what constituted "justice", Vandenberg had little difficulty in securing the assent of the State Department and the Administration to the amendments he proposed. He also received support from the British and Australian Foreign Ministers. The question mark, however, hung over the attitude of the Soviet Union, which saw Vandenberg's identification with "justice" not unnaturally, as an expression of hostility. "Ten days ago," wrote Vandenberg towards

75 See page 95 above.
76 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 157, 163-4, 168-71. A number of Senators, including Connally (Dem. Texas) and George (Dem. Georgia) reportedly felt that "...to expect that Russia will bow to Vandenberg is stretching the imagination"., Report, March 16th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.
the end of March, "Moscow radio spent fifteen minutes in a personal attack exclusively on me as being the greatest 'menace' at Frisco. Perhaps this is the Russian response to my well advertised point of view regarding 'justice' as the basis for permanent peace. Perhaps it is a preview of San Francisco. If it is the point becomes all the more important. We shall see what we shall see." 77

Apart from the desire to introduce the concept of "Justice" into Dumbarton Oaks, the Republican leadership was concerned both to strengthen the proposed General Assembly, and to secure acceptance of the principle of treaty revision. In so far as they tended to play down the peacekeeping elements of Dumbarton Oaks, the attempt to increase the significance of the Assembly, which had no endorsement functions, was consistent. As the "town meeting" of the world, where all nations would have an equal voice, the Assembly might be expected to counter the tendency of the Security Council to be dominated by "power politics". The concern for small nations was central to the concept of "Justice"; Republican leaders could apparently see no possible conflict between the United States' role as a Big Power and its championing of the rights of small nations. 78 Republican leaders believed in unity amongst the major powers as a basis for peace; but they also wished to alter the balance of major power agreement in their favour. Paradoxically, and whether by intention or otherwise,

77 Vandenberg to Harry G. Hogan, March 26th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
78 Dulles reportedly told James Forrestal that he did not think small nations should be allowed to express opinions on all international matters, Millis, pp. 57-8.
a strengthened General Assembly could only strengthen the United States among the major powers.

Treaty revision was seen as of fundamental importance, in view both of the widespread suspicion of agreements already made, as well as in the light of "lessons" drawn from World War I. Commenting on Yalta, Dulles said that "... decisions taken in the heart of war will inevitably fall short of high principles". It was, therefore, all the more necessary to get "the right kind of world organization. It must be an organization which, in addition to having power to prevent aggression, must also seek to correct in the future, the inevitable mistakes of the past." 79

The idea of treaty revision had of course long been emphasized by Republican leaders as the basic cause of the failure of the League. Seeing international organization more as an instrument for peaceful change than for collective security, the concept of treaty revision was central. 80 It had the added advantage of promising an eventual way out of the peace which was emerging in 1945; to the Poles in particular Vandenberg offered this hope: a stiffer United States policy, combined with the right kind of international organization, might eventually be of use to Poland. 81

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79 Press release from Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, February 25th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
80 Hoover and Gibson, saw the failure to make Article 19 of League Covenant a reality, as one of the most serious failures of the League of Nations, op. cit., pp. 266-72.
81 Vandenberg to Frank Januszewski, May 15th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.

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Walter Lippmann's charge that he was confusing "peace keeping" with "peace making", Vandenberg replied: "...I seek only to make certain that...we are not intending to make the colossal blunder of putting peace in a strait-jacket and of offering no means of correcting injustice, if there be such, in the present peace settlements (or in any other situation) except by the very process (war) which we presume to discourage".82

By the time of San Francisco, the odds in favour of Senate ratification of the proposed new league were very high. On the Republican side, the acceptance of Vandenberg's amendments was crucial; yet even before that, many, including Vandenberg himself, were aware of the consequences of seeming to be an obstructionist. In February, Herbert Hoover sketched out the alternatives to Alf Landon; accepting that the "yearning" for peace was becoming stronger, he saw the establishment of an international organization as certain: "As it is planned now it has many faults and weaknesses that are dangerous both to peace and to our country. But to remedy things we must try to amend the faults and weaknesses, not go out in just blind and futile opposition to the central thing we all want - a workable, effective machinery that will at least help preserve peace".83 On the problem of the liberated nations, he offered advice similar to that which Vandenberg was to

82Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 157-8.
83Hoover to Alfred Landon, February 18th, 1945, Hoover MSS.
offer critics: "Nothing you and I can do will get them free, but perhaps if Dumbarton Oaks was a court to which they could appeal they may have a chance for the future. To take this attitude of withdrawing from the whole mess at this time would get no support from the American people, and it would be only a futile gesture to urge it."\textsuperscript{84}

Such in fact was the strength of "International" conviction in 1945, that only the very brave or the foolhardy could envisage opposing it. With some annoyance at the high pressure methods the Administration and press were using to sell multilateralism to the American people, the majority of Republicans in the Senate seemed to be moving towards support of the new league.\textsuperscript{85} Even the revelation that Stalin had been promised three votes in the General Assembly could not slow the momentum.\textsuperscript{86} The death of Roosevelt and the accession of the hapless Truman made the outcome less uncertain. Inspiring less fear or hatred than his predecessor, Truman could better count on the nation to unite behind him in a time of crisis. Vandenberg for one endorsed Truman's decision to go on with the San Francisco Conference. To postpone San Francisco, wrote Vandenberg, "would have confessed to the world that there is a 'indispensable man' who was bigger than America".\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{84}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{85}For Taft's criticisms of propaganda, as well as statement of intention to vote for Dumbarton Oaks proposals, \textit{Congressional Record}, 91, May 3rd, 1945, p. 4128.
\textsuperscript{86}For account of this, see Vandenberg, \textit{Private Papers}, pp.159-62.
\textsuperscript{87}Ibid., p. 168.
On April 21st, he and Senator Conally (Dem. Texas) set off with the good wishes of most of their Senate colleagues. At San Francisco, Vandenberg was to be in the happy position of being regarded as essential to Senate ratification. Although ratification seemed almost inevitable, Vandenberg could probably have defeated it had he wished, albeit at a cost to himself and the Party. That he had no intention of doing so did not seriously weaken his bargaining position. On arrival, he declared that his mail had shown him that the G.I.'s wanted collective security, and felt that it was in the interests of the United States to play its part. At the same time, they were "equally insistent that they do not want the flag hauled down from the dome of the capital and they do not want America's legitimate self-interest hauled down in the process."

His re-statement of what, borrowing from Clare Luce, he called America First Internationalism, was an accurate description of the Republican consensus which he had helped to shape, and of which he was the principal representative at San Francisco. All the aims which he and Dulles set for themselves at San Francisco were designed to strengthen the position of the United States. The new league he saw within the framework of American interests; he was looking for a commitment to "justice" as the aim of the United Nations Charter, increased authority for the General Assembly, treaty revision. He also was a strong opponent of the Russian attempt to secure a veto over Security Council

88Ibid., p. 171.
discussion, as well as concerned to provide an outlet for regional security arrangements. Above all, he wanted to bring an end to what he regarded as the appeasement of Stalin. On Russia he was consistent to the point of rigidity: impatient with Harold Stassen who appeared to want to step down over the veto dispute, he saw the issue as "symbolic of an infinitely larger problem involving American international prestige". "America Wins!" he exuberantly recorded in his diary when the veto dispute was resolved: "In my opinion, this victory this afternoon far transcends the limited sphere of the actual decision itself. I think it restores a sinking American prestige at home and abroad; that it gives the new Peace League a chance; and that it recommends an American Foreign Policy which stands up for our viewpoints, our ideals, and our purposes. I think it also shows just how we can get along with Russia." Vandenberg's underlying assumption was consistent with the imperative of a "Strong America". Whether he was telling Ed Stettinius "to be the Secretary of State", or, in another context, writing to his wife, "...Americans can't surrender," he did not deviate from the conviction that America must operate from strength. Convinced of his country's rectitude, an American and an "appeaser" were to him contradictions in terms.

89 Ibid., pp. 173-4; Vandenberg to Edward Stettinius, May 5th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
91 Ibid., pp. 208.
92 Ibid., pp. 192-219.
The American performance at San Francisco pleased Vandenberg. He exultantly told the press, even before the conference had finished, that he expected no trouble over Senate ratification. "I got much more in this charter than I came out here to get," he said. Much of the credit for the liberalizing of the charter he attributed to his friend John Foster Dulles, whom he described in his diary as "the most valuable man in our entire American set-up. . . . Nominally just an 'adviser', he has been at the core of every crisis. His advice and his labours have been indispensable. I do not know what we should have done without him. . . . He would make a very great Secretary of State." As a result of San Francisco, Vandenberg felt that not only had he and Dulles succeeded in liberalizing the Charter, but they had witnessed a changing attitude to the Soviet Union established by President Truman and Secretary Stettinius. In his diary he wrote, "It has been the crowning privilege of my life to have been an author of the San Francisco Charter. It has an excellent chance to save the peace of the world if America and Russia can learn to live together and if Russia learns to keep her word." In his euphoric mood, Vandenberg could even find it in his heart to forgive Harold Stassen, who had opposed him at crucial stages of the American delegation's discussion.

94 Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 215; see also, Alexander Smith to Dulles, July 2nd, 1945, Smith MSS.; Transcript, interview with Andrew W. Cordier, pp. 2-5, Dulles (Oral).
95 Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 216.
of regional security and the veto and who was suspected by some of seeking a political issue with Vandenberg.95 For his part, Dulles expressed his satisfaction with the Charter and reciprocated Vandenberg's admiration. It was, he said, a far more "human" charter, than that proposed at Dumbarton Oaks.97

The work of Dulles and Vandenberg, irrespective of whether they were as important as they assured each other, ensured the endorsement of the Charter by leading Republicans. Dewey, after a conference with Dulles, called for full Senate ratification. Hoover also endorsed it; though not completely satisfied, he shared the feeling that it was better than Dumbarton Oaks.98 Even the Chicago Tribune found it difficult to oppose: "The San Francisco Charter, altho' a fraud, is probably for the most part an innocuous one," it commented.99 An Associated Press Poll published in June indicated that resistance to the United Nations Charter amongst Senate Republicans was waning.100 Amongst those revealed as "probable" supporters were Senators Brooks

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95 Ibid., pp. 215-6; Vandenberg Diary, May 30th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS. After San Francisco, however, he appeared to take some pleasure from the fact that the section of the Charter on Trusteeship, which Stassen had been responsible for, provoked a great deal of unease in Congress; Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, July 3rd, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.

97 New York Times, June 26th, 1945; John Foster Dulles to Vandenberg, July 10th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.


99 Chicago Tribune, June 27th, 1945.

(Illinois), Hawkes (New Jersey) and Millikin (Colorado), all of whom had previously been numbered amongst the likely opponents. 101

Undoubtedly Dulles' efforts at San Francisco to ensure that an amendment was accepted which specifically precluded United Nations interference in domestic matters had helped to allay some remaining fears. 102 Still, however, there remained the question of military or sanctions enforcement, which had never been settled by Republicans in 1944, and which involved the question of Congress' right to declare war, and the degree of latitude to be allowed the American representative on the Security Council. 103 Even Harold Stassen did not believe that the American representative on the Security Council should have complete freedom to commit American forces and materials to collective action. 104 The question of collective security then remained the key, divisive issue as it had in 1944. At the short Foreign Relations Committee hearings it was persistently raised by Senator Millikin, who took advantage of the invitation extended to all members of the Senate to attend. 105 Dulles, called by Vandenberg as "our ablest and most valuable expert", made it clear that though he himself was not in favour, he accepted the right of the United States to impose conditions on the use of forces put at the disposal of the

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101 Report, June 21st, 1945, McNaughton MSS.
103 Vandenberg to J. F. Dulles, July 3rd, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
105 Divine, Second Chance, p. 305.
Security Council. Vandenberg, who like Dulles had noticeably changed his position since 1944, defended the Charter provision for the use of troops in peace keeping operations against charges that it circumvented Congress' right to declare war by pointing out that the President had the right to do this anyway, and had done so 72 times in 150 years. Against this, however, Hoover, in a radio broadcast, whilst urging ratification of the Charter, and pointing out that it involved little commitment beyond any that the representative on the Security Council might enter into, also said that Congress must not part with its power to declare war.

Much of the heat was taken out of the controversy during the Senate debate in July by virtue of the fact that ratification of the Charter was a separate matter from the question of military commitment: under the Charter, military agreements were to be negotiated separately, and they would therefore be subject to further congressional consideration. For the most part, the Nationalists, quoting an inadvertent endorsement of their view by Dulles in his Foreign Relations Committee testimony, argued that military agreements must come before the Senate in treaty form, and be subject to the required two-thirds vote.

107 Chicago Tribune, July 11th, 1945.
109 There was some disagreement whether such agreements should come in treaty form or should pass through both branches of Congress by simple majority, Congressional Record, 91, July 24th, 1945, pp. 7987-91.
110 Ibid., pp. 7999-8000.
Taft, however, while supporting the latter view, made it clear that in his view the Senate was in good faith bound to ratify any "reasonable agreement" to implement the force proposals of the Charter. Taft's comment, though lending itself to different interpretation if and when the military agreements materialized, was indicative of the smoothness with which ratification of the Charter went through the Senate. Senator Millikin, for example, who had been full of initial doubts, announced on July 16th, before actual Senate consideration began, that his main worries, retention of American control of its armed forces, concern about Monroe Doctrine and retention of powers of President and Congress, had been allayed by the existence of the veto and by the Foreign Relations Committee hearings. Speaking during the debate, he explained that the existence of the veto meant that it was inconceivable that the United Nations would ever undertake major military action, and that the force proposals would be confined to minor disputes.

Vandenberg had no doubts as to the limited gesture many Senators were making in voting for Senate ratification. To

111Ibid., July 25th, 1945, p. 8028.
112Ibid., July 16th, 1945, p. 7553; Cal O'Laughlin wrote in March that the Big Power veto over the use of force "has taken a good deal of wind out of the sails of the isolationists"., O'Laughlin to Hoover, March 10th, 1945, O'Laughlin MSS. See also, Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 200.
113Congressional Record, July 25th, 1945, p. 8032.
Dulles and to Stettinius he urged the necessity of emphasizing that the forces mentioned in the Charter would be very small, and limited to "policing" rather than war, otherwise he predicted there would be trouble. The "real debate," he said, would be over the use of force and the authority to be given the delegate on the Security Council, rather than over the Charter itself.\footnote{Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, July 25th, 1945; Vandenberg to Edward Stettinius, July 26th, 1945; Vandenberg MSS.}

How far Vandenberg and Dulles were themselves prepared to go in support of collective security is unclear. Both were pragmatic enough to begin by asking what was possible rather than by seeking unattainable goals. Vandenberg in particular could not afford to get a reputation as an "advanced" internationalist: were he to do so the basis of his power would vanish. If Vandenberg could not continue to deliver votes in the Senate, he would be of no interest to the Administration, or conceivably, to his friend John Foster Dulles. Both pragmatism and probably conviction dictated a cautious approach.

Perhaps the most important insight into the constraints which were on Vandenberg and Dulles is offered by an analysis of Taft's speech on the United Nations. Taft's position differed from many of the Nationalists in so far as he professed to be a keen supporter of international organization, which he argued was worth a try to prevent another world war. For Taft the avoidance of war was of fundamental importance, for he doubted that liberty could survive another: "The very money cost of such a war would certainly
destroy freedom in the United States as we understand it, as well as our whole business and financial structure". He disagreed with those who thought of the United Nations as an embryo super-state. For him the essence of the Charter, was that it was based on the principle of sovereignty of all its members. He was, he said, prepared to sacrifice some "external" sovereignty, but he was not prepared to have "America...ruled by a majority of people who have no conception whatever of American ideals, American standards of living or American government". Given Taft's fundamental desire to maintain the independence of the United States, and given his continued belief in the virtual impregnability of the United States, it followed that for him commitment to the United Nations did not justify commitment to world-wide collective security, for "...in spite of much propaganda to the contrary, the oceans are still a great barrier which, with an all-powerful Navy and Air Force, can protect this country from foreign attack". Taft saw the United Nations then as a "consulting body"; given that concept, he regretted the acceptance of the veto, which he said made nonsense of the idea that a system of international law was being established. All the United States could do, he concluded, was to show the world by example how it should develop peaceful principles of arbitration, and help to mould world opinion behind law and justice. On the crucial issues that

115 Congressional Record, 91, July 28th, 1945, p. 8152.
116 Ibid., pp. 8156-8.
117 Ibid., p. 8152.
118 Ibid., pp. 8153-4.
Vandenberg was seeking to resolve, Taft was unprepared to give the United States representative on the Security Council the right, without recourse to Congress, to commit the United States to policing operations outside the western hemisphere. In the western hemisphere, history suggested that the United States would always use force to defend its interests; in this area then, tradition, United States' vital interests, and American obligations to the wider world community would coincide. Beyond that, it was doubtful that Taft was prepared to go in his commitment to collective security; any other military actions would not be ruled out according to his philosophy, but they would have to be approved by Congress.

Publicly at least, Taft and Vandenberg did not appear far apart. Like Taft, Vandenberg could support the Charter in the hope that it might bring about a better world; he could also agree that the basic aim of the United Nations was the development of justice. At the very least, he told the Senate on his return from San Francisco, small countries would be better off with the United Nations, even if it did reflect the reality of Big Power domination; so also the United States itself had "everything to gain and nothing to lose by giving it support". This, in a nutshell was the lowest common denominator which formed the basis of the Republican consensus. Framed by Hull in 1944 in conservative terms, amended by Vandenberg to try and

120 Congressional Record, 91, June 29th, 1945, pp. 6981-5.
secure the concept of "justice", the United Nations offered much, promised nothing and cost very little. Given this, and given the widespread enthusiasm for "internationalism" that was current in 1945, it was not surprising that only two Senators, Langer (N. Dak.) and Shipstead (Minn.), joined in spirit by the ailing Hiram Johnson (Calif.), could find either the courage or the conviction to vote nay.121

The whole Republican approach to the United Nations had been to play down the "force" aspects of the Charter, an approach which created far fewer problems. The issue could not be totally avoided in this way, because still to be resolved was the legislation implementing the Charter, in which the question of the authority of the representative on the Security Council had to be defined. Vandenberg had first sketched out his ideas on the subject in July: he felt that the United States representative on the Security Council should be allowed to vote for sanctions only on the instructions of the President, and that such instructions should be communicated to Congress which might, though he was uncertain about the constitutional issues involved, vote by concurrent resolution to recall the representative.122 To Secretary of State Byrnes, Vandenberg made his position clear in a public letter in August. They must, he said, have a statute defining the powers of

121 Ibid., July 28th, 1945, p. 8190.
122 Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, July 3rd, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
the Security Council representative, in the interests of executive-legislative cooperation, as well as of preserving "constitutional process". He was, he said, willing to give the President a free hand on the Security Council to commit the agreed American quota of forces, but beyond that it would be necessary to get Congress to declare war to implement a Security Council enforcement decision. He also suggested that the President should send immediate reports to Congress whenever he instructed his representative on the Security Council to vote for force or sanctions. He also later let it be known that in his view the representative should have the rank of ambassador, to emphasize that he had to carry the President's orders out and that he was not free to act on his own initiative.

When the bill, S1580, implementing the United Nations, was introduced into Congress in November, Vandenberg made it clear that it had his full support; it was, he said, a test of America's good faith, and with deterioration in the world situation, it was important that America spoke with one voice. Taft, however, was not satisfied. Although denying rumours that he intended offering an amendment preventing the Security Council from using armed force without

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123 A. H. Vandenberg to James F. Byrnes, August 5th, 1945, New York Times, August 6th, 1945. He also suggested that the U.S. and its Latin American allies take on exclusive responsibility for policing in the Western Hemisphere: "I doubt whether we shall ever want other armed forces to enter this area."

124 Report, October 20th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.

125 Congressional Record, 91, November 26th, 1945, p. 10975.

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reference to Congress (through the United States veto), he nevertheless was, as always, concerned about careless delegation of power to the executive. Taft therefore offered an amendment designed to lay down the guidelines regulating a United States vote on the Security Council for sanctions, especially stipulating that any such vote should be "in accord with international justice as well as international peace and security". Although his amendment was lost, 18-41, the majority of Republicans present supported him, with only five joining Senator Vandenberg in voting against.

Not liking what he regarded as the preoccupation with the use of force, Taft also offered other amendments, including an amendment requiring the Representative on the Security Council to urge immediate action to limit armaments and prohibit the use of atomic bombs, rocketry and poison gas. Finally, he offered an amendment to limit the President's power in cases of economic sanctions to three months; he feared that by delegating this power Congress gave the President unprecedented powers to control American affairs: including censorship and regulation of economic relations. It was, he argued, "probably the greatest delegation of regulatory power Congress has ever been asked to give the President".

\[126\] Ibid., p. 10966; ibid., November 28th, 1945, p. 11083.
\[127\] Ibid., November 29th, 1945, p. 11166.
\[128\] Ibid., p. 11167; one further Senator (Smith, N.J.), was paired against.
\[129\] Ibid., December 4th, 1945, p. 11406.
\[130\] Ibid., p. 11408.
ments were offered, which suffered similar fates to Taft's. It was clear that the bipartisan consensus had the votes, although there had been significant support for some of the amendments, only six Republicans and one Democrat (Burton Wheeler of Montana) opposed final passage of S1580. To the two original opponents of the United Nations were now added Moore (Oklahoma), Revercomb (West Virginia), Senate Republican Whip, Wherry (Nebraska), and Taft himself. 131 Despite Vandenberg's perpetual fears, it was still considered unpopular to vote against "international" measures. In the House of Representatives, Hoffman of Michigan admitted the difficulties confronting dissenters: "I realize that one who votes against this measure today is about as popular as a carpetbagger in the South immediately following the Civil War. But that is no overwhelming reason, so far as I am concerned. I realize too, that our great statesmen from Michigan are supporting this measure, that the senior Member from Michigan representing the state in the other body, said that this was the great adventure. It is, and it will be. But neither he nor I will ever bear arms to carry out any decision of the Security Council". 132

In the House, which had not been required to vote on the Charter itself, passage of the enabling legislation proved less controversial than in the Senate. Opposition there lacked the respectability which Taft could give it in the Senate. The result was an overwhelming 344-15 vote,

131 Ibid., p. 11405.
132 Ibid., December 18th, 1945, p. 12277.
with 14 dissenters coming from Republican ranks, and one sole Progressive joining them. Few could take seriously the charge of Jessie Sumner of Illinois, that the enabling legislation "gives congressional authority for surrendering the American people to an all-powerful supergovernment which will be controlled by imperialistic foreign governments, England and Russia". Such fears were things of the past.

The party consensus which Vandenberg had developed at Mackinac had stood up well. Sensitive to the Nationalist case, Vandenberg had made sure in all his negotiations with the Administration, that American interests should not be sacrificed to the new league. To his critics, he reiterated his determination not to sacrifice America to utopian dreaming. Given this basic reassurance, he could to some groups try to sell the United Nations as an instrument to attain American objectives, especially in the case of Poland. In such cases the United Nations offered a welcome auxiliary in an area where American physical power was unlikely to be employed. Ultimately, as Vandenberg frequently emphasized, the United Nations could not function as a world policeman: the veto and Big Power disunity could be expected to take care of that. In the final analysis, from Vandenberg's perspective, but not necessarily that of the Internationalists, the United Nations was not of vital importance. It is true that he was proud of his work at

133Ibid., p. 12288.
134Ibid., p. 12281.
San Francisco, and sincerely desirous of making the United Nations work; but he was also realistic enough to believe in keeping his powder dry. One of his main tasks at San Francisco had been to persuade the United States delegation to negotiate provision for inter-American mutual defense arrangements to be allowed by the Charter, pending the wider system of collective security then envisaged. By 1945 Vandenberg was less confident than Taft, and probably Hoover, of the military safety of the United States; but like them, he saw the main hope of the World in terms of the survival of a "Strong America". The United Nations he saw as being no real threat to such a survival; and indeed, he had come to see it as a possible way of maximizing the influence of the United States, and the principles of world order for which it stood. The advantage of the United Nations then was that it demanded little sacrifice; as finally negotiated, it was not inconsistent with the fundamentals of traditionalism.
"A Strong America" and Overseas Economic Expansion

Post-war economic expansion was a central aim of the multilateral peace which the Administration was planning during the war. Economic expansion, it was assumed, would help to bring about a more prosperous and peaceful world, would counter collectivist tendencies which had challenged liberalism since World War I, and would contribute to full employment in the United States. Such aims posed no challenge to the Republican tradition.¹ The difficulty, however, lay in the fact that the Treasury Department planners in particular seemed prepared to invest a significant amount of American resources and freedom of action in pursuit of their goal. As R. N. Gardner commented: "They considered that the United States, as the world's foremost economic power, should bear the primary responsibility for reconstructing a freely flowing system of international trade. Perhaps most important, they were prepared to devote a considerable amount of American wealth, influence, and energy toward the achievement of that end."² It was, therefore, the costs of multilateralism, in all aspects, which were to prove an obstacle to Republican leaders. The Internationalists were for the most part prepared to follow the Administration in pursuit of the liberal world economic order, and some saw

¹Beard, pp. 419, 431.
this as being consistent with the Republican tradition. Russell Davenport, for example, argued that "...the classical Republican foreign policy grew directly out of their domestic policy. We must now go to work on this all over again. If we are to revive a free economic system, the foreign policy must play a major role. That is what the Republican era (as I have called it) understood so well". Fortune magazine put it similarly in 1946: "...if we set aside the petty promises of lesser Republicans and concentrate on the major promise of their party, that promise comes down to this: belief in a dynamic and expansive American capitalism can yet be welded to the spirit of broad internationalism. But more: a dynamic capitalism may indeed be the one way in which U. S. internationalism can be given practical expression".

The Nationalists, however, were unimpressed. In the whole field of foreign economic policy, the major critic was Senator Taft. Critical often of the political aspects of policy, Taft could nevertheless avoid a major part; foreign economic policy, however, impinged more directly on domestic policy which he considered his preserve. The reaction of Taft and the Nationalists to economic multilateralism was to serve as an important limitation on the development of post-war foreign policy, for Taft's views were shared by virtually all senior Congressional Republicans who were to be put in strategic positions as a result of the 1946 elections.

3Russell W. Davenport to Alexander Smith, May 22nd, 1943, Smith MSS.
4Fortune, July 1946, p. 2.
Taft's reservations about the foreign economic programme stemmed, intellectually if not politically, from his unwillingness to accept the premise of the indivisibility of freedom. Rather than seeing the pursuit of the liberal world order as being vital to the United States, Taft was inclined to see its pursuit as being fatal to domestic freedom, as he defined it. His fears about the dangers of such a programme to the United States led him to question every assumption of the expansionists. He questioned the view, for example, that economic factors were likely to cause future wars, suggesting that the Balkans, the Baltic and Poland were more likely causes of conflict than was poverty in India and China. He denied also that expanding overseas economic commitments were likely to create good-will; with the growth of socialism and communism overseas, he felt it was more likely to be resented. The U. S., he felt, would become imperialistic, contrary to its whole tradition and way of life. Aside from these larger questions, he was sceptical as to whether foreign trade was as important to the United States in terms of narrow self-interest as the Internationalists claimed; and rather than fearing that unemployment would be the great scourge of the post-war years, he feared that there would be inflation as a result of unsound fiscal policies. Like all his generation, Taft's views derived from his experiences and perception

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5Congressional Record, 91, July 12th, 1945, p. 7441; Ibid., July 28th, 1945, p. 8156; Kirk and McClellan, p. 163.
6Congressional Record, 91, July 12th, 1945, p. 7442.
7Ibid., April 4th, 1945, pp. 3219-3221.
of World War I. Reading Hoover's war-time study, America's First Crusade, brought back "the complete shamelessness with which the Allies went after our money". In view of his perception of the New Deal, his fears about post-war economic policy were not surprising.

An insight into Taft's critique of post-war foreign economic policy is afforded by a study of Henry Hazlitt, Will Dollars Save the World?, which Taft apparently sent to his friends as required reading. Hazlitt's book argued that the policies European countries themselves pursued were of far more importance than any economic assistance the United States gave, and in familiar terms stated that the best contribution the United States could make to world economic revival was by "making its own economy sound and strong and free. . . ." Amongst its proposals was that international lending to be restored to private finance, which was contrary to the plans of war-time Treasury planning, and a vigorous defense made of capitalism against both communism and socialism. Hazlitt also sought to defend himself and those who thought like him from the charge of "isolationist" in ways which undoubtedly appealed to Taft and Hoover:

". . .those who believe that, in place of government loans, the barriers should be removed to private loans, and that our private lending markets should be freely opened up to foreign borrowers, are in fact the true internationalists. They see economic internationalism as the freedom of individuals in all lands to deal freely with each other, to buy from and sell to each other, and to do all this without having to run to some nationalistic-minded government bureaucrat for a special license for every transaction.

8 J. T. Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 285.
9 Ibid., p. 384.
"It is a completely false internationalism that sees dealings between nations as primarily dealings between the governments of those nations, as dealings between different groups of nationalistic bureaucrats, each preventing their own citizens from buying in the cheapest market, selling where they can sell most profitably, lending where their capital can be widely used and properly safeguarded, and being allowed to indulge in their own charitable instincts instead of those of the bureaucrats in charge of them.

"It is a false internationalism which can only interpret 'international cooperation' as meaning that the United States must be the perpetual innocent Candide among nations, or must act toward other nations like a rather soft-headed Santa Claus. It is a false internationalism that looks upon 'cooperation' as a wholly one-sided affair in which one nation must lend or give without having anything to say about how its loans or gifts shall be used. It is a false internationalism that ignores or represses the freedom of individuals in one nation to buy or sell, lend or borrow, or cooperate as they please with individuals in another nation. It is a false internationalism that assumes it to be the responsibility of the government, rather than of the individual importer, to get the foreign exchange necessary to make his purchases."11

To Taft the first vital step in the attainment of a prosperous world was the restoration of freedom at home by putting an end to the New Deal. The latter, in his view, was synonymous with waste, high taxes, unsound monetary policies, and the expansion of government at home and overseas. Given his prime aim and his disavowal of the concept of the indivisibility of liberty, his inability to compromise with the Administration over foreign economic policy is understandable. For in his view, the result of the Administration's policies would be loss of freedom and economic chaos at home, and no good purpose would be served abroad. In April, 1945, he said, "I do not believe that a nation which relies on another nation to assist it indefinitely is

11 Ibid., pp. 78-79.
doing itself any good. In short, I do not believe that American dollars can make the world go round; and any government that has that idea can easily wreck the finances of this country and destroy our own standard of living, without doing anyone else any good.". 12 So once more, the bed rock of Taft's foreign policy was "A Strong America". "Nothing in the economic field", he told the Senate in July, 1945, "can be so helpful to peace as the adoption of sound fiscal policies and sound policies for the development of industry and employment in the United States."13

To a large degree, Taft's reservations about New Deal economic and fiscal policies at home and abroad were shared by Herbert Hoover. Both men initially had high hopes that President Truman would change the course on which the United States had been set since 1933; but both were soon to be disappointed. In May, 1945, Taft expressed his disillusion to Hoover: "Truman," he wrote," will be as much a New Dealer as Roosevelt. . . . Especially he seems to be embracing the spending policies of the New Deal and the making of huge loans abroad to keep up our employment in this country. I can only hope that he does not acquire the popularity of Roosevelt for election purposes". 14 In October, 1946, Herbert Hoover expressed similar fears to General MacArthur, whom he hoped would return and save the country: "... We are in a muddle between left-wing and right-wing thinking. The left-wing

12 Congressional Record, 91, April 9th, 1945, p. 3222.
13 Ibid., July 28th, 1945, p. 8155.
14 J. T. Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 302. For business perception of Truman as a conservative, see Lisle A. Rose, After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Scribner's, 1973), p. 90.
Regimentation of recent years has created a million bottlenecks in production and distribution and is at last breaking down in shortages of food and other supplies in the midst of plenty. The Administration still holds to the Roosevelt notion that it is possible to have totalitarian economics and at the same time preserve other freedoms. Yet the Government goes on spending as if the economic system could carry this burden of taxes forever.15

In the Internationalist climate of the immediate post-war years, the views of Taft and Hoover were unfashionable. Walter Lippmann found Taft illogical. National Republican leaders, said Lippmann, were well aware that the Party would get nowhere as long as Congress was dominated by men like Taft and Joseph Martin.16 Senator Smith (N. J.) confided in his diary that post-war economic relations and not the U. N. would be the big post-war issue in the Party; it was, he wrote, a question of whether the United States desired "to expand economic relations with other countries or contract?"17 The fact was however, that in Congress the Taft position was the dominant one. Its strength inevitably impinged upon the policies and preferences developed by Dewey, Dulles and Vandenberg. Although Dulles and Dewey were committed, if not in detail in principle, to post-war economic expansion, Vandenberg had still left himself plenty of room for manoeuvre. Considering himself a fundamentalist, he was

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15 Hoover to General MacArthur, October 17th, 1946, Hoover MSS.
17 Diary, July 21st, 1945, Smith MSS. See also entries for February 16th, February 20th, May 3rd, December 2nd, 1945.
very much in sympathy with Nationalist reservations about the New Deal's perceived intention to "give America away", and he was as determined to prevent this in the economic as in the moral and political spheres.

**International Financial Stabilization:**

The foundation of American post-war economic planning was the International Monetary Fund, an international body equipped with funds to make temporary loans to members whose exchange rate came under pressure, which it was hoped would provide the stabilization between currencies which had been lacking in the inter-war years, and which was an essential of the liberal world order. Negotiated at Bretton Woods in 1944, the same conference also agreed upon a World Bank, an organization designed to lend funds for economic reconstruction.

Unlike the United Nations, the IMF and IBRD were not the product of extensive bipartisan negotiations, although uninfluential Republicans had attended Bretton Woods.¹⁸ Initially at least, not even eastern Republicans were enthusiastic about the Bretton Woods arrangements. Their scepticism was probably a reflection of opposition of the New York banking community, which preferred a bilateral agreement with Britain linking the dollar and the pound, plus a large loan or grant to meet Britain's immediate

financial needs. The Nationalists, on the other hand, were concerned both about the large initial outlay which the I.M.F. in particular involved, as well as the fact that the United States would not have complete control of the money it put into the organization. Taft, in particular, was a prominent early critic of the scheme, feeling that the establishment of such a fund before the world situation had sorted itself out was "to put the cart before the horse". Vandenberg also was initially sceptical, fearful that contrary to intention, the I.M.F. might simply prop up "printing press" currencies, and therefore, promote instability.

Aware of the difficulties that Bretton Woods would bring in Congress, the Administration made minor adjustments in 1944-45, and also initiated an extensive propaganda campaign to create popular support by linking the I.M.F. and I.B.R.D. to the universal desire for peace. Although effective, the campaign was much resented by Senator Taft, who felt that it was unconstitutional for the executive to spend public money to put pressure on Congress. In making his case, Taft quoted a witness before the Banking Committee who had described the country as "pathological internationally". Some senators, said Taft, had said there was no point in opposing the plan since it had so much popular support.

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19 R. N. Gardner, pp. 132-133.
20 New York Times, July 12th, 1944. Robert A. Taft to Fletcher, July 27th, 1944, Fletcher MSS.
21 Vandenberg to Jesse P. Wolcott, July 27th, 1944, Vandenberg MSS.
One opponent of Bretton Woods in the House complained about the way in which those who "...give some thought to the welfare of America are branded today as 'isolationists' and are condemned to the nethermost hell of public scorn".24

Although no major Republican leader was prepared to oppose the legislation, there was an absence of enthusiasm for the Bretton Woods package. John Foster Dulles, for example, declined Dean Acheson's request to testify in favour, since, as he told Vandenberg, he could not support the proposals "without considerable reservation".25 Publicly, however, opposition was muted. Governor John Bricker (Ohio), the 1944 vice-presidential nominee, announced his opposition in April, citing Bretton Woods as evidence that the United States was being guided by Keynes, "the putative father of the spending philosophy".26 Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, was meanwhile trying to build up bipartisan support for the package.27 By the end of May, the House Banking Committee had reported out the Bretton Woods legislation with only three Republican dissenters.28 At the request of Acheson and fellow Under Secretary of State, William O. Clayton, Herbert Hoover evidently interceded with his friends in Congress to pass the legislation as a nonpartisan measure.29 Introduced into the House whilst the San Francisco Conference was in session, the bill was quickly and over-

24 Ibid., March 6th, 1945, p. 1824.  
25 Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, March 12th, 1945, Dulles MSS.  
27 Dean Acheson to Alexander Smith, March 12th, 1945, Smith MSS.  
29 Herbert Hoover to O'Laughlin, June 8th, 1945, O'Laughlin MSS.
wholly passed by the House, with only 18 opponents, all Republicans. With emotional internationalism at its height, the Republicans had been out-maneuvered by the Administration. Acheson, delighted with the result, put the size of the margin down to "the panic of the Republicans over their absurd performance on Trade Agreements. They simply couldn't afford to be against every international measure, so they flocked to a man to vote for Bretton Woods". On the day the House voted, Dewey announced his support for the whole programme of post-war economic internationalism.

Taft, however, remained unimpressed, and in the Senate led a vigorous opposition to Bretton Woods. Writing a minority report from the Banking Committee (signed by four of the seven Republican members), which described the I.M.F. as "merely a waste of money" and the I.B.R.D. as "an extension to the world of the theories so vigorously advanced by Henry Wallace", Taft's major tactic was to argue for delay, to wait until the shape of the post-war world became clear. The six-billion dollars the U. S. was committing to Bretton Woods could, he argued, be a useful bargaining factor in negotiating the peace. In essence, Taft's case was simple: the Bretton Woods proposals were costly, badly thought out,

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30 Congressional Record, 91, June 7th, 1945, p. 5723.
31 Acheson, p. 108. The report of the House Banking Committee carefully linked Bretton Woods to the broad international situation: "The rejection of the fund or the bank would make impossible any further progress on international economic cooperation; and, as many witnesses testified, failure to establish the fund and bank would hamper the efforts now being made by the United Nations to establish an enduring peace structure". Congressional Record, 91, June 5th, 1945, p. 5547.
33 Ibid., July 15th, 1945; Congressional Record, 91, July 12th, 1945, p. 7440-7441; ibid., July 16th, 1945, p. 7567.
and not geared to the national interest. He could also argue with some justification that the United States was being asked to put up its money in faith that other countries would agree to remove currency restrictions: he preferred to withhold the money until the world had shown its real intention to cooperate in the establishment of the liberal peace. Taft's attempt to delay final consideration on Bretton Woods received enthusiastic support from many of his colleagues, although unsuccessful, 28 Republicans voted for his motion to postpone until November and only eight (including Vanden-berg) opposed. On a further amendment motion, designed to change the articles of agreement of the I.M.F. by making withdrawals contingent upon compliance with the removal of exchange restrictions, Taft again carried more than a majority of Republicans. In presenting his amendment, Taft attacked Britain and the Soviet Union as economic isolationists and indicated his particular concern at Britain's currency restrictions. Although fighting a hopeless battle in terms of defeating the bill, Taft was clearly representative of majority opinion amongst Senate Republicans, and probably in the House. Senator Ball, an Internationalist who nevertheless had some sympathy with Taft's position, sought to patch up a compromise. Accordingly he offered an amendment directing the U. S. governor on the I.M.F. to propose to the Board an amendment restricting the drawing on the fund by those nations who retained exchange restrictions after three years. On this he was supported by Vandenberg, who

34Ibid., July 18th, 1945, p. 7680.
36Ibid., p. 7753.
37Ibid., pp. 7776-7777.
welcomed the proposal as underlining that ultimately those who made use of the fund, would have to "complete their end of the bargain".\textsuperscript{38} Vandenberg's support was consistent with his own philosophy, and politically astute: as always he was prepared to use American bargaining power more than the Administration seemed inclined. He was prepared to support constructive amendments, but not those which would in effect imperil the whole enterprise.

In the course of the Senate debate, only four Republican Internationalists had supported Bretton Woods against every amendment, but on the final, 21 Republicans voted for the bill, whilst 14 voted against and three were paired against.\textsuperscript{39} But Taft's defeat did not signal even a majority conversion to Internationalism. Some Senators were undoubtedly prepared to go along, as Taft had alleged, because they saw no point in incurring unpopularity by opposing a measure which was bound to pass. The votes on the amendments had revealed the full extent of reservations about the whole foreign spending programme. Those who, with Senator Smith of New Jersey, were prepared to accept the whole international programme propounded by the Administration as an act of faith were in a very small minority. Smith wrote that his disagreement "with Bob Taft's able analysis was in the premise that there was no necessary connection between the political setup of the San Francisco Charter and these economic proposals. In my own judgement, most of the basic causes of wars are economic, and unless we are willing to tackle our trade

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., p. 7779. The amendment was lost 29-46, but only 7 Republicans voted against it; \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., p. 7780.
problems and our monetary stabilization problems in a coopera­tive way with the other nations of the world, I doubt very much we will make very much progress toward the ultimate goal of world peace".\textsuperscript{40} Although Vandenberg had voted with the Internationalists, with whom he was increasingly identified, he had played a minor role in the debate on Bretton Woods; deferring to Taft, he had showed himself willing to compromise with Taft's position. In his willingness to combine the vision of the Internationalists with the Nation­alists' concern that American interests be made explicit, Vandenberg was the perfect broker. Vandenberg's relationship with Taft over matters of foreign economic policy could never be easy; yet he was ideologically close enough to Taft to be an authentic Republican spokesman, and an increasingly indispensable figure in the development of American foreign policy.

The Tariff

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme, which Secretary of State Cordell Hull had developed since 1934, played an equally important role in the conception of a multilateral peace. This programme was designed to increase American exports by the delegation of power to the President to reduce tariffs in agreement with other nations on the most favoured nation principle: the programme was designed to use American bargaining power to create a world economic system in which bilateral agreements, and agreements between limited groups

\textsuperscript{40} Alexander Smith to W. Randolph Burgess, July 24th, 1945, Smith MSS.
of nations, such as the Imperial Preference, would be outlawed. 41

The Administration's attempts to secure tariff revision, were arguably the most controversial of the whole foreign economic package so far as Republicans were concerned. Historically the Republican Party had always been associated with high tariffs. 42 In the 1920's, at the height of American overseas economic expansion, Herbert Hoover has defended the protectionist American tariff at the same time as he was striving to acquire free international access to raw materials and to push overseas investment. 43 The Republican tradition then encouraged trade and economic expansion, but not the import of goods which the United States could produce itself. Although Republicans had originated the Reciprocal Trade Agreements policy in the nineteenth century, it had been designed then in bilateral terms for use against member nations to secure trade concessions for the United States. 44 The major disagreement that Republicans had with the Hull programme, was that it was not explicitly enough linked to American trade interests, that it was too universal and visionary in its concept.

The 1944 platform expressed the traditional policy on the tariff. Whilst looking in general terms to the expansion of world trade "to repair the wastes of war and build an enduring peace", it also reiterated the need to protect farmers, workers, industry and livestock producers by a

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41R. N. Gardner, pp. 16-22; Lloyd C. Gardner, p. 25.
42Beard, p. 431.
44Beard, p. 209.
fair protective tariff, so that living standards should not be lowered by competition with cheap labour. This, said the platform, represented the "primary obligation", although the Party would "join with others in leadership in every cooperative effort to remove unnecessary and destructive barriers to international trade". But the conclusion reiterated that Republicans would "always bear in mind that the domestic market is America's greatest market and that the tariffs which protect it against foreign competition should be modified only by reciprocal bilateral trade agreements approved by Congress".\footnote{Porter and Johnson, p. 411.} The last sentence was a clear rejection of the Hull trade programme, with its emphasis on delegation of power to the executive, and its most-favoured nation agreements. In his first press conference after winning the 1944 nomination, Dewey had announced that he favoured reciprocal trade agreements: "You mean the Republican reciprocal trade agreement program which Secretary has been carrying out. That has always been a Republican policy, which Secretary Hull has carried out ably, and which I hope the Republicans will continue to carry out."\footnote{Cited in House of Representatives, May 22nd, 1945; Congressional Record, Vol. 91, p. 4873. It was a recurring trait of Dewey's to claim Republican credit for policies he approved of; thus the Moscow Declaration was once described as the implementation of Mackinac, bipartisanship was his own creation, whilst the end to "appeasement" of the Soviet Union was the work of Vandenberg and Dulles.} It was apparent, despite the attempt by Thomas Dewey in 1944 to paper over the cracks, that the R.T.A. programme would cause difficulty. The Administration's decision in early 1945 to press Congress for a three year extension to the programme, to give the President authority to reduce or increase rates by 50\%, inevitably posed problems for the Republicans.
As it quickly became apparent, the Nationalists, firmly entrenched in Congress, were not disposed to sacrifice their traditional position on the tariff. The fact that the debate took place against the background of the San Francisco Conference and a general disposition in the country towards "internationalism" in the summer of 1945, appeared to make little difference. Harold Knutson (Minnesota), ranking Republican on the House Ways and Means Committee, and an implacable opponent of the whole multilateral peace appeared to reflect the dominant sentiment. To him it was a prescription for unemployment in the United States, for it would open the country to competition from cheap labour. In 1934, he chided, the proponents of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Programme had argued that it would solve the problem of unemployment, in 1937 they had said it would help preserve peace, now they said it would restore peace. To the argument that a failure to pass the bill would mean a breach of faith with the world, Knutson supplied the usual answer: "...America can best help the world by being prosperous and strong and we can remain neither if we surrender our home markets to the pauperized labor of all the world".47 Like many of his Party, he was rankled by the inference that anybody who opposed this and other "international" measures was an "isolationist": "An isolationist is one who believes in looking after his own country and his own people first. Churchill is one of the biggest isolationists of the day, and so is Stalin, and I hope to God I am, because I believe in looking after the American people. I believe in

47 Ibid., p. 4884-5.
the full dinner pail just as I believed in it 40 years ago." Only one Republican was brave enough to speak on the floor of the House for the bill, and he was given a rather rough ride by his colleagues. The tariff was debated in an acrimonious, partisan atmosphere, with only seven Republicans joining the Democrats against a Republican motion to re-commit the bill, which was lost by 212 votes to 181. The majority of Republicans held out to the end, voting heavily against final passage, which was carried on May 26th by 239 votes to 153.

The Senate also appeared unlikely to offer any comfort to Republican Internationalists, for there also the Republican members of the Finance Committee voted with Democratic dissidents to strike out the discretionary 50% authority in the tariff bill. Commented Cal O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, "... it was apparent that Dewey's endorsement of the measure failed to influence them. This shows where he stands with the Party of which he is nominally the titular leader." Internationalist Republicans were, in fact, distressed at the situation which was developing. At one point, Senator Smith of New Jersey began to develop doubts as to the wisdom of trying to get R.T.A. through in 1945. He argued, in an analysis reflecting the optimism of the time, that if they waited a year, the high tariff people would be on the defensive because of the high prestige of San Francisco.

48 Ibid., p. 4878.
49 Ibid., May 25th, 1945, p. 5090.
50 Ibid., May 26th, 1945, p. 5165-6; Ibid., May 27th, 1945, Appendix P. 2600.
51 O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, June 9th, 1945, O'Laughlin MSS.
52 Alexander Smith to Raymond L. Buell, May 2nd, 1945, Smith MSS.
Smith's friend, Raymond Buell, although not committed to R.T.A. specifically, had in February stressed to Herbert Brownell, National Chairman, the fundamental importance of tariff reduction, "to prevent foreign trade all over the world from falling into the hands of government trade monopolies, which means economic totalitarianism". Without tariff reduction, he had argued, Dumbarton Oaks would not succeed. Not surprisingly then, he disagreed with Senator Smith, arguing that the United States could not afford to wait, for it would only create uncertainty. He felt that if leading Republicans, including Dewey and Stassen, and he thought Hoover, who had all attacked high tariffs, "allow Republican policy to be dictated by the isolationists in Congress, the results to the party I think will be serious". He argued plausibly that the "old guard protectionist wing in the Republican Party has no other place to go. The strategy of the Republicans should be to go after the independent internationalists and liberals". However much Buell might have been able to harden the resolve of Senator Smith, and perhaps other Republican Internationalists, his arguments were unlikely to affect the Nationalists. Senator Smith was to find re-election in New Jersey in 1946 more difficult because of his support of Reciprocal Trade Agreements.

53 Copy, Raymond L. Buell to Herbert Brownell, February 27th, 1945, Smith MSS.
54 Raymond L. Buell to Alexander Smith, April 30th, 1945, Smith MSS.
55 Raymond L. Buell to Alexander Smith, June 5th, 1945, Smith MSS.
56 Chairman of New Jersey Republican Finance Committee to Alexander Smith, September 10th, 1946; Smith to Maxwell M. Upson, February 19th, 1946, Smith MSS.

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As in the other elements of the multilateral peace, the main Senate opponent was Robert Taft. As usual his arguments were persuasive. Every point made in favour of R.T.A. he met: he could not accept that the U.S. needed the bargaining power it would derive from R.T.A., since it already had plenty because of the rehabilitation needs of other nations; he could not accept that R.T.A. was necessary to prevent England going into the collectivist bloc, and thereby diminishing the prospects of a world-wide free economy; he was unimpressed by the argument that it was safer to delegate power to President Truman than to his predecessor. Although professedly an opponent of high tariffs, Taft tended to see R.T.A. as a measure supported by left-wingers to destroy the balance of the American economy, and then to argue that industrial concentration required greater regimentation. Thus Taft disputed the Internationalist thesis that R.T.A. was essential to the survival of the free economic system: like the other "international" measures proposed, it was more likely to imperil freedom in the United States, which was, as always his first concern. Like many Republicans in both Houses of Congress, Taft resented what seemed to him the unrealistic and irrational way in which the United States developed its foreign policies. Britain, he pointed out, showed no intention of surrendering Imperial Preference, but "we are told to guide our economic policy, not in our own interests, but in favour of international cooperation, if you please". He especially disliked the implication, pre-

57 Congressional Record, 91, June 13th, 1945, pp. 6022, 6029-30, 6036.
valent in the summer of 1945, that "anything proposed by
the State Department must be supported, or else we are not
cooperating internationally". 59

With Vandenberg away in San Francisco, the job of re­
futing Taft lay with the small group of uninfluential Inter­
nationalists, one of whom sought to invoke Thomas Dewey and
Alf Landon in support. 60 The group included Smith of New
Jersey, who after wavering for a time, spoke strongly in
support. 61 In his diary he confided that his speech had "made
a real hit" and had shaken up the Party. "God is guiding
me," he concluded. 62 Despite Smith's perception, however,
he appeared to make few converts, at least among his own
Party. On the vital attempt by Taft to eliminate the 50%
discretionary authority, Taft secured a total of 29 Repub­
lican votes recorded and paired for. Only nine Senators voted
against; 63 16 Senators, including Taft, opposed final pass­
age, with another five paired against. 64

At a later time, Senator Smith was to refer to the
vote over R.T.A. as decisive in dividing liberal Republicans
from the rest, and to provide an insight into the thinking
of the group of Internationalist Republicans, of which he
was proud to be a member:

59 Ibid., June 19th, 1945, p. 6255.
60 Ibid., June 13th, 1945, pp. 6041-6042.
61 Ibid., p. 6025.
62 Diary, June 16th, 1945, Smith MSS.
63 The nine were Aiken (Vermont), Austin (Vermont), Ball
(Minnesota), Buck (Delaware), Ferguson (Michigan), Morse
(Oregon), Saltonstall (Massachusetts), Smith (New Jersey),
Tobey (New Hampshire); Congressional Record, 91, June 19th,
1945, p. 6258.
64 Ibid., p. 6364.
"There are many Republicans today, especially in the Senate who share my view that the world situation is entirely changed since World War II, and we must face the future with a new, clean page. Who those Republicans are can be surmised from the vote in the 79th Congress on the Reciprocal Trade Treaty extension. . . As I recall the Reciprocal Trade vote in the 79th Congress, the Republicans were divided about evenly, with the so-called international Republicans all voting for the extension of the Act without the Presidential limitation, and practically the same group voted for the Bretton Woods Monetary Plan.

"What motivated us was not so much the merits of the legislation, as our insistence that we must support every measure that showed the United States as ready and willing and eager even to collaborate in any international movement for the preservation of peace. For example, take my own case. I never understood the implications of the Bretton Woods proposals clearly enough to have sound judgement on those proposals from the standpoint of their scientific value, but I did vote for those proposals because they evidenced the willingness of the United States to go along with other nations of the world in trying to set up an over-all program for monetary stability."65

To the Internationalists, international cooperation had seemingly become an end in itself; their opponents, they were convinced, were living in the past. Thus Smith was later to represent himself and his group as "upholding the program of international cooperation to preserve the peace, with all that implies, as opposed to the old reactionaries who have tried to pull us back into a blind ostrich isolationism".66

Still, however, the Internationalist perspective was a minority one in the Congressional party; the majority of Congressional Republicans remained convinced of the prime importance of a 'Strong America'. In the course of the

65 Alexander Smith to Otto T. Mallery, July 11th, 1947, Smith MSS.
66 Alexander Smith to Philip LeBoulillier, December 8th, 1948, Smith MSS.
Reciprocal Trade Agreements debate, Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, summarized this position:

"Around the corner there is peace or war. I believe that America should be made as strong economically, as strong militarily, and as strong politically as it is humanly possible to make it. I believe that only in that way can America become the real lighthouse of the world, with its gleams of light radiating through the nations of the earth. Peace will then come. If we weaken American industry we do not help the world. All the world is looking to us, not simply for the dollar, but to see whether, in peace, the American idea will stand as it stood in war: or whether in peace, collectivist or totalitarian ideas which have come out of Europe can overcome the American idea. A healthy America will permit the American idea to remain supreme."

The debates and roll calls in Congress revealed that Internationalism as an act of faith left most Republicans unmoved, especially when questions of appropriating American money were concerned. To get majority Republican support, foreign policy required to be framed in a more explicit Nationalist framework, a fact which increasingly made Vandenberg indispensable as a broker both to Republican Internationalists and the Administration.

Post-War Loans

The major emphasis of American post-war planning was on mechanistic international institutions and multilateral tariff reduction to provide a framework for peace and prosperity. At the same time, however, it was also recognized that in the period after the war, before the emergence of the stable political and economic order necessary for a multilateral system, there would be numerous demands from American allies for grants and credits to aid reconstruction.

67 Congressional Record, 91, June 13th, 1945, p. 6045.
Rumours of such loans abounded from the time of the Quebec Conference in 1944, when to the dismay of Cordell Hull and Secretary of War (and former Republican) Henry Stimson, the President agreed to make some six billion dollars available to Britain, partly through post-war lend-lease. Apart from the rumours of post-war aid to Britain, there were similar reports of a Russian request for post-war aid, and in February, 1945, a lend-lease agreement with France was published which looked suspiciously like a post-war measure.

The rumours, inevitably exaggerated, caused a great deal of concern amongst Republicans from all sectors of the Party, and seemed to corroborate the suspicion that the New Dealers intended to establish their world W.P.A. and that they were unaware of the limits to American resources. Cal O'Laughlin had reported to Hoover that the proposal to aid Britain was likely to run into trouble: "Indeed, if the anti-British sentiment which now exists should be intensified - and Republicans do not forgive Churchill for aiding the President's reelection - the proposal is apt to be thrown into the Legislative discard". Before this even, Arthur Vandenberg had sounded a cautious note about post-war loans in general: "Beyond primary relief, I think our

70 See, for example, comments of Mr. Woodruff (Michigan), Congressional Record, 91, March 13th, 1945, pp. 2142-3.
71 O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, November 4th, 1944, O'Laughlin MSS.
participation in foreign rehabilitation should be on a strictly business basis in the post-war period. We should extend credits; but they should be sound credits and not a mere bookkeeping (sic) device by which we find ourselves ultimately paying for our own exports (as in 1920-8). We have a very rich country; but it is not rich enough to permit us to support the world". 72

Because of the rumours, and underlying concerns, both about the wastefulness of the Administration and the increasing debt, the renewal of lend-lease in 1945 was to prove controversial. In order to remove the doubts, the Administration appeared willing to compromise, and accordingly accepted an amendment by the minority members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee precluding the use of lend-lease for post-war relief and reconstruction. 73 Acceptance of the amendment assured a relatively easy passage in the House, with Representative John Vorys of Ohio, a Nationalist, almost fulsome in his praise of the majority for having been prepared to adjust its views. In his view, "any foreign policy in order to have general support in this country must have the support of the kind of people, the kind of Congressmen, who were against going to war, and who are determined not to turn over vast, unlimited powers to the Executive in peacetime, before or after a war". 74 Lend-lease was accordingly passed by an overwhelming 354-28 majority, with 27 of the dissidents coming from Republican ranks. 75 Among the select

72Vandenberg to Allen Shoenfield, July 3rd, 1944, Vandenberg MSS.
73Congressional Record, 91, March 13th, 1945, pp. 2120-2121.
74Ibid., p. 2121.
75Ibid., p. 2152.
group was Representative Knutson of Minnesota, who proclaimed, "you can go up to Canada and get all the beef you want, without points, without any restrictions. The reason is that Britain is not buying much beef up in Canada. She likes American beef with that lend-lease flavor." 76

In the Senate, Taft provided far more formidable opposition. Unlike the majority of House Republicans, he was not satisfied with the amendment that had been put in at their request, since it was nullified by a clause which, in effect, excepted any agreement made before the end of the war. He cited the recent lend-lease agreement with France, which he argued would almost certainly prove to be a post-war loan, since it was unlikely that any of the goods would reach France before the end of the German war. 77 Taft's main objection to the extension of lend-lease in 1945 was on constitutional grounds: he felt that it delegated to the President a virtual blank cheque to make post-war loans. 78 In the course of debate it also became clear, as in the other foreign economic legislation in 1945, that he was fundamentally at odds with many of the assumptions of post-war planning. Professing not to be opposed to post-war lending, he was prepared to be specific about the amount the United States could afford: two or three billions in the first year, two billion in the second, and one billion in the third year after the war. 79 He then proceeded to disagree with the economic theories being used to justify post-war

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76 Ibid., p. 2139.
77 Ibid., April 9th, 1945, p. 3202. Under the agreement, France was to pay for any materials that arrived after the end of the war over a period of 20 years.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., p. 3220.
economic expansion overseas: he could not accept that foreign trade was as important to the United States as was assumed; he did not believe that foreign lending was a solution for unemployment, the fear of which he detected behind/spending philosophy; the real danger in the post-war years would, in his view, be inflation, not depression and unemployment. Taft's solution was simple and predictable: post-war progress could only be based on "sound finance". The United States must get back to a balanced budget.  

Although not all Senate Republicans necessarily shared Taft's overall view of post-war economic policy, on the question of lend-lease he received almost complete support in 1945. Especially important was the position of Vandenberg, who like Taft was opposed to any loophole which allowed lend-lease to be used for post-war reconstruction. Although inclined to put more faith in the word of the lend-lease administrator, Leo Crowley, than Taft was prepared to do, Vandenberg was adamant that Congress must have the opportunity to deal separately with post-war reconstruction. Whilst speaking of America's responsibility towards European reconstruction, he also urged the Administration to prepare an estimate of the total commitments, balanced against a study of domestic taxes and expenditures. It was important, he said, that everybody knew what was contemplated, not least so that the world outside should not ultimately be disappointed. As always, Vandenberg was careful to accommodate himself to prevailing party concern: "There is a bottom to

80 Ibid., pp. 3218-3223.
81 Ibid., April 10th, 1945, p. 3244.
82 Ibid., April 9th, pp. 3199-3200.
every barrel, even America's. There is a last straw which can break any camel's back. A bankrupt America can be of no ultimate help to the world". Taft's amendment to the 1945 bill extending lend-lease was lost by the casting vote of Vice-President Truman, who three days later was to succeed Franklin Roosevelt. By carrying the overwhelming majority of Republicans with him, Taft had demonstrated to the man shortly to be President the need for the Administration to tread warily in foreign economic policy. In the first few weeks of the new Administration, a number of Republican members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who had approved the compromise amendment to lend-lease, warned the President in a letter that any attempt to aid the allies through any loopholes in the lend-lease act would have "disastrous consequences".

From the debates in Congress, it was apparent that the overwhelming majority of Republicans were not prepared to oppose loans for post-war reconstruction in principle. At the same time, however, the Republican consensus required that such loans should be geared to the national interest, and that they should be closely scrutinized by Congress. On these fundamentals, Taft, Vandenberg and the House leadership were united. Where Vandenberg was almost certainly drawing away from Taft was over his estimation as to the amount the United States should be prepared to spend. Less

83 Ibid.
certain than Taft of the self-sufficiency, either economically or strategically, of the United States, he was prepared to devote a significant amount of resources to influence the development of a friendly and peaceful world. Still, however, he judged policy from the "standpoint" of "enlightened self-interest". Still he would require a balance sheet to be drawn up, to balance commitments and resources, and to demonstrate the self-interest of the United States. To the committed Internationalist, Vandenberg's thought processes appeared quaint and perhaps even dangerous. One of them, a State Department official, commented in later years, "The Conservative prefers a balance-sheet approach to world affairs even in an age when his ledgers, the metal filing cases that enclose them, and the concrete and steel buildings that house them have a remarkably good prospect of being reduced to radioactive dust during his lifetime". In his view, "the limits of our foreign policy are on a distant and receding horizon; for many practical purposes they are what we think we can accomplish and what we think it is necessary to accomplish at any given time". Vandenberg, however, was never to lose his "conservative" approach to foreign policy. Like Taft, he had been brought up in an environment in which the innocence of the United States in relation to old world diplomats was an undisputed article of faith. He still required great assurances that the United States was not being an "international sap". Unless he could be convinced

87 Ibid.
of this, he would always find it difficult to defend Administra
tion policies to fellow Republicans.

Herbert Hoover, who many Republicans looked to as the

greatest living expert on relief, reinforced the caution
and scepticism of Congressional Republicans toward post-
war reconstruction. Hoover, who was invited to the White
House in May for the first time since the inauguration of
Franklin Roosevelt, could throw all his experience behind
those who urged caution in post-war lending policies. In
September, Hoover outlined his 12 point plan for foreign
aid in a speech in Chicago. The thinking underlying it
was recognizably consistent with his known position as the
dominant Republican in the inter-war years; he had not been
appreciably affected by the multilateralism of the Treasury
planners. Hoover advocated that all loans or credits should
be reduced to commodity terms, that so far as possible sur-
pluses be exchanged with foreign countries, and that this
be done through crediting the United States with local
currencies to be used to purchase commodities when needed.
In addition, he urged, the United States should not forget
the assets of European countries in the United States.

