National identity and elite interests:
Makarios and Greek Cypriot nationalism (1967-1974)

Sevki Kiralp

PHD

Keele University

June 2014
With my deepest respect to Ekrem, Hasan, Ahmet and all the other victims of the Cyprus tragedy,

I dedicate this thesis to my dear parents Leyla Kiralp and Mustafa Kiralp.
SUBMISSION OF THESIS FOR A RESEARCH DEGREE

Part I. DECLARATION by the candidate for a research degree. To be bound in the thesis

Degree for which thesis being submitted

PHD

Title of thesis

National identity and elite interests: Makarios and Greek Cypriot nationalism (1967-1974)

This thesis contains confidential information and is subject to the protocol set down for the submission and examination of such a thesis.

NO

Date of submission

3 June 2014

Original registration date

27 September 2010

Name of candidate

Sevki Kiralp

Research Institute

Law, Politics and Justice

Name of Lead Supervisor

Lorna Lloyd

I certify that:

(a) The thesis being submitted for examination is my own account of my own research
(b) My research has been conducted ethically. Where relevant a letter from the approving body confirming that ethical approval has been given has been bound in the thesis as an Annex
(c) The data and results presented are the genuine data and results actually obtained by me during the conduct of the research
(d) Where I have drawn on the work, ideas and results of others this has been appropriately acknowledged in the thesis
(e) Where any collaboration has taken place with one or more other researchers, I have included within an ‘Acknowledgments’ section in the thesis a clear statement of their contributions, in line with the relevant statement in the Code of Practice (see Note overleaf).
(f) The greater portion of the work described in the thesis has been undertaken subsequent to my registration for the higher degree for which I am submitting for examination.

(g) Where part of the work described in the thesis has previously been incorporated in another thesis submitted by me for a higher degree (if any), this has been identified and acknowledged in the thesis.

(h) The thesis submitted is within the required word limit as specified in the Regulations.

Total words in submitted thesis (including text and footnotes, but excluding references and appendices) **75,000**

Signature of candidate  

Date 11 June 2014

**Note**

**Extract from Code of Practice:** If the research degree is set within a broader programme of work involving a group of investigators – particularly if this programme of work predates the candidate’s registration – the candidate should provide an explicit statement (in an ‘Acknowledgments’ section) of the respective roles of the candidate and these other individuals in relevant aspects of the work reported in the thesis. For example, it should make clear, where relevant, the candidate’s role in designing the study, developing data collection instruments, collecting primary data, analysing such data, and formulating conclusions from the analysis. Others involved in these aspects of the research should be named, and their contributions relative to that of the candidate should be specified (*this does not apply to the ordinary supervision, only if the supervisor or supervisory team has had greater than usual involvement*).
Abstract

Within the field of Nationalism Studies, the relationship between “National Identity” and “ethnicity” has been widely studied. Likewise, the relationship between “National Identity”, “elite interests” and “ethnic conflicts” has also been investigated. In fact, there is a considerable amount of studies focused on the “inter-state” aspects of “National Identity”, “ethnicity” and “elite interests”, however, such studies tend to highlight the “elite” of the “homeland” as the political and social leaders of their ethnicity; seeing themselves responsible for defending the political interests of their ethnic relatives in transnational borders, or liberating them from other states via “secessionist” or “irredentist” policies. Nevertheless, an example of elite of “ethnic kin”, who dominates another state outside its “homeland”, has not yet been widely theorized academically, with a focus on “National Identity” and “elite interests”. This study aims to fill that gap within the literature through the example of President Makarios and Greek Cypriot nationalism. While Cyprus was a British colony, the Greek Cypriot community was mobilized to unify Cyprus with their “homeland” Greece. However, the result of such mobilization was the foundation of a Cypriot state, based on power-sharing between the Greek Cypriot majority and Turkish Cypriot minority. In the post-Independence era, particularly with the consolidation of the military dictatorship in Greece (1967), President Makarios abandoned the Enosis (unification of Cyprus with Greece) policies and made attempts to reconstruct the Greek Cypriot National Identity in favour of a Greek Cypriot-ruled independent Cypriot state. President Makarios also ignored Greek Junta's manipulations about the Cypriot politics. The subsequent struggle continued until the Athens-led coup d'état that overthrew the President (1974). This thesis shall follow Brass’ “Instrumentalist” theory and shall analyze the reconstruction of the Greek Cypriot National Identity. The thesis will also investigate the role played by the interests of both the President and the Greek Cypriots in constructing this new National Identity.

Keywords: Nationalism, National Identity, elite interests, ethnic conflicts, consociation, “others”, “homeland nationalism”, “nationalizing nationalism”, Cyprus Conflict, Makarios.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements vii
Abbreviations 1
Linguistic Notes 3
Map 1: Cyprus 4
Map 2: Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and Mediterranean 5
Definitions 6
Introduction 13
Literature review 13
Methodology 21

Further elucidation on methodology and concepts 32
Discussion of the accessed sources and the gathered data 33
Inaccessibility of AKEL archives 44
Inaccessibility of Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents 46
Analyzing political speeches: The Makarios case 47
Elite 50
Elite interests 52
Ethnicity 56

Chapter 1: The theoretical framework 61

1.1 National identity 63
1.1.1. Ethnicity, national identity and nationalism 63
1.1.2. National identity and nationalism in the East 68
1.1.3. Consociation and national identity 72
1.1.4. The “homeland”, ethnicity and nationalism 75

1.2. National identity and elite interests 81
1.2.1. Ethnic nationalism and elite interests: The Instrumentalist theory 81
1.2.2. The “elite” and Instrumentalism’s criticisms 86
1.2.3. Consociation, ethnic elite and national identity 92
1.2.4. Symbols, rhetoric, “others” and national identity 96
1.2.5. “Homeland”, national identity and elite interests 104
Conclusion 110

Chapter 2: The history of Cyprus and the nationalism in Cyprus 115
2.1. The history of Cyprus and the shaping of nationalisms on the island 115
2.1.1. Cyprus before the British Era 116
2.1.2. Cyprus as a British colony 119
2.1.3. Towards Cypriot independence 125
Acknowledgements

I am glad that I have completed my thesis as a PhD candidate in the Research Institute for Politics, Justice and Law at Keele University. First of all, I would like to express my profound appreciation towards my dear parents; Leyla Kiralp and Mustafa Kiralp, for the precious support they provided to me during my PhD studies. Additionally, I would like to say a big “thank you” to my supervisor, Lorna Lloyd, for the relentless efforts she made by reading all my draft chapters and encouraging me to improve them with her advices. There is no doubt that, the most important role in the achievements of this thesis has been played by Lorna. Afterwards, I would like to thank my dear friend Ilia Xypolia, who studied another case of nationalism concerned on Cyprus. Our discussions about Nationalism and the Cyprus Question have created an important contribution to my thesis. I owe a “thank you” to Bulent Gokay, my second supervisor, for his help. I would also like to say “thanks” to Vasilis Constantinou, the person in charge for the newspaper archives of Press and Information Office, to Press and Information Office, to Near East University Grand Library and to Dr. Fazil Kutchuk Museum, for the access they enabled for my archival research. I also owe a big “thank you” to my lecturer Elizabeth Carter, who has always helped me when I needed. Last, but not least, I would like to express my appreciation towards Kurt Richard Luther and Helen Parr for the important contributions they made with their suggestions during my doctoral progression panel. The success belongs not only to me, but also to all the people and institutions I referred to. In case of failure, the responsibility belongs only to me.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKEL</td>
<td><em>Anorthotiko Komma Ergazoménon Laou</em> (Progressive Party of the Working People)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>Committee on Missing Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Colonial Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEK</td>
<td><em>Dimokratikó Ethnikó Kóma</em> (National Democrat Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDEK</td>
<td><em>Eniaía Dimokratíki Enosi Kentrou</em> (United Democratic Central Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDES</td>
<td><em>Ellinikós Dimokratikós Ellinikós Syndésmos</em> (National Republican Greek Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELAS</td>
<td><em>Ellinikós Laikós Apeleftherotikós Stratós</em> (Greek People's Liberation Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELDYK</td>
<td><em>Elliníki Dinami Kyprou</em> (Hellenic Forces in Cyprus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EK</td>
<td><em>Eniaío Komma</em> (Unified Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOKA</td>
<td><em>Ethnikí Organósi Kyprión Agóniston</em> (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEO</td>
<td><em>Pankypriaktikí Ergatíki Omospondía</em> (Pancyprian Federation of labour)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>Press and Information Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td><em>Proodeftíki Paratáksi</em> (Progressive Camp)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDY</td>
<td><em>Pankypriaktikí Syndikato Dimossión Ypallíon</em> (Pancyprian Trade Union of Civil Servants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKK</td>
<td><em>Kommounístiko Komma Kyprou</em> (Communist Party of Cyprus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMT</td>
<td>Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (Turkish Resistance Organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Force in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Linguistic Notes

Linguistic Notes on Greek:

“a” is spelled as the “a” in abnormal.
“c” is spelled as the “c” in crown. “d” is spelled as the “th” in that.
“e” is spelled as the “a” in as.
“g” is spelled as the “g” in goal.
“i” is spelled as the “e” in be. “y” is spelled as the “e” in be.
“ch” is spelled as the “h” in hand.
“es” at the end of the word is spelled as the “is” in history. “gi” is spelled as the “yi” in yield.
“ou” is spelled as the “u” in bonus.
“th” is spelled as the “f” in fiction.

The Greek name “Konstantinos” is anglicized as “Constantine”.
The Greek name “Giorgos” is anglicized as “George”.

Linguistic Notes on Turkish:

“a” is spelled as the “a” in abnormal.
“c” is spelled as the “g” in Belgium.
“e” is spelled as the “a” in as.
“g” is spelled as the “g” in goal.
“i” is spelled as the “e” in be. “u” is spelled as the u in bonus.
Map 1: Cyprus

Source: www.planetware.com
Map 2: Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Mediterranean

Source: www.emersonkent.com
DEFINITIONS

**Nationalism:** In this study, “Nationalism” is defined as the mobilization of a social group in order to solidify their attachment via a sovereign state and territory. The term also refers to the emphasis of a specific entity’s interests over all the other entities in the world (Breuilly 1993).

**Ethnicity:** “Ethnicity” refers to the kinships, common ancestries and collective cultural values between the members of one ethnic group in one state or more than one ethnic group in more than one state (Smith 1986).

**National Identity:** This study perceives the national identity as the general outline of duties and social attachment of the citizens of a state or the members of an entity defined or mobilized as a “nation”. For instance, an ethnic group mobilized to coerce the other ethnic groups within a state and render itself dominant in that state might be identified as a “potential nation”. Essentially, its ethnic identity is equated to its national identity (Smith 1991).

**Ethnic Group:** An “ethnic group” is a group, composed of members having common cultural markers such as language, dialect, distinctive dress, diet, custom, religion or race. The members of an ethnic group differ from the members of other groups based on the aforementioned cultural markers (Brass 1991: 19).
**Nation:** The nation is formed by the political and territorial integration or disintegration of different ethnic groups¹ (Brass 1991: 20). As Breuilly (1993) asserts, the “nation” cannot be conceptualized without its relation to the state, sovereignty and political power. The “nation” is an entity aiming to have a sovereign territory, to rule a state and exercise its political power (Breuilly 1993:2). On the other hand, as Brass argues, the “ethnic groups” and “nations” are entities whose identities are constructed and re-constructed for political purposes. Based on Brass and Breuilly, the “nation” might be defined as an entity, comprised of one or more ethnic groups, whose identity constructions aim to attain and sustain sovereignty within the same territory and to exercise political power within the same state.

**Ethnic Conflict:** The “ethnic conflict” describes a violent or non-violent political polarization between different ethnic groups within the same state. Such political polarizations are defined as an “ethnic conflicts”, as they focus particularly on the political rights enjoyed by the members or the non-members of an ethnic group (Horowitz 1985; Vanhanen 1999).

**Ethnic Nationalism:** In multi-ethnic states, once an ethnic group is mobilized to coerce the other(s), the mobilization is defined as “Ethnic nationalism”. In other words, the ethnic character of the national identity overpowers the civic ties amongst the ethnic groups within the relevant state. Thus, the ethnic identity of a group might be characterized as its national identity as well, if it politically mobilizes to coerce other ethnic groups and turn the political entity into a nation-

¹ Nations composed of a single ethnic group, such as the Japanese, might also exist (Connor 1994). In such cases, integration or disintegration of different ethnic groups does not constitute a criterion.
state privileging its own ethnic culture and ethnic interests. Ethnic nationalism might also refer to the mobilization of groups with the same ethnicity across transnational borders with the aim of becoming politically unified within the same state. Furthermore, secessionist movements of ethnic groups are also defined as ethnic nationalism (Smith 1981).

**Civic Nationalism**: “Civic nationalism” implies the legal attachments of citizens to their states and the brotherhood they have based on a citizenship that ignores all religious, ethnic and linguistic differences amongst the citizens. Accordingly, the nations having embraced this civic type of nationalism do not implement and support expansionist policies in order to be unified with their ethnic relatives. Thus the nation is identified and limited with its state and its territory (Connor 1994).

**Elite**: As Mosca (1939) and Mills (1959) argue, in politics, the term “elite” might refer to a broad range of power holders in political, economic and social spheres (politicians, army officers, ecclesiastics, intelligentsia, businessmen etc). On the other hand, as Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell (1971) indicate, in politics, the term “elite” might be substituted with the term “political elite” in order to define the politicians (particularly the elected members of the legislation and execution). This thesis focuses primarily on a bi-communal power sharing democracy. Generally, in such democracies two Chief Executives are elected separately by their own ethnic groups, as are the members of the legislative branch who also represent separate ethnic groups (Lijphart 1977). Therefore in this thesis, the term “elite” includes members of the executive and legislative branches and actually refers to the “political elite”. However, the main example of this within the thesis will be that of
one single political leader: President Makarios, the Chief Executive of Cyprus and the leader of Greek Cypriots.

**Elite Interests:** In this study, “elite interests” refers to the desire of the ethnic elite to maximize their own political power and to minimize their opponents' political power within a multi-ethnic state (Brass 1991). Therefore, in this study, “elite interests” implies the ethnic elite’s interests for political power. However, as Brass theorizes, in many cases the “elite interests” might have a parallel relationship with ethnic groups’ interests. That is to say, interests of the elite and their ethnic group might correspond to each other. Therefore, in its analytical and hypothetical frameworks, this thesis does not ignore the ethnic groups’ interests.

**The “other”:** In this study, the term “other”, is used in the way it is used by O’Shaughnessy (2004) and Prizel (1998). The “other” refers to an entity, a person, an association or a state, which the political elite perceive as rival or hostile. Accordingly, the “internal other” refers to a perceived adversarial power within the state’s borders. The term might be used for ethnic groups (See Prizel 1998). However, it might also refer to an organization, a leader or an ideology influenced by the rhetoric aspects of politics (see O’Shaughnessy 2004). The term “external other” is used by Prizel (1998) in identifying the external states that are viewed as adversarial powers by the ethnic elite. So this study will also use the term “external other” in order to identify the states alienated by the ethnic elite.

**Symbol:** In this study, the term "symbol" refers to socio-cultural, political, national, historical and ethnic values occupying important places in social consciousness
and memories. The meanings of symbols might be constructed and re-constructed by the political elite or religious elite. They are utilized by the political elite or religious elite in the manipulation and mobilization of the masses (See Cohen 1986; Brass 1991; Schwartz 1991; O'Shaughnessy 2004).

**West and East:** In the distinction between the West and the East, this study follows Kohn (1945). As Kohn argues, the West-East distinction is not simply geographical. The term “West” refers to the Western European intellectual, democratic and economic development dating back to the Renaissance period. The Renaissance emerged in Western Europe and constituted the very basis of the Industrial Revolution and contemporary democracies. The first civilizations to begin Renaissance were the Western Europeans, who went on to complete the Industrial Revolution and terminate monarchical regimes by founding democratic states. Northern American societies were in fact colonized by huge swathes of Western European migrants, as were Australia and New Zealand. Therefore, the term “West” refers to the Western European societies in Europe and in their former colonies. In Geographical terms, “Western civilizations” will be defined as Northern America, Australia, New Zealand and Western Europe.

Additionally, there is no reason to exclude the Nordic states from the concept of “West” in this study. As Norris (2009) suggests, those states (since their early democratization processes) have been amongst the most democratic and economically developed states as successful followers of Western Culture. Likewise, East Germany (as a socialist state during the Cold War) is not excluded.
from the term “West”. As Kohn underlines, the Germans played important roles in the Renaissance and Western European culture.

In identifying the “East”, this thesis still follows Kohn’s approach. As the scholar asserts, Western democratization was followed by Central and Eastern Europe (and essentially by ex-Colonies located in Asia and Africa). However, Kohn’s argument is, since the intellectual development in the relevant regions lacked the enlightenment of Renaissance, the Central and Eastern Europeans, Asians and Africans (and in this thesis, the colonies liberated after 1945) were unsuccessful in adapting the Western Civilization to their socio-political systems. In this thesis, India, Nigeria and Cyprus, as ex-colonies ruled by Western Europeans, are included in the term “East”. Unlike Canada, USA, Australia and New Zealand, these societies are not composed of Western Europeans. The demography of Cyprus for instance is not comprised of Western Europeans. The same is valid for Nigeria and India. Additionally, Greece and Turkey (two NATO states) are included in the East. Both states had been economically underdeveloped when compared with their allies in the Capitalist Bloc. Additionally, the armies of both states seized power during the Cold War. Such interventions in democratic governments never happened in “Western” societies during the Cold War.

Consequently, in this thesis, the “West” refers to Western European peoples, in Europe, in Northern America, in Australia and in New Zealand. The term also includes the Nordic States. On the other hand, the “East” refers to the Central and Eastern Europeans, Asians, Africans and the ex-colonies liberated after 1945. When referring to Cold War alliances, this thesis shall refrain from using the term
of “Western Bloc”. Instead, the term “NATO” will be used since Greece and Turkey are not considered to be Western societies in this thesis.

**Manipulation:** In this thesis, the term “manipulation” refers the leaders’ call for the masses to follow them. Masses might follow their leaders by getting involved in armed struggles, organizing demonstrations or simply by voting for the leaders who manipulate them (See Lasswell et al. 1971; Brass 1991; Breuilly 1993; Suzman 1999).

**Homeland:** In this thesis the term “homeland”, follows Brubaker’s (1996) concept. The term refers to the nation-states perceived as the social and political centre of their ethnicity. As Brubaker notes, the concept is relevant only for the “Eastern” states. Such states might attempt to liberate their ethnic relatives in trans-national borders, annex their territories, or at least support and manipulate the policies of their ethnic kin. On this basis, Greece is characterized as the “homeland” of Greek Cypriots.
Introduction

Literature Review

When analyzing academic literature to do with Nationalism, three main trends stand out. The scholars constituting the first trend theorize and analyze the sociological aspects of Nationalism. Kohn (1945), Gellner (1983), Berghe (1981), Smith (1981; 1986; 1991), Armstrong (1982), Chatterjee (1986; 1996), Hutchinson (1987, 2013), Anderson (1991) Guibernau (1996), Guibernau & Rex (2010) and Eriksen (2012) refer to this trend. Smith, Berghe, Hutchinson and Armstrong consider nations as pre-modern entities, and investigate their ethnic origins. Their conceptual frameworks inherently include “national identity” and “ethnicity”. Their studies conclude that modern nations are composed of “kinships”, “coercions” and “accommodations” amongst the ethnic groups, which had already existed prior to the foundation of nation-states. Their methodologies are inspired by the discipline of Social Anthropology.

On the other hand, Gellner and Anderson characterize the nations as post-modern entities. Accordingly, their conceptual frameworks include “national identity”, “nation-state” and socio-cultural transformations. Their methodological frameworks are inspired by Historical Sociology. It is also important to note that, the two scholars neglect “ethnicity” as an element affecting national identity. Their studies reach to the conclusion that the nations and subsequent “national identities” emerged as post-modern creations and products of post-Industrial socio-economic transitions. Therefore the nations owe their homogenous identities to the technological virtues of “Industrialization” and “Urbanization”. In theoretical and
methodological terms, Chatterjee establishes his own “post-Colonial” approach, with his analysis which comes to the conclusion that Colonization sharply divided the colonial societies based on an ethno-cultural nature. Central analytical actor of this trend appears to be the “society”, in terms of “ethnic groups” or “nations”. As mentioned, the scholars of this trend focus on the sociological aspects of Nationalism while they neglect its political aspects. Students following this trend tend to utilize “documentary research”, “ethnography”, “questionnaires” and “narrative analysis” as their research methods.

The second trend within the literature is composed of studies examining the political aspects of Nationalism. Lijphart (1977; 2008), Hobsbawm (1983), Horowitz (1985; 1991), Brass (1991), Kellas (1991), Breuilly (1993), Connor (1994), Reilly (2001), Frankael (2004), Roeder & Rothchild (2005), Esses & Jackson (2009), Brown (2010) and Esteban & Ray (2011) are the scholars of this trend. The scholars within this trend investigate the relationship between the “national identity” and “elite interests”. Barring Hobsbawm, “ethnicity”, “consociations” and “ethnic conflicts” are also included in the conceptual frameworks of the relevant scholars. “Ethnic conflicts” in post-Colonial societies (that gained independence after 1945) have been widely studied by these scholars, as have the relationships between “national identity”, “elite interests” and “ethnic conflicts”, as well as various methods of “conflict resolution” and their implications.

The research behind this trend concludes that ethnic and national identities are constructed and re-constructed in the processes of democratization. Furthermore,
the political elite play an important and manipulative role in such constructions. “Elite interests” play a vital role in “ethnic conflicts” since the elite tend to instigate inter-ethnic hostilities, as they find ethnic nationalism profitable for their self-interests. It is also recognised that the “Eastern” states, particularly the multi-ethnic post-Colonial (post-1945) ones, were quite vulnerable against coercive and secessionist movements amongst the major and minor ethnic groups, particularly due to the failure of “consociational democracies” that were introduced, and because of the economic inequalities between ethnic groups.

This academic trend focuses on the “intra-state” aspects of Nationalism and neglects its inter-state aspects. It considers “nations” as post-modern entities and within this theoretical approach, Brass’ analysis stands out with his focus on the relationship between the “elite interests” and “national identity”. According to Brass’ theory, the political elite and religious elite of ethnic groups construct and re-construct ethnic and national identities, based on their self-interests and their ethnic groups’ interests. Esses and Jackson posit an outstanding adaption of Brass’ Instrumentalism in their case studies focusing on inter-ethnic conflicts in the Middle East. The focus of this trend appears to be the “ethnic groups”, the “consociational institutions”, and the “political elite”. This thesis shall follow Brass, however shall expand upon the theoretical framework since Brass’ theory does not account directly for the inter-state aspects of the relationship between the “elite interests” and “national identity”. The students following this trend tend to utilize “documentary research”, “ethnography” and “narrative analysis” as their research methods. They also tend to test their hypothetical bases via case studies (as single-case studies or comparative case studies).
The third trend within the studies of Nationalism refers to the scholars theorizing and analyzing the inter-state elements of Nationalism, in addition to its intra-state aspects. Posen (1993), Van Evera (1994), Brubaker (1996), Kauffman (1996), Prizel (1998), Saideman & Ayres (2000), Dawisha (2002), Bukh (2010) and Tang & Darr (2012) are amongst the scholars representing this trend. These scholars examine the roles played by inter-state and intra-state rivalries in the construction of the national identity. With the exception of Bukh, they pay attention to ethnicity and how it is reflected within nationalist policies and the formation of a national identity. The primary concepts within this trend widely include “ethnicity”, “national identity” and “international conflict”. Brubaker’s concepts of “homeland nationalism” and “nationalizing nationalism” are particularly outstanding, as is his analysis of the impact of “national identity” and “ethnicity” at an inter-national level regarding “Eastern” societies. On the other hand, Kauffman’s theoretical framework fusing Brass’ “Instrumentalism” with the concept of “irredentism” is equally important. Additionally, Prizel puts forward two valuable concepts as the “internal others” and “external others”.

The studies of scholars included in the third trend within the literature concludes that “ethnicity”, in terms of “irredentism”, might become a source of international conflict. Furthermore, due to interaction between nations and the constant changes in nations’ perceptions towards each other (particularly with regards to ethnic ties), the “national identity” is to a great extent related to external states. More importantly, “ethnicity” appears to be a source of international conflict particularly amongst the “Eastern” states. The third trend within the studies of
Nationalism might provide the required feedback for the adaptation of Brass’ “Instrumentalism” to the inter-state aspects of Nationalism. The scholars included in this trend usually come from a background of International Relations, so their overall focus is on the “state”. However it is essential to note that Kauffman and Prizel consider the “political elite” as their primary focus, which mirrors the analytical purpose of this thesis.

Barring Kauffman, it is clear that the trend neglects the concept of “elite interests”. Nevertheless, Kauffman’s study reaches the conclusion that, if a nation-state is perceived as the political and social centre of its “ethnic relatives” in transnational borders, then the political elite of the relevant nation-state might find it beneficial to re-construct the national identity and implement “irredentist” and “expansionist” policies, in order to enhance their political power at the national level. However, this thesis concerns the relationship between the national identity and “elite interests” taking in the idea of “ethnic kin”, instead of the “homeland”. The methodological basis of this third trend is comprised mainly through documentary research. The students following this trend tend to utilize the relevant research method. Nevertheless, Prizel’s methodology includes a distinctive analysis on “political speeches” of leaders. It is also important to note that the scholars of this trend tend to focus on post-Communist societies, and the ethnic conflicts encountered in both intra and inter-state levels. However, the analyzed and conceptualized “elite” are the “political elite” of the “homeland”, instead of the ethnic kin dominating another state outside the “homeland”. Thus, the third trend remains inadequate given the analytical and hypothetical purpose of this thesis.
The studies of Nationalism have so far paid noticeable attention to the relationship between the “national identity”, “ethnicity” and “ethnic conflicts”. The roles of “national identity”, “ethnicity” and “elite interests” in “ethnic conflicts” have also widely been studied. Brass’ Instrumentalism has been adapted to studies investigating inter-state and intra-state conflicts as a result of ethnic nationalism. In the relevant literature, a significant amount of approaches examining the relationship between the “national identity”, “ethnicity” and their international aspects also exists. Thus, the relationship between the “national identity”, “ethnicity” and “international conflicts” is hardly under-theorized. However, in such studies, the “elite interests” refer to the interests of political elite of the “homeland”. What has remained under-studied and under-theorized is the political elite of the “ethnic kin” dominating another state. This thesis shall investigate the relationship between the “national identity” and the interests of the “political elite”, who represent an “ethnic kin” belonging to the same ethnicity with the “homeland”, but who dominate another state outside the territorial borders of their “homeland”. There is a significant gap in the field regarding the relationship between the “national identity” and “elite interests” in such societies. This thesis shall follow Brass’ theory, and will hypothesize that the national identity is constructed by the ethnic elite and is based on “elite interests” and ethnic interests.

The interests and national identity design of the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios make for an appropriate example with which to study the aforementioned relationship and close the gap within the literature of Nationalism Studies. It can be argued that this aspect of the thesis constitutes a thematic distinctiveness. More importantly, if the thesis generates a theoretical framework based on
Instrumentalism and proves its validity, it will add weight to the theory when studying the relationship between “ethnicity”, “national identity” and “elite interests”, particularly if “homeland nationalism” and “nationalizing nationalism” affects a specific society at the same time.

Regarding studies of Nationalism focused on the Cyprus Conflict, it is possible to categorize the scholars into two groups. The first refers to the studies drawing on the discipline of Historical Sociology and analyzing the sociological aspects of Nationalism in Cyprus. Loizos (1975), Vamik (1978), Doob (1986), Gazioglu (1990), Stamatakis (1991), Mavratsas (1998; 2010), Bryant (2004), Nevzat (2005), Peristianis (2008), Anagnostopoulou (2010) and Bryant & Papadakis (2012) fall into this category. These scholars have analyzed the national identities of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities based on sociological aspects. They mainly analyzed the attachment and detachment of the two communities to their motherlands Greece and Turkey, and the relationship between each other via the formation of their national identities in the post-Independence era. Their research methods draw on documentary research, ethnography, questionnaires and narrative analysis. “national identity” and “homeland nationalism” are amongst the strongest concepts they have analyzed and used to construct hypotheses. According to these scholars, the narratives amongst the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots instigated inter-ethnic hostility. The scholars also concluded that, during the post-Colonial era, Greek Cypriots were sociologically detached from their ethnic ties with Greece. Amongst them, Peristianis, who followed Gellner, outlines the socio-cultural developments that changed the Greeks of Cyprus from Greek nationalism to Greek Cypriot nationalism.
The second category refers to the scholars examining the political aspects of Nationalism in Cyprus. It includes Bitsios (1975), Stavrinides (1975), Markydes (1977), Salih (1978) Attalides (1979), Kitromilides (1979), Joseph (1997), Fisher (2001), Carkoglu & Sozen (2002), Kizilyurek (2002; 2005; 2010), Tocci (2000), Anastasiou (2007), Loizides (2007; 2012), Michael (2007) and Tombazos (2010). The scholars have made significant contributions to understanding the roles of “national identity” and “ethnicity” in the ethnic conflict in Cyprus. They also attach analytical importance to the policies of the Cypriot political elite. However, apart from Tocci, their conceptual frameworks do not directly target “elite interests”. The recurring concepts generally include “national identity”, “conflict resolution” and “ethnic conflicts”. Their conclusions indicate that the post-Colonial Cypriot state, which was established on the basis of power sharing between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority, failed due to the coercive (assimilative) policies of Greek Cypriots and secessionist mobilizations of Turkish Cypriots. These scholars also conclude that the political detachment of Greek Cypriots from their “homeland” Greece contributed to Greco-Cypriot tension which was amongst the reasons that led to the Athens-sponsored coup d’état against the Cypriot government. Amongst the scholars, Kizilyurek, who follows Breuilly, highlights the political factors that shaped the relations not just between the two communities but also with their “homelands” Greece and Turkey. While the scholars following the second trend have broadly utilized documentary research, Loizides has made important contributions using “elite interviews”.

20
The thematic structure of this thesis makes a distinctive contribution to studies of Nationalism analyzing the Cyprus Conflict. It examines the Greek Cypriots' detachment from Greece, based on the relationship between “national identity” and “elite interests”. Due to its conceptual, theoretical and analytical focus, this study shall follow the second group of scholars and investigate the political aspects of Nationalism in Cyprus. However, this thesis shall also be methodologically distinctive, since apart from Loizides and Kizilyurek, there is a significant absence of tri-lingual research using Greek, Turkish and English sources. This thesis uses documents written in all three languages, as well as making a contribution to the relevant methodological gap as well.

Methodology

This thesis relies on qualitative data produced using qualitative research methods. Its analytical design aims to demonstrate the validity of the initial hypotheses (generated in Chapter 1) via the research (see Flick 2012: 311; Bryman 2008:24-27). Regarding the ontological basis of this thesis, it is essential to stress that, in politics, the “constructionist” ontology treats the socio-political environment as a “constructed” and “re-constructed” sphere. Accordingly, actions within the political sphere are characterized as “constructions” of the social environment. In other words, since they are constantly constructed and re-constructed, the actions within the social environment are not static. Analysis on “political speeches” is therefore appropriate for this ontological approach since it investigates how politics and political concepts are constructed via speech; the analytical targets are not characterized as fixed and objective concepts, and the “constructionist” ontology
rejects the positivism of “objectivist” ontology (Willig 2013: 4-12). Prizel (1998) followed the “constructionist” ontological line and analyzed “political speeches” of leaders. She considered national identity a “constructed” concept rather than being pre-determined, static or objectively identifiable in her analysis of the speeches of political leaders and their construction and re-construction of national identities. Nonetheless, for epistemological and ontological considerations, this thesis rejects the “objectivist” and “positivist” approaches as adapted and applied in particular by the followers of Emile Durkheim (See Lukes 1985: 73; Hassard 1995: 13-14).

In analyzing the political speeches, this thesis will follow Wodak’s and her colleagues’ adaptation. According to Wodak and her colleagues, politicians do not only present their own opinions in their speeches on national identity; they also try to emphasize national differences. Usually they want a policy to be legitimated, and to that end they draw a distinction between the “us” and the “other” in their speeches regarding national identity. Such speeches essentially indicate the common aims and the common enemies of the nation. In Wodak’s and her colleagues’ terms, there is a “spatial reference” to “us” and “them”. However, in analyzing the relevant speeches, the words “us” and “them” may not necessarily be found (Wodak et. al 2009). Once the content of the speech stresses a constructive unification of the members of the “nation”, and a “differentiation” between the nation and the “others”, there is no need for specific wording in order to measure the construction of the national identity qualitatively (Wodak et al. 2009: 33-35). This thesis shall investigate which collective aims and which collective enemies were identified by the President of Cyprus. Since the
President’s speeches are mostly found in textual sources, the necessary speeches were provided by documentary research.

Bhatia (2006: 175-176) notes that, in their political speeches, the leaders generally try to find domestic and international support to their policies. Additionally, since the media is globalized, what a leader says in one state (or about one state) is likely to be learned not only by national auspices, but also by international auspices. On this basis, what Makarios said about the Junta, the Greek Cypriot terrorists, Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leaders, regardless of place, was somehow be delivered to all parties via the media. Holly (1989: 123) argues that, in analyzing the political speeches of the leaders, two things help the researcher to a great extent: Having an idea about the predictable after-effects at national and international level, and knowing about the leader’s political interests.

This thesis has a hypothetical basis, enabling it to analyze President Makarios’s speeches based on the relationship between the “national identity” and “elite interests”. Therefore, the hypotheses of this theses posit assumptions about Makarios’s interests and the potential after-effects he expected while making the speech, the hypotheses shall be helpful in accounting for Makarios’s speeches.

The research question animating this thesis is: “To what extent do elite interests affect the shaping of national identity?” The independent variable of this thesis shall be the “elite interests”; the dependent variable will be the “national identity”; and, the specific national identity with which it is concerned is the reconstruction of the Greek Cypriot national identity. Specifically, it shall investigate the role of President Makarios’s interests and Greek Cypriots’ interests in his re-construction
of Greek Cypriot national identity. The main analytical actor for this thesis will be President Makarios. And, as indicated above, its basic research method will be an analysis of historical documents for the period 1967-1974. In doing so, it shall also analyze political speeches. Chatterjee (1986) and Prizel (1998) have successfully shown that analysis of political speeches of leaders is appropriate for this purpose. Thus, the thesis will focus on speeches of President Makarios regarding Greek Cypriot national identity.

The Greek Cypriot case might be regarded as a “typical case” of re-construction of national identity for interests of political elite and ethnic groups. In Social Sciences, “typical cases” are observed via “explanatory” case studies in order to explain social phenomena based on the existing theories (Stake 1995: 1-15; Yin 2003: 40-42). This thesis characterizes the Greek Cypriot case as “typical” insofar as it represents the adaptation of national identity to elite interests. The case study is “explanatory” and reliant on primary documents and secondary sources in the shape of archive documents, newspapers, memoirs and scholarly studies (on the virtues of these materials, see Tosh 2010: 96-111). It covers the period from 1967, when the King of Greece failed to oust the Junta of Colonels and President Makarios declared his pro-Independence policies, and terminates in 1974\(^2\), with the Athens-sponsored \textit{coup d'état} overthrowing the President and leading to the Turkish military intervention\(^3\).

\(^2\)The relevant era has been chosen, as during that period of time, the “homeland nationalism” of Greece was in crosscut with the President's “nationalizing nationalism”.

\(^3\)Turkey and Turkish Cypriots describe Turkey's 1974 military intervention is named as the "Peace Operation". On the other hand, Greece and Greek Cypriots reject this description and call it the "Turkish Invasion", a term which is equally displeasing to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. This thesis will use the term "military intervention". The neutral term, "intervention", avoids the connotations of the terms "Peace Operation" and "invasion" which offend the parties to the conflict.
There are three basic limitations regarding the sources in the archives in Cyprus. First, AKEL, the Communist party in Cyprus, had supported President Makarios' policies and had an important role to play beyond the historical period covered by this thesis. The archives of the party could provide valuable data regarding bi-communal relations in Cyprus (for example, records of meetings, resolutions and pamphlets). However, the party closed the files in its archives. Furthermore, the archives of the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs contain valuable and important sources of data, in particular on the Athens-Nicosia relations, a central concern for the analysis. However, the documents of the period 1969-1974 are closed.

Moreover, on 15 July 1974, when the Cypriot army overthrew President Makarios, the circulation of pro-Makarios newspapers was banned until the resignation of Nicos Sampson (who had succeeded to the presidency) on 23 July 1974. The gap arising from being unable to consult the archives of AKEL, the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the relevant Cypriot newspapers led the author of this thesis to make use of The National Archives of the British government in Kew (see below). Additionally, the archives of Press and Information Office in Nicosia were visited and the online databases of the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* (Nationality) and American Archives were utilized.

Another Cypriot source that was available was the archives of the Archbishopric in Nicosia. President Makarios was also the Archbishop of the Cypriot Church, and the Archbishopric had a developed database. However, the relevant documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1969-1974) were absent. The most important documents for this thesis available at the Archbishopric were newspaper cuttings. Since this was exactly what was contained in the PIO, which was under the direct
control of Makarios’s spokesman, the author of this thesis neglected the Archbishopric and visited the PIO instead.

