Conscientious objection in healthcare: why tribunals might be the answer

Hughes

doi:10.1136/medethics-2015-102970

Conscientious objection in healthcare: why tribunals might be the answer

Hughes

Authors

Jonathan Hughes j.a.hughes@keele.ac.uk

Abstract

A recent focus of the debate on conscientious objection in healthcare is the question of whether practitioners should have to justify their refusal to perform certain functions. A recent article by Cowley addresses a practical aspect of this controversy, namely the question of whether doctors claiming conscientious objector status in relation to abortion should be required, like their counterparts claiming exemption from military conscription, to defend their claim before a tribunal. Cowley argues against the use of tribunals in the medical case, on the grounds that there are likely to be fewer unjustified claims to conscientious objection in this context than in the military, and that in any case tribunals will not be an effective way of distinguishing genuine and false cases. I reject these arguments and propose a different conception of the role of a medical conscientious objection tribunal.

Acceptance Date	Feb 8, 2016
Publication Date	Feb 25, 2016
Journal	Journal of Medical Ethics
Print ISSN	0306-6800
Publisher	BMJ Publishing Group
Pages	213-217
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2015-102970
Publisher URL	http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2015-102970