While he agreed on the necessity of a food and fuel programme
before the winter, he felt that the United States must let
the dust settle before committing itself to new aid; to
help, he suggested a 5-year moratorium on inter-governmental
debts. It was clear then, that Hoover was arguing for ex-

88 For the efforts of Henry Stimson to get Hoover to come to
Washington, and his refusal unless explicitly invited by
President Truman, see undated, untitled two-page memorandum
in Henry L. Stimson folder, Hoover MSS.
89 Executive Club News (Chicago), September 28th, 1945, accom-
panying letter, F.J. Bowman to M.J. Connelly, October 4th,
1945, OF 315, Truman MSS.
tremely tough bargaining on the part of the United States. He wanted total commitments to be limited, and for the United States to secure demonstrable advantages, for example, by insisting that there be no discriminatory tariffs, no dumping, no cartels, and no propaganda against the American system. His old belief in disarmament remained as strong as ever: lend-lease weapons should be destroyed, general loans should be avoided because they might be used for armaments and propaganda. Finally, he felt that an agreement should be signed to reconsider the world situation at the end of ten years, to avoid the recriminations of the 1920's.90

Hoover's statement was significant both as the statement of an influential Republican leader; it also articulated a mood which was sweeping Washington in the autumn of 1945, which was reflected in the lack of sympathy which Keynes found for Britain's problems when he arrived to negotiate a loan in September.91 To Hoover, like Taft and the majority of Congressional Republicans, foreign loans were not an economic necessity for the United States. He could not accept the complete identity of world economic interests which the One Worlders seemed to accept. He had no doubt that the United States must help (he of all people would not deny the humanitarian element in the American tradition) but he was adamant that "we should limit our help to what our taxpayers can afford; we should consider our own employment situations; we should limit our aid to the

90 Ibid.
minimum necessary" and also "should do it with the knowledge that we are doing it at a loss to ourselves but to aid mankind from the greatest disaster of all history". Like Van-denberg, and all the Congressional leaders, Hoover emphasized that there was a bottom to the barrel, and that the United States owed it to itself and the world to look after its own interests: "American recovery and financial stability is the first need of the world. Unless we recover, no one will recover". What is more, Hoover was concerned that if by its foreign economic policies the United States impaired its self-sufficiency, that would represent a serious danger to its security.

In the concluding months of 1945 then, the signs were that Republican leaders in Congress, reinforced by Herbert Hoover, were ill disposed to any further overseas expenditure for matters other than humanitarian relief, beyond that already committed through Bretton Woods and the other minor agencies. Many in Congress had been restless for some time. With the war over, they were impatient to get the United States back on to a pre-war and preferably pre-New Deal footing. Attention in particular became focussed on United States foreign relief policies because of criticisms of the inefficiency of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which was financed to the extent of 70% by the United States, and in particular of allega-

93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
tions that it was being used to consolidate communist control in eastern Europe. In the House, Republicans voted with only two of their members opposed, to cut off United States contributions under U.N.R.R.A. to any country which prevented the American press reporting U.N.R.R.A. activities. Vandenberg, while opposing the House amendment, took note of the criticisms of U.N.R.R.A., and indicated that it must be the last year it operated; if further relief was needed, new arrangements must be made. The debate on U.N.R.R.A. revealed not only disquiet with Russia, but also the determination of Congress to keep fuller control of future American expenditure. It was in this climate that Britain and the United States signed their loan agreement in December. After the votes over lend-lease and U.N.R.R.A. in 1945, the omens for its passage were far from good, since the odds were that insufficient Republicans would vote for it to compensate for Democratic defections. "We have given our coat, vest, shirt and pants," said one Representative, "and soon we will have to join a nudist colony."

Summary

Congressional debate in 1945 revealed then that the majority of Republicans, either through conviction or a realistic appraisal of the requirements of party loyalty, were less than enthusiastic about the economic aspects of multilateralism. Desiring to cut government expenditure, sus-

95 Congressional Record, 91, November 1st, 1945, p. 10305.
96 Ibid., December 17th, 1945, p. 12160.
97 Ibid., December 6th, 1945, p. 11572.
picious both of the Administration and America’s allies, they were very sensitive to the possibility that again the United States would be taken for a ride, which was how those who spoke frequently regarded World War I. In the House in particular the leadership was conservative, and eager to take issue with the extravagance and weakness of Administration foreign policy. In the Senate, nobody could challenge the leadership of Taft. Vandenberg certainly did not seem disposed to do so in economic matters: he still shared many of the concerns of Taft and the Nationalists about the dangers of foreign expenditure, as was to be revealed by his misgivings about the British Loan. With Roosevelt dead, the war over and the 1946 elections on the horizon, the Nationalists sensed the opportunity to put America back on the right track. The prospect of a Republican Party led by Taft seemed suicidal to Internationalists. Thus Senator Smith was trying to persuade Vandenberg to be minority leader if Senator White, the purely nominal leader resigned. Luckily for the Internationalists, Senator White remained; it is unlikely that Taft could have been set aside. The strength of Taft and the Nationalists in the Congressional Republican Party was a fact which other Republican leaders, and ultimately the Administration, had to come to terms with.

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98 Diary, December 2nd, December 3rd, 1945, Alexander Smith MSS.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Russian "Menace"

Roosevelt and the Russians

The controversy engendered by Franklin Roosevelt's war-time diplomacy with the Soviet Union has not ceased, even if the grounds of the debate have changed in the three decades since his death. Some writers, along with Republican partisans, have charged him with lack of foresight about Russian intentions, with having been duped by Stalin. Others have argued that by the end of his life he was coming round to the view of the Soviet Union that was to dominate officialdom in the United States in the post-war years. Others have appeared to argue that he genuinely struck up a useful relationship with Stalin, which had he lived, would have prevented the Cold War. Still others, emphasizing the continuity in United States' policy in the 1940's, have traced the Cold War to Roosevelt's own war-time diplomacy, and his desire to extend United States economic and political interests especially in eastern Europe.  

None of these interpretations

1 The historiography of the Cold War defies easy classification; certainly the attempt to divide material into "revisionist" and the rest (unspecified) is unsatisfactory, although it is still in vogue. The current analysis has found the following recent books, of varying interpretation, to be the most useful: John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia, 1972); Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Cold War Critics (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970); Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: men and ideas in American foreign policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970); Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Random, 1968); James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1971); Robert A. Divine, Roosevelt and World War II (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1969); Lisle A. Rose, After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Scribner's, 1973).
are totally satisfactory, and ultimately none are verifiable. There is ample evidence to substantiate each thesis, provided one is prepared to overlook the conflicting evidence. Two major difficulties, however, stand in the way of satisfactory verification of the hypotheses suggested: 1) Roosevelt died in 1945, yet all the interpretations are based on a knowledge of and a positive attitude to later developments; ii) each of the interpretations lends an orderliness to Roosevelt's actions that overlooks both his pragmatism, and even the near chaotic nature of his administration of affairs.

If the larger issues are historically unanswerable, there are some things which can be said with certainty about Roosevelt's policy toward the Soviet Union. As the war developed, he came to see America's relationship with the Soviet Union as being of increasing importance, not because he desired friendship with Stalin more than with Churchill, but precisely because he was aware of Stalin's suspicion of the Anglo-Americans. At the same time it is apparent that his cautious attitude to domestic pressures combined with the military strategy of the war, prevented any settlement with Stalin of the festering Polish and Baltic problems, and therefore reduced American bargaining power without increasing Soviet good will. Exactly how he envisaged the post-war status of Poland and the Baltic States is unclear. Arguably he did not accord the matter first priority, and certainly there is nothing to suggest that he ever intended to use military

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Burns suggests that Roosevelt did not always see the implications of Stalin's suspicion, especially as related to military decisions, pp. 367, 373-4, 455-9, 582-7; he concludes that Roosevelt was both a practical man and a dreamer, but failed to connect the two, pp. 607-9.
force to impose an American settlement on the area; his
awareness of domestic pressures against land commitment in
Europe was too strong to envisage that as a serious alterna-
tive. The most logical explanation is, as numerous critics
said in 1944 and after, that he had no clear policy, that,
as Burns suggests, he had an ultimate goal, but no real con-
ception of how to get there. His ultimate goal involved a
world in which the large powers, including the Soviet Union,
cooperated in keeping the peace. Such a goal, as he may have
perceived, would involve the United States making domestically
unpopular adjustments, for ultimately the liberal world and
close collaboration with the Soviet Union were contradictory:
this was the fundamental problem of American post-war plan-
ning. 3

It is apparent that a major determinant of policy towards
the Soviet Union was Roosevelt's perception of the domestic
political climate, and especially of the sensitivity of the
various ethnic organizations, most significantly, the Polish
Americans. In the face of the perceived threat from Hitler,
public opinion in the United States swung wildly pro-Russian,
a fact which, like Roosevelt's postponement of the settlement
in eastern Europe, was full of danger for the future. The
illusion of a democratic Soviet Union, where, according to
Life magazine, "Russians look like Americans, dress like

3 Dean Acheson was critical of the unreality of Cordell
Hull's planning, see page 111 above; George Kennan was simi-
larly critical of the unrealistic views held of the Soviet
Union by the Treasury Department, which seemed to think
that the Soviet Union would willingly become part of the
multilateral economic system, Kennan, pp. 293-295.
Americans and think like Americans" was a distortion which may have satisfied the needs of war-time unity, but was not a reliable basis for post-war Soviet-American adjustment. A rose-tinted image of the Soviet Union was part of the "internationalist" syndrome of the time (just as after the war the counter-image of the Soviet Union was to be), with critics of the Soviet Union naturally suspected of being "isolationists". Joseph Davies, former ambassador to Moscow, apparently welcomed the controversial film, Mission to Moscow, because "within six weeks after the first showing... all of the leaders of the Republican Party... made public declarations against Isolation, which the picture so eloquently preached against".  

An important aspect of the domestic political situation was, however, the attitude of the leading Republicans to the Soviet Union. It was important to Roosevelt because of the 1944 election, his sensitivities towards the ethnic groups, and because of his fear that he might run into the same domestic problem as Woodrow Wilson. After Roosevelt's death, the importance of the Republican attitude towards the Soviet Union was to increase. "History" suggested the need for a bipartisan policy, which would have to be formulated in such a way as to win Republican support. It also suggested, with the outcry against the continuance of war-time restrictions, and public demands for demobilisation, the probability

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4Gaddis, p. 38.
of a return to "normalcy" and the restoration of Republicans to political power.

Republican Leaders and the Soviet Union: To 1944

The attitudes of Republican leaders to the Soviet Union, at least for the duration of the war, may best be analyzed within the framework already established. In terms of the Republican tradition, of which the Nationalists were the custodians, there was no doubt how Republicans should view the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1920's, Republican Presidents had resisted any idea of diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. In the eyes of many Republicans, Roosevelt's recognition of Russia and his domestic policy were two sides of the same coin: both were considered the result of left wing influence, and a challenge to true liberalism.

Among the most steadfast opponents of the Soviet Union was Herbert Hoover, a grim observer of the process in 1941 by which the United States had become involved in support of Britain and then the Soviet Union, against Hitler. When the Germans attacked Russia in 1941, he was quoted as saying, it "makes the whole argument of joining the war to bring the Four Freedoms a gargantuan jest". In his view it provided "one-half a dozen more reasons for the United States to stay out of the European war". The announcement that

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lend-lease was being sent to the Soviet Union he greeted with the comment that to align the United States on the side of "Stalin and his militant communist conspiracy" would be "as great a violation of everything American as to align ourselves with Hitler". Victory, he commented, would simply consolidate Stalin's hold on Russia, and provide further opportunities for the extension of communism in the rest of the world.\(^8\) To Henry Stimson, Hoover wrote that the United States should at least secure agreements from Stalin to give independence to those countries taken in agreement with Hitler, but he feared "the administration will not approach this situation in the light of grim reality but in the light of our left-wing lamps".\(^9\) To Bruce Barton's sarcastic comment that since Stalin was now their ally they should "apologize to Earl Browder for having put him in jail and let him out to lecture at Columbia and attend Bishop Manning's church", in Hoover replied: "...Certainly it is not keeping with our national policy to keep him in jail when we are trying to establish that particular brand of human kindness".\(^10\) In August, 1941, along with Alfred Landon, Charles Dawes, Felix Morley and other leading Republicans, Hoover put his name to a manifesto urging Congress to stop the slide into war, especially since Russia's entry meant that it was no longer a clear-cut struggle between liberty and democracy.\(^11\)

\(^8\)Quoted by Lyons, p. 366.
\(^9\)Ibid., p. 367.
\(^10\)Bruce Barton to Hoover, June 30th, 1941; Hoover to Bruce Barton, July 7th, 1941, Hoover MSS.
\(^11\)Johnson, p. 189; McCoy, Landon, 472-3.
In 1941 then, Hoover was absolutely clear on the issue of relations with the Soviet Union. He could not see how support of Stalin against Hitler could serve American interests. He was not reconciled to the continuance of communism in the Soviet Union, let alone to its possible spread elsewhere. Given these convictions, it is hardly surprising that he began to look with less than enthusiasm on the notion of the United States as forming a more permanent association with the Soviet Union as upholders of order in the post-war world. By 1943, with Russia's military position considerably improved, both Hoover and Alf Landon were both becoming apprehensive about Russian post-war aims. Landon even went so far as to advise Republicans not to endorse the Moscow Declaration in October, a statement which Hoover helped to clarify for public consumption: "The Governor is deeply interested in securing a lasting peace but has rightly objected to advance pledges of Republicans to commitments on peace settlements until those proposals are made known. I should expect every sensible citizen, irrespective of party to hold that attitude". Ideologically committed to nationalism, to self-determination and economic freedom, congenitally suspicious both of Roosevelt's secret diplomacy and of the Soviet Union, the Old Guard were by the end of 1943 convinced that they were being proved right by events.

12 Hoover to John Cowles, October 9th, 1943, Hoover MSS; McCoy, Landon, p. 500.
13 Statement by Hoover, December 8th, 1943, Hoover MSS.
The opportunity to express themselves publicly on the matter was limited by the climate of opinion which tended to identify criticism of Russia (or Britain) with "isolationism". But their suspicion of the Soviet Union was reflected in their suspicion of the proposal to put forward an identical foreign policy plank with the Democrats for 1944, and in their opposition to Willkie and the Republican 'One Worlders'. In their view, Willkie merely mirrored what they regarded as Roosevelt's weak kneed subservience to the Soviet Union.  

In 1944, in the wake of rumours about Teheran, the first of the conferences between the three allied leaders, criticism of the Soviet Union became more outspoken. Loudest in condemnation was the Chicago Tribune, which concluded in an analysis in January that the decision by Roosevelt and Churchill to postpone political settlements meant that they "have actually agreed to accept the Russian map". Perhaps not overly concerned about this, the Tribune was concerned about the prevailing notion of post-war cooperation with the Soviet Union: "Any pretense that Josef Stalin has any social or political consanguinity with the Englishman or American is absurd and dangerous altho Mr. Roosevelt came home with just that affectation. It is possible to use such an illusion in fighting a war. As ingredient in a scheme of post-war collaboration an incongruity of such limitless range may fatal". The Tribune had no doubt in 1944 that Russia had effectively won the war, for which it blamed Roosevelt for

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14 See page 61 above.
15 Chicago Tribune, January 3rd, 1944.
16 Ibid., January 18th, 1944.
having neglected America's war and fought Europe's. Roosevelt's actions it explained in terms of electoral considerations in New York State, and his relationship of "utmost intimacy" with Communists.  

Although seemingly extreme in its views, Col. McCormick's Tribune was an index to the concerns of Congressional Republicans. Its respected representative on Capitol Hill, Arthur Sears Henning, reported in May all the rumours that were circulating concerning the Teheran conference held the previous December. The rumours, which seem prescient in hindsight, suggested that Franklin Roosevelt had agreed to divide Europe at the Elbe, that Russia and Britain would insist on American troops remaining on German soil as long as their own, and that they would also want post-war lend-lease and relief from the United States. Henning reported that there was much talk on Capitol Hill of a Republican plank to commit the Party to bringing home all the troops as soon as Germany was defeated. Approving the reports of its Washington correspondent, the Tribune hoped that Republicans would get a candidate and a platform which enabled them to make Teheran an issue in the coming election: "Americans who do not wish their sons to remain in an army of occupation overseas for an indefinite term of years are looking to the Republicans to prevent this from happening. Americans who do not wish their country to underwrite an unstable and

17Ibid., January 31st, 1944, February 15th, 1944, March 9th, 1944.  
18Ibid., May 23rd, 1944.
dishonorable peace from which new wars will inevitably spring are also praying for a...choice between alternative foreign policies".19

In early 1944, suspicion of Head of State diplomacy was intense amongst the Nationalists. Taft in early May at Cleveland had reportedly described American policy as having been "based on the delightful theory that Mr. Stalin in the end will turn out to have an angelic nature and do of his own accord the things which we should have insisted upon at the beginning".20 According to Henning, it was widely regarded as foreshadowing the line Republicans would take at Chicago.21 Earlier in an article in the New York Times Magazine, Taft noted that the United States had no intention of insisting on "the freedom of India or, apparently, even the freedom of the Baltic states or eastern Poland". That, he believed, they were "not fighting for democracy except for our own" clearly did not prevent him from trying to get political mileage out of the issue.22 For Herbert Hoover, meanwhile, the announcement by Stalin of the division of the Soviet Union into 16 Republics meant the "Communistic enslavement of five - and possibly nine - formerly independent nations". The Atlantic Charter, he concluded, had been abolished, add the world was left with three power centres committed to sheer imperialism.23

19Ibid., May 24th, 1944.
20Chicago Tribune, May 9th, 1944.
21Ibid.
23Herbert Hoover to O'Loughlin, February 7th, 1944, O'Loughlin MSS.
The Nationalists then, were confirmed in their Nationalism by their perception of Soviet policy. Ultimately not convinced of the vital importance of Poland or the Baltic, they did not envisage fighting for it any more than did Roosevelt, but they blamed Roosevelt for having got involved on Russia's side, for having neglected the Pacific war, and for giving Russia support without even getting political concessions. In their view, Roosevelt had ignored American interests and principles, and given way to Stalin out of a desire for some kind of permanent peace-time relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. To the Chicago Tribune the very concept of permanent relationships of that sort was fantastic, for "...any one who counts upon permanent friendships among great nations hasn't read history". At the 1944 Convention, Herbert Hoover gave full expression to the underlying hostility of the Nationalists to the Soviet Union. The Atlantic Charter, he said, "has been sent to the hospital for major amputations of freedom among nations". He was greatly applauded for his references to British and Russian imperialism, and to the Republican determination to follow American self-interest also.

If the Nationalists approached the question of relations with Soviet Russia from a highly critical position, derived both from general scepticism about the notion of Big Power collaboration as well as from extreme hostility to communism, the Internationalists were seemingly more prepared to seek

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24 Chicago Tribune, May 27th, 1944.
a working relationship with the Soviet Union. Most prominent in this respect was Willkie, who made no bones during his 1942 visit about the fact that he wished to improve the Soviet Union's image in the United States: he apparently told his hosts that he would remain silent about anything that would create an unfavourable impression in the U. S.. One World was in fact to be one of the most powerful arguments for post-war cooperation with Russia that appeared in World War II. Confident of the vitality of democracy, Willkie apparently had no fears about communism. The United States, he believed, had no choice but to work with the Soviet Union: "...knowing that there can be no enduring peace, no economic stability, unless the two work together, there is nothing I ever wanted more to believe. And so deep is my faith in the fundamental rightness of our free economic and political institutions that I am convinced they will survive any such working together". Fellow Internationalist Harold Stassen reviewed the book for the New York Times, and created some ill feeling by criticising it for failing to stress the dangers of Russian communism as much as the evils of British colonialism. Ironically Stassen himself was to be seen by Vandenberg as being pro-Russian during the San Francisco conference. It was undoubtedly One World which gave Willkie his reputation of being pro-Russian, a

26 Gaddis, p. 39.
27 Willkie, pp. 84-5.
28 Johnson, p. 236.
charge which was to be increasingly levelled at him in the year before the 1944 Convention.

Willkie's belief in cooperation with Russia did not, however, in any way modify his belief in dynamic liberal-capitalism; nor did it reconcile him to a Russian sphere of influence in eastern Europe. What he was equally opposed to, however, with memories of 1920, was the Republican Party seeking to make political capital out of the issue. As much as the Nationalists, he disliked the way Roosevelt conducted his diplomacy. On the eve of the Republican Convention in 1944, he called on the Party to frame a policy which would "recapture America's lost leadership". Roosevelt, he argued, had squandered America's moral and political leadership through ineptness, delay and expediency. Nevertheless he still avoided open criticism of Russia. He, unlike the Nationalists, believed in the Grand Alliance, and wanted it to continue, for the sake of the United States and the world; he also wanted the United States to take a stand on the Atlantic Charter. The two aims would seem to be contradictory, but Willkie was not to live long enough to be forced to make a choice between the two. On Russia, as on other matters, Willkie was virtually isolated amongst Republican leaders. His desire to bring about good relations with the Soviet Union was shared by a few other Internationalists. Senator Austin, for example, resisted the overwhelming hostility

31 See Willkie's suggestions for Republican foreign policy platform, New York Times, June 18th, 1944.
towards the Soviet Union for a long while after Willkie's death. Harold Stassen was to have a famous interview with Stalin in 1947, but was to compensate by an extremely repressive stance on domestic communism. Nobody of any consequence became associated with the Russian alliance in the way that Willkie did; in terms of the political realities in the Republican Party this is not surprising.

More important both for the future of the Republican Party and for the development of American policy were the attitudes of the centre group towards the war-time alliance. Of these, the man with the most clear-cut attitude was Arthur Vandenberg. In his newspaper days, he had supported the Palmer raids and taken an extremist line against internal communism and radicalism in the 1920's. He had in 1933 been one of two Senators to vote against recognition of the Soviet Union. Consistently anti-Soviet in the 1930's, in 1940 he had called on Roosevelt to give assistance to Finland, and to recall its diplomatic delegation from Russia. Significantly, he had called on him to take no such action against Germany or Italy. Vandenberg's background, then, indicated that he would defer to nobody in his suspicion and hatred of the Soviet Union. His sensitivity on this matter was heightened by the existence of a large Polish group in his constituency.

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32 Tompkins, p. 26-7. He also prevented Robert La Follette from speaking in Grand Rapids against the war, ibid., p. 20. 33 Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 31. 34 Tompkins, p. 170.
Virtually from the beginning, of the war, Vandenberg had reservations about the shape of the peace that would emerge. At the time of Molotov's visit to Washington in June, 1942, he confided in his diary, "Moscow has always been a shrewd trader - for Moscow. Will there be any 'four freedoms' left by the time this show is over? Will there be a paraphrase of the 'secret treaties' in World War Number One by which the Allies divided up the spoils in advance of victory and without any knowledge?" At the same time, however, he was mindful of the Russian contribution to the war effort: "I wonder if Russia isn't in position to force almost any 'price' upon us during the balance of 1942 if she really wants to do so! How could either Britain or we refuse? Russia is doing a magnificent job". The realization that the Russian military contribution to the war inevitably strengthened Russian bargaining power was an important factor in shaping Vandenberg's war-time position. He was not prepared, any more than Roosevelt, to take the risk of alienating Russia and fighting Hitler alone; he was not, however, contemplating a sacrifice of American ideals once the war was over; he was regretful that the exact shape of the peace had not been settled by the Allies at the beginning, but "I do not want to wind up fighting this war all alone. If we must quarrel with our Allies, I'd rather do it after victory". Vandenberg, then, was from past experience disposed to distrust the Soviet Union, he was

35Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 32.
36Ibid., pp. 45-6; see also, Ibid., pp. 41-2.
extremely sensitive about Poland and the Baltic, and his whole inclination was to insist that the United States stood up for itself in its international dealings. Against this, was his realization that the United States needed Russia as a military ally; in realpolitik terms it made good sense not to rock the boat until the United States was in a better position to do without Russian cooperation, and this was precisely what Vandenberg was arguing. For him the Russian alliance was a military arrangement; he had no intention of allowing that arrangement to commit him once the war was over. He was, because of his "constant reservations regarding the undisclosed commitments" of the Administration, determined also that the Republican Party should maintain its freedom of action to enable it to criticise Roosevelt's dealings with Stalin.37

The positions of Dulles and Dewey were somewhat less clear-cut. Neither man had perhaps given the matter as much thought as Vandenberg, either in the pre-war or war years. Dulles apparently had favoured recognition of the Soviet Union without reservations or conditions before Roosevelt brought it about in 1933.38 His various writings, however, contained relatively little reference either to Russia or communism. On a war-time visit to Britain, Dulles was concerned at the pro-Russian atmosphere he found there. In March, 1943, he publicly called for decisions in Finland,

37A. H. Vandenberg to Alexander Smith, November 22nd, 1943, Smith MSS.
38Guhin, pp. 91-2.
the Baltic and Poland to be based on values other than power politics. The evidence, such as it is, is inconclusive. For certain, neither Dulles nor Dewey was regarded as friendly to the Soviet Union. Such a reputation on Dewey's part would have imperilled political advancement in any case. Neither, however, is there any evidence of great hostility. If the matter of relations with the Soviet Union did exercise their minds before 1944, there is no evidence of any firm conclusions being drawn, though Dewey later claimed that "neither Foster nor I ever shared Roosevelt's delusions that the Russians were going to lie down and be nice boys". By comparison, asserted Dewey, Roosevelt was "convinced that he was immortal and that he would be able to get along well with Stalin". Despite Dewey's claims, it is difficult to find evidence to support the view that Dulles was any more prescient than anybody else about United States-Soviet relations. In March, 1944, replying to a correspondent who gave him a pessimistic analysis of Russian policy, he agreed that the analysis might be correct, "but I think we must try to find some way to avoid the clash you foresee".

39 Address delivered to Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, New York City, March 18th, 1943, Dulles MSS. 40 Transcript, interview with Thomas Dewey, p. 50, Dulles (Oral). 41 Ibid., p. 51. Dewey's later judgements appeared to be distorted by hindsight; he credited Dulles with having kept the Federal Council of Churches on the straight and narrow by neutralizing the influences of men such as "Bishop Oxnam who was practically for having a merger between the United States and Russia...". 42 Dulles to Nelson B. Gaskill, March 8th, 1944, Dulles MSS.
More reliably, evidence that he had not made up his mind in March, 1944, comes from a letter to Dewey after, on Dewey's behalf, he had been picking Lippmann's brains: "As regards Russia, . . . I do not think anyone can have a very clear conviction as to what Russian policy really is. Certainly the Poles and a large majority of the Catholics feel that the policy is essentially an evil one which we cannot get along with". Not surprisingly Dewey's New York speech in April, 1944, for which Dulles' advice was intended, was similarly cautious. The policing of Japan and Germany, he said, would not have "permanent value unless they fall within the setting of a durable cohesion between Great Britain and ourselves, together, I hope, with Russia and China". Russian relations had not been good in the past, he said, although they were improving; but if they relapsed into the old suspicions after the war, the future would be dark. His speech was presumably designed to meet Lippmann's reported warning that if he did not speak positively of relations with Russia and Germany, "the impression created will be one of negation and strong tendency toward isolation". The manner of his treatment of the issue was, however, characteristically cautious.

In their negotiations with Vandenberg over the 1944 Platform, Dulles and Dewey were prepared to be pragmatic.

43Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, March 30th, 1944, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
44New York Times, April 28th, 1944.
45Ibid.
46Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, March 30th, 1944, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
over the question of self-determination. The draft platform Vandenberg had sent them had committed Republicans to the restoration of self-government "to those who have been forcibly deprived of them and seek their restoration". Commenting on Vandenberg's draft, Dulles and Elliott Bell wrote: "This adopts the most questionable language of the Atlantic Charter. We ought not be and probably will not be indifferent to the forms of government Germany and Japan will choose. It is doubtful whether the platform should seem to commit the Republican Party to restore the prewar status of Poland and the Baltic States and not to divide up Germany". Vandenberg was not entirely happy with the Dulles-Bell-Dewey position; although prepared to exclude Germany and Japan from the benefits of self-determination, he felt that the general "wish" to restore sovereign rights should be expressed: "I do not consider it a commitment to 'restore the pre-war status of Poland and the Baltic States'. It is, however, a gesture in this general direction so far as practicable; and I think we are entitled to take advantage of this tremendous political potential." Vandenberg's letter was written against the background of rumours about Teheran and other war-time conferences. In

47 Memorandum, p. 4, accompanying letter, Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, May 16th, 1944, Dulles M33 (Supplement).
48 Ibid.
49 A. H. Vandenberg to Thomas E. Dewey, May 22nd, 1944, copy in Dulles M33 (Supplement). See also Gaddis, p. 146.
early May, Vandenberg had made reference to this in a Senate speech: "The cause of Poland needs something more than anniversary speeches. It needs constant, relentless sponsorship and fealty in high places. It needs them at Casablanca and Quebec and Moscow and Teheran, and at other supreme conferences to come". The day after Vandenberg's letter to Dewey, Senator Bridges of New Hampshire delivered a vitriolic attack in the Senate on Roosevelt's foreign policy, and challenged the whole notion of the Russian alliance: "...any attempt to corner control of the international organization... is doomed to failure at the outset if appeasement of a lawless and ostracised totalitarian state is made the cornerstone of such a policy". Dewey was not prepared to damn the whole Big Four concept, which alone would have satisfied the Nationalists; but apparently his supporters let it be known that he would withhold any commitment of United States forces to maintain a peace settlement, pending an agreement by the Soviet Union to bring about a just peace in eastern Europe. At the Convention itself, the Resolutions Committee amended the platform to eliminate the phrase inserted by Vandenberg at Dulles' suggestion, to except the Axis from the benefits of self-determination. This meant that the platform as

50 Chicago Tribune, May 4th, 1944.
51 Ibid., May 24th, 1944.
52 Ibid., June 7th, 1944.
finally approved committed Republicans to restore "sovereignty and self-government" to all "the victims of aggression", not just the victims of the Axis. At the time this was interpreted as having special relationship to Russian post-war aims, especially in Germany, eastern Poland, the Baltic States and Bessarabia. If the latent hostility to the Soviet Union did not come to the surface much during the Convention, this was understandable in the light of Republican leaders' desires not to be associated with a negative anti-war, "isolationist" image, but the reaction to Herbert Hoover's speech demonstrated the potential of anti-Soviet rhetoric among the Republican rank and file. Vigorous opposition to the Soviet Union was thoroughly in keeping with the concept of a Strong America which underlaid the foreign policy platform agreed upon at Chicago; that this opposition was not explicit was understandable in view of the fact that the United States was fighting a major war with the Soviet Union as its principal military ally. Other than Willkie, few Republicans appeared to see the maintenance of post-war friendship with the Soviet Union as being of prime importance to the United States or the world; of more importance was the belief that any Russo-American relation­ship should be on terms more deferential to American interests and ideals.

For Republican leaders the question of relations with the Soviet Union was difficult to handle in the 1944 campaign.

53 Porter and Johnson, p. 408.
54 New York Times, June 28th, 1944.
55 See page 202 above.
The nationalists, who had no doubts about Russian untrustworthiness, were a major limitation on any over-enthusiastic embrace of the Big Four idea. At the same time, however, the majority of Americans were apparently in a mood to trust the Soviet Union: an August poll found that only 20% expected the Soviet Union to try to spread communism after the war.\textsuperscript{56}

At the same time, Internationalists regarded criticism of either major ally as a litmus test for identifying isolationists. One of the "lessons" from World War I was that the war-time allies must not allow their differences to divide them in the pursuit of a lasting peace, and there was, in view of memories of 1920, an added peril for Republicans to seem to be the protagonists of allied disunity. The charge made by the Soviet periodical, \textit{War and the Working Class}, that Hoover and the Republican Old Guard "do not want the kind of foreign political alliance that now exists between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union" was accurate, and potentially damaging to Republican hopes.\textsuperscript{57}

These opposing factors inevitably limited Dewey's freedom of manoeuvre, although the ethnic vote was a further factor which inevitably impinged on attitudes to the Soviet Union. In the event, Dewey took the characteristic way out: he avoided any pointed criticism of the Soviet Union, but by numerous comments on tangential issues he let it be known where his sympathies lay.

Relations with Russia, as such, were not an "issue" in

\textsuperscript{56}Cited in Gaddis, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{57}Quoted in \textit{New York Times}, September 23rd, 1944.
the 1944 campaign. Nevertheless Dewey's emphasis in 1944 on attacking the complex of issues embraced by the terms, secret diplomacy, power politics and big power domination, and his attempt to identify himself with the rights of small nations, was a fair guide to his inclinations. In a Polish and Lithuanian area in Pennsylvania, for example, Dewey attacked Roosevelt for his secrecy, whilst hinting at what he suspected was the reason for the secrecy: "He has not told us the nature of his secret conferences with Marshal Stalin... The small nations are being disposed of without the American people being told about what is happening to them". Also of some relevance was the continuous exploitation of the "issue" of domestic communism by vice-presidential candidate, John Bricker, and other lesser orators. Roosevelt was evidently sufficiently worried by this to repudiate communist support, to which Bricker commented, "The American people will believe him in that statement when he fires from high office the last Communist who draws Federal pay".

At Cleveland, in the final address of his campaign, Bricker said that the greatest issue of the election was the question of whether communist influence was to take control of the United States government. More subtly, Dewey used the same issue. At Muncie, Indiana he spoke of his determination

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58 Gaddis, pp. 58-9; Westerfield, pp. 188-9.
60 New York Times, October 7th, 1944.
61 New York Herald Tribune, November 5th, 1944.
to remove the influence of Earl Browder from national affairs, and referred to Browder as "the head of the Demo - I mean Communist party". In Boston in November, Dewey again dealt with the issue of communism, although making it clear that his opposition to domestic communism had no connection with relations with the Soviet Union. Despite Dewey's disclaimer, the fact that such a speech was made in a strongly Catholic area was undoubtedly designed to exploit ethnic sensitivity to European developments. Privately Dewey gave pledges to leaders as to his support for their cause. The attack on domestic communism and secret diplomacy did not meet their demand, for an outspoken denunciation of perceived Soviet intentions, but it was as far as Dewey could safely go in the delicate situation of 1944. "I would not for the world make any specific promises to our American Poles unless and until I could see the way clear to make good on the promises," wrote Vandenberg. "Yet I cannot escape the conviction that the relationship between Roosevelt and Stalin must be interrupted and broken if there is to be a fair chance for Polish post-war equities as you and I conceive them. I cannot escape the conviction that the real fight for Poland will have to be made by Republicans regardless of whether they are in the majority or minority." Although he did

63 Gaddis, p. 59. Evidently, as had been the case with Hoover's Convention speech, Dewey's reference to communism was enthusiastically received by his audience, John Richardson to Hoover, November 13th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
64 Gaddis, p. 147.
65 Vandenberg to George M. Montross, August 2nd, 1944, Vandenberg MSS. Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 122-23.
66 Vandenberg to Frank Januszewski, October 31st, 1944, Vandenberg MSS.
67 Ibid.
not want to play politics with the issue, and felt it would be unfortunate if Polish-American organizations endorsed Dewey, nevertheless, "If there is any spokesman in this campaign for the smaller countries of Europe (and particularly for Poland) it certainly must be Governor Dewey". 68

An insight into the difficulties presented by the issue can be gained by reference to the press conference held by Dewey and Dulles after the attack by the former on the Dumbarton Oaks conference. Asked about their position on the question of the post-war policing of Germany, Dulles spoke of the fact that neighbouring countries might be asked to share: an important point in view of the stated Republican desire to bring United States troops home as soon as possible. Asked whether Poland, Lithuania and Estonia would participate, he replied: "Well, their future is subject to vicissitudes not present in the case of others". At this point the more politically experienced Dewey cut in, "You'd mean Poland to have a full share". "I'd suppose Poland would want a full share," said Dulles, "Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia would play a part either as states themselves or as states of the Soviet Union." 69 Further insight is afforded by Dewey's attack, later in the campaign, on the armistice agreement which the Soviet Union signed on behalf of the Allies with Rumania. 70 To Dulles' annoyance, Walter Lippmann used the attack to announce his endorsement of Roose-

68 Ibid.
69 New York Times, August 20th, 1944.
70 Ibid., October 19th, 1944.
velt on the grounds of Dewey's inexperience.\(^1\) Lippmann's endorsement of Roosevelt revealed the extent of the difficulties inherent in any attack on the Soviet Union. Dulles chided Lippmann that "all Poles who want their country free will be heartened by knowing that some of us still believe in what Mr. Roosevelt professed, in 1941, were our 'principles'.\(^2\) In 1944, Internationalism embraced the concept of the Big Four alliance. The mass media, purveyors of the prevailing ideology, were very sensitive to anything which might imperil the brave new world which seemed about to dawn.\(^3\) Democratic orators were not slow to attack Republican leaders for their attitude to the Soviet Union, and to warn of the dangers of putting into office a man who had opposed recognition of the Soviet Union as late as 1940, and who might have difficulty in persuading Stalin to cooperate in the defeat of Japan.\(^4\)

In conclusion then, the centre group of Republican leaders embraced the Russian alliance without enthusiasm and full of doubts. If the centre group did not share the dire forebodings of Nationalists such as Hoover, neither did they share the enthusiasm which Willkie had previously manifested for closer relations with the Soviet Union.\(^5\)

\(^1\)Clipping from New York Herald Tribune, October 21st, 1944, Thomas E. Dewey file, Democratic National Committee Library MSS.

\(^2\)Dulles to Walter Lippmann, October 22nd, 1944, Dulles MSS(Supp.).

\(^3\)Roose, pp. 4-10; for general account of war-time optimism, Ekirch, op cit.

\(^4\)Speeches by Franklin Roosevelt and James Byrnes, New York Times, October 22nd, 1944 and October 31st, 1944.

\(^5\)By August, 1944, Hoover was full of forebodings: "...the Stalin form of communism seems certain for Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Jugo-Slavia, Bulgaria and Roumania. De Gaulle looks like the introducer of it to France, and if the 'Free Germany Committee' in Moscow is installed in Berlin, it probably will pervade there also. The Communist sections of China seem to be a base for its extension there." Hoover to William E. Barrett, August 4th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
To an English friend, Dulles wrote in September, "I am afraid that nothing inspiring will come out of Dumbarton Oaks, largely because the different Russian philosophy makes it extremely difficult to produce anything which Anglo-Saxons would regard as fundamentally sound and inspiring". If he was not pessimistic, neither did he see the Russian reliance in optimistic terms. In an interview with a French journalist after the campaign, Dulles expressed his confidence that an amicable relationship could be worked out, and expressing an idea that was to become well-known later, said that friendly competition would be advantageous. Vandenberg, closer to the Nationalists, to the Midwest, and to his Polish constituents, was always more sceptical. The only hope he had seen for Poland, and the U.S., was for Roosevelt to be defeated thereby breaking his relationship with Stalin. Amongst the conclusions he drew from the election was that the majority of the electorate were not very worried about communism. But he did not accept this as the final verdict.

1945: Vandenberg and the Soviet Union

Despite the election defeat, Republican leaders, and especially Vandenberg in the Senate, were in a strategic position to influence the general direction of American diplomacy. With so many hopes pinned on American membership of post-war international organization, the two-thirds rule in the Senate made it essential that the bipartisan foreign

76 Dulles to Lionel Curtis, September 19th, 1944, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
77 Transcript accompanying letter from Yvonne Daumarie to Dulles, December 21st, 1944, Dulles MSS.
78 Gaddis, p. 61.
policy consensus be extended beyond the small group of Republican Internationalists. As things nationally and internationally seemed to be going wrong in the final weeks of 1944, the nation seemed headed for another partisan wrangle over the structure of peace and America's relation to it such as had split the nation after World War I. Dulles, in a telegram to a meeting of Boston women Republicans in January, commented:

"You are meeting at a time when some feel discouraged because our party, by a narrow popular margin, fell short of taking over the national administration. That failure was, in part, due to the feeling of many that President Roosevelt had a unique capacity to deal with foreign affairs and had attained a harmonious working relationship with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshall Stalin which ought not to be disturbed. Evidence to the contrary was hidden from most, by the veil of secrecy.

Now the truth is beginning to come out so that all can see. That truth is so serious the Republicans cannot afford themselves the luxury of taking partisan satisfaction out of it. During the campaign the Republican Party said that it could better lead this nation to victory in war and to lasting peace. If we have that capacity, and I believe we do have it, then we have a subsisting duty. A party which in the national campaign polled nearly forty-eight percent of the popular vote can surely find a way to make the contribution of which it is capable to the attainment of these two great ends which transcend partisanship."79

Dulles' comments reflect the disillusion and uncertainty of the period before Yalta.80 In the wake of Churchill's visit to Moscow to meet Stalin, and his report to the House of Commons on their bilateral talks, Republican leaders (and many Democrats) were outraged. Taft commented

79 Telegram, Dulles to Mrs. Katherine G. Howard, January 9th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
80 See page 101 above.
that they were seeing "the end of the Atlantic Charter and
the beginning of power politics". Vandenberg, although
prepared to admit that factors of expediency would have to
be consulted, felt that "it would be a shocking thing if so
fundamental a question" as the future of Poland "were to
be determined to suit the self-interests of Moscow and
London. . .". He was critical of the Administration for
its apparent lack of concern; "We should not be the only
silent partner in this high command". A few days later,
he returned to the attack, complaining that "mere sympathetic
words are not enough to stop the next partition of heroic
Poland. The chiefs of state are speaking in other countries
in complete denial of the Atlantic Charter." Referring
to Churchill's comment that Roosevelt had been kept informed
of developments, he commented, "Under such circumstances
silence gives consent. It is for our chief of state to tell
us what are our commitments and our purposes".

It was, therefore, against the background of mounting
concern with the fate of Poland in particular that Vandenberg
prepared to deliver his celebrated speech of January 10th,
1945. On January 7th, Arthur Sears Hennings had written
of a likely "full dress" debate on foreign policy, with both
Vandenberg and Shipstead (Republican, Minnesota) planning
an attack on Roosevelt for being outwitted by Churchill and

81 Chicago Tribune, December 16th, 1944.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., December 19th, 1944.
84 Ibid. Note that Herbert Brownell's attempt to identify
Dewey with the prevailing criticism brought a fierce
attack from the Chicago Tribune, hearkening back to his
failure to attack Roosevelt's foreign policy during the
campaign, Ibid., December 19th, 20th, 27th, 1944.
Stalin. This, not a renunciation of "isolationism", was the purpose of the speech which Vandenberg rose to deliver. The Daily Worker not surprisingly viewed it as an anti-Soviet speech. In the State Department also it was apparently viewed largely in the light of the proposals it put forward for dealing with the Soviet Union. The Internationalists, Austin, and Warren, also did not see it as a sign that Vandenberg had suddenly joined their ranks. The leading Republican Internationalist in the Senate, Austin, whilst welcoming the speech largely in terms of Vandenberg's progress along the road to "international cooperation", felt that Vandenberg had put the cart before the horse by putting the questions of disarmament of Germany and Japan above the new League. Austin's comment offers a key insight into the contrasting thought processes which still divided Vandenberg from the Internationalists.

One major result of Vandenberg's speech is that it confirmed him as the leading Republican spokesman on foreign policy. For the next four years at least, he could not be ignored either by the Administration or by foreign countries. It meant then, that a significant role in policy approval, and even formulation, was as henceforth to be accorded to a Republican who, although a pragmatist, was in the same

85 Ibid., January 8th, 1945.
86 The best analysis of this speech, although it differs on some points from the present approach, is in Rose, pp. 16-20.
87 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 143-44.
89 Report, "Add Vandenberg", January 13th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.
Nationalist tradition as Henry Cabot Lodge. It also meant increased power to a man who had always been amongst those most hostile to the Soviet Union. From this it should not be inferred that Vandenberg wanted to bring about a break with the Soviet Union. All the evidence would suggest that in fact he saw cooperation with the Soviet Union as desirable. The point, however, was that he viewed Soviet-American relationships from the standpoint of American self-interest, and he was determined in so far as he was able, to change the terms of the relationship, which, he felt with good military justification, had veered too much towards the Soviet Union during the war. In the final analysis, however, he preferred a break with the Soviet Union to a continuance of what he regarded as a one-sided alliance.

In early 1945 the other members of the centre group, Dulles and Dewey, took a cautious, though not hostile, line on the question of post-war relations with Russia. In Detroit in February, Dulles gave what he perceived to be the Russian side of the case: ". . .The Soviets on their side have little reason to trust us. We opposed their revolution. We gave military aid to the counter-revolutionists. For many years we sought to prevent their having economic and diplomatic intercourse with the rest of the world. Our public leaders denounced them up to the moment when Germany's attack made us perforce comrades in arms." 90 To writer Eugene

90 Address, Economic Club of Detroit, February 5th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
Lyons, who took issue with this statement, Dulles replied, "The very fact that millions of Americans share your view that we should distrust Russia is, I think, a reason why Russia should distrust us. Trust only thrives in an atmosphere of mutuality". In the same address in Detroit, Dulles did speak, however, of the need for the United States to establish long-range goals in keeping with its ideals, to battle for those ideals, and even where "partial defeat" seemed inevitable, to ensure that "no particular defeat is final". Thomas Dewey, in his first appearance in Washington since his election defeat, gave general assent to international cooperation and the conference then taking place in the Crimea, but was also critical of policies towards the liberated areas in Europe. The American people, he said, wanted to be sure that they had in fact crushed out "war-breeding totalitarianism" and that they had "not fought this war in vain". Dewey's oblique criticisms were about as far as any Republican leader dared go in the early months of 1945, or indeed through to the end of the war. Hoover, the least trusting of Republican leaders, gave some insight into the restraints which prevented criticism: he predicted Roosevelt "will come back with a lot of Uncle Joe's promises"

91 Eugene Lyons to Dulles, February 7th, 1945; Dulles to Eugene Lyons, February 14th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
92 Address, Detroit, February 5th, 1945, Dulles MSS. See also speech at National Study Conference on "The Churches and a Just and Durable Peace!", Cleveland, Ohio, January 16th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
which will fade out as fast as the so-called Moscow Declaration faded. At the moment it is useless to say anything without being justifiably accused of creating difficulties, so I am keeping still". 95 The Yalta communique, to be the subject of so much controversy later, accordingly got a good reception from Republican leaders. Vandenberg, although reserving judgement on details, described it as "by far the best that has issued from any major conference". 96 Dulles also welcomed it as a sign that the Big Three were going to cooperate, and felt that the decisions were not as important as the procedure of consultation. 97 Even Hoover was quoted as welcoming the Yalta agreements, provided they were carried out. 98

Inevitably, however, greater scrutiny of the Yalta agreements caused doubts. In the hot seat was Arthur Vandenberg, desirous of attending the San Francisco Conference, yet politically unable to be seen to be turning his back on Poland. 99 Enough doubts were raised by Republican Congressmen, including Congresswoman Luce, and conservative journalists, such as David Lawrence to imperil Vandenberg's reputation as a friend of Poland. 100 Privately Alfred Landon wrote to Hoover: "It looks to me as far as benefitting a democratic settlement of European problems it is locking the door after

95 Hoover to Ray Lyman Wilbur, January 28th, 1945, Hoover MSS.
96 Chicago Tribune, February 13th, 1945.
97 Statement dated February 13th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
98 Theoharis, Yalta Myths, p. 27.
99 Chicago Tribune, February 14th, 1945; Report, February 16th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.
100 For Clare Luce's criticisms see New York Times, February 14th, 1945; for David Lawrence's successful attempt to convince Senator Smith of New Jersey that Poland had been betrayed, see Smith Diary, February 23rd, 1945, Smith MSS. For various attacks in Congress, see Congressional Record, 91, February 13th, 1945, pp. 1045, 1070; ibid., February 26th, 1945, pp. 1423-7.
the horse is stolen. 101 Already Vandenberg was coming to see the solution to his and to Poland's difficulties in a review of all interim decisions, assuming that Roosevelt had not committed the United States irrevocably. 102 John Foster Dulles also took a slightly different attitude once the reality of Yalta had sunk in. Speaking from the Headquarters of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, he took issue with "cynics" who would say "that the United States merely accepted the inevitable and that the Soviet Union allowed the United States to agree only on Soviet terms". 103 Instead, maintained Dulles, a "new era" in U. S. - Soviet relations had been opened in the Crimea. Having echoed the Internationalists in his optimism, however, he then proceeded to admit that Yalta revealed "a discouraging gulf between what we practice and what we preach". Although "an indispensable prelude to... San Francisco," in that it reversed the decline in cooperation of 1944, it had nevertheless reached decisions not in accord with the Atlantic Charter. In short, Crimea pointed up the need to get a world organization which, "in addition to having power to prevent aggression, must also seek to correct in the future, the inevitable mistakes of the past." 104 Between them masters of pragmatism, Dulles and Vandenberg had found a temporary solution to their problems. Vandenberg was able to preserve his independence as a delegate to San Francisco, he was also able to secure

101 Alfred Landon to Hoover, February 14th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
102 Vandenberg to Frank Januszewski, February 13th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
103 Press Release, February 25th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
104 Ibid.
the appointment of Dulles as an adviser. Debate in Congress in March and April over the foreign economic programme revealed the difficulties that could lie in the path of the Administration if it failed to secure Republican cooperation. For his part, Vandenberg could argue to questioning supporters that the interests of America, the Republican Party and even Poland demanded that he did not spurn the cooperation offered by Roosevelt.\(^{105}\)

The price of the cooperation of Vandenberg, and his by now close friend Dulles, was a stiffening of American policy towards the Soviet Union. Roosevelt was reported by Vandenberg to have told him in March, "Just between us, Arthur, I am coming to know the Russians better, and if I could name only one delegate to the San Francisco Conference, you would be that delegate".\(^{106}\) But still, neither Vandenberg nor Dulles wanted a break with the Soviet Union, though Vandenberg at least did not flinch at such a possibility. Basically, both men wanted cooperation to be more on American terms, but both recognized that a break with the Soviet Union could not advance American aims in Poland or elsewhere.\(^{107}\) Dulles

\(^{105}\) Vandenberg to Harry G. Hogan, March 26th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS. In March Dulles cautioned Vandenberg against talking "so much about Poland that the American people got the impression that our policy was consideration of Polish rather than American welfare". Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, March 12th, 1945, Dulles MSS (Supplement).

\(^{106}\) Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 155. If accurate, this statement is susceptible of more than one interpretation, but Vandenberg clearly saw it as a sign that Roosevelt was prepared to stand up to the Russians.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., pp. 155-56.
made this point in an address to the New York Foreign Policy Association in mid-March: "Many do not like the sample of reality which Yalta produced. Certainly some of the decisions there taken were very imperfect. But that is because the collaborators are themselves imperfect. Their defects will not be removed by breaking up the collaboration. On the contrary, that would intensify the defects. Then each of the great powers would be actuated by fear. Fear brings out the worst in men. No one can contemplate with satisfaction the fate of the small nations if the great powers start girding themselves for possible war against each other". Perhaps more than Vandenberg, Dulles, who was yet to go through what Guhin describes as his mid-century re-orientation, was prepared to be optimistic about United States-Soviet relations. Arguably however, Vandenberg too was optimistic that the relationship could be re-ordered on terms more deferential to American ideals and interests. Initially, Vandenberg's desire to change the balance of Soviet-American relations was to be met with scepticism both amongst influential Senators and the San Francisco delegation. In his view, however, he was to have a great deal of success in convincing people that firmness was the key to handling the Soviet Union. The day of Roosevelt's death, but before he heard of it, Vandenberg confided to his diary that the "revolt

108 Address, New York Foreign Policy Association, March 17th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
109 Guhin, pp. 131-32.
110 Report, March 16th, 1945, McNaughton MSS; Chicago Tribune, April 12th, 1945.
against any further Soviet appeasement is growing". 111

Whether the accession of President Truman made any fundamental difference to the conduct of relations with the Soviet Union is beyond the scope of this study. 112 Certainly, however, Republicans had high hopes that President Truman, although not a man of great ability, was a conservative who would change the direction in which the United States had been headed, at home and overseas, since 1933. 113 Vandenberg, preparing to go to San Francisco, although wondering whether they had not lost their strongest spokesman "through which we could hope to argue Russia out of some of the mistakes" which it seemed determined to make, also recognized that both the Secretary of State and the San Francisco delegation would now have far greater freedom than would otherwise have been the case. 114 In his view it "wiped the slate clean of whatever undisclosed commitments" Roosevelt had made! "The 'Big 3' no longer exists as a monopoly in respect to world destiny". 115

111 Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 165.
112 For a recent, thorough analysis of Truman's diplomacy in this period see Rose, pp. 31-48, who argues that basically Truman tried to continue Roosevelt's policy. Clearly Roosevelt's death must have had some effect, precisely because he did not appear to have any well-defined policy laid down for his successor to follow, but it was only one of several developments transforming international relations in the early summer of 1945.
113 Hoover to Julius Klein, April 28th, 1945, Hoover MSS; Henry Luce to Harry S. Truman, April 17th, 1945, PPF 928, Truman MSS. Rose, pp. 90-91.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
In his initial dealings with the Soviet Union, Truman helped to foster the impression that the nature of the relationship had changed. At his first press conference, asked about Molotov's impending visit, Truman drew spontaneous cheers by the terse comment, "He is going to stop by and pay his respects to the President of the United States. He should". This, and reports of his meeting with Molotov, helped to create a perception of Truman as a tough talking Nationalist. Even before his initial meeting with Molotov, Arthur Sears Henning had reported that Truman was "determined to end the policy of absolute appeasement toward Russia". Henning indicated that the dispute was over the Russian treaty with Poland (signed April 22nd) and the attempt to seat the Lublin government at San Francisco.

During the San Francisco Conference the Chicago Tribune editorialized on Molotov's conduct: "Perhaps, also, Mr. Molotov has become so voluble in San Francisco because he found out in Washington that President Truman is a fellow who can push back". At the end of April, it carried a report that the President was now listening to those men arguing for a tougher policy with Russia, and that Harry Hopkins, Henry Morgenthau, Henry Wallace and others were no longer influential. After the meetings with Molotov, Secretary of State Stettinius flew off to San Francisco where, according to Vandenberg's diary, he was the bearer of "a thrilling message". Reportedly, Truman had told Molotov that

116 Lockett Report, April 17th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.
117 Chicago Tribune, April 23rd, 1945.
118 Ibid. See Truman, Memoirs I, pp. 78-85.
119 April 28th, 1945.
120 Ibid., April 29th, 1945.
121 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 175-6.
"future Russian aid from America depends entirely upon the temper and the mood and the conscience of the American people - and that Frisco is his last chance to prove that he deserves this aid". Vandenberg also recorded Stettinius as having said that not even he (Vandenberg) could have "made a stronger statement than Truman did". 122

In part perhaps, Stettinius was saying what he knew Vandenberg wanted to hear. But the significance is that Vandenberg's perception was widespread. It did seem as if policy was changing, that "appeasement" was over, and that he and Stettinius were being given a chance to formulate policy at San Francisco in a way in which Franklin Roosevelt would not have allowed. From his San Francisco experience Vandenberg had no doubt that he knew how to handle the Russians; he hoped that journalists, commentators, and even some in the White House would take notice. 123 San Francisco and the United Nations marked the high point of Vandenberg's influence in 1945. With developments at Potsdam he had no part; the appointment of James Byrnes as Secretary of State he resented bitterly, and interpreted as a return to the pre-San Francisco policy towards the Soviet Union. 124 Stettinius himself, extremely upset at his dismissal, attributed it to the fact that he was a Republican. 125

San Francisco, then, had marked the apex of Vandenberg's power. With the close collaboration of John Foster Dulles and Secretary of State Stettinius, he had come to feel that

122 Ibid.
123 Ibid., pp. 208-9.
124 Ibid., pp. 224-5.
125 Transcript, interview with George E. Allen, p. 7, Truman Library.
he was exercising considerable influence over the direction of American diplomacy. For a number of months after San Francisco, however, he was to be excluded from the centre of policy making. Within two weeks of San Francisco, President Truman and his entourage, including his new Secretary of State, slipped unannounced out of Washington enroute for Potsdam and a meeting with Churchill and Stalin. There was already some evidence that after his initial show of toughness he was preparing to take a more conciliatory line to the Soviet Union. The idea of sending Harry Hopkins to see Stalin during the San Francisco Conference was a sign of this.\(^{126}\) Herbert Hoover, invited along to the White House at the end of May, had given Truman the benefit of his steadfastly held opinion that "the Russians were Asiatics; that they had the characteristics of Asiatics; that they did not have the reverence for agreements that was current among Western nations; that we must just take them as they were; that we could not go to war with them and we should never bluff. Our position should be to persuade, to hold up our banner of what we thought was right and let it go at that. A war with Russia meant the extinction of Western civilization or what there was left of it. I stated I had no patience with people who formulated policies in respect to other nations 'short of war'. They always lead to war".\(^{127}\) Hoover also

\(^{126}\) From the office of Fred Vinson, close to Truman, and shortly to replace Morgenthau as Secretary of the Treasury, came the comment that Truman now feared he had been too stiff in his relations with the Russians, and wanted to create a better relationship prior to the Big 3 meeting. Report by Ed Lockett, June 1st, 1945, McNaughton MSS.

\(^{127}\) Memorandum on meeting with President Truman, May 28th, 1945, pp. 6-7, Hoover MSS.
recorded that he gave Truman the benefit of his views on the Far Eastern situation, and his proposal for a peace. But Hoover had no illusions about the influence he exerted over Truman: "My conclusions were that he was simply endeavouring to establish a feeling of good will in the country, that nothing more would come out of it so far as I or my views were concerned". Hoover's disappointment in Truman was already shared by Taft.

The dominant element in the political climate by the time of Potsdam was the personal popularity of the President. Arthur Sears Henning commented that he enjoyed "the confidence of the American people to an unprecedented degree". The Chicago Tribune wondered whether, having recognized the Lublin government, Truman was going to bring back another Yalta. Hoover wrote to minority leader, Senator Wallace White, expressing his concern: "The country, I find, is greatly concerned over the forthcoming Berlin Conference. There is almost universal suspicion of Russia originating, I believe arising mostly from Communist activities in the United States". On July 18th Hoover signed an appeal by 40 distinguished United States citizens, including Landon and Raymond Leslie Buell, warning Truman that the Polish issue still had not been settled. Potsdam in fact made

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128 Ibid., pp. 7-9.
129 Patterson in the Republican, p. 302; Taft also went along to see Truman to argue for a negotiated peace with Japan; like Hoover he was prepared to let Japan keep Formosa, ibid., p. 301.
130 Chicago Tribune, July 23rd, 1945.
131 Ibid., July 7th, 1945.
132 Hoover to Wallace H. White, July 12th, 1945, Hoover MSS; presumably he was referring to the Amerasia case, in which 6 people had been arrested in June, Waddis, pp. 257-8.
133 Chicago Tribune, July 19th, 1945.
remarkably little impact on domestic politics. The initia-
tive in foreign affairs clearly remained with the President.
Senator Taft, who was critical of the cession of part of
Germany to Poland, felt that at Potsdam Truman had helped
lay the seeds for another war: "He really is a very limited
and superficial statesman but up to date his moves have been
popular, largely, I think, because he is such a contrast
to Roosevelt". Politically, then, Republicans were in
a very low state of morale. The victory of the British
Labour Party, suggesting a world-wide leftward trend, did
not help matters. Divided in Congress over much of the
multilateral package, Republicans were finding it difficult
to adjust themselves to the new national and international
situation. The strivings of Mackinac and Chicago no longer
seemed relevant to the problems they faced in the last months
of 1945; neither did the slogans of 1944 about "tired old
men" and "starry-eyed dreamers". James Reston commented
that Truman had become a figure to be reckoned with, and
that Republicans were looking for new issues for 1946.
Developments since Yalta had, however, revealed the possi-
bility of uniting the party in a get tough with Russia policy.

The Reassertion of Republican Leadership

The political situation in late 1945 was exceedingly
complex. On the domestic front, the Truman honeymoon was

134 Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 303.
135 Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 219; Chicago Tribune,
over; Congressional Republicans, with the war over, were determined both to restore the United States as quickly as possible to normalcy, and to create a coherent party position for the 1946 elections. In the international field, the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, the atomic bomb, and the negotiation of the British Loan had created a new situation. To add to the complexity, Senator Vandenberg, the architect of Republican consensus since 1943, and the principal practitioner of bipartisanship, was privately extremely distrustful of the Administration, which he felt had been secretly trying to cut him down to size since San Francisco.137 Apart from his personal vanity, Vandenberg was not disposed to fight hard for Administration measures over which he had not been consulted. As Senator Smith of New Jersey was finding, abstract 'internationalism' was not a likely source of popularity or influence amongst Congressional Republicans.138 The two main pressures emanating from Republicans by the fall of 1945 were i) a desire to return the United States to 'Normalcy'; ii) a strong hostility to the Soviet Union and concern about developments in central and eastern Europe. Herbert Brownell, Republican National Chairman and political associate of Dewey, led the way in August with an attack on the Administration for not having kept the country informed on diplomatic developments.

137Report, October 6th, 1945, McNaughton MSS; Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 225.
138Diary, September 16th, 1945, Smith MSS.
Republicans, he said, would urge that American influence be used to secure her ideals. He also promised that in the coming Congressional session Republicans would demand a clarification of American foreign policy and a disclosure of commitments made at war-time conferences. Herbert Hoover and House minority leader Joseph Martin were also critical of developments in eastern Europe. "Can we honestly say that we have not surrendered these peoples on the altar of appeasement?" asked Herbert Hoover in mid-October.

Joseph Martin called a meeting of the Republican steering committee in the House, predicting that it would approve a proposal to prohibit use of relief funds for nations not permitting freedom of the press. His analysis of opinion among House Republicans was to prove accurate, as was to be shown during the debate on U.N.N.R.A. in November.