As regards primary sources, as Tosh (2010) points out, the British National Archives in Kew (TNA) are amongst the world’s best. Since Cyprus is an ex-colony of Britain, a member of the Commonwealth and the fact that the UK was one of the three guarantors of Cypriot independence, as well as having a sovereign base on this strategically very important island, the United Kingdom has paid considerable attention to the Cyprus Conflict. Subsequently, the first port of call for the primary sources was the documents of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in TNA. As anticipated, there was valuable material for the period covered by the thesis (1967-974) such as telegrams exchanged between London and British diplomats serving in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. The search of the TNA database for the years 1967-1974 included the keywords: “Cyprus”, “Cyprus Conflict”, “Makarios”, “Grivas”, “EOKA B”, “National Front”5, “inter-communal talks”6, “Clerides”, “Turkish Cypriot leadership”, “Denktash” and “Kutchuk”.7 The richness of the documents that were consulted suggests that this thesis has not unduly suffered from being unable to access the archives of AKEL and the Cypriot Ministry of FA.

4 The Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office was created in 1968 with the merger of the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices (See National Archives 2013).

5 As will be explained in broader details throughout the thesis, Grivas was the leader of Greek Cypriot terrorist organization EOKA B, and the National Front was another terrorist organization, which was neutralized by the Cypriot police.

6 Cypriots generally refer to the inter-ethnic negotiations as “bi-communal negotiations”. However, on the first attempt I noticed that the British had referred to the negotiations as “inter-communal talks”. This led me to rely on the term used by the British during my archive research.

7 Clerides represented the Greek Cypriot community at the talks, and Denktash represented the Turkish Cypriot community. They both were the leaders of the ethnic chambers in Cypriot legislation, and they were hierarchically the “second men” after Makarios and Kutchuk. On the other hand, Kutchuk was the Vice-President of the Republic and he was the leader of Turkish Cypriot community.
In addition to the FCO documents, Cabinet and Parliamentary papers also reflected the British attitude towards the Cyprus Conflict. However, since it was the FCO’s job to keep the government informed about the political developments in Cyprus (as well as Greek and Turkish attitudes to the Cyprus Conflict), it is amongst the most fruitful source of information about President Makarios, and the other important analytical actors including Greek Cypriot terrorists, Turkish Cypriot leadership, Turkey and the Greek Junta. Since the focus of this thesis is on the role played by those actors and not on British policy, it was by and large unnecessary to look at Cabinet and parliamentary papers. The online archives of the USA State Department for 1973-1974 were also accessed, using the same keywords. They also provided reliable primary sources. These comprised the reports sent to Washington by American diplomats serving in Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and the United Nations in New York.

President Makarios’s speeches, which were needed for the analysis on political speeches, were obtained in the archives of the Press and Information Office (PIO) in Cyprus which importantly was headed by the government spokesman. The PIO archives contain press releases composed of President Makarios’s statements. Moreover, the PIO contained a great range of Cypriot newspapers as well. The sources analyzed by this thesis included anti-Makarios newspapers *Machi* (the Fight) and *Patris* (the Homeland) and pro-Makarios newspapers *Charavghi* (the Dawn) and *Fileleftheros* (the Liberal). The *Charavghi* (owned and run by AKEL) was particularly useful and important since it clearly supported Makarios and provided significant resistance against the Junta. On the other hand, the archives
of the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Halkin Sesi* (The Voice of the People), owned by Turkish Cypriot leadership, have also been analyzed in order to understand the Turkish Cypriots’ reaction to Makarios’ policies. These were consulted in the Grand Library of Near East University and the Dr. Fazil Kutchuk Museum located in North Nicosia.

The keywords used in exploring the newspaper databases at PIO archives (for years 1967-1974), were “Μακάριος” (Makarios), “Ένωσης” (Enosis), “διχοτόμηση” (partition), “Εθνικό Μέτωπο” (National Front), “Γρίβας” (Grivas), “Δικοινοτικές συνομιλιές” (Inter-communal Talks), “ΕΟΚΑ B”, “Κοφίνου” (Kophinou), “Βασιλέας” (King), “Κουτσούκ” (Kutchuk), “Ανεξαρτησία” (Independence), “Χούντα” (Junta), “Σύνταγμα” (constitution), “Εθνική Φρουρά” (National Guard), “Πλειοψήφια” (majority), “Μειονότητα” (minority), “Τουρκία” (Turkey), “Ελλάδα” (Greece), “Ντενκτάς” (Denktash) and “Τουρκοκυπριακή ηγεσία” (Turkish Cypriot Leadership). The same keywords were searched in the PIO press releases (which were mostly translated into English) plus (in English): “Gross Domestic Product”, “import(s)”, “export(s)” and “economic growth” since the thesis used PIO press releases in order to observe the Nationalist speeches of President Makarios and the economic development enjoyed by Greek Cypriots. The PIO press releases analyzed by this thesis have covered the years 1967-1974.

---

8 When it comes to Nationalism in Cyprus, Enosis (the basic inspiration of Greek and Greek Cypriot cause) and partition (the basic inspiration of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot cause) are amongst the most important keywords.

9 Kophinou was a Turkish Cypriot village attacked by the governmental forces in 1967. The relevant attack had caused a significant crisis and noticeable transitions in Cypriot politics.

10 Due to his relations with President Makarios, King Constantine was amongst the key players in the relevant period of time.

11 In 1968, Makarios had abandoned the pro-Enosis policies, and concentrated his policies on the maintenance of Cypriot Independence.

12 The Cypriot army was named as the “National Guard”.

13 The inter-communal talks were held to rearrange the Cypriot constitution. The rights given to the majority (Greek Cypriots) and the minority (Turkish Cypriots) were negotiated.
On the other hand, the analysis on the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Halkin Sesi* was useful to have an overview of the Turkish Cypriot perspective on some crucial issues and on the key players of the period covered by the thesis. However, the *Halkin Sesi* copies are not provided electronically. Thus, instead of using keywords, the observations on the *Halkin Sesi* relied totally on the time period (1967-1974). Additionally, the Turkish (mainland Turkey) newspaper *Milliyet* was analyzed via its online archive. The keywords used in searches on the *Milliyet* database were “* Kıbrıs*” (Cyprus), “*Denktaş*” (Denktash), “*Makarios*”, “*Enosis*”, “*Ecevit*”, “*İki Toplumlu Müzakereler*” (inter-communal talks) and “*Yunan Cuntası*” (Greek Junta), reflecting the thesis’ focus on Greek Cypriot nationalism. The documents accessed in the database of *Milliyet* covered the years 1971-1974. Therefore, the primary sources of this research included archives of TNA, State Department, PIO and the aforementioned newspapers.

Regarding the secondary sources, the memoirs of Glafkos Clerides were particularly valuable. Clerides was an important figure during the years covered by this thesis when he was President of the House of Representatives and the Greek Cypriot representative in the negotiations with Turkish Cypriots. He was a member of the committee for constitutional amendments and was one of the closest associates of President Makarios. Moreover, Mr. Clerides’ memoirs include the full texts of some important documents that shed light on Greco-Cypriot and intra-

---

14 As Tosh (2011: 91-97) asserts, the newspapers are sometimes primary sources and sometimes secondary sources. According to Tosh, if the newspaper provides information based on the searches of its own journalists about an issue, the data it provides is considered as a primary source. Additionally, any information reflecting the stance of the newspaper about an issue is considered primary source. However, if the information is provided to the newspaper by another source, then the data is characterized as a secondary source. Particularly with regards to the Cypriot press, in many cases, the information was provided by PIO. In such cases, the newspapers constituted secondary sources, and the PIO press releases were also cited.
Cypriot relations. Although these documents are mostly secondary sources, his memoirs constitute valuable sources of data due to the political position he occupied during the relevant period of time\(^\text{15}\). Furthermore, the state archives in Cyprus (not only in the North, but also in the South) are less developed than their British counterparts. Many documents are inaccessible or restricted. Clerides’s memoirs shall also constitute primary sources of this thesis, particularly regarding the information he provided as a witness about the political situation in Cyprus\(^\text{16}\).

In addition to Clerides’s memoirs, there have been valuable documentaries containing interviews with the political elite. Cacogiannis (1975) interviewed President Makarios, Peritsis (1992) interviewed Spyros Kyprianou, who succeeded Makarios as the elected President, Patrocles Stavrou\(^\text{17}\), the Under-Secretary to the President, and Vasos Lyssarides, the leader of Greek Cypriot socialist party EDEK. On the other hand, Birand (1999) interviewed the ex-Prime Minister of Turkey, Suleyman Demirel, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and Greek diplomats who served the Greek Junta (1967-1974). These interviews were useful secondary sources for the research.

In analyzing documents, there are four criteria that the researcher should take into account: “authenticity”, “credibility”, “representativeness” and “meaning”. “Authenticity” refers to the level of confidence that the document is not a fake and

---

\(^{15}\) In possible cases, this thesis utilized additional sources, in order to double-check whether the data provided by the relevant memoirs were valid, appropriate and true.

\(^{16}\) Once the author of a memoir publishes a document, the document constitutes a secondary source. However, when the author explains an historical event based on his or her personal observations as a witness, the data he or she provides becomes a primary source (Tosh 2011: 93-96). Thus, the documents provided by Mr. Clerides are amongst the secondary sources used, however his personal observations regarding the historical events are primary sources.

\(^{17}\) Stavrou served as the Under-Secretary to the President between 1960-1990, during the presidencies of Makarios, Spyros Kyprianou and George Vassiliou.
has not been falsified. “Credibility” refers to having confidence that the document is accurate rather than containing false information benefiting one side of the story. “Representativeness” reflects the certainty that the document is in keeping with the general material rather being atypical. Finally, “meaning” refers to making appropriate use of the source in testing the generated hypotheses (Platt 1981: cited in Mogalakwe 2008: 227; Scott 1990: 6 cited in Bryman 2008: 516).

This thesis only used material from documents where there was access to the full text of the relevant paper, and where it was possible to verify its existence, in order to ensure “authenticity”. The majority of archive documents used in this thesis are historical, being produced 40 or more years ago. Therefore it is impossible that this thesis shall be misled for the benefit of the author of this thesis, or someone else’s benefit and this provides the “credibility”.

The PIO, as has been noted, was an important source of data since it directly represents the views of President. Likewise, the Charavhi (the AKEL newspaper), directly represents the position of that Party. Additionally, the Halkin Sesi was owned by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and therefore directly represents the views of Mr. Fazil Kutchuk (the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and the Vice-President of Cyprus) and his representative in inter-communal talks, Mr. Rauf.

---

18 It is useful to note that, the Cyprus Conflict is still unresolved and it might be questioned whether the data provided by the Cypriot archives are really free of political propaganda. However, as will be explained in broader details in the theoretical framework, this thesis does not conceptualize the construction of national identity, in a way neglecting the political propaganda. Thus, based on its theoretical purposes, this thesis does not intend to ignore the aspects regarding propaganda. On the contrary, this thesis finds it essential to observe the governmental propaganda. The Press and Information Office is amongst the most appropriate places to discover the essence of the governmental propaganda from 1967 to 1974, since the relevant office was led by the Governmental Spokesman. Thus, the possibility that the obtained data contains propaganda does not affect the reliability of this thesis.

19 For Halkin Sesi archives, I utilized the archive databases of Near East University Library and Dr. Fazil Kutchuk Museum, because their services are free and photo cameras are allowed.
Denktash. Accordingly, “representativeness” was ensured. Since the theoretical framework of this thesis was created prior to the documentary research, the documents were interpreted on the basis of hypotheses developed in the theoretical framework (see pages 114). Thus, the last criteria identified as the “meaning” has also been provided by this thesis.

Within Nationalism Studies, particularly with regard to the political aspects, “documentary research” is a useful research method and it is vital to understand the local languages. For instance, Guy (2008: 11) articulates the difficulties she faced while analyzing the Albanian nationalism due to her inability to use local sources in Albanian. She also indicates her inability to analyze Albanian documents as the basic limitation of her thesis. Since the author of this thesis is capable of utilizing documents written in Turkish, Greek and English, his tri-lingual analysis constitutes a distinctive feature, particularly in methodological terms.

**Further elucidation on methodology and concepts**

The primary sources used in this thesis consisted of the records of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the US State Department (which were available online) and the archival database of the Government of Cyprus’s Public Information Office (PIO) press releases. These were supplemented by newspapers (Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot and Turkish), Clerides’s memoirs and Greek and Turkish visual documentaries of interviews with historical figures of the Cyprus Conflict. This section of this thesis will discuss the sources of data and, in particular, their reliability. It shall also consider the limitations arising out of the inaccessibility of the AKEL archives and the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(MFA) archives. It will then discuss using political speeches in general and Makarios’s political speeches in particular. Finally, this section shall provide clarify on the concepts of “elite”, “elite interests” and “ethnicity”.

**Discussion of the accessed sources and the gathered data**

This section shall discuss the primary and secondary sources used in this thesis and, in so doing explain the issues that arise in respect of the authors of documents and how the potential biases and prejudices of authors may be taken into account by “cross-checking” what they have written against other primary and secondary sources (including the academic literature). British FCO documents, US State Department documents, Clerides’s memoirs, the Government of Cyprus’ PIO documents, newspapers, and interviews provided in visual documentaries shall be discussed.

In conducting the documentary research, researchers must consider the potential biases or prejudices of the author that could have influenced the information contained in a document. The position of the author, the purpose of the document, the recipient of the document, the time when the document was prepared, the context in which the document was written, and the place where it was prepared are amongst the points that the researcher must bear in mind (Blaxter et al. 2010: 230). Thus Tosh (2011: 99) points out that the diplomatic staff (particularly heads of mission) might censor their impressions of the government to which they are accredited, in order to make them fit in with the policies of their superiors (their

---

20 The historical period analyzed by this thesis commences with the failed attempt on seizure of power by King Constantine (December 1967) and terminates with the ceasefire terminating the Turkish intervention (August 1974). In 1968, the Commonwealth Office and the Foreign Office were merged, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was created. Since this thesis was concerned mostly on the post-1968 era, it consulted only the the FCO archives.
own government). Tosh also notes that if the author of a document was not an eyewitness to the events on which he or she reported, it is important to consider how they learned about the events. Additionally, as he puts it, if the information was gleaned at second hand, it needs to be “more than a gossip”. How knowledgeable the author is and, if she or he is a junior official, whether they are trying to impress their seniors needs to be taken into account, as is whether the author produced a document immediately after he or she learned the relevant information, or if there had been a time lapse during which his or her memory became “blurred”. The conditions in which the document was written are also important: was the author under pressure during a crisis or did she or he have time carefully to consider the material she or he was discussing?

Thus archival documents may contain potential biases and prejudices. and the researcher might, and must, “cross-check” the data he or she gathers by going to different sources and to the academic literature in particular. Utilizing documents written by authors holding different positions (such as persons embracing divergent ideologies or statesmen from different states) is one useful way of “cross-checking”. During this process, the researcher should ascertain the extent to which the information provided by authors in different positions reveals contradictions and similarities. Sharp contradictions in different sources should heighten researchers’ skepticism. Academic literature (books and journals), especially by leading experts in the field, also provides valuable background material and serves as a corrective to unreliable information. As long as the data gathered by the research is supported by the academic literature (for instance regarding the roles played by the actors within the process) and other primary or
secondary sources, the researcher might claim reliability (Williams 2008:56-63; Blaxter et al. 2010: 192; Tosh 2011: 184).

On the other hand, political speeches of leaders in general, and especially those which touch on national identity (about the “nation” and “others”) in particular, would be expected to display biases and prejudices and to serve particular purposes. Additionally, the propaganda of political leaders or newspapers supporting those leaders’ views are essentially partial, and cannot be expected to be free of prejudice, though they provide pointers regarding the leaders’ formal positions. The national identity is constructed “for” someone (the “nation”) and against someone (the “other”). Likewise, propaganda is made “for” someone and “against” someone (Thompson 1991; Hallin & Mancini 2004; O’Shaughnessy 2004; Wodak et al. 2009).

As regards the documents used in this thesis, PIO press releases and newspapers were partial inasmuch as they represented the official government interpretation of events. However, as mentioned previously, in analyzing the “nation”, the “other”, and the propaganda contained in speeches and the media, the sources would be expected to display biases. The PIO documents used in this thesis comprised, to a great extent, the speeches of President Makarios issued as press releases. The office was managed by the government’s spokesman, Miltiades Christodoulou, who represented Makarios. On this basis, the PIO press releases provide “representativeness” inasmuch as they helped the President to manipulate the press and Greek Cypriot public opinion. It is therefore unnecessary and inappropriate to assume that the office might have falsified Makarios’s speeches.
or the servants of the office did not know what the President spoke about in his public speeches. The office was pro-Makarios. It was thus partial, and since the press releases were used in this thesis to examine Makarios’s speeches and propaganda, their bias accords with the analytical purposes of this thesis.

Charavghi, and other Greek Cypriot newspapers (Fileleftheros, Machi and Patris), the Turkish newspaper Milliyet and the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Halkin Sesi were used to examine how the press tried to shape public opinion about Makarios and his conception of “others” in the Greek Cypriot community, the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey. Charavghi and Fileleftheros were pro-Makarios, while Machi and Patris were anti-Makarios. Halkin Sesi was owned by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, was in mid-1960s both a Member of Parliament and a columnist in Milliyet which was pro-Ecevit while he was in power (1973-1975)\(^{21}\). The newspapers used by the thesis were reliable sources for determining the different parties’ stances about the Cyprus Conflict. Of course, like the PIO press releases, the newspapers will display biases and prejudices, and these were helpful for analyzing the role of the press in the formation of public opinion regarding the re-construction of Greek Cypriot national identity. This thesis only cross-checked the Greek Cypriot newspapers when they quoted Makarios’s speeches. Since his speeches were given to the press by PIO, it was possible to make ascertain that whether newspapers falsely reported Makarios’s speeches.

\(^{21}\) See online database of Milliyet archives database for further details.
FCO documents, US State Department documents, Clerides’s memoirs, and interviews with the political elite contained in visual documentaries were used in order to highlight the political and historical developments driving the Cyprus Conflict in 1967-1974. They were sources that were used to learn about what had happened in Cyprus rather than detecting who was making what propaganda for whom or against whom. Therefore, it was essential to account for the potential biases and prejudices of FCO documents, State Department documents, Clerides’s memoirs and interviews.

To start with, for this thesis, FCO documents were used to learn about the political factors driving the Cyprus Conflict between 1967 and 1974. This was contained in the telegrams sent to the FCO by British diplomats serving in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. In 2014 the FCO defines its task as “promoting the United Kingdom's interests overseas, supporting our citizens and businesses around the globe” (FCO 2014), and this is what it was doing in the period covered by this thesis. Since British diplomats are servants of the British government and obliged to promote British interests, the starting-point for considering the information they provide is to characterize them as pro-British. Moreover, British diplomats were not usually eyewitnesses of the events on which they reported. However, they were generally of high caliber and they enjoyed splendid access to Cypriot leaders. Thus they could gain valuable information during their meetings with Greek, Turkish and Cypriot officials, including President Makarios himself (the key actor in this thesis) and Mr. Glafkos Clerides. Furthermore, they immediately reported information to the FCO, before their memories were “blurred” (using Tosh’s term).
The telegrams of British diplomats had one notable advantage. After November 1963 and the emergence of inter-ethnic violence, the creation of Turkish Cypriot enclaves meant that there was limited dialogue and contacts between Greek Cypriot officials and Turkey, and between Turkish Cypriot leaders and Greece. Furthermore, intra-Cypriot dialogue was limited to the inter-communal talks (1968-1974). However, since the British diplomats kept in contact with all sides (including the Junta, Turkish Cypriot leaders and Turkey, and Greek Cypriot terrorists – see Chapter III), their telegrams provided key information about Makarios’s interactions with his “others” (Turkey, Turkish Cypriot leaders, Greek Cypriot terrorists and the Junta) and the various parties’ roles in, and attitudes towards, the Cyprus Conflict.

Additionally, UK and Cyprus were two member parts of Commonwealth. Despite the jolt the Suez crisis had inflicted on the organization in 1956, and the tensions that it suffered as it expanded with the arrival of sometimes uncomfortable additional partners, the Commonwealth relationship remained strong and often remarkably intimate. British High Commissioners in Commonwealth states enjoyed privileged access to the host state’s officials, and the governments of ex-Colonies tended to look favourably on the British and readily to turn to their representatives. By the mid-to-late 1960s however, Britain was attaching less importance to relations with newly-independent states. Some government officials (mostly in Africa), lacked the confidence to discuss policy with British High Commissioners and some were prickly and suspicious of the British. In 1964,

---

22 Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies (1949-1966), described having to have Makarios as a Commonwealth colleague as “almost as bitter a pill to swallow” as witnessing South Africa’s departure from the Commonwealth in 1961, a development that he deplored strongly (Woodard 2000: 90 quoted in Lloyd 2007: 208).

23 For instance, in Australia only the British High Commission had had right of access to the Prime Minister’s Department (Lloyd 2007: 181).
Makarios even blackballed Cyril Pickard’s nomination as British High Commissioner, a hitherto unheard of action in the Commonwealth context (Lloyd 2007).

On the other hand, British diplomats could have been influenced by prejudices and skepticism\(^{24}\) and the importance of Cyprus to Britain and NATO. It is a fact that Cyprus was geo-politically important for UK. Hence the two sovereign British bases in Cyprus: the island was an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and a key location for siting of radars and spying devices. The Cyprus Conflict threatened the southern flank of NATO by increasing the Greco-Turkish tension (see Chapter II) and President Makarios was perceived as wanting to abolish the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee in order to impede British, Greek and Turkish intervention in Cypriot affairs (see Chapters II and III). Moreover, NATO states, including the UK, were dissatisfied about Makarios’s relations with the Non-Aligned Movement, the Soviet Union and AKEL (see O’Malley & Craig 2001; Miller 2009; Mallinson 2010; Ker-Lindsey 2011). Given the cold war context, this counted against Makarios and might have affected British judgment of Makarios.

However, when Makarios was ousted by the Junta, it was British soldiers who came to his aid and it was from London that he launched his anti-Junta struggle (see Chapter IV). Thus, Makarios and the British were, to some extent, suspicious

\(^{24}\) Peter Ramsbotham (British High Commissioner in Nicosia 1969-1971) refers to Makarios as a “dignified, cheerful and confident man. According to Ramsbotham, when he met Makarios in July 1974 in New York, the Archbishop’s “poise, dignity and inherent courtesy were very much with him there” (Ramsbotham 2001). However, Derek Malcolm (Counsellor in Nicosia 1972-1975) who served under Ramsbotham’s successor (Robin Edmonds), describes Makarios as “the single greatest obstacle to any kind of settlement of the Cyprus problem”. According to Malcolm, the Cypriot President lacked “the vision or the statesmanship to see that some accommodation with the Turkish Cypriots could have preserved the unity and identity of Cyprus” and “he had a very closed mind” (Malcolm 1996).
of each other, but they still maintained good collaboration and contact. The President provided excellent access to British High Commissioners, so did Clerides, the head of the Cypriot legislative branch. Clerides published memoirs have provided a means of cross-checking the information provided by British diplomats in Cyprus and vice versa.

The US State Department documents that were consulted were, as in the case of the FCO, the telegrams sent to Washington by America diplomats serving in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Therefore, it would be appropriate to assume that American diplomats were pro-American and not impartial. Additionally, they could also be prejudiced against Makarios, since between September 1973 and January 1977 they were servants of Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State who described Makarios as “the Red Bishop” and “the Castro of Mediterranean” (O'Malley & Craig 2001). There is a possibility that US diplomats might have censored their impressions regarding the states (particularly Cyprus) to which they were accredited, but a good diplomat should have the ability to provide accurate and appropriately-worded reports and the researcher needs to use judgment in interpreting their reports. The American diplomats were not eyewitnesses to the events on which they reported and, unlike their British counterparts, in the majority of their documents analyzed by this thesis, they did not mention their sources of information. However they also wrote about the events immediately, on the days of the events occurred, while their memories were not “blurred”. And they provided another way of cross-checking British reports and Clerides memoirs.
Mr. Clerides’s memoirs were particularly important sources for this thesis. Before the geographical partition of Cyprus in 1975, Clerides was a pro-Makarios political figure, the second man in the Greek Cypriot political hierarchy as the head of the House of Representatives, and the Greek Cypriot negotiator in the inter-communal talks. He was amongst the closest associates of Makarios, and he knew the President well. In 1976 however, he founded an anti-Makarios political party \(^{25}\) and became the main rival of Makarios, and his memoirs were written after he split with Makarios. There is no doubt that he wrote his memoirs in order to influence Greek Cypriot public opinion and to defend his role he played in the Cyprus Conflict. Thus, there is a strong possibility that what he wrote was prejudiced against Makarios. On the other hand, his memoirs were published were in 1989, nearly two decades after the beginning of inter-communal talks (1968) and the Greek and Turkish interventions (1974). When he wrote them is not certain. Perhaps his memory was not as fresh as the British and American diplomats who wrote to their governments immediately after events occurred. However, due to his political position, Clerides was an eyewitness of the majority of the events he wrote about and assessing what he says is a matter of using judgment and cross-checking where possible.

As regards interviews, this thesis used visual documentaries prepared by the Greek Cypriot journalist Michael Cacogiannis (1975), the Greek journalist George Petritsis (1992), and the Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand (1999). This thesis also cited Makarios’s interview with Cacogiannis. Spyros Kyprianou (the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Makarios’s government), Patrocles Stavrou (the Under

\(^{25}\) The party of Clerides was named as *Dimokratikos Sinagermos (Democratic Rally)* and it comprised liberal democrats and nationalists.
Secretary to the Presidency, appointed by Makarios) and Vasos Lyssarides (a member of House of Representatives and the leader of EDEK) were the interviewees of Peritsis who were cited in this thesis. On the other hand, the thesis also used Birand’s interviews with Suleyman Demirel (the Turkish Prime Minister), Veron Theodoropoulos (the Head of Turkish Desk of Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and Rauf Raif Denktash (Vice-President of Republic). All the interviewees were political figures and their interviews would be expected to be biased and prejudiced as regard events and their own role in them. However, since the interviewees were political figures adopting different stances, they could be cross-checked against each other. Kyprianou, Lyssarides and Stavrou were pro-Makarios figures, and the rest were amongst the domestic and international rivals of Makarios. Demirel and Theodoropoulos were from two different states. All the interviewees were eyewitnesses to the events they spoke about. However, the interviews were conducted around 20 years after the events in Cyprus and this was an important consideration.

Having discussed the documents, newspapers and interviews that were consulted in researching the thesis, it is necessary to explain how “cross-checking” was performed. The sources were “cross-checked” with each other and with the academic literature. As can be seen in Chapter III, when discussing a specific event or process, Clerides’s memoirs were used to “cross-check” the data contained in FCO and State Department documents, and vice versa. In most

---

26 About the coup d’etat of 1974, while Denktash says that the Junta overthrew Makarios in order to unify Cyprus with Greece, Kyprianou, Lyssarides and Stavrou say that the Junta had aimed to share Cyprus with Turkey (see Chapter IV).

27 Since all the interviewees were political figures, what they said could also contain propaganda.

28 Regarding Makarios’s policies on the inter-communal talks, Clerides asserts that the President was aiming to preserve his control over the state, and de-centralizing the state in favour of Turkish
cases, the sources were cited together since they were used for “cross-checking”. The process revealed that the information provided by Clerides, and the FCO and State Department documents corresponded to a significant degree as regards the events, processes and the roles of the actors (for instance inter-communal talks, terrorism in Cyprus, Turkey’s policies, Greco-Turkish relations and Athens-Nicosia relations).

As mentioned above, it was also possible to “cross-check” the material contained in primary sources with the academic literature. As explained in Chapter II, previous research on Cypriot politics has indicated that Makarios wanted to preserve the independence and the unitary structure of the Cypriot state and to limit Turkish Cypriot veto rights (during 1967-1974). Additionally, Turkish Cypriot leaders tried to de-centralize the state (during 1967-1974); Turkey backed the secessionist movement; Greek Cypriot terrorists opposed to Makarios’s leadership and his pro-independence policies by demanding unification with Greece (1969-1974); the Papadopoulos Junta urged Makarios to accept Turkish Cypriot proposals (1969-1973); and the Ioannidis Junta was in league with Greek Cypriot terrorists and Greek officers in the Cypriot army against Makarios (1973-1974). On these aspects, the data gathered during the research for his thesis supported the arguments of earlier scholars on the Cyprus Conflict.

Cypriots (or even Greek Cypriots) was for this reason unacceptable to him. According to Clerides, Makarios knew that, if he allowed Turkish Cypriots to enjoy autonomy in their local governance, Greek Cypriots would also ask for autonomy in local governance. This thesis did not find evidence of this in the telegrams of British diplomats who met Makarios and asked him why he opposed to the de-centralization of the state. This thesis has accounted for Clerides assumption by considering to what extent it might have been influenced by prejudices and it was not unconditionally true. However, it was also noted that, in line with the theoretical basis followed by this thesis, the assumption was not contradictory to Makarios’s self-interests as a political leader (see section 3.5.).
Inaccessibility of AKEL archives

The inaccessibility to AKEL archives created a gap in the discussion of political factors opening the way to the growth of the ethnic nationalism in Cyprus. This thesis argues that President Makarios was an ethnic nationalist leader and, using the Theoretical Framework set out in Chapter I and the writings of Horowitz (1985) and Brass (1991), identified the factors enabling and discouraging the leaders from using ethnic nationalism for political purposes. It argued that the lack of cross-ethnic voting, the economic inequalities between the ethnic groups, and the absence of multi-ethnic political parties enable ethnic leaders to propagate ethnic nationalism (see section 1.2.3.).

In Chapter III it was contended that the lack of cross-ethnic voting and economic inequalities amongst the two principal communities had enabled Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to propagate ethnic nationalism. On the one hand, there was no arrangement for cross-ethnic voting in the Cypriot constitution (see Appendix 1). On the other hand, significant economic inequalities between the two ethnic groups meant that Greek Cypriots paid more taxes than the relatively poorer Turkish Cypriots. These economic inequalities became greater when Turkish Cypriots formed enclaves (1963-1964) and became isolated from the Cypriot economy (see section 3.4). Lack of access to the AKEL archives meant that it was impossible to discover the number of Turkish Cypriot members of AKEL.

This is important because it raises questions about this thesis’ assertion that the political parties in Cyprus were monoethnic. However, it is known that there were
Turkish Cypriot members of AKEL\(^{29}\), including Dervish Ali Kavazoglou, an executive committee member, who became victim of an unsolved murder on 15 April 1965 (see Vanezos 2009: 33-37). And although we do not know how many other Turkish Cypriots belonged to AKEL, we do know that they constituted an overwhelmingly small and insignificant minority in the Party\(^{30}\) (see Adams 1971: 62-63; Markydes 1977: 62-63). Thus, on the basis of existing evidence, AKEL can hardly be said to be a multi-ethnic party.

It is also important to stress that this inaccessibility did not prevent the thesis from shedding light on the “nationalizing nationalism” of Greek Cypriots. In this process, AKEL supported the President, and AKEL’s newspaper, *Charavghi*, contributed to Makarios’ identity construction via its anti-Junta and anti-partition stance. As will be explained in broader details in Chapter IV, AKEL and *Charavghi* did not alienate Turkish Cypriots, and this was the very difference between Makarios and Cypriot communism. However, the party did not push Makarios to grant further rights to the Turkish Cypriot minority, and its newspaper tended to identify Makarios as the political leader who could best help prevent partition of the island.

---

\(^{29}\) Adams (1971: 62-63) refers to six Turkish Cypriots, including Kavazoglu, who were members of the party, or somehow connected to its trade-union PEO. Adams notes that the party had no more than several Turkish Cypriot members, however, he could not find out the exact number of Turkish Cypriot members of the party, due to the inaccessibility to party records.

\(^{30}\) As explained in Chapter II, the KKK (*Communist Party of Cyprus*) had embraced a civic form of Nationalism and supported the establishment of independent Cypriot state. However, AKEL embraced ethnic nationalism by supporting the *Enosis* during the Colonial era and Makarios’s “nationalizing-nationalism” in the post-independence era. Due to the pressure and the threat from TMT, Turkish Cypriot workers refrained from collaboration with PEO during the anti-Colonial struggle of Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, Turkish Cypriot workers who were employed by Greek Cypriots left their jobs in 1963-64, and there was no collaboration between the workers of the two communities, and the Greek Cypriot left had already lost the support of Turkish Cypriot workers (see Adams 1971; Markydes 1977; Kizilyurek 1983; Michailides 2003; Loizides 2007; Anagnostopoulou 2010; Kiralp 2011).
Inaccessibility of Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents

As explained in Chapter II, this thesis follows Brass’s Instrumentalist line in examining the Cypriot national identity constructed by President Makarios and, in so doing, makes use of Brubaker’s (1996) of “homeland nationalism” and “nationalizing nationalism”. As Brubaker puts it, a state that identifies itself as the center of the ethnicity (or “homeland”) helps ethnic relatives outside its borders to defend their political interests and, as shown in Chapter III, tend to promote the policies of ethnic relatives for the common ethnic good. However, President Makarios resisted against such manipulations and tried to follow his own policies.

The most important aspects of the relationship between the government in Athens and Makarios were Papadopoulos’s attempts to manipulate Makarios’s policies on inter-communal talks (1968-1973), Ioannidis’s support for the anti-Makarios activities of Greek Cypriot terrorists and Greek officers in Cyprus, and Makarios’s resistance against such pressures. In examining these aspects of Greco-Cypriot relations, this thesis utilized FCO documents and Clerides’s memoirs (see Chapter III).

The inaccessibility of Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) archives means that it is not possible to know what was the role of foreign ministries in Greco-Cypriot relations. Nevertheless, the key decision-makers were Makarios and the Junta leaders. The Athens and Nicosia Ministries of Foreign Affairs might have tendered advice and had an input into policy, but they did not make policy. Access to the MFA documents would therefore have shed light on what was being said within the ministries but not on the way in which Makarios, Papadopoulos and Ioannidis
(the two leaders of Junta) reached their decisions. Their lack arguably did not significantly affect the data gathered by this research.

**Analyzing political speeches: The Makarios case**

A key source in analyzing the Cypriot national identity as re-constructed by Makarios, was the political speeches of the President. Politicians use speeches to send messages to the public and garner support for their policies. The way they craft their speeches, the words they use and the targeted audience provide a means of knowing how Makarios explained his understanding of national identity. Thus Makarios’s use of the terms “us” (the nation) and the “other” (Wodak et al. 2009) sheds light on what the “nation” and the “others” are, what they are doing, and what the “nation” should do (Billig 1995).

The “other” generally refers to an internal or external danger that is deemed to challenge the interests of the “nation”. The “other” might be an organization, an ethnic group, a foreign state, an ideology, or an external state. References to the “other” in speeches are thus used to increase the nation’s consciousness of the dangers presented by the “others” (Prizel 1998). In their speeches, the leaders also use symbols such as historical figures, territories, ideological and socio-cultural (such as religious) values and re-interpret their meaning (O’Shaughnessy 2004).

---

31 In his political speeches, US President Abraham Lincoln widely used George Washington as the symbol of America’s nationhood and integrity after the American civil war (Swartz 1991). The German leader Adolf Hitler repeatedly used the symbol “lebensraum” in his speeches, in order to legitimize his expansionist policies. According to him, Germans were disadvantaged based on the scale of the territory (identified as “Weimar Republic”) they controlled. The German population was huge but the German territory was small (Ganapathi 2009: 155).
An analysis of President Makarios’s speeches between 1967-1974 show that he identified Greek Cypriot terrorists, Turkish Cypriot leaders, Turkey and the Greek Junta\(^{32}\) as the “others” who threatened the integrity of Cyprus. He asked Greek Cypriots to stand up for the integrity of Cyprus and said they should be aware of the danger posed by the “others”. He also used two specific symbols in his speeches: the “martyrs” and the “partition”. Both symbols were used to support his construction of the national identity. The “martyrs” were the EOKA fighters who were killed during the anti-Colonial struggle for Enosis and whom Makarios in his speeches described as having fought for “independence” and “liberation”. In his speeches about the “martyrs”, the President avoided making references to the 

*Enosis*. He placed the same emphasis on the territorial integrity of the island in his references to “partition”: The “others” aimed to divide Cyprus, and take some parts of it out of Greek Cypriot control.

In considering political speeches it is important not just to look at what was said. Attention should also be paid to the role of the media and the way in which speeches are delivered to the people. The political leaders of states (prime ministers or presidents) are famous and important figures whose statements and speeches inform citizens’ understanding of politics in their daily lives. The media (for Makarios’s era mostly press, radio and television) is the means whereby leaders to deliver their messages to masses (Van Dijk 1982; Billig 1995: 96), to other governments and the wider world. There may be a difference of emphasis according to the target audience or the venue in which the speech is delivered. For

\(^{32}\) As will be explained later in this section, he first identified the Greek Junta as an “other” in a speech in early July 1974.
instance, when soliciting international support the leaders might talk in a way different to the way they speak at home when trying to win elections. Meanwhile, for the researcher there is another important aspect of political leaders’ speeches: The after-effects that the leaders might have aimed to create via their speeches (Holly 1989: 123; Bhatia 2006: 175-176).

As regards the potential after-effects of political speeches, Makarios’s speeches directed at the domestic audience clearly sought support for the territorial integrity of the island and opposition to the dangers created by the external and internal “others”. Interestingly, the President spoke in a similar vein when he was speaking abroad: Greek Cypriot terrorists, Turkish Cypriot leaders and Turkey threatened the sovereignty of Cyprus and interests of Greek Cypriots, and foreign intervention in Cypriot politics was unacceptable. \(^{33}\) Meanwhile an analysis of PIO documents showed that before July 1974 and whether he was speaking at home or abroad, Makarios, did not identify the Greek military regime as an “other”. He did not even use the term “Junta” before the Athens coup of 15 July 1974.

When analyzing Makarios’s speeches and their potential after-effects, this thesis assumes that the President was dissatisfied with the policies of the Junta. Nevertheless, even though Makarios and Papadopoulos (the leader of Greek Junta) exchanged mutual threats in the letters they exchanged in July 1971, \(^{34}\) (see section 3.2.), Makarios refrained until July 1974 from provoking the Colonels with his speeches. He was well aware of the dangers of provoking the Junta and that it

\(^{33}\) The messages sent to international auspices were not a focal concern for this thesis, since what was analyzed in this thesis was the re-construction of Greek Cypriot national identity with the speeches of Makarios. Thus, majority of the speeches analyzed by this thesis comprised speeches made by Makarios in Cyprus and primarily directed to a Cypriot audience.

\(^{34}\) Papadopoulos implied that he could stage a coup and overthrow Makarios, and Makarios indicated that he was ready to counter the coup.
would make no difference whether he referred to the Junta at home or abroad as an “other”. The Cypriot army was officered by mainland Greeks appointed by the Junta. However, when the collaboration between the Junta, Greek Cypriot terrorists and Greek officers in Cypriot army became evident and Greco-Turkish relations were damaged due to the Aegean crisis in early July 1974, Makarios sharply changed his line and referred to the Junta as an “external other”. This greatly provoked the Colonels in Athens as did the publication of a letter he sent them at the time.\footnote{In a letter of 2 July 1974, which was made public by the PIO, Makarios asked the Junta to recall Greek officers from Cyprus and cease supporting Greek Cypriot terrorists.} In the following days, Makarios kept on stressing in his speeches that the Junta was supporting EOKA B and was endangering the survival of the Cypriot state. This was a factor contributing to the Colonels’ decision to stage a coup aimed at overthrowing Makarios on 15 July 1974 (see Chapter IV for details).

\textbf{Elite}

Brass (1991: 14) defines the “elite” as “influential subgroups within ethnic groups and classes” and includes the clergy, politicians and the \textit{bourgeoisie} as members of the elite. In the academic literature, the term “elite” generally includes the \textit{bourgeoisie}, politicians, the clergy, high ranking army officers and bureaucrats (Mosca 1939; Michels 1958; Mills 1959). The term “political elite” is used when referring to elected members of the executive or legislature branches of democratic states and “political leaders” is also used to refer to the Chief Executives (Prime Ministers or Presidents) and party (Lasswell et all. 1971). In studies of multi-ethnic power-sharing democracies, however, the term “elite” is used as a way of describing the executive and legislative branches. In consociational democracies like Cyprus, ethnic groups elect their own
representatives in the legislative and executive branches (see Lijphart 1977) and the term “ethnic elite” refers to the members of legislative and executive branches representing (and belonging to) one ethnic group. Therefore, the difference between an “ethnic elite” and “political elite” lies in is the fact that the former specifically identifies the elected members of the executive and legislative branches representing one ethnic group as a particular elite. There is no difference between the “ethnic elite” and “political elite of one ethnic group” in this thesis.

Also, the term “elite” in this thesis, refers to the “political elite” if no reference is made to scholars who have used the term to encompass the aristocracy, bourgeoisie, military elite and bureaucracy. Only in the section 1.2.2, where the term “elite” is discussed with reference to the academic scholarship, is the “elite” included the other elite groups as well as the “political elite”. When it is used in this way the particular elite groups that are being referred to (such as the bourgeoisie, clergy, army elite etc. are explained in footnotes.

In referring to other elite groups other than politicians this thesis used the terms “bourgeoisie”, “army elite”, or “religious elite” in order to make it clear that the discussion does not touch on points relating to the “political elite”. Apart from that, this thesis used the term “elite” exclusively for the “political elite”. It is also essential to stress that, the term “elite interests” in this thesis refers to the interests of “political elite”. This section will now clarify what the “elite interests” means in this thesis.
Elite interests

In this thesis the term “elite interests” is conceptualized in terms of the political elite’s desire for greater power. In so doing, it follows Brass who argues that in ethnically divided post-Colonial (post-1945) societies the ethnic elite (that is, the political elite representing one ethnic group) tended to re-construct national identities based on their political interests. They do so with a view to mobilizing their ethnic groups and in order to extend their and their ethnic groups’ political power. However, the national identities they constructed also benefited their ethnic groups. The interests of their ethnic groups may be economic as well as political, and the pursuit of political interests may be economically beneficial. But since President Makarios was a political leader, his interests are conceptualized in purely political terms. Thus, in this thesis the term “elite interests” refers to Makarios’s political interests, which also accorded with the political and economic interests of Greek Cypriots. That is to say, his construction of Greek Cypriot nationalism was profitable to both him and his ethnic group.

Raswell, Lerner and Rothwell (1971) divide the interests of political leaders into two general goals: achieving and retaining power. For Brass (1991) and this thesis, however, veto rights in post-Colonial power-sharing democracies in the East are a central concern. Power-sharing and mutual veto rights restrict the political power of political leaders who may try to centralize the state or to limit the veto rights of the political elite of the minor group(s). If they manage to increase the authority of the central government, they increase their chances of bending the minor groups’ political elite to their own political will (particularly if the major group

\[36\] For the formation of ethnic groups, see the sub-heading “Ethnicity” in this section.

\[37\] See Chapter I for broader details.
is also richer than the others). If they manage to limit the veto rights of the minor
groups' political elite, they rule the state with greater power and without being
significantly redundant by the counter-elite. To that end, they re-construct
national identities. Likewise, the political elite of the minor group(s) whose veto
rights have been restricted might try to de-centralize the state or seek secession.
In both cases they gain autonomy. At this point, this thesis also considers what
Brubaker calls “homeland nationalism” and “nationalizing nationalism”. Unification with Greece under a military regime, and following the demands of the
Greek Junta as regards inter-communal talks, were contradictory to Makarios’s
political interests. He accordingly re-constructed Greek Cypriot national identity
by abandoning “homeland nationalism” and embracing “nationalizing
nationalism”. In this way he could increase his political power by preserving the
independence of Cyprus, centralizing the state, and limiting Turkish Cypriot veto
rights. But, importantly, President Makarios’s interests in this respect
corresponded to those of Greek Cypriots generally. Union with a Greek military
regime would deprive them of their democratic rights. Their political interests
could be best promoted in an independent and centralized Cypriot state with
limited Turkish Cypriot rights, a development which would turn the Republic of
Cyprus into a “Greek Cypriot nation-state”.  

The national identity constructed by Makarios suited also suited the interests of
the rest of the Greek Cypriot political elite. Markydes (1977:59) points out that
AKEL would have been banned if Cyprus was united with Greece under an anti-

38 This is the term used by Kizilyurek (2005).
Communist military dictatorship. Furthermore, AKEL’s leader, Ezekias Papagiannou, who was a member of House of Representatives, would have lost his political career. However, unification with a military regime would also have been dangerous for Glafkos Clerides (the leader of EK and head of House of Representatives), Nicos Sampson (leader of the PP and member of House of Representatives), Vassos Lyssarides (the leader of EDEK and member of House of Representatives) and, of course, Makarios himself. They would all have lost their political standing within the government. On the other hand, limiting Turkish Cypriot veto rights would grant broader political power to Greek Cypriot political leaders.

As regards the relationship between national identity and Greek Cypriot economic interests, Brass’s understanding of the Instrumentalist approach to “interest” (1991: 256-257) is different from the Marxist concept of “class interests”. Marxists analyze political conflicts in terms of “dialectic materialism” and “economic determinism”. That is to say, the political stance of a social class is determined by its economic interests (Lucaks 1968; Jordan 1971; Norman & Sayers 1980, see also Marx & Engels 1985). Following Brass, this thesis does not deny that economic interests can play a role in re-constructing national identities. However,

39 It is useful to note that although he was the Archbishop of the Orthodox Cypriot Church, Makarios was hardly an anti-Communist leader. AKEL took around 30% of total Greek Cypriot votes and its support was important for Makarios in presidential elections (Clerides 1989a: 214-215). Additionally, in keeping Cyprus independent, balancing NATO’s power with the support of Nam and USSR was essential (see Chapter II). With the emergence of inter-ethnic violence (1963-1964), based on the Acheson Plan proposed by the US government in July 1964, 20% of Cyprus would be annexed by Turkey and the rest of the island would be annexed by Greece. At this point, keeping Cyprus independent and balancing NATO’s power with the support from USSR and Nam became the common preference of President Makarios and the anti-NATO AKEL (Hitchens 1984; Hart 1990; O’Malley & Craig 2001; Miller 2009; Mallinson 2010; Ker-Lindsay 2011).

40 When the coup was staged on 15 July 1974, Sampson left Makarios’s side and joined the opposing front, since the Junta had appointed him President of Republic (see Chapter IV).
a nationalist mobilization does not serve only the economic interests of an ethnic
group’s upper classes and it cannot win the necessary general support unless it
also serves political interests. Thus economic interests can inspire nationalist
mobilizations only if they represent both the upper and lower classes of an ethnic
group and they are also fed by political interests (Brass 1991: 45-48).

As Brass (1991: 256-269) points out, nations, ethnic groups and classes are all
social organizations. However, nations and ethnic groups are more inclusive (in
terms of quantity) than social classes. Increasing the political rights (or political
power) of an ethnic group within a state suits to the interests of the ethnic group
regardless of its social composition. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that Greek
Cypriots enjoyed economic growth in post-independence Cyprus, particularly
during the days when Commonwealth preference helped to increase the
country’s exports. That is, an independent Cypriot state was economically
profitable to various social classes (not only the upper classes, but also the lower
classes) within the Greek Cypriot community (See Chapter III, Section 3.4.). This
accords with Brass’s argument that a nationalist mobilization promises to
promote the economic interests of some of the upper and lower classes within
the ethnic group and will help increase its political power within the state.
Therefore, section 3.4 shall not analyze the interests of all the Greek Cypriot
social classes or provide a socio-economic map of Greek Cypriot society.
Instead, it will show that economic conditions in independent Cyprus satisfied
both the upper and lower classes within the Greek Cypriot community.
Ethnicity

As mentioned in the section of Literature Review, the scholars of Nationalism are generally categorized as the Modernists and the anti-Modernists. The Modernist school, comprising Gellner (1964; 1983), Anderson (1991), Hobsbawm (1983), Breuilly (1993) and Brass (1991), consider nations and national identities as post-modern subjects, produced by the modern societies of industrialization, democratization and nation-states. While Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm neglect ethnicity in their theories, Breuilly and Brass argue that, not only national identities, but also the ethnic identities are constructed, and re-constructed during the processes of democratization. On the other hand, anti-Modernists, comprising Berghe (1981), Smith (1981; 1986; 1991), and Armstrong (1982), argue that the contemporary nations are extensions of ethnic groups that are older than the Industrial Age. According to Berghe and Smith, the ethnic identity constitutes the infrastructure of the national identity. The two scholars argue that members of ethnic groups share common cultural, linguistic and religious values. Even though they characterize race and kinships as other elements of the ethnic identities, they regard ethnic groups as socio-biological entities, which are to a greater extent social and to a lesser extent biological.

This thesis follows the Modernist line, and assumes that the national identities are constructed during Colonial rule (for Colonial people) and democratization processes. After democratization, national identities are constantly reconstructed based on political developments (see Chapter I). Essentially, it conceptualizes ethnic identities on the same basis. According to Brass (1991: 18-23), one ethnic group is separated from the others based on cultural markers (such as language,
religion, custom and race). For Brass, the ethnicities have socio-cultural determinants. Members of ethnic groups share common cultural, linguistic and religious values, in addition to collective territories, common ancestries, kinships and imaginary kinships. The aristocracy, political elite and religious elite of ethnic groups re-construct the ethnic identities based on political interests. They might re-interpret the meaning of the aforementioned socio-cultural determinants (such as different sects within the same religion, different dialects within the same language, endogamies or exogamies that biologically form the races, geographical origins etc.), and re-identify the ethnic groups. Nonetheless, Brass (1991: 26-27) notes that ethnic groups (and ethnic identities) are older than the nations (and national identities). For instance, during Colonial rule, the local leaders were in power competition with the imperial authorities, and they tended to promote indigenous ethnic separatism to keep the local people under their control. However, Brass underlines that national identities are not necessarily historical extensions of ethnic identities. During the anti-Colonial independence struggles, and in post-independence democracies, the ethnic leaders re-interpret inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic similarities and differences and they construct the national identities.

While Brass argues that ethnic and national identities are formed by the ethnic leaders who re-interpret the socio-cultural markers, Chatterjee asserts that the colonial rulers implemented “divide and rule” policies and they created ethnic identities in order to fragment the Colonial peoples. Accordingly the ethnic fragmentations that led to ethnic conflicts in post-Colonial regions (liberated after 1945) had already existed before independence was won. Chatterjee’s approach does not suit the hypothetical and analytical purposes of this thesis, since the
scholar neglects the role of ethnic leaders and their interests. A brief discussion of the formation of ethnic identities in Cyprus helps explain why Brass’s approach is not inadequate in analyzing the Cyprus Conflict.

It is a fact that the Ottomans had produced the ethnic identities in Cyprus on the basis of religion. In the Ottoman Empire, the society was organized under the “Millet System” which classified people as either “Muslims” or “non-Muslims”. The overwhelming majority of Christians were originally from Greece and they were Greek-speaking. Likewise, the Muslims were overwhelmingly from Turkey and they were Turkish-speaking. Nonetheless, language, race and geographical origins were less important than religion in identifying the groups and the Christian and Muslim groups (and essentially Greek speaking and Turkish speaking people) in Cyprus had been fragmented since the Ottoman takeover of Cyprus in 1571 (Kizilyurek 2002).

The British followed this tendency and identified the communities as “Muslims” and “non-Muslims”. When Cyprus became a British protectorate in 1878, the British established the Legislative Council as the main administrative organ of Cyprus. The Legislative Council had six members: three British, one “Latin” and one Christian. The Christians and Muslims of Cyprus had their own schools. The British had encouraged and supported the two communities to have more schools. In 1878, the Christians had 76 and the Muslims had 64 schools. By 1891 the number of Christian schools had increased to 241 and the Muslims had 103 schools. Greek and Turkish speaking Cypriots both utilized their separate schools in order to construct separate “Greek” and “Turkish” identities. In 1882, the
Legislative Council comprised 18 members: 9 British, 6 “non-Muslims” and 3 “Muslims”. In 1906, the Greeks of Cyprus exerted pressure on the British in order to change the term “non-Muslim”, and it was changed to “Christian”. In 1925, the number of Legislative Council members increased to 24 and comprised nine British, three “Muslims” and twelve “Christians”. Since the British chairman of the Council had double votes and “Muslims” tended to align their votes with the British, the “Christians” could not utilize their numerical strength in Colonial politics. Even though the society was classified in religious terms, the Greeks were overwhelmingly more numerous than the Turks and other groups (Peristerinis 2008: 123-133).

In early 1930’s, the Greeks of Cyprus rebelled against the British in order to end Colonial rule and unify Cyprus with Greece. In the 1950’s, when the future of Cyprus was being discussed at the UN, Greece and Turkey weighed in. Greece demanded to annex Cyprus while Turkey wanted to share the island with Greece. Furthermore, the British recruited Turks into the police in order to counter the Greeks’ pro-Enosis mobilization. The emergence of anti-Colonial mobilization of Greek Cypriots (1931) and the counter mobilization of Turkish Cypriots against the pro-Enosis struggle (1943) played crucial roles in the formation of the ethnic identities in Cyprus (see Chapter II for broader details). The identities of “Christian” and “Muslim” were replaced by the identities of “Greek” and “Turk” (Holland 1998; Kizilyurek 2005; Loizides 2007).

41 According to 1881 census carried out by the British, the Cypriot population comprised 137,000 Greeks, 45,000 Turks and 3,000 “others”, including Armenians, Maronites and Latins (Gurel 1984: 39-40; Varella 2006: 69; Cakmak 2008: 205).
In conclusion, the British and the Ottomans had classified the Cypriots on the basis of their religion. The ones who identified themselves as “Greek” and “Turk” were the Cypriots and not the British. This provides evidence that ethnic identities were re-interpreted and re-constructed during the anti-Colonial struggle. When the ethnic identities motivate the masses to launch nationalist movements, the ethnic identities are equated to national identities, since the members of ethnic groups reflect their will to solidify their socio-political attachment with a nation-state (see Smith 1986; Breuilly 1993). Based on “Article 2” in the constitution of 1960, all the Christians (Greeks, Maronites, Armenians and Latins) of Cyprus were included in the “Greek Cypriot community”, while all their Muslim compatriots were included in the “Turkish Cypriot community” (see Appendix 1). This thesis shall argue that President Makarios, the leader of the Greek Cypriot community, re-interpreted and re-constructed the Greek Cypriot national identity in the post-independence era.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter generated a theoretical framework illustrating for the relationship between the national identity and elite interests. A noticeable amount of scholars identifies a conceptual entity comprising the national identity and elite interests particularly in post-Colonial states that gained independence since 1945, especially multi-ethnic ones where consociations have been tested and failed. Therefore, the theoretical framework shall pay particular attention to theories regarding post-Colonial societies and consociations. As will be seen in the following sections, intra-state rivalry (identified as ethnic nationalism) is conceptually integrated with national identity and elite interests by Brass and Breuilly, the two most respected scholars who have written on political aspects of Nationalism. The literature has, however, neglected the relationship between elite interests and “nationalizing nationalism” and “homeland nationalism”, on which this thesis focuses and are, accordingly, included in the theoretical framework.

As regards to the theories within the field of Nationalism Studies, two main approaches prevail: The Modernist Approach and the anti-Modernist approach. According to the Modernist approach, represented by Gellner, Anderson, Hobsbawm, Breuilly, Chatterjee and Brass, the nations are “modern” creations identified with contemporary nation-states and post-Industrial era. According to Gellner and Anderson, the nations have been formed based on the socio-cultural transformations that shaped the post-Industrial age. Nevertheless, Chatterjee argues that in post-Colonial regions in the East, the disintegrative policies of Colonial powers did not enable the ethnic groups to unite and form nations. On the other hand, Hobsbawm Brass and Breuilly argue that, the nations are political
prdocuctions, generated by the political elite, or by the nation-state itself. Nonetheless, the other main approach is identified as the anti-Modernist School. This school is represented particularly by Smith and Berghe. According to the two scholars, the nations had ethnic origins and the national affiliations of ethnic groups were older than the foundation of nation-states (Ozkirimli 2010).

The theoretical framework of this study comprises two sections. The first shall account for ethnicity, nationalism, nationalism in the East, consociation, “homeland nationalism”, “nationalizing nationalism” and secessionism, on the basis of their connections to the national identity. The first section shall also illustrate for the theoretical approaches of Gellner, Anderson, Smith, Berghe and Chatterjee, by drawing attention to their deficiencies regarding the concept of “elite interests”. The second section of the theoretical framework shall focus on the relationship between the national identity and elite interests. In so doing, it will take into account the theories of Brass and Breuilly and explain the thesis’ reliance on the “Instrumentalism” approach. Furthermore, the concept of “ethnic elite” shall be clarified and evaluated, with particular reference to its role in the formation of the national identity and the mobilization of ethnic groups. In this way the ethnic elite’s manipulation of symbols will also be conceptualized. Additionally, not only intra-state nationalism, but also inter-state nationalism (identified as “irredentism” and “homeland nationalism”) will be illustrated with reference to their relationship with national identity and elite interests.
1.1. National identity

The first part of the theoretical framework will articulate the academic basis of a comprehensive framework encompassing the concepts of ethnicity, nationalism and national identity, characterizing them as interrelated concepts and showing how they fit into theories of Nationalism Studies. Additionally, this section shall try to encapsulate some theoretical approaches within the field of Nationalism Studies and to criticize them with reference to the analytical requirements of the case study of Cyprus.

1.1.1. Ethnicity, national identity and nationalism

As Connor (1994: 90-107) indicates, within the field of Nationalism Studies, there is a noticeable lack of scholarly consensus in describing the terms ‘ethnic group’, ‘nation’ and ‘nation state’. Although ethnicity plays a determining role in the formation of national consciousness, it might be quite difficult to characterize any particular ethnic group as a nation. On the other hand, two or more ethnic groups within the same state which characterize their attachment as being based on nationhood can hardly be said to lack national solidarity. Likewise, as Dahbour (2002) underlines, scholars within the field do not agree about the borders that separate ethnic identity from national identity. Dahbour notes that, although ethnic affiliation is regarded as a central element of nation formation in a significant number of societies, ethnic identity and national identity are generally assumed (by the scholars) to be interrelated, though separate, concepts with ethnic identity generally being subsumed within the latter identity.
In the 1980s, Nationalism scholars tended to exclude ethnicity from nationalism in theorizing and analyzing multi-ethnic societies. For instance, Brass (1985) and Horowitz (1985) significantly refrained from using the term “ethnic nationalism”. Thus, inter-ethnic competitions aimed at the control over the state was not directly interpreted as a form of nationalism. However, as Gutiérrez (1997: 163-164) asserts, the dissolution in the 1990s of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the USSR with socio-political mobilization based on ethnocentrism boosted academic consensus in favour of suggesting that the upheaval of ethnic groups within existing states which led to the re-arrangement of sovereign states might be characterized as ethnic nationalism.

The following theoretical discussion study shall begin with approaches focused on socio-Cultural aspects of Nationalism. Gellner (1983) provides a framework based on postulating that nationalism is a product of post-industrial high cultures. According to Gellner, in the pre-Industrial era, peoples had been divided into a large number of divergent cultures. The Industrial Age not only enabled, but also required, cultural homogenization, and this led to the emergence of nations which were inherently homogenous products of supra-cultural solidarities created by post-Industrial societies. In other words, Gellner argues that nations do not have pre-modern origins; they are socio-cultural creations of Modernity and Industrialization. According him, the nationalism provides an understanding which helps to prevent ethnic boundaries from damaging territorial entities. The nation is such a territorial entity. Hence, his inherent emphasis on the civic aspects of national identity as the superstructure of nationalized and standardized high-

---

42 Gellner is amongst the leaders of the Modernist School within the field of Nationalism Studies. Gellner and other Modernist scholars argue that the nations are productions of the modern era, identified with nation-states and post-Industrial transformations (Ozkinmli 2010: 97-104).
cultures. Ethnicity and ethnic culture are excluded from the context. His analysis focuses on the subsidiary high cultures instead of sub-national (ethnic) elements showing multiplicities within the nation. For instance, Gellner (1994: 113-127) notes that, although the Ottomans in Anatolia had been quite an Islamist society (a society reflecting the Islamic mores to a great extent), Turkish nationalism has achieved some success in transforming the Turks of Anatolia into a secular and Westernized society.

Anderson (1991), who also identifies nationalism as a phase in the socio-cultural transition to Modernity and Industrialization, asserts that nationalism is a transformation process that consolidates a society’s attachment to a particular territory. Like Gellner, he sees nations as post-Industrial creations, emerging with the Industrial Revolution. According to him, nations construct a sense of solidarity which clearly separates them from other nations, provide intra-national unification based on a sense of sentiment, and in so doing enhance the integrity of the state, the nation and the members of the nation. In this way, members of the nation acquire the sentiment and passion about the existence of common duties, common rights and a collective national identity. Since the cultural entity of the nation is an “imagination” (Anderson’s term), searching for primordial elements of attachment (such as ethnicity and race) is not only unnecessary, but also inappropriate.  

Gellner and Anderson fail to answer the research question posed in this thesis in one particular respect: they do not consider the political aspects of Nationalism.

---

See Ozkirimli (2010: 105-112) for the summary of Anderson’s notion of “Imagined Communities”.

---
and they essentially neglect the “ethnic elite”. Although they clearly demonstrate the emergence of nations and nationalism, national identity is essentially conceived as a civic partnership and ethnicity plays no part in determining national identity. However, there exists a broad range of approaches integrating ethnicity, national identity and nationalism. Calhoun (1997: 48), for instance, argues that ethnicity is a powerful national element that might play an integrating role in the formation of nations. Connor (1994), on the other hand, claims that ethnicity can “destroy” (Connor’s term) nations due to its diversifying nature. This study shall follow a Modernist approach and will characterize the national identity as a creation of Modernity. However, in so doing it will also draw on theories that highlight the deficiencies in the approaches of Anderson and Gellner.

In his socio-biological approach, Berghe (1981) states that amongst the intra-ethnic and intra-national families attachment is based on kinships and imaginary kinships which emerged centuries before the advent of nation-states. He says that if race, ethnicity and nationality are considered socio-biological identifications, race is the most biological and the most exclusive of the socio-biological differences. The nation is a more social and less biological entity, when compared to race and ethnic group. Ethnicity comes in the middle, between race and nation. The ethnic group comprises the socio-biological integration of races and the nation is created by the socio-biological fusion of ethnic groups. According to the scholar, once we observe inter-ethnic relations, we witness different groups trying to embrace a way of social co-existence by emphasizing kinships or imaginary kinships. However, in most cases, ethnic groups confront each other in order to access the limited sources of the socio-biological environment, just as different species compete with
each other in the biosphere. Thus, in intra-ethnic relations kinships and imaginary
kinships are emphasized while in inter-ethnic relations divergences are prominent.
Additionally, Berghe argues that, a bio-cultural entity (an ethnic group) dominating its
rivals within the same socio-political sphere provides “coercion” and creates a nation.
Nevertheless, although the ethnicity constitutes the basis of Berghe’s theoretical
considerations, the scholars neglects the concept of elite interests.

As an Ethno-Symbolist and anti-Modernist, Smith (1981; 1986; 1991) provides a
significant theoretical contribution, particularly in his assertion that ethnic affiliation is
significantly related to national identity. He emphasizes the importance of ethnicity
and ethnic culture in the formation of contemporary nations, arguing that post-
Industrial national cultures evolved from the cultural entities of ethnic groups. Ethnic
groups maintained their solidarity throughout the time via symbols and values
representing their collective culture. Most contemporary nations are composed of
coerced or co-operating ethnic groups living within the same territory. Concentrating
on ethnic groups, Smith points out that once an ethnicity is exclusively privileged
over the citizenship ties of different ethnic groups within the same state, the national
identity takes an ethnocentric form and this signals ethnic nationalism. On the other
hand, civic nationalism tends to be concerned with the legal citizenship rights of all
individuals within the territory. Such nationalisms inherently emphasize the civic
character of national identity. As Smith puts it, ethnic nationalism is identified with the
East and civic nationalism is identified with the West. Particularly in Eastern divided
societies; ethnic affiliation might overshadow civic nationalism. Thus ethnic groups
might emphasise the ethnic character of national identity. Smith ascribes this to the
more limited economic and
political sources are more limited in the East where, accordingly, ethnic groups tend to attempt to assimilate each other rather than co-operating with other ethnic groups, and this triggers ethnic conflict. Coercive (or assimilative) and secessionist policies amongst divergent ethnic groups within the same state signal ethnic nationalism. The policies and mobilizations of ethnic groups divided across national borders and which are aimed at unification within a single state so as to preserve their territorial integrity (irredentism and unification nationalism) also signal ethnic nationalism. Nonetheless, Smith also underlines that; purely ethnic or purely civic national identities hardly exist. Additionally, Smith refuses to characterize national identity as a re-constructible phenomenon. Therefore, the scholar does not consider the elite interests as a variable which affects the construction of national identity.

1.1.2. National identity and nationalism in the East

According to Kohn (1945), Nationalism is a Western intellectual development, having evolved through thresholds such as the Renaissance. While social transitions in the Western Europe and Northern America provided the impetus for Nationalism to emerge, the relevant socio-intellectual and socio-economic underdevelopment of East and Central European, Asian and African societies, presented difficulties in embracing the social sentiment and citizenship rights associated with nationhood. Since the East was not as rapid as the West in adopting Western-type democratic regimes, Eastern nationalism is generally seen in ethnocentric terms.
Plamenatz (1976: 26-29), on the other hand, draws attention to differences within Western Europe: whilst the essence of English and French nationalism was civic, German and Italian nationalisms were ethnocentric. Interestingly, and with reference to Plamenatz, Dungaciu (1999: 6) ironically points out that the so-called “Eastern nationalism”, which emphasizes ethnographic solidarities such as language, religion and ethnicity, is also a West European product since it is identified with German and Italian nationalisms in the eastern part of Western Europe. We also witness ethnocentric separatism in Quebec (see Handler 1988) and Northern Ireland (see Suzman 1999). Furthermore, Spinner (2007: 5-6) states that Hungarian and Polish nationalisms had far stronger civic roots than that of their German and Italian counterparts.

As a significant number of scholars argue, and the German, Italian, Quebec and Irish cases demonstrate, ethnic nationalism is hardly limited to the East. However, ethnocultural elements have undeniably and, to a large extent, constituted the very basis of a many nationalist movements beyond the West in the 19th and 20th Centuries. The ethnocentric character of Serbian, Greek and Albanian nationalisms played a crucial role in the death of the Ottoman Empire (Kedourie 1993). Additionally, a significant number of contemporary Political Science and International Relations scholars are concerned with ethnocentric nationalisms leading to the emergence of new states during the democratization process. For instance, in the post-Communist states, where the quasi-cooperation of ethnic groups vanished with the collapse of the Socialist Bloc, and in the post-Colonial states where ethnically fragmented societies (India, Congo, Nigeria and Cyprus

---

44 Not only in Quebec and Ireland, but also in the Basque region of Belgium, we observe ethnic separatist demands.
etc.) suffered due to exclusive types of nationalisms and intra-state ethnic conflicts, ethnic nationalism appeared in intra-state and inter-state conflicts (Cooper 1993; Wimmer 1997: 646; Brown 1998: 6).

Chatterjee (1996) draws attention to the post-Industrial era as the period in which national questions emerged. He sharply criticizes Modernists and Anderson in particular. Chatterjee asserts that, the socio-cultural realities of the Colonial World and the impositions of Western rulers provided fertile soil for the rise of ethnic nationalism found the suitable conditions. Initially, nationalist movements of the colonial peoples imitated their counterparts in the West which had colonized and ruled them for so long. Being “civilized” was equated with being capable of and dominating “different” cultures. Essentially, during the Colonial era, the more ardently Colonial communities cooperated with Colonial administrations, the more they considered themselves to be civilized. At the same time, ethnic cultures were struggling to survive against the Colonial hegemony during the Colonial Era, and against the state in post-Colonization. Due to the disintegration of ethnic groups caused by the Colonial era, nationalism in the post-Colonial societies (particularly India) was based on the diffusion instead of fusion of ethno-cultural divergences. Chatterjee notes that post-Colonial peoples retained only a limited space to “imagine” across sub-cultural boundaries.

Regarding the dominance of ethnocentric-type nationalist sentiments, the Colonial strategy identified as “divide and rule” is another key feature in post-Colonial approaches. In the Colonial world, rulers seeking to enhance the Colonial

---

45 Here Chatterjee exemplifies particularly the 19th Century India.
administration and decentralize socio-political evolutions capable of launching nationalist resistance sharply emphasized divergent ethnic identities in institutional structures. Furthermore, Colonial powers tended to co-operate with minor ethnic groups by appointing their members to administrative offices and police forces. Not only economic underdevelopment, but also the unequal distribution of capital and labor amongst ethnic groups led to social disintegration amongst ethnic lines. Colonialism bequeathed ethnocentric antagonism (regarded by Berghe as antagonism for limited sources) amongst ethnic groups and this was converted to violent forms of conflict after independence. Thus, in a broad range of post-Colonial societies, ethnic-affiliation overwhelms civic solidarity in constructing the national identity (McCrone 1998: 109; Blanton et al. 2001; Randeria 2006: 214-215).

As conceptualized so far, it might be argued that multi-ethnic Eastern (particularly post-Colonial) states are relatively vulnerable to ethnic nationalism. These states face ethno-nationalist challenges. Ethnic groups might, for example, seek political unification with their transnational ethnic relatives (irredentism or unification nationalism). Likewise, an ethnic group might attempt to demand sovereign statehood by obtaining territorial autonomy or separation from the state (secessionism). Moreover, particularly with regard to poly-ethnic consociations, ethnic groups might compete with each other for political power and the ethnic groups may try to constrain the political rights of the smaller group(s) by excluding minorities from political positions or by assimilation of their political demands. In such circumstances the larger group might establish hegemony in a nation-state by coercing the lesser group(s). Every type of ethnic nationalism indicated above
might lead to ethnic conflicts (Kellas 1991; Andeweg 2000: 510; Mushtaq & Zakariya 2011).

1.1.3. Consociation and national identity

Power-sharing democracy (consociation) is relevant for nation and state-building in ethnically divided societies. Consociational state structures (whether federal or non-federal) aim at the decentralization of political power and are essentially designed to provide equal representation of ethnic groups in decision and policy-making mechanisms by eliminating the numerical disadvantage of the smaller communities vis-à-vis the larger ones. On the other hand, their pluralistic nature means that consociation democracies also aim at a convergence of divergent cultures within harmonious multicultural societies (Lijphart 1977: 25; 2008: 35).

In consociational societies where the sub-national elements (ethnic groups) manage to diminish the influences of ethno-cultural differentiation, a multi-cultural national identity with a cohesive civic character might be constructed. For instance, Switzerland is regarded as a state where ethnic identities and sub-national cultures are institutionally protected and civic ties are overwhelmingly stronger than ethnic origins. However, the strength of Swiss civic nationalism in part arises from Switzerland being economically developed and the absence of a huge economic gap between ethnic groups (Steinberg 1976; Zimmer 1998). Moreover, successful inter-communal power-sharing and avoidance of ethnic conflicts does not always construct a national identity with a civic character rather than ethnic fragmentation. For instance, in Canada, although consociation can hardly be said to have failed to preserve inter-ethnic peace, in Quebec
Francophone Canadian ethno-cultural nationalism outweighed the civic ties to the central state and secessionism has found popular support (Kellas 1991: 94-97; Ipperciel 2007).

In a significant number of ethnically divided new states in the Eastern post-Colonial World (liberated after 1945), consociation has not been very successful in harmonizing sub-national communities so as to create civic-based National Identities emphasizing amongst ethnic groups and to preserve democratic stability. First of all, in post-Colonial Eastern societies, some ethnic groups were relatively richer than the other(s). Thus, the economic competition between richer and poorer ethnic groups was unbalanced and the richer groups were significantly advantaged in the domestic and international market. Poor ethnic groups were utilized as cheap labor by the richer ones. Likewise, richer ethnic groups were advantaged in being employed in governmental jobs due to high levels of education. Furthermore, the bourgeoisie of poorer ethnic group(s) remained disadvantaged in competing with the bourgeoisie of richer ethnic group(s). Due to their larger per capita income the richer ethnic groups required to pay more taxes then the poorer group(s)\textsuperscript{47}. Once economic factors are reflected in the political and social sphere, ethnic conflicts are likely to happen. Thus if a government makes a point of employing members of poorer ethnic group(s) as civil servants and adopts economic policies that redistribute wealth to poorer ethnic group(s) might help prevent ethnic conflict. Otherwise, the ethnic conflicts are likely to happen. In consociational democracies, the dominant and richer ethnic group(s) might

\textsuperscript{46}The “bourgeoisie” here refers to owners of private companies.
\textsuperscript{47}Here, with reference to Horowitz, I criticize the earlier phases of post-independence era of ex-Colonies. Horowitz’s arguments are valid for this thesis since it is concerned on the same historical epoch (the first two decades of the Cypriot independence) However, I do not intend to argue that, the relevant arguments entirely remained in the past and they don’t occur today.
attempt to centralize the government in order to prevent ethnocentric disintegration. Likewise, the minor ethnic group(s) might demand further decentralization in order to impede and to avoid assimilation. Both actions might provoke responses leading to violent ethnic conflict and Eastern consociations are more likely to witness intra-state and inter-ethnic violence (Horowitz 1985: 108-116; Roeder & Rothchild 2005: 59; Brancati 2006). However, ethnic groups’ attempts in power-sharing democracies’ to centralize or to de-centralize the state do not necessarily signal ethnic nationalism. When such attempts are made in order to solidify the inter-ethnic harmony, they essentially include significant elements of civic nationalism. However, once such attempts are transformed into coercive and secessionist policies, the ethnic nationalism become very prominent and the risk of inter-ethnic violence increase (Smith 1981; 1986; 1991).