Amidst the suspicion, uncertainty and downright partisanship, Secretary of State Byrnes did seek to perpetuate some form of bipartisan contacts by inviting John Foster Dulles to attend the meeting of Foreign Ministers in London in September. This gesture, however, misfired. The conference broke up in disagreement, and Dulles returned to refuel suspicions already held about Byrnes. Publicly Dulles maintained a united front, arguing that allied disagreements

140 Ibid.
141 Ibid., October 14th, 1945.
142 Ibid.
143 See page 236 below.
were healthier in the open, expressing confidence that they could ultimately find agreement with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{144}

Privately however, his criticisms of Byrnes were widely ventilated. He felt that he had been used to give a bipartisan cloak to the conference without being actually consulted in advance.\textsuperscript{145} He also claimed that at the conference, when Byrnes was considering yielding to Molotov over his desire to exclude France, that he had threatened to resign and go home and attack Byrnes' action in public.\textsuperscript{146}

Undoubtedly the London conference heightened the perception of Republican leaders both that they were being excluded from genuine participation in framing the peace, and that they would have to provide more backbone if the United States was to strengthen its policy against the Soviet Union. At the same time, Republicans in the House expressed their disapproval of events in eastern Europe by an amendment to U.N.R.R.A. designed to make American contributions contingent on free reporting of distribution of relief. The amendment, which secured virtually unanimous Republican support in the House, put Vandenberg in a difficult position, especially since it was very much an Old Guard sponsored amendment.\textsuperscript{147} Opposing it, he praised the House for having brought the subject out into the open, but said he could not support it with winter coming on in Europe. He agreed, however, that the free exchange of information was essential to peace: it was unthinkable, for example, that atom secrets could be shared until the iron curtain on information was lifted.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{144} New York Times, October 7th, 1945.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., October 10th, 1945.
\textsuperscript{146} Gaddis, pp. 290-91; transcript, interview with Thomas E. Dewey, pp. 39, 41, Dulles (Oral).
\textsuperscript{147} Congressional Record, 91, November 1st, 1945, p. 10305.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., November 15th, 1945, pp. 10696-7.
He also criticized Byrnes for a recent speech in which he had compared the good-neighbour policy with Russian security interests in central and eastern Europe. Vandenberg would not accept the analogy: America's neighbours were her "partners" not her "satellites", he said.  

Vandenberg's comments were consistent with his long-held prejudices about the Soviet Union. They also need to be seen in their domestic political context. Vandenberg was already learning to walk the fine line between collaboration with the Administration and identification as a Republican partisan. In the House of Representatives, the leadership was unashamedly Nationalist and partisan, so much so that at the end of November a group of 39 younger Republicans, horrified at apparent assumptions behind the current Pearl Harbor investigations, announced their determination to speak for themselves and not let their elders speak for them.  

To heighten the potential split in the Party came the announcement by Stassen, on demobilization from the Navy, that he intended to devote his time to making the Republican Party more liberal. Finally there was the prospect of a showdown in the Senate over the minority leadership, which it was rumoured Senator White wished to vacate. If White resigned, Vandenberg was liable to find himself pressured by Smith and the Internationalists into fighting Taft for the job, to "keep the party in the anti-isolationist column". All these strands combined to make Vandenberg's job more

152 Diary, December 2nd, 1945, Smith MSS.
153 Ibid.
difficult. His collaboration with the Administration had not enhanced his popularity with the Nationalists, who were impatient for the Party to take a stand in readiness for the 1946 elections. To add to the complexities of the situation, Vandenberg was dissatisfied with the Administration, and as he had indicated in his speech on U.N.R.R.A., especially with Secretary of State Byrnes.

Overshadowing Russian-American relations and Vandenberg's concerns by the end of 1945, was the question of the atomic bomb. Indications were that the overwhelming majority of Congressional Republicans (and a sizeable proportion of the Democrats) were hostile to the notion of sharing atomic secrets with the Soviet Union. That is America's secret, one representative told the applauding Executive Club of Chicago, "and if America has a thimbleful of brains, she will hold onto it". A number of Republicans, largely, but not exclusively drawn from the Internationalist section of the Party were, however, broadly in favour of some form of international control, as proposed by the Administration. Herbert Hoover, for example, had indicated his general approval of some form of international control, so also did Alfred Landon and John Foster Dulles. Few, however,

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154 A survey of congressional opinion in September found overwhelming hostility amongst those who replied, New York Times, September 28th, 1945. It may be, however, that the small sample of 51 was unrepresentative; probably those who felt the strongest replied. If the latter assumption is correct, the survey would tend to bear out the statement that the strongest opponents were Republicans.  
155 Speech by Representative Dewey Short of Missouri, October 12th, 1945, reprinted in Congressional Record, 91, Appendix p. 5433.  
were prepared to go along with Harold Stassen's suggestion in a speech to the Academy of Political Science that the atom bomb be banned apart from 25 to be retained by a United Nations air force. Dulles openly disagreed with the suggestion that the bomb should be outlawed or entrusted to a single world body with "overwhelming military power". This, he said, would do nothing to end the distrust between nations. At the same time, however, he did not want the United States to give the impression that it wished to preserve its atomic monopoly; he felt that this was a matter which the General Assembly of the United Nations should be allowed to decide.

Vandenberg's initial instinct was one of caution, but persuaded that there was no way of safeguarding an atomic monopoly he was prepared to agree to international sharing and control of atomic secrets. The price of sharing, however, was that there be "complete and adequate international inspection", or, in short, that Russia drop its "iron curtain". Broadly speaking he was in agreement with the proposal of President Truman and British and Canadian Prime Ministers, Attlee and Mackenzie King, to establish a United Nations Commission to share and control atomic energy. He was by the same token adverse to any direct approach to the Soviet Union such as that advocated in Cabinet by Wallace and Stimson. He was reported in response to the joint

158 Ibid., November 16th, 1945.
160 Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 223.
161 The joint statement of November 15th is reproduced in full in Truman, Memoirs I; pp. 481-3.
162 Rose, pp. 133-35, 144-46.
declaration as commenting, "The Russians are a hell of a long way from getting anything yet". Secretary of State Byrnes, meanwhile, puzzled by the deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union, had come to the conclusion that the atomic bomb was the difficulty, and expressed the intention of making this a priority of his forthcoming discussions in Moscow. Vandenberg was not alone in being perturbed by what Secretary Byrnes might agree to at Moscow, and as a result he and the rest of Senate committee responsible for atomic energy went along to see the President. He was convinced that the Administration intended to give Russia atomic secrets before agreement had been reached on inspection and control. Vandenberg was not impressed with the President's grasp of the issue: "In any event we have made the record - and we should hold the Executive Department responsible. It's our unanimous opinion that the Byrnes formula must be stopped".

In December Vandenberg and Dulles were invited to attend the forthcoming London meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. Vandenberg claimed to be reluctant to go. He was disillusioned with the Administration, under pressure from Republicans whom he described as feeling very restless, and distressed at the handling of the British Loan. The official

163"Congressional Reaction to Atomic Statement", November 16th, 1945, p. 2, McNaughton MSS.
164Report from Anatole Vission, "Byrnes on the Moscow Meeting", December 10th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.
165Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 228-9; Report, December 13th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.
166Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 229.
167Ibid., pp. 229-0; Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, December 19th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
communique from Moscow on internationalization of atomic energy had, he claimed, almost made him resign from the London delegation.\textsuperscript{168} A meeting with President Truman on December 28th, clarifying the Moscow communique, satisfied Vandenberg, or perhaps gave him the excuse to go to London without being called an "appeaser".\textsuperscript{169} He was, however, going on his own terms; the noises which had already been made in Congress against the British Loan can only have strengthened his bargaining power.

Vandenberg's manoeuvring again has to be seen in the context of domestic politics, as well as his disquiet with Byrnes' atomic diplomacy. Looking to 1946, Congressional Republicans were seeking to promote agreement on a broad statement of principles and policies. The eventual statement, although described by Internationalist, Senator Smith, as "a mere platitude" which would "sound rubbish", was strongly supported by the House leadership.\textsuperscript{170} It was evidently designed to heighten the ideological division between the parties: "Today's major domestic issue is between radicalism, regimentation, all-powerful bureaucracy, class exploitation, deficit spending and machine politics, as against our belief in American freedom for the individual under just laws fairly administered for all, preservation of local home rule, efficiency and pay-as-you-go economy in Government, and the protection of the American way of life against either

\textsuperscript{168}Vandenberg to B. E. Hutchinson, December 29th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
\textsuperscript{169}Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 233-5; Truman, Memoirs, II: 489-90; Chicago Tribune, December 29th, 1945.
\textsuperscript{170}Smith Diary, December 5th, 1945, Smith MSS.
Fascist or Communist trends". 171 In foreign affairs, the statement was general and mildly "internationalist", supporting the United Nations, international relief subject to United States economic considerations, the rights of small nations and free communications throughout the world, but ending with the pledge of "a strong, solvent, free America". 172

The statement of principles was criticized vehemently by Governor Green of Illinois at the December National Committee meeting in Chicago: "The Republican party," he said, "was founded to elect, not sheriffs, but Presidents. It was born as a national party, has always been a national party, and if it cannot win national elections has lost its main reason for existence". 173 Arguing that the Republican party had been trying to get "communist and other radical votes", he also deplored its failure to speak out against the "rape" of Java by Britain and Holland, and the "betrayal" of Poland. He attacked the "Truman New Deal" diplomacy for its failure to protect the Four Freedoms and for allowing the United States to be the servant of communism and colonialism. Midwestern Republicans, he said, were concerned that the Administration had not done enough to secure vital sea and air bases. 174 The following day, Herbert Brownell, although managing to get the policy statement endorsed, delivered a similarly partisan speech, which included an oblique reference

172 Ibid.
173 Ibid., December 8th, 1945.
to the recent allegations made by Patrick J. Hurley on his resignation as Ambassador to China: Republicans, he said, would ensure that "at all times the State Department shall give honest and efficient service to the foreign policy of the United States."175 At the same time, however, he was authorized by the National Committee to appoint a subcommittee to receive suggestions for supplementing the statement.176 Unity had been preserved. But as Vandenberg noted, the Party was in a restless mood. The perils of the time counseled cooperation with the Administration, but the logic of the argument of Governor Green, that New Deal diplomacy had suffered the worst diplomatic defeat in United States history, seemed difficult to refute.

By the end of 1945 then, partisanship in foreign policy was coming to be a possibility. Not only were Congressional Republicans in a militant mood, and Vandenberg alienated from Byrnes, but Dulles also was coming to be distrusted by the Administration. The President detected Dulles' hand in a speech delivered by Dewey at the Gridiron Club, whilst Byrnes had no love for Dulles, having heard of the criticisms which Dulles had been making of his conduct at the London Foreign Ministers' Meeting.177 The fact that Dulles and Vandenberg were both invited to the United Nations session in London was a reflection of domestic political realities and external

176 Ibid.
177 O'Loughlin to Herbert Hoover, December 22nd, 1945; O'Loughlin felt that Dewey's speech had made a bad impression, letter to Roger W. Straus, December 17th, 1945, O'Loughlin MSS.
difficulties. Opinion within the Administration was already mounting against Secretary of State Byrnes. The cooperation of Dulles and Vandenberg effectively marked an end to the type of diplomacy Byrnes had conducted at Moscow, where he had been concerned to get agreement at almost any cost. Republican cooperation, which was necessary for the sake of national unity, could only be gained if American-Soviet relations were brought more in line with Republican ideas. Dulles and Vandenberg were both spokesmen for a tradition which taught that international cooperation must be on terms deferential to the interests and ideals of "a strong America." In London, Vandenberg and Dulles were not to go out of their way to hide their dissatisfaction with Byrnes. Their absence from a delegation press conference prior to Byrnes' arrival in London was publicly explained as being related to their disagreement with him over the Moscow agreement on international control of atomic energy. Byrnes' memory in later years was that soon after arrival he had met Vandenberg and explained the Moscow agreement to him, and that there was no other disagreement; after that "misunderstanding" he claimed that he insisted that Vandenberg went to every international conference with him. A New York Times report of his meeting with Vandenberg and Democratic Senator, Connally, lends some corroboration to Byrnes' account. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the relationship at London was

181 January 9th, 1945.
an uneasy one. Eleanor Roosevelt observed that Byrnes seemed afraid of his delegation. On his return from London, Byrnes told a Cabinet luncheon, if James Forrestal's account can be relied on, that they must face the fact that Vandenberg and Dulles' activities must be seen as being based on political considerations; Vandenberg had claimed that he was being accused of appeasement by his colleagues, he said.

On their return Vandenberg and Dulles certainly were critical of the pursuit of policy at London. Before leaving Vandenberg had expressed the hope that in the future the United States would "more firmly assert its moral leadership". James Reston, close to Vandenberg, reported that Vandenberg and Dulles were dissatisfied with their role at the United Nations, and with the lack of advance briefing and policy planning. Both, said Reston, wanted a more active role for the United States, but at the same time they did not want to imperil the Republican Party's chances in the 1946 elections by participating under the same conditions as had existed at London. Vandenberg's forthcoming Senate report was, said Reston, anxiously awaited. Reston's article can only have been an inspired leak. Vandenberg's tactics were unchanging. By playing hard to get he could both cement his domestic support, and at least convince himself that he was getting concessions from the Administration.

182 Gaddis, p. 293.
183 Millis, p. 138.
185 Ibid., February 16th, 1946.
Vandenberg's report to the Senate on the London Conference must therefore be viewed within the context of domestic and international politics. His son, explaining the speech at a later date to a political associate in Michigan, wrote: "The speech was delivered somewhat unexpectedly and principally as a result of Republican pressure within the Senate itself. He seemed to be in a position where he felt it was his duty to the Party to report to the Senate on UNO in an attempt to revive a lagging faith in our foreign policies." If Vandenberg saw it in terms of protecting his political position as a collaborator with the Administration, the speech was also designed to influence the direction of policy; the two were in fact closely connected. The message behind the speech was clear: to get Republican support, the Administration must be seen to be exerting moral leadership against the Soviet Union. London had convinced him (not that he needed convincing) that the Soviet Union was not seriously interested in peace, and as evidence he reported Vishinsky's exploitation of the dispute between Lebanon and Syria against Britain and France, on a night which had made him "proud of western democracy...". If Russia was still worried about its security, he was, he said, prepared to take up his earlier offer of a defense treaty against future axis aggression. The fact that Vandenberg

186 Arthur H. Vandenberg Jr. to Howard C. Lawrence, March 5th, 1946, Vandenberg MSS.  
187 Congressional Record, 92, February 27th, 1946, pp. 1692–95; see also Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 241–251.  
188 Ibid., p. 242.  
189 Congressional Record, 92, April 27th, 1946, p. 1695.
went out of his way to praise Bevin, Bidault and Strettinius, and even Vishinsky, whilst omitting Byrnes from the list, was not lost on the press. It confirmed the rumours of Vandenberg's disquiet that had been in circulation for a number of days.\footnote{New York Herald Tribune, February 28th, 1946; Chicago Tribune, February 28th, 1946; comments by Arthur Krock, New York Times, March 1st, 1946.}

The fact that Secretary Brynes delivered a similarly tough report on the London United Nations Meeting on February 28th convinced Vandenberg that he had been instrumental in bringing about a changed stance in American foreign relations.\footnote{See for example, Vandenberg to H. W. Smith, March 6th, 1947, Vandenberg MSS.} Arguably Vandenberg's view of Byrnes' speech was oversimplified: the speech was written before the 27th February when Vandenberg delivered his speech; President Truman told former Secretary of State Stettinius that Vandenberg, hearing of Byrnes' speech, had arranged to get his in first.\footnote{Chicago Tribune, March 12th, 1946; Gaddis p. 306, note 40.}

What seems clear, however, is that Byrnes saw Vandenberg (and Dulles) as the powerful articulators of a mood which was strong within the Administration as well as the Republican Party. Byrnes had according to Forrestal identified Dulles and Vandenberg as partisans by the end of January.\footnote{Millis, p. 138.} Both made no secret of their dislike with the lack of direction of American policy long before Vandenberg's report on February 27th. Dulles in fact had delivered a speech at Princeton on February 22nd in which he had criticized the fact that the President gave the American delegation to the United Nations no instructions.
The United States, charged Dulles, was giving no leadership: "That would not have happened fifty years ago or 100 (sic) years ago. Then the American people were imbued with a great faith. We acted under a sense of moral compulsion, as a people who had a mission to perform in the world. . . That mood has passed, with the result that at this critical time we may fail the world". 194

Behind Dulles and Vandenberg was an increasingly militant and frustrated Party, which had never been enthusiastic about the war-time alliance with the Soviet Union, and which was longing to make "appeasement" part of its strategy of restoring the United States to Normalcy. In Dallas in mid-February Taft criticized the Administration for having forgotten "justice" in its conferences at Teheran, Yalta and Moscow, and also especially criticized the agreement to let the Soviet Union have the Kurile Islands, which had only just been made public. 195 In early March, Senate Whip Kenneth Wherry, called in a New York address for an end to "appeasement". The United States must now, he said, "compete with Russia for the allegiance of mankind on the basis of a respect for the liberty, dignity and the rights of others". 196 Broadly the same criticisms as those made by Taft and Wherry were made in a Lincoln Day address in Tennessee by Governor Green of Illinois, another authentic spokesman for midwestern Republicanism. The United States, he said, had failed to

195 Dallas, February 14th, 1946, text of address reprinted in Congressional Record, 92, Appendix, pp. 1050-51.
stand up for its moral principles in its dealings with its war-time allies, and had also failed to safeguard its own requirements for vital sea and air bases. Taft had made the same point in his initial reaction to the disclosure of the secret Yalta agreement on the Kuriles and Sakhalin in January. Given the existence within the Republican Party of widespread hostility both to the Soviet Union and the war-time agreements, the call by Vandenberg and Dulles for an open break with the Soviet Union was politically understandable. It was not however simply short-term political expediency which directed their actions. The Republican consensus which Vandenberg and Dulles had helped to develop up to the San Francisco Conference had consistently stood for both "firm" and "open" diplomacy on behalf of American interests and principles; if disputes were brought out into the open, where world opinion and "moral force" could operate, Republican leaders had no doubts that right would be seen to be on their side. From February and March 1946, American diplomacy was seemingly to be conducted in a way in which Republicans could more easily approve: the Soviet Union was no longer to be seen as an ally.

197 February 9th, 1946, reprinted in Congressional Record, 92, Appendix, p. 927; Theoharis, Yalta Myths, deals with the mounting criticism in early 1945, but argues that the critics were neither representative nor effective (pp. 41-46). He ignores the effect which such criticism could have on Vandenberg and Dulles' attitudes to the Administration, especially in an election year.


In April, Vandenberg agreed to attend the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Paris, having first refused to go to the Peace Conference in May on the grounds that it would be simply a "carbon paper" for the Ministers' Conference. Vandenberg also received assurances that if he went, his independence would be maintained, whilst Byrnes agreed to send and publish a stiff note to Poland. To Dulles, Vandenberg defensively explained his decision: "Frankly, I don't like any part of it. I was content with our tentative decision to stay out of this business. But Byrnes did so well at New York, in line with our Russky ideas, that I didn't feel like deserting him in response to his very first request thereafter lest he 'revert to type'. Perhaps I can keep a bit of the good old iron in his backbone as you did at London."  

In April 1946, then, Vandenberg still held reservations about James Byrnes, and his alleged propensity towards compromise, which he had been disposed to hold ever since Byrnes' appointment. Vandenberg was, however, perhaps both from his sense of patriotism as well as personal vanity, keen to be involved in foreign policy decision-making. His decision to attend the later Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, even during his re-election campaign, he explained in terms of Russian attacks on him and the need to preserve unity. His initial decision to go to Paris was, however, the result of mutual adjustment: Vandenberg, according to James Reston, had had to make concessions on atomic energy.

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200 A. H. Vandenberg to Dulles, April 15th, 1946, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
201 Vandenberg to Arthur E. Summerfield, June 4th, 1946, Vandenberg MSS.
and to give public support to the British Loan. 

Byrnes for his part had to talk tough. 

At the Paris meeting, Vandenberg began to develop confidence in Byrnes. The latter told him of his domestic difficulties with Secretary Wallace and Senator Pepper, and Vandenberg came to the conclusion that "Byrnes gives every evidence of 'no more appeasement' in his attitudes". In his diary he recorded his conviction that "America must behave like the Number One World Power which she is". 

To Dulles he reported that only once had Byrnes almost given in to the Russians, "at which point I put on one of my well-known exhibitions". 

After the conference he recorded in his diary the conviction that appeasement had been reversed: Molotov had been in a "trading mood", but the United States had stood firm.

Whilst Vandenberg believed that he had been instrumental in reversing American policy, Dulles had re-evaluated his ideas on the Soviet Union. He had never shared Vandenberg's certainty about the sources of Soviet conduct, but his experience in 1946 had crystallized his views.

After the London Conference in 1945 Dulles had read Stalin's Problems of Leninism, his understanding of which informed his evaluation of Soviet policy. By May, 1946, he had made...

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203 See report by Frank McNaughton, April 20th, 1946, of a briefing Byrnes gave the Foreign Relations Committee in April; McNaughton linked it to the fact that American forces were being increased in Europe, which it was expected would have a diplomatic pay-off with the Soviet Union, McNaughton MSS.
204 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 266-7.
205 A. H. Vandenberg to Dulles, May 13th, 1946, Dulles MSS.
207 In May he wrote, "...until recently I have not felt clear enough in my own mind about Russian foreign policy to feel like giving leadership in any particular direction". Dulles to Dr. Rosell P. Barnes, May 8th, 1946, Dulles MSS.
up his mind that the fact that American and Soviet aims and values were in conflict should now be revealed.\textsuperscript{208} He personally chose to do this through a lengthy article to be published in \textit{Life} magazine.\textsuperscript{209} In the article he argued that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a Pax Sovietica, that she regarded the United Nations as for the present merely an instrument of the United States-United Kingdom rule, and would rely on the veto until she had taken over the West's influence.\textsuperscript{210} He argued that Soviet policy should be seen in terms of three zones: 1. the inner areas such as the Baltic States, under direct Soviet legal authority; 2. the middle zone, which would remain outside Soviet authority but was susceptible to Soviet power; 3. the outer zone.

Within this analytical framework the struggle in 1946 as he saw it was an attempt by the Soviet Union to extend the middle zone to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Kurdistan and South Korea. In the outer zone, he saw the Soviet Union as trying to promote purely political objectives: prevention of western European unity, encouragement of colonial unrest, undermining Britain in the middle east and the United States in Latin America, opposition to Franco and incitement to civil war in Spain.\textsuperscript{211}

In his suggestions as to the course the United States should follow, Dulles echoed Vandenberg in the importance

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\textsuperscript{208} Guhin, pp. 131-2, 135. \\
\textsuperscript{209} "Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to Do About It", \textit{Life XX} (June 3rd and 10th, 1946), pp. 113-26, 118-30, reprinted in the \textit{Congressional Record}, 92, pp. 7170-7175. \\
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., p. 7171. \\
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., p. 7170.
\end{flushright}
he attached to making the Soviet Union realize that the
United States would no longer abandon its principles. Ameri­
can policy he was convinced, must rededicate itself to the
faith of their forbears, whose belief in individual liberty
had derived from their belief that "men are created as the
children of God, in his image". This meant that the west
must reform itself, especially get rid of imperialism, but
it must also build up its military strength, be prepared to
support Britain and other nations, and demonstrate the success
of freedom in the occupied areas.\(^212\) Primarily, Dulles
did not see the challenge as military, but more as political,
economic and even spiritual. He was, for example, opposed
to the United States becoming too militaristic and making
provocative use of far-flung bases.\(^213\) Dulles had not been
won over to the concept of a Pax Americana, with its mili­
taristic overtones, although he had gone further than many
Republicans would agree in his support for the use of non­
moral resources in diplomacy. At the same time, Dulles had
not yet embraced Vandenberg's more simplistic analysis of
the situation: he could appreciate that his view of the world
might not be shared by the Soviet Union, who might see their
action in the middle zone as essentially defensive.\(^214\) In
the long run also, he was convinced of the possibility of
peaceful co-existence: "we would each seek...to exert an
influence in the world...But we would each let the extension

\(^{212}\)Ibid., p. 7173.
\(^{213}\)Ibid.; Guhin, pp. 137-140.
\(^{214}\)Congressional Record, 92, p. 7174.
extension of our influence depend primarily on letting our light shine before men so that they may see our good works. The Soviet Union would abandon such methods as are being used by it in the middle and outer zone and we in turn would abandon methods which seem to us defensive, but which may seem to Soviet Leaders to be offensive. . .".  

Dulles' article undoubtedly reads differently in retrospect than it did at the time. In the summer of 1946, it was seen not in terms of its ultimate optimism about American-Russian relations, but in terms of the heightening tension between the former allies. Dulles' article, followed on Vandenberg's report from Paris of the development of "a positive, constructive, peace-seeking bipartisan foreign policy. . .based, at last, upon the practical necessities required for Europe's rehabilitation and upon the moralities of the Atlantic and San Francisco chapters. . ." Both were signs of the emerging, bipartisan, anti-communist consensus. By the middle of 1946, Vandenberg was convinced that the United States was well on the way to adopting a "Republican foreign policy", one which consisted of standing up for American ideals and interests in negotiation with the war-time allies. The snag, as Vandenberg was well aware, was that though he could get complete Nationalist support for an anti-communist stance, such a stance would require more than moral force to back it up. Although Vandenberg had been successful, and would continue to be successful in  

215 Ibid., p. 7175.  

216 Ibid., May 21st, 1946, p. 5325.
demanding a foreign policy based on a calculation of American self-interest, rather than on the basis of abstract 'internationalism', there was no guarantee that the majority of Congressional Republicans would be prepared to make the material sacrifices which his calculation of the national interest demanded. The resistance which had been revealed in 1945 to foreign economic expenditure had not decreased in 1946; neither had the resistance of key Congressional Republicans to universal military training. Although necessary for Republican support, the anti-communist stance of American policy as developed in 1946 could not guarantee that bipartisan support would be forthcoming. The desire to wipe away the New Deal, to balance the budget and reduce defence expenditure, in short, to return to Normalcy, was ultimately of more concern to Congressional Republicans than questions of foreign policy. The Nationalists, including Taft and Hoover, still put their prime emphasis on restoring liberty in the United States; in their eyes all other things were of secondary importance.
The multilateral peace, to which Republicans, albeit reluctantly, had been won over in 1945, had been pre-occupied with mechanistic international institutions. Its major weakness was the failure to face up to the short-term problems of reconstruction, for multilateralism was dependent on a stable world, politically, economically and socially. Awareness of this was implicit in Herbert Hoover's war-time advocacy of a transition period, and in the criticisms often made by Taft in 1945 that the United States should wait to see the shape of post-war world before committing itself to the various economic aspects of multilateral planning. In the "international" climate of 1945, the warnings of Taft and Hoover were unconvincing; the argument of Administration supporters and Republican Internationalists was that the United States had got to take a lead if the multilateral world, which they assumed was necessary to the United States and world peace, was ever to come about. Thus one of the leading post-war Internationalists, Senator Smith of New Jersey, argued that since "...the post war world is a new chapter...we must take the initiative in breaking down barriers between nations. The old type unilateral tariff is a form of isolationism and we cannot follow that road. I am not a free trader and I expect to protect American industry and American living standards, but I shall support a foreign policy aimed to help other nations to help themselves - and our help must take the form of economic
cooperation. The choice is between our international leadership and another world war. And that is why I am so opposed to Henry Wallace's spheres of influence theory. The internationalists cannot support Wallace.¹ The difficulty, however, was the fact that the multilateral world would not emerge unless the United States provided more than just leadership and ideas. Each instrument of multilateralism was over-sold to the American Congress and people in 1945, and there was a consequent unwillingness to face up to the real dimensions of the problem. In fact, not until 1947 was there a willingness to face up to the fact that a world in conformity with American ideas and planning would not emerge of its own accord. Before 1947, the only important attempt to use American resources on a large scale to influence the direction of world reconstruction was the British Loan. Signed in December, 1945, the Loan was designed to make available to Britain the estimated amount of its deficit until 1948, by which time it was assumed its economy would have revived.² As the most important trading nation with which the United States had to deal, Britain was seen by Administration spokesmen as a special case. The Loan, it was assumed, would enable her to fall in with multilateral trading and exchange policies.³ Designed then as an essential step on the way to the multilateral peace, the British Loan posed severe political problems to Republican leaders; problems which need to be viewed in the light of the domestic

¹ Diary, September 21st, 1946, Smith MSS.
political situation in 1945-6, in light of the Republican tradition, and also in the light of perceptions of the developing hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As argued in previous chapters, the Republican tradition was a tradition of self-interest and independence, a tradition which scorned sentimentality in foreign relations. Historically the great Republican statesmen of the turn of the century had seen a certain mutuality of interest between the United States and Britain.\(^4\) Vandenberg had also in his *Trail of a Tradition* approvingly quoted Emerson on "the moral peculiarity of the Anglo-Saxon race", and had described Anglo-American "harmony" as "the first hope of the world".\(^5\) As late as 1940, T. R. B. in the *New Republic* was to write: "The Traditional Republican administration foreign attitude has favored the fullest collaboration with England and the building up of a powerful navy to safeguard American 'interests'. On this front therefore the President has a policy which commands the heartiest approval of all those who have had this traditional Republican attitude, first crystallized into a policy by John Hay and carried on right up to the time of Henry L. Stimson left the State Department".\(^6\) World War I perhaps weakened this feeling; despite the apparent identity of ideals revealed at Versailles, the immediate post-war period had revealed a number of conflicting interests.

\(^4\) Osgood, pp. 72-3, 282, 285.
\(^5\) pp. 185-187.
\(^6\) April 8th, 1940, cited in James Martin, II: 1230.
Although aware of the common legal traditions and the political and economic similarities between Britain and the United States, Herbert Hoover and John Foster Dulles were both in their inter-war writings very much aware of the deficiencies in the British Empire. Hoover certainly had become convinced as a result of his World War I experience of the uniqueness of the United States. Versailles to Hoover had revealed "the collision of civilizations that had grown three hundred years apart". The United States by contrast had developed a distinctive civilization, where class barriers and destructive ideologies were unknown, and which was based on the working concept of equality of opportunity. To Dulles it was difficult to see the role of the British Empire in the liberal world he envisaged. Although he was aware of the self-governing Dominions, and of the importance of the common law, Britain was still the major Imperial power. In 1940, therefore, the preservation of the British Empire was a worthwhile goal, short of war, and "so long as its leadership remains liberal as over the past century", Ultimately, however, its preservation could not, according to Dulles, be guaranteed, for within the Empire were "inherent weaknesses". It was, therefore, "inevitable that this Empire will evolve... and the form of evolution cannot be predicted". Opposed to colonialism, and favouring the

7 Hoover, Memoirs I:479.
8 Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1922), pp. 8-11.
11 Ibid., p. 8.
12 Ibid.
mandate system and the "open door", Dulles was disturbed when he visited Britain in 1942 to find a basic desire to maintain the status quo. Although stressing the need for post-war Anglo-American collaboration, as well as arguing the need for a revision of colonial policies, Dulles' emotional detachment from the British fight for survival made him a less than favourite figure amongst British officials, even in 1942. In later years he was to be criticized by fellow Americans for having no conception of the "special relationship" between Great Britain and the United States.

In many ways Willkie made the same, more powerful criticisms of Britain in One World. Willkie, however, had never lacked the empathy which Dulles failed to exhibit, and his visit to Britain in 1941 had proved tremendously popular.

Dulles' ambivalence towards Britain was matched by Hoover. In the Problems of Lasting Peace, he and Hugh Gibson were not prepared to condemn outright Imperialism other than the conquest of "Civilized" races: Africa, they made clear was not ready for self-government; the most that could be expected was equal access for all nations for immigration, trade, resource development. At the same time, however, Hoover was deeply concerned that the United States should not be put in a position of defending the British Empire.

13 Guhin, pp. 49-50.
14 Ibid.; Hoopes, p. 53.
15 Joseph Alsop to Martin Sommers, September 8th, 1948; transcript, interview with Harold E. Stassen, p. 11, Dulles (Oral).
17 Barnard, p. 284.
18 pp. 163, 318-19.
During the war, he was worried by the publication of Lippmann's *U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (1943), because of its premise that the British navy had been America's first line of defense for 120 years. To Dulles and to John Reuben Clark (author of the Clark Memorandum) he wrote urging that Lippmann's "historic distortion" ought to be answered. Britain had always been guided by self-interest, he said, and he denied completely that "the growth of the United States owed one atom to the helpfulness of the British Empire". Nevertheless, earlier in the same year he had written to another friend, "...the British are going to require some defence before this is over. The whole tendency of the Left-wing today is to destroy the British in the hope of making Russia the great post war partner". Similarly, in 1945, Hoover informed Secretary of War Stimson of the need for a negotiated peace with Japan, on the basis that a continuation of the war would weaken the economic position of the United States and Britain, and would strengthen the Soviet Union. Hoover's position was not, however, as contradictory as it may appear. Starting off from the standpoint of American self-interest, Hoover's aim was an independent foreign policy; but confronted with a conflict between British and Russian interests he had no doubt which the United States should support. Although he would not have accepted the label, Hoover's attitude was

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19 Hoover to J. Reuben Clark, October 6th, 1943; Hoover to John Foster Dulles, September 30th, 1943, Hoover MSS.  
20 Hoover to Chauncey McCormick, March 31st, 1943, Hoover MSS.  
21 Memorandum, May 15th, 1945, Henry L. Stimson file, Hoover MSS.
one of classic realpolitik, in the best traditions of the "Farewell Address". Friendship with Britain was not an aim of policy, it was viewed within the context of American interests and ideals; in short, he was neither pro-British nor anti-British, in so far as that ideal state was possible. The Chicago Tribune, often accused of anglophobia, a label which Col. McCormick would not accept, put the position of the Nationalists bluntly: "If it ever was true, as the internationalists insisted, that our security was dependent upon the British fleet, it isn't true today and it need never be true again. We can cooperate with the British or not, as our interest demands. That goes equally for the Russians, the Chinese and every other nation. Their need for our friendship is far greater than ours for theirs, and we should conduct our foreign affairs accordingly".  

Within the framework of the tradition then, relations with Britain were seen somewhat ambivalently. In the war and afterwards, all Republican leaders could agree that the survival of the British Isles as an independent political entity was important to the United States; such an assumption was even part of Taft's foreign policy. But there was a difference between this and the view, perhaps more common in London than in Washington, that British and American interests were identical. Republicans from all sections of the Party could agree that Britain was closer to the United States culturally and ideologically than any other country; but her deficiencies were still apparent. Thus Republican leaders, like left-wing Democrats, for the most part rejected

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22 Chicago Tribune, June 24th, 1944.  
23 White, Taft Story, pp. 154-55; address to American Assembly, May 22nd, 1951, cited by Kirk and McClellan, p. 32.
the implications of Anglo-American alliance which began to emerge at the end of the war. This was especially true of the Nationalists. The image of the British as slick international poker players, soaking gullible and sycophantic American foreign service personnel was convincing, and Lincoln's adage, that the sun never sat on the British Empire, because the good Lord couldn't trust the British in the dark, seemed as relevant as ever in the post-war world, in which socialist Britain seemed determined to hang on to most of her Empire, and to soak the United States into the bargain. Characteristically then, Cal O'Laughlin, Hoover's faithful friend, reported in January, 1945, that the British were delighted with Vandenberg's speech of January 10th, and noted that Vandenberg was friendly with Lord Halifax.24 The implication was clear: perhaps Vandenberg had been unduly influenced by the ever wily British. A year later, O'Laughlin reported, on the basis of his friend's visit to Europe and Asia investigating the food situation, "Mr. Hoover found the British as usual grabbing everything in sight. They have no intention of doing any more for Egypt and for India than they must do".25 A Strong America, therefore, required eternal vigilance against the wiles of the British; Anglo-American cooperation, like post-war relationships with the Soviet Union, must be seen to be deferential to American interests.

24 O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, January 13th, 1945, O'Laughlin MSS.
25 O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, May 18th, 1946, O'Laughlin MSS.
The British Loan

The British Loan was negotiated, without consultation with Republican leaders, at a time when the congressional party were more concerned with returning the United States as quickly as possible to "Normalcy". To many in Congress, the Loan offered a great opportunity to lambast the Administration, and to point up the basic issue as they saw it: between a bungling give-away, extravagant Administration, and a more hard-headed realistic opposition. The desire to balance the budget by trimming down both domestic and external expenditure found strong sympathy amongst congressional Republicans in the run up to the 1946 elections. A bipartisan call in March, 1946, for the budget to be balanced in 1946-1947 received the support of all the major Republican leaders in both Houses of Congress: Vandenberg, Taft, Wherry, White, Bridges, Halleck, Martin, Taber.\(^{26}\) Earlier, in mid-February, eight Republicans on the Senate Appropriations Committee in the Senate presented a resolution to the President calling for a detailed picture of the American international economic position.\(^{27}\) In delivering the resolution, their leader, Senator Bridges, made it clear that they saw their action as consistent with the demands by Herbert Hoover, Vandenberg and Democratic elder statesman, Bernard Baruch, that a balance sheet be drawn up.\(^{28}\) Senator Warren Austin, soon to leave the Senate for the United Nations Security Council, was critical of what he described as an

\(^{27}\) Ibid., February 16th, 1944.
\(^{28}\) Ibid.
undercurrent of "isolationism" in Congress and the nation. He was especially critical of Congress' failure to deal with the extension of selective service, universal military training and unification of the armed forces.29

In this climate of opinion, the attitude of the Nationalists especially towards the British Loan was predictable. Concerned about what they regarded as the restoration of liberty in the United States, they were ill-disposed to go on pouring American resources into Europe or Asia for matters other than relief. In November, 1945, Col. McCormick recommended that England receive "a delegation of energetic Americans to teach the English workmen how to work. That would be better than to strain our own workmen to still greater efforts to keep English workmen in semi-idleness".30 In Congress the British Loan was greeted with hostility. There was a widespread feeling that as usual the United States had been bested in international negotiations, as well as the fear that this would set a precedent for further loans. John Vorys, the influential Ohioan on the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House, commented that he found Britain's request for an interest free loan an insult to his intelligence. "I want to see Britain survive," he wrote, "but we should help from now on only on a basis that is mutually profitable."31

29 Article from Christian Science Monitor, reprinted in Congressional Record, 92, March 5th, 1946, Appendix 1178.  
30 Address to Foreign Policy Association, November 17th, 1945, New York Times, November 18th, 1945.  
31 John Vorys to Clark Riker, September 24th, 1945, Vorys MSS., Ohio State Historical Society, Columbus.
Senator Taft reported to Hoover that sentiment against the loan was growing, and noted, perhaps with satisfaction, that the State Department appeared to be in a state of confusion. The fact that British Conservatives opposed the Loan, and argued that it would simply advance socialism in Britain, was not calculated to increase the Loan's attractiveness to the Nationalists.

In the Senate the small group of Internationalists could be counted on to give support to the Loan. Warren Austin was an early supporter, arguing that it would help Britain to stay away from socialism rather than aid socialism. Senator Smith too was an early supporter. In the country they could rely on the support of Harold Stassen, who on leaving the Navy in November began his campaign to change the face of the Republican Party away from Old Guard dominance. Although Stassen was the subject of much press attention, with resultant good showings in opinion polls, it is doubtful that he could at any time wield much influence in Congress. The fact is that by 1945-46, only a minority of Congressional Republicans shared what the New York Herald Tribune described as, a commitment to support "the...outposts of a functioning free enterprise economy and democratic polity." Neither did they share the Herald Tribune's own conviction that the "Western democratic ideal" could not "be preserved and nurtured in the United States alone".

32 Robert A. Taft to Hoover, November 30th, 1945, Hoover MSS.  
33 O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, November 3rd, 1945, O'Laughlin MSS.  
34 Report, September 13th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.  
35 Alexander Smith to Otto T. Mallery, December 12th, 1945, Smith MSS.  
36 By June 1946 Stassen had a narrow lead over Dewey as the popular choice for 1948 nominee, Fortune, June, 1946, p. 6.  
37 March 1st, 1948.
Crucial then to the Republican position on the British Loan was the centre group, and especially Arthur Vandenberg. John Foster Dulles was evidently for the Loan, but he was aware of the political difficulties which existed by the end of 1945. To Vandenberg he suggested that rather than opposing, Republicans in Congress should take the more constructive path of insisting on a total clarification of the money and goods to be taken from the American economy, and for an articulation of the principle on which allocations were to be made between the various nations.38 In an address to the Fiftieth Annual Congress of American Industry, a copy of which he sent to Vandenberg prior to delivery, Dulles set out his ideas more clearly. The United States, he said, must exercise good judgement in the distribution of foreign loans, with priority being given to Britain, France, Holland and Belgium; at the same time, however, he was critical of government handling of the whole question, and in particular for the failure to outline a total programme. "When our government talks with foreign governments," he said, "it should be primarily to tell them what it is we have decided to do in our interest. If some aid to Great Britain is in the national interest, and I believe it is, why should it have taken over three months of negotiation to define what that aid will be. The impression created is that our government did not know its own mind, or has been talked or traded into

38 John Foster Dulles to Vandenberg, December 17th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
doing what is against its better judgement. The result may be serious opposition in the country and in Congress to doing what, if properly explained, the whole nation would support.\textsuperscript{39} Like Vandenberg and Hoover and other Republicans, Dulles also emphasized that there was a bottom to the barrel: "There is a severe limit to the material aid which our government ought to extend, and it is small in relation to the need. There is, however, no limit to the moral leadership which we could give, and that is equally needed. Our nation was designed to help others in that way."\textsuperscript{40} Dulles' equivocal endorsement of the British Loan was to be repeated on March 1st, 1946. He realized, he said on that occasion, that there were many economic arguments against it, but "it has become a symbol of whether or not we are prepared to help Great Britain when she is standing at a critical juncture...\textsuperscript{41}

Vandenberg, however, was sceptical, and in any case was far more concerned about Byrnes' negotiations in Moscow. Not having been consulted, he was not, in December, 1945, disposed to fight for the Loan.\textsuperscript{42} To Dulles he confided a "feeling" that they should support it, "for the sake of some nebulous affinity which the English speaking world must maintain in mutual self-defense". But he felt the whole thing had been badly handled - his constituency would be unimpressed by/arguments.\textsuperscript{43} "It can easily become a major tragedy."\textsuperscript{43} He was particularly concerned that it might make it difficult

\textsuperscript{39}December 7th, 1945, Dulles MSS.; New York Times, December 8th, 1945.
\textsuperscript{40}Address, December 7th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
\textsuperscript{42}Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 230-31.
\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., p.231.
to turn down other requests, particularly from Russia, which he knew Republicans would definitely not support. In view of these considerations, he wondered whether it might not be better for the United States not to open up the "pawnshop" at all. Vandenberg's reasoning revealed a conflict between his fear of over-spending, and his desire to oppose the Soviet Union externally. He would not wish to see Britain weakened in the light of his fears about Russia. On the other hand, he remained temperamentally close to Taft when it came to expenditure, and his desire to maintain the American way of life. To a friend in Detroit, he wrote at the end of December, "I hope it may be a 'new year' in which we can restore at least a few of the American fundamentals in which you and I believe". In London for the opening of the United Nations in January, Vandenberg sought to ascertain what the effect on Britain would be if, as he thought possible, the Loan were thrown out by Congress. Although he came round to supporting it, as late as April, 1946, he was still dubious as to whether the Loan could get through Congress.

The caution and apprehension of Vandenberg needs to be seen in the context of domestic politics, as well perhaps

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44 Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, December 19th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.; the word "pawnshop" was edited out of the Private Papers, p. 231.
45 Vandenberg to B. E. Hutchinson, December 29th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
47 Report, April 19th, 1946, McNaughton MSS.
as in the context of his feeling that the Administration were consciously ignoring him. The 1946 elections were not far from the minds of most Republicans, and the necessity of winning, and making certain of victory in 1948 was self-evident to all who, with Vandenberg, wished to see a return to American fundamentals. Victory could not be regarded as inevitable in view of the extraordinary popularity of President Truman in his first months in office.\textsuperscript{48} To make matters worse, Republicans found it hard to secure unity, as the dissatisfaction at Chicago in December over the Congressional draft of Party principles had revealed.\textsuperscript{49} A meeting of midwestern State Chairmen on February 1st failed to come up with anything much more positive; Stassen supporters reportedly managed to tone down the section on foreign affairs to the innocuous statement that "...responsibility for world leadership has fallen on American shoulders, but in our dealings with other nations we must not make this land of plenty a land of scarcity. Experienced and capable men must replace those now handling our foreign affairs".\textsuperscript{50} At the State Convention in Nebraska in March, Kenneth Wherry, Senate Whip, faced with an attempt by Harold Stassen to get Nebraskans to dump Old Guard Senator, Hugh Butler, attacked "Republican New Dealers" who he alleged were trying to take over the Party. One of the tests for identification of Republican New Dealers, he said, was their use of the slogan, "We will enforce the peace...".\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{49}See page\textsuperscript{241-2} above.  
\textsuperscript{50}Chicago Tribune, February 3rd, 1946.  
\textsuperscript{51}New York Times, March 20th, 1946.
At the end of March, following the resignation of National Chairman and Dewey associate, Herbert Brownell, the National Committee elected the Nationalists' representative, Carroll Reece of Tennessee.\(^5^2\) Reece's election, said Stassen, did not constitute a decision on policy or platform: he still intended to carry on his fight within the Party on issues and principles.\(^5^3\) The *Chicago Tribune* clearly thought otherwise: "Mr. Stassen will, of course, continue as a pseudo-Republican. Currently he is organizing what he calls Republican Open Forums, ostensibly an effort to probe the opinions of Republican voters. . .If the Republican party follows the only course that can assure it victory, namely, the selection of a candidate in 1948 who will go to the country as the sponsor of a pro-American foreign policy, it can be expected confidently that Mr. Stassen's Wall Street sponsors will push him into the camp of the New Deal Internationalists".\(^5^4\) Given time to reflect, the *Tribune* was even more certain that the election of Reece signified that in 1948 the voters "will be offered a clear choice of foreign policies, a choice between a pro-American policy put forward by a revitalized Republican party and the New Deal policy, which now more than ever can be seen as a continuous struggle between a pro-Russian group and a pro-British group for the influence of the United States."\(^5^5\)

\(^{52}\) *Ibid.*, April 2nd, 1946.


\(^{54}\) *Chicago Tribune*, April 3rd, 1946.

The reaction of the Chicago Tribune was, not surprisingly, echoed by Governor Green of Illinois, who way back in December had been critical of the "left wing" stance of the Republican Party. On April 1st, he declared that the issues of 1946 would be crucial to the nation: "In foreign affairs, it is not isolationism versus internationalism. It is the secret deals of the New Dealers versus a frank cooperation based on a full recognition of our first responsibility to our own people, and in which both the American people and the world shall know exactly where we stand". Critical of the "appeasement" of the Administration at various wartime conferences, when, he alleged, it had yielded on issues vital to American commerce and defense, Green continued: "The events of the last weeks in Iran and in New York have demonstrated both the soundness of those warnings and the tragic futility of the New Deal diplomacy. Americans of all parties will approve our belated stand against Russian aggression, but I know that the people of Illinois would rather have seen us act when communist Russia violated the political and religious freedom of the Poles, the Lithuanians and the other small nations on her borders instead of waiting until Stalin's program clashed with the oil interests of the British empire".

56 Ibid., April 2nd, 1946.
57 Ibid.; on March 27th Gromyko, the Russian delegate, walked out of the Security Council meeting after the Council had voted, against Soviet wishes, to keep the matter of Iran on the agenda; Gaddis argues that the decision of Secretary Byrnes to push the matter through the Security Council, even though the Russians had indicated a willingness to withdraw their troops by early May, was largely the result of his desire to convince domestic critics that "appeasement" was over; op. cit., pp. 310-12.
Vandenberg had instinctively realized in 1945 that, despite anti-Russian feeling, the British Loan would not be very popular in the Middle West. The British Loan and the apparently emergent Anglo-American alliance, suggested by Churchill's Fulton, Missouri speech in early March, were difficult to reconcile with the concept of a "Strong America". One Congressman, from Vandenberg's home state, saw the emergent alliance as the result of the influence of Rhodes Scholars. "Naturally, these British-educated young men return to the United States thrilled with the greatness of the British Empire...and most of them have devoted their time ever since preaching the doctrine that America must forever be the guardian of...Britain from whom we thought we gained our independence back in 1776". The same Congressman saw Dean Acheson as the prime example, and recalled the U.N.R.R.A. conference at Hot Springs, Virginia in 1943: "He ate every meal with the British at that Conference - not with the Americans. He played tennis with the British, he lived, dressed, and talked like the British, and that reminds me of another thing. Personally, I am getting sick and tired listening to the "cheerio's", "right-ho's" etc., down here in Washington - and the British accents and mannerisms which we are constantly met with. It's a new, but costly fad".

Small wonder then that Republican leaders were hesitant

58 Representative Bradley of Michigan, transcript of radio address, January 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 1946, reprinted in Congressional Record, 92, Appendix, p. 25.
59 Ibid.
about the British Loan. Representative Charles Eaton of New Jersey was perhaps the most publicly prominent in support both of the Loan and of standing behind Britain in international affairs. He was a man of limited influence, however, despite his seniority on the Foreign Affairs Committee. In New York on March 9th, Eaton said that "for our own safety we cannot permit Russia to weaken and finally destroy Great Britain as a world power. The only assurance of safety for our two countries and for all other free self-governing capitalistic countries is our continuing unity in peace as in war". Harold Stassen, however, though arguing that defeat of the Loan would harm the American economy, urged that all foreign loans must have firm conditions attached to them: in Britain's case he wanted a change in sterling bloc and empire preference policies. Vandenberg held off from taking any public position on the Loan until April 22nd, the day before his departure with Byrnes for Paris. In so doing, he described it as the most difficult decision he had had to take in his whole 18 years in the Senate. Whilst expressing regret that Congress had not been consulted in advance, he also tried to reassure the Senate that the pound sterling was a special case, that the Loan was necessary to the functioning of Bretton Woods, and that rather than encourage socialism it would contain it. Gradually then, Vandenberg convinced himself of the necessity of supporting it.

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60 Congressional Record, 92, Appendix, p. 1340.
62 Congressional Record, 92, April 22nd, 1946, p. 4079.
63 Ibid., pp. 4080-4082.
to be most difficult, the Loan had also threatened to be
difficult in the Senate, with four of the seven Republicans
on the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, including
Taft, having voted against it in committee.

Taft, in announcing his intention to oppose the Loan,
reported the decision of the Republican Steering Committee
that it should not be a Party matter: "a rule which I
think should apply to most matters relating to foreign
relations". Taft then proceeded to take the bill apart,
on the grounds that it violated what he regarded as sound
principles of foreign lending and fiscal policy. He was,
he said, prepared to give Britain one and one quarter billion
dollars to balance its trade account with the United States,
but the extra two and one-half billion dollars was "an attempt
to stabilize the currencies of the world, which is just
exactly what Bretton Woods was going to do." Had they not
passed Bretton Woods, he said, he would not now be opposing
the British Loan. But as it was he could not see why the
United States should now be expected to provide the money
required by Britain to settle her accounts with her own
Dominions: "It is difficult indeed for me to see why we
should underwrite the entire British Empire and the Sterling
blue". Taft's fundamental position remained the same: he
disputed that the United States should be primarily concerned
with foreign trade, since its economy was largely self-
sufficient. The artificial creation of large demands for

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64 New York Times, April 11th, 1946.
65 Congressional Record, 92, April 24th, 1946, p. 4106.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., p. 4111.
68 Ibid., p. 4110.
exports he saw as inflationary, and ultimately unwise, since the United States could not in the long run import enough to keep its trade with the rest of the world in balance. 69

Taft's arguments went largely unanswered from Republican ranks. In succeeding days, Republican support increasingly appeared to be lining up behind Taft, with the exception of the usual small group of Internationalists. One of the most telling points against the Loan was, in the words of Senator Capper of Kansas, that "Every time we are asked to sacrifice our own interests to promote world welfare, we are told that this fresh step is necessary to make previous programs work". 70 So also commented Senator Willis of Indians: "For month after month, as the administration has unfolded its program of so-called international cooperation, many of us have gone along, thinking that each measure would be the last. . . Yet, apparently, each proposal is but the genesis of another proposal which, it is said, is even more important than its predecessor. . . Perhaps in several more months. . . we shall be told that it will be less than useless if we do not pass other resolutions providing for loans to Russia, France, China, or any of a dozen other nations". 71 With regard to Vandenberg's argument that the British Loan was necessary to make Bretton Woods work, he was "constrained to ask why someone did not mention that when the Bretton Woods legislation was being debated here". 72

69 Ibid., pp. 4107, 4113.
70 Ibid., May 2nd, 1946, p. 4314.
71 Ibid., p. 4316.
72 Ibid.
Senator LaFollette, recently welcomed into Republican ranks, cautioned against "extremists who blindly support any project that is labeled 'international'"; such propaganda, he said, would provoke a reaction "in the opposite direction from sure-footed and sane international cooperation". Concern for domestic matters such as money for veterans, for tax reduction, for budget balancing, were foremost in the minds of Republican Senators, who were anxious to "liquidate" the New Deal. The debate on the Loan suggested that the "international" climate of 1945 had been superseded; but supporters of the Loan had one trump card, which was played more in private than in public, which was that the Loan was necessary because of the dispute that was shaping up with Russia. The Loan had been doomed, charged Senator Burton Wheeler (Dem., Montana) until the propaganda had begun that it was necessary to save Britain from Russian hands. Despite the intrusion of the anti-communist issue, the Loan was passed by the relatively narrow margin of 46-34. Republicans supplied 19 of the nays, with two more announced against the measure. The development of the anti-communist consensus was even more important in the House of Representatives than it had been in the Senate. In May, one Representative wrote to Under-Secretary Clayton after a dinner he had held with Republican Congressmen to muster support for the Loan: "I find that the economic arguments in favour of the loan are on the whole much less convincing to this group than the feeling may serve us in good stead in holding

73 Ibid., April 30th, 1946, p. 4239.
74 Ibid., May 3rd, 1946, p. 4373.
75 Ibid., May 10th, 1946, p. 4806.
up a hand of a nation whom we may need badly as a friend because of impending Russian troubles." In early July, 74 Republicans and the lone Progressive signed a statement attacking the British Loan and dedicating the day it was due to be debated as Veterans and Old Age Pensions Day. By July, relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated still further. Republicans, who had for the most part been hostile to the Soviet Union, or at least sceptical, throughout the war, were by 1946 publicly identifiable as anti-Soviet; anti-communism in fact for the Midwestern wing of the Party was to be a major issue of the campaign. Given this fact, it was difficult for Republicans to oppose the British Loan when it was put into anti-communist terms. "Out in the cloakroom," complained one Representative from Illinois, "practically the only argument for the British Loan is the hush, hush stuff that, 'Now you can say you voted for something to stop Russia!'".

Against the portrayal of the British Loan in anti-Russian terms, opponents suggested that Russia was not the threat which she was being built up as, and that the real threat to the United States came through bureaucratization and regimentation. To these arguments were added the usual anglophobia, and the conviction that once more the United States was being taken for a ride by Britain, whilst at home it was sliding into insolvency and bankruptcy. Republican Congressmen complained that the Administration track record did

76Quoted by R. N. Gardner, p. 250.
78Congressional Record, 92, June 28th, 1946, p. 7913.
79Ibid., July 5th, 1946, p. 8425.
80Ibid., p. 8428; Ibid., July 12th, 1946, p. 8367.
not inspire confidence in the success of the Loan. One Congressman complained that the press were labelling opponents of the Loan as "isolationists": "The inference is that in order to demonstrate to the world that we are not isolationists or nationalistic we must continue lend-lease until the end of time". Another, who as he reminded the House had supported the U. N., Bretton Woods and other "international" measures, felt that the Loan would serve simply to divide the world, and he commented, "...it appears that financing foreign governments like atomic energy is a process of chain reactions. In my opinion, we better call a halt to the process while there is still a chance to save the solvency of the United States".

One of the most influential opponents of the Loan was representative John Vorys of Ohio, whose opposition appeared to derive from his feeling that the Loan was a bad agreement for the United States. At the same time, Vorys attacked the technique of representing international agreements as "sacred governmental obligations" which Congress was bound to ratify to avoid a world tragedy. He commented also that Vinson and Clayton, Secretary of the Treasury and Under-Secretary of State, were inexperienced in diplomacy, and had neglected to consult with Congress as in previous "international" measures. He believed, he said, in the need for cooperation with Britain against communism, and he also believed that the United States had a duty to help in worldwide reconstruction, but the British Loan he held was sound

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81 Ibid., p. 8872.
82 Ibid., p. 8849.
83 Ibid., p. 8849.
84 Ibid., p. 8726, July 11th, 1946.
Ibid.
in neither an economic nor a political sense. He was especially dubious as to whether Britain, having promised already under lend-lease and Bretton Woods to reform its trading and exchange practices, would be any more inclined to do so under the Loan agreement. 

On July 13th, the Loan was passed by 219 votes to 155. One hundred and twenty-two of the negative votes were Republican. Most of the votes, and the voices in favour of the Loan, came from Eastern Republicans; a bill which seemed to be nationally unpopular was likely to be a very risky proposition in an election year in the Midwest. Among the supporters of the bill were conservative Eastern Republicans, Joseph Martin and John Taber; among the opponents of the bill were Republicans such as Everett Dirksen of Illinois, Mundt of South Dakota and Vorys of Ohio, all of whom were usually more inclined to support "international" measures than were Martin and Taber.

The strength of Republican opposition suggested then that the Congressional Party were more concerned about domestic problems in the summer of 1946. Inflation and labour troubles seemed more important than Britain's economic difficulties; communism and radicalism seemed more of an immediate threat in the United States than overseas. On the question of opposition to communism the Republican Party could unite; thus some supporters of the British Loan were careful to point out that if the Loan were defeated, the

85 Ibid., p. 8725.
86 The public seemed to be pre-occupied with domestic matters in 1946; polls revealed that 40% were opposed to the Loan in June, and 42% in August, after Congress had passed it, R. N. Gardner, p. 236.
87 Congressional Record, 92, July 13th, 1946, p. 8956-7.
Communists, the Soviet leaders and the left wing of the British Labour Party would celebrate. The problem, however, was one of priorities and allocation of resources. Senator Bridges of New Hampshire, long known for his anti-soviet views, gave an insight into the dimensions of the problem. Bridges believed that the United States could not afford a period of social and economic dislocation in Europe, but he regretted that "a large part of our population is still far from the realization that the epoch of natural isolation is ended, that whether we like it or not we must shoulder the responsibilities and the risks of leadership in a shrunken world". Senator Bridges himself, however, apparently saw no contradiction between his foreign policy convictions and the statement of Republican contributions to the 79th Congress which he put in the Congressional Record in August, which outlined the Republican intention to reduce taxes, economise and balance the budget. Herbert Hoover likewise was belligerently anti-communist; privately encouraged President Truman in his anti-communist stand, and publicly attacked the communist press for slandering him whenever he went overseas. In his usual birthday statement in August, he coupled attacks on the Soviet Union with a three point plan for the United States: 1) the United States must conserve resources and reduce spending and end its "role of Santa Claus"; 2) economic relations should be a "two-way street", and "balanced traffic at that"; 3) pending general

88 Ibid., July 12th, 1946, pp. 8856, 8865.
89 Ibid., June 26th, 1946, p. 7577.
90 Ibid., August 2nd, 1946, p. 10735.
91 O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, May 18th, 1946, O'Laughlin MSS.; note of meeting with President Truman, May 16th, 1946, Hoover MSS.; New York Times, June 6th, 1946.
disarmament, the United States must hang on to the atomic bomb. 92

For Herbert Hoover, and the bulk of the congressional party, relations with both the Soviet Union and Britain were viewed within the framework of a "Strong America". The apparent decline of Britain, a major change in world power which had been foreseen by A. T. Mahan among others in the late nineteenth century, coupled with the rising military and ideological strength of the Soviet Union, had created a situation in which the apparent demands of world leadership could not easily be reconciled with the desire to return to domestic Normalcy. By 1946, the fundamental question was how much the United States was prepared to pay, not only in terms of money, but also in terms of its way of life, to defend and extend the liberal political economy overseas. For those who shared the Wilkieite assumption about the indivisibility of freedom, the dilemma did not exist. For the Nationalists, for whom the liberal political economy was not a vital interest, the demands of the restoration of "freedom" at home remained first priority.

By 1946, Vandenberg and Dulles, though still concerned about and sensitive to the domestic implications of United States policy, were finding themselves increasingly isolated from the Nationalists. To Charles Eaton, Dulles wrote, "I was delighted that you raised your voice so effectively in support of the British Loan. I am sorry that more of our Republican brethren did not follow you, but you were a good

92 Ibid., August 13th, 1946.
symbol of what the Republican Party should stand for". Moral leadership against the Soviet Union, which cost nothing, had never been controversial, and Dulles in particular had been adept at using moral leadership to good political effect. The implications posed by the failure to secure agreement with the Soviet Union in central Europe went far beyond this. Reconstruction of Europe on liberal capitalist lines was ultimately to require aid and military commitment, and to threaten inflation, bureaucratization and regimentation at home.

The British Loan had almost certainly been saved by the raising of the communist menace; but even Vandenberg had gone along without conviction. The British Loan demonstrated two things which Republican victory in 1946 was to underline; firstly, that any further talk of a loan to the U.S.S.R. was totally impracticable; secondly, that future policies requiring foreign expenditure would require greater consultation with Republican leaders. Before the election, Byrnes and Vandenberg had begun to develop an exceptionally close understanding at the Paris foreign ministers meeting. This cooperation was going to be even more necessary in the 80th Congress; but cooperation with Vandenberg had its price; and in particular it precluded any hint of a return to the conciliatory, "horse-trading" diplomacy which Byrnes had sought to follow at Moscow in December, 1945.