This section has appraised the theories of Gellner, Anderson, Smith, Berghe and Chatterjee. As Smith noted, once ethnicity is more privileged than civic ties between different ethnic groups within the same state, national identity gains an ethnocentric character. This thesis shall not follow Smith’s theory although his arguments are important for this thesis. Instead, this thesis shall follow the Modernist line and characterize national identity as a modern, post-Industrial phenomenon. However, as mentioned, the trend within the Modernist scholarship which focuses on the socio-cultural transformations and follows Gellner and Anderson, pays very little attention to ethnicity and hardly regards it as a basic element of National Identity. On the other hand, Chatterjee, Smith and Berghe (the opponents of Gellner and Anderson) tend to not to identify the political elite and
their interests as a focal concern. Nonetheless, other theoretical considerations
initiating slightly different approaches are essential for the framework of this thesis.

1.1.4. The “homeland”, ethnicity and nationalism

It has been seen that ethnicity and nationalism are closely interrelated. It has
also been stressed that different ethnic groups within the same state, particularly
in the Eastern ex-colonies (liberated after 1945) where rich and poor ethnic
groups were forced to share political power based on consociation, are quite
vulnerable to ethnic conflict. More importantly, irredentist and secessionist
movements were identified as ethnic nationalist (i.e. implying an ethnocentric
national identity) mobilizations. This thesis shall now clarify the relation between
ethnicity and irredentism and secessionism.

Smith (1991: 82-3 cited in Ozkirimli 2010: 227) re-interprets Kohn’s East-West
distinction by reproducing a typology of nationalisms. Since Eastern societies
characterize Nationalism as an ethnocentric and organic attachment, colonized
peoples with a common ethnicity were first mobilized against the Colonial
powers. Their struggle for the liberation set free all people sharing their ethnicity.
Having succeeded in this aim, they then seek to unify, and impose their ethnic
culture on, the liberated territories. Much the same applies to separatist ethnic
minorities. And if they succeed in seceding, they launch attempts at unification,
expansion and irredentism (as forms of “pan” nationalisms) in order to be unified
with their ethnic relatives and the liberated territories.

Brubaker (1996) identifies two types of nationalisms as crucial for ethnic nationalism:
“nationalizing nationalism” and “homeland nationalism”. “Nationalizing
nationalism” is an “inwards” type of nationalism. The state is concerned for its own integrity rather than the ethnic relatives of its dominant ethnic group, and the dominant ethnic group is not concerned with the idea of having an external “homeland”. Hence, the ethnic group “nationalizing a state” refuses to be annexed by a larger state dominated by their ethnic relatives. On the other hand, “homeland nationalism” mobilizes ethnic groups across borders in pursuit of expansionist and irredentist claims (as forms of unification and “Pan” nationalisms). As Brubaker puts it, the “nationalizing” type of nationalism implies a national identity which represents an “incomplete” nation. That is to say, there is a large ethnic group which dominates the state and there are also smaller ethnic groups within the same state. This type of nationalism is generally generated by the state (not by the nation). “Nationalizing states” aim to maintain their territorial integrity and sovereignty. They do not seek unification with dominant ethnic group’s ethnic relatives and treat issues relating to their ethnic minorities as totally domestic matters. They thus try to avoid foreign intervention and also to eliminate potential secessionist movements; and accordingly, they might restrict or expand the ethnic minorities’ political rights.

On the other hand, Brubaker argues that “homeland nationalism” instigates a sense of national identity that is likely to seek unification with ethnic relatives living across their state’s borders. This type of nationalism is essentially irredentist and expansionist (as forms of “Pan” nationalisms). There is a “homeland” representing the center of the ethnic culture. This ethnic culture constitutes the core of the national identity and groups having the same ethnicity are regarded as members of the “nation” and owe loyalty to it. The “homeland” is the state that considers itself responsible for promoting the interests of ethnic relatives’ (who live outside
the territorial borders) or liberating them from other nations. Likewise, ethnic groups (particularly lesser groups in “nationalizing states”) remain attached to their “homeland” and seek to be unified to it. Even if unification is not planned or pursued, the homeland manipulates the policies of her ethnic kin.

Brubaker generated a theoretical framework based on research into Eastern and Central Europe (and essentially Caucasia), where ethnicity became a source of inter-state and intra-state conflicts with the collapse of Communist regimes. He used this to produced a framework is also essential to stress that, the framework of Brubaker is generated particularly. Brubaker (1996:108) notes that, in the post-Communist era, the Azerbaijani state generated a “nationalizing nationalism” to preserve its integrity and sovereignty. This was aimed at deterring its Armenian minority from secessionist mobilizations and preventing the Armenian government from intervening in Azerbaijan’s domestic issues. However, Armenia, as the “homeland”, adopted an expansionist form of nationalism in order to liberate her ethnic relatives and invade Azerbaijan. Nor can the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan be claimed to be reluctant to be unified with the “homeland” since they have preserved their ethno-cultural attachment to Armenia and supported the “homeland” in the struggle for the “homeland nationalism”. According to Brubaker, this case was a typical example of “homeland nationalism” confronting “nationalizing nationalism” and his approach will be adopted in this thesis.

At this point, Horowitz (1985) emphasizes the contribution of economic factors to the likelihood of ethnic minorities and lesser ethnic groups following their homeland’s irredentist policies or launching secessionist movements. The artificial borders of former colonies left troublesome ethnic heterogeneities inside new
states. The power-sharing constitutions encouraged by the ex-colonial powers further exacerbated the problems arising from ethnic differences. According to him, once a lesser ethnic group becomes relatively more educated and plays a relatively more significant role in economic growth (in terms of per capita income) vis-à-vis major ethnic groups in the same state; it is likely to be secessionist. The particular ethnic group might raise its living standards (by, for instance, paying lower taxes) if it secedes. Likewise, if a lesser (and poorer) ethnic is relatively less educated and poorer than major ethnic groups within the same state, is likely to be secessionist. Separatism might promise economic development since the richer and more educated ethnic groups might have created socio-economic conditions disadvantageous to the poorer and the less educated group. However, an ethnic group that is larger and richer than other ethnic groups is not likely to turn to secessionism. On the contrary, it is likely to attempt to put down the other groups’ potential secessionist movements.

Saideman and Ayres (2000) are concerned with the likelihood of lesser groups being secessionist or supporting unification with a state ruled by their ethnic relatives. They note that an ethnic group is supposed to be populated enough to win the battle for liberation. A relatively small ethnic group is unlikely to be secessionist or irredentist. Moreover, an ethnic group that is dispersed throughout the state is less likely to be irredentist or secessionist. However, if the members of the relevant group are located in specific regions, they are likely to be irredentist or secessionist (Byman 1997 cited in Saideman & Ayres 2000: 1128). Importantly, if a group’s ethnic relatives dominate a neighboring state, that particular group is more likely to be irredentist. On the other hand, if its ethnic relatives do not
dominate a neighboring state, it is likely to be secessionist (Weiner 1971 cited in Saideman & Ayres 2000: 1129).

Saideman and Ayres also argue that ethnic groups are more likely to be secessionist or irredentist if they are politically and economically disadvantaged. If they believe that they will enjoy better political rights and per capita income by seceding from the state in which they comprise a minority, they might turn to secessionism or irredentism. It is noteworthy that, in their eyes, secessionist and irredentist movements are particularly noticeable in democracies: in democratic regimes ethnic minorities can demand broader political rights (at least in theory) and, if these are rejected, the ethnic minority might turn to secessionism and separatism (Saideman 1998 cited in Saideman and Ayres 2000: 1131).

Posen (1993) and Van Evera (1994) argue that the security dilemmas lead to ethnocentric hostility at intra-state and inter-state levels. According to them, if a state is dominated by one ethnic group, and there also exists an ethnic minority within the same state which belongs to the same ethnicity with another state’s dominant ethnic group, intra-state and inter-state security dilemmas might occur. The states might perceive the minorities inside their borders and the nation-states comprising their minorities’ ethnic relatives as potentially hostile adversaries. Thus, the homeland of the ethnic minority might be perceived as the source of a potential irredentism or expansionism endangering the other state’s integrity. To make the point clearer, if the state A is dominated by the ethnicity X, the state B is dominated by the ethnicity Y and there is a minority belonging to the ethnicity Y in

---

48 Security dilemmas happen “when the military preparations of one state create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as whether those preparations are for [defensive] purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes” (Wheeler & Booth 1992: 30 cited in Dunne & Schmidt 2008: 102).
the state A, the ethnicity X might perceive the state B as a potential threat to state A’s integrity and security. On this basis, the ethnicity Y might characterize the ethnicity X (not only the ethnic group dominating the state B, but also its ethnic kin as a minority within the state A) as a potential adversarial power.

Based on the aforementioned hypothetical approaches, this thesis concludes that a state within which one ethnic group dominates the other might tempt to preserve its integrity by insisting on its own sovereignty regarding the ethnic minorities’ political rights. Such states tend to avoid foreign manipulations or influences in their internal ethnic issues. In addition to this, a state where an ethnic group dominates the others might seek ways of defending or liberating its ethnic relatives in transnational borders. As Brubaker (1996) argues, the “nationalizing nationalism” of one state might crosscut with the “homeland nationalism” of another state and this might lead to an international conflict.

On the other hand, the lesser ethnic groups or ethnic minorities might turn to secessionism or irredentism in case they are economically and politically dissatisfied with their state dominated by another ethnic group. In case their ethnic kin dominates a neighboring state, they might turn to irredentism. Otherwise, their alternative is secessionism. This thesis has so far explained how the existing academic approaches account for the potential policies of a state dominated by a major ethnic group when its sovereignty is internally challenged by an ethnic minority and another state dominated by the relevant ethnic minority’s ethnic kin. The missing part of the puzzle is the hypothesis of this thesis regarding the politics of the dominant ethnic group whose sovereignty is challenged via another state dominated by its own ethnic kin. Since this thesis constitutes a
contribution to Brass’s Instrumentalist theory focused on the elite interests, this thesis shall now try to explain how the ethnic elite of a dominant group might react against the irredentism of a state dominated by its ethnic kin.

1.2. National identity and elite interests

This section of the theoretical framework shall identify the most appropriate theoretical approach for this study. This study shall illustrate for the theoretical approaches linking the national identity and “elite interests”. This study shall follow Brass’s Instrumentalist theory. Therefore, its strengths against the other nationalism theories regarding this thesis’s analytical and hypothetical purposes shall be clarified. Since the consociation, as an important element, occupies a special position within the framework, it will also be linked to elite interests and national identity. The role of symbol manipulation and propaganda with regards to the national identity shall be illustrated. Furthermore, this section of the thesis shall hypothesize the linkage between the irredentism, national identity and elite interests.

1.2.1. Ethnic nationalism and elite interests: The Instrumentalist theory

As mentioned earlier, one of the goals of the first section of the theoretical framework was to highlight a comprehensive context for ethnicity, nationalism and national identity. Ironically, Breuilly (1993) had already identified the intersectional framework where all the relevant concepts crosscut each other: “politics”. Breuilly identifies his approach as Modernist. However, unlike Gellner, he does not

49 This thesis is not focused on the “homeland”. The analytical actors of this thesis are the ethnic relatives of the “homeland” dominating another state. Therefore, here the “irredentism” refers to the “homeland nationalism”. Thus, the irredentist state is the “homeland” and the state that is aimed to be annexed is dominated by the ethnic relatives of the “homeland”.
characterize nations as high-cultural productions. Instead, he describes them as post-Industrial, political creations. As he says, his theory criticizes nationalism as “a form of politics”. According to Breuilly, nationalism is a set of methodologies legitimizing political mobilizations in pursuit of founding a state and accessing its political and economic power. Thus, the members of the nation voluntarily share their individual material sources in the name of national sentiment and national interests. His theoretical and analytical framework basically observes the manipulation of nationalism as an instrument of politics. With regard to the ethnically divided states that emerged after 1945, Breuilly argues that, the ethnic diversities are not the actual reasons beyond the ethnic conflicts. The ethnic conflicts are caused by the abuse of ethnic identities and hostilities for political purposes. He notes that, in post-Colonial states that were founded on a basis of power sharing or federalism, ethnic conflicts do not occur as long as none of the ethnic groups seizes the mechanism of central government.

Another modernist scholar, Hobsbawm (1983), argues that nations create their own links with their past, in order to enhance their socio-political solidarity. The political elite are obliged to “invent” (Hobsbawm’s term) historical links for the society, for instance by building monuments to the past, in order to provide national fusion. According to him, nationalism is imposed from above (by the political elite) in order to justify the post-Industrial cohesion of social strata within the societies, by enhancing them with invented ties dating back to past centuries. Thus he regards national identity as a means of social unification, which aims to diminish class divisions. As he underlines, his approach contains Marxian

50 For the summary of Breuilly’s theory, see Ozkirimli (2010: 83-87).
51 For the summary of Hobsbawm’s notion, see Ozkirimli (2010: 94-96).
essences since he characterizes Nationalism as a justification for socio-political harmony between the upper and lower classes within society. Although Hobsbawm’s Marxian approach might seem appropriate in integrating the national identity and elite interests, he neglects “ethnicity”. Therefore, Hobsbawm’s theory is hardly appropriate for applying to failed consociations and to ethnic nationalism.

Brass (1991), in a way similar to Breuilly, argues that, the political elite in post-Colonial societies (liberated after 1945) abuse the ethnic divergences within the society and use the ethnic groups’ nationalist sentiments for political purposes. Brass asserts that the political elite tend to reproduce the national identity over the time and identify ethnic groups, as the means whereby they (the political elite) seek power. The political elite in ethnically divided societies have the choice between enhancing and weakening civic ties amongst ethnic groups within the state. Thus, ethnic leaders create a profitable (as regards political power) identity for their self-interests and for their ethnic groups’ interests. Nevertheless, it is also essential for the political elite to construct an understanding of nationalism privileging their ethnic group’s economic and political interests above the other intra-state attachments, in order to obtain massive support from their ethnic groups.

According to Brass (1991: 275) particularly post-Colonial Eastern states that won independence with a federal or power-sharing constitution, the political elite representing the dominant community might tempt to suppress the political elite of the lesser ethnic group(s) in the central government in order to gain control over the state. Likewise, the political leaders of the dominant ethnic group might follow
repressive or assimilative policies towards the ethnic minorities. Additionally, the ethnic minorities might seek for decentralization. (Brass 1991: 59). The political elite of the lesser group(s) or ethnic minorities might seek for secessionism, if the state tries to restrict their political power (Brass 1991: 345). The scholar asserts that, the political leaders of the major group(s) try to centralize the state while the political leaders of the lesser group(s) try to decentralize the state (Brass 1991: 305-306). Furthermore, while the political leaders of the dominant groups might allow the minorities to preserve their ethnic identities, as far as they do not endanger the unitary and centralized structures of the state. However, if the demands of political leaders of dominant and lesser groups do not meet each other, an ethnic war is likely to occur (Berghe 1981: 181-191 cited in Brass 1991: 337). As Brass notes, in such equations, the political elite lead the struggles not only for their leadership prestige, but also in the name of political power (and political interests) for the ethnic group they represent. Brass notes that the majority of ethnocentric intra-state conflicts are caused by power competition between central government and adversarial sub-units. Additionally, the scholar also notes that, the political elite of different ethnic groups co-operate with each other due to their common interests, and they collectively transform the national identities.

52 Kauffman (1996), who adapts Brass's instrumentalism into inter-state violence, notes that the ethnic conflicts are categorized in to two: Elite-led ethnic conflicts and mass-led ethnic conflicts. In the first type of ethnic conflicts, the elite manipulate symbols of enmity and hatred to the masses. It is the elite's intention to instigate scepticism and inter-ethnic hostilities. In such cases, in the elite's rhetoric, we generally observe attempts to launch the ethnic conflict or at least some significant preparations for an appropriate background for the emergence of the ethnic conflict. In the mass-led conflicts on the other hand, the ethnic groups start killing each other spontaneously. Thus, regarding the ethnic conflicts, when we do not observe an elite-driven manipulation of inter-ethnic hostilities or inter-ethnic scepticism imposed by the elite, these signal a mass-led ethnic conflict.
According to Brass, the term “interest”, for the political elite is, to a large extent identified with the political power and prestige. However, the scholar does not conceptualize the “political elite” as selfish persons exploiting their ethnic groups. On the contrary, for Brass, the ethnic elite tend to drive the politics and manipulations of Nationalism for their ethnic groups’ interests as well. Based on the scholar, when it comes to ethnic groups’ interests, the economy is another determinant for construction of the national identity. The ethnic leaders might also consider the economic benefits of their ethnic groups in constructing national identities. However, Brass also underlines that, without political interests, economic interests hardly mobilize masses for nationalist movements. Furthermore, in order to feed the nationalist mobilizations, the economic interests must represent not only the upper classes, but also the other classes.

When it comes to observe the relationship between the national identity and elite interests, Breuilly’s, Brass’s and Hobsbawm’s theories regarding Nationalism Studies can be claimed to be more useful than the other theories. Since, as noted, Hobsbawm neglects the role of “ethnicity” in his theoretical considerations, Brass’s and Breuilly’s theories are more suitable for this study. But it is essential to note that the main divergence between Breuilly and Brass lies beyond their analytical concerns. For instance, Breuilly (1993) is concerned with a broad geographical range of cases and a many divergent types of nationalism. His analysis is not restricted to the post-Colonial era and new, post-Colonial states. His case studies cover a great range of countries from continental Europe to Japan, and include a multiple typology of nationalist movements from anti-Colonialism to reform nationalism and different historical epochs between the 18th and the 20th
Centuries. On the other hand, Brass (1991) is particularly concerned with the post-Colonial era and ethnic nationalism in newly-independent states. Additionally, as Breuilly (1993:2) stresses, his approach might be most useful in providing the theoretical basis for a comparative analysis of different cases. Brass has no such intention. Nevertheless, since this study is concerned with ethnic nationalism in a single, new, post-Colonial and Eastern state, its stance might be said to cross the line in favour of Brass’s stance. Thus this thesis can conveniently be said to follow Brass’s Instrumentalist approach regarding the theoretical and analytical aspects.

1.2.2. The “elite” and Instrumentalism’s criticisms

This section of the thesis shall try to identify the “elite” based on the theories illustrating for who the “elite” are. Brass, on whose theoretical approach this PhD thesis widely relies, defines the elite as “influential subgroups within ethnic groups and classes” (Brass 1991: 14). He conceptualizes the “elite” as a multiclass and a multidimensional entity in modern societies. His perception of the elite includes groups capable of playing a manipulative role in politics. In his case study focused on India, he is particularly concentrated on the religious leaders. As he notes, his description of elite follows Michels. However, in some particular occasions, his analysis focuses directly on Jinnah, the political leader of Pakistani nationalism.

Michels (1958), argues that the elite are basically composed of organization leaders. The masses, as members of political parties, constituted the massive power of the elite during the mid-20th Century. According to Michels, the eco-politic associations of lower classes (such as trade unions) were led by people
who actually become elite due to their leadership and manipulative effects over the masses. To put simply, Michels suggests the masses did no more than following their organizational leaders (See also Parry 1969: 42-45). Brass has adapted Michels’s understanding of organization leaders to his analysis on the religious leaders.

Mosca (1939: 50-68) on the other hand, argues that in every society, the unorganized majority (masses) is ruled by a hierarchically organized minority (elite). The ruling class discharges its manipulations to the masses by lower-ranking agents. From bureaucracy to economy, the entire socio-political life is controlled by the relevant class. Wealth, political position, aristocracy, knowledge and respect (for instance religious prestige) are determinants of power within the society. The masses ruled by the organized elite can hardly be said to have access to politics. Mosca refers to the elite as the “ruling class”. His term of “ruling class” includes a broad range of politically, socially and economically powerful businessmen, political leaders, bureaucrats, military officers and ecclesiastics. According to Mosca, the entire political and socio-economic life is manipulated and led by the “ruling class”.

Mills (1959: 18) argues that an elite hierarchy makes political decisions and leads the masses. The hierarchical power is distributed from top to bottom: “the owner of a roadside fruit stand does not have as much power in any area of social or economic or political decision as the head of a multi-million-dollar fruit corporation; no lieutenant on the line is as powerful as the Chief of Staff in the Pentagon; no deputy sheriff carries as much authority as the President of the United States”. His
understanding of “elite” refers to a fistful of powerful individuals. However, as can be understood, his range of determinants for being a “power elite” includes the army, the government and the business.

This thesis is concerned basically (and only) for the elite who might come into power by being elected by the democratic elections. On this basis, this thesis follows Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell (1971). The three scholars constitute a concept to which they name as the “political elite”. They postulate that, the difference between a political leader who wants to govern the state and a businessman who wants to be the executive of a trade association lies in the fact that the first markets his or her projects to the entire society rather than a relatively small minority. In order to be elected, or to be re-elected after coming into power, the politicians are supposed to be in front of the public opinion by manipulating the masses. They make speeches in mass demonstrations and they utilize the mass Media. They need to be persuasive and convince the people that they are doing right things for the “common good” of the society. Moreover, the political leaders might shape and re-shape the public opinion in order to gain the support of the masses in their political maneuvers. The businessmen and the army elite (apart from the ones seizing power with coups) do not have such a requirement.

53 It is beneficial to note that, the decline in public’s interest in politics (in addition to the decline in party memberships or the decline in turnout) in contemporary democracies (not only in the West, but also in Central and Eastern Europe) gathers academic attention. The studies prove that, the public’s interest in politics decreases and increases based on the governments’ performances and socio-economic determinants (See Cassel & Hill 1981; Mair & Van Biezen 2001). However, as Brass (1991), Breuilly (1993) and Kauffman (1996) underline, the societies included in intra-state or inter-state violence caused by Ethnic Nationalism, the ethnicity and nationalism constitutes the very basis of the political agenda. Thus, for the public, the priority of the public becomes the ethno-nationalist debates. This accelerates the masses’ mobilization and increases their actual and active interest in politics. Therefore, this thesis avoids getting engaged with a theoretical debate illustrating for the public’s interest to politics.
As concluded, for the academia, the term “elite” might include political leaders, bureaucrats, businessmen, ecclesiastics and army officers (etc.). In this thesis, regarding the concept of “elite”, the followed scholar is Lasswell. Thus, the “elite” refers to political leaders and politicians who need to manipulate the masses for being elected office holders. The Republic of Cyprus is governed by a presidential democracy. The businessmen (as the phrase goes the “bourgeoisie”), the bureaucrats, the ecclesiastics and the army officers and politicians can hardly be said to not to affect politics in Cyprus. However, it is also an academic approach to analyze a particular elite group (for instance Brass’s analysis focuses on the religious elite in India), or a single leader (See Chatterjee 1986; Prizel 1998), with regards to manipulation of nationalism and national identity. Therefore, this study shall focus on President Makarios, the elected Chief Executive of the Republic of Cyprus and the leader of Greek Cypriot nationalism. Simply put, the analytical “elite” is the President and the term “interests” refers to his political interests. However, as Brass notes, the Instrumentalist approach also covers the interests of the ethnic groups. Thus, this study shall conceptualize the President’s in a way integrated with Greek Cypriots’ interests.

If the political decision-making in a presidential democracy is taken into account, there is no collective sense of governmental decisions. Unlike in parliamentary systems, in Presidential democracies, the ministers of the cabinet are as the advisors and secretaries of the President. In a sense, the executive branch has only one person (the President) authorized to make the decisions. Since the

---

54 For instance, the Greek Junta had utilized Greek Mass Media in order to manipulate the Greek people and dictate their ideological and political preferences to the public opinion (See Coloumbis 1974).
executive and legislative branches are elected separately, the President is directly responsible to electorate. In addition to the candidates of political parties, the independent candidates might also be elected President. It is a fact that the President must acquire legislative support in order to exercise his or her political program since the legislative branch is authorized to veto some executive decisions. However, due to the essence of the presidential democracy, the President might enjoy quite a great area of political power due to his or her authority (Verney 1992: 40-45; Müller and et al. 2003: 13-21). On the other hand, as noted by Lasswell et al. (1971), the President, as a political leader, tends to manipulate the masses and persuade them in order to be re-elected. The Presidents and the candidates of Presidency need to convince the masses that the common good of the public is quite skillfully defended by his or her government. Thus, in this thesis, President Makarios is an “elite”, due to his popularity as a political leader enabling him to manipulate masses, and his political power as the Chief Executive authorizing him to make political decisions and drive the Cypriot politics.

Hobsbawm, Breuilly and Brass, the scholars who identify Nationalism with political transitions, argue that the national identity is imposed “from above”. Additionally, Brass argues that the politics and manipulation of ethnic nationalism are driven by the political elite. This basis is the very point regarding criticisms of the Instrumentalist theory. For instance, Robinson (1979:107 cited in Ozkirimli 2010: 129) argues that politics-centered approaches (particularly Brass’s Instrumentalist Theory) are separated from the primordialists on the basis of their elitist inspirations. According to Robinson, Brass and his followers exaggerate the role of
the political elite in constructing the national identity and underestimate the role of the masses. Likewise, Smith (1986: 9-18) agrees with Brass and his followers inasmuch as the political elite and their interests play a crucial role in mobilizing ethnic groups. However, Smith argues that the main impetus driving such mobilizations of ethnic groups is not loyalty to the ethnic elite. On the contrary, ethnic ties and ethnocentric attachments constitute the very heart of the sociology of ethnic groups. Ethnic groups do not need elite manipulation in order to achieve ethnic solidarity. Additionally, Smith argues that the ethnic groups’ self affiliations are relatively older than the democratization processes.

Brass (1991: 16-17) replies to the relevant criticisms by asserting that the elite do not construct the ethnic ties from zero. They are well aware of the importance of ethnic attachments for the masses. The relevant attachments even constrain the elite in their manipulation of symbols. However, the scholar notes that, it is not a coincidence that the ethnic conflicts happen when the ethnic elite’s political power is constrained by the counter-elite. In such periods, the symbols of ethnicity and national identity are re-constructed and re-interpreted with emphasis on inter-ethnic adversaries. Such preparations are launched in order to achieve mass mobilization for changes in the political system (sovereignty and ethnic status quo). The political elite are amongst the ones who benefit from such revisions, since they are likely to obtain greater political power if their goals are achieved. Therefore, particularly in multi-ethnic societies suffering due to communal conflicts, the national identity and ethnicity are instruments of the political elite.
1.2.3. Consociation, ethnic elite and national identity

Simply put, Lijphart (1977) argues that, in multi-ethnic power sharing democracies, the legislature and the executive are composed of politicians belonging to different ethnic groups. For instance, if we assume that there are two ethnic groups within a power sharing state, group X elects the legislative and executive members representing it. The same is true of the group Y as well. Both ethnic groups vote for their own executive and the legislative members. Due to “mutual veto” rights, the ethnic elite in the executive and legislative branches check and balance each other, providing political equality between the ethnic elite and their groups. Principally, regardless of the system (presidential or parliamentary) in multi-ethnic consociations there are (generally) two Chief Executives (Prime- Minister and Vice Prime-Minister, President and Vice President or President and Prime-Minister) and each of them is elected separately by different ethnic groups\(^{55}\).

According to Dixon (2012: 108), consociations are essentially based on a primordial understanding of national identity, since institutionally and constitutionally they emphasize the ethnic divisions of societies. Lijphart (1977; 2008: 35) argues that in consociational democracies the political elite are regarded as balancing and accommodating the ethnic interests. The mutual veto rights which the constitution grants ethnic groups help to maintain the inter-ethnic political balance and social peace. On the other hand, the political elite need not only to preserve inter-ethnic equilibrium in central government but also to satisfy the political demands of their own ethnic groups in the light of electoral considerations.

\(^{55}\) In Cyprus, there was a bi-communal power-sharing democracy. Greek Cypriots voted for the Greek Cypriot President, and Turkish Cypriots voted for the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President.
As indicated above, the consociational type of democracy in multiethnic societies might fail due to contrasting inter-ethnic interests and ethnocentric national identity manipulations. At this point, the political elite play a crucial role. For instance, the Swiss political elite voluntarily accommodated ethnic demands and developed a political culture based on negotiations and mutual compromises (Steinberg 1976: 103). Additionally, since the late 19th Century, the Swiss have manipulated convergent symbols such as the Alpines via education in schools. Consequently, they managed to construct a collective national identity and, in a sense, the Swiss political elite played a significant role in creating the Swiss nation (Zimmer 1998). However, as Roeder & Rothchild (2005:29-32) underline, the post-colonial (post-1945) consociations were not as successful as the Swiss consociation in preserving inter-ethnic peace and constructing a national identity based on the co-operation of the ethnic groups. Due to lack of inter-ethnic accommodation, the power-sharing became a danger for the social peace amongst the ethnic groups. The fact that the ethnic elite were unprepared (or reluctant) in co-operating with the other group(s)’s elite, the ethnic demands (no matter whether from the major or lesser group) shifted fear due to the lack of power-sharing culture in politics of the relevant multi-ethnic societies.

Nonetheless, Brass (1991) draws attention to the fact that, particularly in post-Colonial consociations, the political elite might utilize ethnic nationalism in order to achieve more political power. If the political system, upon which the power-sharing is built, forces the political elite to moderate inter-ethnic political interests and operate the democracy in an accommodating way, they are unable to utilize ethnic
groups in the pursuit of more power. Otherwise, they might manipulate their own ethnic group and mobilize them against the counter-elite and the other ethnic community. If they achieve their goals, they manage to constrain the counter-elite’s influence on politics. The minor group’s political elite might secede or de-centralize the state, and the major group’s political elite might coerce the opposing ethnic group and their political elite, transform the power-sharing democracy in to a nation-state representing their own ethnic group or at least centralize the state.

Horowitz (1985: 291-301) and Brass (1991: 333-345) assert that the party typology within the consociational democracies plays a crucial role in moderating or boosting ethnic conflicts. They note that, if significant numbers of members of all groups participate in multiethnic political parties the inter-ethnic cohesiveness increases and the ethnic elite tend to act in a more accommodating manner. Where, however, monoethnic parties prevail, the interests of the ethnic elite is equated to ethnocentrism and to the demands of ethnic groups identified with their own interests.

On the other hand, Reilly (2001) and Fraenkel (2004) regard cross-ethnic voting as an important consociational feature, moderating ethnic conflicts. These scholars assert that, when the party elite have a multi-ethnic electorate, they feel responsible for maintaining the peace amongst divergent ethnic groups. Similarly, Horowitz (1991) draws attention to the fact that the cross-ethnic voting, once adapted to Nigerian presidential elections in late 1970’s (after the ethnic civil war when Biafra attempted to secede), had forced the presidential candidates to act responsibly to an ethnically heterogeneous electorate. Before the introduction of
cross-ethnic voting, however, presidential candidates concentrated basically on manipulating their own ethnic group, in a sense their ethnically homogenous electorate, before and after the electoral victory. In other words, the presidential candidates (and essentially the presidents) scarified ethnocentric interests because they needed to fulfill their own ethnic group’s demands at the first place. Additionally, they needed to manipulate and persuade their own ethnic group in order to be elected. This tendency had played an effective role in the emergence of the ethnic conflict in Nigeria. However, the cross-ethnic voting made the presidential candidates and presidents to moderate the ethnic conflict since they needed to respect the other ethnic groups’ demands and manipulate them that the ethnic groups are treated as they are equal and no ethnic group is politically scarified over the others.

As emphasized, where cross-ethnic voting and multi-ethnic partisanship is absent, elite politics devote more space to promoting ethnic nationalism. The above-mentioned electoral anxieties might make more sense if the Laswell’s detections are taken in to account. Since political leaders need to shape public opinion in order to be re-elected, an ethnically homogenous electorate might conveniently be said to constitute an attractive mass to be manipulated via ethnic nationalism.

The theoretical framework of this study has so far tried to clarify that ational identity might be linked to ethnocentrism, particularly in post-Colonial states. Elite interests play a crucial role in forming the national identity in such societies. The type of the democracy (particularly consociational), party typology and electoral regulations also stand out as important sub-contents. The theoretical account of
this study about the national identity shall follow the Instrumentalist line. It has been argued that the political elite might be responsible for consociational failures if they impose ethnic nationalism and dignify ethnic interests in order to consolidate their own political power.

1.2.4. Symbols, rhetoric, “others” and national identity

This section of the theoretical framework shall highlight important points in relation to the ways in which the leaders manipulate the masses. The approach to the “manipulation” will mostly try to illustrate how the political elite utilize symbols in constructing the national identity. However, since the discussion shall lead the thesis to “propaganda”, how the public opinion is shaped by the political elite will also be illustrated in relation to the mass media. It is useful to stress that, since the internet was not relevant for the time period beginning in 1967 and terminating in 1974, the approaches illustrating for the internet’s influences on politics shall be excluded.

Propaganda is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols. The word attitude is taken to mean a tendency to act according to certain patterns of valuation. The existence of an attitude is not a direct datum of experience, but an inference from signs which have a conventionalized significance (Lasswell 1927: 627).

As mentioned above, leaders manipulate symbols in order to persuade and mobilise masses. O’Shaughnessy (2004: 65) asserts that propaganda is a trinity composed of rhetoric, myth and symbolism. Political leaders utilise rhetoric as a cheap but effective element of propaganda. The leaders’ rhetoric creates an emotional sentiment within the public. The speeches of leaders are reflected in the
press and their rhetoric affects the masses’ opinion. On the other hand, myths are useful in propagandising since historical narratives code the public opinion and the political leaders might utilise them by interpreting or re-creating the myths. Additionally, political leaders not only interpret and re-interpret symbols, but they also create and re-create them for public manipulation. Due to their received meanings, the symbols help leaders to persuade the public by manipulating emotions.

A symbol might derive from history. For instance, Schwartz (1991) argues that George Washington, a leader of the American Revolution and the first President of the United States, has been used as a symbol by the American political elite. With the civil war (1861-1865) as an exception, George Washington has widely been identified with the integrity of USA and American patriotism. Washington’s prestige as part of the Americans’ collective memories provided a basis for the American political elite (both Republicans and Democrats), including Presidents, to justify their policies and enhance their rhetoric.

Religious and socio-cultural values might also be used as symbols. For instance, Brass’s concept of symbol manipulation is important for understanding how the political elite, aristocracy and religious elite shape public opinion and national identity. As he illustrated with reference to the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India, the political and religious elite of Hindus had mobilised their religious groups against the counter-elite and Muslim groups. Brass (1991: 77-102) indicates that the “cow” is a sacred symbol according to Hindu religious beliefs. On the other hand, and in keeping with their religion, Muslims sacrifice cows. The religious leaders of Hindus
interpreted this Islamic practice as an aggression against Hindu symbols and managed the socio-political mobilisation which resulted in a tragic intra-state conflict since the political and religious elite of Muslims also acted in a similar way. In Brass’ view, the political and religious elite of Muslims also manipulated the Muslim groups against the “cow scarifying” Hindus. They utilized the same symbol, “the cow”, by instigating a religious hatred and indicated the Hindus as a group disrespecting the Muslim traditions and Islamic values. However, the religion centred hatred was not only utilized by the religious leaders. For instance, according to Brass, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of the independent Pakistan, was a politician utilizing the religious symbols in his separatist policies. The Muslim League was the political organization driving the secular politics of Muslims and it was founded and led by Jinnah. It represented the Muslim political interests and Jinnah’s separatism in the Indian elections. Jinnah was displeased to be restricted by the political rights enjoyed by the Indian majority in politics. Brass notes that, Jinnah had used the Muslims as an instrument in order to get dispose of the Indian elite restricting the Muslim elite’s political power in the Indian Grand Coalition. Despite Gandhi’s attempts to prevent a religious conflict between the Hindus and Muslims, Jinnah was in cooperation with Muslim religious leaders for his political desires. The religious conflict had helped him to increase his votes and solidify his political leadership amongst the Muslims. In 1947, he managed to found an independent state (Pakistan).

Cohen (1986: 14 cited in Fremeaux & Albertazzi 2002: 147) argues that a community is socio-culturally coded with its own inclusive and exclusive symbols. If such symbols are identified with territory, the set of symbols also provide a code
for the national identity. Within a community, individuals might attach different meanings to the symbols; however, the scarcity of relevant symbols is a collective value. Essentially, the scarcity of common symbols distinguishes the particular community from the others. Fremaux & Albertazzi (2002) examine the Leda Naga, the communitarian party of Northern Italians, which demands regional federalism. The Catholic values of Italian national identity are fundamental to party propaganda. The Southern Italians are criticized for their secularism. Not only the African and Albanian immigrants, but also the Southern Italians are alienated and accused of damaging the North Italian cultural heritage. The Party also makes use of the esoteric dialect of Northern Italians, which is hardly understood by Southerners, as a communitarian symbol. Nonetheless, the party elite manipulate the exclusive symbols sanctified by the Northern Italians in their propaganda.

In addition to the socio-cultural values and historical motives, lands might be utilised by leaders as effective tools of symbolism. For instance, in Nazi propaganda venerated symbols appear as the territories. The idea of “Greater Germany”, which included the Weimar Republic, the Sudetenland, Austria, Alsace-Lorraine and parts of Poland, had been manipulated by the Nazi elite. Adolf Hitler and his colleagues used cartography effectively to shape German public opinion.\(^{56}\) Nazi expansionism found popular support within Germany and the German aggression leading to World War II was justified in Nationalist terms and the Party elite published maps addressing the territorial targets of Nazi expansionism (lebensraum). They used territories as symbols of Nazi nationalism as a basis for the Third Reich (Herb 1999). Additionally, in his speeches, Hitler tended to use the

\(^{56}\) It is useful to note that, Hitler had appointed a Minister for Propaganda and Social Enlightenment, when he came into power in 1933 (Hobsbawm 1990: 141-142).
symbolm "lebensraum" in order to state that the German territory before the World War II was relatively small when the huge population of Germans were taken into account (Ganapathi 2009: 155).

Another crucial point signified by O'Shaughnessy (2004: 123-127) is the role of the “other” in symbolism and propaganda. He notes that propaganda requires an “other” and if the other does not exist, it is created by the propagandist. It is an important fact that propaganda is made “for” something or someone and “against” something or someone. For instance, an ideology might be an appropriate “other” for a leader who tries to impose his or her own ideology. The leaders tend to indicate internal and external dangers while manipulating the public opinion. In other words, enemies are also socially constructed via propaganda. Symbolically, they are valuable in enhancing nationalist sentiments\(^57\) which fits in with Prizel's (1998: 23-28) concepts of “internal others” and “external others” in constructing the national identity and justifying the intra-state and inter-state politics of the political elite. Prizel notes that, the political leaders of Eastern states, where one ethnic group dominates the other(s), tend to indicate the lesser ethnic group(s) as the “internal other(s)” damaging the state’s integrity. Likewise, the Eastern political leaders indicate foreign states, whose policies towards their state dissatisfy them, as the “external others” and accuse the relevant states of affecting their state’s politics and sovereignty in a negative way. Furthermore, if the ethnic minorities in their states stand for further political rights and they receive encouragements from foreign states to do so, the Eastern leaders tend to label the ethnic minorities as “internal others”, while they characterize the foreign states supporting the

\(^{57}\) For instance, Khalidi (1997) argues that, the anti-Zionist sentiment had played an integrative role in the formation of Palestinian National Identity.
minorities as “external others”. Prizel also argues that, there is a "dialectic" relationship between the nation and its "others". If the leader sets up a political goal for his state and some internal or external powers oppose to that goal, such powers are likely to become the “others” of the leader and his nation.

It is also essential for this study to account for how leaders convey their rhetoric and propaganda to the masses. Due to the political elite’s influence on the press, their rhetoric and symbolism are effectively carried to the masses. Until the German invasion of the USSR in 1941, Stalin had utilised Pravda and Izvestiia to shape Soviet National Identity, in a similar way to that of the Nazi elite in Germany. Not only Stalin’s, but also Hitler’s rhetoric and speeches were reflected in the Soviet press since Stalin had been affected by Hitler and aimed to combine Soviet Socialism with a form of ethnic nationalism inspired by his German counterpart. Additionally, during the 1939 Soviet invasion of Finland, since the bourgeoisie is used as a typical anti-symbol of Socialism, the Finnish bourgeoisie was labelled as “the other” by the Soviet press. Soviet newspapers tended to describe the Finnish bourgeoisie as cultural and political enemies of Russians and the Finnish ruling class was accused of inciting anti-Russian feelings amongst their people. Nevertheless, the Soviet government attempted to justify the invasion of Finland by combining symbols of Socialism and ethnic nationalism (Thompson 1991).

The press, the radio, the television and other fundamental devices of the mass media, provide political leaders significant opportunities to affect public opinion via propaganda. It is also a fact that, the organized masses (such as trade unions) might utilize mass media to affect the politics. Additionally, political leaders of the
opposition can also manipulate the government via the mass media. The chances of
the opposition, divergent interest groups and the masses to influence the
government and politics depends on the government’s legal authority over the media
and on the characteristics of the media systems (Heywood 2007: 232-244).

As noted, the political elite utilise symbols in manipulating the masses. As
Lasswell et al. (1971) indicated, the leadership in political mobilizations
technically has two basic methodologies: Mass demonstrations and the utilization
of mass media. The mass demonstrations are quite an effective way for the
politicians in creating a collective sense of “common purposes” amongst their
followers. The masses and their leaders in demonstrations exhibit their political
will against the counter-masses and the counter-leaders. The opposition
generally organizes mass demonstrations in order to protest the government.
The government on the other hand generally organizes mass demonstrations as
a counter-mobilization against the opposition’s protests. Additionally, the
opposition or the government might gather their followers into streets in order to
protest a foreign state. As expressed, the political leaders find the opportunity to
create a sense of “collective purposes” with their followers. They also find the
chances to impose their rhetoric quite effectively via the mass demonstrations
(58
(Tarrow 1994: 33; Meyer & Stangenborg 1996).

For instance, in Canada, UK and US, the governments have ever since been
less restrictive and far more liberal over the radio and television. However, in the

58 In the contemporary politics (not only in the West, but also in the East) the masses are gathered in
the streets in order to reflect their political will without requiring elite manipulation. Additionally, to the
same extent with the elite, they utilize the mass media in order to protest or manipulate the
governments (See Cottle 2008). However, in ethnic conflicts the elite generally manipulate and mobilize
the masses instead of being manipulated by them (See Brass 1991; Breuilly 1993).
Mediterranean Europe, the governmental control over the broadcasts has relatively been more restrictive. In the majority of the European states, the radio and television broadcasts began under the state monopoly. Thus, the first radio and television stations were owned by the state. However, in the Mediterranean Europe, the governments were more enthusiastic in utilizing their broadcasting monopoly as a propaganda tool. Additionally, in Mediterranean Europe, the non-governmental media associations (particularly the press) had strong ties with the politicians. While in UK and US the press included more news about non-political issues (art, marketing and non-political celebrities), paid more attention to graphic designs and played an important role regarding the advertisements of products and firms, till 1980’s, the Mediterranean (for instance Greek and Italian) press had been identified with politics and political parties. Therefore, aiding the political parties to market their politics and ideologies were more important than increasing their mass-circulation for the majority of Mediterranean newspapers till 1980’s (Papathanassopoulos 1990; Hallin & Mancini 2004). The political elite’s rhetoric is quite an effective way in manipulation of the masses via political sentiments and this is valid for the construction and re-construction of the national identity as well. The masses, while reading their newspapers, watching television or listening to the radio, are constantly affected by the political elite’s rhetoric. Thus, the political elite’s rhetoric is constantly broadcasted and published with the media associations having strong ties with them. With the communication technology, the political elite keep going with their national identity constructions, the relevant

---

59 In the time period this thesis case studies, there was one single television station broadcasting in Cyprus. It was the state-run “PIK”. Whilst the PIK had a radio station as well, the other radio station the “BAYRAK” was established by the Turkish Cypriot political leadership (See Kizilyurek 2005; Loizides 2007).

60 This point is quite important for this thesis. One of the daily Cypriot newspapers to be analyzed, the “Charavghi”, belongs to the communist party AKEL.
manipulations of symbols and political rhetoric even if they do not gather the masses into streets (Ellinas 2010).

1.2.5. “Homeland”, national identity and elite interests

In the previous sections, this thesis has clarified that in “nationalizing states” and multi-ethnic consociations, the dominant ethnic group’s political elite tend to assimilate lesser ethnic groups’ or ethnic minorities’ demands to prevent potential secessionisms. The dominant ethnic group’s political elite also tempt to centralize the state in order to consolidate their political power. This thesis shall now illustrate for the relationship between the elite interests and irredentism.

Waterbury (2009), with reference to Brubaker’s (1996) terms, argues that the “homeland elite” tend to defend the political rights of Diasporas and ethnic minorities belonging to their own ethnicity in transnational borders. The political elite of homeland have two types of interests in doing so. First, they act as the centre of the ethnic culture and the nation by manipulating their ethnic relatives (Diasporas and ethnic groups in transnational borders) in order to strengthen their position in international politics. Their utilization of ethnic kin might provide them extraction of material resources. Thus, the more an ethnic minority is politically and economically developed within another state, the greater are the chances of the political elite of homeland to provide income from abroad. Additionally, since the public opinion is likely to be satisfied with the political elite’s support to their ethnic relatives in transnational borders, the support for external ethnic kin also promises electoral advantages for the elite. Likewise, the support from their homeland might increase the political power of the ethnic minority’s elite. For
instance, with the support of their homeland, the state where they live might reserve a specific number of seats in the parliament for them.

On the other hand, Saideman (1997; 2001) argues that, if a state is dominated by a major ethnic group, its political elite is likely to support the secessionist movements launched by ethnic groups belonging to the same ethnicity with them. Since the ethnic group represented by the relevant political elite is likely to be satisfied by their political elite’s support towards their ethnic relatives, the political elite might enjoy broader public support in domestic policies. However, if a state is dominated by a major ethnic group, there are lesser minor groups in that state and another ethnic group in a different state launches a secessionist movement, the major ethnic group's political elite tends to refrain from supporting the relevant secessionism. Since the ethnic minority within their borders might follow their ethnic kin and commence a separatist mobilization, the sovereignty of the state might be challenged and the political elite’s political power might negatively be affected.

Kaufmann’s (1996) theoretical considerations include Brass’s Instrumentalism and he successfully integrates the ethnic nationalism and irredentism to elite interests. He argues that political leaders aiming to enhance their political power are one factor contributing to intra-state and inter-state ethnocentric hostilities. The political leaders manipulate symbols of ethnic nationalism and mobilise masses by preparing them for intra-state or inter-state violence. If a state is dominated by an ethnic group, its political elite might provide public support with an ethnic nationalism containing irredentist elements and for democratic regimes; they might
increase their electoral power with the expansionist policies (as form “Pan” nationalism). The ethnic group represented by their political elite might be satisfied with expansionist movements since their ethnic rivals will be eliminated and their ethnic relatives will be liberated. According to Kaufmann, the electoral desires had motivated the Armenian government to a large extent in their expansionist policies towards Azerbaijan. In a sense, the Armenian elite had abused the ethnocentric sensitivity of homeland Armenians since the invasion foresaw the liberation of ethnic Armenians from the Azerbaijani dominance.

Based on the aforementioned hypothetical approaches, this thesis concludes that the academia is widely concerned on the relationship between the “homeland nationalism” (irredentism), secessionism and the homeland’s political elite. Since this thesis tries to fill a gap within the literature, it is focused on the ethnic kin of the homeland, instead of the “homeland” herself. This thesis hypothesizes the potential national identity construction of the political elite who represent the ethnic group dominating the lesser ethnic groups within a state and at the same time, being invited to be unified with their “homeland”. In such a case, the relevant political elite appear to have two options: “Nationalizing nationalism” and “homeland nationalism”. For Brass’s Instrumentalism, the answer is not complicated. The relevant political elite are likely to follow whichever way is more profitable for their political interests. Thus, they are likely to choose between their state’s sovereignty (“nationalizing nationalism”) and their attachment to the “homeland”, based on the promises they are offered in their search for power. If the unification with their homeland is likely to provide more political power for the political elite, they might embrace the unification nationalism. Nevertheless, if
such unification is likely to limit their political power, the political elite are likely to reject the idea of unification. Likewise, if the homeland’s international policies are likely to enhance the hegemony of their ethnic kin’s political elite, within their own state, the relevant political elite are likely to follow the homeland. However, if the homeland’s international policies are likely to diminish the ethnic kin’s political power; the ethnic kin’s political elite are unlikely to follow the homeland. In all cases, the political elite are likely to manipulate their own ethnic group by constructing a national identity profitable for their own interests.

To make the argument clearer, it is essential to stress Brass’s considerations about the multi-ethnic consociations, elite interests and national identity. Brass (1991) argues that, the ethnicity and national identity of the political elite and their ethnic groups is not the source of the trouble. The political elite utilize the nationalist sentiments of the ethnic groups and take advantage of their massive power in order to reduce the counter-elite’s political power. As stressed earlier in this thesis, if the major ethnic group is also richer than the other ethnic groups, its political elite might turn the consociation into a nation-state representing their ethnic group’s culture and they become the rulers of the state. Thus, for the political leaders of ethnic groups, the national identity is related to the sovereignty. If the dominant group’s political elite assimilate the counter-elite, they obtain a chance to abolish the power-sharing. In other words, they defeat the counter elite in the struggle for exercising the state power. Based on Brass’s arguments, this thesis concludes that, if the major group’s political-elite have a “homeland” belonging to the same ethnicity with them and the “homeland” acts as the “homeland” by processing irredentist policies or by manipulating the policies of
her ethnic kin, the major group’s political elite is likely to take that into account. If the homeland’s political conditions are likely to reduce the chances of the major ethnic group’s political elite in coming into power, the major group’s elite is unlikely to support homeland’s irredentism. Likewise, if the homeland’s preferences and her ethnic kin’s political hegemony cross cut each other, the ethnic kin’s political elite are likely to disobey the manipulations of the homeland.

Suhrke & Noble (1977: 3) argue that, in intra-state ethnic conflicts, ethnic groups tend to make use of international alliances and rivalries in accordance with their domestic interests. They might try to reduce or increase international involvement in the conflict. The commonest strategy for the ethnic groups is to maximise the involvement of parties that support their stance and minimise the interference of parties supporting the opposing group’s preferences. At this point, government power plays an important role. If one ethnic group is more powerful than another in the government, it has a better chance of limiting or expanding the involvement of foreign parties. Thus, it might be assumed that, if the homeland supports her ethnic kin’s stance in the ethnic conflict, the ethnic kin’s political elite are likely to follow the homeland. However, if their stance is contradictory to the preferences of the homeland, they might disobey the homeland.

The likeliness of the dominant ethnic group’s political elite to support the “homeland nationalism” (by following her manipulations or by supporting her irredentist policies) depends on the political system and the political preferences of the homeland. For any state, the conditions and chances of the political leaders in coming into power depend on a number of factors: The type of the governance,
the party system, the electoral system, the media, the constitution and the electoral behaviour are amongst the factors affecting the chances of political leaders in coming into power. However, all those factors are relevant under one single condition: If the state is governed by a democratic regime (Lijphart 1999). If the state is ruled by a military regime, the political leaders have nearly no chances in coming into power and exercising political power since the state is governed by the military staff. Thus, the entire statecraft is appointed based on the preferences of the army elite and no democratic elections are operated. Accordingly, not only the political leaders, but also the masses are given quite a limited space (may be no space at all) to vote and have a word in the politics. However, it is also noteworthy that, in some cases the military regimes might be beneficial in overcoming the economic crises and achieving institutional reforms that might consolidate the state’s democracy when the army leaves the governance back to politicians (Geddes 1999; Heywood 2007: 407-413). Additionally, Horowitz (1985) indicates that the military regimes might also be beneficial in overcoming the inter-ethnic violence. As in the Nigerian case, the army’s intervention played an effective role in termination of the inter-ethnic violence and re-arrangement of the federative power sharing. Therefore, it can profoundly be claimed that, if the “homeland” is ruled by a military regime, unification with her is not quite attractive for her ethnic relatives (particularly the political leaders) dominating a democratic state, particularly in case there are no sharp economic crises and inter-ethnic violence which endangers their state’s security.

It is essential to note that, a homeland with a military regime, a multi-ethnic state governed by a democratic regime and dominated by the homeland’s ethnic kin,
and the irredentist attempts of the homeland to annex the relevant state dominated by her ethnic kin, draw quite a compatible table in order to measure the “Instrumentality” of the national identity. In such circumstances, as an Instrumentalist approach shall conclude, the political elite of the homeland’s ethnic kin dominating the multi-ethnic state is likely to construct a national identity for their ethnic group to be mobilized in order to assimilate the adversarial ethnic groups (particularly against potential secessionism) and to resist against the irredentist policies of the homeland, at least till the military regime is dissolved.

On the other hand, in case there is an ethnic conflict within a state, one of the ethnic groups are dominating the relevant state and the dominant ethnic group’s “homeland” tries to mediate the conflict, the “Instrumentality” of the national identity for the dominant ethnic group might also be tested. If the “homeland” is included in the conflict resolution attempts and tries to manipulate her ethnic kin by disregarding its political elite’s political preferences, the relevant political elite are likely to refuse to follow the homeland’s manipulations. In such a case, the relevant political elite are quite likely to construct a national identity which diminishes their ethnic group’s attachment to the homeland.

CONCLUSION
The theoretical framework of this study has considered theories within Nationalism Studies that are relevant for the national identity and elite interests. It has been contended that the Eastern societies (including the post-Colonial societies) were more liable to the ethnic nationalism when compared to the West. It has been clarified that Brass’s Instrumentalist Theory is best incorporates the National
Identity and elite interests in the post-Colonial ethnic conflicts in multi-ethnic power sharing democracies. It has also been pointed out that, once the cross-ethnic voting and multi-ethnic parties are absent and one ethnic group is relatively richer than the other(s) within a state governed by a multi ethnic power-sharing democracy, the ethnic elite are given greater opportunities to drive ethnic conflicts.

In post-Colonial (liberated after 1945) consociations, the major ethnic group's political leaders might be tempted to restrict the political access of the counter elite, to centralize the state and to transform the state into a nation-state representing their own ethnic group’s culture. Likewise, the political elite of the minor group might try to decentralize the state or turn to secessionism. For the minor and major group’s political elite, the logic is similar. The ethnic leaders might aim to limit the counter elite’s political power and enhance their own access to the governmental power.

Since the ethnic elite in post-1945 multi-ethnic consociations are likely to instigate ethnic conflicts, they mobilize the masses via the national identity they construct. For the major group’s ethnic elite, the national identity is an instrument of defeating the other ethnic groups’ political elite and enhancing their political power. In other words, the national identity they construct is likely to serve in mobilizing their ethnic group against potential mobilizations of the lesser ethnic group(s) aiming to de-centralize the state (or secede from the state) and foreseeing to diminish the major ethnic group’s political dominance. For this thesis, the logic is similar for the irredentist policies exerted by the major ethnic group’s “homeland”. This thesis hypothesizes that, if one ethnic group dominates a state outside their “homeland”
and the political system of the “homeland” reduces the chances of the political elite of the ethnic elite to come into power, the ethnic elite are likely to construct an anti-irredentist national identity. Likewise, if there is an ethnic conflict within the state dominated by the ethnic group, the dominant group’s “homeland” is involved in the conflict resolution attempts and there is a contradiction between the political preferences of the “homeland” and the political elite representing the dominant ethnic group, the political elite of the dominant ethnic group are likely to turn to “nationalizing nationalism” instead of “homeland nationalism”, and neglect the manipulations of their “homeland”. In such a case, the relevant ethnic elite are likely to construct a national identity enabling the “nationalizing nationalism” and disabling the “homeland nationalism”. It has also been noted in this thesis that, in constructing and re-constructing national identities, political leaders also tend to refer to some “internal others” and “external others”. The “other” might be an entity, a person, an association or a state, which the ethnic elite perceive as rival or hostile.

Based on the theoretical framework, this thesis follows Brass’s Instrumentalism and argues that, the national identity in the multi-ethnic Eastern societies, particularly in failed multi-ethnic consociations, is an instrument of the ethnic elite. Following Brass, this thesis hypothesizes that, in case a multi-ethnic consociation fails to fulfil the ethnic demands, the political elite of the major ethnic group is likely to construct a coercive national identity. This thesis also hypothesises that, if the “homeland” of the major ethnic group is governed by an anti-democratic regime (which limits the political power of the politicians) and the “homeland” does not support the preferences of her ethnic kin regarding the resolution of the ethnic
conflict, the major ethnic group’s political elite are likely to construct a national identity enabling the “nationalizing nationalism” instead of the “homeland nationalism”. This thesis shall test the validity of the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: In case there is an ethnic conflict in an “Eastern” and multi-ethnic power-sharing democracy and the major group is also richer than the other(s); its leader is likely to construct a national identity aiming to coerce the minor ethnic group(s).

Hypothesis 2: If an “Eastern” state is dominated by an ethnic group, the dominant ethnic group has a “homeland”, and unification with the “homeland” or loyalty to the political manipulations of the “homeland” contradicts to the interests of the ethnic group and its leader, the leader of the ethnic group is likely to construct a national identity favouring “nationalising nationalism” and opposing “homeland nationalism”.

The 2nd Chapter shall explain and classify the movements of Nationalism throughout the Cypriot History. As Breuilly notes, classification and identification of the character of a nationalist movement is quite beneficial in examining and analyzing it. The 3rd Chapter shall analyze the political (and essentially economical) conditions in Cyprus, by linking the policies of President Makarios to his own interests and to Greek Cypriots’ interests. Thus, the determinants of the Cypriot political scene during the period of time this study is concerned on will be analyzed based on the concept of “elite interests”, which essentially includes the interests of the ethnic group (Greek Cypriots). The 4th Chapter shall link the
President’s construction of the Greek Cypriot national identity based on the concept of “elite interests”. Thus, the validity of both hypotheses shall be tested particularly on the 4th Chapter.
II. THE HISTORY OF CYPRUS AND THE NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS

This chapter shall explain the historical origins of the Cyprus Conflict and identify the nationalist mobilizations of the island’s two dominant ethnic groups (Turkish and Greek Cypriots). Breuilly (1993) argues that, in order to analyze a nationalist movement, it is first necessary to identify the type of nationalism involved. Once the nationalist movement the research is concerned on is identified (as secessionism, ethnic nationalism, civic nationalism, unification nationalism etc.), the hypothetical considerations can be tested via the case study. This thesis follows Brass’s Instrumentalist Theory. However, Breuilly’s suggestion to analyze the typology of nationalist movements is helpful, since analyzing the typologies of nationalism in Cyprus shall clarify the extent to which Makarios re-constructed Greek Cypriot national identity in terms of Greek Cypriot Nationalism rather than Greek Nationalism per se.

2.1. The history of Cyprus and the shaping of nationalisms on the island

The period on which this thesis focuses begins with Makarios’s anti-Enosis transition in late 1967, and finishes with the Junta-sponsored military coup that ousted him in 1974. However, it is useful to have an overview of Cypriot History in order to understand the principal factors that shaped the island’s destiny. It will also clarify the Cyprus policies of the UK, Greece and Turkey, the three states that had most to do with Cypriot history.
2.1.1. Cyprus before the British era

Cyprus is an island which has a surface area of 9250 km². It is located in the Eastern Mediterranean, 70 kilometers away from Turkey, 1000 kilometers away from Greece (400 kilometers away from the Greek island Rhodes), 400 kilometers away from Egypt and 200 kilometers away from Lebanon. Since the 2nd Millennium B.C., the island has had geostrategic significance. Due to its copper reserves and its location as a station contributing to the inter-continental trade (between Europe and Middle East) and as a naval base enabling to safeguard and control the Eastern Mediterranean, even in the ancient history, Cyprus drew the attention of powerful civilizations. On the other hand, for the Cold War juncture, Cyprus became relatively more important since it was near the Middle East, the central source of oil. Furthermore, Cyprus could constitute an effective airbase, enabling the NATO to safeguard and control the Middle East and the Eastern and the Central Europe.

Towards the end of the British Era in Cyprus, the UK had established radars and electronic spying devices in Cyprus (in 1940’s and 1950’s), for its intelligence activities aimed at the Middle East. Cyprus was expected to play a key role (with its geostrategic significance) for the interests of NATO. Accordingly, although the island gained its independence in 1960, the UK did not totally give up her geostrategic interests over Cyprus, and obtained two sovereign bases (see Map 4) on the island. Moreover, UK had been amongst the parties who tried to mediate Greece, Turkey and Cypriots, encourage them to refrain from war and conflict and provide stability on the island. On the other hand, since the majority of islands in the Aegean was taken over by Greece, Turkey remained vulnerable to potential military attacks from sea, and particularly in post-1964, Ankara paid maximum attention to Cyprus and refrained from pacifism against

Greeks were amongst the first settlers and have lived on the island since the third Millennium B.C. The island welcomed additional Greek settlers (particularly the Mycenaean people), who lost their cities in the destructive Aegean earthquake that occurred in the 12th Century B.C. Greek settlers, whose number was continuously increasing during the second Millennium, had cultural influence over the local peoples, and this was seen in the ancient architecture and town planning. Although the Assyrians, Egyptians and Persians each ruled Cyprus between the eighth and fifth centuries B.C, the Hellenic culture survived and Alexander the Great took the island over in the fourth Century B.C., claiming Cyprus as part of his Hellenic Empire. The Hellenistic culture of the island and its people’s Greek-Orthodox identity was constructed and consolidated by Byzantium. In 30 B.C, the island was captured by Romans. In 395 the Roman Empire was split between the Western Roman Empire ruled from Rome and the Eastern Roman Empire ruled from Constantinople (today Istanbul) in 395. Till the 12th Century, Cyprus remained under control of Byzantium. Since the Byzantine Empire was Orthodox and Greek was its official language, the socio-political influence of Greek culture further increased in Cyprus (Peristianis 2008: 40-115; Ker-Lindsay 2011: 11-12).

Byzantine Empire had been destroyed by the Ottomans’ take over of Constantinople, which was later on named as Istanbul and became the Capital of Ottoman Empire in 1453. Turks began settling in Cyprus with the Ottoman
conquest on 1 August 1571. Although the Ottomans sponsored Turkish settlement over the island, they did not force the local people to become Muslims. On the contrary, the Greek-Orthodox people of Cyprus, as the other Orthodox people within the Ottoman state, enjoyed autonomy in their religious affairs and taxation, and they co-existed peacefully with Ottoman settlers. On 7 May 1832 Greece became independent from the Ottoman Empire and a source of ideological inspiration for mainland Greeks who wanted Greece to expand to include Cyprus; parts of the Balkan Peninsula where there were Greek-Orthodox ethnic groups; Crete; Rhodes; the Aegean islands; and parts of Western Anatolia where ethnic Greeks were located. *Megali Idea*, the “Great Idea” of uniting all Greeks into a single nation state, clearly used an ethno-religious criterion which identified the “Greek nation” with “Greek-Orthodoxy”. In 1844, Ioannis Kollettis became the first Greek Prime Minister to voice support for *Megali Idea* as a political goal for Greece. During constitutional disputes in the Greek Parliament, he claimed that, the Greek state was responsible not only for the interests of its citizens, it was also responsible for liberating all neighbouring ethnic Greeks from foreign rule and incorporating them into Greece. Prime Minister Venizelos, who came into power in 1909, put this expansionist policy in to practice by annexing Crete in 1912. With British encouragement the Greek army invaded Western Anatolia in 1919. However, under the of Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish repulsed the Greeks (Clogg 1980: 65; Heraclides 2001: 45-61; Kizilyurek 2002: 49-68; Demirozu 2007: 21-28).

Meanwhile, the steady decline of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century had had a fateful impact on Cyprus. After its defeat by Russia in 1878, the Ottoman
Empire had turned to Britain for security and the latter took Cyprus as a protectorate on 4 June 1878 (based on the British-Ottoman Defensive Convention signed by the two states) in exchange for helping the Ottoman Empire secure the Anatolian territory against Russia. In exchange for this aid, Britain took Cyprus as a protectorate and paid Istanbul an annual rent of £88,676 for the island. At that time the total Cypriot population was around 186,000 of whom 137,000 were Greek Cypriots, 45,000 were Turkish Cypriots and 2,500 were other ethnicities (notably Armenian, Maronite and Latin). Following defeat in the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved and on 29 October 1923 the Turkish Republic was founded. Mustapha Kemal, the founder of the Turkish state, had no expansionist policies regarding Cyprus. During the Conference of Lausanne which drew up the peace treaty with the allied victors (i.e. the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State [Yugoslavia]) (1922-1923), Ismet Inonu, representing Mustapha Kemal and the Turkish Parliament, made no demands on Cyprus which was duly excluded from the Turkish territory. Under the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923, Turkey gave up her rights regarding Cyprus, and the island officially became a British colony on 3 March 1925 (Kizilyurek 1983: 32-37; Hale 2000: 45; Atun 2007: 10-15; Ker-Lindsay 2011: 13).

2.1.2. Cyprus as a British colony

When Cyprus became a British protectorate in 1878, Turkish Cypriots constituted around 25% of the total population. On independence in 1960, Turkish Cypriots were 18% of the population. This was for an important reason. On 5 November 1914 Britain had annexed Cyprus and this had led to massive Turkish Cypriot
migrations to Turkey. In the 1920s and 1930s, 20,000 Turkish Cypriots settled in Turkey. In 1938 there were 310,000 Greek Cypriots (two per cent of whom were Armenian and Maronite people) and 65,000 Turkish Cypriots (Cakmak 2008). According to the 1959 census there was a population of around 587,000 people: 441,000 Greek Cypriots, 105,000 Turkish Cypriots, 6,000 people Maronites and Armenians, and 25,000 foreigners. Under the 1960 constitution the Maronite and Armenian peoples were regarded as part of the Greek Cypriot community (Solsten 1991).

In late 1920’s and early 1930’s, there were two mainstream anti-British mobilizations within Cyprus. One was led by the Church and the other by the Kommunistiko Komma Kyprou (the Communist Party of Cyprus which had been founded in 1926). In 1929, the KKK had encouraged 6,000 mine workers to organize strikes (essentially against the British companies that ran the mines) all around Cyprus. In 1931, while the Church called on the people to engage in a struggle for Enosis (unification of Cyprus with Greece), the KKK wanted to unite all the Cypriots (regardless of ethnicity) in a struggle for independence. The Church utilized the clergymen and encouraged tens of thousands of people to engage in an anti-British rebellion aimed at Enosis. On the other hand, the Communists took advantage of their syndicate PEO\(^{61}\) (Pan-Cypriot Federation of Workers). On 21 October 1931, 5,000 people gathered at a Church-sponsored demonstration in Nicosia\(^{62}\) which was followed by the burning down of Government House, the home of the British governor. On 24 October 1931 at the behest of the Church, 8,000 Greek Cypriots once more demonstrated in favour of Enosis. KKK sent a

\(^{61}\)In that period of time, the PEO had 2,000 Turkish Cypriot members (Varnava 1997: 7-13).

\(^{62}\)Capital of Cyprus.
small number of activists to Church-sponsored demonstrations but their pro-
Independence placards were far less noticeable than the thousands of pro-

The Church and the KKK had entirely different goals for Cyprus. The former
wanted unity with Greece; the latter aimed to unify Cypriots in an independent
sovereign state. The KKK-owned newspaper, *Neos Anthropsos* (*New Man*), which
had a circulation of 1,500 copies, used its columns to emphasize that the central
duty of Cypriot Communism was to discourage any kind of ethnic hatred.
According to the *Neos Anthropsos*, people should be classified as “rich” and
*Pankypriakh Ergatikh Omospondia* (*Pan-Cypriot Workers’ Federation*), a trade’s
union allied with close links to KKK, also obtained Turkish Cypriot workers’ support.
By 1936, Turkish Cypriot members of PEO had reached to 2,000 (Varnava 1997: 7-13). Even though the British had banned KKK in 1933, the PEO maintained its trade
union activities. In August 1936, 3,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriot members of PEO
who worked for British mining companies in *Mavrovouni* (a village in North Western Cyprus) went on strike. They demanded a collective
contract providing compensation to the families of the workers injured or killed in
mining accidents. Furthermore, on 6 March 1939, members of the Limassol63
Dock Workers Union voted a central committee composed of 4 Greek Cypriots
and 2 Turkish Cypriots (Michailidis 2003: 311).

---

63 A harbor city located in Southern Cyprus
The British regarded the KKK and the Church as equally dangerous. After the rebellion of 1931, Nikodimos Milonas (the Bishop of Kitium\textsuperscript{64}), Makarios Miriantheus (the Bishop of Kyrenia), Kostas Skeleas and Charalambros Vatiliotis (leaders of KKK) were sent to exile (Gazioglu 1996: 266). On 15 August 1933, Sir Richmond Palmer (the British High Commissioner to Cyprus) enacted a law prohibiting the KKK and the party was dissolved (Adams 1971: 19). When Greek Cypriots rebelled against the British, Greek Prime Minister Venizelos condemned their anti-British rioting. When the British administration accused Alexis Courou, the Greek Commissioner to Cyprus, of supporting the rebellion, Venizelos immediately dismissed him. On 24 October 1931, Venizelos told the press that “no logical man can believe that he can force Great Britain to fulfill Greek Cypriots’ national inspirations” (Kranidiotis 1985: 125 cited in Kizilyurek 2002: 85).

The Turkish government followed a similar Cypriot policy to that of its Greek counterpart. In the early 1930’s, the migration of Turkish Cypriots to Turkey and the Greek Nationalist uprising on the island had irritated the British Government. Furthermore, Kemalism (Mustapha Kemal’s pro-secular reforms) were popular within the Turkish Cypriot members of the Legislative Council.\textsuperscript{65} In 1930, the British Ambassador to Turkey, Percy Lorain, met Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rustu Aras to explain British anxieties about rise of Kemalism in Cyprus. Aras responded that: “Each Kemalist is a friend of Britain. This is not only a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[64] The Church of Kitium is located in Larnaca (a city in South Eastern Cyprus). The Bishop of Kitium is the leader of Church representing Larnaca and its outer suburbs (including villages around the city).
\item[65] The Legislative Council was composed of 18 members. 12 of the members were to be Greek Cypriots, elected by Greek Cypriot votes, and the 3 members were to be Turkish Cypriots, elected by Turkish Cypriot votes. The remaining 6 members of the council were appointed by the British High Commissioner. The High Commissioner had the power to veto any draft laws prepared by the council. The High Commissioner acted as a representative of the British Government, and he exercised the executive power on behalf of the British Government (Atun 2007: 16).
\end{footnotes}
fundamental policy of the Turkish Government. It is also the personal desire of Ataturk himself. If some Turkish Cypriots are trying to create a hostile environment to damage the relations between Britain and Turkey, those people should know that, they are hostile to Kemalism at the first place” (Kizilyurek 2002: 44).

In the 1930’s, Turkish Cypriots had no ambition for union with Turkey. Greek Cypriots’ demands for Enosis were rejected by Athens and Turkey had no intention to annex Cyprus. In 1941, AKEL (the Progressive Party of the Working People) was founded as the successor to the KKK. However, unlike the KKK, AKEL followed a pro-Enosis line. In October 1943, at a “Cyprus Conference” it organized at the Royal Hotel in London. AKEL adopted a resolution which, inter alia, stated:

We support the will of the Cypriot people to be united with Greece, and we claim that, the unification must be materialized immediately after the liberation of Greece...The national question of Cyprus can only be solved with unification with the homeland of the majority of the Cypriot people.

This signaled the beginning of a competition between AKEL and the Church for leadership of the pro-Enosis struggle (Gurel 1984: 14-21). With the outbreak of the Greek Civil War in 1946, Greek Cypriots were polarized on the same lines as mainland Greeks, between the communist army, Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (Greek People’s Liberation Army) and the royalist army Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos (National Republican Greek Army). In Cyprus, while the Church declared support for the royalist front, the AKEL elite favoured the Greek communists. The Church’s support for Enosis was in keeping with its support for the classic Megali idea which held that Cyprus and Greece were

---

66 In that period of time, Greece was under German occupation.
Hellenic and Orthodox. For its part, AKEL jockeyed for leadership of the pro-
Enosis struggle by linking Greek nationalism and anti-Imperialism. According to 
AKEL, Communism would liberate Greeks and Cypriots from Anglo-American 
“imperialism” and make the Enosis dream come true (Drousiotis 2005: 3-8; 
Mallinson 2010: 86-87).

In 1949, the Greek Civil War ended with the defeat of the Communist Front and 
the Greek Communist Party was banned. This left AKEL with no other choice but 
to obey the leadership of the Church. In 1950, AKEL and the Church sponsored 
a pro-Enosis plebiscite in which 95.7%67 of Greek Cypriot participants voted for 
Enosis. One year later, Michail Mouscos, the Bishop of Kitium, was elected as 
Archbishop and he took the name “Makarios” (blissful). He was thus at the helm 
of the Greek Cypriot national struggle. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots had 
founded the “Association of the Turkish Minority of Cyprus” in 1943 and the 
“Special Turkish Committee” in 1948. The aim of the latter was to establish closer 
relations with Ankara (Peristianis 2008: 159-160).

Based on the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (both prepared in 1947)68, as 
the two cornerstones shaping the anti-Communist US foreign policy at the beginning 
of the Cold War, Greece and Turkey received substantial economic and military aid 
from the USA, in order to provide economic development and defend themselves 
from the internal or external pressures sponsored by Communism or

67 The lists of voters including their signatures were gathered in 52 volumes. Although this indicates a 
huge number, it does not refer to the 95.7% of the actual Greek Cypriot population. It was the Church 
who prepared the list of voters (Drousiotis 2005: 39). According to a documentary prepared by Birand 
(1999), the number of voters who voted for the Enosis in the plebiscite was 225,000.
68 This thesis is a study of Nationalism and does not have much to do with the Cold War. However, the 
participation of Cypriots’ “homelands” in NATO did not left the political destiny of Cyprus be free 
of the bipolarity of balance of power during Cold War.
Soviet Union. On 18 February 1952, Greece and Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and they became allies of USA and UK (Howard 2001: 128; Gaddis 2005: 22). Afterwards, the Greek government supported Greek Cypriots’ struggle for Enosis. Greek public opinion had been aroused over the Greek Cypriot struggle and when the Greek Prime Minister, Alexander Papagos (the former commander-in-chief of EDES) met the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, in Athens in September 1953. Papagos said Greece wanted to negotiate the future of Cyprus. Eden said Britain had no intention of leaving Cyprus (Kizilyurek 2002: 102; O’Malley & Craig 2001: 12).