93 Dulles to Charles A. Eaton, July 15th, 1946, Dulles M33.
94 In 1946 the extension of the Selective Service Act ran into considerable difficulty in Congress; Republican Whip, Kenneth Wherry charged that the Administration was trying to transform the United States into a totalitarian society; Congressional Record, 92, June 5th, 1946, p. 6332.
95 Herring, Aid to Russia, pp. 253-65.
The 1946 Election and the Development of Containment

As in 1944, the main focus of the Republican campaign in 1946 was not on matters of foreign policy. The main issues of the campaign were domestic, including labour relations, price controls, commodity shortages, especially of meat, and a general Republican charge of bureaucratic bungling and incompetence. Thomas Dewey, up for re-election as Governor of New York, struck the theme of domestic disillusion in his first campaign broadcast:

"During the war all of us held firmly to a precious vision of what we called the 'post-war world'. We saw America once again the land of freedom and opportunity. We saw a reaffirmation of the ideal of government by the people and an end to wartime regimentation.

Well, we are in the 'post-war world'. We have been in it for more than a year. But our vision remains just a vision.

Our people stand in lines for meat - and there is no meat. We still need new cars. Our national housing shortage is critical. Our hopes for a better world are being blotted out by clouds of Washington confusion."1

Whilst, however, concentrating on disillusion following the failure of the better world to emerge, there was also a significant ideological element to the Republican campaign which was of relevance to matters of foreign policy. For Dewey, for example, the great responsibility of the Republican Party was to uphold the tradition that Americans "are the trustees of the cause of equal opportunity for all our people, of social freedom, of economic freedom. We

1 Radio Address, October 7th, 1946, Dewey, Public Papers, p. 783.
are trustees of the greatest cause of all — of human freedom". Whilst preaching national unity, Dewey saw this trusteeship as too important to be entrusted to Democrats: "having no basic philosophy the present Democratic Party is committed to a series of expedients which would take us step by step into a controlled and regimented society... We believe that free men and only free men can continue leading the world upward in the paths of peace and righteousness and in liberty and justice for all".

The ideological framework of the Republican campaign, as revealed by Dewey, made it possible for the less subtle to subsume all the issues of the 1945 campaign under the broad issue of "Democracy versus Communism". The Midwestern wing of the Party, which had, with Carroll Reece's election as National Chairman, got control of the national organization, especially tended to see things in this way. In May, Reece had labelled Democratic policies as bearing "a definite made-in-Moscow label". Therefore, he had concluded, "from a long-range viewpoint the choice which confronts Americans this year is between communism and republicanism". Accordingly, the National Committee concentrated its preparation of campaign material under the headings of Red Menace, Bureaucracy, High Taxes, Preservation of the American Way of Life. "The issue is clear for 1946," wrote one Representative: "To loan or not to loan. New Deal or Republican. the Kremlin or the Constitution. Leninism or liberty".

The highly ideological perspective on the 1946 election

2 Radio address, November 6th, 1946, ibid., p. 835.
3 Speech accepting Renomination, September 4th, 1946, ibid., p. 776.
4 Speech at Springfield, Missouri, May 28th, 1946, reprinted in Congressional Record, 92, Appendix, p. 3441.
5 New York Times, August 18th, 1946.
6 Congressional Record, 92, Appendix, p. 913.
was shared by Vandenberg, who at times appeared paranoid about left-wing Democrats whom he described as "pro-Russky" or fellow travellers. In June he wrote to a Michigan constituent, "Unless I am greatly mistaken, it will be a highly critical showdown between the "American way of life' on the one hand and highly financed, highly organized radicalism on the other hand". To a political associate he wrote in August about his own campaign, which he was being forced to neglect, ". . . if the people understand that they are 'dropping a letter to Stalin in the mailbox' when they drop their votes in the ballot box, I have no doubt of the outcome". Whether justifiably or not, as a result of the attacks to which he had been subject in left wing newspapers, Vandenberg had been convinced that he was the prime target of the Communists, that they would stop at nothing to defeat him, and that his defeat in Michigan would therefore be a severe setback for the global struggle against world communism. To his friend, the editor of the Polish News, in Detroit, who had allowed an editorial attacking Vandenberg's desertion of Poland to be published, he wrote a long and somewhat irritable rebuke: "I now see what I confront this fall".

Vandenberg's view of the world was consistent. He saw himself, in terms of the development of American policy, as having been the prime instrument of the policy of toughness

Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 266, 271.
Vandenberg to C. L. Brody, June 1st, 1946, Vandenberg MSS.
Vandenberg to J. W. Blodgett, August 23rd, 1946, Vandenberg MSS.
Vandenberg to Frank Januszewski, July 27th, 1946, Vandenberg MSS.
towards the Soviet Union. By preaching nonpartisanship at the time of a highly ideological election, Vandenberg was in a curious position, but he was adept at playing the game. To the Senate, after the foreign ministers meetings, he reported that events had vindicated his position: he had always been an opponent of Big Power domination, and saw arrangements for the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference as being in line with his views; an advocate of the review of all treaties if they endangered peace, he reminded the Senate of Article XIV of the United Nations Charter which he said he had initiated; an opponent of Yalta style "power politics", he reminded the Senate of his long opposition to the Polish settlement, and of his proposal for a treaty to disarm Germany which, had it been followed at Yalta, would, he said, have eliminated "many of our subsequent, tragic errors and anxieties". Privately, to a political associate in Michigan, Vandenberg confided his feeling that "the developments in the Tito case (as reported this morning) demonstrate that I have been right in demanding an American foreign policy which 'stands up to Russia.' When Byrnes phoned me his SOS from Paris last week, he said that inasmuch as he has now adopted a 'republican foreign policy' he is entitled to have the chief Republican conspirator sharing the grief with him. I am quite willing to 'carry on' as long as he does. I really think he is doing a thoroughly sturdy job". Vandenberg then, was prepared to champion the cause of Secretary Byrnes and the bipartisan

11 Congressional Record, 92, July 16th, 1946, pp. 9061-65.  
12 Vandenberg to J. J. Blodgett, August 23rd, 1946, Vandenberg MSS. The reference to Tito is connected with the incident of August 19th, in which an American plane was shot down by the Yugoslavs.
policy. At the same time, however, he was inclined to take credit himself for having put Byrnes and American policy on the right tracks.

The Republican self-image of complete opposition to totalitarianism, at home and overseas, was shared by other leading Republicans. At the Ohio State Convention in September, Taft confidently asserted that Republican criticism had terminated appeasement of Russia. Taft also alleged that whilst playing into Stalin's hands abroad, the New Deal at home had tried to teach that "communism" is a kind of liberal Democracy. Former vice-presidential nominee, now Senatorial candidate, John Bricker, challenged President Truman to intervene in the Ohio campaign: "...bring on your New Deal, Communistic and subversive groups. If we can't lick them in Ohio, America is lost anyway". Similar implications, as already suggested, were made by Thomas Dewey who spoke at the New York State Convention of the conflict between "those who believe in dictatorship, either the dictatorship of communism or fascism and those on the other hand who believe that human freedom is the ultimate expression of the highest aspiration of man. We are enlisted here - all of us - under the single banner of human freedom. No Republican candidate in this State election has been dominated by the dictation of a splinter group

13 See Vandenberg's vigorous defense of Byrnes against Senator Wherry, Congressional Record, 92, July 31st, 1946, p. 10534.
14 See page 247 above.
16 Chicago Tribune, September 12th, 1946.
or of any group of men who owe their allegiance to any foreign ideology".18

On the question of supporting the bipartisan foreign policy, Republicans appeared to be united in 1946. Senator Taft was to claim in a radio address in November that there were no basic conflicts within the Republican Party over foreign policy.19 In a gesture of unity, he had written in conciliatory tones to Vandenberg in late October: "I noticed in Joseph Alsop's column some effort to show that I differed with you on foreign policy. I suppose there may be some differences as there always are, but I approve without qualification your whole position as far as I know it".20 There were differences in the Party, however: Col. McCormick of the Chicago Tribune had no illusions about New York Republicanism, which he saw as being dedicated to the preservation of British Imperialism. The only hope he saw was for the Midwest to nominate either Taft or Bricker in 1948.21 Although anti-communism could serve as the basis for broad agreement, what was really at stake was the degree of commitment to anti-communist foreign policies. Taft found encouragement in the hardening of policy towards the Soviet Union and the less harsh policy towards Germany; but where he differed from Vandenberg by 1946 was in his estimation of the importance of developments outside the western hemisphere for the United States. The widening gulf was obscured by Vandenberg's cautious approach; he did not go out of his way to alienate the Nationalists, as Internation-

20 Robert A. Taft to Vandenberg, October 20th, 1946, Vandenberg MSS.
alists such as Harold Stassen and Senator Morse did, by talking of "economic isolationists" who refused to see the connection between "America's standard of living" and the "world economy"; neither did he proclaim America's responsibilities "as the great creditor nation of the world" to pursue policies that would lead to "increased trade between the nations of the world". He was more careful to talk about American interests rather than responsibilities, and about the bottom to the barrel rather than about the needs of world trade and reconstruction.

Perhaps the key to apparent Republican unity in the 1946 elections was the apparent reaction of the left wing of the Democratic Party to the development of the anti-Russian consensus. Pre-disposed to see the Democrats as pro-communist, especially because of left wing political and pro-labour ties in New York State, Republican leaders could not have been unduly surprised by the controversial speech of Henry Wallace in September. The day that Wallace was to make his speech, Bob Andrews writing in the New York Herald Tribune said that September 12th might go down in history as the day Truman decided his only chance of re-election lay with the left: he instanced four actions by the President, one of which was the advance endorsement of Wallace's speech. Coming at a time when Byrnes and

22 Address by Wayne Morse, Oregon, June 9th, 1946, reprinted in Congressional Record, 92, Appendix, p. 3862; address by Harold Stassen, Maine, April 12th, 1946, ibid., Appendix, p. 2502.
23 September 12th, 1946.
Vandenberg (and southern conservative Democrat, Tom Connally) were in Paris, the Wallace speech, calling for a sphere of influence approach to world politics, and critical of the "Get tough with Russia" policy, suggested a challenge to the bipartisan foreign policy from within the Administration. In Paris, Vandenberg issued a statement, declaring his conviction that most Republicans would continue to follow a "bipartisan" foreign policy, and concluding in words destined for immortality: "We can only cooperate with one Secretary of State at a time".

The Wallace affair then was ideal electoral material for Republicans. It enabled them to pose as patriotic defenders of American foreign policy. Thus the New York Herald Tribune castigated the Administration for its incompetence, and charged that Republicans in their worst moments had never done anything so damaging to world peace. According to Dulles, Dewey felt it best "not to make any major attack" in case it seemed that he was trying to derive partisan advantage. Dewey was, however, reported as having been greatly disturbed by the Wallace speech, and as expressing the opinion that it was a bid for the communist vote. Far more outspoken was Taft, who with the backing of officials of the Republican National Committee, charged the President with having made a bid for the votes of the C.I.O.-P.A.C. which he alleged favoured the Russians abroad and communism at home. Taft was in no doubt that the President had repudiated Byrnes' policy of standing up for freedom.

24 For a full account of the affair, see Markowitz, pp. 181-91.
25 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 300-01.
26 September 13th, 1945.
27 Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, September 16th, 1946, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
and equality of all peoples. The Democratic Party was, he said, "so divided between Communism and Americanism, that its foreign policy can only be futile and contradictory and make the United States the laughing stock of the world". Commented National Chairman, Carroll Reece, "If Mr. Stalin were to come to this country and address the P. A. C. in Madison Square Garden, what could he have said that Mr. Wallace did not say?" Wallace's speech then fitted in with the pre-existing thesis of Democratic culpability for "appeasement" of Stalin. On September 11th, at Columbus, Taft had warned that a "New Deal" Congress, especially one owing its election to the C.I.O.-P.A.C., "would return again to the appeasement of Russia, to a policy in Germany dictated by PM and the rest of the communist press" in New York, and an imperialist policy whenever it did not run against Russian interests.

President Truman's initial attempt to compromise by getting Wallace to make no more speeches for the duration of the Paris conference disturbed Dulles. To Vandenberg he expressed his dismay, interpreting it, probably correctly, as a manoeuvre to "hold the left wingers in line" and allowing them "to feel that they have a chance of controlling our foreign policy or at least nullifying any foreign policy of which they do not approve". Like Dewey, Vandenberg

30 Chicago Tribune, September 17th, 1946.
32 For Wallace's account of this, suggesting that Truman was prepared to take a far more flexible line toward the Soviet Union, see Markowitz, pp. 188-90.
33 Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, September 19th, 1946, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
cautioned against a full-scale attack on the Administration, preferring to let people judge for themselves. To Dulles he expressed his regret that the Wallace affair had gone against "my own entire theory about the necessity of making Russia understand that our new bi-partisan American foreign policy says what it means and means what it says". But he said he had kept silent because "I thought perhaps the country would like to feel that there is one Party left that can be trusted in emergencies. There'll be plenty of time to tell the story when there isn't quite so much at stake. Meanwhile, I cannot but believe that this episode has been a body blow to the President and his Party". The resignation of Wallace did not even get the President off the hook. At best it substantiated earlier judgments of his incompetence. At worst it helped to substantiate the thesis that at least a section of the Democrats were advocates of "appeasement"; Carroll-Ree© commented, "the President has seen fit to gamble for the radical vote in New York and

34 A. H. Vandenberg to Dulles, September 19th, 1946, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
35 Commented Lippmann, "Mr. Truman has exposed himself to the world as a bit slow to catch on"., New York Herald Tribune, September 17th, 1946; the Chicago Tribune commented that "it has disclosed more clearly than ever Mr. Truman's fabulous incompetence... Even the most simple minded of citizens must now have the measure of Mr. Truman's fitness for the office he holds"., September 17th, 1946. Senator Morse expressed the hope that the country could struggle through until 1948 "when I'm convinced the chief bungler of America will be removed from the White House"., New York Times, September 21st, 1946.
elsewhere with the nation's security". In New York State itself, both Dewey and Senatorial nominee, Irving Ives, made continuous references to bipartisan foreign policy. Speaking to a foreign language voter group at the end of October, Dewey prided himself on the fact that Republicans alone had made "no compromise whatever with totalitarianism in any form".37

In October, Vandenberg made his sole "nonpartisan" contribution to the campaign with a radio report from Paris.38 His response to the allegations made by Wallace and others was masterly. American policy was not one of "getting tough with Russia" but simply one of "friendly firmness", he declared; asked whether it departed from Roosevelt's policy, he hedged cleverly: "Well - that depends upon what you mean by the 'Roosevelt pattern'. If you mean the 'Roosevelt pattern' as originally laid down in the Atlantic Charter, I should say that we are earnestly seeking to return to it after it was partially scrapped by the late President himself at Yalta. . ." Roosevelt had, continued Vandenberg, been forced to give way on some issues because of war, but he reminded his audience that in 1935 Roosevelt had himself addressed a strong note to the Soviet Union. Vandenberg also denied that he was trying to divide the world into two spheres: ". . .there is little left to give - unless we give our birthright. . .It is impossible to keep on signing

36Chicago Tribune, September 20th, 1946.
'dotted lines' as we often - perhaps too often - did in war". His general theme was insistent if repetitive: "I sometimes wonder just what our "appeasers" here at home would have us do". "...Perhaps we fail to understand Moscow. Certainly Moscow misunderstands us." "But we need to know that they are not pushing toward a communist world. If there is any way to achieve this mutual understanding and good-will, I will thankfully and prayerfully embrace it. We must all keep on trying. But we will not 'sell America Short' in the process." Vandenberg's statement was in keeping with the traditions of "Strong America"; he was not giving up hope of cooperation with the Soviet Union even, but, "...I say again and again that this is not possible on a one-way street. I would have America do everything, consistent with her honor, her security and her ideals, to deserve this cooperation and to allay any reasonable Russian grounds for fear, suspicion and distrust. I think we are doing this today - despite the astonishing and often subversive contentions of some of our own American critics to the contrary".39

Vandenberg's report from Paris, and the attack made upon him by Henry Wallace harmonized with the general Republican campaign. Attacks on Vandenberg merely substantiated the thesis that the Republican Party was the main obstacle, at home and overseas, to communism. If foreign policy as such was not a major issue of the election, anti-communism, and its foreign policy implications were. Unless a Republican Congress were elected, charged Taft, "we will not have an

39Ibid.
American foreign policy but a foreign foreign policy". A Democratic victory would, he said, mean the substitution of Wallace for Byrnes as Secretary of State. This was probably why Moscow wanted the Democrats to win, he said.  

In November, 1946, the Republican Party duly swept to victory, gaining control of Congress for the first time since the Hoover landslide of 1928. The verdict of the pollsters was that foreign policy had played no part in the victory. Nevertheless, the Republican Party had successfully done what it had demonstrably failed to do in 1944: it had neutralized its "isolationist" image and had in fact taken the political initiative as the apparent defender of the bipartisan anti-communist consensus against attacks from the Democratic left wing. Vandenberg heralded 1946 as a victory for the bipartisan foreign policy. Taft argued that the turn to the right did not mean a change in foreign policy; he even argued that it did not prevent cooperation with Communist and Socialist countries. If the election meant anything at all, however, it certainly ruled out the kind of alternative offered in 1946 by Henry Wallace.

Back in the Senate with a huge majority, Arthur Vandenberg was now to be chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Despite his absence for much of the campaign, he had found his identification with the Administration foreign policy a source of tremendous popularity. In the future, Vandenberg's

40 New York Times, October 30th, 1946. A Moscow newscaster had apparently made a statement earlier in October that a Republican Congress would be a disaster. Ibid., October 22nd, 1946.
42 New York Times, November 7th, 1946.
43 New York Herald Tribune, November 8th, 1946.
44 Wallace, speaking in Detroit, had been prevailed upon by local Democrats, to take all references to Vandenberg and Russian policy out of his speech, Chicago Tribune, November 3rd, 1946.
role as a broker with the Republican Nationalists, whose numbers had been strengthened considerably by the 1946 victory, was to become even more important than it had already. What gave Vandenberg added importance was the question of foreign economic policy. The Administration had had difficulty enough with the British Loan in a Democratic Congress, but with a Republican Congress under the dominant influence of Taft. Vandenberg's cooperation became all the more necessary.

For the Nationalists, the 1946 victory was the first step on the road to Normalcy; freedom was to be restored through fiscal conservatism, by cutting taxes and reducing the federal government budget to something approaching pre-New Deal size. Herbert Hoover, for example, saw it as "much more than just another congressional election". "The whole world has been for years driving to the left on the totalitarian road of 'planned economy'. America is by this election the first country to repudiate this road." He took some delight in the fact that the Republicans seemed to be committed to changing the country's direction, rather than allowing those who flirted with the New Deal to deflect them. He also noticed a change in attitude towards himself. "The climate has changed," he wrote, "Republicans that I haven't seen in years are coming in." Cal O'Laughlin concluded on the basis of the results that the Chicago Tribune would be very influential at the 1948 Convention.

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45 Chicago Tribune, November 7th, 1946.
46 Hoover to Raymond L. Wilbur, November 10th, 1946, Hoover MSS.
47 O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, November 9th, 1946, O'Laughlin MSS.
This judgement certainly reflected the Chicago Tribune's own hopes. Whilst exultant about the Republican victory, the "greatest victory for the Republic since Appomatox", the Tribune saw a few clouds on the horizon, not the least of which was the senior Senator from Michigan. In particular, it described Vandenberg's claim that his re-election was a vote of confidence in bipartisanship as "poppycock". Whilst it had been "campaigning through the Middle west for Americanism and the end of New Deal controls, confusion, corruption, and communism," Vandenberg was, in its view, "amusing himself in Paris with his aristocratic friends". The voters of Michigan, it said, had had no choice over foreign policy, "THE TRIBUNE with its expounding of the issues. . . and its exhortations to vote the Republican ticket straight. . . did more to carry the State for Vandenberg than did Vandenberg himself".48

The 1946 elections then, by returning the Republicans to power, confirmed the shift to the right in American politics, and appeared to presage a Republican victory in 1948. Sensing their time had come, Congressional Republicans were anxious to restore American government to pre-New Deal dimensions, and to expose what they regarded as the bungling and near-treason of the Democratic Administration. The election, like the debate over the British Loan, was something of a setback for the foreign policies of the Administr-
tion, although it did free President Truman from the inhibitions of the left wing of the Democratic Party. Vague appeals on behalf of "international cooperation" would no longer suffice to get the money out of Congress that the Administration needed for its foreign policy. The Republican leadership, it is true, was broadly committed to the foreign policy goals of the Administration; to the endorsements of Taft and Vandenberg were to be added those of solid Republicans such as new Speaker of the House, Joseph Martin, and the influential Midwesterner, Everett Dirksen of Illinois. Dirksen expressed confidence that there "should be no difficulty over foreign policy where the GOP is concerned. The present broad foreign policy is the same as that laid down by the Republican Conference at Mackinac Island in 1943." John Vorys of Ohio likewise reassured a friend and southern Democratic Congressman, "I believe we can go ahead with the job of trying to work out some details of an American foreign policy as we have been doing. That is, most of us". Alfred Landon added his voice to those who affirmed that Republicans would cooperate with the President in developing foreign policy along the lines already laid down by Secretary Byrnes. In all cases, however, the pledge of cooperation carried with it the assumption

49 Memo written by Clark Clifford on American-Soviet relations arguing a similar case to George Kennan, had apparently been locked away in a safe by the President, who had described it as too hot to handle, Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Knopf, 1972), pp. 56-7, 67.
51 *New York Times*, November 12th, 1946.
52 Vorys to Peter Jarman, November 7th, 1946, Vorys MSS.
that it would be on a more equal basis than before. John Foster Dulles, commenting on the President's offer of cooperation, said, "The President is right in predicting that Republicans who have worked cooperatively with him in the past will do so in the future. Presumably their views will carry more weight now that the Republican party is the majority party in the nation and in Congress." 54

The demand for Republicans to be brought into decision making was, apart from Dulles' vested interest, a prerequisite for political support in Congress. As he prepared for the 80th Congress, Vandenberg was very much aware of the political difficulties that lay ahead. The bulk of Congressional Republicans were more likely to line up behind Taft than Vandenberg over matters of foreign economic policy. Already Taft and John Taber, champion of the vital House Appropriations Committee, were talking of a 10-12 billion dollar cut in the budget. 55 The tariff, central to post-war foreign policy, could be expected to be a particular headache. 56 Vandenberg was convinced that his colleagues would be far less "docile" than in the past, whilst he expected less cooperation from the Democrats than he had given in opposition. 57 In December he announced his withdrawal from active participation in future United Nations and Foreign Ministers' meetings, as well as making it plain that he was not a candidate for the 1948 nomination. 58 His desire to concentrate on

54 Ibid., November 12th, 1946.
56 Diary, January 18th, 1947, Smith MSS.
57 Vandenberg to Esther Van Wagoner Tufty, November 11th, 1946, Vandenberg MSS.
his work in the Senate was a measure of the difficulties he expected; privately he indicated that he expected the "first great challenge" of the New Congress to be an attempt "to prematurely reduce our national defense beyond the limits currently advisable or justified". Vandenberg was not alone in his fears, for there was a general apprehension reflected in the Press that now the Republicans were back in power they would initiate investigations into various areas of alleged Democratic laxity; amongst the rumoured targets was the failure of the Administration to press hard enough for outlying bases for the United States. Senator Smith of New Jersey, was in December greatly disturbed lest the Republicans tried to make political capital out of investigations into military matters, not least because he felt it would rebound against them. In his diary he confided: "I am very fond of Bob Taft but we must watch his battle for leadership of the party". Taft, who had secured the ascendency in National Committee circles through the election of Carroll Reece, and who could claim to have largely engineered the successful 1946 election strategy, was very much a shadow over bipartisan policy by the end of the year. Despite his apparent endorsement of policy after the election, over the previous year he had shown himself an able and articulate opponent of the basic

59 Vandenberg to Colonel Alton T. Roberts, December 20th, 1946, Vandenberg MSS.
61 Alexander Smith to Homer Ferguson, December 23rd, 1946, Smith MSS.
62 Diary, December 30th, 1946, Smith MSS.
asumptions on which post-war planning had been based. Despite his gratification at a stiffer policy toward the Soviet Union, and the hopes of a reversal of German policy promised by Secretary Byrnes' speech at Stuttgart, he had still not been won over to the multilateral world. 63

For Arthur Vandenberg, the lingering fear of "isolationism" had its compensations: it could not help but strengthen his own bargaining position. Vandenberg himself, despite apprehension about some of his colleagues, was still also distrustful of the Administration, especially after the Wallace affair. Wallace's post-election charges that Vandenberg was "violently anti-Russian" and that the President had allowed foreign policy to fall too much under his control could not be ignored, for the President had a very different political constituency to satisfy from that of Vandenberg. 64 Vandenberg's suspicions of the Administration had in 1946 been partially eroded by the development of his relationship with James Byrnes. In December, in announcing his decision not to attend any more conferences, he said, "I am for him 1,000 per cent in what he is doing". 65 He was, therefore, to be considerably "jolted" in the New Year by the announcement of the resignation of Byrnes, and the appointment of General Marshall, whose personal prestige and aloofness were to change the ground rules of bipartisanship. 66

63 Freeland, pp. 61-6.
64 New York Times, November 13th, 1946; see also comments by Cabell Phillips, ibid., November 24th, 1946.
65 Ibid., December 18th, 1945.
66 Report, January 10th, 1946, McNaughton MSS. Frank McNaughton thought that Vandenberg had to a large extent dominated Byrnes, ibid.
"It looks like a good many of you have moved over to the left since I was last here," quipped President Truman to the new Congress in January, 1947. He could not, however, have derived much cheer from Congress' opening speech by Speaker Joseph Martin, whose commitment to a "Strong America" had not diminished in the post-war period. Speaking of the danger that "the warstricken nations may be led to rely too much on the United States, and try too little to help themselves," Martin warned that the United States "must avoid the danger of so depleting and weakening ourselves as to be dragged down with them. . . .Only a strong, sound, solvent, free America can help to rescue the world". Martin's conviction that the best way the United States could help the world was by putting its own house in order, by dismantling the New Deal and re-establishing "freedom", was a fair reflection of Congressional Republican sentiment, especially in the House of Representatives.

The political situation in 1947 was extremely complex. The initial struggle between supporters of Dewey and supporters of Taft to control the organization of the House, which Dewey's supporters won, could not obscure the fact that the House leadership remained firmly Nationalist. The House Foreign Affairs Committee was weak, chaired by the ageing and totally uninfluential 'Doc' Eaton, who was followed in

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68 Ibid., January 4th, 1947.
69 Ibid., January 5th, 1947; Taft's supporters wanted Clarence Brown of Ohio as majority leader, Dewey's supporters secured the election, after the latter's withdrawal, of Charles Halleck of Indiana; Alsop to Martin Sommers, February 3rd, 1947, Alsop MSS.
seniority by four midwesterners whose past record on foreign policy suggested little support for Administration proposals. In the Senate, the dominant figure was expected to be Taft, who from his official position as Chairman of the Republican Steering Committee exercised far more influence than the nominal majority leader, "Internationalist" Wallace White of Maine. Majority Whip was the unsubtle Nebraskan conservative, Kenneth Wherry, whilst the presiding officer of the Republican Conference was Eugene Millikin. Completing the "hydra-headed" leadership was Vandenberg, President pro-tempore and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The key to the situation was the relationship between Taft and Vandenberg, which had never been close, but which was based on a polite if distant accommodation. Overlaying the situation in Congress was the manoeuvring for the 1948 nomination. Harold Stassen was the first in the field, having announced his candidacy in December, 1946, as well as his continuing determination "to move our Republican party along the path of true liberalism". The main contenders, however, were already expected to be Dewey and Taft. The former was reported by early 1947 to have made considerable progress already in garnering delegates. The latter's candidacy was somewhat delayed by the prevarication of John Bricker, whose appearance on the Washington scene, including a disastrous Gridiron dinner speech, had not had the effect

70 New York Times, January 14th, 1947; among the four was John Vorys, who was to emerge as a supporter of the bipartisan policy in 1947.
71 Report, "Taft III - His Mind and His Methods", January 9th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.
73 Alsop to Martin Sommers, January 3rd, 1947, Alsop MSS.
his supporters hoped, but who was nevertheless reluctant to give Taft the go ahead. Vandenberg's independence amidst all the Presidential politicking was undoubtedly an advantage. It was as important to him as his independence from the Administration. He even sought to persuade Dulles to become less dependent on Dewey. In the position of broker in which he found himself, it was important to him to keep his lines open to all groups: his position precluded his being a partisan, a me-too or a member of a party faction. His role was a difficult one, but it was one in which he excelled.

The most serious problem posed by the 80th Congress to the Administration's foreign policy derived from the campaign commitment to reduce federal expenditure and cut taxes. Support for "economy" was particularly strong in the House of Representatives, where the very thought of Appropriations Committee Chairman, John Taber, was enough to produce apoplexy in Administration circles. In November, Speaker elect Martin was talking in terms of a 10% tax cut, which he hoped would be in operation by February. In December, Taber and Taft had been talking of a budget cut of 10-12 billion dollars. Even Harold Stassen joined in the demand

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74 O'Laughlin to General MacArthur, December 20th, 1946, O'Laughlin MSS.; Ray Erehct report, "Taft and Bricker", December 27th, 1946, McNaughton MSS.; New York Times, December 22nd, 1946; Alsop to Martin Sommers, March 9th, 1947, Alsop MSS.; Clarence Brown to Walter L. Tooze, January 14th, 1947, Brown MSS.; Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 375-5.

75 Unsigned pencilled note from Wardman Park Hotel, Dulles to Herbert Brownell, March 4th, 1947, Dulles MSS.

76 Chicago Tribune, November 13th, 1946.

for substantial cuts in taxes and expenditure, although he avoided the extreme demands of the Nationalists. The Legislative Budget then, which Congress was, under the 1946 Reorganization Act, required to consider, proved an early test of Republican attitudes towards the central economic questions. In the Senate the proposal to cut six billion dollars off the budget was fiercely resisted by Vandenberg: "I shall have to say it bluntly, Mr. President; I cannot escape the conviction that this may prove to be sheer folly. At this critical juncture in world affairs, when there are great powers which think only in terms of force, I do not believe we have any right to speculate, to indulge in guess-work - and that is all we are doing here today - at the expense of our national security in this restless and unpredictable world. In my view, this is the year of all years when we must hold the line." A compromise, backed by all Republican leaders except Wherry, to cut the amount by only four and one-half billion instead of the six billion recommended by the Republican group on the Legislative budget, was duly passed, with Democratic support. In the House the leadership was determined to hold out. Majority Leader Halleck assured the House that Republicans were concerned about American defense, but "no military disaster within the range of possibility today could equal... the destruction of American power and authority which would be accomplished by the all-consuming conflagration of inflation." American defense, he said, should not be construed so narrowly.

Halleck was supported

78 Ibid., January 12th, 1947.
79 Congressional Record, 93, February 21st, 1947, p. 1265.
80 Ibid., p. 1438; 21 Republicans voted for the reduced cut, 24 opposed; adding the non-voters who had a declared position, the split was 25 for, 26 against.
81 Ibid., February 20th, 1947, p. 1209.
82 Ibid.
by Everett Dirksen of Illinois, who deprecated "futile efforts to halt communism with hand-outs of American cash" and argued that the first essential was to be strong at home. The tenets of a "Strong America" were as powerful as ever among House members, who proceeded to vote the full six billion dollar cut, with only Margaret Chase Smith of Maine opposing. The vote was a remarkable testimony to the effectiveness of the control which Joseph Martin and Charles Halleck exercised over Republican rank and file. At least one influential Republican member had doubts about the wisdom of the House's action. On the Legislative Budget the House, not for the first time, was to defer to the caution of the Senate; but the debate in the House was indicative of an organized commitment to "economy" which could not be ignored. This commitment was not to die with the compromise over the Legislative Budget, nor was it confined to those who were opposed to the bipartisan foreign policy. In March, after the announcement of the proposal to aid Greece and Turkey, John Vorys, despite his disenchantment with the reactionary House leadership, was to write that if, as he aimed, they could eventually "get our budget around to where we are spending about half a billion on the State Department and two or three billion on foreign loans, grants, bribes, etc., and thus be able to cut our appropriations for the armed forces from $11,000,000,000 to, say, $3,000,000,000, we may make the grade". Even Vandenberg, in opposing the

83 Ibid., p. 1250.
85 Alsop to Martin Sommers, April 15th, 1947, Alsop MSS.
86 Diary, February 17th, 1947, Wadsworth MSS.
87 Vorys to Evert G. Addison, March 22nd, 1947, Vorys MSS.
full cuts sought by Republicans in the Legislative Budget, had not closed the door to cuts beyond the four and one-half billion dollars finally agreed.\footnote{Congressional Record, 93, February 21st, 1945, p. 1265.}

Whilst the Republican commitment to "economy" was a major problem for the development of American policy, so also the continued Republican scepticism about the reciprocal trade agreements programme was a source of much apprehension. Multilateral tariff reduction remained a central aim of American foreign policy, and an eighteen nation conference on tariffs was scheduled to open at Geneva in April. The Republican victory had, however, thrown a shadow over this, for protectionist sentiment remained strong amongst Congressional Republicans, who saw the tariff reduction programme as part of a general process of weakening the United States through "give-away" diplomacy. It was rumoured that concerns about the tariff were the real reason for Vandenberg's decision not to go on any more international conferences.\footnote{St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 7th, 1947, reprinted in Congressional Record, 93, Appendix, p. 496.} Certainly, Taft remained very sceptical of this aspect of the bipartisan policy. To Hoover, later in the year, he was to confide his distrust of Under Secretary of State, William Clayton. Clayton, he said, was an "inveterate free-trader" who had used American "loaning power to secure concessions which...foreign nations really cannot afford to make".\footnote{Robert A. Taft to Hoover, August 13th, 1947, Hoover M33.}

Although Taft was undoubtedly the more authentic spokesman for the Republicans, Vandenberg managed to secure a compromise over the tariff in early 1947, with the aid of his
friend, Eugene Millikin, chairman of the Finance Committee. The suggestions of Vandenberg and Millikin, worked out with William Clayton and Dean Acheson for the Administration, were that in all the agreements signed a provision would be inserted allowing either party to modify or withdraw any tariff that caused undue hardship. Domestically, provision was made for industries who wished to protest tariff cuts to be permitted to state their case before the Tariff Commission. Taft was reported as cool towards the Vandenberg-Millikin compromise. His own proposals differed markedly; he wanted the tariff to be delegated to the Tariff Commission, with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements in a supplementary role in those cases which the Commission found did not impair the protection of American industry. His change of emphasis revealed a significant division; basically he was opposed to the whole R. T. A. programme on the grounds that it delegated complete power to the President; he wanted the Tariff Commission to define standards of protection, rather than simply to serve as an appeal body.

The disagreement between Taft and Vandenberg over the tariff was perhaps the first serious one. Vandenberg's friendly journalist, James Reston, commented that it was regarded "as a warning to both that a sound domestic policy and a sound foreign policy are inseparably connected. It

92 Ibid., February 9th, 1947; Congressional Record, 93, February 10th, 1947, p. 912-3.
94 Ibid., February 13th, 1947.
is being pointed out in the Capital. . . that since each has sufficient strength on Capitol Hill to defeat the program of the other, there is no future for anybody in trying to divide the indivisible." Reston's view of the deteriorating relations between Taft and Vandenberg was confirmed by Dulles in early March. Vandenberg, however, tried to dismiss the rumours as a New Deal attempt to give the impression of Republican disunity. The situation, however, was undoubtedly more serious than Vandenberg would admit. With the house leadership, Taft stood for the programme on which most Congressional Republicans felt they had been elected in 1946. By March, with the Democrats ahead in the Gallup poll, and with their failure to secure the six billion budget cut and other measures designed to return the United States to Normalcy, frustration and recriminations were bound to appear.

The mood of the Republican 80th Congress was a vital factor which the Administration could not ignore as it sought to develop its foreign policy in early 1947. As part of its strategy, it enlisted the aid of Herbert Hoover, who was asked to undertake a mission to Germany and Austria, on the assumption that he would persuade Congress to support

95 Ibid., February 12th, 1947.
96 Unsigned pencilled note from Wardman Park Hotel, Dulles to Herbert Brownell, March 4th, 1947, Dulles MSS.
98 Comments of Senator Bushfield on latest Gallup Poll, ibid., March 7th, 1947, p. 1781.
the appropriations necessary to sustain the American occupation. Influential in matters of relief, especially on the House of Representatives, Hoover still belonged firmly to the Nationalist wing of the party. In January, 1947, he wrote to the newly elected Malone of Nevada, one of the most conservative of the famous class of 1946, that his election was "one of God's unique gifts to the Republican Party. . .. It is a monument not only to your own capacity but to the fact that the American people are turning to the right, trying to get from under this unendurable regime". His selection by the Administration is evidence of its awareness of the increased power of economy-minded Republicans after the 1946 elections; throughout the 80th Congress he was to remain a figure to be wooed. For the most part, however, development of foreign policy was dependent on the cooperation of Arthur Vandenberg. In early 1947, Vardenberg was in one of his periods of disenchantment with the Administration. Caught in a difficult political situation, between a Congressional party bent on economy and retrenchment, and an external situation which to the Administration and to him seemed to require bold and costly innovation, he had been somewhat shaken by the resignation of James Byrnes.

In the context of the domestic political situation, as well as the development of American foreign policy, the speech delivered by Vandenberg at the Cleveland Foreign Affairs Forum on January 11th, 1947, is worth careful analysis. In the

100Hoover to George Malone, January 24th, 1947, Hoover M33.
101New York Times, January 12th, 1947. On the same platform was James Byrnes, who had just resigned as Secretary of State.
speech there was material for the benefit of fellow Republicans, for the outside world (which he was aware was concerned about the implications of the Republican victory in 1946) and material also for General Marshall and the Administration. Committing himself firmly to an American foreign policy, and to the stopping of partisan politics at the "water's edge", he cited his work with Byrnes, "which I hope has permanently established the American doctrine that there are deadlines in our ideals from which we shall never again retreat". The United Nations he held up as "the heart and core of united, unpartisan American foreign policy. We shall be faithful to the latter and the spirit of these obligations. In my view, this will be true no matter what administration sits in Washington." Having affirmed, however, that Republicans would not reverse American foreign policy as it had been established by the end of 1946, he also in his criticism of what had not been done outlined his hopes for the future. In essence, he wanted a global policy, one which would seize the initiative against communism all over the world. He was particularly critical of the failure to secure a bipartisan policy on Latin America: "...it is past time to hold the Pan American Conference which we promised in 1945, and there to formally renew the joint new world authority which is the genius of our new world unity. There is too much evidence that we are drifting apart - and that a communistic upsurge is moving in. We face no greater need than to restore the warmth of new world unity which reached an all-time high at San Francisco." On China, too, he suggested that the United States implement a policy to
unite the opponents of the Communists. In Europe he called for the United States to come to terms with Austria and Germany, "the heart of the European problem", which required economic unification and eventual decentralized political control. His desire to sort out central Europe did not prevent him from giving an undertaking that American troops would remain in occupation until the job was done.\textsuperscript{102}

Vandenberg's careful balancing of his external and domestic constituencies was mirrored in his handling of the sensitive areas of tariffs and rehabilitation and reconstruction. He believed, he said, that the United States would continue the Reciprocal Trade Programme, though whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis was dependent on other countries, some of which he noted were beginning to make bilateral arrangements; but to Republicans he offered the assurance that "we intend to keep our American industry and agriculture in sound, domestic health, and to protect our system of free enterprise. Anything less would be a calamity not only for us but for the Western world. But sane, healthy, mutual trade expansion is best for all concerned." He also thought that the United States would make credit available for reconstruction, and would appropriate for relief in consultation with the United Nations, "even though", again for the benefit of fellow Republicans, "we never again contribute 72\% of an international fund, as in U.N.R.R.A., which can be controlled and even exploited by others."\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{102}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{103}\textit{Ibid.}
As always, Vandenberg's speech was masterly. As the leading Republican spokesman he was at one and the same time seeking to reassure and give a warning to foreign countries, whilst domestically he was seeking to give warning to the Administration and reassurance to his own Party. Although he had gone some way in accepting the "One World" or "Internationalist" position, his speech revealed a continuing sympathy with the tenets of a "Strong America." At the same time, his veiled criticism of the Administration for past failings could not but strengthen his standing with fellow Republicans; and the stronger his position with his own Party, the more useful he was to the Administration, and still stronger was his bargaining position.

Throughout January, and February, Vandenberg's relations with General Marshall were to remain distant. It was temperamentally impossible for General Marshall to offer Vandenberg the same relationship as the latter had developed with Byrnes.\(^{104}\) It is probable also that the President was not sorry that he had found a Secretary of State who had enough prestige to stand independent of Vandenberg and Dulles. Truman's respect for presidential prerogatives, his desire to restore the domestic initiative to the Administration, and his awakening desire to be re-elected, as well as his desire to have a prestigious Secretary of State to help out with a Republican Congress, all suggest that the appointment of Marshall may well have been designed to break the influence which Vandenberg was widely reputed to have had.

\(^{104}\)Reports, February 25th, February 27th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.
On January 27th, 1947, Truman wrote to his former Secretary of State of "the tendency on the part of Vandenberg and our partisan friend, Dulles, to implement a Republican foreign policy. Dulles has made two speeches in which he has made a sincere attempt, with the help of the Republican press, to take charge in foreign relations, especially as it affects the German settlement and Central Europe. It seems to me if you are inclined to do it, that you are in a much better position now than at any time in the recent past to flatten out that sort of approach." Possibly the President had been nettled by Dulles' speech to the Women's National Republican Club on January 25th, in which he had underlined what he believed to be domestic political realities: "A Democratic President and his Secretary of State can propose, but a Republican Congress can dispose. Foreign diplomats know that, and they suspect what we know — that 2 years from now, a Republican will be in the White House. So these foreign governments will not take very seriously proposals which are backed only by the Democratic Party". Representation at the Moscow Conference was involved in the interplay between Administration and Republican leaders. The idea that Dulles should go had been floated by James Reston in December. When the invitation failed to materialize, Dulles

105 Quoted by Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror; The Onset of the Cold War 1945-50 (New York: Norton, 1970), p. 152, n. 22. Like the President, Senator Pepper, the left wing Democrat from Florida, saw a pattern in the Dulles and Vandenberg speeches; in his case he saw it as repudiation of the bipartisan policy, repudiation of Potsdam, and support of reactionary forces in China and the Argentine, Congressional Record, 93 February 5th, 1947, pp. 789-90.


himself broke the ice by writing to Marshall offering to discuss his views on the German situation. At a meeting in Washington on February 24th, Dulles was invited to go to Moscow, but before acceptance checked with Vandenberg, who was less than pleased. Unlike Dewey, who felt that Dulles' cooperation with Marshall would be good for the Party, Vandenberg evidently felt by February that Republicans would have been better to have been free to criticize what would almost certainly be a failure. Vendenberg's reaction to the rapprochement between Dulles and the Administration is evidence of his dissatisfaction and his desire to maintain his own independence. Attacked, along with Dulles, by Pravda (and Senator Pepper) for allegedly trying to build up Germany, and to change United States policy towards the Argentine and China, (and in Pepper's view, to force policy away from that established by Roosevelt), Vandenberg was undoubtedly very wary in early 1947. The exact reasons for his wariness are impossible to locate. Possibly it was a hangover from the Wallace affair; certainly he was disappointed at Byrnes' dismissal, and upset at not being given due deference by the new Secretary of State. Perhaps, too, as a man of vanity, he was not too happy at the invitation to Herbert Hoover. He must also have been sensitive to the mood of Congress, and to his problems with Taft.

Whilst relations with the Administration remained poor, Vandenberg and Dulles both continued to outline what they saw as the Republican viewpoint on foreign affairs.

108 Memorandum, "Re: Council of foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow", February 26th, 1947, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
109 Fuller analysis of Dulles' speeches is in the following chapter.
men still revealed their ability to develop policy within the framework of restraints imposed by a "Strong America". Vandenberg, especially sensitive to the strength of the President in Congress, asked Dulles to insert in his address to the Inland Daily Press Association in February a plea to keep midwesterners informed of foreign affairs. In the address Dulles put forward a programme which, in the changed conditions of 1947, could still be reconciled with a "Strong America". First, emphasis was put on saving the world by example: they must demonstrate at home that a free society and a free economy worked. Additionally, they must keep a strong military establishment, promote hemispheric solidarity and European unity, support the Chinese Nationalists, and use the United Nations to mobilize world opinion against injustices such as Poland. Dulles' programme was both global and yet "economic", the primary emphasis was still on moral leadership. At a time when Congress was determined to prune government spending, Dulles' speech was politically astute.

Vandenberg also, in his home town in February, in more ornate prose than Dulles, set out his ideas in a Lincoln Day Dinner address. He would, he said, continue to

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110 John Foster Dulles to Vandenberg, January 31st, 1947, Vandenberg M33.
112 To the National Publishers Association in January he had stressed the need for more creative leadership; in his text the passage was emphasized with lines in the margin, January 17th, 1947, Dulles M33.

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oppose appeasement, and to insist on maximum national defense, including monopoly of the atom bomb, pending agreement, by Russia in particular, to international provision that "swift and conclusive punishment...shall stop treachery at its source". Putting his faith in international cooperation by peace loving nations, who must stand together, he transported his audience to Gettysburg, to plead with Lincoln that democratic government should not perish from the earth: "Republicanism - now as then - is not an end in itself. It is the means to an end. The end is the healthy preservation here in the United States of free institutions, free enterprise and free men, amid a disorganized and distraught world not yet recovered from the shock and wreckage of total war. The end is the restoration of those stabilities which shall rekindle the hopes of all Western democracy everywhere that here is the true way of life, liberty, happiness and peace."

Vandenberg then, was reminding Republicans both of their traditions and their basic aims, at a time when some were disposed to indulge in pure partisanship. He felt sure, he said, "that Republicanism will justify their (sic) new responsibilities and thus, by deserving works, will assure America's final and complete achievement of sane, sound, solvent Republican administration in 1948." However much he had cooperated with the Administration, Vandenberg was seeking to reassure his friends that he had not become a "New Dealer", that he did not believe that dollars could

114 Ibid.
ultimately solve all problems, in short, that he was keeping faith with the Republican tradition.

Both Dulles and Vandenberg had an instinct which enabled them to collaborate with the Administration whilst still keeping alive their claims as authentic exponents of Republicanism. To Vandenberg's vanity was added Dulles' considerable ambition to guide American foreign policy. On February 6th, Dulles wrote of the considerable interest that had been shown at home and overseas in his speech to the National Publishers Association: "It is absolutely certain that we started something significant". Three days later he wrote, "The favourable extent of that reaction has been beyond my expectation. I think it makes clear that we need not have any lack of confidence in carrying on along that line and scoring another strengthening of U.S. policy and, incidentally, of the competence of the G.O.P. in foreign affairs." 115

This then was the domestic context in which a new direction in American foreign policy was being planned. The Truman Doctrine, although the result of an external condition, the British economic crisis and withdrawal from Greece, was planned in a domestic political context. Against the background of a widespread desire by Republicans to reduce all governmental expenditures and to get the United States once more on the road to solvency, the Administration determined to reverse what it saw as a return to "isolationism".

115 John Foster Dulles to Vandenberg, February 6th, 1947, Vandenberg MSS.
116 John Foster Dulles to Vandenberg, February 9th, 1947, Vandenberg MSS.
The Republican confidence of electoral victory in 1948 was also bound up with this. The Administration could not afford to allow the Republicans to keep the political initiative which they had gained in 1946, and which Vandenberg and Dulles had sought to keep in their well publicized speeches in 1947.

**Aid to Greece and Turkey**

"The primary mission of the Truman Doctrine speech was not to provide a correct statement of American foreign policy but . . . to assure Congressional approval of the Greco-Turkish Aid Program." -Richard M. Freeland.117

The key to an understanding of the Truman Doctrine was the political situation in the United States. The revival of "isolationism", an obsession since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, had apparently been confirmed by the 1946 reaction to the British Loan and the 1946 elections. Difficulties in 1947 over the tariff and the budget, not to mention resistance to further large-scale aid for reconstruction, appeared to State Department and White House planners to pose a serious threat to the objectives of post-war policy.118

The key to the Administration's strategy for dealing with domestic restraints was Arthur Vandenberg, who was later described by one of the participants in the planning, as never having faced up "fully to the economic realities of American responsibilities in the post-war world, in terms of tariffs, commercial policies, foreign aid, and taxation".119

On February 27th, 1947, the President invited Congressional leaders to the White House to put to them the proposal

117 Freeland, p. 102.
118 Gaddis, pp. 317-8; Joseph M. Jones, pp. 89-91, 96-98.
119 Jones, p. 124.
to aid Greece and Turkey, made urgent by Britain's economic situation and its decision to withdraw from Greece. At the meeting, the most effective exponent of the Administration case was Dean Acheson, who portrayed the proposal not in terms of either humanitarian aid or of strengthening Britain's position in the Middle East, but in terms of the prevention of Soviet domination of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. Acheson's presentation apparently salvaged the situation after what seemed to the Congressmen a less convincing and less ideological case put forward by Secretary of State Marshall. Vandenberg in particular was impressed by Acheson's presentation, and urged that any request for funds to Congress should be made in similar terms, accompanied by a radio address. It was Vandenberg's condition then which required that aid to Greece and Turkey be enveloped in a global statement of American policy, or, as some reports would have it: he demanded that the President should "scare the hell" out of the American people and Congress. 120 Joseph Jones ambiguously commented: "It was Vandenberg's 'condition' that made it possible, even necessary, to launch the global policy that broke through the remaining barriers of American isolationism". 121

As the Administration was doubtless aware, the Greek Turkish aid proposals had come at a difficult time for

120 Ibid., pp. 138-144; Freeland, pp. 88-89.
121 Joseph M. Jones, p. 143.
already the congressional party had revealed itself divided, with relations between Taft and Vandenberg somewhat uneasy. In the week following the White House briefing, which could not have been helped by the omission of Taft, the signs of disunity became even more evident.\footnote{New York Times, March 9th, 1947.} To add to the problem was the fact that the President had also put in a request for 350 million dollars post-U.N.R.R.A. relief, whilst Herbert Hoover, returned from his mission overseas, had urged Congress at the end of February to exercise care in the dispensation of such relief.\footnote{Acheson, p. 221; O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, March 8th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.} "Charitable relief," he said, "is today a double tax upon most of our people. It is not only a direct burden upon the taxpayer, but these unremunerative and unbalanced exports keep up prices and the cost of living." With taxes taking 35\% of the national income, there was a limit, said Hoover, despite the belief of people abroad that "our possibilities of giving are unlimited".\footnote{Testimony to House Foreign Affairs Committee, New York Times, March 1st, 1947.} Efficiency, economy, safeguards for the taxpayer, repayment, these were the key elements in Hoover's approach.\footnote{Ibid.} In his view the United States could not afford, neither would the receiver benefit from what for years he and other Republicans had labelled a permanent international W.P.A. Hoover's views could be expected to carry considerable weight in Congress in view both of his experience and his recent trip overseas, and could not help but reinforce the disquiet which rumours of the White House briefing aroused. As many, including perhaps Vandenberg
himself realized, a crucial time for decision had come: the emerging Administration initiative, which some saw as a familiar pattern in the long duping of the United States by slick British diplomats, was a challenge to the desire of the Congressional Republican Party to return to Normalcy.\textsuperscript{126} In the House of Representatives in particular some of the comment was bitter: "It is not Russian communism we have to fear but New Deal communism", commented one Representative. Another war, he argued, would make it impossible to restore America to normal health.\textsuperscript{127}

Such was the reaction that the \textit{Chicago Tribune} reported that Vandenberg felt that he did not know enough about the situation to support it before his colleagues.\textsuperscript{128} The Administration meanwhile was preparing if necessary to go over Congress' head and to appeal to the people.\textsuperscript{129} The White House Staff were busy on a speech which Clark Clifford labelled "the opening gun in a campaign to bring people up to realization that the war isn't over by any means".\textsuperscript{130}

Privately, however, Vandenberg had seemingly been impressed by Acheson's rhetoric. To the editor of the \textit{Jewish News} in Detroit he wrote, in answer to a query about Palestine: "Of course the problem throughout the entire Middle East has

\textsuperscript{126} Walter Trohan reported that Dean Acheson had told a Republican Congressman at a party that Turkey had served notice that it would reduce its army unless the United States shared the cost; Trohan reported that Republicans were disposed to see this as a part of a mounting campaign to get the U.S. to take over British commitments. \textit{Chicago Tribune}, March 9th, 1947.

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Congressional Record}, 93, March 4th, 1947, p. 1671.

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Chicago Tribune}, March 8th, 1947.

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{In, Booth Report, "Prex Week - The Great Decision"}, March 7th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.

\textsuperscript{130} Handwritten note, March 9th, 1947, George M. Elsey MSS., Truman Library.
been stupendously complicated during the last few days by the frank disclosure that the British Empire is further crumbling and that the United States must quickly make some major decisions respecting its relationship throughout this vast area. . . I have something of a feeling that the future of the entire world may easily turn upon American attitudes in respect to the situations which we now confront in connection with a global problem".  

At a further White House meeting on March 10th at which Taft was included at Vandenberg's request, Vandenberg again reminded the President of his previous insistence on a full explanation by the President to both Congress and people.  

It was also reported that Vandenberg took the President to task for American policy towards the Argentine and China; a report which if correct reveals the way in which Vandenberg had come to see the Greek and Turkey situation in global, ideological terms.

From the meeting also emanated reports of vague references to the possibility of the United States armed forces organizing and training troops in Greece, Turkey, Italy, China and Korea, to build a "fence around Russia".  

After the 80 minute session at the White House, Vandenberg urged Senate Republicans to keep an open mind on the forthcoming proposal: "I simply indicated to my colleagues my opinion that it is not an isolated phase but may prove to be symbolic of general policy which may have to be pursued all around

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131 Vandenberg to Philip Somovitz, March 5th, 1947; see also Vandenberg to John F. Bennett, March 5th, 1947, Vandenberg MSS.
132 Joseph M. Jones, pp. 168-9; Truman, Memoirs, II:111.
134 Chicago Tribune, March 11th, 1947.
the world inasmuch as the same fundamentals are involved in so many situations".\(^{135}\) Cautious as ever, he withheld endorsement until the President had delivered his side of the bargain, but his attitude was hardly in doubt, it was, he told his fellow senators, "a matter which transcends politics".\(^{136}\)

Despite the build-up and the gravity of the President's tone, his speech of March 12th, calling for the United States "to support free peoples", was received unenthusiastically by Congress. The only exception was a passage in the speech, added by Clark Clifford, which spoke of the need for the United States to supervise the spending of its own funds, which was a popular statement in the "economy" climate of 1947.\(^{137}\) Warned by the Chicago Tribune not to be taken in by eastern press propaganda, designed, it said, to prevent Republicans cutting the budget, and to get them to support Britain and "half the other governments of the world", Republicans were in a quandary.\(^{138}\) After the President's speech there was a tense clash between Senator Brooks of Illinois and left wing Democrat Pepper of Florida, in which Brooks argued that it was a repetition of 1940-1941, and that they wouldn't have to fight Russia now if the Republicans had had their way in 1941 and let the Germans "eat up Russia".\(^{139}\) Vandenberg, although supporting the President, and implying that Congress had no choice but to support

\(^{135}\)Ibid.
\(^{136}\)Joseph M. Jones, p. 169.
\(^{138}\)Chicago Tribune, March 11th, 1947.
\(^{139}\)Ibid., March 13th, 1947.
him, let it be known that he was upset by the Administration's failure to keep Congress fully in the picture, and for its failure to present the implications of British decline for discussion earlier. He also felt that the Administration had not given enough attention to the possibility of having a direct showdown with Stalin.  

Vandenberg's interpretation of the crisis was, therefore, consistent with his pre-existing belief as to the need for a "total policy" to deal with communism on a global basis. His statement of March 13th asserted that the "plain truth is that Soviet-American relationships are at the core of this whole problem." He had, therefore, swallowed the Acheson interpretation whole, seeing the Greek crisis solely in terms of American-Soviet relations; thus on March 5th he had written disparagingly of a suggestion that it ought to be dealt with by the United Nations, largely on the grounds that such a proposal had been advanced by Senator Pepper, whose views he commented, usually paralleled Moscow's. "My private opinion," he wrote, "is that we are rapidly approaching a point where we must honestly pose this question to ourselves: can the United States survive in a Communist-dominated world?" James Reston, who was the source of reports of Vandenberg's desire to take the matter up with Stalin, had earlier reported that Vandenberg had told the President that he should instruct the Secretary

140 New York Times, March 14th, 1947; Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 342-4. The timing of the Truman Doctrine made some Republicans suspicious, for the question of British withdrawal from Greece had been discussed in 1945; Free-land, pp. 89-92.
141 Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 343-4.
142 Vandenberg to John B. Bennett, March 5th, 1947, Vandenberg Mss.
143 Ibid.
of State to explain the policy to Stalin and to say that it was dual: i) collaboration for peace; ii) economic intervention in key areas to block Soviet expansion. At his meeting with Stalin, in April, Marshall did not put it so bluntly, simply saying that the United States would assist countries suffering from economic deterioration, in order to prevent collapse and threats to democracy. The essential problem, as the White House and State Department well knew, was that the Soviet Union was not directly involved in Greece, but the portrayal of the Greek crisis in terms of a cataclysmic ideological confrontation had been the price of Vandenberg's support. George Kennan of the State Department Planning Staff, and widely heralded the author of the policy of containment was unhappy with the ideological and universalist nature of the Truman Doctrine, so also was journalist Walter Lippman who regarded it as vague and uncontrollable. Within a few months of the message, both Kennan and Under-secretary Robert Lovett were to be cautioning Clark Clifford and the White House staff against any more simplified statements of American policy: a lot of things, they said, had been said which ought to be forgotten, including the global commitment to "aid free peoples...", which they indicated was beyond American capabilities.

144 Joseph M. Jones, pp. 154-5.
145 Commander Elsey opposed preparing the "All-out" speech Clark Clifford had wanted to back up the Greek crisis partly because there was no overt action by the Soviet Union to serve as an adequate pretext for such a speech; Elsey to Clark Clifford, Elsey MSS, March 8th, 1947.
147 Penciled note, September 2nd, 1947, Elsey MSS.
The Secretary of State also was less than pleased when he read the draft in Paris en route for Moscow, but was informed that it was necessary to get Congressional support.\textsuperscript{148} In view of this, it is perhaps not surprising that Vandenberg again reportedly became disillusioned with the Administration; by the end of April, he was to become convinced that there was "no Truman Doctrine", purely expediency, nothing more.\textsuperscript{149}

In April, Henry Wallace was to charge during his European tour that the Truman Doctrine was a political manoeuvre designed to steal the anti-communist issue from Republicans.\textsuperscript{150} Vandenberg demanded that the President make his position clear, and described Wallace as an "itinerant saboteur".\textsuperscript{151} Wallace's comments were accurate so far as the effect of the Truman Doctrine was concerned, but there is no evidence that that was the primary intention, which was to win support for the general direction of American foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Truman Doctrine was an intensely political speech, aside from its other implications. By taking the anti-communist initiative the President created some difficulties for the Democratic Party, hence the claim by Senator Connally, the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that the proposal to aid Greece and Turkey was not anti-Russian but anti-agression.\textsuperscript{152} The principal effect, however, was to put Republicans on the spot. The Democratic National Committee's executive director, Gael Sullivan, immediately exploited this by a challenge to Carroll Reece,

\textsuperscript{149}Report, "Vandenberg III - Cover", April 30th, 1947, p. 9, McNaughton MSS.
\textsuperscript{150}New York Times, April 12th, 1947.
\textsuperscript{151}\textit{Ibid.}, April 13th, 1947; Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 351.
\textsuperscript{152}Congressional Record, 93, April 22nd, 1947, p. 3791.
to sign a bipartisan declaration in favour of aid to Greece and Turkey, a move which Vandenberg and Connally both denounced. Reece's reply was as intensely political as Sullivan's challenge, and lends substance to Wallace's perception: assuring Sullivan that there was no division in the Republican Party on the question of resisting "communist aggression", he berated the Administration for its "appeasement" at Yalta, Potsdam, etc., which he held was partially responsible for the situation in Poland and the Baltic; at the same time, he charged, opposition to communist aggression was also involved "in the insidious infiltration of Communists and fellow-travelers into our own governmental structure at home. Actually, from the stand-point of American security, the presence of armed bands of outlaws on the frontiers of Greece or Turkey may be less dangerous than subversive termites disguised in striped trousers and spats in governmental positions in Washington". Clearly then, the Truman Doctrine had, with Vandenberg's connivance, put the midwestern wing of the party on the spot. By the end of March, the Gallup Poll was reporting 56% support for aid to Greece and Turkey, although considerably less support for the proposal to send military advisers. Arthur Krock commented that if Republicans opposed the Administration, there would be a danger of reopening the "isolation" issue, which in his view had lost them the

153Ibid., March 18th, 1947, p. 2167.
154Carroll Reece to Gael Sullivan, March 18th, 1947, copy in O.F. 426, Truman MSS.
155Congressional Record, 93, March 28th, 1947, p. 2827.
By framing its foreign policy in explicit anti-communist terms, the Administration had delivered a master stroke; it had challenged Republicans on the anti-communist issue which previously they had regarded as their own property. Whether in the long run the move was beneficial to the conduct of foreign policy is, however, doubtful. As one recent writer has argued: "By presenting aid to Greece and Turkey in terms of an ideological conflict between two ways of life, Washington officials encouraged a simplistic view of the Cold War which was, in time, to imprison American diplomacy in an ideological straight jacket. . . ."  

Early debate in Congress reflected the unease of the rank and file. A few Republicans, including Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Mass.) and his brother Representative John Davis Lodge (Conn.), were inclined to see the Doctrine as the logical conclusion to the pressure which Republicans had been putting on the Administration, and therefore, to welcome the about face and even to express a willingness to go further.  