2.1.3. Towards Cypriot independence

In 1954, Papagos played the United Nations card, in order to pave the way to annex Cyprus. On 17 December 1954, towards the end of the ninth General Assembly, the Greek delegate declared his government’s intention to unify Cyprus with Greece, saying that this was the will of the majority of Cypriots. He also said that that, in so doing, his government would respect the rights of Turkish Cypriots. British and Turkish delegates objected that Cyprus was a British colony and had been one since 1925. Accordingly, the General Assembly refused to accept Greece’s application and no decision was made regarding the future of Cyprus. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot leader, Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, and his closest associate, Rauf Raif Denktash, were whipping up Turkish Cypriot opposition to Enosis. In early 1950’s Turkish Cypriot students and emigres to Turkey founded the Cultural Association of Turkish Cypriots with aim of persuading Turkish public opinion to resist Enosis. As the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Necmettin Sadak, stated in a press conference, his country’s view was that “there is no
Cyprus question. The British Government shall not leave the island to another state. Our youth is becoming unnecessarily enthusiastic” (Firat 2007: 597-598).

For their part, in 1955, Greek Cypriots founded the underground organization Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston\textsuperscript{69} (EOKA) under the leadership of Georgios Grivas\textsuperscript{70}, an experienced Cypriot colonel who had served in the Greek Army. The ultimate goal of EOKA was to unify Cyprus with Greece. EOKA was sponsored by the Greek government. Makarios and Grivas were in direct contact with each other and collaborated in EOKA. While Makarios (as the ethnarch\textsuperscript{71}) conducted the political dimension of the pro-Enosis struggle, Grivas and EOKA waged a guerilla war against the British (Holland 1998: 55-82; O'Malley & Craig 2001:14). In his personal memoir, Grivas (Grivas & Foley 1965: 66-67) indicates that the EOKA included around 1,000 guerillas. The British forces were composed of 20,000 soldiers and 5,000 policemen. Grivas had no intention to obtain a certain military victory against the British. Instead, his strategy was to transform the entire island into a battlefield via the guerilla warfare, and to force the British government to allow the Enosis. The EOKA started the Enosis struggle on 1 April 1955, with the explosion of the British radio station in Nicosia (Grivas & Foley 1965: 33).

Until the foundation of EOKA, the majority of Cypriot police was Greek Cypriot. However, when armed struggle began, the British started recruiting more Turkish Cypriots. EOKA was engaged 1,114 clashes with the British armed forces. Around

\textsuperscript{69} EOKA means “National Organization of Cypriot Warriors”.

\textsuperscript{70} Grivas had fought against Turks in 1919-1922, against Italians in 1940-1941, against Germans in 1941 and against Greek communists in the Greek Civil War in 1946-1949 (Jones 1959: 22-40).

\textsuperscript{71} “Ethnarch” means “national leader” in Greek. It is the title that the Greek and Orthodox Cypriots gave to their Archbishops during the Ottoman and British eras. This title had played an important role regarding Makarios’s popularity amongst Greek Cypriots (Kizilyurek 2005).
600 people (including Britons, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots) were killed by EOKA between 1955 and 1959. Of these, nearly 150 were Greek Cypriots. Communists, policemen, owners of coffee shops, taxi and bus drivers constituted the majority of Greek Cypriot victims. Policemen were killed simply due because they resisted EOKA. Coffee shop owners, taxi drivers and bus drivers were killed because the British could use them as sources of information (Markydes 1977: 19-20; See also Crawshaw 1978). Communists were killed largely because AKEL leaders discouraged party members from supporting the EOKA. They had also made speeches condemning Grivas and the armed struggle (Adams 1971: 51-52).

On 3 March 1956, the political leader of the pro-Enosis struggle, Archbishop Makarios, was exiled to Seychelles Islands by the British. He was not allowed to return till 28 March 1957 (O'Malley & Craig: 26-27). In 1956, Grivas distributed pamphlets in Nicosia in which he called on Greek Cypriot leftists to leave AKEL and to support EOKA. In retaliation, in the same year, AKEL’s Central Committee issued pamphlets condemning EOKA and inviting EOKA fighters to leave Grivas’s side and to join AKEL’s non-violent Enosis struggle. However, the majority of Greek Cypriots supported EOKA by helping the guerillas to hide in villages, towns, cities and mountains (Adams 1971: 218-219). On 20 December 1957, Kutchuk and Denktash published a pamphlet and invited the Turkish Cypriot community to oppose to the Enosis and stand for the partition of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece (Akkurt 1999: 42 cited in Kizilyurek 2010: 180). In 1958, EOKA started appealing to Greek Cypriot leftists (Fantis 1995: 365-381: cited in Peristianis 2008: 163).
Turkish Cypriots retaliated to EOKA’s killing of Turkish Cypriot policemen by killing Greek Cypriots. On 7 June 1958, inter-ethnic violence broke out in Nicosia. In the following two months, 56 Greek Cypriots and 51 Turkish Cypriots were killed (Crawshaw 1978: 408). On 1 August 1958, Kutchuk and Denktash founded a paramilitary organization named as the *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*[^72] (TMT). The TMT was sponsored and supported by the Turkish government. Turkish Cypriot leadership and TMT maintained the struggle for the partition and propagated for the separation of the two communities from each other (Hasguler 2007; Kizilyurek 2010; Ker-Lindsay 2010: 20-22). It is also important to note that, TMT, like its Greek Cypriot counterpart EOKA, exerted pressure on the Left. The collective organization of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, particularly in PEO, was perceived as a danger by the TMT, whose political objective was to attain the partition of the island. The pressure of the TMT managed to force around 3,000 Turkish Cypriot members of PEO to join to Turkish Cypriot trade unions (Attalides 1979: 48).

Turkey also weighted in. Britain had responded to the beginning of Greek Cypriot terrorism in 1955 by not only recruiting Turkish Cypriot policemen but also by encouraging Turkey to play a more active role in the Cyprus Question. On 16 June 1958 the Turkish Parliament passed a resolution approving the Cyprus policy of Adnan Menderes in favour of a share-out of Cyprus by Greece and Turkey (Firat 2009: 603-607). However, NATO and USA were worried that inter-ethnic violence in the island endangered the southern flank of NATO by raising tension between Greece and Turkey. In early August 1958, Paul-Henri Spaak, the Secretary General of NATO, suggested the US government to ask Turkey and Greece to

[^72]: Unlike its Greek Cypriot counterpart EOKA, the TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization) did not target the British.
stop the violence in Cyprus. The USA asked her allies to take action, and, Turkish and Greek governments encouraged Cypriots to declare a ceasefire. On 4 August 1958 Grivas announced a ceasefire and asked the EOKA fighters to refrain from attacking Turkish Cypriots and the British. On 5 August 1958, TMT acted in a similar manner, announced a ceasefire and asked for the termination of attacks against Greek Cypriots. In October 1958, Spaak invited British, Turkish and Greek governments to negotiate a solution formula, which would exclude Enosis and partition (Holland 1998: 263-294; O’Malley & Craig 2001: 65-68; Atun 2007: 49-50).

2.1.4. The Republic of Cyprus

The mediation of US and NATO encouraged all the parties (Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Turkey, Greece and Britain) to reach to an agreement. The solution formula was the foundation of an independent Cypriot state. However, none of the parties was totally satisfied with the formula of independence. Greek Cypriots and Greece had struggled for Enosis. Turkish Cypriots and Turkey demanded partition. Both Turkey and Greece had to respect American anxieties and take NATO priorities into account. In 1959, the parties held talks in Zurich and London to resolve the Cyprus question, and the basic principles determining the future of Cyprus were agreed. According to the Zurich and London agreements, a Cypriot state was to be constructed on the basis of bi-communal equality and partnership in legislation and execution. The continuance of bi-communal equality was to be guaranteed by Britain, Turkey and Greece. The Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, which was signed by Greece, Turkey, Britain, Makarios (as the leader Greek Cypriots) and Kutchuk (as the leader of Turkish Cypriots),
enshrined their agreement on these points. An additional Treaty of Alliance was signed by Greece, Turkey, Makarios and Kutchuk. The “Treaty of Alliance” provided for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to form a tripartite alliance whereby they would collectively protect the independence and integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. According to the same treaty, Turkey and Greece were allowed to deploy military forces on the island. Greece could deploy up to 950 troops and Turkey up to 650 troops. A further Treaty of Guarantee (see Appendix 2) was signed by the two Cypriot leaders, Greece, Turkey and Britain. This gave Britain two sovereign military bases on the island and Turkey, Greece and Britain were given the right to use military force for the maintenance of constitutional order in Cyprus (Ertekun 1981: 7-8; Hale 2000: 132-135; Dodd 2010: 20-40; Mallinson 2010: 91-115).

The Cypriot state was built on a constitution (see Appendix 1) preserving political power-sharing between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 70% of the executive branch and members of the legislature were Greek Cypriots while the remaining 30% were Turkish Cypriots. However, due to their mutual veto rights, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives and government ministers could prevent each others’ bills from coming into law. The state had no federal borders. According to the Cypriot constitution, the President of the Republic was to be a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President was to be a Turkish Cypriot. Turkish Cypriot ministers were to be appointed by the Vice-President and Greek Cypriot ministers were to be appointed by the President. The President was to be elected by Greek Cypriots, and the Vice-President was to be elected by Turkish Cypriots. In elections to the House of Representatives Turkish Cypriot members were to be elected by the Turkish Cypriot community, and their Greek
Cypriot counterparts were to be elected by the Greek Cypriot community. Ethnic Maronites and Armenians were treated as part of the Greek Cypriot community. In December 1959, Archbishop Makarios was elected as the first President of the Republic of Cyprus. He won 66% of the Greek Cypriot votes. His rival, Giannis Clerides, who was supported by AKEL, obtained 34% of the votes. Dr. Kutchuk, who became Vice-President, was the only Turkish Cypriot candidate for the office. On 16 August 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was officially founded (Vanezis 1974: 61-84; Markydes 1977: 26; Bahcheli 1990: 31-43; Kizilyurek: 2005: 106).

According to Xydis (1973), Cyprus was a “reluctant Republic”. The pro-Enosis Greek Cypriot political elite and the pro-partition Turkish Cypriot political elite found themselves elected to the leadership of a bi-communal power-sharing democracy. They had mobilized their communities for union with the motherlands, and in a sense, the creation of the Republic of Cyprus disappointed both sides. For the Greek Cypriot people, particularly for their leader, Makarios, sharing political power with the minor ethnic group was unwelcome (Stavrinides 1975; Loizides 2007). President Makarios faced alleged executive problems arising out of the political rights enjoyed by the Turkish Cypriot political elite. The Cypriot constitution provided for 70% of public servants to be Greek Cypriots. The remaining 30% was to be composed of Turkish Cypriots. Since Greek Cypriots constituted the 82% of the population, they felt disadvantaged in obtaining government employment. Taxation was another issue that Makarios disliked. Since Greek Cypriots were richer and more populous than Turkish Cypriots, they

---

73 The turnout had been 91% (Nohlen & Stöver 2010: 445)
74 This is also the name that the scholar gave to his book.
paid most of the taxes. In order to do away with these provisions, Makarios needed to do away with the Turkish Cypriot veto rights (Markydes 1977: 26-27).

On 1 September 1961, Makarios went to Belgrade for the conference of Non-Aligned Movement. He made Cyprus (a state allied with Turkey, Greece and UK based on the Treaty of Alignment) a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, with 24 other states including United Arab Republic, Cuba, Yugoslavia and India (O’Malley & Craig 2001: 150; Hasguler 2007: 98). According to Clerides, what led Makarios to join into the NAM were his future plans for the constitutional re-arrangements. The NATO alliance could not ignore the interests of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, the accession in Non-Aligned Movement could provide greater international support to Makarios, in his future attempts to limit Turkish Cypriot veto rights. Clerides also notes that, Vice President Kutchuk also knew that Makarios was aimed at gathering greater international support with his non-aligned foreign policy. Turkish Cypriot leader was aware that, at any time, such a support could motivate Makarios to tempt to change the constitution. However, Kutchuk thought that, if Makarios was to league with the non-aligned states, he would be disliked by the NATO, and Turkey would be given greater chances to intervene in favour of Turkish Cypriots. Thus, although Kutchuk was dissatisfied with Makarios’s non-aligned foreign policy and he could use his veto right to impede it, he did not do so. And, Cyprus accessed into the NAM according to the conference held on 1-6 September 1961 (Clerides 1989a: 124-125).

---

75 See section 3.4 for broader details.
2.1.5. Inter-ethnic violence, “homelands”, USA and UN

The foundation of the Republic of Cyprus had managed to moderate the inter-ethnic relations in Cyprus, at least for a short time. However, the peaceful atmosphere did not last long. On 11 February 1962, Polycarpos Georgadjis, Minister of Interior, made a speech in Limassol. His statements greatly provoked the Turkish Cypriot community. He said:

Since the beginning of History, Cyprus has been Greek…. Its spirit will always remain Greek… Turks owe us a great thank you. Because, they owe all the rights they gained to EOKA and its struggle. Greek Cypriots fought and struggled, and Greek Cypriots deserved the privileges. But the privileges are enjoyed by Turkish Cypriots. The future of our country depends on us… All of our fighters are invited to the front line of the struggle (Machi 11 February 1962, p.1: cited in Drousiotis 2005:15).

In his speech, Georgadjis clearly criticized the veto rights provided to Turkish Cypriots, and asked Greek Cypriots to struggle against the “privileges” enjoyed by Turkish Cypriots. In the same year, violence grew and this led to inter-ethnic tension. On 25 March 1962, a bombing attack targeting the Bayraktar Mosque in Nicosia was made. On 23 April 1962, two Turkish Cypriot journalists, who supported the inter-ethnic peace, Ayhan Hikmet and Muzaffer Gurkan, became victims of unresolved murders (Markydes 1977: 32-33; Kizilyurek 2005: 240-241).

Prior to the murders, the two journalists asserted that, based on the information they received from the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia, the attack against the Mosque had been instigated by Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. According to the journalists, Denktash aimed to create inter-ethnic hatred and launch the pro-partition movement. Gurkan visited Georgadjis in order to inform him about the information they received. Georgadjis acted as he paid no attention to the information provided by Gurkan. However, prior to Gurkan’s visit, he had already
asked his associates to record the conversation secretly (Ali 2003: 40). After the two murders, on 21 May 1962, Georgadjis was called by the Court of Nicosia to testify. He submitted the sound records to the court. As the records indicated, Gurkan asserted that the architect of the attack on the Mosque was Denktash, and this information had been provided to Gurkan and Hikmet by the Turkish Embassy (Phileleftheros 22 May 1962, p.1 cited in Drousiotis 2005: 26). However, on 22 May 1962, the Turkish Embassy declared that they had had no contact with Gurkan since the end of 1960. Consequently, Denktash managed to save his prestige. Gurkan and Hikmet were labeled as “traitors” by the Turkish Cypriot leadership (Phileleftheros 23 May 1962, p1. cited in Drousiotis 2005: 31). Not only the two murders, but also the bombing attack on the Mosque are still unresolved.

Georgadjis was prepared for inter-ethnic violence and he was setting up a para-military organization named as “Akritas”. Furthermore, Turkish Cypriot leadership was also prepared for armed struggle. The Akritas was composed of 1,800 recruits and Makarios had information about the activities and purposes of the organization. In September 1963, Georgadjis and his organization were fully prepared for the armed conflict. An operation plan, named as the “Akritas Plan”, was prepared. According to the plan, the Greek Cypriot political elite should ask for constitutional amendments which would enable the Greek Cypriot dominance over Cypriot politics. If Turkish Cypriots were to resist by conducting violence, their resistance would be terminated without serious casualties. Massacres and impression of massacres against Turkish Cypriots were to be avoided in order to

---

76 The text of the plan was discovered and given to Greek Cypriot press by General Grivas. Grivas was dissatisfied with Georgadjis’s failure in implementing the Akritas Plan, and wanted to manipulate the public opinion against him. The text was for the first time published by pro-Grivas newspaper Patris on 21 April 1966 Atun 2007: 159).
not to open the way for a foreign intervention. The final stage of the plan was the proclamation of *Enosis*. To what extent Makarios knew about the plan is still uncertain (Clerides 1989a: 212-219; Atun 2007: 158-169; Drousiotis 2005: 97-99).

The *Akritas* Plan was prepared by Georgadjis. As the President, Makarios was dissatisfied with the Turkish Cypriot veto rights, and based on the political hierarchy, he was certainly superior to Georgadjis. Regarding the post-Independence era, it is difficult to know whether Makarios was really after *Enosis*, or he simply aimed to limit Turkish Cypriots’ veto rights. Makarios might have used Georgadjis and his para-military forces in order to deter the potential Turkish Cypriot resistance, and to get dispose of the political power enjoyed by Turkish Cypriot political elite. Likewise, he might have asked for the constitutional amendments to open the way for the *Enosis*. This thesis does not aim to find out whether Makarios played a role in the preparation of *Akritas* Plan, or whether he offered the constitutional amendments as an earlier phase of his alleged pro-*Enosis* struggle. However, there is no doubt that, incase he limited the Turkish Cypriot veto rights, he would have enjoyed greater political power.

On 25 November 1963, Makarios proposed amending the constitution by centralizing⁷⁷ the government and limiting the veto rights of Turkish Cypriots (Vanezis 1974: 114-123; Ker-Lindsay 2011: 30-32). His proposals included the following points:

---

⁷⁷ As Lijphart (1999) argues, in multi-ethnic consociations and federations, the enhanced authority of the central government, over the federal states (or ethnic chambers), the limitation of mutual veto rights and the solidification of the central judiciary represent the attempts for high centralization and low federalism.
The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abolished\textsuperscript{78}

The Greek President of the House of Representatives and its Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House\textsuperscript{78}

The constitutional provisions regarding separate majority for enactment of Laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished\textsuperscript{80}

The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and of the Forces of the Republic, i.e. the Police and the Army, to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots

The constitutional provision regarding the establishment of separate municipalities in the five main towns to be abolished. Provision should be made so that: (a) The Municipal Council in each of the aforesaid five towns shall consist of Greek and Turkish Councillors in proportion to the number of the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of such town by whom they shall be elected respectively. (b) In the Budget of each of such aforesaid towns, after deducting any expenditure required for common services, a percentage of the balance proportionate to the number of the Turkish inhabitants of such town shall be earmarked and disposed of in accordance with the wishes of the Turkish Councillors\textsuperscript{81}.

All the decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority. If there is an allegation of discrimination on the unanimous request either of the Greek or of the Turkish members of the Commission, its Chairman to be bound to refer the matter to the Supreme Constitutional Court (Salih 1978: 132-143; Clerides 1989a: 176-193).

AKEL supported Makarios’ recommendations for constitutional reform. On 16 December 1963, its central committee published a widely-distributed pamphlet telling the Turkish Cypriot community that the Cypriot constitution was an “imperialist” product aiming to foment ethnic conflict in Cyprus and called upon the

\textsuperscript{78} Based on the Article 46 in the Cypriot Constitution, the President and the Vice-President were given the right to veto each other regarding governmental bills and veto the House of Representatives regarding enactment of laws (See Appendix 1).

\textsuperscript{79} This referred to a review on the Article 72 in the Cypriot Constitution (See Appendix 1).

\textsuperscript{80} Based on the Article 78 in the Cypriot Constitution, the laws regarding the taxation and municipalities were to be accepted by the simple majority of both ethnic chambers (See Appendix 1).

\textsuperscript{81} Based on the Article 173, in Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos, the two ethnic groups were given the right to establish their own municipalities (see Appendix 1).
Turkish Cypriot community to support Makarios’s attempts for constitutional regulation. AKEL’s pamphlet asserted that

The Imperialism imposed to all of us, to the entire Cypriot people, the Zurich and London Treaties that contained too many anti-democratic, unfair and impractical articles, in order to achieve its own purposes. Those articles do not actually defend Turkish Cypriots’ interests. Instead, they constantly instigate conflicts, and from times to times, they create chaos and danger of violence. As it is familiar to all of us, if violence occurs in our country, its consequences shall be catastrophic for our people, and the Imperialism will take advantage of it. Therefore, all the articles, which do not serve to Turkish Cypriot interests and make things easier for the Imperialism and its anti-Cypriot behaviour, are to be eliminated. The constitutional arrangements proposed by the President to the Vice-President are aimed at this purpose…. The aim of the proposals made by the President is to remove all the obstacles preventing the collaboration and conditions of peaceful co-existence amongst the two communities (Kizilyurek 2005: 359-360).

Necatigil (1981) notes that, Makarios aimed to transform the Republic of Cyprus into a state reflecting the numerical dominance of Greek Cypriots in Cypriot public life (in the legislature, public services and the police force) and restricting Turkish Cypriot veto rights. The constitutional amendments offered by Makarios would also render Turkish Cypriots a simple minority under a Greek Cypriot-rulled Cyprus. This led to a major crisis in November 1963. The Turkish Cypriot leaders (Vice President Kutchuk, Turkish Cypriot ministers and members of Parliament) resigned because they regarded Makarios’s proposal as contrary to the power-sharing arrangement set out in the constitution. This led to bi-communal violence and the Republic of Cyprus became a state dominated by the Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot civil servants followed the politicians and quit their government jobs and Turkish Cypriots started forming enclaves (see Map 3) beyond government control. Turkish Cypriots regarded the enclaves as an essential protection from Greek Cypriot violence. But it was also a step towards partition.
While the Greek Cypriot para-military groups were led by Georgadjis, Turkish Cypriot leaders re-activated their para-military organization TMT (Stavrinides 1975; Kizilyurek 1983). In the three years following the outbreak of inter-ethnic violence, around 395 Turkish Cypriots and 215 Greek Cypriots lost their lives (Patrick 1976: 45-88; Yennaris 2000: 152-160 cited in Peristianis 2008:350).

In February 1964, the British Government invited Turkish and Greek Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot representatives to negotiate. The parties negotiated in London on 15 February 1964. While Clafcos Clerides, Greek Cypriot representative, asked for a constitutional restoration opening way to a majoritarian (in other words a Greek Cypriot dominated) democracy, Rauf Denktash, Turkish Cypriot representative, asked for a federative arrangement which would separate the Turks and Greeks. The Greek delegation supported Greek Cypriot side and Turkish delegation supported Turkish Cypriot side. The British remained impartial about the constitutional arrangements and tried to make a step towards the peacekeeping. Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, offered a NATO Peacekeeping force, composed of British, Greek and Turkish troops be deployed in the island. Greek, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot delegates accepted this offer, however the Greek Cypriots rejected. Clerides (essentially manipulated by Makarios) wanted to avoid Turkish intervention. For the Greek Cypriot leadership, the existence of Turkish troops as a peacekeeping force could serve the Turkish Cypriot preferences. The failure of the meeting led the British to apply to the Security Council. The British Government applied to the council, on the same day with the failed negotiations in

In selecting the participant states in the UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus), the involvement of Greek and Turkish forces could violate the impartiality. According to his Non-Aligned foreign policy, Makarios wanted to minimize the role of NATO states in the UNFICYP. On the other hand, due to their overwhelming support to Makarios, Turkey wanted to prevent Third World states’ involvement in UNFICYP. Although it was unusual for a permanent member of the Security Council to contribute to UN Peacekeeping Forces, UK was included in the UNFICYP. There is no doubt that, the British was more impartial than the Greeks and Turks. Additionally, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden were also included in the Peacekeeping Forces deployed in Cyprus. Austria was involved in the peacekeeping mission via a field hospital. So, the forces of UNFICYP were composed of the military staff sent by three NATO members (UK, Canada, Denmark) and five non-NATO states. The UN forces in Cyprus were located between the government controlled areas and Turkish Cypriot enclaves, in

---

82 Under Article 23 of the Chapter V in the UN Charter, the UN Security Council is composed of 5 permanent and 10 non-permanent members. The permanent members are the U.S.A, the U.K, France, Russia and China. During the Cold-War, the U.S.S.R held what is now Russia’s seat. It was replaced by Russia in 1991. The non-permanent members of the Council are elected on a rotating basis for two-year terms by the General Assembly. Under Article 24, the Security Council is authorized and responsible for the maintenance of international peace. Under Article 27 any draft resolution (regarding any action aimed at the maintenance of the international peace) requires at least nine affirmative votes to be adopted by the Council. If any of the 5 permanent members of the Council vetoes a draft resolution, the relevant resolution cannot be adopted (International Peace Academy 1978: 10-11; Kegley 2007: 528-529; see also United Nations 2013).

83 The UN Peacekeeping Forces supervise ceasefires and withdrawal of military forces. They ensure political independence, regulate the flow of refugees, and establish buffer zones to prevent infiltration or assault between the parties (Wiseman 1987: 34-36).
order to prevent the bloodshed amongst Cypriots. They established the “Green
Line” which constituted a buffer zone between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek
Cypriot parts of Nicosia. When they became operational in March 1964, the size
of UN forces in Cyprus was around 6,000 (James 1990: 225-227).

On 16 March 1964 Turkish Parliament passed resolution authorizing the
government to intervene in Cyprus. Makarios wanted to prevent Turkish
intervention and on 4 April 1964 he declared that the Cypriot government
bilaterally abolished the treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. Since Turkey did not
agree, this movement remained ineffective. On 11 April 1964, Makarios visited
Athens and he met Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou. The two leaders
agreed on the deployment of 10,000 Greek troops in Cyprus. Based on the
Treaty of Alliance, the number of Greek forces comprising the ELDYK (Hellenic
Forces in Cyprus) could not exceed 950 troops. However, according to
Papandreou and Makarios, the existence of 10,000 Greek troops would
constitute a defensive measurement against potential Turkish aggression. The
troops were secretly deployed in the island by summer 1964, and spread out in
the regions under governmental control (Fouskas 2001: 117; O’Malley & Craig
2001: 79; Papandreou 2006: 225; Firat 2008: 720-731). On 27 May 1964, the
Cypriot government introduced a bill making military service compulsory for all
Greek Cypriot male citizens aged between 19 and 21 (PIO 27 May 1964). It was
passed by the House of Representatives on 5 June 1964 (PIO 5 June 1964).
General Georgios Grivas was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army in June 1964. While the Turkish Army was preparing to intervene, the US President, Lyndon Johnson, sent a letter to Prime Minister Ismet Inonu on 4 June 1964. In it, Johnson sternly warned Inonu to desist. Turkish military intervention might ignite a Greco-Turkish war that would threaten NATO. He also drew attention to support the Soviet Union was giving Makarios and intimated that if the Soviets retaliated NATO would be unlikely to help Turkey. This letter had the desired effect on the Turkish government. This led Makarios to be less anxious about a potential Turkish military intervention (Hart 1990: 21-22; Hale 2000: 154-155).

On 14 July 1964, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, proposed the famous “Acheson Plan” in an effort to lessen the tension between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. The plan provided for the Karpazi peninsula (located in North Western Cyprus and comprising under 20% of the island) to be annexed by Turkey, and the rest of the island to be annexed by Greece. According to Makarios, this would mean “double-Enosis” (a share-out between Greece and Turkey) instead of Enosis. Makarios also declared that his political aim was to achieve Enosis.

However, any carving up of Cyprus, even for the sake of Enosis, was unacceptable and he was irritated by U.S policies that disregarded the will of Cypriots and threatened the sovereignty of the state (Hart 1990: 19; Heraclides 2001:256; Kizilyurek 2009: 20-27; Ker-Lindsay 2011: 39-40). On 6 August 1964, Greek Cypriot military forces besieged Turkish Cypriot fighters around the village Erenkoy (located in the North-Western part of Cyprus). On 8 August 1964,

84 The officers of the Cypriot Army were mainland Greeks.
85 Erenkoy was the part of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves which enabled Turkey to send military and humanitarian supplies to the Turkish Cypriot community. The fall of Erenkoy would mean the termination of Turkish Cypriot resistance and secessionism (See Firat 2008).
Turkish jets made an air-strike directed at the forces besieging the village. 33 Greek Cypriot soldiers were killed (Firat 2008: 729).

On 8 August 1964, Soviet News agency TASS declared that the Soviet Union supported the independence and the sovereignty of Cyprus, and was ready to help Makarios to defend Cyprus, if the island was invaded (Rubinstein 1982: 24 cited in Hale 2000 156). President Makarios, as a leader of a state containing less than 600,000 citizens, and a community comprised of 450,000 people, could hardly resist the NATO demands aimed at the partition of the island. However, he found significant support from the Non-Aligned Movement, from the Third World and from the U.S.S.R. While the U.S government made attempts to terminate the Republic of Cyprus and open the way to a share-out between Greece and Turkey, Makarios’s leadership was more preferable than the partition to the Soviets. First of all, Makarios followed a non-aligned political stance and ignored NATO’s demands regarding the future of Cyprus (in post-1963 period). Accordingly, the NATO alliance did not perceive and treat him as a pro-NATO leader. Furthermore, the partition would essentially render Cyprus a NATO territory, but with Makarios as the President of the independent Cyprus, the island could remain as a memberpart of the Non-Aligned Movement. And more importantly, as long as the Cyprus Conflict remained unresolved, the integrity of the NATO was damaged, particularly due to the tension upraising between Greece and Turkey. Therefore, the Moscow had important reasons to back Makarios against the NATO. On the other hand, not only the USA, but also the U.S.S.R, made their positions clear, both deterred the Turkish military intervention, and the Turkish threat directed
against Makarios was balanced (Adams & Cotrell 1968; Kuniholm 1980; Mallinson 2010: 144-146).

In 1964 and 1965, in addition to the US mediation (The Acheson Plan), the destiny of Cyprus was also negotiated under UN auspices. The Cypriot Ambassador to United Nations, Zenon Rossides (a Makarios appointee), drew the attention of General Assembly to the importance of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, a member state of UN. According to Rossides, the Cyprus Question was a domestic matter and any foreign interference was a violation of Cypriot sovereignty. On the other hand, President Makarios had already turned to the U.S.S.R and to the Non-Aligned Movement in order to gather international support for the Cyprus Conflict. He would not agree to any territorial concessions and in order to avoid the possibility of Turkey intervening to support her ethnic kin’s (Turkish Cypriots’) secessionism, he called for the termination of the 1960 treaties of guarantee. On 16 September 1964, UN Secretary General, U-Thant, appointed Galo Plaza (ex-President of Ecuador) as a mediator to the Cyprus Conflict. Plaza put forward a plan envisaging the demilitarization of the island, the respect of Cypriot sovereignty and integrity, and limits on the Turkish Cypriots’ constitutional veto rights (Richmond 1998: 90-106; O’Malley & Craig 2001: 76; Mallinson 2010: 139-141).

Turkish Cypriots’ settlement in the enclave regions (1963-1964) led to a sharp political disintegration between the two communities. Turkish Cypriot leadership exerted pressure on Turkish Cypriot leftists and discouraged their co-operation with Greek Cypriot communists. In doing so, the Turkish Cypriot leadership
managed to impede the unification of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leftists and workers. On 15 April 1965, AKEL’s Central Committee member Dervish Kavazoglu, who was amongst the very few Turkish Cypriot members of AKEL\textsuperscript{86}, and Costas Mishaoulis, a Greek Cypriot member of PEO, became victims of unresolved murders. This instigated fear amongst Turkish Cypriot leftists and they refrained from rapprochement with AKEL (Adams 1971: 62-63; Markydes 1977: 62-63; Vanezos 2009: 33-37).

After Plaza submitted his report to U-Thant on 26 March 1965, the Cyprus Question was discussed in the General Assembly of United Nations on 16 November 1965. 23 Non-Aligned-States, including United Arab Republic, India and Yugoslavia, supported Makarios’s stance, and they proposed a draft resolution calling on all states “to respect the Cypriot sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and refrain from any intervention directed against it”. While Makarios received the overwhelming support from the Non-Aligned Movement and the Third World, 54 states abstained. The U.S, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Albania were the 5 states who voted against the draft. In addition to the 23 Non-Aligned States who proposed the resolution, 24 other states (mostly Third World states) voted for. The support given by 57 states who voted for the draft was a victory for Makarios and, the General Assembly endorsed Resolution 2077 (Caradon despatch 24 November 1965; see also Firat 2008: 733-734).

\textsuperscript{86} Adams (1971: 62-63) refers to six Turkish Cypriots who were members of the party (or to its trade union PEO) or somehow connected to it.
2.1.6. Greeks versus Greek Cypriots

After the Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from the government, the Greek Cypriots enjoyed a rapid increase in their living standards (see section 3.4; see also Markydes 1977). On 21 April 1967, the Junta of Colonels seized power in Athens. On 15 December 1967, the Cypriot Army attacked the village Kophinou, located in the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. 24 Turkish Cypriots were killed. Turkey asked for, and obtained, the removal from the island of 10,000 Greek troops and General Grivas. Afterwards, Makarios abandoned Enosis saying, in January 1968, that his main objective was to maintain the independence of Cyprus since there was at that time no prospect of Enosis. In February 1968 he was re-elected with 95% of the Greek Cypriot votes cast\(^{87}\) (Kizilyurek 2005: 146).

Meanwhile, the bi-communal talks, aimed at the resolution of the constitutional disputes, had commenced. The President and his ethnic group were represented by Glafkos Clerides, while Turkish Cypriots were represented by Rauf Raif Denktash. Denktash accepted to make the constitutional regulations proposed by the President in 1963. However, in return, encouraged by the Turkish government, he asked for autonomy in Turkish Cypriot municipalities. President Makarios refused all the Turkish Cypriot proposals. The deadlock of the negotiations irritated Greek Junta (Stavrinides 1975: 64-72).

The Greek Junta regarded resolving the Cyprus Question and avoiding tension with Turkey as crucial for the NATO alliance. The Colonels first negotiated with Turkey over the possibility of the latter obtaining a military base in Cyprus in

\(^{87}\) The turnout was 93.5% (Nohlen & Stöver 2010: 445).
exchange for conceding Enosis (1967). Once Turkey refused, they urged Makarios to settle with the Turkish Cypriot (1968-1973). Makarios would neither agree to any territorial concessions nor to the establishment of autonomous Turkish Cypriot municipalities was unacceptable. Furthermore, in Makarios’s perspective, the NATO alliance was endangering the political dominance of Greek Cypriots and the integrity of Cyprus. The attempts of NATO to resolve the Cyprus Conflict could not, and did not, neglect the Turkish interests over the island. As in the Acheson Plan, Turkey was offered 20% of Cypriot territory, as an exchange for Enosis. As will be analyzed in broader details in section 3.3, in 1969, Greek Cypriot extreme nationalists founded a terrorist organization named as the Ethniko Metopo (National Front), in order to force Makarios to return to the pro-Enosis line. In 1970, they made an attempt on Makarios’s life. However, the Cypriot police managed to eliminate the National Front. In 1971, Georgios Grivas returned secretly to Cyprus and found a terrorist organization named as the “EOKA B”. Grivas became the leader of the anti-Makarios and pro-Enosis powers. The bishops were also included in the opposing front. The opposition made several attempts to oust Makarios. However, all the relevant attempts failed (Markydes 1977:59-68; Uslu 2003a: 196-206).

Miller (2009: 206) argues that, for Makarios, the independence “was the best means of securing his personal position” and this was amongst the reasons leading him to abandon the pro-Enosis line. Greek and Greek Cypriot extreme nationalists branded Makarios a “traitor to Hellenism” because of his rejection of Enosis. And his efforts to develop good relations with Cypriot communists (AKEL), the Soviet Union and the Third World in order to obtain a counterbalance to NATO
pressure on him to make concessions to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots led the Greek Junta to perceive Makarios as responsible for the trouble (Stern 1977:86 cited in Uslu 2003b: 107; Coloumbis 1983: 77 cited in Bahcheli 1990: 82-83). The Colonels had, of course, sought to establish the legitimacy of their regime via their anti-Communist struggle and by stressing their loyalty to the NATO alliance (Clogg 1980: 193-211; Woodhouse 1985). Under such circumstances, and even was Enosis a possibility, the Colonels would not have left much freedom of political manoeuvre to the Greek Cypriot political elite, and Makarios in particular.

USA was well aware of the tension between Nicosia and Athens. On the other hand, Makarios’s relations with the Non-Aligned Movement, Soviet Union and domestic communists had displeased Washington. Moreover, the Cyprus Question had also damaged the Greco-Turkish relations. In 1974, these factors led the US to tolerate Greek and Turkish interventions in Cyprus (Hitchens 1984; Fouskas 2001; O’Malley & Craig 2001). On 15 July 1974, the Greek Junta overthrew Makarios via the Greek officers appointed in the Cypriot army. Afterwards, on 20 July 1974, Turkey launched a military intervention in Cyprus and justified the intervention based on the Article IV of the Treaty of Guaranty (Ker-Lindsay 2011: 41-44). With the Turkish intervention, inter-ethnic violence grew. The Greek coup, Turkish intervention and the inter-ethnic violence on the island (15 July 1974- 16 August 1974) caused over 4,500 casualties. The bloodshed was terminated with the cease-fire on 16 August 1974, and Cyprus was divided into two. In 1975, Turkish Cypriots were settled in the North, and the Greek Cypriots settled in the South. The two sides are separated with barricades and the UN

---

88 See Appendix 2.
Green Line\textsuperscript{89} (O’Malley & Craig 2001: 221; Lindley 2007). The Northern part of the island, where the Turkish Cypriots are settled, constitutes the 36% of the total Cypriot territory and is being, in Turkish and Turkish Cypriot terms, “safeguarded” by the Turkish army. In Greek, Greek Cypriot perspective on the other hand, the North is being “occupied” by Turkey.