There was, however, a great deal of unease. In the House in particular, the economy advocates were in disarray. One Representative, after surveying all the American foreign policy failures, concluded that the Administration had been controlled either by Communists or more likely by stupid people duped by communists. He couldn't believe that the New Dealers had changed their spots overnight:  

157 *Gaddis*, p. 352.  
"A management which has committed 14 years of blunders for communism is hardly qualified, because of an almost overnight reformation, to be given a blank check for a crusade against communism". The policy, he argued, would aid Russia, it would tie the United States down all over the globe and bring about economic collapse; those who advocated economy would, he predicted, be branded as friends of Russia and as reactionaries putting dollars at the expense of lives. Having completed the analysis of the Truman Doctrine as the culmination of a long policy of playing into Russian hands, he proceeded to agree with an interruption by the indefatigable Hoffman of Michigan, who claimed that "our foreign policy has been coming from abroad through the British Empire for something like 10 years".

Perhaps the most impressive early opposition came from Representative Bender of Ohio, who questioned how support for democracy could be reconciled with the regimes in Greece and Turkey, and wondered why there had not been similar concern for Poland, Finland, or China; from this he concluded that the United States was simply taking over British commitments. He was not, he said, prepared to commit the United States to another world-wide war "to protect the British Empire, to maintain monarchy, to bribe any scoundrel throughout the world to keep screaming against communism." Did this mean, he wondered, that the United States was going to turn the whole world into another central America, with

159 Ibid., March 18th, 1947, p. 2215.
160 Ibid., pp. 2216-7.
continuous intervention, as in that area in the 1920's.\textsuperscript{163}

Perhaps the man in the most difficult position of all was Robert Taft. Initially he had reserved his position on the question of aid to Greece and Turkey, and in particular had expressed his fear that it might lead to war with Russia. He had also wondered how the United States could reconcile its assertion of a special role in Greece and Turkey with its objection to Soviet domination of eastern Europe. He was particularly opposed to military aid.\textsuperscript{164} Taft's reservations were consistent with his long-standing belief that the United States must avoid imperial commitments, and with his belief that the United States should not engage in costly policies in areas which were not, in his view, vital to the security of the United States. By 1947 his view of what was vital to the United States had come to diverge markedly from Vandenberg's. Vandenberg, it seems, had at least since 1946 come to regard the threat of a world dominated by the Soviet Union as something which it was the vital interest of the United States to prevent. Not starting off from the internationalist assumption of the indivisibility of liberty, he had in fact come close to that position; as always, however, he retained his fear that the United States might over-strain its resources.\textsuperscript{165} Taft, however, still had a far more limited view of the vital interests of the

\textsuperscript{163}Ibid., p. 2587.
\textsuperscript{165}In March he wrote of his belief that they could avoid both war and "Communist encirclement and infiltration. . .if we make it immutably plain that we are the lineal descendants of those rugged old pioneers whose flag bore the motto 'Don't Tread on me'. But you may be very sure that I share all of your anxieties and that I have no illusions." Vandenberg to Bruce Barton, March 24th, 1947, Vandenberg MSS.
United States. The fact that the majority of Republicans in Congress probably supported him was no comfort: trailing in the opinion polls, criticized by the eastern press, not loved even by the Chicago Tribune, his chances of getting the 1948 nomination evidently on the wane, Taft decided with reluctance, to go along with the proposal to aid Greece and Turkey. 166

Taft's decision undoubtedly reflected the dilemma in which the President's address had put Republicans. In the middle of March Herbert Hoover, in an address to some 90 Senators and Representatives, said that the Republican Party had no alternative but to make the money available; failure to do so would, he said, simply lay them open to the charge that they had undercut Secretary Marshall at the Moscow Conference. He did feel, however, that Congress could write into the programme a clear definition of the circumstances in which Congress would sanction intervention elsewhere, as well as putting restrictions and conditions on the aid. 167 To Hoover's acquiescence, Alf Landon added enthusiastic support, seeing it as a reversion to "big stick" diplomacy, as befitted "the most awe-inspiring military power the world has ever seen". 168 No Republican leader in fact was prepared to come out in opposition to the aid to Greece and Turkey; in the House of Representatives even, vocal opponents came

167 O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, March 23rd, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.
from the ranks of the relatively unimportant. Amongst the early supporters in the House was Everett Dirksen, Illinois, hitherto an opponent of Administration foreign policy. Dirksen announced his support of "spirited resistance to communism" provided the Administration's about-face was real, and provided the many wasteful errors of international spending, which he catalogued, were remedied. Top of his list of failures was U.N.R.R.A., the administration of which he described as having been run by "mental misfits, indolent adventurers, and hypersensitive pinks. . .".

The Greek-Turkish aid bill was introduced into the Senate on the 19th March, amended in Committee by Vandenberg and Connally (especially in order to offset criticism about by-passing the United Nations) and reported out unanimously by the Foreign Relations Committee on April 3rd. On April 8th, Vandenberg initiated the formal Senate debate. He began his speech by declaring that the bill could have been called "a bill to support the purposes of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security", a response to criticisms of by-passing of the United Nations; or alternatively, it could also have been called "a bill to serve America's self-interest in the maintenance of independent governments". In his view, the bill did not initiate a new Doctrine: there was nothing new, he said, in aiding free peoples or resisting communism; but what was new was

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170 Ibid., p. 2545.
171 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 344-6; Alexander Smith to A. H. Vandenberg, March 17th, 1947, Smith MSS.
172 Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 347.
the decision to send peace time military missions to the Mediterranean, a policy which had previously been confined to Latin America.\textsuperscript{173} Vandenberg denied, therefore, that the United States intended to "underwrite the earth". There would, he said, be further situations requiring intervention, he instanced Korea, but United States reaction would always be according to the requirements of the particular situation. He also expressed the hope that in future they would have enough foresight not to react on a crisis basis.\textsuperscript{174} As regards the criticisms made about ignoring the United Nations, he asked the critics whether they wanted a repetition of U.N.R.R.A. in which the United States paid the bulk of the costs, but did not have over-all control.\textsuperscript{175} In essence, Vandenberg seemed to be emphasizing two points: the policy was based on self-interest; the Foreign Relations Committee had supported the bill "for the sake of the Stars and Stripes"; secondly, he emphasized Congress' responsibilities so far as backing up the President was concerned; failure to do so would "give the green light to aggression everywhere; our moral authority and leadership would die on the spot".\textsuperscript{176}

As always, Vandenberg's efforts on behalf of the bill were impressive; his continual emphasis on the importance of not surrendering to communist aggression and his care to relate the bill to American interest were calculated to secure maximum Republican support. If Turkey fell, he argued in his concluding speech, so would Greece, with a probable

\textsuperscript{173}Congressional Record, 93, April 8th, 1947, p. 347.  
\textsuperscript{174}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{175}Ibid., p. 3197.  
\textsuperscript{176}Ibid., p. 3198.
"chain reaction" from the Dardanelles to China, and westward to the Atlantic: "If we fail to act, aggression gets the green light; and the rest of the world, including America, gets the red".\(^{177}\) From the Moscow Conference he was encouraged in his stand by John Foster Dulles, who said that his efforts had strengthened the American position in western Europe: many "who believe our way are now daring to stand up for their beliefs".\(^ {178}\) At the end of a two week debate, the Greek-Turkish aid bill was duly passed 67-23, with 16 Republicans joining a mixture of left wing Democrats and Southern Democrats in opposition.\(^ {179}\) The debate revealed, however, a significant degree of unease amongst Republicans. Taft in particular indicated the conditional nature of his support: he did not regard it as a commitment to a similar policy elsewhere, nor eventually to Greece and Turkey when peace negotiations had been completed; in his view, it was purely a measure for reconstruction and rehabilitation, rather than a new departure.\(^ {180}\) It was indeed the global implications of the policy which worried Republican Senators most of all. It was, said Senator Wherry, a consistent opponent of Administration foreign policy, "a global leap in the dark".\(^ {181}\) Several predicted national bankruptcy at worst, a return to war time controls at best. Wherry's colleague from Nebraska, Senator Butler commented that the bill was "a return to the basic philosophy of the New Deal - that the way to meet any problem is to spend Government money".\(^ {182}\) He couldn't understand why the United

\(^ {177}\)Ibid., April 22nd, 1947, p. 3773.  
\(^ {178}\)Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, April 10th, 1947, Dulles MSS.  
\(^ {179}\)Congressional Record, 93, April 22nd, 1947, pp. 3792-3.  
\(^ {180}\)Ibid., p. 3786.  
\(^ {181}\)Ibid., April 21st, 1947, p. 3741.  
\(^ {182}\)Ibid., April 9th, 1947, p. 3238.
States, unlike Germany and Russia, "manage to discover that every country they enter is a liability and must be subsidized". 183 To Senator Martin from Pennsylvania, who was reluctantly supporting the bill, it was important to remember that "there is a bottom even to the American pocket. I hope we shall not have to learn it the hard way, as the British did." 184 Another unenthusiastic supporter, Cain, (Washington), felt that the bill had been presented in such a way that it could not be rejected, but ". . .some of us resent the administration's urging us to move so fast into an unknown and uncharted and uncertain field". 185 Even those who could always be relied upon were critical, possibly for tactical reasons. Lodge and Saltonstall of Massachusetts expressed the hope that Congress should not be put into another crisis situation; whilst Lodge hoped that the United States would encourage European integration, to reduce the ultimate costs to the United States of its European policy. 186 Flanders, (Vermont) regarded aid to Turkey as "dangerously near the border line of provocative military action". 187 Senator Smith of New Jersey was still troubled by the apparent bypassing of the United Nations. 188 In his diary he recorded his reasons for supporting the bill: despite his concerns about the United Nations and his worries about military aid to Turkey, he felt he had to support the President; in his view, it was not a precedent for making further aid, it was

183 Ibid., p. 3239.
184 Ibid., p. 3225.
185 Ibid., April 16th, 1947, p. 3484-5.
186 Ibid., April 11th, 1947, p. 3336.
187 Ibid., p. 3340; Ralph E. Flanders to Alexander Smith, April 14th, 1947, Smith MSS.
188 Congressional Record, 93, April 17th, 1947, p. 3590.
not a policy of imperialism or *Pax Americana*, but was a move within the spirit of the United Nations.\(^{189}\) The less idealistic and more partisan Styles Bridges berated the Administration for its inconsistency: it was, he said, still shipping U.N.R.R.A. supplies behind the Iron Curtain.\(^{190}\) Even Vandenberg took care, in response to an enquiry from Wherry, to dissociate himself from the development of American policy in China.\(^{191}\) Not for the first time, the debate revealed that the policy which would maximize Republican support was one which was both rigidly anti-communist and limited in financial or other commitments.

Despite Vandenberg's tactical success in getting the Greek-Turkish aid bill through the Senate, the Republican Party was clearly divided over the question. Vandenberg was less than universally praised for his closeness to the Administration.\(^{192}\) One Ohio Republican went so far as to describe him as "the most dangerous force which has ever imperiled the existence of the United States".\(^{193}\) The same man felt that if the party followed Vandenberg and "other pro-European Senators" there would be "no Republican party by November of 1948".\(^{194}\) Whilst Vandenberg was incurring the hostility of the Nationalists, Dewey kept silent. Joseph Alsop described him as having "broken all records for

\(^{189}\) Diary, March 3rd, 14th, 25th, 27th, April 18th, 1947, Smith MSS.
\(^{190}\) Congressional Record, 93, April 16th, 1947, pp. 3470-1; Vandenberg and Bridges combined to prevent Congress appropriating funds to complete the pipe-line lend-lease shipments, the last of which left the U.S. in early summer; Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p. 273.
\(^{191}\) Congressional Record, 93, April 16th, 1947, p. 3474.
\(^{192}\) O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, March 22nd, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.
\(^{193}\) George L. Gugle to John Bricker, March 18th, 1947, copy in Vorys MSS.
\(^{194}\) George L. Gugle to Vorys, March 19th, 1947, Vorys MSS.
political mumness". The divisions amongst Republicans might have been expected to manifest themselves most embarrassingly in the House of Representatives, where there was nobody of Vandenberg's calibre identified with Administration foreign policy. In the event, however, House Republicans gave the bill an easier passage than had been the case with the British Loan in 1946. Backed by the House leadership, which helped to overcome the obstruction of the Chairman of the Rules Committee, Leo Allen of Illinois, the bill was also supported by John Vorys of Ohio, who emerged as the most influential member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. A consistent pre-war anti-interventionist, and an opponent of the British Loan the previous year, Vorys' changed position was indicative of the willingness of a group of midwestern Republicans (including Everett Dirksen) to support tough anti-communist foreign policies. As he explained, to a political associate in Ohio: "There is a split in the Ohio delegation in both the House and the Senate on this. It is a tough question politically because it is a tough question from the standpoint of national policy, but I find that I cannot line up beside Wallace and Stalin.

To fears as to whether the United States could afford the policy being embarked on, and to fears that it might lead to war, Vorys argued in debate that if they didn't act now, they might as well withdraw to their own border, double their military budget, adopt universal military training and

197 Vorys to William Schneider, May 9th, 1947, Vorys MSS.
prepare for "the bitter end of World War II, in a few years". Eventually, he argued, the United States would save on defense spending by "a judicious and well-ordered plan of assisting in the rebuilding of the economy and the defense of the world. I believe this will bring peace nearer; at worst, it will make our defense cheaper." As to whether it would bring war, he preferred, he said, to rely in this matter "on the judgement of General Marshall rather than that of General Bender". The implications of the bill were clear to Vorys: it meant, he said, that the United States was not going to withdraw from Europe, they were going to stay and rebuild it. Vorys' support of the bill appeared to go further than fellow Ohioan Taft's support in the Senate. Rather than a continuation of former policy, he saw it as the beginning of something new. He was also unimpressed with those who argued that past mistakes by the Administration were hardly a basis for present confidence:

"It will not do much good to debate now the New Deal policy of appeasement that is partly responsible for this. It was not a bipartisan policy. Republicans generally opposed it. We were for a policy of firmness with Russia. Now that our policy of firmness is at last being followed, we Republicans should back it up.

198 Congressional Record, 93, May 6th, 1947, p. 4623.
199 Ibid., p. 4624; like most House Republicans, Vorys was opposed to universal military training; the only conceivable war he saw as an "A bomb war" with Russia, in which the U.S. would have no need of a costly mass army; Vorys to E. W. Dillon, March 29th, 1947, Vorys MSS.
200 Bender was a fellow Ohio Congressman opposed to the bill. Congressional Record, 93, May 6th, p. 4623.
201 Ibid.
"The Administration made a lot of mistakes in launching this program. Republicans should have been consulted earlier. Paul Porter, the most thoroughly repudiated public official in America, should not have headed the mission to Greece. The United Nations should have been informed earlier. We should never have been told that March 31 was the deadline.

"So what? All of this is spilled milk - very sour spilled milk. If this bill is voted down it will be taken the world over, not as a vote of protest against the administration's past mistakes, but as a vote against the new policy of firmness backed with action instead of words." 202

On the 9th May the bill passed the House by 287 to 107, with Republicans divided 127 to 94. 203 The vote confirmed the importance of the group of former anti-interventionists, whose foreign policy ideas were rooted in traditionalism, but who were prepared to support a hard-headed, anti-communist, interventionist foreign policy. Among the group was Dirksen of Illinois who, contrary to Taft's position in the Senate, gave as one of the prime reasons for support: the Soviet interest in Middle Eastern oil. 204 For the most part, however, Republican members of the House were very hesitant about committing the United States on a road which might lead to war; few were prepared to accept that the securing of Middle Eastern oil was a vital interest of the United States. An incisive analysis of the situation was made in an open letter to President Truman by Rep. Case of South Dakota, who had presided over the debate as chairman of the Committee of the Whole House. In his letter he

202 Ibid., p. 4624.
203 Ibid., May 9th, 1947, p. 4975.
204 Ibid., May 6th, 1947, p. 4633.
emphasized that the bill should not be seen as a commitment to war. Support, he said, had been very reluctant: the House had been dealing with a *fait accompli*. He estimated that at least 75 members, himself included, had refrained from opposing simply because they had not wished to pull the rug from under the President and Secretary Marshall in positions they had taken at the Moscow Conference. At the same time, he warned that Congress was weary of "government by crisis", the aid to Greece and Turkey was merely a "stop-gap", some way had to be found to let the nations of the world, live and let live.  

Case's analysis was an accurate reflection of a strong Republican ground swell against the way in which aid to Greece and Turkey had been presented by the Administration. It seems clear that rather than strengthening bipartisanship, the Truman Doctrine had in fact given the Administration the domestic political initiative. By the end of April, Arthur Vandenberg had apparently come to see it as pure expediency rather than marking a real change in Administration attitudes towards the Soviet Union on a global basis.  

By the summer, John Foster Dulles, despite his early support to Vandenberg, had come to re-evaluate the whole episode: "I realize that once it was formulated," he wrote to Vandenberg, "it would have been a disaster had Congress repudiated it, but I have never been very keen about it, and I think it needs considerable over-hauling to be workable".

205 Francis Case to Harry S. Truman, May 10th, 1947, O.P. 426, Truman MSS.
206 See page 328 above.
207 Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, July 21st, 1947, Dulles MSS.
Stassen, regarded as the Internationalist contender for the 1948 nomination, also had his doubts, publicly condemning it as "negative" and warning against waste and military involvement.208 Certainly the way in which Vandenberg had manoeuvred, or been manoeuvred into getting, Congress to accept the Greek-Turkish aid had done nothing for his popularity amongst his colleagues in Congress. In both Senate and House, resentment was expressed at the implication that Congress had the duty to go along with the President. Even regular supporters of bipartisan foreign policy were disturbed at the way in which the Truman Doctrine had been put to the Republicans; Vandenberg himself often invoked in his defense the fact that by the time Congress was consulted it had, as in the case of the Greek-Turkish bill, no real choice.209 The comment of one Representative from Michigan, although always to be found in the opposition ranks on foreign policy, was cutting: "If this Congress has reached the conclusion that it must follow and uphold every thought of the Chief Executive, of the Secretary of State, or, if you please, of a bipartisan group of internationalists in the other body, then the House might just as well adjourn, or perhaps resign, go home, and save the taxpayers' money".210 In July, Senator Malone of Nevada charged that the U. S. did not have a bipartisan foreign policy: "what we do have is a few Republicans who vote with the Democrats for the disconnected

209 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 339, 342, 351. For report of criticisms of Vandenberg, O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, May 29th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.
210 Congressional Record, 93, May 9th, 1947, p. 4920.
and dangerous emergency decisions of the administrations. . .."211

He also charged that the Administration was deliberately fostering fear of communism to build "an international WPA" whilst still allowing oil refining equipment to be shipped to the Soviet Union.212

Rumours of the proposed long term programme to bring about European reconstruction did not help matters. At the end of March, the left wing Democrat, Taylor of Idaho, taunted Republicans about the reports of a new long term aid programme, forecast by an American magazine article: "... they have got it down to the point where the poor Republicans cannot vote their convictions for fear of being called Communists. We are in the same boat together: the Red hunt has got us all".213 Not surprisingly, Vandenberg whilst struggling over a foreign relief bill in May, was horrified to read an article by James Reston on a proposed five year aid programme for European reconstruction:

"... either you are wrong or this government is out of its mind. Any plan of that size is out of the question."214

By May, then, Vandenberg was once more disillusioned with the Administration. To many Republicans he seemed little more than an Administration stooge, whilst as a result of the Administration's actions in March and April he felt, not unreasonably, that he was being asked to get costly measures through Congress whilst not being put fully in the

211 Ibid., Appendix, p. 4138.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid., March 31st, 1947, p. 2867.
At the same time, however, the debates in Congress at the inauguration of containment revealed his indispensability to the Administration. The plans being formulated could not ultimately be passed without his cooperation. If the State Department convinced themselves that he would easily be persuaded, the fact is that his own convictions, and the political situation which made him indispensable, would dictate the need for concessions to his viewpoint. Vandenberg and the Congressional Republicans were in 1947 no more prepared than in 1944 to give assent to what they regarded as an "international W. P. A.". "We have got to stay strong at home, not only for our own sake but for the sake of world peace and security," wrote John Vorys, one of the newer Republican converts to the bipartisan foreign policy, "but I believe that reconstruction can be good business for the United States if we go at it the right way." In 1947 no Republican leader could afford to ignore the tenets of a "Strong America"; the emerging American policy towards Europe would have to be seen to be related to American self-interest as well as to be explicitly anti-communist in order to gain Republican support.

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216For the State Department view of Vandenberg as lacking in creativity, but open to reasoned persuasion, see Joseph H. Jones, p. 124.
217Vorys to John V. Miller, June 4th, 1947, Vorys MSS.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Towards a "Long Range" European Policy

In their dealings with American foreign policy initiatives up to 1946, Republican leaders were largely responding to developments formulated outside the Republican Party. The main content of Republican policy until that time consisted of the domestic restraints hitherto referred to as a "Strong America", and a firm anti-communism. In the previous chapter, it was shown how Republicans were manoeuvred into acceptance of the Greek-Turkish aid programme by invocation of the anti-communist crusade to counter their strong "economy" sentiment. Nevertheless, although the aid to Greece and Turkey was put in the context of an anti-communist crusade, Republican leaders were still not confident about the Administration's handling of foreign policy; in particular, they disliked the expediency and crisis tactics. Thus although the Truman Doctrine has frequently been portrayed as the beginning of a new, constructive era in American foreign relations, to Republicans it also seemed to be one of a long line of ad hoc expediencies produced by an administration lacking both in philosophy and faith in the American system.

From 1947 Republican leaders were increasingly to press for policy to be put on a non-crisis basis, and for a coherent, consistent global policy to be formulated. Republican leaders saw the establishment of such a policy as essential for the preservation of "liberty" in the United States; liberalism could not flourish in a continual state of emergency, and neither American institutions nor the economy could long
survive such a situation. The assumption that the objectives and capabilities of the United States would be carefully evaluated and balanced was implicit in the demand for a settled policy. Not only was this beneficial at home, but as Vandenberg often argued, it let the rest of the world know where the United States stood; as he saw it, the alternative was continuous misunderstandings and bitterness among allies, and possible miscalculation by potential enemies. The demand for a settled foreign policy, anticipating rather than reacting to crises, pre-dated the Greek-Turkish aid programme, and it particularly began to come to the fore in the aftermath of the 1946 elections. After their victory, Republican leaders were determined to try to influence Administration policy rather than to be passive collaborators; the likelihood of a Republican victory in 1948, and the failure of New Deal diplomacy to bring about a peace over a year after the war, seemed ample justification for their efforts.

The German Question

By the end of 1946 the most crucial question in American foreign policy was the nature of the European settlement to be arrived at following the inability of the Big Powers to produce agreement at the Foreign Ministers' Meetings and Peace Conference in 1946. The German settlement, which was due to be discussed at the meeting in Moscow in March, 1947, was central to the structure of peace. The most intractable of the problems left over by World War II, the question of the post-war status of Germany had been complicated by the war-time decision to press for unconditional surrender, and by the attempt at joint occupation. The major occupying
powers each approached the German settlement in terms of their own perceived national interests. For France and the Soviet Union, in particular, the German settlement was seen as vital to their security, whilst the Soviet Union had an additional interest in securing reparations to help pay for its own post-war reconstruction. For the United States, a series of constraints hedged German policy: a) Germany must not in the long run be an economic burden on the United States; b) long term military occupation, on a major scale was ideologically and economically unthinkable; c) Germany must not be allowed to come within the Soviet sphere of economic and political influence. The still considerable fear of and revulsion for Nazi Germany, and the consequent determination not to allow Germany to benefit from another quarrel among the victors of war, was an additional constraint which is likely to be overlooked as the period recedes from memory. There was, in short, still a disposition to try and solve the problem of Germany in cooperation with the Soviet Union, however hopeless such a task might seem in retrospect. The not unexpected resurgence of political conservatism in the United States, of which the 1946 elections seemed a sure portent, made this task more complicated.

For Republican leaders, who had never had a commitment to the alliance with the Soviet Union, the re-evaluation of German policy proved less difficult than for many of their

\[1\text{This analysis of the German question is based to a large extent on the following: Diane Shaver Clemens, }\text{Yalta (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, }\text{The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1944 (New York: Harper, 1972); Herbert Feis, }\text{From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War 1945-50 (New York: Norton, 1970).}\]
political opponents. At the same time, it is not irrelevant to note a basic sympathy with Germany on the part of certain Republican leaders in the pre-war years. John Foster Dulles' lack of outright opposition to Hitler, which in 1944 in particular was to lead to allegations that he was pro-Nazi, is well established. In 1935, apparently confronted with a revolt by his law partners, who refused to go on doing business with German firms on account of persecution of the Jews, Dulles relented in tears, protesting that the firm's German business was profitable. In his intellectual formulations, Dulles sought in the late 1930's to find ways of reconciling the demands of dynamic nations such as Germany with the need to maintain peace. In 1940, with his brother, he wrote that the aggressive policies of the Axis powers "can doubtless be explained... in terms of errors and injustices of the past and the inherent vices of excessive nationalism. But their present objectives seem to go far beyond anything necessary to redress those errors and to be calculated to impose upon others, in even greater degree, the same injustices of which they themselves complained." Even, however, in the dark days of 1940, whilst advocating moral and economic influence to be exerted "with a view to checking the super-dynamic tendencies which are now the characteristics of certain countries" the Dulles brothers were not prepared to commit themselves to the restoration of the European status quo: some way had to be found, perhaps through federal

2 Hoopes, p. 47.
principles, to absorb the energies of dynamic nations. 4 Thomas Dewey in later years provided a down to earth summary of Dulles' views at that time: "He felt that the Germans were the strong, aggressive force in Europe. He thought, I think, that Hitler was a passing phenomenon who would disappear and was reflecting a basic economic problem - - which is certainly going on now and will go on through history. There will be fat and happy people, and there will be lean and hungry people. His thesis was that the fat and happy should gracefully yield to avoid war and let the lean and hungry have a little better place in the sun. In due course the lean and hungry people would become fat and happy, so that this process of peaceful change would be the solution. The full horror of Hitler had not yet dawned on the world, but it was becoming pretty clear." 5 Dulles' views on Germany at this stage were not far different from Herbert Hoover's. In the war-time book he wrote with Hugh Gibson, Hoover had discounted any notion of the division of Germany, and appeared to blame the situation resulting in World War II largely on what he regarded as selfish and unreasonable French demands. For Hoover more than for Dulles perhaps, a weak Germany was never, even at the height of war-time anti-German sentiment, seen as a desirable path to peace. 6

During the war, detached and unemotional attitudes towards Germany were, like criticism of the Soviet Union,

4Ibid.
5Transcript, interview with Thomas E. Dewey, p. 6, Dulles Oral.
6Hoover and Gibson, p. 316; note also J. Reuben Clark to Hoover, January 15th, 1943; "I am not nearly so much concerned about Germany, for I think that if she had not, over the years since the Versailles Treaty, been so grossly mishandled, we need not have had this war." Hoover MSS.
regarded as the trade mark of the "isolationist". In 1944, for example, Sumner Welles outlined a German plan to prepare for a third war by a process of "indirect complicity", enabling it to gain control of Europe and much of the rest of the world politically and economically through using nationals of other countries: "The principal danger is that after the present war the people of the democracies, and particularly of the United States, will wish once more, as in 1920, to plunge themselves into the oblivion of "normalcy". We will be inclined to accept at its face value the propaganda which will once more emanate from German sources and, unfortunately, from many wholly sincere and patriotic sources susceptible to the influence of German propaganda. The very nature of the German plan will, in peace times, seem fantastic." Republican leaders could not afford, in the war-time climate to be seen as pro-German, or worse, as Dulles was accused during the 1944 campaign, of being pro-Nazi. So, in August, 1944, New York Republican James Wadsworth warned Dewey of an intelligence report he had read indicating that the Germans hoped to influence the Republicans so as to embarrass relations with Britain and the Soviet Union. "It might be deduced from that," replied Dewey, "that the Nazis are expecting to go under ground when they lose the war and come out again ten and fifteen years from now."8

The question of post-war occupation also made Germany a very sensitive political issue for Republicans by 1944.

8Thomas E. Dewey to Wadsworth, August 23rd, 1944, Wadsworth MSS.
The 1944 Platform, whilst committing the Republican Party to total victory and to keeping the Axis impotent, also expressed the determination to being all the armed forces, other than those who volunteered for further overseas duty, home at the "earliest possible time after the "cessation of hostilities". The pressures for a return to "normalcy" were, in addition to scepticism about working with the Soviet Union, an obstacle to the complete embrace of Administration policy towards Germany as it developed. During the 1944 campaign, Dewey appeared reluctant to spell out Republican policy on the German question. On one occasion, he said, it would depend on when Germany surrendered. On another, under Dulles' guidance, he had talked of a policing of Germany by European countries such as France, the Low Countries and Poland. Finally, influenced by the ideas of Jean Monnet, Dewey and Dulles suggested that the Ruhr should be internationalized. Clarifying his views still further during the campaign, Dewey suggested that German raw materials would form part of a programme of rehabilitation and economic integration of the European continent. Privately, however, Dulles seemed to be prepared to contemplate considerable dismemberment of Germany as a prelude to European federation. In an unpublished memorandum he noted that "the German is assimilated into other societies, he makes a good citizen." On this premise he constructed a tentative plan: "Let us

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9 Porter and Johnson, p. 407.
10 New York Times, June 30th, 1944.
11 Ibid., August 20th, 1944.
12 Ibid., August 21st, 1944; Chicago Tribune, June 7th, 1944; Hoopes, pp. 67-8.
then draw life of the Germans into surrounding countries, leaving only a nucleus of Prussia. Let the Rhineland be drawn into France, South Germany into Austria, Eastern Germany into Poland. Then let us encourage a European federation of States that will ally itself against the rise of the war spirit in the Prussians to police them".  

In so far as there was anything resembling a coherent Republican attitude to post-war Germany by 1944, it was one which was constrained by the need to convince the rank and file that it would not lead to permanent policing by the United States. Part of Dewey's campaign strategy was to claim that the New Deal wished to keep people in the army because it was either unable or unwilling to provide jobs for them in private enterprise. This strategy led the New York Times to comment that he appeared to under-estimate the length of job that would be involved in occupation of both Germany and Japan. The vague ideas developed by Dulles were compatible with the domestic constraint, as well as logical developments of his own position on international affairs: not having been prepared to fight before Pearl Harbor because he felt the United States would go in for the wrong reasons, Dulles had at the same time urged the need for a reform of the European state system, for the extension of the Federal principle to areas outside the Americas, and to the integration of "hungry" peoples such as the Germans into the liberal western world. Dulles' war-time activities with the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace had not taken him substantially beyond this position, certainly in so far as United States

14 Memorandum dictated in Atlantic City, November 1944, Dulles MSS.
15 September 8th, 1944.
military commitments on the European continent were concerned.

Apart from Vandenberg's speech of January, 1945, copies of which Roosevelt had taken to Yalta, there was no major initiative on German policy by Republican leaders and no real cooperation with the Administration. The question of Germany was a matter for Head of State meetings at Yalta and Potsdam, and a question for the military. Requiring no legislation, German policy, although of fundamental importance, was largely an Executive matter. The Nationalists in particular were frequently critical of what they perceived as German policy in 1945-6, and especially of the Morgenthau Plan, which Dewey had publicly attacked in 1944.\footnote{During the 1944 campaign Dewey blamed the Morgenthau Plan for prolonging the war, \textit{New York Times}, November 5th, 1944; in the campaign he lambasted Roosevelt for taking to Quebec not the Secs of State or War, but the Secretary of the Treasury, "whose qualifications as an expert on military and international affairs are still a closely guarded military secret." \textit{Ibid.}, October 18th, 1944.}

Publicly, however, criticism of the Morgenthau Plan and German policy did not really emerge until after the war, and especially when relations with the Soviet Union began to cool. After Yalta, for example, far more attention was given to Poland than to the implications of the German policy tentatively agreed on. Herbert Hoover, however, was disturbed by what he saw as the disastrous consequences of the policy: "The folks here who want more punishment of the civil population of Germany seem to overlook that they have already received a punishment that will last for 40 years. And one of the sardonic things is that with their present set up we will probably be feeding them for the next two
or three years out of charity. "17 In October he spoke out against the Morgenthau Plan: "Measures which reduce the economic life of coming generations to the low levels of an agricultural state are neither justice nor good policy... There is no such thing as a 'hard peace' or a 'soft peace'. It must be a just peace if we are to restore justice in the world. And without justice there is no peace."18

Reports of conditions in Germany in late 1945 and early 1946 angered some, largely Republican Senators, especially Langer (N. Dak.), Wherry (Neb.), Hawkes (N.J.), and Shipstead (Minn.), all of whom were consistent opponents of Administration foreign policy.19 Some Senators were particularly upset by a statement by the President that he could feel no real sympathy for those who had caused so much death, destruction and starvation themselves. Commented Senator Hawkes: "...there are millions of people in Germany who had no more to do with what Hitler did than I have had to do with what the New Deal has done in the United States of America".20 In February, Governor Green of Illinois, a barometer of Midwestern Republicanism, indicted the policy of "starvation" in Germany as being likely to "breed in the hearts of its victims a smoldering hate against us... which may force us to maintain permanent armies of occupation".21 In May, Alf Landon spoke of the need to let Germany operate as an economically self-supporting nation.22 In

17 Hoover to William F. Knowland, June 12th, 1945, Hoover MSS.
19 Congressional Record, 92, January 29th, 1946, pp. 512, 516; ibid., Appendix, p. 509.
20 Ibid., p. 512.
21 Ibid., Appendix, p. 927.
August Herbert Hoover warned that "dismemberment of the German state and the attempt to reduce the German people to a level of perpetual poverty will some day break into another world explosion. . .".23

Whilst criticism of policy towards Germany was rife, the Administration was in fact moving towards a change. In July, at Paris, Secretary Byrnes offered to merge the American zone of occupation with any other power's zone, which was a move to lead to merger with the British zone in December. In a speech at Stuttgart in September, where he was accompanied by Vandenberg and Connally, he made a number of commitments to a revitalized Germany: German control of the Ruhr and the Rhineland, opposition to reparations from current production, and a belief that Germany must be allowed to export goods to attain self-sufficiency. Designed to counter Soviet efforts to woo the Germans, the Byrnes speech also encouraged Robert Taft who wrote to Vandenberg:

"It looks as if he was turning definitely against the pre-existing policies which I have criticized".24 For his part, Vandenberg, after what was his only post-war trip to Germany, concluded that the effect of the war on Germany was "past comprehension. There certainly won't be any 'German menace' again in my lifetime."25 For Republicans, the re-evaluation of German policy came naturally: as naturally as the changed state of relations with the Soviet Union. Both the anti-

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23 Ibid., August, 13th, 1946.
24 Robert A. Taft to Vandenberg, October 20th, 1946, Vandenberg MSS.
25 Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 299.
communist crusade, which Republicans tended to regard as their own mission, as well as the desire to restore the United States to domestic "Normalcy" required such a re-evaluation. The election of the Republican Congress in 1946, with its commitment to economy, and its interest in exposing what it regarded as past errors, inevitably raised questions about the German occupation, and therefore, about United States European policy. Republican leaders, as it became clear, were not content simply to endorse Administration policies without consultation and participation, especially in view of the costs of continued European occupation and relief.

**Dulles and Hoover: European Unity and a "Separate Peace"**

Apart from Vandenberg, the most important Republicans in terms of the development of foreign policy in 1947 were John Foster Dulles and Herbert Hoover. Dulles still had no official position, other than his advisory role with Dewey; but since 1944, his position had been greatly strengthened by the development of a close friendship with Vandenberg. Herbert Hoover owed his importance to his reputation as an expert on matters of foreign relief, a view of his capacities which was especially strong amongst Republican members of the House of Representatives.

In the past, Dulles and Hoover had, as previously argued, shared many common views on American foreign policy. Both had always been, and remained, concerned about the dangers of over-expenditure and military over-commitment. But in

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26 For confirmation of this interpretation of Dulles' position beyond the immediate post-war period, see Guhin, pp. 107-8, 140-2.
so far as a difference existed between them in their intellectual formulations of policy, it stemmed from Dulles' sense of mission, which became a central characteristic of his foreign policy rhetoric in the 1940's. Hoover had been convinced since his World War I experience that the countries of Europe were virtually past praying for.27 Dulles tended by contrast to emphasize the beneficial aspects of world leadership, and to give less emphasis than Hoover to the difficulties overseas which stood in the way of the attainment of American aims. Dulles in fact claimed even to welcome the Soviet challenge, based on his reading of Toynbee's theory of "challenge and response". Through its response to the Soviet challenge, he felt the United States could rediscover its own purpose, and could invigorate western civilisation.28 In the 1950's he was to come to fear the domestic consequences of a relaxation of tension with the Soviet Union, fearing that in such circumstances the United States would lose its newly rediscovered creative belief in itself.29

The difference between Hoover and Dulles was reflected in their approaches to the German question. For whereas Hoover appeared to approach the problem from the standpoint of reduction of American expenditure, Dulles, although not insensitive to "economy" arguments, was more concerned to

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27 Hoover, Memoirs I: 473-9; still later, he was to write that "enumeration of the 'points' which the President lost at Paris is of little importance to history except as a demonstration of the hostility of Old World concepts to New World ideals." Herbert Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York: McGraw Hill, 1958), p. 264.
28 Dulles to Edward C. Carter, January 22nd, 1947; Dulles to Joseph Barnes, January 31st, 1947, Dulles MSS.
29 Guhin, pp.124-8, 151-3.
see the German question as part of a constructive, long-term European settlement. Unlike Hoover and the midwestern Republicans, who had always regarded the Soviet Union as a potentially worse enemy than Germany, and who had less faith in America's ability to bring about a liberal democratic Europe, Dulles seemed unwilling to accept the simple solution of the restoration of a strong Germany. By early 1947, Dulles had begun to clarify his views on American policy in Europe; and increasingly, he was coming to talk of the German problem in terms of Europe as a whole. In part he and Dewey had used this approach in 1944, partly under the influence of Jean Monnet. With the development of the post-war rift with the Soviet Union, Dulles had become concerned that the talk of a restoration of a strong Germany might push France into the Soviet Union bloc. The solution, the integration of Germany into a united Europe, was a logical development from Dulles' assumptions: a united Europe, based on the principle of Federalism, which he regarded with almost reverence, would not be the restoration of the old Europe which he had always opposed; it would safeguard "freedom" in western Europe, providing Americans with the rights to trade, travel and so on, which he saw as fundamental aims of United States policy; it would finally in the long run produce a Europe which could support itself, and which therefore would not be a burden on the United States. In short, through its sense of mission, the United States would also be able to serve the paramount needs of a "Strong America".
Apart from the problem of how to put the grand plan into operation, which required access to the Administration, Dulles still was unclear on matters of detail. To a friend he wrote in September, 1946, of his difficulties which needed sorting out. These included such questions as whether Eastern Europe be excluded, should England be included, what sort of political unity, and questions of free trade, immigration and common currency. Also in his list was the question of whether Germany would have to be split up.  

On January 17th, 1947, Dulles' celebrated address to the National Publishers Association, delivered after consultation with Dewey and Vandenberg, was clearly an effort both to develop a distinctive Republican solution to the problem of Europe, and to exert direct influence on the Administration before the forthcoming Moscow Conference. In the carefully planned press build up before the speech, Dulles briefed Alsop and other journalists in the letter sending them advance copies, that the speech "sets forth what I think I can fairly call the Republican position".  

The actual speech called for the development of creative leadership by the United States, following the success achieved in 1946 through developing policies of relief for the needy and opposition to Soviet expansion. German policy must now be guided by considerations of the economic unity of Europe rather than "the Potsdam dictum" of single German economic

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30 Dulles to Ferdinand Mayer, September 24th, 1946, Dulles MSS.  
31 Dulles to Joseph W. Alsop, January 15th, 1947, Dulles MSS.
unity. Although accepting the importance of German economic union, disrupted by the joint occupation, which had separated industrial areas from agricultural areas, Dulles argued that European unity was more important. His solution was simple but calculating. Aware of European fears of Germany less than two years after the war, he took care to say that the new Europe must not lead to German dominance. At the same time, he described "pastoralization", i.e., the de-industrialization of Germany, as impracticable; apart from other considerations, it would put an increased burden on the United States if the German economy was held down. A long-term occupation of Germany he also ruled out.

What Dulles had done in effect was to guard in advance against critics who accused him of simply wanting to restore Germany to its pre-war dominance in order to build a bloc against the Soviet Union. In the United States Senator Pepper made this charge, seeing it as part of a conscious Republican attempt to reverse war-time "international cooperation" and to return to a post-World War I policy of rebuilding Germany. Izvestia printed an analysis by a Soviet historian suggesting that the speech indicated a determination by the United States and Britain to use their zones as the basis of an anti-Russian coalition. Dulles himself hastened to

32 Address to National Publishers Association, January 17th, 1947, Dulles MSS. On January 11th, Vandenberg had called for economic unification of Germany and the offer of eventual decentralized political autonomy to give the Germans hope for the future: this revealed a different emphasis from Dulles' speech, of which the latter must have been aware and which probably accounts for the mention of the importance, albeit secondary, of German economic unity. For Vandenberg speech, see New York Times, January 12th, 1947.
33 Congressional Record, 93, February 5th, 1947, p. 789.
34 New York Times, February 17th, 1947; Pravda also attacked Vandenberg and Dulles for their speeches of January 11th and 17th, respectively; New York Times, January 27th, 1947.
correct the notion that he saw European unity as a bloc against Russia: "... the goal should be increased unity in all of Europe and only if the Soviet Union is unwilling to play ball with its zone in Eastern Europe should we seek a unification limited to Western Europe", he wrote. If Dulles' proposal was not anti-Soviet in the narrow sense, its implications certainly cut across apparent Soviet perceptions of their interests in Europe: the integration of the German industrial machine into western Europe could not help but weaken Soviet influence on the continent; by implication it meant no reparations for the Soviet Union, as well as a powerful economic pull to counter Russian force in eastern Europe. Walter Lippmann, who warmly supported the proposal, interpreted it as likely to create a dilemma for indigenous communists. Opposition to European integration would be against national interests, and if in response to Moscow they took this line, they would be weakened. At the same time, it was not a narrowly anti-Soviet policy: it would only become a western bloc if the Soviet Union compelled Poland and Czechoslovakia to remain outside the United Europe.

The policy then which Dulles outlined in January, 1947, was a masterly political statement, in the larger sense of the word. Internationally it contrived to hold out hope to all Europe, including even Germany, without alienating France. It could be defended against the charge of being anti-Soviet.

35 Dulles to Maynard Stitt, February 4th, 1947; Dulles to Geoffrey Parsons, February 6th, 1947, Dulles MSS.
Yet, as Dulles claimed to Secretary Marshall, it could only strengthen the American hand in its negotiations with the Soviet Union, since it showed that the latter could no longer count on being able to veto the development of policy in Europe. In short, the virtue of the programme was that it "could be carried out without the participation of the Soviet Union" if the need arose. Domestic, the speech capitalized on the Republican victory of 1946, and strengthened Dulles' claims as a Republican spokesman whom the Administration could hardly ignore. The statement was also, along with his Chicago speech of February 10th, reconcilable with Republican concerns about over extension: Dulles still saw America's role largely in terms of moral credit and economic power, plus the immediate presence of its occupied forces; in the not too distant future it held out the hope of creating a liberal Europe, strong enough for American withdrawal. Yet, whilst playing down the American role in European unity, partly perhaps out of sensitivity to external attacks of "imperialism", to Secretary of State

37 Memorandum, "Re: Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow", February 26th, 1947, p. 3, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
38 The Soviet attacks made it difficult for the Administration to ignore him; to have left him behind in the circumstances would have indicated division in the United States. Drew Middleton wrote in the New York Times that Dulles' invitation symbolized the division between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. over Germany, ibid., February 27th, 1947; Senator Smith wrote, "I have felt right along that...it was vitally essential that you should go, especially because of the courageous position you have taken with regard to the Russian situation." Alexander Smith to John Foster Dulles, February 27th, 1947, Smith MSS. To his wife, on arrival, Dulles wrote that he was the second to emerge from the plane: "apparently my coming second was noted - in view of the attacks here - which was what I hoped." John Foster Dulles to Janet Avery Dulles, March 10th, 1947, Janet Avery Dulles MSS.
Marshall, Dulles apparently expressed the view that Europe was "of vital importance to us; that we had fought two wars to keep political freedom alive in that area, and that in essence we would have lost those wars if it fell under a Soviet type of dictatorship which suppressed human liberty." Assuming that Dulles' choice of words was considered, Dulles' description of Europe as of vital importance to the United States marked a definite development of his foreign policy. In Chicago earlier in February he had put it rather differently, saying that whilst European unity "depends primarily on the peoples of the Continent themselves... the United States has there both moral rights, bought with the blood of two wars, and political power." 

While Dulles was putting forward his dynamic view of American policy toward Europe, Herbert Hoover was also being brought into the picture. The idea of inviting Hoover to visit Germany originated with General Lucius D. Clay, the Deputy U. S. Military Governor in Germany. The invitation was designed to persuade Congressional Republicans of the necessity of appropriating funds for the continued occupation. Hoover, however, was not prepared to be used so obviously, and demanded that the invitation should come from the President himself, and also that his enquiry should not be merely into the nature of the food shortages, but into the political causes. Hoover's conditions therefore

39 Memorandum, "Re: Council of Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Moscow", February 26th, 1947, p. 2, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
41 Ibid., January 23rd, 1947.
42 Ibid., January 24th, 1947.
would open up his enquiry into matters such as the level of industry, the problem of whether Germany should be allowed to export, and the question of economic unification. All of these were, as the Secretary of War noted, matters for the State Department, which were soon to form the agenda for the Moscow Conference.\(^{43}\) Against the domestic political background, the Administration had no real option but to accede to Hoover's conditions. To the President, Hoover made it clear that his proposed mission would not be a simple reporting job, he would view its function as determining ways in which the economic burdens on the United States could be reduced: "It will come as a great shock to our people that the American taxpayer for a second year must expend huge sums to provide food for the enemy peoples. Therefore it seems to me that the mission to accomplish its purpose must also include inquiry into what further immediate steps are possible to increase their exports and thus their ability to become self-supporting; what possibilities there are of payment otherwise; and when charity can be expected to end. Without some such inclusive report, the Congress and the taxpayers are left without hope."\(^{44}\) At a meeting with the President on January 22nd, Hoover secured agreement

\(^{43}\)Robert P. Patterson to Forrest Davis, December 27th, 1946, Robert P. Patterson MSS., Library of Congress. In January Hoover appeared to be trying to strike up a relationship with the new Secretary of State through Cal O'Laughlin; Memorandum, January 22nd, 1947, Hoover file, O'Laughlin MSS.

\(^{44}\)Hoover to Harry S. Truman, January 19th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
that his mission would look into food and "its collateral problems". In his public statement Hoover once more emphasized the prime purpose of his mission, the need to find ways of reducing the burden which the occupation of Germany was imposing on the American taxpayer. In his view, therefore, rather than being a mere fact finding mission, to determine Germany's food needs for the next few months, his mission was a "long-range study".

The findings of the Hoover mission were predictable. His report, coming at the end of February, at a time when the Greek crisis and preparations for the Moscow Conference were dominating the Washington scene, at least guaranteed that Congress would appropriate the necessary funds, which from the Administration point of view had been the object of the exercise. But his suggestions as to ways of reducing long-term costs were likewise bound to be taken up by Congressional Republicans. The report argued that in future all relief expenditures should be repaid: in fact, they should be the first charge on the German economy, ahead of reparations. It also suggested that among ways of reducing costs to the United States was a removal of restrictions on the export of German manufactured goods. The over-all implication of the report was, therefore, of an economic revival of Germany, designed primarily to reduce the burden on the United States. The report concluded: "If western

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45Note, dated January 22nd, 1947, Hoover MSS.
civilization is to survive in Europe it must also survive in Germany. And it must be built into a cooperative member of that civilization. That, indeed, is the hope of any lasting peace." Not surprisingly, Hoover privately urged the President not to compromise at Moscow over Germany. He felt that the United States could let the Russians know that it was prepared to wait for a peace treaty, and that in the meantime it would build up the bizonc economically. The implications of Hoover's report, like Dulles' more subtle proposals, was therefore the use of German economic power to strengthen Europe, economically and politically, both against the Soviet Union and indigenous communists in western Europe. Aside from any other considerations, the domestic political situation in the United States ruled out any chance of compromise with the Soviet Union over Germany.

In March Hoover followed up his report with a more detailed one, which, he confided to Henry Stimson, "will probably stir up the 'Morgenthau planners'." By intent then, Hoover's report was designed to further the case for the rebuilding of German industry after what he regarded as the disastrous attempt to hold it back in the preceding 18 months. In his second report, he listed what he described as five "illusions": 1) the idea that Germany could be reduced to a pastoral state, which he said would require the

48 Memorandum, attached to letter from Julius Klein to Bernice Miller, March 6th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
49 Hoover to Henry Stimson, March 21st, 1947, Hoover MSS. Stimson, although a member of Roosevelt's cabinet, had been opposed to the Morgenthau Plan at the beginning, Stimson, pp. 568-74.
removal of 25 million people; ii) the idea that one could eliminate industries with "war potential", for he claimed that all industries could be so described; the way to deal with this was through enforced disarmament, not the imposition of levels of industry; iii) the idea that Germany could support itself simply through light industrial activity; iv) the idea that Germany could ever support itself under any "levels of industry" plan; v) the idea that Europe could recover without Germany. His conclusion was simple: free German industry, subject to the over-all supervision of a control commission; stop the removal of industrial plants; insist on the unification of German industry under international control (including the Russian zone) and prevent the detachment of the Rhineland and Ruhr. These proposals, he said, would safeguard the interests of British and American taxpayers, and would bring about the economic recovery of the whole of Europe. If it proved impossible to secure four-power agreement on these lines for the whole of Germany, at least, they shou ld put the principles into operation in the bizone, which would "do infinitely more for Europe than American loans and charity". The report also argued that the failure of Russia and France to carry out "the agreement for economic unification of the four zones of military occupation and the additional burdens this imposed upon us in consequence certainly warrant our ignoring all agreements for "level of industry" transfer and destruction of non-arms plants". 51

51 Ibid.
For his work, Hoover received the customary congratulations from the Administration. Secretary of War Patterson thanked him for having assisted in getting the funds for administration and relief in occupied areas. The President had earlier thanked him for having "made a very decided contribution to the situation in Germany and Austria", which he said "will have a bearing on the conference in Moscow". Apart from his services in getting Congress to look more favourably on War Department appropriations, however, Hoover's main contribution had been to the cause of the pro-German elements in the Administration. General Clay, whose suggestion it had been for Hoover to be invited, was particularly pleased. To Hoover, he wrote, "If it were not for your report, I know that we would face disaster in the months ahead. As it is, I believe we shall pull through with an appreciable economic revival and without substantial loss to communist penetration and influence." More important, however, he added, "we can sense even now the improvement in American thinking and feeling toward the German problems which has come about from your report. In the long run, that may be even more valuable to us than the appropriation; although this latter need was so urgent from our viewpoint as to overshadow the former."

52 Patterson to Herbert Hoover, March 28th, 1947, Patterson MSS.
53 Harry S. Truman to Hoover, March 11th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
54 Lucius D. Clay to Hoover, April 7th, 1947, Hoover MSS.

Hoover also argued the case for the removal of restrictions on heavy industry in Germany at a luncheon with James Forestal, Millis, p. 251.
Whilst Hoover, as the champion for the Nationalists was helping to strengthen the pro-German elements in the Administration, John Foster Dulles was at least hoping to do the reverse. Suspicious especially of Clay and Robert D. Murphy, one of Dulles' main concerns before accepting the invitation to attend the Moscow Conference had been that the delegation should not be heavily pro-German. Dulles was reportedly the leader of the pro-French section of the delegation at Moscow. His concern was that the pro-German elements might drive France into Soviet hands, and might in any case lead to a strong Germany under Soviet control. Whereas Hoover then saw the revival of Germany as the key to European recovery, and incidentally to the restoration of Normalcy in the United States, Dulles preferred to approach the German problem from a European perspective, in line with the ideas he had developed in January. His hope was that he could persuade Secretary of State Marshall of the superiority of his approach to the problem. As the Conference proceeded, Dulles became convinced that he was having some effect. Dulles' evaluation of his own importance was lent substance by a Howard K. Smith report from Moscow that "Secretary Marshall does not give the impression of holding the initiative in American foreign policy, but rather to be following stronger forces inside his delegation, the chief influence of which is the Republican delegate Mr. John Foster Dulles." The report

55 Memorandum, "Re: Council of Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Moscow", February 26th, 1947, p. 6, Dulles MSS (Supplement). Murphy was Clay's political adviser in Germany.
57 Transcript, broadcast from Moscow by Howard K. Smith, March 16th, 1947, Dulles MSS.
also noted that "General Marshall's predominantly conservative advisers and delegates led by Mr. John Foster Dulles" reacted to the Truman Doctrine "with undisguised enthusiasm, and they consider it not a local isolated action, a temporary crisis largely staged for domestic consumption. They believe it is a radical, definitive change in all American foreign policy, and their strength appears to be such that what they believe to be the case will be the case..." 58

Irritated by the complacency of "our Berlin people", he felt, "overestimate their ability to prevent Soviet control a unified Germany" (sic), Dulles reported to his wife that he was trying to get the delegation to see things in a "European context", and he also reported, "I really think that Marshall is getting the idea". 59 Publicly also, he described the proposal by the United States for international control of the Ruhr and other major industrial areas as the most important development of the Conference, and reiterated that what was required was "a European solution in a Europe that includes Germany". 60

Dulles' hostility to the pro-German approach was intensified by the fact that the Soviet Union was now pressing the case for a unified and re-industrialized Germany. To Vandenberg he reported his conviction that the Russians

58Ibid.
59John Foster Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, March 22nd, 1947, copy in Janet Dulles MSS., John Foster Dulles to Janet Dulles, Thursday (probably April 11th, 1947), Janet Dulles MSS.
were "anxious for unity if it is on terms which they believe will give them a good chance to get control of Germany, which would for all practical purposes mean control of the continent. They want a highly centralized government located in Berlin which being within their zone they feel they can get to control by penetration. Also they replace (sic) reliance on nation-wide trade unions with headquarters at Berlin."  

The Russian insistence on reparations from current production, including consumer goods, clinched the argument. Dulles' proposal would mean that German industry worked for the benefit of liberal capitalism and democracy in western Europe; he was not prepared to see a settlement which operated economically to the benefit of the Soviet Union and against the interests both of western Europe and the United States. He noted to Vandenberg, in terms which were bound to appeal to him, that this new reparations proposal "would mean an indefinite postponement of the ability of the United States zone to pay for its food imports. In effect we would be paying reparations to Russia."  

Both publicly and privately Dulles described the Moscow Conference as an important stage in the development of a constructive European policy by the United States. The statement which he issued at the conclusion of the conference referred to American desires for Germany in terms of a political system in which men could organize "without surrendering their individuality or falling under the mastery of those...

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61 John Foster Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, March 22nd, 1947, copy in Janet Dulles MSS.
62 Ibid.
who masquerade as the state.\textsuperscript{63} At the same time, he commented on the need for increased European economic unity, and referred to the conference as a demonstration of the "increased unity between the British, French and ourselves". The United States, he said, would not compromise its principles, it was still looking for four-power unity, but at the same time he reassured that "whether or not there is a four-power treaty the United States will continue to concern itself with European conditions which have twice involved us in war".\textsuperscript{64} Privately, too, he celebrated the fact that American statements at Moscow, for the first time to his knowledge, reflected a desire for increased economic unification in Europe, even if they did not go as far as he would have liked.\textsuperscript{65}

Back in the United States after the Conference, Dulles delivered a radio report in which he outlined the key nature of the bizon which, by virtue of the inclusion of the Ruhr, "is the economic heart of Europe".\textsuperscript{66} In the bizon, the United States could "pump vitality into Western Europe" and demonstrate "the value of our free institutions". The United States would then not merely be putting in money, but "ideas and efficiency and technical ability" and would be able to show "that we still have the capacity to produce what the world wants".\textsuperscript{67} As always, Dulles emphasized the creative leadership he felt the United States could and should exert. The challenge he saw not as a military one,

\textsuperscript{63} New York Times, April 25th, 1947.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65} Dulles to Charles Edmundson, May 20th, 1947, Dulles M33.
\textsuperscript{66} New York Times, April 30th, 1947.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
for in his view the Soviet Union did not want war, because they were too weak, but counted more on subversion and trade union activity. They wanted control of Germany to help rebuild their own economy, he argued. But as against his perception of the emerging strategy of the Soviet Union, he reported, as in his Moscow statement, on the good relations with France and Britain, "because we have a similar spiritual and political background". In his view then, the European orientation of United States policy as revealed at Moscow was a big gain: "The positions we took will show the world that we have ideas and ideals and not merely dollars". In effect Moscow had, to Dulles, confirmed the insidious nature of Soviet purposes in Germany and begun to make the western bloc a reality; it was time to put into execution the policy he had proposed. On the same day that Dulles delivered his report, Senator Vandenberg, commenting on the report by Secretary of State Marshall, was more explicit: "We must still strive for a united program. But if it is beyond reasonable reach, we cannot wait for too long for a peace program which at least unites those who can agree."  

The failure of the Moscow Conference had made a divided Europe almost inevitable. It would be an exaggeration to attribute this to the influence of Republican leaders and the conservative 80th Congress, but they were important parts of the domestic half of the equation. Certainly, what amounted to the change of alliances by 1947 was from all respects wel-

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68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. Henry Wallace said on May 2nd, 1947, that Dulles' and Vandenberg's comments would be interpreted in Europe as steps toward the creation of an anti-Soviet bloc; Ibid., May 3rd, 1947.
comed by Republican leaders and Congressional rank and file: it satisfied requirements both of ideology and economy to restore Germany as a major bulwark of liberal capitalism in Europe. It is doubtful whether any major figures in the Administration had ever disagreed with the revival of German economic strength as a broad aim, but it had always been assumed that such a satisfactory settlement could arrive by a process of four power agreement. By 1947 this was coming to seem unlikely, although the sensitivities of European allies required that the possibility should not be excluded. Dulles had been aware of this in his formulations throughout the early months of 1947, but Herbert Hoover, whose concerns stemmed from fears about the burden on the United States rather than from a desire to reconstruct Europe, had less time for such niceties. On May 26th, in a public letter to John Taber, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, ostensibly designed to get Taber's support for foreign appropriations, Hoover raised the question of a separate peace with Germany: "The time has come when we should issue a last call to Russia and France to comply with the Potsdam agreement. If they do not at once respond, we and the British should immediately take the sets to set up the economy of the bizonal areas so as to restore their individual production and exports." If the next Foreign Ministers' Meeting proved unsatisfactory, Hoover suggested they should consider a separate peace with a new German government. Russian ob-

70This was particularly so with France, with its strong Comunist Party and its lingering hostility to German revival; much to the horror of some Republicans, this factor required the Marshall Plan not to exclude the Soviet Union.
struction he attributed to a belief that the United States "can be bled white by relief measures. We should wait no longer. Russia will not make war about it". France, said Hoover, should be asked to integrate its zone into the bizonal area; in view of the sacrifices the United States was making for France, the American people had "a right to expect French cooperation". Clearly, however, Hoover was not particularly worried about upsetting France, for the most vital of "the frontiers of Western civilization" were Germany and Japan.

Hoover's letter was said to have struck a responsive chord in Congress and the Administration, and also in the press. Frank McNaughton commented: "Hoover is not regarded by anyone as a political hack or a has-been. When he gets in this field of operation, he is taken by Congress as solid. Joe Martin, Taber, Al Engel of the Appropriations Committee, and dozens of others have said that Hoover is right." He also commented that Vandenberg was "sick of trying to get the Russians to agree to a reasonable and just program for Germany". The logic of Hoover's demand could not be faulted, and it was naturally especially appealing to the large number of Congressional Republicans who shared his assumptions about the effects of foreign expenditure on the American economy and ultimately the

72 Ibid., May 28th, 1947; Herbert Hoover to O'Laughlin, June 5th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.  
73 McNaughton to David Hulburt, May 30th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.
American way of life. At a time when plans were being formulated by the Administration for a large scale programme of aid to bring about European reconstruction, Hoover's influence in Congress could not be ignored. In any new long range programme, Hoover and his supporters could be expected to argue not only for strict economy, but also to look for positive proposals to revive Germany.

John Foster Dulles on the other hand, who like Hoover felt that he had had some influence in the development of policy in 1947, could be expected to look not only for economic use of American resources, but in particular for that vision and creative leadership which he had consistently maintained to be America's role in the world. Although taking comfort from the fact that the perceived shift in American policy "to the program of economic aid based on increasing economic unity in Europe, which I discussed at great length with Secretary Marshall at Moscow" was at least partially the result of his efforts, his over-all confidence in the Administration was low. By July he had come to have doubts as to whether American policy was properly coordinated, and felt that changes would be necessary "so that they will have enough chance of success and be sufficiently within our means so that the American people will support them." He was also concerned, as he confided to Vandenberg, about the inattention to French fears about the revival

74 Dulles to Paul Hutchinson, June 24th, 1947, Dulles MSS.
75 Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, July 21st, 1947, Dulles MSS.
of Germany, which he felt would prevent European unity and throw France into the hands of Russia. Dulles' position on Europe then was clear by the middle of 1947. Firstly, he had come to see Europe as of vital importance to the United States, a position which certainly he had not made explicit before. Secondly, he had come to place the whole emphasis of American policy on the creation of a united Western Europe, both as a means of re-integrating Germany without causing disunity, but also as a logical development of his fairly long standing desire to expand the political economy of the United States, i.e., liberal capitalism and federalism, outside the western hemisphere. Thirdly, he was still concerned about over-commitment by the United States, both militarily and economically. This concern was almost certainly intensified by his acute realization that a foreign policy which lost political support in the United States would fail, a lesson which he had drawn from Woodrow Wilson's experience a generation before, and one which can only have been reinforced by his closeness to Dewey's long campaign for the Presidency. The strength of Dulles' position was the way in which, perhaps more successfully than Vandenberg even, he managed to combine vision and idealism with realism, and national unity with partisan advantage. It was this perhaps which made him an unpopular figure with the Administration, State Department officials,

76 Ibid. This was the verdict of conservative Joe Pew, bitter opponent first of Willkie, then of Vandenberg, who was a major financial supporter of the Republican Party in the 1940's and was to support Dewey in 1948. Diary, September 24th, 1948, Smith MSS. For evidence of Dulles' continuing caution about military intervention see his letter on a State Dept. proposal in August, 1947, to get a U.N. mandate in Greece, which he helped to squash, John Foster Dulles to Vandenberg, August 28th, 1947, Vandenberg MSS.
foreign, especially British diplomats, and certain elements of the American press.

**European Relief and Reconstruction**

What made both Hoover and Dulles important figures in the development of American foreign policy in 1947 was the juxtaposition of a perceived external crisis and an economy-minded Republican Congress. By 1947, the foreign policy of the United States had demonstrably failed, in terms both of the desire to preserve Big Power unity, and of the desire to bring about a multilateral peace. The bad winter in Europe, the British economic crisis and the failure of the Moscow Conference made re-evaluation a necessity, whilst the domestic political situation inevitably impinged on such a re-evaluation. The manner in which the Greek-Turkish aid had been presented to Congress had not improved Executive-Legislative relations. To some Republicans it suggested that the dangers had been exaggerated in order to manipulate Congress, whilst the rumours of a large scale programme of aid for European reconstruction were also apt to be seen as another device to frustrate the Republican Congress' desire to get the domestic economy on a peacetime footing.78

The difficulties which a programme of European reconstruction might meet in Congress were illustrated by the bill for $350,000,000 relief in war-torn areas, (Poland, Austria, Hungary, Greece, China and Italy) which was designed to take

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over from the much criticized U.N.N.R.A. in 1947. Writing
in the Republican in April, Karl Mundt of South Dakota de-
scribed the proposed programme as "a new formula for foreign
relief - largely the program of Herbert Hoover, former Re-
publican President. Our foreign relief will henceforth be
supervised by American citizens rather than foreign Communist
leaders. It will be used to extend relief to human suffer-
ing". Any further assistance above the needs of prevention
of starvation, would, avowed Mundt, go only "to areas where
the precepts of freedom are permitted to function". Mundt's
description of Hoover's influence was perhaps exaggerated.
In February Hoover had testified before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, in which he had outlined a stringent set
of conditions and a formidable programme of economy. Among
his proposals had been the confinement of relief to food,
medicine, seeds, fertilizers and perhaps some clothing;
that relief to be purely in the form of credits for Ameri-
can goods, not cash; that relief levels be not above the
level in Germany; that the relief be put on a monthly basis,
terminable at any time, and certainly in 1947; that no re-
lied be given to any country paying reparations; that the
cost be repaid to the United States or alternatively repaid
to a United Nations fund for future relief. "Charitable
relief," said Hoover, "is today a double tax upon most of
our people. It is not only a direct burden upon the tax-
payer, but these unremunerative and unbalanced exports keep

79 Republican (April, 1947), reprinted in Congressional
Record, 93, Appendix, p. 2191.
up prices and the cost of living". There was, he had said, with taxes taking 35% of the national income a limit on what the United States could do, despite the belief of people abroad that "our possibilities of giving are unlimited". The bill, as reported out of the Foreign Affairs Committee, failed to satisfy Hoover's friends in the House, including two influential members of the Committee, Vorys and Christian Herter. Many of Hoover's recommendations were there, but on April 22nd, Christian Herter put down a list of amendments to the bill, including a proposal to name the countries specifically involved, to avoid giving the President a blank cheque; a requirement for 90% of purchases to be made in the United States, and under United States purchasing agencies; a review of the authorization after the harvests; provision for money from goods to be used for further relief or at the discretion of the United States; the establishment of a Relief Administration separate from the State Department; the postponement of all reparations, to avoid subsidizing the U.S.S.R.

The intention of Herter and others to amend the bill revealed the powerlessness of Charles Eaton and the small group of House Internationalists. Eaton in particular attempted to make the debate into a vote of confidence both of the bipartisan foreign policy and of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The bill was duly amended in ways to make it

81 *Congressional Record*, 93, April 22nd, 1947, pp. 3822, 3824-5.
more acceptable to Hoover's suggestions, including provisions for no relief to countries paying reparations, which effectively excluded Hungary from relief, as well as for no more than 10% of the relief to be purchased outside the United States, and for the establishment of a separate administration under the President. The most important amendment, however, concerned the amount, which the House finally voted, 225-165, to cut to 200,000,000 dollars, with only 36 Republicans opposing the cut. This vote, which was supported by majority leader Halleck, and other influential Republicans such as Vorys, Dirksen, Mundt, Knutson and Taber marked a repudiation for the leadership of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The amended bill passed 373-66, with 45 Republicans opposed, the majority from the Midwest.

In the Senate Hoover's efforts to get the bill amended fell on stonier ground. To Senator Vandenberg he sent a detailed memorandum which argued that the United States must "serve notice that large scale charity is at an end and that repayment in some form must be undertaken". In the memorandum he called for a prohibition of relief on any country whose army was above "police needs", prohibition to countries paying reparations, and a specific designation of the countries to be helped: "As the bill stands it is a blank check to employ anyone anywhere and to relieve any country anywhere -- among 50 nations which would include

83 Ibid., April 29th, 1947, pp. 4243-44, 4239.
85 Ibid.
86 Memorandum, "Status of the Proposed Amendments to the Authorization Bill for $380,000,000 Relief", April 21st, 1947, copy in Smith MSS.
even Rumania, Yugoslavia and any other Communist dominated nation". In the event, however, Vandenberg piloted the bill through the Senate in two days. Only 12 Republicans and seven Democrats could be mustered to vote for the cut, approved by the House, to $200,000,000 dollars, and the bill passed the Senate without a roll call. 88

Most of the House amendments were lost in Conference, including the over-all figure, and John Vorys refused to sign the Conference report. 89 Debate on the Conference report once more revealed the strength of economy sentiment in the House, and the hostility to the bipartisan majority on the Foreign Affairs Committee. One hundred and forty six Republicans, including majority leader Halleck and appropriations chairman, Taber, voted, unsuccessfully, to recommit the bill to Conference. 90

The 1947 relief bill then, revealed the extent of dissatisfaction with continued foreign expenditure; a comparatively minor measure, justified largely on humanitarian grounds, it had, despite the ease with which it went through the Senate, proved surprisingly controversial. Even Vandenberg, in defending the bill, out of the necessity to "present a united front", revealed some dissatisfaction with the way in which he was continually being expected to defend Adminis-

87 Ibid. Congressional Record, 93, May 14th, 1947, p. 5245; Senator Wherry did not even vote for a cut, though he pointed out that the Appropriations Committees still had to ascertain that the amount was justified; ibid., p. 5243.
tration policies without being put in the full picture. 91
Out of the debates over foreign expenditure one clear argument was emerging: there must be an end to crisis measures and the development of a coherent programme, based on an evaluation both of external needs and domestic capabilities. Those Republicans faced with the job of having to argue the Administration's case before unenthusiastic colleagues were convinced that this was necessary; repeatedly since the last year of the war, measures had been presented to Congress piecemeal, often argued as necessary to make previous measures work. 92

The most clear call for an over-all study of American policy came from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, close to Vandenberg, who was concerned both about the direction of Republican leadership as well as about the lack of coherent Administration leadership. The United States, he said, had not, two years after the war, achieved any of the aims outlined in the peace. Its failure he attributed to: 1) lack of assurances received on U. S. equipment and supplies from its allies during the war whilst they were dependent; ii) an over-estimation of Japanese strength, leading to unnecessary concessions at Yalta; iii) lack of preparation for the end of war, leading to iv) a dwindling of military strength. 93 What was now needed, he argued, was "a consistent, decisive, and thoroughgoing over-all plan for foreign

92 Both Charles Eaton and Vandenberg agreed on the need for an over-all study of American resources. Congressional Record, 93, April 23rd, 1947, p. 3862; ibid., May 14th, 1947, p. 5243.
93 Ibid., p. 5234.
policy which will secure military, political and economic conditions in the world which will make peace and prosperity possible; and which, by making foreign peoples self-supporting, will obtain for us the markets and raw materials we need. In other words, Mr. President, what is wanted is a foreign aid program which will also aid the American people."  

Such a policy required, he said, 1) a more effective American foreign service; though he did not share the view that it was "largely composed of millionaire graduates of Ivy League Colleges who loaf in glittering world capitals where, having entirely forgotten America, they adopt reactionary and supercilious views in order to toady to the European nobility"; ii) American policy must be consistent: "We must not blow hot and cold. We must not be caught by surprise"; iii) the United States must export democracy, it must not become imperialist; iii) it must remain strong, economically, militarily and morally.  

Lodge's speech was important in particular because he was probably as close to Vandenberg as any other Senator, and because he represented a group of Republicans whose support was essential to the Administration. Concerned about the direction in which both the Administration and his own party were headed, Lodge's speech, with its emphasis on self-interest and a "Strong America", represented an updating of the Republican tradition by the grandson of one of its best known defenders. Lodge had no time for the pennypinching, and what he regarded as short-
sighted parsimony of many Congressional leaders: "Whether . . . from the standpoint of integrating a new Europe, or from the standpoint of restoring peace and prosperity, we may as well realize that it will in all probability be cheaper to appropriate substantial sums to be spent in accordance with a sound plan than to appropriate a smaller sum on a shotgun basis. In one case you have a good chance of getting your bacon back; in the other you face the sure prospect of total loss".  

By May, 1947, the concept of an over-all programme, based on an evaluation of American capabilities, with clearly defined objectives, promising an end to American handouts, was becoming a political necessity for Republican support. Such a programme offered Republican leaders who wished to cooperate with the Administration the chance of a distinctive Republican contribution to policy. In place of the commonly accepted image of New Deal Waste, inefficiency, and failure to stand up for American interests (hence Lodge's reference to State Department reform), Republicans could cater to their own self-image of dynamism, efficiency, and above all concern for and belief in the American system.  

Arthur Krock  

Ibid., p. 5235.  

The concept of European unity, which Dulles sought to advance as a Republican idea, was a perfect fusion of "economy", "mission" and "vision". In so far as it sought to extend political-economic principles that were deemed to have been successful on the American continent, it was in line with tradition; the extension of the political-economy of "freedom" had been an aim, albeit not a vital one, of American diplomacy since the Revolution. John Vorys was convinced that "while . . . it is important for Americans to study the details of European history, it is far more important for Europeans to be studying American history at this time, in order to find out how a continent of people of all kinds of races functions as the United States of America." Vorys to Joseph C. Canady, March 22nd, 1947, Vorys MSS.
reported in May that Republican leaders were impressed by an analysis of a well-known former Representative, proposing a supervisory council, headed by a cabinet level appointee, to supervise all foreign relief and aid, "in order that taxpayers of the United States may be relieved as soon as possible and that the grant-in-aid countries can in due course seek future assistance through International Bank Loans." Such a scheme, which began with an explicit recognition that there was a limit to American capabilities, rather than emphasis on American responsibilities, was a political necessity. It would not necessarily guarantee Republican unity in support of Administration policy, for Republicans would still disagree as to how much the United States could and should afford for international reconstruction, but such an approach would be the best way to get support in Congress.

On June 5th, Secretary Marshall delivered his speech at Harvard, calling on European nations to get together and ascertain their total needs from the United States. Marshall's proposal, which was by June not unexpected, except perhaps in its new approach, came at a time when relations between the Executive and Congress were poor. The situation was not improved by a wrangle between Taft and the President over a remark by Taft attributing high prices to the Administration's foreign aid programme. The dispute, which was regarded as a preliminary "bout" to 1948, put Vandenberg in a difficult position, and boded ill for Republican

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cooperation over European reconstruction. The President's veto of the Republican bill to cut taxes, and his attempt, which Congress over-ruled, to veto the Taft-Hartley Act, also contributed to a political climate that was not conducive to cooperation. Herbert Hoover, close to the House leadership, resentful of Vandenberg, and convinced that but for his own efforts Congress would not have passed the relief bill, predicted that many Republicans would now cease to cooperate and that it would be revealed that "the publicity crumb-eaters cannot deliver the Republicans".

In the House of Representatives, one of the most consistent opponents of all foreign policy legislation, Hoffman of Michigan, took some delight in the situation. There were now signs, he said, that people were beginning to realize that Mr. Truman's foreign policy was politically motivated, and that he was aiming at the 1948 election. Perhaps, he added, the call by many "Internationally minded 'me too' Republicans" for an inventory of national resources, was a sign of their realization that "there is a bottom to the barrel".

Vandenberg's endorsement of the Marshall proposal, which was made before the Senate Republican Policy Committee in mid-June, undoubtedly proved a great irritation to many Republicans. In his endorsement, Vandenberg made two conditions: 1) the programme must be based on an inventory of

99 O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, June 7th, 1947, O'Loughlin MSS.
100 Herbert Hoover to O'Loughlin, June 23rd, 1947, O'Loughlin MSS.
101 Congressional Record, 93, June 17th, 1947, p. 7146.
resources; ii) a bipartisan advisory council must be created to coordinaee the programme and advise both President and Congress. Guided by "intelligent self-interest", as he described it, he expressed satisfaction with the realization that the problem must be faced on an over-all instead of a crisis basis, and he saw the inventory of resources as being necessary in the same "intelligent self-interest". Harking back to a "Strong America", his statement concluded, "This comes first because if America ever sags, the world's hopes sag with her". The strongest reaction, as one might expect, came from the Chicago Tribune, which lambasted Vandenberg as a New Deal stooge: "By his definition, whatever he was for in foreign affairs was bipartisan altho he never knew what he was for until the New Deal told him what it was for". Scarcely less upset was Herbert Hoover. On June 15th, in a public letter addressed to Senator Styles Bridges, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, he outlined his proposals for the American contribution to world reconstruction in far different terms. Characteristically, his whole emphasis was on the limitations imposed by the situation in the United States: "...the greatest danger to all civilization is for us to impair our economy by drains which cripple our own productivity. Unless this one remaining Gibraltar of economic strength is maintained, chaos will be inevitable

103 Chicago Tribune, June 16th, 1947.
over the whole world".  

Like Vandenberg he accepted the premises of a "Strong America", but his deductive processes were different. Calling for the coordination of all government agencies involved in foreign economic relations was unexceptionable, but his assertion that the United States must prevent excessive exports, on the grounds that they were inflationary, revealed his continuing opposition to one of the basic tenets of economic multilateralism. In his other proposals, the possible reduction of consumption at home to prevent starvation abroad, aperiodic assessment of the safety margin in hand for the export of goods and services, the stockpiling of strategic materials from abroad, and a blunt insistence that all recipients cooperate with the United States to reduce the burden on it, Hoover revealed that his prime concern was the domestic economy. As firmly as ever then, Hoover was looking towards a restoration of the free economy of pre-New Deal days, which he saw as being prevented by incessant government expenditure both at home and overseas. In his proposal that the United States concentrate its resources "in the areas in which Western civilization can be preserved", was a deep seated criticism of the whole approach of the Marshall Plan. The Plan left the initiative to foreign nations to get together; it also included the Soviet Union, which had, said Hoover, cost the United States billions in the past two years because of its obstruction: "...we can apparently expect little cooperation from that quarter". Hoover's whole approach

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\textsuperscript{104}New York Times, June 16th, 1947.  
\textsuperscript{105}Ibid.
was more narrowly nationalistic: he clearly believed that the United States should make up its mind what it could and should do on the basis of its own self-interests, and then present this to other nations on a take it or leave it basis. This was an approach which he continued to reveal in his advocacy of restoration of the German economy.

Hoover's objections to the whole proposal apparently stemmed from three factors: i) his continuing belief in the fundamental importance of economy; ii) the fact that he had not been consulted by the Administration, whilst Vandenberg clearly had; iii) the invitation to the Soviet Union and its satellites. On the last point, he wondered what had become of the Truman Doctrine. Did the Administration believe that Russia would cooperate economically but not politically and did the Administration really believe that "any Republican Congress" would give aid to Russia or the satellites? At the same time, he was clearly irritated that he, and his friend Bernard Baruch, had not been consulted: "...If they want Republican cooperation (and many Democrats) why don't they consult somebody," he enquired of Cal O'Laughlin. Convinced that he had the most relevant experience of Europeans and problems of relief, Hoover was inclined to regard the Administration as amateurs who would learn the hard way:

"Marshall will get a demand for three times what the American people can, or will, give. Reducing such demands will be a painful moment for him. I have gone through such affairs before."

106 Herbert Hoover to O'Laughlin, June 16th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.
"The General has never dealt with politicians of Europe who under the present desperate circumstance of their countries are even more desperately selfish than ever before. He apparently believes that they move from the same altruism which animates this more comfortable land of our own. Already he has a taste of what they can do to him in their insistence on bringing into the European set-up Russia -- all of which is the negation of the Truman Doctrine. It can result in good if the Russians have repented. It can also result in a new era of appeasement."

Hoover's views were important precisely because of his reputation among Republicans in Congress. Cal O'Laughlin indicated to him that his reservations were shared by many Republicans, who were, claimed O'Laughlin, no longer prepared to follow Vandenberg, who was "well inside the Marshall-Truman camp". The Truman vetoes, and the apparent back-tracking from the Truman Doctrine would, claimed O'Laughlin, undoubtedly lead to difficulties in Congress. Hoover's initiatives in foreign policy, the letter to Bridges and the call for a separate peace with Germany in the face of continued Russian obstruction, were deemed by Hoover and his friends to have upset both Marshall and Vandenberg. O'Laughlin predicted that although by this Hoover had excluded himself from the proposed bipartisan advisory council, the Administration would try to appoint people close to Hoover to make it difficult for him to oppose. In July, O'Laughlin reported that Hoover was in frequent touch with members of the Foreign Relations Committee, a result, he claimed, of

107 Herbert Hoover to O'Laughlin, June 23rd, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.  
108 O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, June 21st, 1947; O'Laughlin to Hoover, June 27th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.  
109 O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, June 21st, 1947; Herbert Hoover to O'Laughlin, June 23rd, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.
Vandenberg's loss of influence, stemming from the fact that he alone was being kept informed by Marshall. 110 Some of the evidence for Hoover's rising influence comes from sources, such as Cal O'Laughlin, who were not always totally objective in their evaluations of the situation. Nevertheless there is other evidence of Hoover's importance. John Vorys, whose influence in the House was in the ascendant, wrote in June regarding the relief bill, "...I am relying heavily on the advice of former President Herbert Hoover, who is in my opinion one of the best informed persons on relief needs in the United States". 111 Further evidence is furnished by Hoover's success, with the aid of his friend Dr. Julius Klein, in persuading House Republicans to concentrate all matters involving foreign relief in a special committee. 112 The committee duly created, the Committee on Foreign Aid, chaired by a friend of Hoover, Christian Herter, was given the brief of looking at the over-all problem and of co-ordinating the work of various committees involved, both domestically and externally. The fact that this committee was created at the insistence of Joseph Martin; against the wishes of Charles Eaton, chairman of Foreign Affairs, led to reports that the Committee would be an obstructionist influence. 113 To Taft, Hoover expressed his delight at the acceptance of his recommendation. 114

110 O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, July 12th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.
111 Vorys to M. E. Dudley, June 2nd, 1947, Vorys MSS.
112 Julius Klein to Hoover, June 2nd, 1947; Julius Klein to Hoover, July 2nd, 1947, Hoover MSS.
114 Hoover to Robert A. Taft, July 16th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
Herter Committee clearly was not solely the work of Hoover; but it was created by a coalition of people who had great respect for Hoover's views and broadly respected his concerns about the continued impact of overseas expenditure on the domestic economy.

Hoover also received encouragement from Senator Taft. Taft wrote in July congratulating him on his analysis of the Marshall Plan, whilst criticising both the Administration, and also Vandenberg, for the latter's suggestion of a special commission to study the relationship between aid and the domestic economy: "Such a commission has now been appointed, but Harriman is its chairman, and the staff will presumably be selected by the Administration. While there are a number of good men on this Committee, I don't know how far they will stand up for their convictions. Neither do I like the implication that if we are capable of exporting more goods we should, therefore, do so regardless of the wisdom, either from our standpoint or that of the countries of Europe". Taft was prepared to support a lending programme to make available food stuffs, machinery and supplies, "to help them work harder". He was, however, not happy about the probable outcome of the Paris Conference: "I am afraid that European nations will agree on some global plan and global figure which Marshall may accept, and then we will be in the wrong if we try to cut it down to a reasonable plan". Like Taft, Hoover clearly did not see the revival of trade

\[115\text{Robert A. Taft to Hoover, July 11th, 1947, Hoover MSS.}\]
\[116\text{Tbid.}\]
with Europe as being in any way vital to the United States. The limited view of American objectives and capabilities which both had always held had not fundamentally changed by 1947. Hoover then, expressed his agreement with Taft's fears, "it looks like committing the United States without authority of Congress - until afterwards. Of course all of us want to do what we can, but we do not want to exhaust this country." 117

It is clear then, that initial Republican reaction to the Marshall Plan was less than enthusiastic. Thomas Dewey's failure to speak out, despite an excellent opportunity to do so when General Marshall addressed the Governor's Conference in mid-July, was noted by Arthur Krock. 118 Since Dewey was the favourite to get the Republican nomination, and since the pundits still made the Republicans overwhelming favourites to win in 1948, Dewey's failure to take a lead was bound to excite comment. 119 In the summer of 1947, he did send his close adviser to Europe to study conditions, presumably in order to prepare for the campaign. 120 Hoover's associate, Hugh Gibson, found Dewey annoyed by the current gibe that he was trying to get into the White House "in sneakers" without taking a stand on any of the issues. He also claimed that Dewey was both "cadging for ideas about foreign policy" whilst also claiming that the Administration

117 Hoover to Robert A. Taft, July 16th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
119 Leo Egan article, ibid., July 20th, 1947; Alsop to Martin Sommers, June 9th, 1947, Alsop MSS., O'Laughlin to Hoover, July 28th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.
had recognized its bankruptcy and called on Dulles for guidance. On August, 28th, Dewey did make a national speech, in which he made the not infrequent claim of having created bipartisanship in 1944, and recommended universal military training to his audience of American Legionnaires. Expressing his commitment to bipartisanship, he was critical in a suitably partisan way of its operation, "because in many important matters there has been virtually no consultation and bipartisanship has been ignored. On many occasions the country has been confronted with fully elaborated programs which it had no choice but to accept or present to the world a picture of a divided nation." But whilst affirming the necessity for Congress to have a full share in shaping policy, Dewey still said nothing to indicate his position on the question looming up of large scale aid for European reconstruction. A Fortune poll, however, showed him clearly ahead of all his Republican contenders by the summer of 1947. Dewey's caution was a sure barometer of feeling among organization Republicans, in and outside Congress, whom he could not afford to alienate.

The failure of the U.S.S.R. to accept the French-British invitation to participate in the Paris Conference probably saved the Marshall Plan in the long run, but in the last few weeks of the first session of the 80th Congress, there were few signs for optimism. The appointment of

121 Hugh Gibson to Hoover, August 25th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
123 Ibid.
124 Fortune, September, 1947, pp. 5-6, 10.
Herbert Hoover, at the instigation of Speaker Martin, to the Committee to study the reorganization of the Executive Branch was a sign of his continued influence. Hoover was continuing, in cooperation with Bernard Baruch, to advance the idea that instead of a Marshall Plan, there should be an international bank loan to Europe, which would thereby reduce the strain on the United States. The Administration were claiming to be worried about a new kind of "isolationism" (economic) the latest manifestation of which they saw as the way in which John Taber had held up Greek-Turkish appropriations for ten weeks without any reproach from Republican leaders. Taber had in fact become convinced as a result of his investigations that the Greek-Turkish programme was "wholly dominated by a lot of New Deal crackpots such as Paul Porter, David Miles, Sam Rosenman, and Felix Frankfurter". Reportedly, he felt that Dwight Griswold, the Nebraskan Republican (identified with Stassen) had no idea of what was going on. The Administration finally got round this obstacle by getting Secretary Marshall and Under-secretary Lovett together with House leaders, and warning the latter that if America pulled out of Europe, Italy and France would probably fall. Not surprisingly, as the session drew to its close, Vandenberg felt distressed

125 O'Laughlin to Brigadier General Sarnoff, July 12th, 1947; O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, July 19th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS. 
127 Julius Klein to Hoover, July 2nd, 1947, Hoover MSS. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Report, July 18th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.
at the way in which the Marshall Plan had been presented to the American people; not enough emphasis had been put on the fact that it was "businesslike" and "hard-headed", he confided.\footnote{Alscop to Martin Sommers, July 29th, 1948, Alsop MSS.}

Vandenberg, it is clear, had by 1947 virtually come to accept the "one world" assumption of the indivisibility of liberty; certainly he now regarded what happened in the outside world as being considerably more important to the United States than did either Hoover or Taft. Aware as always of the dangers of over-commitment, by July, 1947, he was convinced of the importance of making the American people understand "that America cannot indefinitely prosper in a broken world and that we have a real stake in external rehabilitation."\footnote{Vandenberg to Floyd McGriff, July 1st, 1947, Vandenberg MSS.} In a lengthy letter to Colonel Alton T. Roberts of the American Legion in August, Vandenberg sketched out his over-all conception of American policy: the key question was whether the "two worlds" could live in peace; he hoped so, but at the same time, the U. S. must make itself strong, through diplomatic and military means, through aid, and through coalition building via regional and other pacts, in case war came.\footnote{Vandenberg to Colonel Alton T. Roberts, August 12th, 1947, Vandenberg MSS.} On the fundamental question of balancing resources against interests, which had been a persistent post-war struggle in his own mind, he argued:

"We have poured 20 billions into the Old World since the war ended and there is little or nothing, in the way of peace and security or recuperation, to show for it. That can not go
on any longer. We are not rich enough to W.P.A. the earth. Nor is it our job. We have to think about ourselves because a sagging economy in America will be the end of hope for the whole world. But when we think about ourselves, if we have any sense, we shall also realize that America herself cannot long survive if all the rest of the world sags. Furthermore, there is only one way in which we could maintain our system in a generally Communistically controlled world, and that one way would be to live under such utterly rigid disciplines ourselves that our freedoms would become a paraphrase. So we have a stake in helping Britain and France and China and Greece and Turkey and Italy, etc. Intelligent self-interest is involved in that stake. That's where the 'Marshall Plan' comes in, if I understand it correctly.

WE PROPOSE TO HELP THOSE WHO HELP THEMSELVES AND WHO ARE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE MAKING PRACTICAL PLANS TO THIS END. Help to any others would be futile. And even this help must be within the limits of our own production available for export."133

Vandenberg was certainly not alone in Congress, for example, in the House of Representatives, such influential figures as Vorys and Dirksen, though friendly to Hoover, were prepared to accept the Vandenberg interpretation, provided they were sure that that was what the Marshall Plan was all about.134 The manner of the Marshall Plan's presentation, and especially the invitation to the Soviet Union, made it difficult for Republicans to accept the Vandenberg interpretation. Many Republicans wanted a showdown with Russia; if they were to support large scale appropriations in an election year, they wanted to be certain that there were no

133Ibid.
134John Vorys, for example, committed to anti-communist spending, would not support the Marshall Plan unless the revival of Germany was part of it; Vorys to H. B. Burchinal, July 27th, 1947; Vorys to Dr. Eugene Van Cleef, July 19th, 1947; Vorys to John J. Raskob, July 14th, 1947, Vorys MSS.
flirtations with Henry Wallace. The walk-out of the Russians at Paris, and Secretary Marshall's assurance to the Foreign Relations Committee that if a participant nation succumbed to communism it would get no further aid largely helped to ease the fear of further "appeasement", however.¹³⁵

As Congress recessed for the summer in 1947 then, the outlook for the commitment of the United States to long-term, large-scale reconstruction of Europe was uncertain; in view of the 1946 elections, perhaps it was incredible that it should even be the subject of serious consideration less than a year later. The first session of the 80th Congress had revealed that American foreign policy, if it were to be successfully implemented, would have to make continuing concessions to conservative sensibilities both as regards outright hostility to the Soviet Union, and adequate safeguards for American domestic economic interests. Joseph Alsop commented that "the record of the Congress clearly raises... a very serious issue as to the nature of American conservatism. Is it to be back to Harding, or is it to be forward to Stassen - or Dewey, or Lodge, or whomever you please?... The Congress has on the whole, shown strong back to Harding inclinations. Cabot is exercised about this, as are several of the younger Republicans."¹³⁶ Taft, launching his candidacy for the Presidential nomination at Columbus, revealed the difficulties that

¹³⁶ Alsop to Martin Sommers, July 29th, 1947, Alsop MSS. See also Diary, August 19th, 1947, Smith MSS.
still lay in the way both of Republican unity and of the
Marshall Plan in the run up to the election. Blaming con-
ditions in the world on Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, and
on the Morgenthau Plan, which he said had wrecked the economy
of Europe, Taft was also extremely critical of Truman for
lack of real cooperation with Congress. Taft accepted
that Congress should not "give foreign countries a picture
of a divided America" and should not interfere in foreign
policy "unless that policy involves us in the danger of an
unnecessary war, or proposes to drain the resources of our
taxpayers and our productive labor to an unreasonable de-
gree". At the same time, however, he expressed the opinion
that, in view of domestic inflation especially, American
loans in future should be confined to providing the actual
goods necessary to enable recipients to restore their own
productive ability. "Certainly, we must move very cautiously
and be sure that additional loans really furnish incentive
to the foreign peoples involved to work harder to support
themselves, and are not too burdensome on our own tax-
payers." Privately, to Hoover, Taft indicated his doubts
about the whole approach to aiding Europe. "Like you, I am
afraid that the manner in which the Marshall Plan was pre-
sented invites the foreign nations to gang up and make un-
reasonable demands. Instead of making them come to us and
imposing conditions on our assistance, we always seem to
be begging them to let us help them as if it were to our
financial or economic advantage to do so. As a matter of
fact, the only advantage to us is a long-range desire to

see peace and prosperity in the world."\textsuperscript{139}

The strength of Republican conservatism in Congress undoubtedly made Vandenberg, Dulles and Hoover more important to the Administration than they would otherwise have been. Each, in varying degrees, had reservations and fears about the course on which the United States was embarked, and each expected the Administration to make concessions to their viewpoint. All required a continued tough attitude to the Soviet Union. Dulles looked for increased emphasis on a united European policy. Hoover was concerned about Germany: in August, he publicly stated that if the Soviet Union failed to cooperate, the United States should insist as a condition of American aid, that France and Britain join in setting up a government in the three western zones of Germany, thereby reducing United States occupation costs.\textsuperscript{140} Most satisfied was Vandenberg, who was beginning to develop a much closer relationship with Secretary Marshall, and who was gratified that at long last the Administration had taken up his call for a western hemisphere pact, duly negotiated at Rio in August. Dulles was less happy, especially because of his fear that the Administration lacked the ability to co-ordinate policy over-all, and would imperil domestic support. Hoover, despite the issuance of JCS 1779, paving the way for re-industrialization of Germany, was not surprisingly the least satisfied. Not accepting the vital importance which both Vandenberg and Dulles had apparently

\textsuperscript{139} Robert A. Taft to Hoover, August 13th, 1947, Hoover MSS. 
\textsuperscript{140} New York Times, August 10th, 1947.
by 1947 come to place on affairs in Europe, Hoover's fundamental concern remained with what he regarded as the unending and ultimately ruinous strain which the proposed European policy would impose on the United States. To his loyal friend, Cal O'Laughlin, he wrote, "General Marshall has succeeded for the moment in complete division of the two worlds. But whether the present definite boundaries along the Iron Curtain and Manchuria will remain is speculative - for nations will remain within their present allotted places only so long as they can work the two now competitive Santa Clauses."¹⁴¹ His conviction that Europeans and Asians were past praying for, and that Americans were innocents abroad, remained firm; his unparalleled experience enabled him in the eyes of many Republicans to speak with final authority on this subject.¹⁴²

Interim Aid

In the summer of 1947, large numbers of Congressmen hurried to Europe to investigate conditions there for themselves. Inevitably reactions to what they saw differed. Senator Smith of New Jersey was an easy convert to the arguments of the British officials, Ambassador Douglas and Walter Lippmann that the Marshall Plan offered the sole alternative to chaos. On his journey, however, he met members of the Senate Appropriations Committee, a conservative

¹⁴¹ Hoover to John O'Laughlin, July 23rd, 1947, Hoover MSS.
¹⁴² Ironically, if Republican leaders were dissatisfied, left wing Democrats attributed them with too much influence; Pepper said that a resurgence of anti-liberalism and anti-internationalism had made "reaction in domestic policy the most potent force in shaping our foreign policy." New York Times, August 17th, 1947. In June, Henry Wallace had linked Hoover and Vandenberg with proposals to make a separate peace with Germany and Austria; ibid., June 10th, 1947.
dominated body, who suggested to him that "Operation Rathole" summed up their reaction. 143 John Taber, the economy fiend of the House of Representatives, who was reportedly "causing sleepless nights in the White House", proved rather harder to persuade. 144 In Berlin he was quoted as having said that the people of Europe were not working hard enough: "We in the United States got where we are because we worked harder". He also said that any country which went communist, and he mentioned France, would get no help from the United States. 145 On his return he was reportedly not wholly opposed to foreign aid, but also of the opinion that the situation was neither as bad as the Administration or some of his colleagues had pictured it.

Taber and Smith were representatives of the two extremes. On balance, however, most Congressmen came back from Europe slightly more convinced than they had been before of the need for American assistance. The establishment of the Comintern in October, to fight the Marshall Plan, helped to create a sense of urgency in some quarters. Everett Dirksen, for example, already committed to general policies of anti-communist spending, called on October 9th, in Berlin, for quick American aid to prevent the Soviets establishing a "bridgehead on the Atlantic". 147 On his return he apparently reported that the "betting" was that the United States and Russia would be at war within four months. 148

143 Diary, October 16th, 1947, Smith MSS.
144 Alsop to Martin Sommers, October 25th, 1947, Alsop MSS.
146 Ibid., October 24th, 1947; O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, October 25th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.
148 O'Laughlin to Brigadier General Sarnoff, November 14th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.
Similarly, John Vorys was talking about the possibility of war. In a widely distributed letter, he wrote: "I am more deeply concerned, than ever, about Russian aggression and infiltration since my return from Europe this fall... although our small occupation forces could be over run by near-by Russian forces, this has not happened because Russia is not yet ready for the type of counter attack we would make, not in Germany or in Austria but in Russia; Russia in not ready for that type of attack against the United States. I believe that we must not yield an inch to Russia anywhere, must prepare for possible war, that any aid we furnish must be used to strengthen anti-communist forces in Europe, and that we must have far more effective American information and propaganda."  

Clearly, what most Republican Congressmen were concerned about was the extent and potential of "communism" and/or Russian influence in western Europe. Aid programmes to Europe could be expected to be viewed solely in the light of that perceived threat. Mr. Bender of Ohio, a staunch opponent of the earlier Truman Doctrine, attempted to counter the general impression brought back by quoting a report he had received from a Pittsburgh businessman, who had come back convinced that in France and England there was not the "slightest danger" of communism, and that this was simply a "bugaboo put out by our administration" to support their aid policies.  

Over-all, there is little doubt that the

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149 Vorys, letter to various enquirers regarding broadcast by Walter Winchell, October 30th, 1947, Vorys MSS.  
150 Congressional Record, 93, Appendix, p. 4322.
summer recess of 1947 had done a significant amount to make Congress more receptive to further American aid. Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania claimed in a radio broadcast in November that "four outspoken isolationists" he knew had completely changed their views about the American role in world affairs as a result of their visit.151

Over the summer, the Administration decided to try and establish an emergency programme of European aid, to meet what it regarded as a crisis situation.152 On September 29th, those Congressional leaders who were available went to the White House, where Lovett duly warned that unless immediate aid was forthcoming, communism would sweep over most of western Europe.153 Vandenberg was reportedly less than pleased at the President's suggestion that it was now up to Congress, especially in view of the fact that the Administration had known for five weeks about the economic situation in Europe.154 Despite his reservations, Vandenberg (and Senator Bridges and Representative Eaton) agreed to support interim aid, and to call their respective committees.155

At this time, however, John Taber, chairman of the vital House Appropriations Committee, was in Europe, and both Senator Taft and Speaker Martin were making political tours in the west. This apparently left the burden of opposition on majority leader Halleck. Halleck was reported as saying: "You must realize there is a growing resistance to these

151Ibid., Appendix, p. 4261.
152In September, Lovett warned Vandenberg of "disturbing news" regarding the economic situation of France, Italy and even Britain; Robert A. Lovett, to Vandenberg, September 21st, 1947, Vandenberg MSS.
153Report, October 3rd, 1947, McNaughton MSS.
154Report, October 4th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.
155Report, October 3rd, 1947, McNaughton MSS.
programs. I have been out in the hustings, and I know. The people don't like it. I think we should hear from our committees who are in Europe now, making studies specifically for the Congress. I don't feel that I can commit the House to rush into anything until we have had the Herter Committee report, and until Mr. Taber and the others return. There is a growing feeling that these relief programs with all the shipments of food and goods to Europe are pushing prices higher, creating greater scarcities here, and the people don't like it."156

Although the only real representative of the economy wing at the White House meeting, Hallack's reaction was indicative of the difficulties which lay ahead in a political year. Out on the hustings, Joseph Martin and Robert Taft were revealing a determination both to blame the Administration for the state of the world, and to change the scope of the envisaged aid to Europe. Both men in their oratory rejected the New Deal -W.P.A. approach and preached self-help; Taft in particular was talking of ending foreign aid by 1950 and of getting the budget by that time down to 25-30,000,000,000 dollars.157 Taft was evidently trying to ensure that in 1948 the Republicans presented a real challenge to the Administration; this did not mean that he opposed

156Report, October 9th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.  
bipartisan foreign policy necessarily, indeed he gave
Senator Vandenberg a lot of credit for what he regarded as
the beneficial aspects of it. 158 At the same time, however,
he was concerned that the Republicans should challenge
both domestically and overseas what he represented as the
New Deal philosophy, which he saw as one of extravagance
and interference in people's lives. In the foreign sphere,
he charged, the New Dealers "... have ... tried to use our
financial resources to force on the rest of the world the
manner in which they shall conduct their foreign exchange,
their foreign trade, and even their currency and other
domestic affairs". 159

Not surprisingly, the coolness of key Republicans, and
some of the public comments of Taft and others, caused a
great deal of concern amongst members of the Administration.
James Reston drew comfort, however, from the fact that the
revival of the Comintern would allow the Marshall Plan to
be presented as a political rather than an economic
measure. 160 Not until October 23rd, did the President
call a special session, due to meet on November 17th. Poli­
tics was very much in the air when Congress assembled. The
preceding weeks had seen a spate of Republican oratory and
public comment on matters of foreign policy. Nobody seemed
prepared to come out in direct opposition to the Marshall
Plan: even Taft, who described the 8,000,000,000 figure
for the first year, which, he said, had been proposed by

158 Ibid., September 26th, 1947.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid., October 12th, 1947.
some officials, as "beyond all reason", seemed inclined to
go along provided the total cost was cut considerably. 161

Vandenberg, however, was pessimistic, both about Taft and
the general situation: He concluded that the people were
moving back toward "isolationism", and that Taft had sensed
this. 162 Against this, however, was the fact that Dewey
had publicly endorsed the Marshall Plan in a speech in New
York. While doing so, he blamed the situation which made
it necessary on the past mistakes of the Administration,
attributed all the successes of the bipartisan policy,
since its creation by himself, to Republicans, and promised
that Republicans would see that the Marshall Plan was an
efficient, business-like venture: "By the greatest of good
fortune, both for our country and for the world, we have a
Republican Congress. It understands the nature of business,
and I am confident that these able men will bring forward
a sound program. It may well eventuate that the election
of a Republican Congress last year not only saved the domes-
tic affairs of the United States, but it may well also save
the peace of the world". 163 Republicans, he said, would
make American policy more effective: "It is time we got

161 Ibid., November 5th, 1947; O'Laughlin to Hoover, November 8th,
1947, O'Laughlin MSS.
162 Report, November 17th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.; Vandenberg,
Private Papers, p. 379; on November 11th, Taft had announced
his "absolute" opposition to the figure of 2,657,000,000
Marshall had said was necessary for European aid, China
and Army occupation costs for the balance of fiscal year
163 New York Times, November 6th, 1947; a copy of the speech
is in the Dulles MSS.
business men into a business job," instead of using "social planners who do not know a loom from a corn husker".  164

Dewey's highly partisan endorsement of the Marshall Plan, was, like the rhetoric of Taft, Martin and others, an indication of the difficulties that would beset the passage of a major piece of foreign policy legislation in an election year. When Congress met, President Truman showed himself able to enter into the spirit of things by linking his call for emergency aid to a call for domestic controls to check inflation, a move which to Republicans seemed deliberately provocative. On the same day, Taft delivered a reply on radio, concentrating largely on domestic issues, but also arguing that the Administration had no real will to return to peace-time conditions: "Evidently under this Administration we can never return to a state of peace. We still have war taxes. We have a war budget. Now we are to have war controls".  165 His sole reference to foreign policy was to suggest that European aid would be useless without changes of policy towards China and Germany, both of which had become common Republican charges.  166 Arthur Sears Henning reported that Congressional Republicans intended to fight the 1948 election along the lines laid down by Taft: they intended to reduce Marshall Plan expenditure, and to deal with rising prices by reducing government expenditure, limiting exports, reducing taxes and controlling

164 Ibid.
165 Ibid., November 18th, 1947.
166 Ibid.
the growth of credit. 167

Strongest support for the Taft position came, as always, from the House of Representatives. Congressman Bender of Ohio congratulated Taft for his work in the Senate, especially since he "has had a number of ten percent Republicans included in the majority". 168 Bender saw the President's speech as having been designed to pin the blame for inflation on the Republicans, for he knew full well they would not enact controls; it was time, said Bender, that Republicans told the truth, that it was Democratic bungling at home and abroad which had led to inflation at home and to turning practically the whole of Europe over to the Communists. 169 A Michigan Representative noted that the C.E.E.C. report of September 1st, said nothing about communism, but the Marshall Plan was "being sold to the people of the United States on the proposition of preventing the spread of communism throughout western Europe". 170 "Is it not possible," asked Mr. Bender, "for a Member of Congress to be a defender of the Constitution and not convict himself of isolationism? Are we going to permit these labels to be pinned on us?" 171

More significant, however, was the reaction of Dirksen and Mundt, two influential members of the House whose support had been crucial over the question of aid to Greece

167 Chicago Tribune, November 19th, 1947.
168 Congressional Record, 93, November 18th, 1947, p. 10650.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid., p. 10662.
171 Ibid., p. 10550.
and Turkey earlier in the year. Dirksen's position, it became clear, was now very close to that of Vandenberg: the United States, he felt, could not abandon Europe without eventual danger to the American way of life. Large amounts of American aid to Europe could be justified, he argued, if they preserved American freedom, safeguarded her right to do business with the rest of the world, and prevented another war. Mundt of South Dakota, who like Dirksen had been to Europe over the recess, was prepared, with safeguards, to go ahead with aid to Europe. He was, however, not prepared to commit himself to a five, four or three year programme in advance: the United States must retain freedom of action, he said. The speeches by Dirksen and Mundt, both Nationalists and midwesterners, indicated that, provided interim aid was portrayed as an anti-communist measure, there would be enough support in the House to carry it.

On November 24th, the Interim Aid bill was reported out by the Foreign Relations Committee, designed to provide $597,000,000 for food, coal, petroleum, fertilizers, cotton and medicine for France, Italy and Austria. It was not, said Vandenberg, meant to be the first instalment on the Marshall Plan. In his masterly presentation, Vandenberg dealt with all the issues that had been raised by Republicans in preceding weeks. He claimed that more

172 Ibid., pp. 10651–2.
careful preparation had gone into this than previous measures, and he pointed out various safeguards which partly as a result of Republican criticism of previous bills had been written in: separate administration by the relief administrator created by the previous bill; a revolving fund, requiring all goods to be paid for in local currencies, the expenditure of which was subject to American direction. Vandenberg regretted the omission of China from the bill, but commented that there was no practical way in which Congress could initiate an aid programme for China, and promised that China would be included in subsequent plans. He also regretted that the President had tied Interim Aid to his anti-inflation message; unlike the long-term programme, interim aid was not large enough to have a significant influence, although he noted that provision had been made for 25% of the total to be spent outside the United States.

In his presentation, Vandenberg again revealed the extent to which he had come to differ from Taft and the Nationalists. Still taking care, as always, to justify his position on the basis of self-interest; he now saw it as the "self interest which knows that...there can be no peace for us or anybody else which does not stem

175 Ibid., p. 10704.
176 Ibid. At the insistence of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 60 million dollars was added for China; Vandenberg agreed to leave it in because to take it out would look like a negation of the desire to give aid., ibid., December 15th, 1947, p. 11346. In November and December there was a great deal of Republican support for China, including speeches by Dewey in New York (November 24th) and New Hampshire (November 20th); at a dinner in Washington in December, attended by over 100 Congressmen, Dewey spoke of the strategic importance of China in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. Report, December 13th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.
177 Congressional Record, 93, November 24th, 1947, p. 10704.
It was furthermore a self-interest which realized that western civilisation could not indefinitely be preserved alone, which knew that the United States could not "indefinitely prosper in a broken world" and which recognized that any revolution would "rate America as the top-prize scalp". Vandenberg had seemingly, as his enemies had long alleged, joined the Internationalists. In December he was to decline a request by National Chairman Carroll Reece to make a Republican broadcast: "I am acutely conscious of the fact that I cannot speak for the Republican Party on this subject because the Party is sharply (and often bitterly) divided. I do not wish to embarrass any of my Party associates who certainly have a complete right to disagree with me. This is their Party just as much as it is mine. There is no need (and certainly there is no advantage) in needlessly aggravating this situation".

Despite all the fears of October and early November, Interim Aid went through the Senate without difficulty. Taft, having joined with 19 Republicans and 11 Democrats in an abortive attempt to reduce the amount authorized, from $597,000,000 to $400,000,000, signified that despite his objections he would support the bill. He disliked, he said, the whole approach of asking recipients what they wanted; he preferred simply to make surplus available, on

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178 Ibid., pp. 10701-2.
179 Vandenberg to Carroll Reece, December 17th, 1947, Vandenberg MSS. In November, Reece had come under fire from Internationalists for having claimed that the President had cooked up a "phony" issue to recall Congress; Report, November 28th, 1947, McNaughton MSS. Alexander Smith to Carroll Reece, December 10th, 1947, Smith MSS. 180 Congressional Record, 93, November 26th, 1947, p. 10910; Ibid., November 28th, 1947, p. 10928
a credit basis, rather than trying to make good the trade
deficit of every country "which will wreck the United States
if we go through with it". The emergency, he felt, gave
Congress no choice but to go along; but he hoped that in
the long-range programme a board would be created, with full
authority to administer the aid in the light of domestic
economic needs.\textsuperscript{181} In the event, only three Republicans
and three Democrats opposed the Interim Aid bill.\textsuperscript{182}

In the House, the survival instincts of the Republican
majority also enabled them to paper over the divisions.
The chairman of the Rules Committee, Leo Allen of Illinois,
in introducing the rule, announced his personal opposition,
on the grounds that passage of Interim Aid would be inter­
preted as "tantamount to the passage of the Marshall Plan
when it comes before the House".\textsuperscript{183} His over-all oppo­sition
was, he indicated, largely on the grounds of the eco­
nomic effects; it would, he said, ultimately reduce the
United States to the level of Europe, for the same reasons:
"the fundamental causes of today's economic distress in
Europe are found in government policies that have stifled
initiative, controlled enterprise, upset currencies, and
disrupted production".\textsuperscript{184} Majority leader Halleck bitterly
attacked the Administration for the manner in which it had
called the special session and injected the issue of prices

\textsuperscript{181}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 10930-1.
\textsuperscript{182}\textit{Ibid.}, December 1st, 1947, p. 10930.
\textsuperscript{183}\textit{Ibid.}, December 4th, 1947, p. 11035; members of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee had made strongly anti-
Russian statements before the Rules Committee, designed
to make Interim Aid seem necessary to prevent Russian
take-over of France, Italy and Austria; \textit{New York Times},
December 4th, 1947.
\textsuperscript{184}\textit{Congressional Record}, 93, December 12th, 1947, p. 11036.
into the debate. Despite the bitterness and division, the House, as a result of clever manoeuvring by Joseph Martin, passed the bill by a voice vote, to avoid bringing the divisions out into the open.

In Interim Aid, as in all other pieces of foreign policy legislation requiring large appropriations, Republicans in Congress went along reluctantly. Opposition to the President, at a time of perceived crisis, would have been politically suicidal. The tactic seemed to be to go along, criticizing past failures, and take credit for what were regarded as good features of policy both in the past and the present. Throughout 1947, the dimensions of a Republican long-term policy were becoming apparent: this policy required a consistent anti-communist posture; it required aid programmes to be administered separately from both State Department and White House if possible, to provide loyal, competent and efficient administration based on an awareness, (which the State Department was judged incapable of having) of American domestic economic interests; it required also recognition of the importance to the United States of China, which at the initiative of the House of Representatives was included ultimately in the Interim Aid bill; it required also a change of policy in Germany.

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185 Ibid., December 11th, 1947, p. 11283.
186 Report, December 12th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.
all these matters, Republican leaders and Congress could basically agree, and what is more could satisfy themselves that their record was distinctive and superior to that of the Administration. Where the Republicans got into difficulties, however, was in evaluating the importance of Europe to the United States, and how much they were prepared to devote to achieve their aims there.

By the end of 1947, the majority of the Congressional Party still appeared to stand with Taft and Hoover in placing prime importance on a restoration of Normalcy in the United States. It is not that Taft and Hoover regarded Europe as unimportant, but that neither regarded it as vital. Seeing the Russian challenge as largely an ideological rather than a military challenge, they placed first the need to make the American system work properly at home; and this, by their definition, it could not do if it continued to pour their wealth overseas and to over-tax the American people. They also could not accept that the United States had any great need, economically, for the multilateral world. In New York, in November, Taft had commented that the Administration could not "get away from the New Deal principle that government spending is a good thing in itself. They so overdraw the picture to convince our people that these grants were entirely for our own benefit that even the Europeans came to believe they were conferring a favour on us by accepting our loans - that we had to export to prevent a depression." For Taft then, aid to Europe was primarily humanitarian, and concerned with

America's interest in bringing about peace in the world; given these assumptions, his continual attempts to reduce American commitments were logical.

Republican leaders, then, by the end of 1947 were basically agreed on the kind of European peace they wished to see, but they were divided as to how to get there (between, for example, the pro-French views of Dulles and the pro-German views of Hoover), and even more divided by their evaluation of the importance of Europe to the United States. United in their concern to see the restoration of a particular kind of political economy in the United States, they were divided over the extent to which they gave this prime importance, or, at the other extreme, saw this as ultimately dependent on the type of foreign policy carried out. The task of 1948 was to be that of somehow preserving unity in the face of unprecedented foreign demands on the United States in peace-time, so as to assure the election of a Republican President of the United States. Even Vandenberg, for all his association with non-partisan-ship, was concerned that this should happen; despite its divisions, he saw the Republican Party still as being the only Party truly committed to liberty, and therefore the only one to be able to make American foreign policy work. To a close friend in Michigan in early 1948, Vandenberg still described himself as a "fundamentalist". He agreed that "the disintegration of Constitutional liberty in America would end the hope of the world", although he also believed that governments had to evolve, and he cited the development of social responsibility in the United States.
But, he continued, "the mere statement of this fact unavoidably involves the need for greatest prudence and caution lest this evolution shall destroy the 'fundamentals' from which I think it logically springs. And at this point our minds completely meet when you say that the present Democratic Party cannot be entrusted with any such responsibilities". In foreign policy also he revealed a continuous concern with fundamentals; as in domestic affairs, his concern was with re-evaluating traditional policies in the light of changed conditions, rather than in radical change. Dulles' approach was very similar, and so also presumably through the latter's influence was Dewey's. Increasingly towards the end of 1947 Vandenberg and Dewey were using such traditional symbols as "efficiency", "self-help", "hard-headedness", and even a "business job", to justify their support and to assert a Republican contribution to what seemed a radical departure in American foreign policy. Although accepted, unlike Taft and Hoover, the premise that the American system could no longer survive in a communist dominated world, which was the essence of the earlier "One World" position, through a mixture of pragmatism and conviction they continued to be sensitive to the traditional concern with over-commitment and over-stretching of resources.

188 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 424-5.
CHAPTER NINE
1948: The Politics of Unity

All Republicans knew that 1948 was to be their year. With the war, the depression and Franklin Roosevelt behind them, nothing appeared to stand in the way of the restoration of the United States to political Normalcy. 1948 was, however, to pose a test to the foreign policy leadership which Arthur Vandenberg had patiently sought to develop since the war. Although the Republicans had avoided the serious "splintering" over the Interim Aid programme which Vandenberg feared, 1948 was likely to be an even more critical time for party unity than the previous year. The first session of the 80th Congress had failed to bring about the changes which the majority in the Congressional Party were committed to; instead it had seen the Party's commitment to domestic economy frustrated by increased foreign commitments. Inevitably, nerves had become frayed; frustration and resentment, both at the Administration and Vandenberg, had increased. The midwestern wing of the Party was determined that the Administration should be held accountable for its past mistakes, and that the Republicans would not fight another "me-too" campaign in 1948.

The Chicago Tribune was foremost advocate of a fiery, partisan

1Vandenberg to Leverett Saltonstall, November 17th, 1947, Vandenberg MSS.
2Hoover to Colonel Orville Bullington, November 11th, 1947, Hoover MSS; Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 48.
campaign. In its view "Only a real, vigorous campaign for economy at home and for a foreign policy founded upon American welfare" would enable the Republicans to win in 1948. The prospect of the re-nomination of Thomas Dewey would mean that Mr. Truman's worries were at an end. Dewey, it commented, was a "me-too" candidate who "actually claims credit for what is called the bipartisan foreign policy, which is to say that he is for the Truman-Marshall program in all its essentials and most of its details". The Chicago-Tribune's real venom, however, was reserved for Vandenberg, whom it dismissed as a Democrat: "He was able to pose as a Republican after going over to the New Deal, and it is a sad commentary on the weakness of other Republican senators that they accept the impersonation". Talk of Vandenberg's likely candidacy for the Presidency in view of an anticipated Taft-Dewey deadlock was greeted with horror by the proprietor of the Tribune, and other Republicans of somewhat less extreme views. "Hoover hates the Michigan Senator," commented Cal O'Loughlin. In February he reported how the Old Guard in seeking an alternative to Vandenberg had been considering Joseph Martin: "To block Vandenberg Speaker Martin is being boomed, but while practically all of the House Republicans are back of him,

3Chicago Tribune, January 16th, 1948.
5Ibid., January 26th, 1948.
6O'Loughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, December 6th, 1947, O'Loughlin MSS.
7Ibid.
he is a poor speaker, his relatives are all Catholics and he is unimpressive in appearance. To look Martin over a dinner was given for him in New York... It was attended by prominent Republican (sic) and financial leaders. He did not make a good impression."\(^8\) Still, he added, "Hoover would infinitely prefer Martin to Vandenberg."\(^9\)

Whatever his prestige amongst syndicated columnists, with the major eastern newspapers, and with the small group of Republican Internationalists, Vandenberg had by 1948 become a controversial figure amongst Republicans.\(^10\) James Reston, perhaps closer to him than any other journalist, commented in February:

"The Senator from Michigan has been walking the knife-edge for months between the broad objectives of the Administration's policy, which he approves, and the reluctant halfway policies of so many of his colleagues, who are neither isolationist nor internationalist but somewhere in between, at sea.

"The genius of his leadership in this field is that he understands and sympathizes with both sides. Although he has really made the crossing himself, he rejected the Willkie technique of storming the uncertain. He makes concessions from time to time to both sides, never really satisfying either and often infuriating both. But on the whole he maintains control of the situation and when he stands firm, his party hesitates to attack full-front."

Reston's appraisal would seem accurate. Those who accused him, with the *Chicago Tribune*, of being a mere "me-too"

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\(^8\) O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, February 14th, 1948, O'Laughlin MSS.
\(^9\) Ibid.
\(^10\) There is no doubt that the press did their best to push Vandenberg's candidacy in 1948; neither Taft nor Dewey were popular. Vandenberg's continual good publicity did not help to win friends amongst fellow Republicans. Reportedly the editor of the Saturday Evening Post felt that Taft was "as dangerous to the national security of this country as Chamberlain ever was to Britain's". Martin Sommers to Stewart Alsop, March 17th, 1948, Alsop MSS.
were being a shade harsh; he still in fact shared the basic convictions which formed part of the Republican creed, as well as a lingering distrust and distaste for the Democratic Party. His private writings reveal the continual dialogue he conducted within himself, as between the demands of national unity at a time which he perceived as being one of crisis, and the needs both of a strong and coherent two-party system, and of a sound domestic economy. In the fall of 1947, on the eve of the greatest overseas expenditure on record in times of peace, his misgivings were apparent. To Robert Lovett, he wrote in connection with the proposed construction of a United Nations building: "I can make no sort of commitment regarding Congressional attitudes respecting this difficult and delicate problem, I can make no commitment for myself." Would not such a proposal, he asked, "tend to arm the critics who will argue that all our aid programs are a futility? Does this not encourage the rapidly growing isolationism which argues that UN is bound to be a pipeline into the U. S. Treasury?" He continued, "The next Congress will be asked for many billions in foreign emergency (which it undoubtedly is). Only a desperate emergency could possibly justify these demands upon our American resources." Since other nations had for the most part insufficient dollars to pay their share of the United Nations construction, he wondered whether their

12 For an earlier introspective account of his concern about the philosophic basis of bipartisanship, see Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 548-50.
13 Vandenberg to Robert A. Lovett, October 30th, 1947, Vandenberg MSS.
design to proceed was not "based solely on the too-prevalent concept that Uncle Sam is so rich that he can pay for anything." To his wife, he wrote from Washington while plans were being made for Interim Aid: "The confidential reports from Europe are that the Commies are losing ground (even their satellites are restless). . . This seems to be the time for us *to make hay*. But if our friends in Western Europe are allowed to starve and freeze to death this winter, the Commies will be completely back in the saddle. On the other hand, we must keep our own feet on the ground and avoid commitments that would disrupt our own economy. Where to draw the line!"

Vandenberg's task in 1948. was somehow to preserve Republican unity for the election, whilst at the same time giving support to further developments in European policy. The prospects of so doing were not good. Aside from the inevitable conflict that seemed to be shaping up for the nomination between eastern and midwestern Republicanism, there still remained to be resolved the question of the Marshall Plan. Despite the ultimate ease with which Interim Aid had been negotiated through Congress in December, a great deal of Republican disquiet about various aspects of policy had been revealed. Apart from the pressure, especially from the House, to include China in Interim Aid, Senator Vandenberg had had to deal with a determined attempt

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14Ibid.
15Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 378.
16Vorys to L. E. Sulzer, February 12th, 1948, Vorys MSS.
by the Senate Appropriations Committee to prevent all re-
parations being paid from Germany, a policy which to that
Committee appeared inconsistent with the objectives both of
Interim Aid and the Marshall Plan. It was clear that to
gain Republican support, the Marshall Plan would have to
be as explicitly and consistently anti-communist as the
Interim Aid programme; it was also clear that some arrange-
ment would have to be made, especially in view of the elec-
tion, for the whole administration of the programme to be
independent of the White House and the State Department.
To add to the potential difficulties of the Plan was the
fact that Herbert Hoover, like Taft, was full of scepticism
about it. Hoover had already declined an invitation by
Henry Stimson to be a member of the citizen's group he was
organizing in support of the Marshall Plan. Speaking in
New York, in November, he had suggested that the only real

17 Congressional Record, 93, December 19th, 1947, pp. 11680-90.
18 O'Laughlin to Brigadier General Sarnoff, December 6th,
1947; O'Laughlin MSS.; Freeland comments that the Admin-
istration's rhetoric to try to pass the Marshall Plan was
forcing it into policies that were not intended, op. cit.,
p. 200; Gael Sullivan of the Democratic National Committee
regarded the military emphasis being put on the Marshall
Plan as "dynamite" and wrote that "all of us here have
been emphasizing the fact that it's a blueprint for win-
ning the peace for generations to come." He wanted the
Administration to de-emphasize the nationalistic slant
which appeared to be put on the Plan, and concluded, "I
believe it is imperative to take this program out of uni-
form." Gael Sullivan to J. Howard McGrath, November 24th,
1947, J. Howard McGrath MSS., Truman Library.
19 Hoover to Henry L. Stimson, November 7th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
solution to Europe's difficulties was a move away from eco-

nomic utopias, back on to "the only road to freedom from

hunger and cold". In the New Year, Senator Smith of New

Jersey found him still sceptical.

In the discussion of the Marshall Plan, Vandenberg, for

the first time since he had assumed the role of G. O. P.

foreign policy leader, was to be faced with organized op-

position among Senate Republicans, and the open hostility

of the House Republican leadership. Initial reactions in

December to the proposed 17 billion, four-year plan, had

indicated the difficulties. Taft, unsurprisingly, was

prepared to consider only a smaller, one year trial.

James Reston argued that Vandenberg had advised the Presi-

dent against the four year, 17 billion plan even before

Taft's announcement. On December 22nd, Vandenberg announ-

ced that he reserved judgement on the programme, although

he reaffirmed his commitment to "saving Western Europe

on a self-help basis" which he regarded as essential "from

the standpoint of intelligent American self-interest".