\subsection*{2.2. An analysis of nationalism in Cyprus}

Cypriot scholars have identified five mainstream Cypriot Nationalist movements during the years before the July 1974 crisis: Cypriot nationalism, Greek nationalism, Turkish nationalism, Turkish Cypriot secessionism and Greek Cypriot nationalism. Cypriot nationalism refers to the KKK’s struggle to liberate Cyprus from the British and to create an independent Cypriot state. The Greek Cypriot struggle for \textit{Enosis}, manipulated by the Church, AKEL and EOKA (during the Colonial era), constituted the most important socio-political reflection of the Greek nationalism amongst Greek Cypriots. “Greek Cypriot nationalism” refers to President Makarios’ attempts to maintain the independence of Republic of Cyprus as a Greek Cypriot-dominated state (Bitsios 1975; Stavrinides 1975, Markydes 1977; Vamik 1978; Attalides 1979; Kizilyurek 2002; 2005; Peristianis 2008; Loizides 2007; 2012; Anagnostopoulou 2010; Tombazos 2010; Hatay & Papadakis 2012).

“Turkish nationalism” was primarily represented in the Turkish Cypriots’ struggle to divide the island and make it shared by between Greece and Turkey. “Turkish Cypriot secessionism” refers to the Turkish Cypriots’ struggle to secede from the

\footnote{89 See Map 5.}
Republic and form an independent state on the island. Both Turkish nationalism and Turkish Cypriot secessionism were led by Dr. Kutchuk and Rauf Denktash. This section shall follow Breuilly in its discussion of the types of Nationalism, and analysis of the typologies of the five nationalist movements.

2.2.1. The Cypriot nationalism

Cypriot Nationalism emerged as an anti-Colonial nationalism that aimed to liberate Cypriots from British colonial rule. Thus the British were the “others” of Cypriot nationalism. Additionally, KKK had identified Cypriots as a united oppressed people, instead of divided as Greeks and Turks. The form of Cypriot nationalism pioneered by the KKK envisaged the establishment of an independent state in which all Cypriots, whatever their ethnicity, were united on the basis of a civic partnership (see Loizides 2007). Brass’s theory is applicable here inasmuch as the KKK could pioneer Cypriot Nationalism as a means of winning power in an independent state, although, of course, all would benefit from being liberated from Colonial rule and enjoying the citizenship of an independent state. Thus Cypriot nationalism refused to determine the political destiny of Cyprus based on ethnic nationalism.

Although the KKK lacked a place in the colonial government apparatus, its trade union, the PEO, was capable of mobilizing Greek and Turkish Cypriot workers. In a sense, the PEO sponsored the collective struggle of the two communities against the British. However, as argued by the Cypriot scholars (See Markydes 1977), once AKEL began lobbying for Enosis and the Turkish Cypriot leadership discouraged its kinfolk from joining bi-communal trade unions, the idea of a single
Cypriot nation and the movement for the Cypriot nationalism fell by the wayside. After independence in 1960, Cypriot nationalism had never received much massive support. This was partly because of Greek Cypriot attempts to assimilate the Turkish Cypriot minority and Turkish Cypriots secessionism, but it was also because AKEL, the KKK’s successor, supported Makarios’s policy of seeking independence in what would amount to a Greek Cypriot dominated state. Other contributing factors were inter-ethnic violence and the formation of Turkish Cypriot enclaves (see Kizilyurek 2005; Tombazos 2010).

2.2.2. The Greek nationalism in Greek Cypriot community

Greek Nationalism in Cyprus emerged in the context of seeking independence from two empires: from the Ottomans in the years before 1878, and then from the British in the years up to 1960. It was “homeland nationalism” and “Pan-nationalism” since it aimed to unite Greek Cypriots with their compatriots on the mainland and to unify Cyprus with Greece. It was ethnic nationalism since the Greek Cypriot community had privileged their ethnic ties with the mainland Greeks (see Mavratsas 1998).

The Greek Cypriot pro-Enosis struggle demonstrates the validity of Smith’s typology for ethnic nationalism. There is a “homeland” (Greece) under the hegemony of a colonial power (the United Kingdom). An ethnic group liberates its territory from the Colonial power and then aims at uniting with their ethnic relatives in neighbouring states by assimilating into their state the territories in which their kinfolk live (as, for example, Greek Cypriots and Cyprus). Greek nationalism in Cyprus is also in keeping with Brubaker’s concept of “homeland nationalism”:
“homeland” Greeks and their ethnic relatives in Cyprus wanted to be unified in the same state.

On the other hand, if Greek nationalism is analyzed using Breuilly’s and Brass’s theories, the linkage between elite interests and nationalism becomes clear. Greek nationalism promised the the Church and AKEL a chance to be liberated from the British and to play a role in mainland Greek politics, in case the Enosis was achieved. With regard to the interests of the Greek Cypriots community as a whole, they would have greater political freedom as citizens of Greece than they would as British colonial subjects. Since nationalism was directed against British Colonialism, the U.K was the main “other” of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus. Additionally, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots were also included in the “others” of this nationalism.

2.2.3. The Turkish nationalism in Turkish Cypriot community

Turkey’s characterization as the “homeland” of Turkish Cypriots fits in with Brubaker’s concept of “homeland nationalism”. Additionally, the idea of partitioning Cyprus refers to an ethnic and irredentist type of nationalism. Turkish Cypriots were mobilized against the Enosis and they aimed to be unified their homeland Turkey. However, unlike the Greek Cypriots the Turkish Cypriots did not join in the armed struggle against the British. Indeed, they joined the colonial power’s police force. Thus the “other” of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was the Greeks and Greek Cypriots (See Kizilyurek 2002; Loizides 2007).
From the perspective of Breuilly’s and Brass’s concept of elite interests, the Turkish Cypriot political elite would have no political clout if Cyprus joined Greece. However, if the island were divided by Turkey and Greece, the Turkish Cypriot elite could have a voice in Turkish politics. As regards the Turkish Cypriot community’s interests, unification with Greece would make them a very small minority indeed. A division of the island would render them citizens of Turkey, a state representing their own ethnic-culture.

2.2.4. The Turkish Cypriot secessionism

Turkish Cypriot secessionism differed from the Turkish nationalism in Cyprus in one particular respect. While Turkish nationalism was aimed at dividing the island between Greece and Turkey, Turkish Cypriot secessionism was directed against the integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, Turkish Cypriot secessionism was composed of ethnic nationalism and separatism (see Stavrinides 1975). Applying Brass’s theory, it is clear that Dr Kutchuk and Rauf Raif Denktash would obtain more power under a Turkish Cypriot territory that had seceded from the Republic of Cyprus. They could get rid of the Greek Cypriot political elite and become the leaders of the new, independent Turkish Cypriot state. The linkage between their interests and their ethnic nationalist line accords with Brass’s theory.

Since Turkish Cypriot secessionism was directed against the Greek Cypriot majority, Greek Cypriots were the “others” of the secessionist movement. Turkish Cypriot secessionism was, moreover, inspired by “homeland nationalism”. Turkish Cypriots looked towards their “homeland”, Turkey, and relied on it to defend their interests and achieve their secessionist aims (see Loizides 2007).
2.2.5. The Greek Cypriot nationalism in Greek Cypriot community

Brubaker’s distinction between “nationalizing nationalism” and “homeland nationalism” is helpful in classifying Greek Cypriot nationalism. Greek Cypriot Nationalism is a “nationalizing nationalism” since it was looked “inwards” and attempted to make Greek Cypriots dominant in Cypriot politics. Greek Cypriot Nationalism also saw ethnic issues in Cyprus as a domestic matter and aimed to prevent foreign intervention (Stavrinides 1975; Markydes 1977; Anagnostopoulou 2010). More importantly, as Brubaker notes, the “nationalizing nationalism” of one state might come in conflict with the “homeland nationalism” of another state. Thus, as noted in the previous chapter, for Brubaker, the “nationalizing nationalism” of Azerbaijan was in conflict with the “homeland nationalism” of Armenia. The “homeland nationalism” of Turkey was in conflict with Makarios’s “nationalising nationalism”. Nevertheless, ironically, the “nationalizing nationalism” of President Makarios also conflicted with the “homeland nationalism” of his own “homeland” (Greece). As will be explained in broader details in Chapter 3, Greek Cypriot Nationalism and Makarios himself refused to follow Junta’s manipulations regarding the Cypriot politics. Accordingly, the “others” of Greek Cypriot nationalism included the Greek Junta, Greek Cypriot terrorists, Turkish Cypriot leaders and Turkey.

Greek Cypriot nationalism was ethnic nationalism since its purposes were to dominate assimilate the Turkish Cypriots’ secessionism and render them a minority in a Greek Cypriot-ruled Cyprus (Kizilyurek 2005; Loizides 2007). This being so, it could also become a coercive type of nationalism. It was not irredentist since it rejected joining Greece. And it was anti-secessionist since it struggled
against Turkish Cypriot separatism. According to Markydes (1977: 59), AKEL and its leader Papagiannou would likely to find themselves in an advantage position since the Greek Junta had dictated an anti-Communist political atmosphere, and Communism had constitutionally been banned since the end of Greek Civil War (1949). Moreover, Makarios would also likely to find himself politically disadvantageous. He would certainly have lost power if Cyprus united with Greece during the reign of the colonels who would not have allowed him, as a political leader, to remain in office.

As noted above, in Eastern post-1945 consociational democracies where we observed ethnic conflicts and inter-ethnic violence, the political elite of the major and richer ethnic group tended eliminate the elite of the lesser and poorer ethnic group(s) and try to abolish the power-sharing. So, they increased their political power within the state. Since the Turkish Cypriots were not in the government after November 1963, the Greek Cypriot political elite, particularly the President, had an opening to dispose of the power-sharing and enhance Greek Cypriot political power by transform the state into one that was dominated by his ethnic group. Since the Junta’s priority was to resolve the Cyprus Conflict, Makarios found himself in confrontation with his “homeland”. Had he been successful in transforming the Republic of Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot-dominated state, he and his ethnic group could go on enjoying the political and economic advantages they had had since the 1963-4 crisis. This was why he chose to confront the Junta and abandon the pro-Enosis struggle.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has identified the key thresholds in the Cypriot History and the five forms of nationalism in Cyprus. Greek nationalism and Turkish nationalism were both ethnic, irredentist and “homeland” nationalisms. They benefited their political elite inasmuch as they aimed at removing British rule and offered greater political power in a state or states that had united with the homeland(s). Cypriot nationalism was a form of civic nationalism which thought in terms of a bi-communal struggle against the British in order to create an independent Cypriot state.

The Turkish Cypriot secessionism was also an ethnic type of nationalism since it foresaw the Turkish Cypriots’ secession from the Republic of Cyprus. The most important nationalism for this thesis is Greek Cypriot nationalism, because of the extent to which President Makarios re-constructed Greek Cypriot national identity. Makarios’s nationalist transition (from Greek nationalism to Greek Cypriot nationalism) referred to a “nationalizing” and ethnic type of Nationalism. It was aimed at the domination of Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots. Additionally, Greek Cypriot dominance would help protect the island against the Junta’s impositions and Turkish Cypriot secessionism backed by Turkey. Thus, the Greeks of Cyprus became an ethnic group aiming to construct, dominate and rule a Cypriot nation. This thesis supports Brass’s Instrumentalist theory inasmuch as Greek Cypriot nationalism was more profitable than Greek nationalism for Makarios and Greek Cypriots, and this was why they abandoned the quest for Enosis.
If these two hypotheses are valid, the President could be expected to persuaded Greek Cypriots to cease calling for Enosis and to oppose Turkish Cypriot political demands, the pro-Enosis terrorists, Turkey, and, essentially, the Greek Junta. Brass suggested that the political elite in failed multi-ethnic power-sharing democracies are likely to re-construct the ethnic and National Identities in order to manipulate their ethnic group against the counter-elite and the counter-elite’s instruments (their ethnic group). The concept of “elite interests” becomes significant when the Greek Junta is regarded as a “counter-elite” challenging the Greek Cypriot political elite’s (particularly Makarios’s) political interests. Moreover, Turkish Cypriot constitutional rights and their secessionist movement (reflected in formation of enclave regions) limited Makarios’s political power, his freedom of action and his government’s sovereignty. Furthermore, the constitutional rights and the secessionism had prevented Cyprus from being a Greek Cypriot dominated state. Accordingly, Makarios was likely to “alienate” Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the Junta and Greek Cypriot terrorists. The following chapter shall analyze the way in which political and economic conditions determined the interests of Makarios and Greek Cypriots.
III. ELITE INTERESTS

The Chapter 1 has clarified the hypothetical approach of this thesis, which has been inspired by the Instrumentalist Theory of Brass. The Chapter 2 has clarified the political thresholds of the Cypriot history and classified the movements of nationalism in Cyprus. This Chapter shall focus on the elite interests and shall analyze how Makarios’s self-interests (as a political leader) and his ethnic group’s interests (as the major ethnic group in Cyprus) affected the re-construction of Greek Cypriot national identity. In order to clarify the perception of the relevant interests, the key historical actors as the King of Greece, the Greek Junta, Greek Cypriot terrorists, Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey will be analyzed in relation to the Cypriot politics. Additionally, the economic development enjoyed by Greek Cypriots will also be analyzed as another determinant of their interests. As asserted by a significant amount of Cypriot scholars (Bitsios 1975; Stavrinides 1975; Markydes 1977; Joseph 1997; Kizilyurek 2005), preserving Cyprus’s independence, limiting Turkish Cypriots’ veto rights and suppressing their secessionism became the priority of President Makarios. In doing so, according to the scholars, Makarios could grant Greek Cypriots a sovereign state ruled by their political will. Independence could also sustain the economic growth enjoyed by Greek Cypriots. As the scholars note, the policies of Makarios were challenged by Turkish Cypriot leadership, Turkey, Greek Cypriot terrorism and the Greek Junta. This thesis theorizes that, Makarios’s policies were compatible with his ethnic group’s interests and his self-interests. Therefore, this chapter shall investigate the conflict between Makarios and the four actors who challenged his policies.
3.1. The King vs. the Junta: Makarios abandons the *Enosis*

As noted in Chapter 2, in early 1968, President Makarios had articulated that his political goal in Cyprus was the maintenance of independence since that juncture was not suitable for achieving the goal of *Enosis*. It was his first public statement that he had abandoned the Enosis policies. As previously noted in this thesis, a political leader has no guarantee of holding power in case of unification with a military regime. However, what makes the pro-Independence transition particularly interesting is the fact that the Greek Junta had managed to exile King Constantine after his unsuccessful attempt to seize power in December 1967. Thus, in the political arena of Greece, the Colonels had consolidated their monopolized regime.

On the 21 April 1967, the Greek Junta, led by Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, seized power. Prime Minister Panagiotis Kanellopoulos was arrested. Georgios Papandreou, the ex-Prime Minister and the leader of Center Union, was put under house arrest. Constantine Karamanlis, the ex-leader of National Radical Union, who was also the processor of Kanellopoulos as Prime Minister, had already self-exiled himself prior to the coup. Papadopoulos, appointed Constantine Kollias, the ex-Attorney General of Greece, as Prime Minister. However, as the President and the leader of the Junta, Papadopoulos was superior to Kollias. The Colonels having eliminated the most powerful political leaders in Greece and imposed their own regime, there remained only person who could oust the Colonels: King Constantine (Papandreou 2006: 354-370). According to Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash (1988: 59-61), Makarios was a “Royalist” and his attempt to postpone *Enosis* was based on the fact that the Archbishop was reluctant to increase the Junta’s prestige with the materialization of *Enosis* under its regime. Once the
outcomes of the military operation in *Kophinou* are analyzed, the relationship between the consolidation of Junta’s regime and Makarios’s pro-Independence transition becomes clearer.

*Kophinou* is a village located in the South East of Cyprus. It was included in the Turkish Cypriot enclaves that were formed after the governmental crisis in 1963. In January 1967, armed Turkish Cypriots detained 20 Greek Cypriot civilians with their vehicles. Although all the civilians were released within few hours, the illegal activities of Turkish Cypriot fighters around the *Kophinou* had instigated fear amongst Greek Cypriots (Charavghi, 27 January 1967, p.6). In April 1967, the police forces around the village were attacked by Turkish Cypriot fighters (Machi, 7 April 1967, p. 1). In July 1967 Greek Cypriot vehicles using the roads next to the village were attacked and provoked by Turkish Cypriots (Teleftaia Ora, 20 July 1967, p. 6).

Due to their secessionist movement, the Turkish Cypriots were checked by the Greek Cypriot police erecting barriers all around Cyprus. However, the enclave regions, including the village *Kophinou*, were exceptions and the government had lost its authority in *Kophinou* and the surrounding neighborhood. The Cypriot Defense Council (led by President Makarios) and the Greek Junta had decided to arrange a military campaign joint by the Cypriot police forces in order to restore government control over the village. The campaign was launched on the 15 November 1967 and was led by General Grivas, the Commander-in-chief of the Cypriot army. The army used mortars and armored vehicles during the campaign. Neither the army, nor the police forces suffered serious casualties. Only a few
police patrols and troopers were wounded. However, the mortars caused significant Turkish Cypriot casualties. 24 Turkish Cypriot “terrorists” (as they were described in the Greek Cypriot press) were killed. The leader of the Turkish Cypriot fighters in the region (a high-rank officer from Turkey) was captured by governmental forces and a picture of him taken at the time of his arrest was published on the first page of the newspaper Agonas (17 July 1967, p.1). The Greek Cypriot press regarded the campaign as a glorious victory (Clerides 1989b: 205-208) and the pro-Makarios newspaper Fileleftheros (Liberal) praised the success of the governmental forces (Fileleftheros, 18 November 1967, p.1).

On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Halkin Sesi (The Voice of the People) regarded the operation as a catastrophe. According to the newspaper, there were over 100 Turkish Cypriot causalities. Referring to an 80-year-old man, who was burned and killed by the troops, the newspaper described the operation as barbaric. Additionally, the newspaper stated that unarmed Turkish Cypriots were also killed by Greek Cypriot troops. The newspaper, which was owned by the Turkish Cypriot leader Fazil Kutchuk, said Makarios and Grivas were the two men responsible for the catastrophe (Halkin Sesi 17 November 1967, p.1). And, in the wake of the episode, the Turkish Parliament enacted a law which authorized the government to order a military intervention in Cyprus (Halkin Sesi, 18 November 1967, p.1). On 18 November 1967, Fazil Kutchuk sent a telegram to Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, and the summary of the telegram was published by the Halkin Sesi. In his telegram, Mr. Kutchuk had asked Demirel to order a military intervention in Cyprus (Halkin Sesi, 19 November 1967, p.1).
Meanwhile, Ankara’s immediate response had been to ask for the removal of Greek Division (composed of 10,000 troops) and General Grivas from Cyprus. Athens fulfilled Turkey’s demands and Grivas and the Greek Division serving in Cyprus were recalled by the Junta on 3 December 1967 (Clerides 1989b: 209-212). More importantly, due to the upraising tension between Greece and Turkey, the Greek Junta essentially moved additional forces to the Turkish borders. On 13 December 1967, the King took advantage of the reduced number of soldiers in the urban areas of Greece and attempted to seize power. With the military officers and soldiers loyal to him, Constantine captured a radio station in Athens, declared that he seized power, and ordered his supporters to take over another radio station in Salonika. However, his supporters failed. Although the naval and air forces were loyal to the King, the majority of the land forces remained loyal to the Junta. The Junta broadcast an announcement declaring that they were still in power and the King had committed a serious crime against the Greek people with his attempt to seize power. Having failed to oust the Junta, on 14 December 1967, the King left Greece and went to Rome. King’s failed attempt to seize power led Papadopoulos to unseat Kollias and assume the Prime Ministry (Papandreou 2006: 406-419).

King Constantine was different from the Junta on one particular aspect. As previously stated and as will be analyzed in broader details in the following sections of this thesis, the Greek Junta made an attempt to reach to an agreement with Turkey that did not involve or take account of the views of Makarios, the leader of Cyprus, and, in so doing, would materialize Enosis but with a Turkish military base in Cyprus. However, the King had no intention of neglecting Makarios during the Junta’s reign. For instance, on 25 September 1967, in a conference in
Athens, where Loizos Christodoulou, the chairman of the PSDY (Pan-Cypriot Syndicate for Civil Servants), was also present, the King had made the following statement:

Dear friends, as you would have seen, the Cypriots have a great sense of diplomacy. The Archbishop and the Cypriot civil servants.... are scouting for Enosis. They will help, and.... they will approve that, one day; the unification of the entire Cyprus with Greece will happen (Agonas, 26 September 1967, p.6).

Shortly after the exile of the King, President Makarios sent him a telegram which was published in a PIO press release. The telegram was important since in it the President had clearly articulated his sympathy towards an anti-Junta leader. More importantly, Makarios did not feel any need to hide his personal support for the exiled King. As the press release put it:

The President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, today sent a cable to King Constantine in Rome expressing deep sympathy for the sad mishap to Her Majesty the Queen. His beatitude also wishes the King a happy and peaceful New Year and early return to his throne for the good of the Greek Nation (PIO, 30 December 1967).

Makarios thereby had publicly taken sides in the confrontation between the Colonels and the King and indicated that he perceived the Junta as a danger. In a visual documentary, prepared by Greek Cypriot journalist Cacogiannis (1975), Makarios characterized the Junta as a hazardous power that endangered Cyprus, with the following words:

I did not request but accepted the military presence of Greece in Cyprus. The reason for the presence of the Greek army in Cyprus was to deter Turkish expansionism. In retrospect, I regret to say that, this idea was inaccurate. The existence of the Greek army was not only unnecessary, but it was also dangerous with the Junta in power.
There are sensational assertions suggesting that the President was in league with the King, and that they had organized the Kophinou incidents in order to damage Junta’s prestige. This thesis does not consider them to be unconditionally true but account should be taken of the existence of such views. Cyrus Sulzberger, one of the most famous journalists of his time, asserts that in an interview in Paris Karamanlis talked about the background of the Kophinou incidents. According to Sulzberger, on 30 October Karamanlis said he had met a confidential courier from Constantine who asked him whether he could do anything to help the King. Karamanlis responded positively (Sulzberger 1973 cited in Papageorgiou 1988: 66). Spyros Papageorgiou90 (1988:66), the ideologist of EOKA B, points out that neither the King nor Karamanlis denied Sulzberger's claim. Papageorgiou (1988: 64), moreover, quotes the Athens Newspaper Acropolis (2 December 1976) which cited statements Karamanlis allegedly made to Le Monde (29 November 1967), and which

constituted the first phase of a plan aiming to oust the dictatorship...At a suitable moment – when there was a change for the worse in the situation, a new inevitable crisis, particularly over the Cyprus Question – Karamanlis would make a proclamation, Prime Minister Kollias would propose the resignation of the government, and Karamanlis would immediately call political society for the establishment of a government of “National Unity”.

Papageorgiou (1988: 64-66) draws attention to the fact that Karamanlis did not disclaim either of these assertions. Papageorgiou (1988: 12) sets out a report which General Grivas prepared for King Constantine and the Greek Government on 3 October 1967. In it, Grivas said “the National Guard [Cypriot Army] must not be included in a task which is under the responsibility of the police forces... The

90 Papageorgiou was appointed as the spokesman of Government and the head of PIO by Nicos Sampson. Papageorgiou, like Sampson, stayed in his office only 8 days (15 July 1974-23 July 1974).
involvement of the army signifies a military campaign... The Cypriot police forces are well equipped and are well prepared to undertake such a task”. General Grivas thus made clear his reluctance to undertake the Kophinou operation and to get the Cypriot Army involved in the issue.

A report from the British High Commissioner at Nicosia, Peter Ramsbotham, about Makarios’s personality also confirms President’s responsibility for the Kophinou crisis; the police forces were under Makarios’ direct control, as was the army. More importantly, Rambotsham reported that the President supported the King.

There is no question that the present Greek government is allowing itself to be outmaneuvered by the Archbishop as were some of its predecessors; but it has found him elusive and unwilling to comprise his own objectives in order to suit Colonel's policies. The tussle continues beyond the thin façade of communiqués which invariably records “complete identity of views”. The whole outlook and style of Makarios are at variance with those of the Colonels, not least in his alliance with the Communists, his use of left-wing advisors such as Dr. Lyssarides, and his relations with King Constantine. It is even possible that his ambitions extend beyond the narrow limits of Cyprus, and that he hopes to play a decisive role in Greece at some future time of appeal and political change. He has often told me that he would willingly act as a mediator if the times were favorable for a restoration of the King. “I am a Hellenic monarchist” he says…. (Ramsbotham despatch, 29 March 1971)

Papageorgiou’s assertions constitute the only evidence that there might have been direct collaboration between the King, Karamanlis and Makarios over the Kophinou crisis. Still, the King’s attempts to oust the Junta were not contrary to Makarios’s interests. Furthermore, Makarios was on the King’s side and it was he who made the final decision to launch the campaign. In any case, it reasonable to assume that Makarios abandoned the pro-Enosis rhetoric since the Junta’s regime
was consolidated with the exile of the King. He could not expect to retain power if Cyprus united with Greece under a military regime.

3.2. Makarios against the Junta

In September 1967, after the Junta’s seizure of power in Greece, the Junta’s Prime Minister, Constantine Kollias, arranged a meeting with Suleyman Demirel, the Prime Minister of Turkey, in *Dedeagac (Evros)*, a small town in the Western Turkey, to exchange opinions about the Cyprus Question. They met on 10 September and were accompanied by senior diplomats. In a visual documentary, prepared in 1999 by a Turkish journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand, Demirel reported that Kollias took a paper out of his pocket. He started reading. He said that Turkey and Greece are friends. This friendship needs to be improved. Collaboration [between the two states] is essential. Further collaboration will be beneficial. There is an obstacle to this friendship. It is the Cyprus Conflict. If the Cyprus Conflict is resolved, friendship can be maintained. For the conflict to be resolved, Cyprus must to be left to Greece (Demirel 1999).

Veron Theodoropoulos, the head of Turkish and Cypriot Affairs in the Greek Foreign Ministry, was also present at the meeting. He was also interviewed by Birand whose documentary records Theodoropoulos confirming the truth of Demirel’s remarks. “It was”, he said,

my responsibility to translate during the meeting. Our Prime Minister had naively asked “why you don’t leave Cyprus to us?” He [Kollias] afterwards said “if you want a military base so much, I can let you have one” (Theodoropoulos 1999).

Clerides (1989b: 193-194), too, confirms that the Greek Junta offered Turkey a military base on the island in exchange for *Enosis*. But it is also clear that, in so doing, the Greek Junta ignored Makarios. In 1968, when Makarios was re-elected President with 95% of Greek Cypriot votes, he steered a pro-Independence
course, initiating inter-communal talks with the Turkish Cypriot leadership in order to solve the Cyprus Question. (The inter-communal talks shall be analyzed in section 3.5.) However, it is useful to stress here that the talks failed due to Makarios’s rejection of Turkish Cypriot demands for the establishment of autonomous municipalities.

The inter-communal talks were deadlocked due to a dispute regarding the autonomous municipalities. On 14 August 1970, Robin Fearn, the Head of Southern European Department, sent a telegram giving the Foreign Office information about the state of Greco-Cypriot relations. In his telegram, Fearn stressed that, on 25 June 1970, Greek Minister of Foreign affairs, Panagiotis Pipinelis, attended a ministerial meeting of NATO in Rome. In the meeting, he had a word with his Turkish counterpart, Sabri Chaglayangil. Pipinelis told Chaglayangil that even a form of federal government would be acceptable to Greece. Furthermore, Fearn confirms that, up to his death on 19 July 1970, Pipinelis continued exerting pressure on Makarios in order to persuade him to accept Turkish Cypriots’ demands regarding the autonomous municipalities (Fearn despatch, 14 August 1970). On 30 July 1970, 11 days after Pipinelis’s death, Michael Stewart, British Ambassador to Greece, phoned Veron Theodoropoulos, and sent a telegram to British Embassies at Ankara, Nicosia and Athens reporting what Theodoropoulos told him as follows:

Theodoropoulos told me that, he had been one of the first to see the Prime Minister after Pipinelis’s death on the Morning of 19 July 1970 and Papadopoulos instructed him to inform Turkish Embassy at once that Pipinelis’s policy in respect of Turkey and Cyprus had always been a policy of his own, and the policy of the whole government and would continue. The Turkish chargé reported this immediately to Ankara, and the Turkish
Foreign Minister had immediately responded gratefully, and had sent a warm message to Papadopoulos (Steward despatch, 30 July 1970).

During the following year (1971), disagreements over the powers of local government continued to be the stumbling block in the bi-communal talks. The Greek Junta suggested they might be resolved if President Makarios offered Turkish Cypriots the establishment of a Ministry of Local Government that would be headed by a Greek Cypriot Minister with a Turkish Cypriot Deputy Minister under him. On 9 June 1971, Constantine Panagiotacos, Greek Ambassador to Cyprus, delivered the Greek government’s proposal to Makarios. The Junta suggested Makarios offer Turkish Cypriots the establishment of a Ministry of Local Government. The Minister of Local Government could be a Greek Cypriot and his deputy a Turkish Cypriot. Alternatively, the Minister could be a Turkish Cypriot, and his deputy a Greek Cypriot. The Junta said both formulas were acceptable to Greece. The Colonels asked Makarios to consider the proposal as a means of giving Turkish Cypriots the local autonomy they demanded and thereby resolve the Cyprus Question. Makarios refused to follow this advice (Clerides 1989b: 71-77).

Since Makarios rejected both the Turkish Cypriot demands and the recommendations of the Greek Junta, there was no way out of the deadlock. On 18 June 1971 Papadopoulos, the leader of Junta, warned President Makarios to moderate his opposition to Turkish Cypriot demands for greater local powers, saying that the Greek government was anxious about the state of the talks:

The only concession, because there is no other of any substance, is demanded by the Turkish side is counter-balanced fully [sic.] by all the
proposals of Mr. Denktash up to now, which satisfy, inter alia, the “13 points”\textsuperscript{91} of your demands, and permit the unhindered functioning of the Government machinery…. Under the present circumstances an agreement would be clearly to the benefit of the Greek Cypriot people… Already your Beatitude, you appear determined to reject our proposals, for reasons which I admit I am unable to understand, and to bring about an interruption of the dialogue, instead of benefiting from a possible rare opportunity, and you tend to create a situation which can lead the Greek Cypriot people into an adventure from which it is possible to come out seriously injured…. Your correct way of thinking gives me the hope that even at the last moment; you will wish to reconsider your decision. Should the contrary occur, should you break our common front, I am bound to tell you that you undertake a heavy responsibility regarding the Cypriot Greeks, regarding the Nation more generally, and regarding History. In such a case, the Greek Government would find itself by hard necessity to take those measures which national interest and the best interests of the Cypriot Hellenism demand, irrespective of how bitter these may be… (Kranidiotis 1981: 341-324; Clerides 1989b: 77-79)

Makarios’s reply on 24 June 1971 was hardly less threatening than Papadopoulos’ letter. Makarios believed acceding to Turkish Cypriot demands for local autonomy would consolidate Turkish Cypriot secessionism. He thought local autonomy was contradictory to the principle of a unitary state. And he retaliated to Papadopoulos’s threatening sentences in a similar vein:

\[T\]he fixing of areas of local government on racial criteria breaks the unity of the state at its base, and this separatism continues upwards by appointing a Turkish [Cypriot] Minister …The Greek Government believes that with the sole exchange of satisfying, to a certain extent the Turkish Cypriots on the subject of local government the present enclaves would be dissolved, the Turkish Cypriots would accept practically all the “13 points” of my old proposals and this would constitute an important gain. But by accepting local government, as proposed, the enclaves are not dissolved. On the contrary, they are made permanent and are legitimized. It is true that most of the 13 points of my old proposals, which were formulated under different circumstances, are accepted. The exchange which is demanded, in any event is too large and its acceptance would present the Zurich and London Agreements as a better situation, despite the fact that we do not desire a return to them. In conclusion, Mr. President, I refer to the last paragraph of your letter, which states that if the proposals of the Greek Government are not accepted, the Greek Government would find itself faced by “hardly necessity to take those measures, which national interest and best interests of the Cypriot Hellenism demand, irrespective of how bitter they might be”.

\textsuperscript{91} In addition ot the 5 points mentioned by this thesis in section 2.1.5, Makarios had six other points in the proposal he delivered to the Turkish Cypriot side on 25 November 1963.
During the first 10 days of February 1972, Makarios imported mortars, bazookas, heavy and light rifles from Czechoslovakia. As Clerides puts it, the amount of the weapons was “substantial”. The Junta immediately asked Makarios to hand over the weapons to the National Guard or to the UN peacekeeping forces. Makarios refused. The Greek Junta asked him to resign. On 11 February 1972, Constantine Panagiotacos, Greek Ambassador to Cyprus, told Makarios that the Junta demanded his resignation from the Presidential office in order to open the way for the establishment a government of “National Unity”. Panagiotacos also said that Grivas would be recalled to Greece and kept away from Cypriot politics (Clerides 1990: 124-129).

The previous day, 10 February 1972 Robin Hooper, the British Ambassador to Greece, sent a telegram to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, expressing the fear that Makarios could establish para-military forces against Grivas and his supporters. This could instigate a war between pro-Grivas and pro-Makarios supporters. Accordingly, the Junta needed to take measures to prevent a potential

\[\text{\textsuperscript{92}}\text{It is important to note that the correspondence between Makarios and Papadopoulos is drawn from two sources. Mr. Clerides is the ex-President of the House of Representatives, the ex-Greek Cypriot representative in inter-communal talks, and the ex-President of Republic of Cyprus who in the post-1974 era led the anti-Makarios opposition in Cyprus. There seems no reason to doubt the authenticity of the letters he quotes. A book published by Giannos Kranidiotis, an ex-Greek Cypriot Ambassador to Greece (appointed by Makarios) and the Head of Cypriot affairs of Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (appointed by Andreas Papandreou). Papandreou and Kranidiotis were known to be sympathetic to Makarios due to his anti-Junta inclinations (see Miller et all. 2010 for Kranidiotis’s biography). The extracts from the letters which Kranidiotis quotes correspond to Clerides’s full texts.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{93}}\text{According to a document drafted by the Southeastern Department on 14 February 1972, the amount of imported weapons was 287 tons (Draft Telegram, 14 February 1972).}\]
Greek Cypriot civil war (Hooper despatch, 10 February 1972). On 11 February 1972, Makarios sent Clerides to David Popper, US Ambassador to Cyprus, and Clerides asked the USA to help Makarios (Clerides 1990: 132-133).

On 11 February 1972, Henry Tasca, US Ambassador to Greece, met Papadopoulos. On the same day, Robin Hooper, British Ambassador to Greece, sent a telegram to the Foreign Office reporting on the meeting. According to Hooper, Tasca encouraged Papadopoulos to give up his demand for Makarios’ resignation. Forcing Makarios to resign would be likely to increase Archbishop’s popularity amongst Greek Cypriots. The US Ambassador also drew attention to the fact that, such a step was likely to increase Soviet influence over Cyprus. Furthermore, demanding Makarios’s resignation was likely to cause Turkish interference in Cypriot politics as well. Tasca managed to convince Papadopoulos, and the Junta stepped back (Hooper despatch, 11 February 1972; see also Clerides 1989b: 134). On 17 February 1972, the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, Robin Edmonds, sent a telegram to the Foreign Office. In it he said that, the day before (16 February 1972), 3,000 pro-Makarios Greek Cypriots had demonstrated near the Presidential Palace, protesting about foreign (actually Greek) impositions towards Cypriot politics (Edmonds despatch, 17 February 1972).

The involvement of USA in Greco-Cypriot relations had managed to lead Makarios and Papadopoulos to restore their relations. It caused Papadopoulos to review his policies and support Makarios. On 1 February 1973, Papadopoulos issued a statement and asked Greek Cypriots to put down their weapons and be united on
the National Question. On 20 April 1973, Papadopoulos issued another statement in support of the inter-communal talks and condemning the terrorism that undermined the negotiations. On 24 August 1973, Papadopoulos accused Grivas once more of undermining the inter-communal talks and asked him to stop using violence and disband the EOKA B. Grivas refused to do so (Clerides 1990: 350-374; McCloskey despatch, 28 August 1973).

Thanks to the efforts made by the USA, Makarios saved himself from Papadopoulos. Thus, as will be explained in the next chapter, Makarios did not need to alienate the Junta, as long as Papadopoulos was in power. However, once Makarios turned Greek Cypriots’ public opinion against the Junta, Dimitrios Ioannidis, the successor to Papadopoulos, sponsored a coup and overthrew the Cypriot government. What provoked Ioannidis to order the National Guard to oust Makarios was not only the political conditions, it was also Archbishop’s anti-Junta discourse, and that will be explained in the next chapter. However, it is also a fact that, from 1969 to 1972, Papadopoulos made attempts to interfere in Makarios’s negotiation policies and asked him to resign. Therefore, the Junta was a “counter-elite” for Makarios.