In the House meanwhile there were reports that Republican

leaders were talking of drafting a "Republican Marshall

Plan", a move which Foreign Affairs committee chairman,

Charles Eaton, publicly opposed. Despite the signs of

21 Diary, January 1st, 1948, Smith MSS.
23 Ibid., December 22nd, 1947.
24 Ibid., December 23rd, 1947.
25 Ibid., December 24th, 1947.
a build-up of Republican opposition, Cabell Phillips had earlier reported that supporters of the bill were confident that, given safeguards, it would pass; he reported one Senator as saying: "The greatest help we had in getting the interim-aid bill through came straight from Moscow. I see no reason to think we can't count on more of the same with ERP."26

In January a group of 18-20 Senators, led by Wherry, began to organize opposition to the Administration proposals. Both Taft and Vandenberg refused an invitation to attend their first meeting, which was reportedly a source of relief to Wherry, who was not on good personal terms with either: "When they get into a meeting it is just like a Republican conference - nobody else gets a chance to talk," Wherry's denial that the meeting was a move to organize an opposition failed to impress Vandenberg; privately he commented: "I see the boys are advertising their meeting as a move towards conciliation; but that's not the way it was planned by some of those die-hards."28 The meeting, which was attended by some 18 Republican Senators, largely from the midwest and mountain states, ultimately led to the formulation of a set of alternative proposals for European reconstruction. Continuing to meet through until March, the

26 Ibid., December 14th, 1947.
28 Ibid., p. 6.
committee of 20, as it came to be called, was composed of
diverse elements. Some, such as Malone (Nevada) and Kem
(Missouri) were in effect outright opponents of large scale
aid for reconstruction; others, such as Knowland (Calif.)
and Ball (Minn.) were primarily concerned with modifying the
proposal of the Administration. As a whole, the group was
able to agree in calling for significant changes in the con-
ception of the Marshall Plan, and for a reduction in the
amount authorized. On many points, Vandenberg was able
to move towards the viewpoint of the committee of 20; in
some respects he still shared their reservations and con-
cerns. In particular, he was able to meet their views on
the administrative set-up of E.R.P., on the provision for
a Congressional watch-dog committee to oversee its opera-
tions, and on the writing in of provisions for a termination
of aid should progress on the part of recipients be unsat-
isfactory. Where, however, he failed to make concessions
was over the demand that aid be given in the form of speci-
fic production prospects in basic industries, to be con-
trolled by the Administrator. In the bill reported out
by the Foreign Relations Committee provision was made for
such projects, but they were not to become the core of the
programme; the basis of the E.R.P. was, in line with war-
time multilateral planning, the desire to revive trade

29 Accounts of the group's activities reported in the New
York Times, January 31st, 1948, February 7th, 1948, Feb-
30 Report, February 12th, 1948, McNaughton MSS; New York
Times, February 13th, 1948, March 1st, 1948; Vandenberg,
through subsidizing the dollar deficits of European countries. This approach was one which the Nationalists from Taft and Hoover down could not accept, since they failed to accept the basic premise of the importance of an expansion of trade to the American economy.

By the time that Foreign Relations Committee hearings had ended in early February, Vandenberg had by amendment taken the steam out of the opponents of the bill. Joseph Alsop, although far from an objective observer, commented on February 6th, "There will, I think, be an ERP compromise, which will pass, in effect, as the Vandenberg bill. He is going to emerge from this session as a really big figure, while poor Taft, I fear, will look mighty puny." Still however, there remained the question of the amount that would be authorized. In January, Herbert Hoover had issued a statement paring the Administration request for $6,800,000,000 for the first fifteen months down to $3,000,000,000 plus a further $1,000,000 for loans for the first twelve months. Taft also criticized the Administration figure as being too high, as did the committee of 20. To their criticism was added that of the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Bridges, who alleged that the Administration had inflated their request.

32 Alsop to Martin Sommers, February 6th, 1948, Alsop MSS.
33 Chicago Tribune, January 22nd, 1948; O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, January 23rd, 1948, O'Laughlin MSS.

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quested amount by 2 billion dollars.\textsuperscript{35} Many Republicans were inclined to go along with the four billion required up to January, 1949, by which time they were convinced that a Republican President would be able to sort things out. Thomas Dewey, however, the favourite to be next President, lent his weight to the demand for the full request.\textsuperscript{36} As reported out by the Foreign Relations Committee, the bill proposed an initial authorization of $5,300,000,000 for 12 months, which represented a cut in the time span of the initial period, not in amount.\textsuperscript{37} Both Taft and the committee of 20 were dissatisfied with this, and Taft predicted that Congress would reduce it.\textsuperscript{38}

Despite all the fears which had been generated, the attempt led by Taft to reduce the initial authorization to $4,000,000,000 dollars, was the most serious challenge which Vandenberg had to face. During the debate, there was some evidence of organized opposition, but it was largely confined to the die-hard members of the committee of 20. On the Taft amendment to reduce initial authorization to $4 billion dollars, 24 Republicans voted against the amendment and 23 in favour.\textsuperscript{39} On the final vote, only 13 Senators voted against.\textsuperscript{40} Taft's failure to lend his prestige to the dissidents was clearly crucial; despite his well-known views, he made it clear that he would oppose any

\textsuperscript{35}Chicago Tribune, January 27th, 1948.  
\textsuperscript{36}New York Times, February 13th, 1948.  
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., February 14th, 1948.  
\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., February 15th, 1948.  
\textsuperscript{39}Congressional Record, 94, March 12th, 1948, p. 2708.  
\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., March 13th, 1948, p. 2793.
amendment designed to gut the E.R.P.; his support of the bill was justified solely in terms of its political import as an anti-communist measure, it did not mean that he had come to accept the economic theories underlying its whole approach. What perhaps gave the bill an easier passage than might have been predicted was the Czechoslovak coup at the end of February, and the impending sense of crisis. If all else failed, Congressional Republicans could always be relied to respond in an atmosphere of crisis. For Taft, with his eye on the Presidential nomination, there was an added incentive to show himself both statesmanlike and willing to compromise.

In the House of Representatives the outcome was less predictable. The House Foreign Affairs Committee had initially got itself into a tangle over the proposal of Christian Herter, chairman of the Select Committee on Foreign Aid, that an independent corporation be created to oversee all foreign spending, a view undoubtedly influenced by Hoover. In the event it was decided to leave this question open, especially in view of the fact that the Senate had under Vandenberg's guidance already plumped for the alternative Brookings Institution recommendation of an independent government agency. Then Speaker Martin and Majority Leader Halleck caused consternation by insisting on an "omnibus" foreign aid bill, including not only the proposed E.R.P., but also Greek-Turkish aid and aid to

\[\text{Ibid., March 12th, 1948, p. 2641, 2650.}\]
\[\text{Poole, pp. 238-40, 245.}\]
China. Informed of this decision by the House leadership whilst on the Senate floor, Vandenberg apparently regarded it as direct challenge to him. Against the House leadership, Vandenberg invoked the crisis in Europe. He warned Congressional leaders that there was a real danger of communist take-over of Italy; if the Republicans delayed E.R.P., they would get the blame, he said.\(^4\) Vandenberg's warning was effective in speeding up House consideration, if not in persuading the leadership to drop the "omnibus" approach. James Wadsworth noted in his diary that a meeting of the Republican Steering Committee had revealed that "a large majority have come to a realization that we must help the Western Democracies in Europe in their efforts to get together and cooperate in their defense against the menace of communism".\(^4\) To Herbert Hoover, Christian Herter wrote of the increasing pressure on the House to act quickly.\(^4\)

Hoover himself had changed step over the E.R.P.. He still had his doubts, and in particular he hoped that Latin America, whose economy was more complementary to that of Europe, would be brought into the plan so that American costs could be cut, ultimately, he hoped by 50%.\(^4\) Many of his original objections he felt had been removed, and in the last week of March, he addressed a public letter to

\(^4\)Report, March 13th, 1947, McNaughton MSS; Diary, March 16th, 1948, Wadsworth MSS.
\(^4\)Diary, March 16th, 1948, Wadsworth MSS.
\(^4\)Christian Herter to Hoover, March 15th, 1948, Hoover MSS.
\(^4\)Memorandum, March 6th, 1948, pp. 3-4, John Taber file, Hoover MSS.
Speaker Martin, which could not fail to reinforce the already considerable pressures on the House: "I realize that many approach this gigantic experiment with great apprehension and a realization of the sacrifices it will mean to our people. . . . However, if it should produce economic, political and self-defense unity in Western Europe, and thus a major dam against Russian aggression, it would stem the tide now running so strongly against civilization and peace." 47

March, 1948 was a frenetic month. The Czechoslovak coup, the forthcoming Italian elections, the report from General Clay that war might come, all helped to give the impression of ineluctable crisis. In Congress there was open talk of military confrontation with the Soviet Union. 48 Not all Republicans were convinced about the crisis, but scepticism did not make it easier to deal with Administration requests. Hoover was inclined to see it as an Administration tactic "to try to blitz the House into accepting the Senate bill. We saw exactly the same blitz over U. N. R. R. A., Bretton Woods and the British Loan. In every case such action has made common sense management and control of these questions impossible of enactment. I still hope the House can do something to make the administration of this bill more sensible." 49 Yet Hoover's later letter

47 Hoover to Joseph Martin, March 24th, 1948, copy attached to Hoover to Bernard M. Baruch, March 24th, 1948, Bernard M. Baruch MSS., Princeton University Library.
48 Report, March 12th, 1948, McNaughton MSS.
49 Hoover to Christian Herter, March 13th, 1948, Hoover MSS.
to Martin was in its own way a recognition of the pressures under which Congress was, whether by design or not, being forced to work. The death of Masaryk, President Truman's speech of March 17th calling on Congress for universal military training, the Brussels Treaty, the Russian exit from the Allied Control Council in Berlin, and subsequent restrictions on transport and travel, all, to an historically minded generation, suggested a strong possibility of war. "It is accurate to say," wrote Representative Wadsworth in his diary, "that the opposition to this bill labored in large measure under the same delusions as were evident back in 1939, 1940, and 1941." In the event, it was perhaps surprising that as many as 61 House Republicans held out in opposition to the omnibus foreign aid bill. Although, at the insistence of John Vorys, the House got its way over aid to China, and incorporation of Greek-Turkish aid, the real victory once more belonged to Vandenberg. On the same day, as it voted for the 6 billion dollar aid bill, Congress also voted to override the President's veto of the tax bill. The Chicago Tribune commented that it was a pity that the men who led the tax fight did not control foreign affairs. In the Tribune's view, Vandenberg and Eaton had put the Republican Party under a tremendous political handicap.

50 Diary, March 31st, 1948, Wadsworth MSS.
51 Congressional Record, 94, March 31st, 1948, p. 3321; the bill passed 329-74, Republican figures were 171-61, ibid.
52 Westerfield, p. 263; Vorys to Harld S. Stacy, October 9th, 1948, Vorys MSS.
53 Chicago Tribune, April 6th, 1948.
Congressional authorization of the Marshall Plan was, as Joseph Alsop had predicted earlier in the New Year, a tremendous victory for Vandenberg. While it inevitably increased talk about his possible nomination, it had not increased his popularity in Congress.\(^5\)\(^4\) Neither, despite the months of patient compromise, had the E.R.P. greatly contributed to unity over foreign affairs. It was true that the impending integration of Germany into a western bloc, and the emphasis on European unity and self-help were music to Republican ears, but domestic Normalcy still seemed as far off as possible. In the wake of aid for European reconstruction, followed talk of military guarantees and peace-time arms aid. In March, Cal O'Laughlin wrote, ". . .we are doing in the west precisely what Stalin has done and is doing on eastern Europe. In other words, we are supporting the formation of a bloc which will depend on us to lend lease equipment just as in the world war, and it follows that as in that holocaust, our manpower will be available for another struggle in Europe."\(^5\)\(^5\) The formation of a military bloc was not explicitly put in the original Marshall Plan idea, nor was it part of policy formulations of Dulles or, still less, Hoover. Dulles had, in particular, always been consistent in his opposition to reliance primarily on a military response to the Soviet

\(^{54}\) In later years, John Vorys said that although he frequently conferred with Vandenberg, he did not do so openly, because of some members of the House and Senate who would not have approved, Poole, pp. 412-3.

\(^{55}\) O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, March 6th, 1948, O'Laughlin MSS.
challenge; as late as January, 1948, he had warned about the dangers of letting the military make United States policy, and of striking a military posture. The United States, he had told the Foreign Policy Association, in characteristic Dullesian language, must combat Soviet expansion "with food and fuel and with creative ideas and lofty ideals". Not surprisingly, Dulles was to have serious reservations about the proposed regional alliance which was being seriously considered from the spring of 1948 in Washington.

The paradox was, however, that Congressional Republicans could not be roused to make large scale appropriations to meet a purely economic and ideological challenge; especially in view of the fact that the majority did not share the "One World" view of the indivisibility of liberty. To Republican Congressmen, a military threat made far more sense and was far better justification for large scale expenditure. The Administration, by design or through genuine confusion, did not always speak with one voice as to exactly what kind of threat it was trying to combat, but increasingly resorted to crisis tactics to force Congress to act. Such tactics caused disquiet and scepticism. Taft, for example, refused to get hysterical about the Czechoslovakian coup:

56 New York Times, January 18th, 1948; in December, on his return from the London Foreign Ministers' Meeting, which had included for him a visit to Paris in a state of political crisis, he described the danger as "not military but economic"., ibid., December 25th, 1947.
57 Hoopes, p. 76; Guhin, pp. 85-6. Dulles had never liked the idea of semi-permanent treaties, and was also worried in case American military support discouraged Europe from saving itself through unification. Possibly Dulles' attitude to the military reflected the residual Church influences on him.
there was, he said, nothing the United States could have done; he didn't see how economic aid could help in that kind of situation; he didn't believe Russia planned any military aggression "beyond the line fixed at Yalta". In his view, therefore, the Czechoslovakian coup was solely a consolidation of the gains made at Yalta. If there was any crisis, he demanded the Administration to give full information, but in any case, like Speaker Martin, he favoured concentration on the development of American air power. Yet for all the scepticism and clarity of his analysis, and despite his known convictions, Taft voted for the Marshall Plan; perhaps he was aware of the political risks in an election year of taking what might appear to be such partisan and unpatriotic action.

Taft's cautious scepticism was paralleled by National Chairman Reece. In response to the President's speech to Congress in mid-March, calling for a draft, universal military training, and support of the Brussels Pact, Reece commented, "If we are really on the verge of war it is, of course, the duty of all loyal Americans to cooperate without regard for political considerations to insure the nation's security. But that should not preclude inquiry as to how we got into our present situation and who led us there." The fact that the scare came at a time when the President's

59 Ibid., March 18th, 1948.
political stock was low made some Republicans suspicious. Harold Knutson said that President Truman had created far more crises even than Roosevelt: he said he had given up counting, but claimed the total had reached 78 in 1947. To the Chicago Tribune, the war scare was suspiciously like an attempt by the military to justify grandiose plans for expansion: it reported, for example, testimony by the Navy Secretary before the Senate Armed Services Committee of the sighting of a submarine, presumably Russian, over 200 miles off San Francisco. The Tribune viewed with some alarm the prospect of defence costs rising to 20-25 billion for fiscal year 1950, which would mean a total budget in the region of 50 billion dollars and, in the Tribune's view, national collapse.

The Tribune's analysis revealed the extent to which Republican dreams of 1944-6 were now in disarray. Herbert Hoover was relying on John Taber to enquire carefully into E.R.P. appropriations to make up for the size of the authorization. Not even the Italian elections cheered him up, for he feared that in the future the United States might

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60 On March 13th, Cabell Phillips wrote that the President's stock was very low and that Republicans were convinced of victory in 1948; New York Times, March 14th, 1948; in April the National Committee were to issue a document attributing the March 17th speech to his desire to distract attention from his troubles with the Southern revolt in the Democratic Party, and the Wallace candidacy; ibid., April 11th, 1948. See also, comments by Representative Hoffman, Chicago Tribune, March 25th, 1948.
61 Ibid., March 27th, 1948.
62 Ibid., March 26th, 1948; March 27th, 1948.
63 Ibid.
64 Hoover to John Taber, March 22nd, 1948, Hoover MSS.
find itself continually forced to interfere. Finally, despite the assumption of electoral success he was worried about the future of the Party of Lincoln; reported: 

O'Laughlin, ". . . he is worrying what the people will do with this party which has reduced taxes and will have to raise them after the election". Against this, Thomas Dewey, speaking in Milwaukee in April, offered a more optimistic assessment: whilst warning against military domination of American policy, a timely warning in the midwest, he called for the United States to take a new approach: it must take the moral offensive, by the use of propaganda, a federation of western Europe, universal military training and limited selective service, a new far eastern policy and complete world-wide intelligence. The influence of Dulles' ideas was apparent in his formulation. What was new about the approach was less certain, but, perhaps detecting Republican unease and wariness, especially in the midwest, Dewey was promising light at the end of the tunnel. Increasingly, despite the war scare, thoughts were turning to the election, to Philadelphia, and to the final reward after the barren sixteen years in the wilderness. Whatever the difficulties confronting Republicans, all could take comfort from the seemingly greater difficulties of the President, beset with rumours that he would step down in favour of Eisenhower, as well as with troubles from Dixiecrats and supporters of Henry Wallace. In 1948, at long last, Republicans would win their reward for the statesman-

65 O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, April 21st, 1948, O'Laughlin MSS.
66 Ibid.
67 Chicago Tribune, April 2nd, 1948.
ship they had exhibited since 1944.

While Vandenberg was labouring in Congress on behalf of the European Recovery Program, and becoming involved in preliminary discussions on a European security treaty, other party leaders were increasingly involved in the struggle for the presidential nomination. 1948 had begun with Taft and Dewey billed as the most likely contenders. Taft, with his great centre of power in the Midwest, and strong support in the South, was the favourite of the party Old Guard. His biggest disadvantage, however, was the fear, which the polls confirmed, that he might prove difficult to elect. Henry Wallace's announcement of his third party candidacy in December appeared to make that less of a worry, with Republican National Chairman Reece prepared to write the obituary for the Democratic Party: it "merely makes official the tragic disintegration of the once great party of Jefferson", commented Reece. "The Moscow wing of the Democratic Party has now parted company from the Pendergast wing". At the meeting of the National Committee in January, the question of whether Taft could get elected was a major topic of discussion. "They all want to nominate Taft," wrote Joseph Alsop, "but the polls are frightening them off." Taft himself, was well aware of the need, if he was to get the nomination, of removing the fear that he

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68 New York Times, December 31st, 1947; Wallace, in reply to criticisms that his candidacy made the nomination of Taft more likely, replied that Taft's election would give more hope for a change of foreign policy than that of any other possible Republican nominee except perhaps Eisenhower, ibid., December 11th, 1947.

69 Alsop to Martin Sommers, January 22nd, 1948, Alsop MSS; see also O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, January 23rd, 1948, O'Laughlin MSS.
could not get elected. Although his identification with the Taft-Hartley Act was considered as much a liability as his foreign policy views, the latter could not be ignored. In January, Taft had been disturbed by reports that Stassen, who had been critical of him recently on the question of foreign aid, was going to challenge him in his home state. Stassen's refusal to heed Taft's private request not to intervene in the Ohio Primary, seemed certain to guarantee a divisive time for Republicans in the run up to the 1948 Convention.

Stassen's determination to fight Taft on his home ground was reminiscent of the tactics of Willkie. But in early 1948, nobody took Stassen's campaign for the nomination very seriously. There was some speculation that his real aim was to become vice-presidential candidate on a ticket headed by Vandenberg. More serious consideration was given to the question of whether Eisenhower would try to secure the nomination. Like Taft's deficiencies, the question of whether Eisenhower would run was a burning topic of conversation at the January National Committee meeting. Eisenhower could convince nobody that he didn't want the nomination, "Everyone knows," wrote Cal O'Loughlin,
"he would accept the nomination if he could get it."74

O'Laughlin's view was shared by Joseph Alsop, whilst Eisenhower's old war-time comrade, Commander H. C. Butcher, wrote to Eisenhower, explaining the rumours: "Some professional Republican politicians are of the opinion that General Ike is thin skinned and can not stand criticism. Therefore, they plan to needle him out of the campaign."75 Certainly Dewey took Eisenhower's possible candidacy seriously; apart from MacArthur, he was the only candidate that Dewey was reported to fear.76 Eisenhower's public announcement that he was not a candidate temporarily put an end to the speculation, as well as disappointing many supporters.77 Eisenhower's public announcement that he was not a candidate temporarily put an end to the speculation, as well as disappointing many supporters.77 Eisenhower's public announcement that he was not a candidate temporarily put an end to the speculation, as well as disappointing many supporters.77

74 O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, October 22nd, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS. Reports of his address at a dinner in honour of Governor Duff of Pennsylvania in December, at which Taft and Vandenberg were present, helped to increase rumours of his candidacy; the meeting was meant to be off the record, but to Vandenberg's annoyance, somebody leaked distorted reports. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Rolman Mörin, December 12th, 1947, copy in General Floyd L. Parks MSS., Eisenhower Library; Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 423-4. In December, Vandenberg had written thanking Eisenhower for the gift of a box of cigars with the comment, "...I am smoking to your good health and your Presidential success at Columbia or anywhere else". A. H. Vandenberg to Dwight D. Eisenhower, December 15th, 1947, Dwight D. Eisenhower MSS, Eisenhower Library.

75 Harry C. Butcher to Eisenhower, January 17th, 1948, Eisenhower MSS.

76 O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, October 11th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.

77 Report, January 30th, 1948, McNaughton MSS; "...his present stand is at variance with what he intimated privately when he visited Manchester in October," grumbled one of his supporters, Leonard V. Finder to "Mother and dad", January 30th, 1948, Leonard V. Finder MSS, Eisenhower Library.
Lower himself was to give the impression that he favoured Vandenberg for the nomination; he also apparently left the door open for himself to take the Democratic nomination if Taft or MacArthur got the Republican nomination. Eisenhower's elimination of himself from the race, convinced the pundits that a compromise choice, either Joseph Martin or Vandenberg would be nominated. Vandenberg still protested that he was not a candidate; to Eisenhower booster, Finder, he cabled in March in response to a request for an interview, "...I am quite willing to chat with you about Eisenhower or about why I should not - repeat not - be nominated." The Soviets apparently shared the judgement of the eastern press, for in January the Soviet Ambassador requested a meeting with Vandenberg.

For all the press speculation, however, the fact is that the principal contenders for the nomination were Dewey and Taft. Both were conducting vigorous campaigns for the nomination in what looked likely to be a vintage year. Inevitably, in view of the emergence of the United States as the dominant world power, both candidates were forced to deal with the question of foreign policy in their pre-convention campaigns; the question could not as easily be avoided as in 1944. Dewey, sensitive to past taunts as to his avoidance of discussion, made a forthright explication of his views. In Massachusetts in February, he committed himself to European federation, and to make Marshall Plan...

78 Stewart Alsop to Martin Sommers, April 2nd, 1948, Alsop MSS. 79 Telegram, A. H. Vandenberg to Finder, March 5th, 1948, Finder MSS. 80 Report, January 30th, 1948, McNaughton MSS.
aid conditional on progress towards unity and on self-help towards economic recovery. At the same time, he had no hesitation in putting blame on the Administration for the state of the world, especially for its failure to tackle the question of the Ruhr, whose internationalization he recalled, he had advocated four years earlier: "The policies which created this paralysis can and must be reversed. Our Government can still do a job, unless the National Administration actually wants, for political purposes, to keep this country in a continuing state of crisis and of high prices caused by shortages of goods". He also blamed the Administration for helping "to build up the strength of another expanding despotism". In March, a Chicago Tribune reporter commented that in recent off the record speeches, Dewey had become increasingly belligerent in matters of foreign policy, having even advocated, the creation of a United States military establishment in Outer Mongolia. His commitment to the Marshall Plan was also unequivocal, despite the rhetorical conditions imposed in the February speech. Accepting the validity of the President's crisis speech in mid-March ("as far as it went"), he was unsparing in his criticism of the Administration for having let things get to the present pass, and for vacillation. The United States, he said, must have a "hard boiled" programme of

81 Taft's organization got reports that this speech made a good impression; John Gordon Bennett, "Supplementary Massachusetts Report", Taft, Philadelphia Convention File, Clarence Brown MSS.
aid, and an "accelerated" diplomatic and propaganda offensive, and must revive its world wide intelligence services. In addition, he promised that over the next two months, he would continue to make a number of speeches on foreign affairs.\(^84\) Dewey's early rhetoric then, indicated the likelihood of a vigorous and hard-hitting campaign on matters of foreign policy. Indications were that Dewey would expect to attack the Administration for having made previous mistakes, as well as urging more vigorous, yet on the whole not over costly, American leadership. The emphasis on dynamic leadership, on ideas and toughness, which Dewey and Dulles had developed since 1944 formed, therefore, the basis of the foreign policy "alternative". which they were proposing to offer in the 1948 campaign.

For his part, Taft, although he made concessions to the prevailing trends, could not but strike a dissenting note. Even more explicitly than Dewey, he blamed the Administration for the world situation. Democratic policy towards the Soviet Union, he argued, was not "merely a mistake" but the result of "softness" towards communism in "the basic New Deal philosophy".\(^85\) As well as excluding Republicans from the mistakes which had been made, and calling for a change of policy in Asia, Taft also berated the Administration for having failed to give a moral lead. At the same time, however, he criticized the Administration for having over-estimated the influence which American economic power could have on


the world. 86 Fundamentally then, Taft was still at odds with the direction of post-war policy; not because it was anti-Russian, for he deferred to nobody in his anti-communism and berated the Administration for having "an inferiority complex to Russia", but because in his view it was based on a mis-perception of American interests. 87 At Chicago in February, he revealed the extent to which his ideas remained unchanged: "We may well remember that the ultimate purpose of any foreign policy is to assure that freedom under which progress can be resumed. We should not be actuated by purely altruistic desire to improve the condition of other people who have failed for centuries to do the job for themselves". 88 Taft, then, could not share Dewey's vision of a dynamic capitalism; too much aid would be damaging, he said, it would do more harm than good in Europe, they must be made to "depend on their own efforts". 89 Though Taft's political ambitions had perhaps forced him to modify his views, he was by 1948 further from the position of Vandenberg and Dewey than he had been in 1944. Opposed to the idea of a draft, he pinned his hopes on a strong air force, on research and intelligence, and on a system of reserve provision. Assuming, apparently correctly, that the United States did not face a military challenge beyond the

86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., February 24th, 1948.
88 Ibid., February 11th, 1948.
89 Ibid., February 24th, 1948.

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line "fixed at Yalta", he still believed in the military impregnability of the United States. Prepared to support economic and military aid, within reason, he never lost sight of the prime objective of foreign policy as it had been traditionally defined, to maintain freedom in the United States; characteristically, then, he was concerned as a first priority to fight communism in the United States, rather than concentrating exclusively or primarily on Europe or even Asia. In the final analysis, the European situation was not, in Taft's view, of vital concern to the United States; given this assumption, it followed that from a self-interest standpoint, the provision of large scale assistance to sustain liberal capitalism in Europe was not required, and, as he had consistently argued throughout the post-war years, might end freedom in the United States whilst doing no good to the recipients.

The challenge of Harold Stassen, whose star was in the ascendant following primary victories in Wisconsin and Nebraska, provided a crucial test for Taft in his home state. Inevitably, Stassen, who as ever sought to be in the vanguard of foreign policy leadership, was bound to force an examination of Taft's foreign policy position. In the early part of 1948, he outdid everyone in his call for the United States to go on the offensive against the Soviet Union with economic and propaganda methods. Such methods,

91 Alsop to Martin Sommers, April 18th, 1948; Alsop to Martin Sommers, May 3rd, 1948, Alsop MSS.

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he had argued, would facilitate a new convention in 1950 to strengthen the United Nations.92 In April, in Wisconsin, Stassen announced his support for a move to outlaw the Communist Party, which was likely to be popular in some sectors of the Republican Party.93 In Ohio, he continued with same theme. There was, he said, a "world menace to liberalism" which should be met neither by appeasement nor by talk of inevitable war, but by outlawry of the Communist Party, both in the United States and all peace-loving countries, as well as by a strengthening of the United Nations and the establishment of an international peace force.94 Calling for assurance that Marshall aid would be continued into the second year, and endorsing the idea of a regional security grouping with the Brussels pact powers, he also challenged Taft's right to be considered a Republican leader; on matters such as the Marshall Plan, he claimed that he himself was far nearer to the Republican position.95 Stassen's campaign forced Taft to defend his own position. Labelling Stassen a dreamy idealist and a virtual New Dealer, he also charged him with being a late-comer in his opposition to communism.96 Taft also opposed the idea of outlawing the Communist Party: "Under our Constitution a man can be

93 He attacked Truman and Dewey for opposing this; referring to a Dewey statement opposing outlawry, he commented darkly: "Jan Masaryk made a statement very much like that to me in Prague a year ago."; Ibid., April 3rd, 1948.
96 Ibid., April 28th, 1948.
a Communist if he desires". At the same time, Taft resolutely defended his own pre-Pearl Harbor position, claiming that like Willkie and Roosevelt he had favoured aid to Britain short of war, but that he had opposed Roosevelt's later measures as likely to lead to war. "I predicted the futility of war," he commented, "the fact that a nation which wins a war, loses the war. I foresaw the advent of Government regulation and control, and huge Government deficits. I urged peace until it should become clear that our national freedom was involved".

Stassen's intervention in Ohio, as Taft had feared, weakened Taft's own candidacy without significantly strengthening that of Stassen himself. By May, with MacArthur's candidacy already played out, the Old Guard were looking to Martin or Bricker in the event of Taft's failure. Their hopes depended, however, on Stassen eliminating Dewey in the Oregon primary. In the event, Stassen's ineffective challenge to Dewey to a radio debate on the issue of outlawry of the Communist Party was generally held to have effectively put an end to his candidacy, and incidentally to the Old Guard's hopes that he might "stop" Dewey. Stassen's attempt to bracket Truman-Wallace-Dewey as all favouring the continued legalization of the Communist Party might have

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97 Ibid., April 25th, 1948.
98 Ibid., May 2nd, 1948.
99 Diary, May 6th, 1948, Smith MSS; O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, May 14th, 1948, O'Laughlin MSS.
100 Ibid.
seemed good tactics in the climate of 1948, but it misfired. By the end of the campaign, his credibility gone, Stassen was alleging a Taft-Dewey deal to defeat him.\footnote{101}{New York Times, May 13th, 1948.} \footnote{102}{Ibid., May 20th, 1948.} \footnote{103}{Ibid., May 16th, 1948.} \footnote{104}{Ibid., May 7th, 1948.} \footnote{105}{Ibid., May 12th, 1948.} \footnote{106}{In October, 1947, James Forrestal had got the impression from Dewey that he was in general agreement with the Administration's foreign policy, Millis, p. 314.}

By contrast, Dewey's campaign in Oregon reflected the self-confidence, and the arrogance, of a front-runner. Stressing that he was "the founder and head of the nation's bipartisan foreign policy" and that he had, as Governor of New York, conferred with "the heads of freedom-loving nations all over the world", he portrayed the Democratic Administration as vacillating and fumbling.\footnote{103}{Ibid., May 16th, 1948.} Taking a consistently hard line against the Soviet Union, he said that he had two men in mind for Secretary of State, both of whom were capable of saying "No" to Stalin: Dulles and Vandenberg.\footnote{104}{Ibid., May 7th, 1948.} Commenting on radio reports that the Soviet Union was prepared to negotiate its difficulties with the United States, "the best news since V-J Day if they mean it", he added that for the first time the Administration was dealing from strength, which he attributed to "prodding by the Republican Congress".\footnote{105}{Ibid., May 12th, 1948.} If Dewey was offering any alternative policy to that already being pursued, it was hard to detect.\footnote{106}{In October, 1947, James Forrestal had got the impression from Dewey that he was in general agreement with the Administration's foreign policy, Millis, p. 314.} The bipartisan policy, which he claimed as his own, was the foundation of his policy; the Administration
he appeared to regard as inefficient and maybe half-hearted protagonists of the same. Dewey, then, offered the Old Guard no real hope of making foreign policy the issue in the 1948 campaign which they so dearly wished. The Old Guard, however, was whistling in the dark, with talk of nominating Bricker if Taft couldn't get it. The press could talk about nobody as a serious alternative but Vandenberg.

Vandenberg's success in Congress with the Marshall Plan, and later the Vandenberg Resolution, kept him continually in the forefront in 1948. He remained, however, despite pressure, opposed to his own candidacy: concerned about his health, afraid of dying in office, aware of his wife's opposition, the reasons why he felt he should not be a candidate were many. Not least was the fact that he felt his candidacy would impair foreign policy leadership in the Senate. Senator Smith, on the basis of a long talk with him in June, concluded, "The Vandenberg situation is serious. There is something behind that she does not want in the light. . .", and "The Chicago Tribune is out to get him". Vandenberg's hesitancy could not however stop the speculation, nor the activities of friends such as Senator Smith and Henry Cabot Lodge, nor of his son,

107 O'Laughlin to General MacArthur, June 11th, 1948; O'Laughlin to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, June 11th, 1948, O'Laughlin MSS.
108 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 424-7, 431-9; Alsop to Martin Sommers, June 1st, 1948, Alsop MSS.
109 Diary, June 16th, 1948, Smith MSS.
Arthur Vandenberg, Jr. Friends and foes alike seemed convinced that he would ultimately be a candidate, reports even got down to details of who would be his Vice-President (Dewey was mentioned in April) and who would be his Secretary of the Treasury.\footnote{Alsop to Martin Sommers, April 2nd, 1948; Alsop to Martin Sommers, April 10th, 1948; Alsop to Martin Sommers, April 18th, 1948; Alsop to Martin Sommers, June 12th, 1948, Alsop MSS.}

On June 2nd, 1948, it was revealed that a poll of 50 Washington correspondents, whilst unanimously forecasting a Republican victory, also predicted by a large majority that Vandenberg would be the next President of the United States.\footnote{New York Times, June 3rd, 1948.} A day later, in what was regarded as an overt attack on Vandenberg, the House Appropriations Committee, led by John Taber of New York, slashed 25% off the first year of the Marshall Plan. Majority Leader Charles Halleck reportedly told "a friend of young Van's that the House was a 'Martin House first, a Dewey House second, a Taft House third, and not a Vandenberg House at all'". The same source also claimed that the cuts had been planned by Halleck, Taber and Martin to trip up Vandenberg before the Republican Convention. There were even insinuations that Dewey might have known something about the move in advance.\footnote{Alsop to Martin Sommers, June 12th, 1948; Alsop MSS; Report, June 11th, 1948, McNaughton MSS.} Whatever the truth of the rumours, Vandenberg was predictably furious, and immediately asked to be allowed to testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee; he also attacked
the cuts on the floor of the Senate.\textsuperscript{113} To John Foster Dulles he wrote of the need to do something quickly about drafting the Republican foreign policy platform: "... Because I think it is quite obvious now that a serious effort will be made in the Resolutions Committee of the Convention to upset any sort of enlightened foreign policy and return to the 'good old days' when it took two weeks to cross the ocean".\textsuperscript{114} "I think," he continued, "the action of the House Appropriations Committee yesterday is one of the warning signals. I do not know how anything could be more shocking or more subversive of every Republican pretense toward international cooperation. Mr. Molotov told Western Europe last summer not to make the mistake of 'trusting' us. Some of our distinguished colleagues seem bent on proving how right he was. I am frankly disgusted this morning. I do not know whether I can survive the day without making a 'Sherman statement' or not."\textsuperscript{115} Vandenberg's inclination then, although resisted by his son and Senator Lodge, was to take himself unequivocally out of contention for the Presidential nomination.\textsuperscript{116}

The action of the House Appropriations Committee, which was a reflection of the under-currents against Vandenberg, and the "bipartisan" foreign policy, presaged a lively Convention. The Old Guard were determined to cut Vandenberg down to size, and to ensure that he didn't complete what many regarded as his betrayal of the Party by winning the

\textsuperscript{113} Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 396-7.
\textsuperscript{114} Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, June 4th, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Alsop to Martin Sommers, June 12th, 1948, Alsop MSS.

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nomination. For their part, Vandenberg's supporters were simply spurred on to greater action, with Governor Duff of Pennsylvania coming into the spotlight as a key advocate of Vandenberg's nomination. Cal O'Laughlin, a faithful reflector of anti-Vandenberg opinion, reported to General MacArthur that "Vandenberg is doing all in his power, under cover of course, to get the nomination. He seized upon the cut of the ERP appropriations to make a dramatic appeal to all those who believe in huge spending for foreign aid. However, there will be many delegates at the Convention opposed to the Truman policies and they will insist that with Vandenberg it would be impossible for the Party to criticize them in the bitter campaign we have entered upon."

Vandenberg was not alone in fighting the appropriation cuts. Publicly he was backed by Dewey, Stassen and Earl Warren; Dewey in particular could not afford to let Vandenberg take all the credit for fighting the cuts. In Congress, however, Vandenberg also received support from fellow Republicans, including even from Senate Whip, Kenneth Wherry, who had led the opposition to the Marshall Plan earlier in the year. Senator Bridges, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, also supported Vandenberg, whilst in the House Vandenberg was supported by Christian Herter and Everett Dirksen. The signs of the closing of the

117 Chicago Tribune, June 9th, 1948. Alsop MSS.
118 Alsop to Martin Sommers, June 8th, 1948; Chicago Tribune, June 10th, 1948.
119 O'Laughlin to General MacArthur, June 11th, 1948, O'Laughlin MSS.
120 Ibid.; clipping from Washington Post, June 8th, 1948 in Dewey file, Democratic National Committee Library MSS.
121 New York Times, June 10th, 1948; Report, June 5th, 1948, McNaughton MSS.
ranks did not impress John Taber, who reaffirmed that he would not yield an inch, and that he expected the House to support him. The bill had, he said, become "a test as to whether people will support legislation based on facts and constitutional government or whether they want billions of tax money appropriated by hearsay and emotion. The house unlike two-thirds of the senate, was elected less than two years ago. We came here to put a stop to legislation rammed thru by emergency and tear-jerker tactics."122

With the Republican Convention due to open in Philadelphia on June 20th, the pressures on securing unity were tremendous. They were increased by President Truman's action in setting off for a "non-political" trip to the West, during which he appeared to be capitalizing on Republican difficulties by describing the 80th Congress as the worst ever. The President's charge brought instant reaction: from Charles Halleck the comment that many thought Mr. Truman was the poorest President the United States had ever had; from Taft the comment that among other things the Congress had reversed the Administration policy towards communism.123 Vandenberg also, in a television broadcast from the Foreign Relations Committee room, took issue with the President's attacks on Congress: "It is a little early to subordinate the national welfare to partisan sniping. At least let it be said that Congress has remained faithfully at work

122 Chicago Tribune, June 10th, 1948.
during this critical fortnight. It has not shared the Presidential luxury of a self-serving political vacation at a moment when the whole Government should be on the job in Washington." At the same time, Vandenberg declared his pride in the Congress' record in foreign affairs; in fact, he said, he doubted whether a better record had ever been made.\textsuperscript{124}

Vandenberg's broadcast, enabling him to appear in his most convincing role, as a non-partisan partisan, was timely. Although three days earlier he had given the impression that he would be happy with Dewey as President and Dulles as Secretary of State, his candidacy was very much alive.\textsuperscript{125} On the day of his television address there were reports that he would allow his position on the nomination to be determined by the question of whether or not Congress restored the E.R.P. funds.\textsuperscript{126} Taft meanwhile, was clearly seeking to conciliate Vandenberg. A few days before the Convention, he told him that in the event of his nomination, he would want him to be his Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{127} On June 18th, he announced that the passage of draft legislation and agreement on E.R.P. appropriations were essential before Congress adjourned, which was no idle threat with the Convention only two days away. As Republican leader in domestic affairs, he said that he would be "quite prepared to stand by the

\textsuperscript{124}Ibid., June 19th, 1948.  
\textsuperscript{125}Ibid., June 16th, 1948.  
\textsuperscript{126}Ibid., June 19th, 1948.  
\textsuperscript{127}Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 438; Taft was also responsible for the nomination of Senator Lodge as chairman of the Resolutions Committee at the Convention, \textit{New York Times}, June 23rd, 1948.
view of Senator Vandenberg as to what is essential to carry out our moral commitments to Europe". John Taber, however, held out until the end. On June 18th, he was reported as saying: "There is no agreement. There is no agreement on anything. There is nothing; it's all over". But under pressure, he gave way at the eleventh hour, most of the funds were restored, and Congress adjourned in time for the Republicans to hurry off to Philadelphia.

In the event, the first two weeks of June were a triumph for Vandenberg, although he had been aided by the pressures toward Party unity. Personally he had no illusions as to his own popularity amongst the Old Guard, even though many had given him belated support in his struggle with the House Appropriations Committee. On June 20th, the New York Times carried a statement by the Governor of Michigan, that Vandenberg would take the nomination if the Convention demanded it, a statement which was factually correct but likely to give a false impression. The fight with the House leadership had wakened Vandenberg to the possibility of an attempt to revert to "isolationism", especially with Governor Green of Illinois scheduled to deliver the keynote address. In that event alone was he prepared to become an active candidate. The reported attempt of Col. McCormick,

128Ibid., June 19th, 1948; he had earlier threatened to bring Congress back after the Convention, a threat which led to uproar in the House Steering Committee, Diary, June 8th and 9th, 1948, Wadsworth MSS.
130Ibid., June 10th, 1948; Dewey is usually credited with having put pressure on Taber, who as an up-state New York Republican was loyal to Dewey.
131Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 428.
proprietor of the Chicago Tribune, to arrange a Taft-Stassen ticket to stop Dewey and Vandenberg was, however, a sign, not only of the durability of the Nationalists' hatred of Vandenberg, but also of their desperation. As the Convention was once more to reveal, the Dewey organization had left nothing to chance, and Vandenberg's fears were unfounded.

Philadelphia 1948: The Triumph of 'Unity'

The first, most important job of the 1948 Convention was to secure agreement on a foreign policy plank, a job which had caused difficulties in the two previous Conventions, and which, in view of the development of bipartisanship and the unforeseen changes in American policy since 1944, might be expected to cause even more difficulty than previously. The ground work for the 1948 platform had been laid since May by John Foster Dulles and Vandenberg, although they each ultimately submitted separate drafts to the Resolutions Committee. For the most part Vandenberg and Dulles had been in agreement, although Dulles, by 1948 more sensitive to the needs of electoral politics, favoured a more detailed bill of goods, especially mentioning policies towards countries such as Italy and China. At Philadelphia, despite the opposition of Senator Brooks of Illinois, Senator Lodge was able to pilot the platform through with remarkable ease. A few controversial items were taken out, apparently

132 Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, May 14th, 1948; 1948 Scrapbook, June 20th-25th, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
133 See Dulles' draft of June 8th, 1948, Vandenberg MSS; in the early Dulles draft was the following: "The iron curtain must not be advanced and we shall keep hope alive in those behind it - in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries - who trusted in our word".
134 Charles S. Reed to Vandenberg, July 14th, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
as anticipated, including a United Nations control of atomic energy, a commitment to "implement with appropriations any commitment made by legislative enactment", and a specific commitment to the Reciprocal Trade programme. 135

The resultant platform was far less equivocal over foreign affairs than had been the case in 1944. Although all the fundamentals of a "Strong America" remained, the emphasis was different. For the traditionalists, there was the familiar commitment "to uphold as a beacon light for mankind everywhere, the inspiring American tradition of liberty, opportunity and justice for all. . ." 136 There were also a string of statements giving the familiar reiteration of prime concern for American welfare: "Prudently conserving our own resources, we shall cooperate on a self-help basis with other peace-loving nations". 137 "At all times safeguarding our own industry and agriculture, and under efficient administrative procedures for the legitimate consideration of domestic needs, we shall support the system of reciprocal trade and encourage international commerce." 138 ". . .all foreign commitments should be made public and subject to constitutional ratification. In all of these things we shall primarily consult the national security and welfare of our own United States. In all of these things we shall welcome the world's cooperation. But in none of these things

135Chicago Tribune, June 23rd, 1948; Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 429.
136Porter and Johnson, p. 450.
137Ibid.
138Ibid., p. 454.
shall we surrender our ideals or our free institutions."\textsuperscript{139}

But whilst the familiar signposts remained, there was also a lack of any concern for sovereignty, which had been a great issue in 1944; in its place was a strong commitment to the United Nations. More remarkably, there was a statement calling for "primary recognition of America's self-interest in the liberty of other peoples" and praise of the Republican Congress for having passed "the most far-reaching measures in history adopted to aid the recovery of the free world on a basis of self-help and with prudent regard for our own resources".\textsuperscript{140} No wonder Vandenberg derived some satisfaction that the unanimous passage of the platform "means that the Chicago Colonel and many of my bitter Congressional foes who were Delegates must have voted for it. Life does have its amusing consolations".\textsuperscript{141}

In short, the platform did not promise the changes in foreign policy which the Nationalists desired. Neither was it other than mildly partisan: it expressed pride in the part Republicans had played "in those limited areas of foreign policy in which they have been permitted to participate" and offered the minority party a chance in the next administration to join "in stopping partisan politics at the water's edge".\textsuperscript{142} The Platform then was a victory for Vandenberg and the group of Republicans who had supported the

\textsuperscript{139}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140}Ibid., pp. 450, 451.
\textsuperscript{141}Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 428-9.
\textsuperscript{142}Porter and Johnson, p. 454.
bulk of Administration foreign policy initiatives since World War II. Passage of the platform did not, however, produce unity out of a hat; controversial issues such as arms aid and the European security pact lay in the future. Vandenberg, however, defending the platform to a friend against the charges of over-generalization allowed himself to be carried away, describing it as "the most important advance in American foreign policy since the Monroe Doctrine". "I think it definitely and conclusively commits the Republican Party to the intelligent self-interest which we have in the preservation other independent governments as a bulwark to our own national security," he wrote. Naturally, the Chicago Tribune could not share Vandenberg's enthusiasm over the direction which the Republicans seemed headed as a result of developments prior to and at the Convention. These developments, which it attributed to Wall Street dominance and internationalist propaganda, it felt could only be redeemed by the nomination of Taft, "a candidate distinguished for common sense and for his belief that the welfare of the United States must not be sacrificed either to the desire of European nations to live off us or to the ambitions of our own military for dominance over the nation".

143 Vandenberg to Frank Januszewski, July 17th, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
144 Chicago Tribune, June 21st, 1948.
145 Ibid., June 23rd, 1948. Joseph Alsop predicted that the "reactionaries" would be too divided between the candidacies of Taft, Ericker, Martin, Dewey, etc., to be able to unite at the Convention; Alsop to Martin Sommers, June 12th, 1948, Alsop MSS.
If the "Internationalists" were able to make the running in drafting the platform, they kept a low profile in the public sessions of the Convention. Apart from Clare Luce, whose fiery partisanship and out-spokenness always compensated for earlier "One World" affiliations, the principal speakers were all identified with the Old Guard: Governor Green of Illinois, Senator Wherry and Herbert Hoover. In the area of foreign policy, all the main speakers at the Convention took a partisan line, for the most part emphasizing the mistakes of the Administration in appeasing the Soviet Union at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. Clare Luce said she dreaded to think how much more would have been given to Stalin had not "Senator Vandenberg and Foster Dulles and other Republican Statesmen... put some backbone into the New Deal State Department." 146 Senator Wherry, similarly, although coming from the opposite wing of the Party to Clare Luce, said "there has been and will continue to be cooperation by the Republican majority in Congress with all Americans of good will in a fair and reasonable American foreign policy. But the Republican Party and its Congressional leadership have never been the appeasers of Soviet Russia. You can't charge the Republican Party with that." 147 He also credited the Republican Party with having helped bring about the abandonment of the Morgenthau Plan, which he saw as the root cause of American foreign policy flounderings: "Our party and its representatives in Congress know that German recovery

147 Ibid., p. 70.
is the key to recovery for all of Europe. It is essential to our belated American policy to neutralize the threat of world communism."\textsuperscript{148}

The somewhat apocalyptic terms with which both Internationalists and Nationalists had viewed the 1948 Convention proved unjustified. Not surprisingly, the Convention was more concerned to smooth over differences, rather than to exacerbate them. Thus Dewey, on arrival, praised the 80th Congress, which had recently come under attack from the President, and like many of the key speakers, praised it for having made the Administration take a more realistic foreign policy line, and for having forced the Truman team to "quit wobbling".\textsuperscript{149} Clare Luce's praise of Stassen, Vandenberg and Dewey, and her omission of Taft, were noted, but drowned by the applause which greeted her anti-administration rhetoric.\textsuperscript{150} In her syndicated report of the Convention, she commented that Governor Green's address had been far from the "isolationist" argument that rumours had suggested it would be, and instead "...it showed that the Republican party has returned to the progressive, forward marching, world-minded foreign policy of Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay and Elihu Root."\textsuperscript{151}

The actual process of nomination likewise went smoothly. Despite the unfaltering enthusiasm of his supporters, who

\textsuperscript{148}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{151}United Feature Syndicate Release, June 23, 1948, copy in Baruch MSS.
even hired an elephant to boost his drive for the nomination, Taft's candidacy never transcended his sectional appeal to the South, Midwest, mountain and border states. His reputed poor electoral record frightened the cautious, whilst his relatively progressive record on domestic affairs had, in his view at least, led to disenchantment amongst some conservatives, who were courted by the slick Dewey organizers. The main hope of stopping Dewey probably lay with Vandenberg, who declined to "connive", but who in any case was more unpopular with the Old Guard than Dewey. Such was its despair, that the Midwest put its faith in Stassen. Having described Stassen in January as "merely a 1948 edition of Willkie, put up by Wall Street to fool middle westerners into thinking he is one of them. . ." the Chicago Tribune, at the instigation of the indefatigable Colonel, came out in favour of a Taft-Stassen ticket, arguing that Vandenberg could not even carry Michigan and that Dewey would do no better than in 1944. The chances of a Taft-Stassen ticket seemed less great than that of a Vandenberg-Stassen ticket, but Vandenberg refused to take any active part in such a move. In any case, the chances were slim, but the Dewey machine was leaving nothing to chance; rumours about Vandenberg's mistress, which had been used by the right wing in the past, were circulated by the Dewey organization at Philadelphia.

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152 Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 416-417.
154 Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 412; New York Times, June 24, 1948; Chicago Tribune, June 23, 1948.
The key to the nomination was held by the Pennsylvania delegation, the largest of the "favourite son" delegations, which was committed to supporting Senator Martin. This situation, the result of divisions between the Grundy organization and Governor Duff, who hated Dewey and supported Vandenberg, was resolved on June 22nd when Senator Martin announced that he was withdrawing, therefore leaving his Dewey-dominated delegation free to support Dewey on the first ballot. Following the Pennsylvania success, the Dewey organization succeeded in wooing Indiana, reportedly by offering Charles Halleck the vice-presidency. At the end of the first ballot, a meeting of Taft, Stassen, Governor Duff, Governor Sigler (Mich.) and J. D. Hamilton unsuccessfully sought agreement on how to stop the inexorable Dewey blitz. "It might have been worse. It might have been Vandenberg," commented Colonel McCormich as he left the Convention floor. For the third time, commented the Colonel's paper, the international bankers had taken the Republican Party; the Tribune only hoped that Dewey would not drag other Republican candidates down to defeat.

There was no doubt that Dewey was less than universally popular even among the party faithful gathered at Philadelphia. Senator Martin's description of him in his nominating speech as "a giant towering over all" brought laughter from the floor and galleries, and his name was reportedly booed. There was also some scepticism about

155Chicago Tribune, June 23, 1948; Ross, p. 17.
158Chicago Tribune, June 24, 1948.
159Ibid., June 25, 1948.
160Ibid.
161Ibid., June 24, 1948.
his claim that he had made no promises of jobs. But even the Tribune's chief political correspondent, Arthur Sears Henning, reported the unity and the optimism of the Convention, as well as explaining Dewey's nomination partly out of a desire to do "political justice to a candidate who but for the war unquestionably would have been elected in 1944." Some of the Internationalists however, were still uneasy, especially about the way in which Dewey's supporters were conciliating conservatives. Senator Smith of New Jersey for example was concerned about rumours that Halleck would get the vice-presidential nomination, and sought to throw what influence he had behind Stassen's candidacy for the job. In his diary he confided, "there is an undercurrent of isolationism and the pressure of the diehards." Had Halleck been nominated, the supporters of Stassen and Vandenberg, determined to make the defeat of the Old Guard total, were preparing to nominate Stassen from the floor. In the event, Warren's selection avoided the split between Dewey and the Internationalists.

The Convention then, was a complete triumph for the kind of Republicanism for which Vandenberg had become the spokesman since 1945. Vandenberg confessed himself well pleased. To a friend in Michigan he wrote, "I agree with you about

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162 Joseph Alsop commented that "some of Dewey's larger contributors, . . . behave as though they had already taken out a mortgage on the government." Alsop to Martin Sommers, June 29, 1948, Alsop MSS.; Congressman Walter Judd was quoted as saying that "he's promised so many men cabinet jobs that they'll have to operate in three shifts." Chicago Tribune, June 26, 1948.
163 Chicago Tribune, June 25, 1948.
164 Diary, June 25, 1948, Emith MSS.
the Republican ticket. The Warren touch did something to it which has added immeasurably to its potentiality. . . . the Philadelphia platform and the Philadelphia ticket are such a complete vindication of my own Republican attitudes that I am totally content."165

Vandenberg's contentment was shared by others who were agreeably surprised that after the potential disasters of early June, the Party had emerged in good shape for the election and for victory.167 John Vorys of Ohio wrote, presumably assuming with everyone else that victory was inevitable, "For the first time since I have been a Member of Congress, I feel freed from the obligations and embarrassments imposed by the presidential ambitions of Bricker and Taft. An era in Ohio politics has ended, and you would be surprised to know how little regret there is among a lot of people greatly interested in politics out here."168

The complete rout of the Midwest at Philadelphia was based on the assumption that electoral victory required a candidate who could carry the large industrial states where Taft, especially because of his alienation of organized labour, was likely to be a liability. The politics of unity required however, a convincing victory in November. Taft, despite his characteristic cheerful reaction, was very much aware of the way in which his wing of the Party had been repudiated at the Convention. To Governor Green of Illinois, he wrote, "I urged your name on Tom Dewey but I got little response except that you were too closely connected with the Chicago Tribune. Tom's whole concern

165 Vandenberg to John W. Blodgett, July 6, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
167 James W. Wadsworth to Thomas E. Dewey, June 30, 1948, Wadsworth MSS.
168 Vorys to Leonard W. Hall, June 29, 1948, Vorys MSS.
seemed to be about carrying the Atlantic seaboard and he seemed to be afraid of all midwestern candidates because they were too 'isolationist.' A dedicated partisan, Taft was not likely to rock the boat in public. Despite his personal disappointment, he could with all Republicans share the joy that an unhappy period in American and Republican Party history was coming to an end.

The Campaign

The Convention at Philadelphia appeared to have got the Republicans off to an excellent start to what seemed their inexorable victory. Their opponents by contrast, already divided by the Wallace candidacy, also suffered the defection of the Dixiecrats, and a widespread lack of enthusiasm for the Truman candidacy, which found expression in heterogeneous support for Eisenhower. The theme of the Dewey campaign was to be "Unity", a phrase considered suitable at what was regarded as a time of severe national crisis, and which was also by implication meant to illustrate both the statesmanship and the internal "unity" of the Republican Party by comparison with its opponents.

Dewey, as much of a machine politician as Truman, although he had never been linked in any way with corrupt politics, sought to put over the claim that he was far more of a statesman; his opponent by contrast was pictured as a none too intelligent man whose meddling in foreign affairs had

\[169\] Patterson, Mr. Republican p. 421; according to Vandenberg, Taft sent word to the party meeting to discuss the vice-presidential nominee that he favoured Bricker, Vandenberg, Private Papers p. 439.

\[170\] Indications of the extent of this support, including Stettinius, Joseph Grew, Adlai Stevenson, and at one stage the Dixiecrats, may be gleaned from the Leonard V. Finder Papers, Eisenhower File, in the Eisenhower Library.
been injurious to the country. Dewey's tactics then, were to claim all the essential features of American policy as it had developed by 1948 as being Republican inspired; all the failures and the alleged initial bungling which had made expensive aid programmes necessary were of course the responsibility of the Administration. The Republican campaign was not therefore "non-partisan" in an absolute sense, but it was designed to maintain a high tone, to reveal Dewey as a man who would not respond to Truman's lower level of political sniping. Such a campaign it was judged, would make it easier for the Republicans to unite the country when Dewey took over from Truman in 1949; it also had the added political advantage of not opening up old sores which had previously divided the Party. "Unity" was a theme which nobody could oppose, provided of course it brought results, and in the summer of 1948 few doubted that it would. As Herbert Hoover commented: "From the signs about, I do not think it will be a very different campaign from 1944 but even so, I don't see how it is possible to lose the election."¹⁷¹

The major internal influence on the nature of the Republican campaign was Senator Vandenberg. Assuming the inevitability of the coming Republican victory, Vandenberg's main concern in 1948 was to protect the bipartisan foreign policy which had been associated with him in the post-war years from the damage which might be inflicted on it by partisan politicians. At times therefore, his relations with some of Dewey's advisers, including even his good friend Dulles,

¹⁷¹ Hoover to Hugh Gibson, August 12, 1948, Hoover MSS.
became somewhat strained. On July 1st at a press conference following discussions with Dulles, Dewey announced his intention of attacking foreign policy decisions made without consultation with Republicans, including China and Palestine policy, the Potsdam decisions and the Greek-Turkish aid programme.¹⁷² Vandenberg, disturbed by Dewey's remarks, addressed a long letter to Dulles outlining his concern that they handle foreign affairs carefully in the campaign, and suggesting that Dewey's statements on foreign affairs be made, if Dewey agreed, only after consultation with Dulles, to avoid "some of the groups working at cross purposes". Convinced of victory, Vandenberg was already looking forward to January: "the next Republican Secretary of State is going to need Democratic votes in the Senate just as badly as the present Administration has needed Republican votes. I have no illusions that the Republican isolationists have surrendered. They will be 'back at the old stand' next January."¹⁷³ Although not wishing, to give the impression that the Republicans could not attack over foreign affairs, Vandenberg argued that there was a danger, which he felt Dewey had approached, of circumscribing "our bipartisan liaison too narrowly" and thereby robbing themselves of important credits, of which he felt the E. C. A. was a spectacular example.¹⁷⁴ At the same time, Vandenberg outlined his intention of urging Secretary Marshall to establish a liaison with Dulles: "I know the Secretary has

¹⁷³Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 446-7.
¹⁷⁴Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, July 2, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
a great respect for you" he wrote, "and I am sure it will be possible to find some sort of a working agree­ment regarding contemporary crises... which may develop in our foreign relations. Governor Dewey's highly pat­riotic attitudes in this connection during the campaign of 1944 cannot be forgotten."175

Dulles sprang to Dewey's defence, arguing that Truman did not divorce himself from politics, and Dewey could not be expected to either; nevertheless, the Vandenberg thesis won the day.176 Apart from a statement on the Italian colonies, to which Vandenberg took exception, Dewey did not significantly deviate from the path laid down by Van­denberg.177 C. Douglas Dillon, one of the group who helped to compile largely un-used material on foreign relations for the campaign,explained in retrospect that Dewey did not use the material, because he was "convinced he was going to win, and he followed the advice of Senator Arthur Vandenberg and of Cabot Lodge. . . that he should not say anything that would too much upset the Democrats because it would be hard for them when they were in the majority.

175Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, July 2, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
177Dewey had spoken in favour of returning the colonies to Italy, Vandenberg disagreed that he should commit himself on a complex international matter during the campaign. Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, August 21, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
after 1948 to deal with the Democrats." A similar analysis was made by Dulles in a letter to a friend in September 1948: "The policy to follow in foreign affairs is difficult because Vandenberg is particularly anxious to avoid anything in the nature of attack. He is taking for granted Dewey's election and is looking to the situation after January when cooperation from Democrats will be required to effectuate the Republican foreign policy." He also added, "I think that not being a candidate for office himself he is a little too dispassionate, but his point of view cannot be ignored as there must not be any 'break' between him and Dewey."  

Over-shadowing the campaign however, was the crisis in Berlin. Even what to Republicans seemed the unnecessarily provocative tone of the Democratic platform was insufficient to bring about a re-appraisal of the campaign. In the crisis of 1948, all the actions of the Administration seemed somehow beneath contempt; thus the decision of the President to call the extra session of Congress evoked from Vandenberg the comment that he doubted that "any good to the country" would come from it: "This sounds like a vast hysterical gasp of an expiring administration." Yet even an Old Guard sympathizer, Cal O'Laughlin, warned Dewey

178 Transcript, interview with C. Douglas Dillon pp. 2-4, Dulles (Oral).
179 Dulles to Ferdinand Meyer, September 7, 1948, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
180 The Soviet blockade of Berlin began on June 24.
against making too much of an issue of the special session, which he said was not solely dictated by domestic politics, but by the dangerous situation in Berlin.\footnote{O'Laughlin to Thomas E. Dewey, July 16, 1948, O'Laughlin MSS.} Vandenberg also was extremely concerned about the situation, and what he regarded as the attendant risk of war. To Robert Lovett, who had written expressing less than pleasure with the decision to call a special session of Congress, he urged that the State Department keep in touch with Dulles: "Unity is dreadfully important at home (to whatever extent this asset remains within our reach after Philadelphia). . ."\footnote{Chicago Tribune, July 21, 1948.} Publicly, Charles Eaton of New Jersey, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called on the President to tell Congress just how close the country was to war. Describing Berlin as the supreme issue facing the United States, he commented, "It is a world conflict between Christ and the devil, between freedom and slavery."\footnote{Ibid. July 22, 1948.} Congressman Walter Judd publicly warned that the country might be at war before the end of the year.\footnote{Ibid.}

In the face of all the war talk, Dewey's statesmanlike pose was faultless. On July 21st he described Berlin as the "major concern" of the Republicans; he was, he said, in daily contact with John Foster Dulles over the situation.\footnote{Ibid. July 22, 1948.} Harold Stassen, who the same day had had a meeting with Dewey, took a more partisan line: whilst attacking the Russians, he blamed "the unusual administrative set-up that grew out of the Potsdam Conference" which made it "almost
impossible to have a satisfactory administration of the whole of Berlin or Germany." On July 23rd, Dewey conferred with Eisenhower, and even extended to him the rare privilege of a joint press conference: both men expressed agreement on the Berlin question and the whole problem of European military and economic union, whilst Dewey expressed the hope that he would have the opportunity of calling on Eisenhower in the future. Finally, on July 24th, after consultation with Vandenberg and Dulles, Dewey issued a statement on Berlin in which, whilst criticizing past mistakes, he expressed the conviction that the United States must not surrender its rights in Berlin. Explanations of Dewey's conduct was given by two journalists with good Republican contacts, James Reston and Arthur Krock. Both agreed that in view of the external situation, Dewey would not attack the Administration over foreign affairs: "There may" commented Reston, "even be no attack made on President Truman for undue interference during the campaign period with the conduct of foreign affairs by the State Department." Arthur Krock commented that whilst Dewey and Dulles were privately very critical of Administration policies leading up to the Berlin crisis, they would not rock the boat. Dewey would, he predicted, "limit his discussions of foreign policy to very broad and cautious statements, as in 1944, in acknowledgement of practical

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188 Ibid., On July 22, the President expressed confidence about a peaceful outcome, and said he would not be discussing foreign affairs in his message to the special session of Congress. Chicago Tribune, July 23, 1948.
190 Ibid., July 31, 1948.
191 Ibid., July 31, 1948.
necessities and patriotic requirements."\textsuperscript{192}

Clearly then, the Berlin crisis, added to the solid influence of Vandenberg, had an inhibiting effect on the Republican campaign; it was even reported that the Republican National Committee Campaign Committee had decided not to approve the use of its major research pamphlet: "Democratic Duplicity and Appeasement in Foreign Policy Administration, 1935-47."\textsuperscript{193} At times Dewey showed signs of wishing to break free from the constraints imposed on him, as over his comments on the Italian colonies and his clear identification with China. Even Vandenberg was prepared to agree that he could attack areas of policy not involved in major negotiation which had not been the subject of bipartisan development. But, in spelling out his objections to Dewey's statement on the Italian colonies, Vandenberg indicated how narrowly in practice he wished criticism to be circumscribed. They must not, he said, commit themselves publicly in advance of consultation with friendly nations, they should deal with generalities which invited "unity rather than debate". "From the standpoint of sheer politics I respectfully submit that we can prove from the record that Republicans can be wholly trusted with these foreign policy responsibilities. I respectfully submit that our only political danger is to UNPROVE it." And further ". . .I think we (as a Party) have infinitely much to lose if we invite the slightest suspicion of our

\textsuperscript{192}Ibid., August 5th, 1948.
\textsuperscript{193}Ibid., August 15th, 1948.
richly earned prestige (from the Governor down) as the authors and advocates of foreign policy cooperation."  

Insisting in public that he did not intend bipartisan foreign policy to muzzle his relations with other countries, Dewey, through his secretary, stated that, "As a founder of this bi-partisan foreign policy. . .Governor Dewey has consistently sought a united front in foreign affairs".  

Perhaps significantly, the same day, after a meeting with Dewey, Charles Halleck reminded the press that on many matters Republicans had not been consulted, and that "mistakes" at war-time conferences had increased the difficulties of the situation in which the United States was now operating.  

The tactics seemed clear: to take all the credit for the successful aspects of American policy, and to dwell critically on the seemingly unsuccessful aspects, such as the war-time conferences, with which Republicans had not been consulted. At the end of August, Dewey said that he was not going to be lulled into over-confidence, and that he was going to conduct a rugged campaign.  

But as far as foreign affairs were concerned his hands were seemingly tied by his commitment to unity, both in the national and party sense. In particular, with Dulles' relationship with Vandenberg apparently cooling, it was clearly unthinkable that there be a repetition of 1944,  

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194 Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, August 21st, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.  
196 Ibid.  
197 Ibid., August 31st, 1948.
when a few liberal Republicans and influential newspapers had deserted him.\(^\text{198}\)

If the theme of "unity" was based on the assumption that a Republican victory was inevitable, the small group of Democrats who, led by Clark Clifford, were managing the President's re-election campaign clearly thought otherwise.\(^\text{199}\) None of the President's political advisers held high political or administrative office; they were in many ways excluded from the foreign policy decision-making process to almost the same degree as the political advisers surrounding Dewey. This meant, therefore, that the President was, like Dewey, pulled by two sets of advisers: the political, and those whose interests were in maintaining a united foreign policy.\(^\text{200}\) In the same way as Republicans sought to maximise their contributions to bipartisanship, so the President's political advisers sought in 1948 to play down bipartisan foreign policy, and to play up executive leadership, especially as Vandenberg's prestige began

\(^{198}\) Alsop to Martin Somers, August 16th, 1948, Alsop MSS.

\(^{199}\) Useful background on this can be found in, Harold Emery Barto, "Clark Clifford and the Presidential Election of 1948" (Ph.D. thesis, Rutgers University, 1970), pp. 25-31, 35-38.

\(^{200}\) In July Dulles gave the following account of a talk with Robert Lovett which reveals the strains between the two sets of advisers: "...He...privately expressed his chagrin at the Democratic platform on foreign policy, saying that he and M. were bitterly disappointed; that they had worked with the President to get a decent platform which would not claim all credit for the results of bi-partisan cooperation; that they had thought they had Truman's support, but that in the end the political advisers had written it their way. Also, the State Department knew nothing about the call of Congress until they read it in the papers." Memorandum of meeting with Lovett and Marshall, July 19th, 1948, dated July 20th, 1948, Dulles MSS.
began to rise as a result of the Marshall Plan fight.\textsuperscript{201} In December 1947, Clark Clifford prepared a memorandum outlining re-election strategy for 1948 in which he discounted the possibility of a continuation of bipartisanship, and referred to the "considerable political advantage to the Administration in its battle with the Kremlin".\textsuperscript{202} Predicting a continued deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, the memorandum noted that "In times of crisis the American citizen tends to back up his President".\textsuperscript{203} Republican strategy it saw as distinguishing between the good (Marshall) and the bad (Truman), whilst playing up their own part, and especially the role of Vandenberg.\textsuperscript{204} The Administration must, therefore, ensure greater exposure for the President as regards foreign policy leadership; they must correct the situation in which "several of the incumbent Cabinet officers tend to regard themselves as the rulers of independent baronies".\textsuperscript{205}

The essence of the Clifford strategy was, therefore, clear; in 1948, Mr. Truman must be seen to be President, and in particular he must regain the initiative in matters of defence and foreign policy. Such then was the broad

\textsuperscript{201} Clifford crossed out a reference to bipartisanship in the 1948 State of the Union speech, Draft 6, January 7th, 1948, State of the Union, Elsey MSS; he also opposed reference to bipartisanship in the draft of the message on the Marshall Plan in December, 1947, Pencilled note, undated, Marshall Plan Message Folder 3, Elsey MSS.

\textsuperscript{202} Clark Clifford, Confidential Memorandum to the President, November 19th, 1947, pp. 14-15, Political File, Clark M. Clifford MSS., Truman Library.

\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., p. 15.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., p. 16.

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., pp. 30-1.
strategy of 1948; it was a strategy which was bound to bring some degree of conflict with the State Department and the Department of Defence. In the first half of 1948, Truman's political advisers worked hard, albeit with limited success, to establish the President as the man who made policy. Perhaps the key example of this was the President's decision to address Congress in mid-March, on the same day that he addressed a St. Patrick's Day meeting in New York. The St. Patrick's Day speech in New York had been planned first; it was designed to give a simple explanation of the European situation in anti-Russian and anti-Wallace terms, for obvious political reasons. Commander Elsey, one of Clifford's top aides, commented, that unless the President did something to offset the Marshall Plan and engative publicity about Palestine and China, he was lost; he needed, therefore, to deliver a speech outlining American leadership in the search for peace, European recovery and unity, and opposition to Russian expansion. The State Department viewed the projected speech with considerable misgivings, feeling that the world was far too dangerous a place for the President to take a belligerent stand. Only two days

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206 Pencilled note, "Problems - as EME sees them 8 March '48", Speech File, March 17th, 1948, Elsey MSS.
207 Pencil note, "For. Pol. Message to Congress" bears the cryptic comments: "HST talked to Marshall who is nervous - world keg of dynamite - HST shouldn't start it." Speech File, March 17th, 1948, Elsey MSS. The same file contains other similar warnings from the State Department in opposition to the more belligerent stance of the political staff.
before the scheduled speech, it was decided that the President should first address Congress, a view taken against the wishes apparently of the political staff, and ask it to enact Universal Military Training. On March 17th, then, only one and one-half hours before the scheduled speech to Congress, Congressional leaders were invited to attend the White House, but apparently refused to do so. Both Republicans and Democrats were reportedly hostile to the President's action, and there was speculation that Vandenberg had not been consulted in advance for political reasons. The speech was perhaps a success in terms of publicity: the Democratic National Committee Staff noted that more people had listened to it on the radio than to any speech by Truman since VE day; one of the political staff, congratulating Clark Clifford, said it was a pity that policy decisions had not yet been made which would have enabled it to contain an effective plan for peace to help with the Italian elections and to steal the issue from Wallace. The speech failed, however, to impress Taft, who remained as opposed to universal military training as ever. Frank McNaughton of Time scorned various House leaders who "sat at the Republican committee table in the densely-crowded House Chamber". They grinned as if they were seeing the death of an opposition political party and as if they

208 Report, "Truman Reaction Etc. (NA)", March 1948, McNaughton MSS.
209 Memorandum, Ken Fry to Jack Redding, March 19th, 1948, Publicity Files, Democratic National Committee Records, Truman Library; William Batt to Clifford, March 18th, 1948, Political File, Clifford MSS.
had no realization of any U.S. peril."\(^{210}\)

Truman's address to Congress in March revealed, therefore, the political ramifications of the crisis of 1948. At the time of his speech, his stock was very low, and in the succeeding months there appeared to be no improvement. Opposed by large sections of his party, he appeared to have lost whatever control he had ever had of his Administration. Foreign policy in particular seemed increasingly the preserve of Secretary Marshall, under-Secretary Lovett and Senator Vandenberg. April, in fact, found the President's prestige and morale at a low ebb.\(^{211}\) Arthur Krock commented that "the President's influence at this writing is weaker than any President's has been in modern American history, and in an hour when national security requires all the strength implicit in his office".\(^{212}\) Walter Lippmann also claimed that the President had lost control of his administration: "...Mr. Truman does not have the qualifications that are essential in a Commander in Chief".\(^{213}\)

It seems clear, therefore, that the President's role in the development of policy was, apart from politically sensitive matters such as Israel, minimal by the summer of 1948. Even matters of appointment to the European Recovery Program were partially taken out of Administration hands by the need to secure the assent of Vandenberg and Congress.\(^{214}\)

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\(^{210}\)Report, March 17th, 1948, McNaughton MSS.
\(^{211}\)Tris Coffin to Finder, April 13th, 1948, Finder MSS.
\(^{212}\)New York Times, April 4th, 1948.
\(^{213}\)Clipping, dated April 1st, 1948, Harry S. Truman Administration, Subject File, Elsey MSS.
\(^{214}\)Lilienthal, II: 337.
Rather than redound to his political advantage, the war scare in fact seemed to have the reverse effect. In May, Senator George told reporters that the country should elect a strong, one-term President; he did not think Truman was "the answer to the country's prayer for leadership". In early June, fifty Washington correspondents, asked who was the "most qualified" to be the next President, divided their votes equally between Vandenberg, Taft and Dewey, with only one vote for the incumbent. Despite the prognostications, the President refused to accept defeat. Although he had not managed to establish himself as outstanding executive leader, the basic Clifford strategy remained valid. Political considerations required him to undercut Wallace, which in return required Wallace to be impugned as a communist, and the President to be closely associated with possible moves toward world peace. In May the head of research at the Democratic National Committee wrote to Clifford of the need, as evidenced by the polls, for the President to express confidence in peace and spell out how it was to be achieved. He also noted the disillusionment and ignorance of the electorate with regard to foreign policy. Another element of the strategy was avoidance of too slavish an identification with the bipartisan foreign policy. An indication of this was the Democratic

217William Batt, memorandum to Clifford, May 8th, 1948, *Political File, Clifford, MSS.*
platform, with its long section on Israel, and a paragraph on Poland, outlining Woodrow Wilson’s fight for Polish freedom on the aftermath of World War I. What grieved Republicans especially was the way in which it took sole credit from in developing United States policy before Pearl Harbor right up to the Marshall Plan, with only negative mentions of Republicans for their opposition in Congress to the R.T.A. programme, and to the Marshall Plan appropriations. The policy of excluding any olive branches to Republicans was the work of the political staff. Clearly they were not going to allow their campaign to be muzzled by bipartisan policy, any more than Dewey had intended to.

In the event, the President's re-election campaign did not concentrate on foreign affairs, but his advisers were quite prepared to let it enter the debate. Aware of Republican internal divisions, convinced that the Administra-

218 The original State Department draft was hard hitting, with mention of the "short-sighted policies of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, and of the philosophy of Grundyism" in connection with the tariff, and with attacks on Republicans for imposing discriminatory conditions on the admission of displaced persons, and with references to "isolationism" within the G.O.P.; at the same time, however, it had paid tribute to "those distinguished Republicans" who had worked for E.R.P. in 1948; State Department Draft, Political File, Clifford MSS., The section on E.R.P. was initially approved by the President, "This is OK I think," he wrote beside it; he also approved references to bipartisanship which like the section on E.R.P. did not survive the final drafting; Proposals attached to G.M.B. Memo, August 26th, 1948, Speech File, Elsley MSS.
tion had a good track record, they were confident that foreign affairs would not harm them. If the Republicans were the party of the rich and the special interests, while the Democrats were the party of the people, so, in the view they encouraged in their rhetoric, the Republicans were the party of high tariffs and "isolationism", whilst the Democrats were the party of international cooperation. So far as the "communist issue" was concerned, they were prepared to counter-attack boldly, by elaborating the Clifford thesis that the Communists wanted a Republican victory to bring about political reaction, in which conditions communism would thrive. Concerned about Dewey's "unity" theme, they counter-attacked, by bringing in Cordell Hull to answer Dewey's claim that he had founded the bipartisan foreign policy, and by getting the State Department to supply material refuting Dewey's claim that the Republicans had changed E.R.P. from just another relief handout into a practical measure. One of Clifford's helpers argued for greater attack on "unity"; it was, he said, platitudinous and de-

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219 Memorandum on Foreign Policy in the Campaign", Presidential Speech File, Western Tour - September 12th, 1948 - October 2nd, 1948, Charles S. Murphy MSS, Truman Library.  
220 "Suggestions for Preparing Outlines for Brief Platform Speeches", Presidential Speech File, Murphy MSS.  
221 Barto, p. 198; William Batt pointed out that Dewey had done nothing about Communists in New York State, where 70% of American Communists resided and that he had worked closely with Communist Party "elements". Batt's reference was apparently to the fact that three New York Republicans had been elected with American Labor Party endorsement! William L. Batt, Memorandum to J. Howard McGrath, September 2nd, 1948, Dewey File, Democratic National Committee Library MSS.  
222 Memorandum, Jonathan Daniels to Matthew Connelly (aboard Pres. train), copy in Political File, Clifford MSS; memorandum, F. H. Russell to Robert A. Lovett, October 13th, 1948, Presidential Speech File, Murphy MSS.
signed to hide the issues. The President, he argued, could not throw away the asset "contained in the fact that when all is said and done the initiative in formulating a foreign policy which has the overwhelming approval of the American people came from a Democratic Administration".\textsuperscript{223} In Minnesota in October, Truman apparently responded to the suggestion by a snipe at Dewey. The unity they had, he said, was achieved by Republicans as well as Democrats who were prepared to fight for principles: "It was not achieved by the people who copied the answers down neatly after the teacher had written them on the blackboard".\textsuperscript{224}

The biggest threat to the somewhat uneasy bipartisanship during the 1948 campaign came from the political advisers' desire that any successful settlement of the Berlin crisis should be seen to be the work of the President. In August William Batt, the Director of the Research Division of the Democratic National Committee, had written to Clifford of the need to let the President be seen to be handling the Berlin crisis: "If an arrangement is obtained with Russia to resume four-power talks, the President should be first to announce this result. He should go on the radio and tell the people how he has directed our foreign policy to establish not merely peace in our time but peace for all time. He should remind the people of his Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery Plan, and point to the fact that both the policy of economic aid to Europe and military aid

\textsuperscript{223} "L" to Clifford, October 5th, 1948, Political File, Clifford MSS.  
\textsuperscript{224} New York Times, October 14th, 1948.
to Greece and Turkey have proved to be successful. He should discuss these policies as steps to enhance the prospects of permanent peace." Suggestions such as these emanating from the President's political staff were bound to make the delicate bipartisan approach to the Berlin crisis even more difficult. The bipartisan policy, which was symbolized by the cooperation between Secretary of State Marshall and John Foster Dulles at the Paris United Nations Assembly, was one of securing three power unity against the Russians; such a policy, especially in view of French uncertainty about the agreed re-establishment of a German government, required assurance of continuity. Whilst, therefore, Republicans were in their own view being statesmanlike over Berlin at a time of acute crisis, and so as not to arouse fears in Britain and France or to bring about Russian miscalculation, Truman's political advisers hit on the idea of sending Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow to negotiate with Stalin. The proposal, which was clearly designed to associate the President with a major peace initiative and to cut the ground from under Henry Wallace, was, to the irritation of the political staff, vetoed by Secretary Marshall. That would have been the end of the affair, but for the fact that news of the scheme leaked to the press because of the

225 William L. Batt, to Clifford, August 11th, 1948, Political File, Clifford MSS. On 30th August, Clifford apparently talked with the President about the publicity angle to the negotiations with the Soviet Union over Berlin, handwritten note, August 30th, 1948, Speech File, Elsey MSS. 226 Barto, pp. 191-3.
Administration's action in booking and then cancelling radio
time.\footnote{\textit{Vandenbergs, Private Papers, pp. 456-7; New York Times, October 10th, 1948.}}

Republicans were outraged by the revelations. To them it seemed that as during the Wallace affair in 1946, the President was playing politics with foreign policy at a time of major crisis. To Dewey, Dulles cabled from Paris; "My estimate of Vinson affair is that it greatly increases difficulty pursuing joint British French U.S. policy toward Soviet. French and British who feel they are most exposed to consequences of firm policy are wondering whether they can rely on our stability or whether after they are committed we may not deal separately with Soviet Union behind their backs. Situation somewhat like that created during 1946 Paris Conference by President's approval of Wallace speech."\footnote{\textit{Telegram, Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, October 10th, 1948, Dulles MSS.}} The strategy Dulles recommended was in keeping with the whole "unity" theme: "From standpoint of bipartisan cooperation you may want to suggest necessity of unity behind Marshall. You are seeking through me to present united face of foreign perils but you cannot at the same time cooperate with irreconcilable policies one developed by Secretary of State at Paris the other developed under political influences at Washington."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} Republican high command seemed disposed to follow Dulles' line. So sure were they of victory, that on balance they decided not to
make overt attacks on the Vinson proposal. On October 10th, Dewey issued a "non-political" statement in line with Dulles' recommendations: "The people of America wholeheartedly and vigorously support the labours of our bipartisan delegation at Paris and specifically its insistence on a prompt lifting of the blockade of Berlin. The nations of the world can rest assured that the American people are in fact united in their foreign policy and will firmly and unshakably uphold the United Nations and our friends of the free world in every step to build and preserve the peace."230 On the same day, Vandenberg allowed himself a reference to the affair at a dinner at which he was presented with the Freedom Award: "...now that we have gone to the United Nations we must intelligently avoid any unilateral independent action on our own account, lest we confuse our friendly associates, cramp the Security Council, and encourage our opponents to think our appeal to the United Nations is either timid or insincere. Since I think I have earned the right to deal in the truth, I am bound to assert that we have just had a narrow escape upon this score at Washington".231

At the time, the Vinson affair seemed to illustrate the high-minded, statesmanlike pose of Dewey as compared with the cheap precinct politics of Truman. Both government officials and Republicans were watchful for a repeat

231 Ibid.
Amongst ostensible neutrals, Truman also appeared to have few friends. Amongst his critics was Walter Lippman, who bemoaned the fact that American policy had become separate from the Democratic process: only Vandenberg, he said, of those who made important decisions, had been elected to his office. Truman, he commented, had no control, he simply meddled: "... in plain words Mr. Truman does not know how to be President. He does not know how to conduct foreign relations or how to be Commander in Chief. His absences from Washington during the campaign have merely disclosed what has since the beginning been the fact - that Mr. Truman does not govern and has no control over, the diplomatic and military policy of the United States." So also, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr added his condemnation: "Mr. Truman's final meddling venture in foreign policy, probably prompted by a desire to gain a few votes, actually cost him many a supporter among the more sophisticated portion of the electorate. The idea that he might be able to pull a rabbit out of a hat by sending Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow after our dispute with Russia had been submitted to the United Nations, proved beyond doubt that Mr. Truman does not understand foreign policy. We may be grateful that the team, to which he has intrusted our foreign affairs, was, on the whole, a good one; and that he interfered only occasionally with their conduct.

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of foreign affairs." The New York Herald Tribune, feeling charitable as victory neared, said that the country would not "wish to berate their Vice-President become President by the chance of death. There was plainly a grievous blunder in his selection; but that was not his fault." Its one remaining fear was that "he may spend his remaining months in office improvising fresh experiments in foreign affairs to avenge his defeat. The hope must be that the strong men about him will be able to save the country from such blundering." There was a certain inevitability about the Chicago Tribune's endorsement of Dewey, despite all it had said about him; its judgement on Truman reflected the current trend: "Mr. Truman is not the worst President this country has had; but he has the least capacity for the office. While he is incapable of great betrayals, he is possessed by an invincible stupidity and a political morality that has never risen above the ghost voting and the graft of the Pendergast machine."  

Doubtless his confidence increased still further by the apparent unanimity amongst the influential, Dewey continued to parade the theme of unity as he toured the country on his immaculately organized "Dewey Victory Special". His whole campaign was as mechanical as it appeared to be effective. At his brief whistle stops he appealed for national unity,
condemned the Administration for letting the Communists get into Government and then asking for 25 million dollars to get them out, and promised the "biggest, fanciest house-cleaning in Washington next January that this country has ever seen". Then, having introduced his wife, he departed for the next performance.238 His major speeches were even more mechanical. One reporter, who like most failed to warm to him, described his appearance: "...there he is, smiling, waving, tidy and efficient, the very symbol of a generation that has glorified techniques".239 Despite reports that a number of Republican senatorial candidates were in difficulty, the confidence of victory was virtually unchallenged.240 In Paris, Dulles and Marshall were giving thought to the transition period after Dewey's election, a matter of which Truman, as the supposed defeated candidate, was left totally ignorant.241 Back in New York, Allen Dulles was thinking of the same thing, and in particular of the difficult position his brother would be in, in Paris in the transition period.242 For the moment, however, Dulles was enjoying the attentions of the Ambassadors of the world, all of whom were as confident of the result as the opinion pollsters.243

239 Ibid.
241 Memorandum of conversation with Secretary of State Marshall, October 25th, 1948, Dulles MSS.
242 Allen Dulles to John Foster Dulles, October 22nd, 1948, Dulles MSS.
243 Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, October 24th, 1948, Dulles MSS (Supplement); telegram, Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, October 11th, 1948, Dulles MSS.
In the last weeks of the campaign, foreign policy, albeit subtly, became an issue of some importance. Not that Republican spokesmen offered any serious alternatives, but they continued to press home their past contributions and their present commitment. Dewey, in his major foreign policy address at Louisville, Kentucky in October, echoed Vandenberg in making greater and greater claims for past Republican wisdom; claiming that Republicans in 1945 had been responsible for ensuring that Regional Security Agreements under the United Nations need not be subject to the veto; claiming to have made E.R.P. a practical aid programme; claiming to have initiated bipartisan foreign policy whilst attacking the Democrats for themselves claiming sole credit for it. He also attacked the Administration for its bungling and its failure to understand communism: "The leaders of the world Communist movement are ruthless, hard-headed, ambitious men. The tragedy of our time has been that we have had an administration that did not understand those leaders and did not understand the great need for firmness and consistency in our foreign affairs. Time and again, America has been made to appear before the world as a fumbling giant, serving up diplomatic victories which only whetted the appetites of men whose appetites are world wide." James Reston, on the "Dewey Victory Special",

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244 New York Times, October 14th, 1948; on October 4th, in a radio address Vandenberg had outlined his view of bipartisanship, outlining the long list of Republican contributions, and excluding China, Palestine, Japan, Germany, and "until recently" Latin America from the bipartisan policy; ibid., October 5th, 1944.
245 Ibid., October 14th, 1948.
commented that, despite his high-minded claims, Dewey had made the Berlin crisis and the Vinson affair an issue, since at almost every stop, he criticized the Administration's handling of foreign affairs. Whilst he did not mention the Vinson affair, his aides made it clear to reporters that it was to that he was referring when he repeatedly said that the Administration's left hand did not know what its right hand was doing. 246

Coming into the home straight, Dewey was reportedly determined not to sink to what was generally regarded as the low level of his opponent. 247 In his diary, Senator Smith commented, "We are all stunned at the extravagance of invective that Truman is hurling around in his desperate effort to win. His charges against his opponents are difficult to understand. Both he and the Wallace forces are trying to divide America when we need unity so badly". 248 At Pittsburgh on October 11th, Dewey had announced, "We are now entering the final three weeks of the campaign to unite America. With the ominous overtones of division and strife in the world, there is increasing evidence of the great good this election is going to do. It will revive the spiritual unity of our people. It will restore our unity and our strength in the cause of peace abroad. And most of all it will show the world that we are selecting a competent Administration which will unfailingly back up the work of its

246 Ibid., October 17th, 1948.
247 Ibid., October 23rd, 1948.
248 Diary, October 30th, 1948, Smith MSS.
own representatives in the United Nations for peace."

At Cleveland on October 27th, he stuck to the same theme, with more emphasis on Administration incompetence both to diagnose and deal with the Communist threat. The Administration, he said, were, "whether they know it or not" voicing Communist propaganda in their talk of an economic boom and bust. Peace depended on unity, he said, but his opponents were ridiculing the "old-fashioned American idea of teamwork and unity". At the end of his campaign, Dewey was convinced that his campaign was "worthy of the greatness of our country". "As a people," he told his Madison Square Garden audience at the end of October, "you and I have made great progress during this campaign. We have rediscovered our belief in the old-fashioned American idea of teamwork. We have rediscovered the great fundamental that when Americans are united on a team it is unbeatable." Now, with this election, the World would "know at last where America stands and it will be the same place every day. We shall at last be all out on the side of human freedom". The day before, campaigning in New England, he had expressed his conviction that a united America, pressurizing Europe to unite also, could roll back

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250 Ibid., October 28th, 1948; Vandenberg described this as "one of the greatest speeches of all time" in a radio address the following day, ibid., October 29th, 1948.
251 Ibid., October 31st, 1948.
the iron curtain, and push back the "area of slavery".\(^{252}\)

To what extent Dewey was offering an alternative to the policy already being pursued is doubtful. His whole campaign had been one of high minded generalities: he favoured American aid to bring about European federation, more help to China, and bipartisanship; he opposed Communism, appeasement and "isolation". But this hardly added up to a new programme. In late October, Dulles wrote to Dewey of the need for "a fresh approach on foreign affairs", he offered little guide as to what he thought this should be; his major drift appeared to be that the incoming Administration needed time to re-order priorities before assuming control:

"...foreign policies are today largely dependent on strategic considerations; on what we are prepared to do about armaments at home and abroad and on what we will contribute to the economic recovery of our friends abroad. To assume responsibility for new foreign policies apart from the possibility of their integration into a total national policy, would be to risk failure. Equally, it would be unfortunate to drift into such identification with existing policies as would make it embarrassing to change them."\(^{253}\) These considerations reflected a proper concern for a Republican Secretary of State, who would still have to come to terms with

\(^{252}\)Ibid., October 30th, 1948.

\(^{253}\)Memorandum to Dewey, October 26th, 1948, Dulles MSS.
Congress. To Vandenberg he wrote, "I am getting an amazing picture of the world situation and the flood of demands to which we are going to be subjected. . ." Press reports meanwhile, indicated that the new Administration intended to build, unite, arm, and finance the non-Communist world on a larger scale than the Truman Administration had ever dared suggest. Such an outcome was, however, unlikely; the Republican emphasis as always was not on more, but on more efficient use of the same, or if possible, of less.

In his letter of October 30th, Dulles wrote to Dewey, "it is apparent your election will bring to all our foreign friends new hope that the United States power will be more effectively used for world peace". That in essence was what the Republicans offered, not a real alternative, but the efficiency which they held came from a wholehearted belief in freedom and the American system, as opposed to the half-hearted belief of New Dealers.

More precise formulations, apart from being diplomatically unwise, would have created difficulties within the Republican Party. "Unity" and "teamwork" required demonstrations of party unity. Despite earlier strains, by the end of the campaign, Dewey, Dulles and Vandenberg were said to be in perfect harmony, as too was Harold Stassen.

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254 Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, October 24th, 1948, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
255 Clipping from New York Post, October 21st, 1948, Dewey File, Democratic National Committee Library MSS.
256 Telegram, Dulles to Dewey, October 30th, 1948, Dulles MSS.
Although relations with Taft were poor, Taft refused to be drawn publicly, even on the question of arms aid to Europe which was likely to be the first major subject to confront the new Administration. "Even if I have ideas, I'll wait until Governor Dewey and Mr. Dulles express an opinion," said Taft. On the general question of relations between Dewey and the Congressional Party, Taft merely grinned, and wagging a finger at reporters, said, "There's unity in the air." Efforts were made to conciliate Martin and Halleck, and a programme of broadcasts laid on for Congressional leaders. Even John Taber was reported as expecting no difficulties in his relations with Dewey: "You can talk to Dewey. You can talk to Dewey and he'll listen. Vandenberg doesn't know what the spending picture is: all about." So, with the Republican Party ostensibly united, more so than at any time in its history, claimed Earl Warren, and the pollsters having given up taking soundings because the campaign was so one-sided, Republicans not surprisingly were coming to see polling day as a mere formality.

In the last week of the campaign, even Dewey's press agent, James Hagerty, conceded that the President gained some support, but he was sure it was not from Dewey. Truman, however, exuded confidence. Big crowds, he said,

258 Ibid., October 6th, 1948; Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 421-4.
260 Ibid., October 14th, 1948.
261 Ibid., October 31st, 1948.
greeted him everywhere; he predicted that there would be some red-faced pollsters on November 3rd. Speaking in Boston and New York, Truman rounded off his campaign vigorously, arguing that the best way to defeat Communism was to re-elect him: the only real danger, he said stemmed from the possibility of another Depression and the policies of the 80th Congress. In Brooklyn on October 29th, he sprang to the defense of the abortive Vinson proposal: "So long as I am President of the United States," he said, "the door will not be closed to peace. I will always explore every possible means, no matter how difficult or how unconventional, for reaching agreement". Regrettably, he said, his opponent had brought foreign policy into the campaign, and he proceeded to attack the Republican Party as the party of "isolationism" and reaction. "I have good news for you. We have the Republicans on the run," he said. The same day, he raised Bronx cheers by allegedly quoting Dewey as saying, "'You know your future is still ahead of you'. I was greatly impressed by this bold stand of the Republican candidate," he quipped.

Despite Truman's final flourish, and the huge crowds which turned out to see him on the East Coast, his chances were not taken seriously. On October 31st, Taft predicted

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262 Ibid., October 17th, 1948.
263 Ibid., October 30th, 1948.
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
that the Republicans would have four to five million votes to spare. From Paris John Foster Dulles cabled his disappointment to Dewey that he was "not to be with you on the day when what I have so ardently hoped for will, it seems, finally be realized". Herbert Hoover, who was earlier optimistic because he had detected "another mass movement...such as the phenomena which swept Woodrow Wilson and 'a Mr. Hoover' aside", was invited to a dinner party in New York to hear Arthur Krock expound on the incoming Administration. In Paris, meanwhile, Dulles was invited to be guest of honour at a dinner given by the Philippines Ambassador, in anticipation of Republican victory; the shock election result forced him to cover his disappointment by apologizing good-humouredly for the guests having been invited under false pretenses. For all his good humour, Dulles was disappointed with the result. Dewey's campaign he felt, "had dignity" and "was in the best American tradition". Dulles was, therefore, "rather frightened by the influences which prevented it from succeeding". Not only was the result a crushing blow to Dulles' own ambitions, as well as to those of Dewey, it was also a defeat for the

267 Telegram, Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, October 30th, 1948, Dulles MSS.
268 C. D. Hilles to Ezra R. Whitla, October 19th, 1948, copy in Hilles file; William Chadbourne to Hoover, October 1st, 1948, Hoover MSS.
269 Diary of Janet Avery Dulles: U.N. Assembly 1948, p. 35, Janet Dulles MSS.
270 Telegram, Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, November 3rd, 1948, Dulles MSS.
"politics of unity" and for the architects of Republican consensus since Mackinac and Chicago.

The expectation of Republican victory in 1948 had been implicit in the Party's actions at least since the 1946 elections, and to a lesser extent since Roosevelt's death in 1945. This expectation had been reinforced by the apparent deficiencies of President Truman, and, on the part of eastern Republicans at least, by what they regarded as their own statesmanlike response to the strife-ridden post-war world. The splits in the Democratic Party in 1948, leading to the Wallace and Thurmond candidacies, had contrasted with the unity which the Republicans seemed to have constructed at Philadelphia. Because expectations of victory were so high, disappointment was to be even more acute, and the unity, which had been the theme of Dewey's campaign was to disappear more quickly than it came. The fact that the election had been lost to Truman, a man whom all agreed was of poor presidential calibre, made the defeat much harder to take than those inflicted by Roosevelt. One of Hoover's friends reflected the general disbelief and despair:

"Think of it. The democrats with a candidate so abysmally ignorant (I use the word advisedly) that he is frightening to a thinking person; the Dixiecrats with a candidate; and Wallace as a candidate! And yet the republicans couldn't manage to win!" 271 Herbert Hoover commented bitterly: "We

271 Herbert V. Clark to William F. Knowland, November 22nd, 1948, copy in Herbert V. Clark file, Hoover MSS.
lost that campaign; Truman did not win it".272

Inevitably, the election defeat led to recriminations. Although disturbed by "the state of mind that seems to have influenced the votes of the majority in the election", the Chicago Tribune saw the result as an inevitable consequence of Wall Street domination of Republican Conventions.273

Publicly Taft attributed the defeat to the general prosperity, but privately he was extremely bitter, and felt that Dewey had thrown it away.274 Taft's disillusion with Dewey was widespread amongst the Old Guard. George H. E. Smith, Staff Director of the Majority Policy Committee, prepared an election report for Taft which gave full rein to these views.275 Dewey's "Brahmanistic conduct and suffocating over-confidence blighted the enthusiasm of party workers," it alleged; his campaign was "self-centered on his personal interest in the presidency", whilst he and Warren showed that they "both regarded the 80th Congress as a liability".276 It also criticized Dewey for having taken no action, despite reports that the Congressional campaign was in difficulty, for "in the Dewey strategy the congressional battle was a minor incident in the more important campaign for the presidency".277

Criticizing Dewey for over-reliance on the opinion polls,

272 Hoover to Arthur S. Crites, December 18th, 1948, Hoover MSS.
274 Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 424-5; White, Taft, pp. 83-4.
275 Report by George H. E. Smith, Staff Director, Majority Policy Committee to Robert A. Taft, Chairman, and Members of the Majority Policy Committee, December 17th, 1948, copy in Wallace H. White MSS, Library of Congress.
276 Ibid., pp. 20-2.
277 Ibid., p. 12.
the report also by implication took issue with the whole strategy of "unity": "...the Dewey-Warren speeches were efforts to keep political waters calm and unruffled. They were floated gently upon an air of inevitable success, studiously created. The more outlandish Truman's provocations became, the calmer and more dignified Dewey and Warren conducted themselves. No gage of battle was accepted; no Truman bungle (like the Vinson affair) was exploited. As if to accent the aloofness, Dewey occasionally noticed Truman much as a lady prohibitionist recognized the drink evil by picking up her skirts and looking the other way as she passed a corner saloon."278 Although critical in part of Congress for its lack of unity, the main emphasis of the report was its criticism of the Dewey-Warren campaign. It also commented that Senator Vandenberg ought to have been used more often to speak on foreign policy. The report was reflective of a determination on the part of the majority of the Congressional party at least, that there should be no more "me-too" campaigns: the lesson drawn was for the need to be partisan and controversial, especially over foreign affairs.279 Joseph Martin, Republican leader in the House, was quoted, in the aftermath of defeat, as urging a more partisan approach to all national problems: "The trouble with us is that we tried to be statesmen for the

278Ibid., p. 11.
last two years, and forgot about politics. Now then, in the next two years, as far as I am concerned, we're going to think more about the ballot box." Like many others, Martin had come to see the 1950 elections as crucial: "One thing is certain, after the lickings we've taken in the past 16 years, and this one when we all thought we had the election won, we've got to win Congress back in 1950 or we are through. And I mean through. We'd just as well move into the Democratic Party and work from the inside of it."\textsuperscript{280} The extreme bitterness which infected American political life in the succeeding decade was at least partly a result of Dewey's defeat in 1948.\textsuperscript{281} The 1948 election, then, marked a transition in Republican politics; Republicans could no longer blame their defeats on the war or the depression, or on Roosevelt's magnetic personality; they could no longer assume that they were the majority party in the nation. In 1948, History had failed to repeat itself; 1946 had been a false portent of a Normalcy that was never to be restored.

\textsuperscript{280}Report, December 29th, 1948, McNaughton MSS.
The result of the 1948 election was a major blow to the three Republican leaders who had, in varying degrees, guided and articulated Republican foreign policy since Mackinac. Under their leadership the Republican Party had adapted itself to the changed role of the United States in world affairs in the post-war years. Unhappy with Roosevelt's "Four Policemen" as well as with much of the wartime Internationalism, Republican leaders had in their own view been influential in shaping a vigorous anti-communist foreign policy which seemed more in accord with American interests. Within the Republican Party, however, the anti-communist consensus, which governed American foreign policy from 1945, had caused a number of strains. Most Republicans, it is true, could readily welcome what amounted to a reversal of alliances by the late 1940's, for they had never embraced the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union with enthusiasm. Nevertheless, for the majority of Republicans, certainly in Congress, who still put prime emphasis on the restoration of liberty at home, the bipartisan policy was a dangerous double-edged sword, which might damage both the Republican Party and their hopes of domestic Normalcy.

Up to 1948, however, the Nationalists were politically and intellectually on the defensive. Their ultimate
humiliation had come at Philadelphia in 1948, when they had had to swallow Vandenberg's foreign policy plank, and Earl Warren as vice-presidential nominee in preference to a plethora of Nationalists. With Dewey's election a virtual certainty, and with Dulles probable Secretary of State and Vandenberg Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the final rout of the Nationalists had in the summer of 1948 seemed complete. In August moves were afoot to undercut Taft's power in the Senate.\(^1\) Vandenberg, as ever reluctant to take on Taft, was clearly hoping that Mr. Republican would recognize that the time had come to step aside.\(^2\) For his part, however, Taft was apparently oblivious of the moves against him, and confident that after Dewey's election power would be returned to Congress.\(^3\) In the event, Dewey's defeat made the attempt to unseat Taft from his position as Chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee hopeless. The attempt to pin the blame for the 1948 defeat on the leadership in Congress found relatively few supporters in Congress itself. At the meeting of the Senate Republican Conference in January, Taft and Wherry withstood the liberal Republican challenge by 28 votes to 14.\(^4\) Taft, sensing his political star in the ascendant, taunted that liberal Republicans "have offered nothing of their own in the way of a program. Apparently what they

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1 Alsop to Martin Sommers, August 24th, 1948, Alsop MSS; Henry Cabot Lodge to Irving M. Ives, August 12th, 1948, copy in Vandenberg MSS.
2 Alsop to Martin Sommers, August 24th, 1948, Alsop MSS; Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 449; Vandenberg to Henry Cabot Lodge, August 17th, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
3 Alsop to Martin Sommers, August 16th, 1948, Alsop MSS.
4 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 464-7. See also Diary, November 17th, 1948, Smith MSS.
wish for the Senate is a Republican party committed to nothing except a policy of non-resistance to the Truman administration."⁵ Victorious in the Senate, Taft and his supporters moved on to the National Committee, where even a move by the hapless Chairman Hugh Scott to dissociate himself from Dewey and the 1948 campaign could not ultimately save him. The Nationalists were bent on removing all traces of Dewey from the party, and of ending the era of "me-too" in national politics.

Amidst all the turmoil, Vandenberg sought as ever to preserve unity. Disappointed in his hope that Taft would step down voluntarily, he made it clear that he would not vote against him but would vote against the more extreme Wherry.⁶ Meanwhile, so far as the National Committee was concerned, he advanced the claims of Everett Dirksen of Illinois. Dirksen, as an evangelistic Midwesterner, a "liberal thinking conservative" who was independent of "the Tribune tower," as well as a supporter of the bipartisan foreign policy, seemed a man in Vandenberg's own mould. To Stassen he wrote, "He represents the type of Republicanism which I like to emphasize".⁷

While Vandenberg was evidently hoping for compromise, Dewey, infuriated by attacks on him at the Omaha National Committee meeting in January, 1949, was preparing to address

⁶Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 464-7.
⁷Vandenberg to Harold Stassen, January 24th, 1949; Vandenberg to Thomas E. Dewey, December 6th, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
the Congressional Party at a Lincoln Day Dinner. Invitably, his speech caused advance speculation as to whether he would hit back at the Old Guard. The Chicago Tribune derived some amusement from the rumours that he intended "to tell Republicans what they must do to win elections. As Mr. Dewey is the only living Republican who has lost in two Presidential campaigns, he may be qualified to tell how to lose but he is hardly in a position to advise anybody on how to win". Amidst all the rumours of a boycott of the dinner, Vandenberg wrote to Dulles of his interest and curiosity as to what Dewey would have to say: "Thus far it seems to me that the Republican Party has been chiefly engaged in a post-election job of 'falling apart' instead of 'getting together'. At the meeting on February 8th, Dewey chose to bring out into the open the fact that the Party had for years been trying to gloss over a hopeless split. His major emphasis was on domestic issues, such as unemployment insurance and old age benefits, which in his view the Party could not oppose, certainly not if they wished to win elections. Seeking to illustrate the difference between Republicans and Democrats in foreign affairs, in answer to those who argued that the leadership tamely accepted Administration policy, he dealt with the question of China: "we Republicans have insisted on a world-wide

8 Stewart Alsop to Martin Sommers, February 3rd, 1949, Alsop MSS.
10 Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, February 7th, 1949, Vandenberg MSS.
foreign policy and not merely a European foreign policy," he said. Two days after Dewey's address, Vandenberg publicly announced his retirement in 1952. Speaking in Detroit on the same day, he urged Republicans to unite for the 1950 campaign, to stop wrangling over 1948, and to stick to the middle of the road policies of "sound conservatism and liberalism" in domestic affairs. He also urged them to continue the bipartisan foreign policy; in opposition, he said, they would ensure that Administration policies were "sound and firm" but also that the United States did not over-extend itself.

The rhetoric of Dewey and Vandenberg revealed the difficulties inherent in the politics of unity; although both men sought to differentiate Republicanism from the New Deal, in both domestic and foreign affairs, to many it sounded suspiciously like "me-too". The politics of unity had assumed that moderation and statesmanship would bring its own reward in electoral terms; the argument for that now seemed weak. To make matters worse, in the aftermath of the 1948 election it had been generally assumed that President Truman would now insist on taking a more active role than hitherto in the formulation of policy. John Foster

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Dulles felt, on the basis of his and Marshall's experiences during the 1948 campaign, "that the politicians may want to take over the State Department. . .". Speculation was also rife about the departure of Secretary of Defense Forrestal, who was strongly identified with the bipartisan anti-communist consensus. A comment by President Truman in Kansas City in December that the Russian leaders were anxious to come to terms with the United States, made without reference to the State Department, also lent weight to the suggestions that the President now intended to make his own policy. Similarly, the resignation of Secretary of State Marshall and Under-secretary Lovett, and the appointment of Dean Acheson seemed to confirm the trend.

By the beginning of January, 1949, in fact, bipartisanship was well on the way to being discredited. The Chicago Tribune shed no tears for Vandenberg as it pronounced the end of the bipartisan policy. Acheson's appointment it greeted with the headline, "It Might as well be Hiss."

Vandenberg remained as convinced as ever of the importance of bipartisan foreign policy as constructed since 1944, but

14 Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, November 4th, 1948, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
17 Ibid., January 8th, 1949; Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 469-72; to Vandenberg's disgust, the ratio on the Foreign Relations Committee was changed to 8-5, whereas he had been led to expect a 7-6 division, ibid., p. 458.
18 Chicago Tribune, January 7th, 1949.
19 Ibid., January 8th, 1949.
his influence, both with the Administration and Republicans was undeniably past its peak. Largely isolated amongst Congressional leaders, he had counted on a Republican executive to aid his own efforts at foreign policy leadership. The surprise defeat of Dewey, added to the impending defeat of Chiang Kai-shek in China, and the increased focus on domestic loyalty trials in the wake of the Hiss case, created a totally new political situation. With the help of Dulles, temporarily appointed to fill a Senate vacancy, Vandenberg gave his usual crucial support in 1949 to Senate passage of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Military Assistance Program. Twenty-four hours after the Senate passed the arms aid bill, the Administration announced that the Soviet Union had brought about an atomic explosion. Vandenberg wrote to his wife bitterly about the partisanship of some of his colleagues: "...Some of the boys who voted to gut the arms program are pretty sick of what they did in the light of atomic developments twenty-four hours later. But they'll just 'play politics' and blame Truman for not telling us sooner although if he had, they would just as readily accuse him of trying to influence the arms vote with a scare. On many counts I don't like him any better than they do. But he is the only President and the only Commander-in-Chief we have got or are going to have for three more critical years. I want to help lick him when the time comes - but not at the expense of the national security, meanwhile."\(^{20}\)

\(^{20}\)Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 518.
In declining health, and impotent in the face of changes in the political situation both at home and overseas, Vandenberg was increasingly gloomy from the summer of 1949. In October he wrote to Robert Lovett of his regret that he was unable to help Dulles in his special Senate election; Dulles' election, he argued, would be a God-send for the country, and "also for a G.O.P. which shows signs of dangerously splintering in its fidelities to effective freedom". In another letter, he wrote similarly that the Republican Party "shows signs of 'splitting' into various degrees of isolationism which could be ominous for a free America in a free world". To Charles Taft he expressed his regret that he and Bob Taft were drawing apart on foreign affairs, whilst to Senator Lodge amongst others he expressed his disquiet at the distortions about foreign policy that were being circulated: "This could develop into a very serious business for the country - and it could needlessly wreck our Party's future. This is a time for sober honesty and straight thinking. We must hold Western Europe to far stricter accountability for its specific 'self-help and mutual aid'. But at the same time, we must hold ourselves to strict accountability for winning the cold war and preventing the calamity of a hot one, and for saving national security and peace from unenlightened politics." 

21 Vandenberg to Robert A. Lovett, October 26th, 1949, Vandenberg MSS.
22 Vandenberg to Albert L. Miller, October 28th, 1949, Vandenberg MSS.
23 Vandenberg to Charles Taft, November 10th, 1949; Vandenberg to Henry Cabot Lodge, November 19th, 1949, Vandenberg MSS.
For the moment, however, the tide seemed to be running strongly against Vandenberg. Taft, who had never believed in the bipartisan policy, was beginning his drive for re-election in 1950 with what Joseph Alsop described as a "straight-out isolationist appeal."24 To Taft, who had opposed the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States was not faced with a military challenge from the Soviet Union, it was "a struggle of ideas and not of arms".25 Taft's priority was still to ensure the survival and success of liberty at home; if they compromised with socialism, he argued, as Britain had, they would be lost.26 The implications of Taft's deeply held views about the need to restore domestic Normalcy spelled danger for American economic and military commitments to the European continent: it was not that the views had changed, but they were now being presented in the most receptive climate since the war. Vandenberg himself noted in September, 1949; "The whole country is in a state of nerves. Everybody is under tension. Nothing is right. The whole tenor of Senatorial correspondence has changed. Everybody is mad about something - and they seem to love to 'take it out' on their members of Congress."27 John Vorys perceived a similar change: "I find that most people around here feel as follows about our foreign policy problems: 1 - They would rather not

24 Alsop to Martin Sommers, September 31st, 1949, Alsop MSS.
26 Ibid.
27 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 515-16.
think about them. They would rather not spend any money on them." Vorys himself had become extremely disillusioned with England, for its failure to cooperate fully in the implementation of a multilateral trading and exchange system and for the extension of socialism. In his view the British were "attempting to build just the kind of self-sufficient state that got us all into trouble in the Thirties." Britain's failure to follow American policy toward China in 1950 was to complete his disillusionment. Vorys had in the past been a reliable guide to G.O.P. trends; his disillusion by 1949 was indicative of the far deeper disillusion of the Old Guard who felt that the Republican Party had failed itself and the nation by its failure to present alternative foreign policies over the previous four years.

Whilst the Nationalists were preparing to capitalize on the disillusion and hysteria engendered by Russian explosion of the atom bomb, the spy trials, and the communist victory in China, the Centre group were not prepared to relinquish control. Dewey, whilst after 1948 ruling out a third attempt at the White House, had announced his intention of taking an active role as titular leader, and said that he had definite ideas about the Party's future.

28 Vorys to Robert E. Matthews, November 8th, 1949, Vorys MSS.
29 Vorys to William Benton, July 26th, 1948; Vorys to Frank E. Archer, September 16th, 1959, Vorys MSS.
30 Vorys to Ralph W. Gwinn, December 16th, 1950, Vorys MSS.
True to his word, in 1949, he began to speak out on national matters far more than over the previous four years, and he also let it be known that he intended to run again for Governor of New York in 1950. In May he began a six week European vacation, which included an address to British Members of Parliament, in which he warned them of the concern of American taxpayers about the size of American aid to Europe, and pressed the need for European unity. On his return he described continued American aid to Europe as vital. While Dewey was strongly identifying himself with the European policy which was increasingly to be opposed by the Nationalists, he also continued to press for a global policy to unite the five "free" continents. In July, at the time of the Senate debate of the North Atlantic Treaty, Dewey sought to strengthen foreign policy leadership in the Senate by the appointment of John Foster Dulles to fill a temporary vacancy. More important, however, were the preparations he was making to secure the defeat of Mr. Republican in 1952. In April, Dewey wrote to General Eisenhower that there were "one or two things of some importance that I would like to talk with you about at your convenience." According to Dewey's own account, he met Eisenhower in the summer at Columbia and spoke with him of

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32 Ibid., January 30th, 1949.
33 Ibid., May 17th, 1949.
34 Ibid., June 17th, 1949.
35 Thomas E. Dewey to Eisenhower, April 11th, 1949, Eisenhower MSS.
the need for him to be Republican nominee in 1952. 35 By September the Alsop brothers were convinced that Eisenhower was the favourite for the 1952 nomination. 37 Like Dewey, Vandenberg was also looking to Eisenhower. Writing to congratulate him on a recent speech, Vandenberg expressed his conviction that Eisenhower was the person best qualified to lead the "indispensable 'revival' of the philosophy of the 'middle road'" to protect "our threatened American unity". 38 The somewhat cryptic letter included two telling sentences: "This means more than meets the eye. I am one of those who deeply believes in you". 39

Despite their set-backs, the Centre group proved remarkably resilient in the changed atmosphere of 1949 and beyond. Whilst a more belligerent leadership, especially identified with the anti-communist struggle in Asia, seemed to be coming to the fore, its victory was not to be complete. Dewey retained sufficient political power to help Eisenhower defeat Taft for the 1952 nomination. Dulles, despite the disappointment of his defeat in the special Senate election of 1949, continued to walk the tight-rope between Republican partisan and Administration collaborator. In 1953 he was to fulfill

37 Stewart Alsop to Ben Hibbs, September 10th, 1949; Joseph Alsop to Martin Sommers, September 31st, 1949, Alsop MSS.
38 A. H. Vandenberg to Eisenhower, September 8th, 1949, Eisenhower MSS.
39 Ibid.
his long ambition of becoming Secretary of State, an ambition which would probably have been realised even had Taft won the nomination and been elected.

Dulles' survival was almost certainly based on the lessons he had drawn from Woodrow Wilson's failure over thirty years earlier; but his emergence as a Republican partisan was to be at the cost of unlearning many of the lessons of international relations which, as impartial observer, he had absorbed in the inter-war years. His new book, *War or Peace*, which was published in 1950, revealed that he had himself come to use the villain nation concept which he had deplored in his earlier writings. His reading of Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*, and the analogy readily drawn with *Mein Kampf*, led him to interpret Soviet actions solely in ideological terms. In the policy which he offered, however, there were elements of continuity with his earlier writings. Opposing the concept of containment, which was too militaristic and too close to the status quo thinking which he had always disliked, and opposing both isolation and American (presumably military) domination of the world, Dulles' view of the kind of peace they should aim at was unchanging: "In the pattern of our own national life we can find the pattern for world peace". In other words, they should aim at a dynamic peace, based on the principles of the American political economy: the inter-communication of goods, people and ideas. This meant in his view that

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the United States must take the offensive in "rolling back" totalitarianism by developing a global strategy. This strategy included pressure for European unity, pressure against socialism and state planning, and demonstration in Japan, West Germany and West Berlin of the advantages of freedom. His strategy was explicitly not a military or a "material" one: the prime need, he argued, was for "a righteous and dynamic faith" and a sense of mission, and he deprecated the way in which the United States had come to be looked upon "more as a possible source of money and material things and less as a source of inspiration and guidance".

In his rhetoric at least, Dulles was close to Taft in putting prime emphasis on the Soviet challenge in ideological rather than military terms. In his view the ascendency of the west had come about because it offered men moral and economic freedom; or, as he put it in a speech in February, western ascendance in the world was the work not of generals, but of missionaries and merchants. He could also find common ground with Taft in his insistence on the need to show at home that one could have social justice without accepting the materialist philosophy; this, he said, depended on "the individual to accept and discharge social obligations to his fellow man". Thus during his unsuccessful

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41 Ibid., pp. 175-7.
42 Ibid., pp. 215-17, 220, 230-1.
43 Ibid., pp. 254-5.
45 Dulles, War or Peace, p. 259.
ful election campaign in 1949 he condemned the Administration's domestic policy as being injurious to its foreign policy: "If, here at home, we concede dependence on the all-powerful state, our foreign policy will be bereft of power". In the campaign he had also described "Federal control of education" and "socialized medicine" as "chapters out of the Communist book." For all the similarities between the approaches of Taft and Dulles, one important division remained: Dulles regarded Europe and Asia as of vital importance to the United States. He was further convinced that the aim of Soviet policy was to encircle and then ultimately strangle the United States economically.

For Taft, who had never shared the prevalent belief in the need for overseas economic expansion, these areas were not vital to the well-being of the United States. Rhetoric, however, could lessen the differences, and it enabled Dulles to get over the disappointments of 1948-49, to survive the bitter partisan years of 1950-52, and to achieve his long ambition.

For the remaining member of the Centre group, Arthur Vandenberg, only a few months of active life remained. In poor health, he played little part in politics from the time of the Military Assistance Program's passage in September, 1949. In a speech to European journalists in September,

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described by his staff as his probable valedictory, he spoke on a familiar theme: of the limit to American resources and the need for American aid to Europe to come to an end. Aside from his dwindling political influence, he was in his private life a tragic, even pathetic figure towards the end.\(^5\) In January, 1950, Stewart Alsop wrote, "Both Joe and I have seen Arthur Vandenberg in the last few days, and we both came away with the same impression: he's dying and knows it. He's having his last fling, both in a personal and political sense."\(^5\) In May, 1950, he made his last visit to the Senate, in June his wife died, and he died the following April. The "Great Debate" in 1951 over the stationing of troops in Europe, he could only watch from the sidelines. He died by his own admission an "internationalist", but it was not a label he took to easily. Shortly before his death, he wrote, "...I still think that our first American fidelity must be to our own American security. ...This is only another way of saying that I think the 'nationalist' of yeaterday still recognizes this axiom when, as a matter of intelligent self-interest, he demands 'collective security' as the only means to defend our own American welfare and to pursue our freedoms in a free world."\(^5\) To the President, he wrote, just over a month before his death, "I have abiding faith in the future of our good old U.S.A...."\(^5\)

\(^{50}\) Transcript, interview with Edward Weintal, p. 11, Dulles (Oral).
\(^{51}\) Stewart Alsop to Martin Sommers, January 14th, 1950, Alsop MSS.
\(^{52}\) Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 577-8.
\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 579.
Guide to Sources

Major sources for this study may be divided into three categories: 1) the published writings of the individuals studied; ii) the daily, contemporary record furnished by newspapers and the Congressional Record; iii) manuscript sources. No particular problems are associated with the use of sources in the first and second category. Fuller explanation is required for the various manuscript collections, which are both less accessible and more difficult to cite accurately. Virtually all the manuscript collections used are personal papers, since access to State Department records for the period studied is not yet open to research by foreign nationals. The absence of these records is probably not a major deficiency, since this is a study of a party in opposition, although such records might conceivably have helped to establish the importance of political considerations in Administration policy formulation. For the most part, citations to the various collections have been kept brief, with emphasis on the accurate description of the document cited rather than reference to box numbers; this seems a particular necessity for recent collections which are more likely to be re-sorted and re-boxed than older established collections. The manuscript collections used are to be found in seven different libraries in the United States. The date of the present writer's visit to each of the libraries is given; information as the availability and organization of collections at each library reflects the situation that obtained at the time of the visit.
Princeton University Library (1969; 1972)

The most important collection here is that of John Foster Dulles, an extensive collection organized by categories: viz, correspondence, addresses and speeches, statements and testimony, press releases, notes and memoranda etc. The collection also includes certain letters and other items of Mrs. Dulles, referred to in citations in the present study as the Janet Avery Dulles MSS. Between 1959 and 1972 a large accession, especially of letters, came from the office of Dulles' old law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell; material found in that later accession, is referred to in citations as Dulles (Supplement). To round off the Dulles collection is an extensive collection of oral history transcripts, referred to in citation as Dulles (Oral).

Also used at Princeton were the papers of H. Alexander Smith. At the time used (1969) the collection was found to be incompletely sorted; most useful were the diary, and the files arranged under Politics 1944-1959, Foreign Relations Committee 1946-1959, and Miscellaneous Public Issues. Also used at Princeton, but of limited value, were the Selected Correspondence files, 1946-1965, in the Bernard M. Baruch collections.


The papers of Arthur H. Vandenberg are deposited here amidst largely eighteenth and early nineteenth century collections. The collection appears to have been pruned by Vandenberg's son, who edited the collection of his papers published in 1952, but it remains extremely important.
Apart from the few diaries and scrapbooks, each item is filed separately under its date.

Ohio State Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio (1969)

A number of minor collections was found here. The most important turned out to be the papers of John M. Vorys, which produced a number of interesting items, largely of constituency correspondence. Also used were the papers of Clarence J. Brown, Taft's campaign manager in 1948, which proved disappointing, and the small collection of Henry Prather Flectcher papers. Apart from a collection of newspaper cuttings in connection with his 1944 campaign, the papers of John W. Bricker contained nothing of even possible value to this study.

Library of Congress (1969)

The most useful collection turned out to be the little known one of John Callan O'Laughlin, owner and publisher of the Army and Navy Journal. His alphabetically arranged General Correspondence 1933-1949, proved a mine of information on affairs in Washington written from the perspective of a conservative Republican. Also useful were the papers of Joseph W. and Stewart Alsop, which contain the regular correspondence with Martin Sommers of the Saturday Evening Post from 1946. In citation "Alsop" refers to Joseph Alsop, whilst letter written by Stewart Alsop are described in full. A few items were found in the correspondence files of Robert P. Patterson (Secretary of War, 1945-1947). The papers of James W. Wadsworth Jr. are thin,
but, his diary contains a few useful entries. The papers of two senior Senators, Wallace H. White and Tom Connally proved unproductive apart from one item in the White MSS. file on 1948 presidential campaign which was not found elsewhere. The present writer was denied access to the papers of Robert A. Taft, which were closed pending the writing of an official biography by J. T. Patterson.

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri (1971)

The most useful collection was that of Frank McNaughton, Washington D. C. correspondent of Time, 1941-1949. The collection consists of his regular reports by other Time correspondents. McNaughton appeared to have excellent contacts in Washington, and the papers are a major source for the politics of the period. The papers of Harry S. Truman consist of the vast, and not very useful, collection of White House Central Files; a limited number were looked at, and where cited the number of the file is given. More useful were the papers of Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, 1946-1950, whose Political File proved valuable for study of the 1948 campaign. Also valuable were the papers of George M. Elsey, a member of the White House political staff. Especially useful were his Speech file and his Subject File, both of which contain nondescript scraps of paper with intriguing and sometimes cryptic information, kept with an eye for history. Less useful were the papers of J. Howard McGrath, Chairman of the
Democratic National Committee, 1947-1949, and the files (1948-1953) of Charles S. Murphy, administrative assistant to the President. The newspaper clipping file of the Democratic National Committee Library proved useful, especially the large file on Thomas E. Dewey; a few items were found in the separately catalogued National Democratic Committee Records. The Library contains a collection of oral history transcripts, but a number requested proved to have unpublicized restrictions which made their use either impracticable or impossible.

**Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (1971)**

A few useful items were found in the Dwight D. Eisenhower papers, 1916-1952, and, with regard to the 1948 campaign, in the papers of Leonard V. Finder. Minor items were found in the correspondence files of the papers of Harry C. Butcher, naval aide to General Eisenhower, and the Library staff drew my attention to some material in the papers of Floyd L. Parks. The Republican National Committee papers were unavailable at the time of my visit.

**Herbert Hoover Library, West Branch, Iowa (1971)**

The Post-Presidential Individual File of the papers of Herbert Hoover proved valuable; this contains the most important correspondence, filed, except where indicated in citation, under the name of individual correspondents. All references to the Hoover MSS. are to the Post-Presidential Individual File.

The present writer was denied access to the Thomas E. Dewey papers which are deposited at the University of Rochester, New York.
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