As expressed in the theoretical framework of this thesis, the decentralization of the central government is likely to be demanded by the minority and poorer ethnic groups in multi-ethnic power-sharing democracies. Likewise, major and richer ethnic group(s) might seek to enhance the power of the central government (see Roeder & Rothchild 2005). Additionally, in multi-ethnic power-sharing democracies, the more the minority ethnic groups’ political rights are limited and
they are coerced, the more the political power of the political elite representing the major ethnic group increases (see Brass 1991). The Turkish Cypriots’ willingness to accept limits on their veto rights does not constitute a restriction to Makarios’s political power. However, the President tried to retain his authority over local administrations as well. By centralizing the central government’s authority and limiting the power of local government, he would consolidate his own political power.

Abolishing veto rights, as Stavrinides (1975) and Necatigil (1981) indicated, would also end power-sharing amongst the two communities and transform the Republic into a Greek-Cypriot dominated state. However, Makarios’s hard-line strategy made the Junta anxious because the Colonels were prioritizing intra-NATO relations and the Cyprus Question endangered the alliance. This section of the thesis has shown that the Greek Junta’s desire to avoid conflict with Turkey motivated the Colonels to urge Makarios to resolve the Cyprus Question. Since the Junta was trying to persuade Makarios to make a concession in favour of Turkish Cypriots, this thesis includes the Colonels amongst the “counter-elite” to Makarios.

3.3. Makarios against the Greek Cypriot terrorism

As stressed in section 2.1.6, in late 1969, the Greek Cypriot extreme nationalists founded a terrorist organization called the “National Front”. The organization was aimed at Makarios and his pro-Independence policies. The Front tried to force Makarios to quit the inter-communal talks and return to the pro-Enosis political line. They even made an attempt against Makarios’s life. Within two years, the
Cypriot police managed to eliminate the Front. However, by 1972 Georgios Grivas had returned to Cyprus and founded another terrorist organization, “EOKA B”. Grivas took the same line with the National Front. He had two basic goals: forcing Makarios to return to the pro-Enosis line, and forcing him to resign. This section shall clarify how the two organizations were directed against Makarios’s and Greek Cypriots’ interests.

It is important to note that, the anti-Makarios terrorism commenced after the resignation of Minister of Interior, Polycarpos Georgadjis. On 13 August 1968, the Cypriot government learned that there had been an attempt on the life of Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos. The would-be assassin had been caught carrying a fake Cypriot passport signed by the Cypriot Minister of Interior, Polycarpos Georgadjis. According to Greek investigators, Georgadjis had met the culprit in Athens and handed him the explosives to be used in the assassination. Makarios denied any involvement and yielded to the Junta’s demand that Georgadjis be made to resign. Georgadjis resigned on 1 November 1968 (Clerides 1989b: 213-262).

The National Front opposed to the pro-independence policies of Makarios and Greek Cypriot terrorists manifestedly followed an anti-Communist line. On 7

---

94 EOKA B was composed of 827 members (Markydes 1977: 116). On the other hand, the number of the members of the National Front and the identity of its leader is uncertain, because the organization comprised of too many secret cells which lacked a central leadership. Nonetheless, it is thought that, the founder of the National Front was Polycarpos Georgadjis, the ex-Minister of Interior. With regards to the leadership of the National Front, Makarios asserted Georgadjis had asked him for financial aid to support the “national course”. Makarios also confessed that, he provided financial aid to Georgadjis and his associates. Nevertheless, it did not take Makarios too long to understand that the National Front was directed against him. Consequently the NF was eliminated by the police (Ierodiakonou 2003: 83 cited in Kizilyurek 2005: 149). As will be explained in this section of the thesis, it was not difficult for the Cypriot police to neutralize the NF, after the investigations that were done in Limassol. This indicates a few possibilities; the NF was not as big as EOKA B, it was not as well organized as the latter or did not enjoy as greater support by the Junta as EOKA B did.
January 1970, Timothy Daunt, First Secretary of British High Commission in Cyprus, sent Robin Fearn a confidential telegram about the leaflets distributed by the National Front in October 1969. The translation and summary of the leaflets as set out by Daunt are enlightening on the ideological preferences of the National Front:

The N.F. [National Front] regards Cyprus as belonging ethnically, historically and politically to the Greek lands. Cyprus should maintain its Greek character and prepare itself internally and in the international field for union with Greece…. The right to demand a complete or partial reshuffle of the [political] leadership it would be in the national interest is reserved…. Cyprus belongs ideologically to the West if only because Greece does: ties should be strengthened…Communism opposed. AKEL condemned: it is the instrument of the foreign interests. Government policy allowing freedom of action to AKEL condemned. Patriotic elements must be strengthened by the removal from the government of the unpatriotic persons …. National Front and Police: These should obey orders from Greek mainland military leadership…. The House of Representatives should be abolished and a National Council set up (Daunt despatch, 7 January 1970).

On 22 January 1970, Ramsbotham sent a confidential telegram to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He reported that, on 21 January 1970, the National Front had attacked the local government office in Limassol. They did not kill the guards; however they tied them up and escaped with fire-arms and a wireless. Afterwards, the Police forces made a successful raid on villages around Nicosia, and seized a substantial amount of explosives. It was also reported by Ramsbotham that the Cypriot police expected an attempt on Makarios’s life (Ramsbotham despatch, 22 January 1970).

On 28 January 1970, Ramsbotham met Clerides in Nicosia and, in a confidential letter, told the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about the meeting. According to Ramsbotham, Clerides and Makarios agreed on passing a bill permitting the
preventative detention of the suspects, in order to provide the police with greater authority to put suspects under custody. Makarios, the head of the executive branch, and Clerides, the head of the legislative branch, were also in agreement that they would use the relevant law only if the public peace were seriously challenged. Additionally, Ramsbotham had asked Clerides whether the National Front was likely to attack the British bases in Cyprus. Clerides responded that the National Front was directed against the Cypriot government, and he expected no attacks against the British bases (Ramsbotham despatch, 28 January 1970).

On 8 March 1970, an attempt was made on President Makarios’s life. The President was preparing to attend the annual ceremony commemorating Gregoris Afxentiou, an EOKA fighter who had been killed during the anti-Colonial struggle. When the helicopter to take him to Paphos arrived at the Archbishopric in order, assassins were waiting on top of the roof of an elementary school located in front of the Archbishopric. When Makarios’s helicopter took off, the assassins fired at the helicopter. The pilot of the helicopter was hit in the abdomen but he managed to land the helicopter on open ground. Makarios was uninjured, the pilot was taken to the hospital and he was saved. The assassins managed to escape. The Presidential Guard found three machine guns on the top of the roof of the elementary school. After the investigation, the police arrested six suspects regarding the assassination attempt. Three of them were police officers. The alleged culprits indicated that ex-Minister of Interior, Polycarpos Georgadjis, was amongst the architects of the assassination plot. On 15 March 1970, Georgadjis was killed while he was trying to leave Cyprus. Prior to his murder, Georgadjis had

---

95 A city located in Southwestern Cyprus.
telephoned Dimitris Papapostolou, a Greek officer serving in the Cypriot Army. The investigators found out that Georgadjis had asked for Papapostolou’s help in order to leave Cyprus. Papapostolou had agreed to meet Georgadjis, and Georgadjis was killed near the meeting point. According to Clerides, his associates killed Georgadjis in order to silence him (Clerides 1989a: 361-372). On 5 June 1970, Ramsbotham told the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that one of the six suspects, who were all judged guilty and sentenced for their assassination attempt against Makarios, was connected to the National Front (Ramsbotham despatch, 5 June 1970).

According to a confidential telegram, sent to Foreign and Colonial Office by Ramsbotham on 19 May 1970, the Turkish government knew who was beyond behind the terrorist activities, the assassination attempt and the murder. Ramsbotham had learned from the Turkish Embassy in Cyprus that the Turkish government had reliable information indicating that terrorism in Cyprus was masterminded and controlled by Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis, the head of Greek Military Police (Ramsbotham despatch, 19 May 1970). On 14 October 1970, David Beattie, First Secretary of the British High Commission in Cyprus, sent Fearn a confidential telegram in which he indicated that Makarios had visited Athens on 14 September 1970 and he met Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos had told Makarios that Papapostolou had prepared a plan to kidnap the Cypriot President in the past. Although Papadopoulos assured him that the Greek government was not behind the terrorist activities in Cyprus, he could not guarantee that all the Greek officers in Cypriot army were pro-Makarios (Beattie despatch, 14 October 1970). On 17 October 1970, Ramsbotham met Clerides, and asked him about the
acts of terrorism, the attempt on Makarios’s life, and the murder of Georgadjis. In a secret telegram of 21 October 1970 Ramsbotham indicated that it was his and Clerides’s common opinion that, the assassination attempt and the National Front were controlled by the same instigator. Ramsbotham and Clerides also believed mainland Greeks had killed Georgadjis in order to silence him (Ramsbotham despatch, 21 October 1970; see also Clerides 1989a: 378).

On 23 May 1970, at approximately at 01:30 a.m., the police headquarters in Limassol was attacked by masked people. The raiders had identified themselves as members of the National Front. They immobilized the guards and stole a significant amount of arms, ammunition and vehicles. They distributed National Front brochures and left the headquarters. The government found it essential to send additional reinforcements to the police forces in Limassol (PIO 23 May 1970). The police forces swiftly completed their investigations and had arrested all the suspects by 2 June 1970, and the Limassol branch of the National Front was suffocated by the police (PIO 2 June 197).

The leadership of National Front’s branch in Paphos sent a letter to President Makarios and declared that it had voluntarily dissolved itself on 24 June 1970. The members of the branch did not think that any national goal could be served via terrorism and they accepted that they had been misled. They also handed over their weapons and equipment and claimed that they had moved over to Makarios’s side (PIO 24 June 1970). In the annual report on the crime rates for 1970, the police authorities announced that there had been 2,439 true cases of serious crime, of which only 117 had been committed by Turkish Cypriots. Ten murders
and ten attempts on life had occurred, including the attempt on the President’s life and the murder of Georgadjis. Additionally, the number of assaults against the person was 979 (PIO 10 November 1971). The low rate of Turkish Cypriot involvement in crimes indicates that Greek Cypriot terrorism had instigated intra-Hellenic violence in Cyprus. Thus, inter-ethnic violence had been transformed into an intra-ethnic shape with the emergence of terrorist activities.

Once the elections for the House of Representatives were held on 5 July 1970, neither AKEL nor Makarios was seemed to have been affected negatively by the illegal activities of the National Front. AKEL managed to gain 30% of the votes. In a statement he made on 14 July 1970 regarding the elections, Makarios said that AKEL had managed to defeat the anti-Communist activities of the National Front, even in Limassol, where the power and activities of the organization was at the highest level. On the other hand, Makarios thought the right-wing was unnecessarily polarized in to too many political parties. As the leader of the nation, he stated that his intention was to provide harmony amongst the Right, inside and outside the House of Representatives (PIO 14 July 1970).

On the other hand, the President articulated that he expected no disloyalty from the House of Representatives, which was composed of two leftist parties (Communist AKEL, led by Ezekias Papagiannou and Socialist EDEK, led by Vasos Lyssarides) and two rightist parties (EK, led by Glafkos Clerides and the PP, led by Nicos Sampson). The only anti-Makarios party, the DEK (National Democrat Party), led by Takis Eudocas gained no seats in the House of Representatives. After the elections, all the party leaders in the House of
Representatives told the press that they would support the President and remain loyal to him (PIO 14 July 1970). However, it was also significant that, the turnout in the elections were significantly lower compared to the last presidential elections. In 1968 the turnout had been 91% (see section 2.1.6) in 1970; it fell to around 75% (PIO 6 July 1970).

Grivas and EOKA B shared a common purpose with the National Front. They aimed to make Makarios return to the pro-Enosis line and to force him to resign. Things went the other way. On 17 January 1972, Socrates Eliades, an ex-officer of the Cypriot army and the closest associate of Grivas, had secretly given a message from Grivas to a British diplomat in the High Commission. According to the message delivered by Eliades, Grivas saw Makarios’s relations with the Soviet Union and the local Communism as a threat against the British interests in Cyprus. He also stressed that he would launch a pro-Enosis struggle and wanted to learn whether the UK government was likely to support him. If the British did support him in his struggle for Enosis, the British bases in Cyprus would be safe. The British High Commissioner, Robin Edmonds, immediately reported this in a top secret telegram on 19 January 1972 (Edmonds despatch, 19 January 1972). In his top secret reply of 24 January 1972, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Alec Douglas-Home, instructed Edmonds to ignore Eliades’ message. “If he again approached to the high commission, and”

asks for our response, the member of your chancery should say that the only comment he can make on the message is that the attitude of HMG towards Enosis and partition is determined (like that of the Greek and Turkish governments) by their legal obligations under the 1960 treaties, quoting the Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee. Without declining to receive further messages, he should give no encouragements to them (Douglas-Home despatch, 24 January 1972).
On 17 April 1972, Grivas sent Makarios a message which was delivered by their common friend, Dr. Marios Tritoftides. In the message, Grivas asked Makarios to retire from politics and open the way for a pro-Enosis leader to come into power. Makarios refused to do so (Clerides 1990: 144). On 8 February 1973, Makarios was re-elected, since he was the only candidate for the presidency. The relatives of the EOKA “heroes” who had lost their lives during the struggle for independence were amongst the important figures who had nominated Makarios for re-election. Pieris Afxentiou, whose son (Grigoris Afxentiou) was amongst the EOKA elite killed during the struggle for Enosis, was one of the relatives of these “heroes”, who declared that they supported Makarios’s re-election96 (PIO 8 February 1973).

On 5 April 1973, Georgios Photiou, a member of EDEK, was killed by EOKA B and became the first victim of the organization (PIO 6 April 1973). On 1 August 1973, EOKA B conducted one of its most sensational activities and kidnapped Christos Vakis, the Minister of Justice. According to a secret telegram Robert McCloskey (the US Ambassador to Cyprus) sent to the State Department on 3 August 1973, immediately after the kidnapping, EOKA B had released a typewritten document signed by Grivas. The document, which surfaced in Limassol contained a confession by Grivas that Vakis97 had been kidnapped by EOKA B and asked Makarios to choose between the Church and politics (McCloskey despatch 1 August 1973). According to a subsequent confidential telegram sent to the State Department by McCloskey on 6 August 1973, Makarios refused to fulfill Grivas’s demand and publicly accused Grivas of making “illegal” and “insane” activities.

96 After Makarios’s re-election, in March and April 1973, EOKA B attacked 17 police stations. No police officers were killed; however, two police stations were greatly damaged by the bombing attacks (Drousiotis 2002: 230-231).
97 Vakis was released by Grivas on 27 August 1973 (PIO 27 August 1973).
The President called upon Grivas and his supporters to propagate their ideology using legal and democratic methods. The President also said that if Grivas and his supporters abandoned terrorism, he would hold new elections. Since, according to McCloskey, Makarios enjoyed overwhelming popularity amongst Greek Cypriots, the pro-Grivas front had no chances of defeating him in democratic elections. Accordingly they could not dare to confront the President democratically (McCloskey despatch, 6 August 1973).

While Grivas and EOKA B had been urging Makarios to choose between the Church and politics, the Bishops of Paphos, Kitium and Kyrenia called a Holy Synod and declared (on 8 March 1973) that they had defrocked the Archbishop because of his involvement in politics. This cut no mustard with the public since the Archbishop was in his 12\textsuperscript{th} year in the presidential office. The Bishops therefore could not gather public support. However, not only had they failed to depose Makarios, but they also found themselves defrocked by him. The Archbishop summoned a Supreme Synod on 14 July 1973. Two Patriarchs, two Archbishops and eight Bishops from Orthodox Churches outside Cyprus were present at the Supreme Synod which defrocked the three Bishops of Cyprus (Clerides 1990: 123-124; McCloskey despatch, 14 July 1973). Consequently, neither the terrorism nor the Bishops could remove Makarios from the Presidency and the Archbishopric.

Once the activities of Greek Cypriot terrorists on the Cypriot politics are analyzed, it is seen that they could not reduce the political power of Makarios. AKEL, the police forces and the President himself were successful in resisting against the
illegal activities of Greek Cypriot terrorism. Despite their lack of success the terrorists had firmly embraced the goal of diminishing the political power of Makarios and AKEL and both were aimed at scuppering the pro-Independence policies of Makarios and his political position as Greek Cypriot leader. However, neither the National Front nor EOKA B achieved their targets. They could not remove Makarios from his office and they could not manipulate his policies in the direction of Enosis.

3.4. Greek Cypriots’ interests: The developing Cypriot economy

As mentioned in Chapter 2, after the Turkish Cypriots’ November 1963 withdrawal from the executive and legislative branches of government, the state was ruled by Greek Cypriots alone. Additionally, the improvements recorded in the Cypriot economy provided increased living standards for Greek Cypriots. As this section shall clarify, the economic virtues of independence were another reason leading Makarios to abandon the pro-Enosis struggle.

After independence in 1960, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communal chambers received annual subsidies from the government budget. However, Greek Cypriots were unhappy with the inter-ethnic distribution of the subsidies because they were asked to pay much more in taxes due to the relative poverty of Turkish Cypriots. Since the Turkish Cypriots were poorer, their economic demands on the government were greater (Clerides 1989a:127-139). On 12 September 1963, the Ministry of Finance declared that that year’s rise in the taxation of Turkish Cypriots would be only 8% of the additional tax that would be imposed on Greek Cypriots (PIO 12 September 1963). Thus Greek Cypriot contributions to the
economy had been much larger than that of Turkish Cypriots, even before the emergence of violent ethnic conflict.

When, following the 1963 crisis, Turkish Cypriot political elite left their political positions at the House of Representatives and the Government, the Turkish Cypriot civil servants and the members of the community who were employed by Greek Cypriots as well, left their jobs and moved into enclaves. The consequence was that they suffered economically. First, every member of the Turkish Cypriot community was asked to pay 10% of his or her total income as taxes to the leadership of the enclaves. Second, Turkish Cypriots in the enclaves had to buy driving and vehicle licences not only from the government, but also from the enclave leadership. Third, there was an additional tax for the “struggle fund”. Fourth, the Turkish Cypriot leadership introduced “custom taxes” for Greek Cypriot goods brought into the enclaves. Fifth, there was a loss of income since Turkish Cypriot civil servants had abandoned the governmental jobs and many employees ceased working for Greek Cypriot employers. Those who obtained civil service jobs with the Turkish Cypriot leadership had low salaries. There was a high level of unemployment and the community relied on the supplies provided by the Red Crescent of Turkey. Sixth, fears of secessionism meant that Turkish Cypriot merchants lost the trust and partnership of foreign investors (PIO 11 March 1966). In short, the enclaves formed by Turkish Cypriots for security reasons had isolated them from the Cypriot economy. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots enjoyed economic growth.
First of all, it is important to note that, being a memberpart of the Commonwealth helped Cyprus significantly to increase its exports and improve its economy. As Papandreou (2006: 223) indicates, Greek Cypriot merchants would have had to forgo Commonwealth preferences if Cyprus were unified with Greece. On 15 July 1966, Andreas Araouzos, Cypriot Minister of Commerce and Industry, mentioned that the Commonwealth preferences had a very important role in Cypriot economy. The Minister said that the UK and other Commonwealth countries accounted for 44% of Cypriot exports. Moreover, the UK alone took approximately 70% of Cypriot agricultural exports, and this was a virtue of Commonwealth preferences (PIO 15 June 1966).

On 22 March 1967, in a press conference, Araouzos underlined once more the importance of being a memberpart of the Commonwealth for the Cypriot economy. Araouzos said that, Cypriot agricultural goods were privileged in the UK market and the Commonwealth market, not because of their quality, but because of preferential Commonwealth tariffs. The Minister also mentioned that, although the UK was moving inextricably towards membership of the EEC (she acceded in January 1973), there were still favourable trading preferences for Commonwealth partners, and this benefited the growth of Cypriot economy (PIO 22 March 1967). On 18 June 1970, Makarios himself mentioned in an interview that “the mutual help in trade” was a virtue of Commonwealth enjoyed by Cyprus, and according to the President, being outside the Commonwealth was “not advantageous at all for Cyprus” (PIO 18 June 1970). Therefore, in order to remain inside the Commonwealth, Makarios and Grek Cypriots needed to abandon the Enosis policies. However, as the data provided in this section will show, the growth of the
Cypriot economy was not only enjoyed by merchants. The Greek Cypriot community in general was satisfied with the developing Cypriot economy.

In 1964, Cypriot exports totalled £20.5 millions. In 1965 they rose to £25.3 millions. Cyprus’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was £14.4 millions in 1964 and £15.7 in 1965 (PIO 31 December 1966). This was reflected in government expenditure on education. In 1964 it accounted for 15.23% of the ordinary budget. In 1965 it was 17.57% of the ordinary budget (PIO 18 April 1967). On 27 July 1965, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Paschalis Paschalides, stated that, since independence 65 new factories had been established. Industrial production had been £4,695,000 in 1954. In 1964 it had risen to £12,348,000 (PIO 27 July 1965).

In 1967, the official unemployment rate was 1.4% of the working age population, its lowest since independence, and the government was seeking to reduce it even further by sponsoring technical courses to train blacksmiths, plumbers and mechanists. There was industrial peace, trade union freedom and a right to full-time employment (PIO 26 April 1967). In 1967 the Minister of Labour, Tassos Papadopoulos, stated that the number of factories had tripled since 1965 (PIO 15 January 1967). The factory workers and the middle classes were growing more prosperous and they were also enjoying broader social services. In 1968, Papadopoulos launched an improved Social Insurance scheme providing for Social Insurance Benefits to rise by an average of over 50% and for over a 500% increase in compensation for industrial injuries compared to 1965 figures (PIO 24 April 1968). In addition to this, the agricultural exports of Cyprus significantly grew
Makarios’s government pursued economy policies aiming to consolidate all sectors of Cypriot economy. The “Second Five-Year Plan” (launched in 1967) managed to achieve a 7% annual economic growth. Between 1967 and 1969 the agricultural sector increased beyond expectations, rising to 30.9% of GDP. Manufacturing rose by 25.5% and banking by 70.8%. During the same years, tourism grew by 30% rather than the expected 25%. Unemployment declined further, from 3,484 registered unemployed in 1966 to 2,703 in 1969. Foreign exchange reserves reached £79.5 millions in 1969, their highest rate since Independence. Meanwhile, workers gained improved rights for association and trade union activities and greater employment protection, and there was a good measure of industrial peace. In 1969 there had been 17,602 man-days lost to strikes, but in 1970 this declined 5,000 (PIO 23 August 1971).

Meanwhile, according to the annual reports of the Central Bank of Cyprus, the “Second Five-Year Plan” was accompanied by a noticeable increase in the Gross Domestic Product. In 1971, GDP grew by 14.1%. From mining to tourism, the majority of economic sectors recorded significant growth rates. However, due to the isolation of Turkish Cypriots from the Cypriot economy, it was the Greek Cypriots who particularly benefited from this growth (PIO 14 September 1973). So, too, did Greek Cypriot civil servants, thanks to improved associational rights and the effectiveness of their trade unions. For instance, they won “thirteenth month’s salaries” (an extra month’s payment which they received as a gift from the
government) and they enjoyed government-sponsored housing in relatively low-priced co-operatives (PIO 4 April 1971). The Minister of Commerce and Industry, Michael Colocassides, stated that in 1966, 27,930 persons were employed within the industrial sector and their number rose to 34,235 in 1971. Government development expenditure was £12.9 millions in 1971 and became £17.2 in 1972 (PIO 4 November 1972).

Thus, Makarios and Greek Cypriots were doing well. It would not be unreasonable for Makarios to think it would be best for the communal interests of Greek Cypriots to retain control over the country’s economy by abandoning any dreams of Enosis. On the other hand, Commonwealth preferences, which would have been lost had there been Enosis, played a crucial role in the growth of Cyprus’s exports. Additionally, the growth in Cypriot economy was reflected in improved living standards for Greek Cypriots.

3.5. Makarios against Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey

It was underlined in Chapter 1 that, in Eastern post-Colonial power-sharing democracies, the political elite of the major (and also the richer) ethnic group might be tempted to try to assimilate the minority and their political leaders in order to limit their political rights (particularly veto rights) to enjoy broader political power. This might led the minority to turn to secessionism. This notion explains the essence of the ethnic conflict in Cyprus. Chapter 1 also noted that, as argued by Brubaker, the “homeland” interfering in another state’s domestic affairs in order to support its kin folk might lead to a conflict between its “homeland nationalism” and
the other state’s “nationalizing nationalism”. This notion perfectly suits to the relations between Turkey and Cyprus.

Glafrkos Clerides (1989a:127-128) draws attention to the fact that, by the time the President proposed the constitutional changes, the resolutions of the House of Representatives had only been vetoed twice by the executive branch: Once by President Makarios and once by Vice-President Fazil Kutchuk. Nevertheless, in both cases, the House of Representatives made no changes in the laws it enacted. On the other hand, Kutchuk had vetoed Makarios only once. The veto was related to a governmental bill aiming to re-arrange the ethnic composition in the Cypriot army. Even some Greek Cypriot ministers were pleased with this veto since they thought the recruitment of additional troops would mean unnecessary governmental expenditures. As regards foreign policy, although Mr. Kutchuk ideologically opposed to the pro-Non-Aligned transition of the President, he did not use his right to veto. Clerides states that, the veto power in the Cypriot constitution was not really impractical. What dissatisfied Makarios and the Greek Cypriot political elite was the fact that they were rendered totally equal with the political elite of the minority.

On 26 October 1962, President Makarios made a speech in the House of Representatives. He congratulated the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives due to their “spirit of co-operation and the willing understanding”. In addition, the President drew attention to the difficulties that the government and the people faced with due to the “financial nature” of the fresh state. He also complained about the lack of productivity and
charged the government, the employers and the entire population with
developing the country and increasing its economic productivity (PIO 26 October
1962). In that speech, the President did not articulate his dissatisfaction with
alleged difficulties arising from power-sharing. However, the fact that he was
displeased with Turkish Cypriot demands regarding further investments and
lower taxes for the Turkish Cypriots was known to the Turkish Cypriot Vice-
President, ministers and members of the House of Representatives. Both the
Greek and Turkish Cypriots had expected the President to seek constitutional
changes and, because of the power-sharing arrangement, Makarios had to take
account of Turkish Cypriot demands and settle, or at least negotiate, with them
over any proposed changes (Clerides 1989a: 127-151).

The general outline of Makarios’s 13 points was summarized in the previous chapter
of this thesis. The President aimed to limit the veto rights of Turkish Cypriot members
of the House of Representatives and open the way for the Greek Cypriot hegemony
in the legislative branch. He had also wanted Mr. Kutchuk’s veto rights abolished and
the municipalities united. The Turkish Cypriots’ reaction against the President’s
proposals (their withdrawal from the legislative and executive branches of
government) actually gave the President more than he had asked for. With the
withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the political positions of the Republic, the
President became the only Chief Executive and the absolute leader of Cyprus. He no
longer shared executive power with a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President. In 1968 the
President launched the process of bi-communal negotiations in order to resolve the
Cyprus Question and re-establish bi-communal government. However, as will be
explained in further detail below, his strategy was
to enhance his political power by limiting the political power of the Turkish Cypriot political elite. However, Turkish Cypriots were not alone and their secessionism was backed and encouraged by Turkey.

Makarios tended to perceive Turkey as an external threat encouraging the Turkish Cypriot community to stand for the partition. On 27 December 1967, Turkish Cypriots established the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration. Fazil Kutchuk became the leader of the Administration. While he was preparing to re-organize the Turkish Cypriot administrative system with his associates, Zeki Kuneralp, general director of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, came to Cyprus and encouraged the establishment of the Provisional Administration. On 29 December 1967, Turkish Cypriot leadership published a written text regarding the declaration of the Administration. The provisions of the Administration were declared as follows:

Until all provisions of the 16 August 1960 Constitution of Republic of Cyprus are applied, all Turks living in Turkish areas will be attached to the Provisional Turkish Administration. The necessary legislation of Turkish areas shall be made by the House of Provisional Turkish Administration which will be composed of Turkish members of the House of Representatives, and members of the Turkish Communal Chamber. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives shall be the President of the House. The members of the House shall possess all the powers embodied in the Constitution dated 16 August 1960… (PIO 2 January 1968)

With the establishment of the Provisional Administration, Turkish Cypriots aimed to achieve autonomy in their internal affairs. They clearly disregarded the authority of Makarios’s government. The presence of Kuneralp in the declaration of the Provisional Administration showed that, Turkey maintained her support to the secessionist movement of ethnic kin. Makarios was greatly dissatisfied with the
declaration of the Provisional Administration, Turkey’s support beyond the Turkish Cypriot secessionism, and the Turkish interference in Cypriot Affairs. On 5 January 1968, Roger Allen, British Ambassador to Turkey, sent a telegram to the Foreign Office. Allen reported that Kuneralp was declared persona non grata by Makarios on 30 December 1967, and he left Cyprus on the same day. Roger also noted that, Kuneralp, and essentially the Turkish Government knew in advance that the Turkish Cypriots were in preparation of establishing the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration. According to Allen, with the declaration of the Administration, “Turks had played right into the hands of Makarios. They had given him a grievance which he could, and would, exploit to the full” (Allen despatch, 5 January 1968; see also Clerides 1989a: 212).

The inter-communal talks started on 3 June 1968 in Beirut. The President appointed Clerides, the head of House of Representatives, as the Greek Cypriot negotiator. Denktash, the deputy head of the House, was appointed as the Turkish Cypriot negotiator by Kutchuk. On 24 June 1968, Denktash and Clerides met in Nicosia at the Ledra Palace Hotel. During the first round of inter-communal talks, which took place in Beirut and Nicosia, Osorio Tafall, the UN representative appointed by U Thant (the Secretary-General), was also present. The first phase of the talks was completed on 28 August 1968. The Turkish Cypriot side accepted the amendments foreseeing the abolition of the Vice President’s veto rights; the abolition of the requirement for separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot

---

98 A diplomat is generally declared persona non grata in case of his/her involvement in harmful activities against the interests of the host state. A diplomat who is declared persona non grata might be expelled (McClanahan 1989:126; Feltham 2004: 6-7; See also Lorna & Berridge 2012)

99 This right was provided by the Article 48.
majorities in the House for the enactment of bills regarding taxation; the reduction of the Turkish Cypriot quota in the Civil Service and police forces from 30% to 20%; and the establishment of united municipalities in Paphos, Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta and Larnaca. In return, the Turkish Cypriot negotiator demanded a constitutional arrangement enabling Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot villages to be grouped separately, regardless of where they were situated, so that the two ethnic groups would be autonomous in their own, local affairs. Although Clerides had advised Makarios to accept this last proposal, the President refused to group Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot villages separately. In consequence, the negotiations were deadlocked (Clerides 1989b: 217-247).

On 22 November 1968 Norman Costar, British High Commissioner in Cyprus, sent a confidential telegram to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office confirming that the talks were deadlocked mainly due to Makarios's reluctance to accept Turkish Cypriots' demands regarding local administration (Costar despatch, 22 November 1968). In another telegram on 25 November 1968, Costar reported on a visit to Cyprus that Denis Greenhill (an under-secretary and the most senior Foreign Office official dealing with defence and intelligence questions) had paid to Makarios on 4 November 1968. Makarios told Greenhill that the grouping of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot villages separately would work in favour of partition and was contradictory to the principle of the unitary state (Costar despatch, 25 November 1968).

---

100 This requirement was provided by the Article 78.
101 The proportion of Turkish Cypriot proportion in Civil Service was provided by the Article 123, and the amount of Turkish Cypriot participation in police forces was determined by the Article 130.
102 Based on the Article 173, it was provisioned that the two ethnic groups would establish their own municipalities in the largest cities.
At this point, Clerides indicates one more reason leading Makarios to reject Turkish Cypriot demands. According to Clerides, if he accepted the local autonomy for Turkish Cypriots, President Makarios knew that “he would be pressed by Greek Cypriots to accept it for the Greek [Cypriot] community as well”. Accordingly, he would have lost control over local administrations (Clerides 1989a: 274). It is a fact that, Clerides had close relations with Makarios and he knew the President better than the British did. However, he was a rival of Makarios in post-1975 politics, and as mentioned previously in this thesis, what he says about Makarios is not free of bias and prejudice. Nevertheless, based on the theoretical basis of this thesis, keeping the state centralized would have maximized Makarios’s authority.

Turkish Cypriot leadership did not give up their demands regarding the local autonomy. They had Turkey’s support behind them and this gave them a chance to manoeure. On 29 November 1968, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel spoke at the 4th National Congress of the Justice Party, and he referred to the Cyprus Question. On 2 December 1968, Roger Allen sent a telegram to the Foreign Office, and informed about the speech made by Demirel. Demirel had made the following statement:

The crisis of November 1967 had shown the Government’s determination. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Community would search till the end for a peaceful solution to the problem but would never give up their historical and constitutional rights.... The local talks are a search for conditions under which the two communities can co-exist in the independent Republic of Cyprus....Turkey can not forego her rights, or ignore Cyprus’s importance for her security. A final solution which is not acceptable to Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot community is out of the question. (Allen despatch, 2 December 1968)
It is also noteworthy that, Makarios prepared and processed policies aiming to provide Turkish Cypriots' loyalty to the Cypriot state. He aimed to terminate their secessionism in a peaceful way. On 8 March 1968, the President lifted all the police barriers controlling and limiting the movement of Turkish Cypriots. After Makarios's switch in favour of pro-Independence policies, by summer 1969, 75 Turkish Cypriots were employed by the government. Additionally, the government spent over £47,000 to repair the damaged houses of Turkish Cypriots and constructed 400 prefabricated houses for those who had lost their houses during inter-ethnic violence (PIO 1 July 1969).

In 1969, the deadlock remained unresolved because of the dispute over local governance. Denktash repeated Turkish Cypriot demands for local government for Turkish Cypriot villages; Makarios repeated his refusal (Clerides 1989b: 310). On 22 July 1969, Daunt wrote to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and reported about the visit he made to Turkish Embassy on 21 July 1969. Based on his exchange of ideas with the Turkish diplomats about the inter-communal talks, Daunt concluded that the Turkish Government was unlikely to ask Turkish Cypriots to give up their demands on the local governance. Daunt was told by his interlocutors that, the local governance was essential for Turkish Cypriots' security and existence in the island (Daunt despatch, 22 July 1969).

On 7 September 1969, Makarios and Kutchuk met for the first time since the governmental crises of November 1963. The meeting took place at the Plenary Assembly of the World Federation of United Nations Associations in Nicosia. On 10 September 1969, Ramsbotham reported on the meeting in a telegram to
Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. According to Ramsbotham, Kutchuk had been reluctant to meet Makarios because he wanted to avoid creating an impression that Turkish Cypriots were safe. It would have been inconsistent with his having pioneered the creation of Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Although he had been re-elected as Vice President in 1968, Kutchuk never took up office but remained in the enclave regions with his community. However, the Turkish government encouraged Kutchuk to attend the meeting and he acquiesced. According to Ramsbotham, the meeting had a symbolic value, because the two leaders met each other after 6 years. However, Kutchuk underlined that he was not optimistic about any progress in the inter-communal talks (Ramsbotham 10 September 1969).

On 30 September 1969, Ramsbotham met Makarios and asked him why he kept on avoiding provision for separate authorities for ethnic groups at the local level. Reporting on the meeting in a confidential telegram on 1 October 1969, he said that he had been told by the President that giving into Turkish Cypriot demands for autonomy could lead to federation or partition of the island (Ramsbotham despatch, 30 September 1969). On 8 October 1969, Ramsbotham reported, in a telegram, a statement issued by Kutchuk on 7 October 1969. According to Kutchuk, the Turkish Cypriots side could not be expected to give up their demands regarding local administration since these demands were aimed at preserving the Turkish Cypriots' security and existence in the island (Ramsbotham despatch, 8 October 1969). In a letter to Clerides on 1 September 1969, Denktash had also expressed that giving up the local autonomy demands would render Turkish Cypriots a totally ineffective minority in a Greek-ruled island (Clerides 1989a: 339).
On 16 October 1969, Ramsbotham reported about President’s public statements. Ramsbotham stressed that, during September and October 1969, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sabri Chagalayangil, repeatedly praised the establishment of the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration. Makarios was greatly dissatisfied with Chaglayangil’s speeches, and he reacted in a provocative manner. In September 1969, Makarios visited three military camps of the National Guard. During his visits, he articulated that he expected the Greek Cypriot soldiers to defend the territorial integrity of Cyprus, particularly against Turkey. Makarios made statements on 8 October 1969 at Famagusta and on 10 October 1969 at Paphos. In his statements, Makarios accused Turks of preparing aggressive plans. He also stated that, Turkish Cypriots’ intransigence constituted a part of the Turkish plans. According to Makarios, the Turkish Cypriots were insisting on the local governments, in order to create a suitable juncture for Turkey to implement her aggressive plans (Ramsbotham despatch, 16 October 1969).

In March 1971, the Turkish Armed Forces invited Turkish citizens to aid the Air Forces with their donations. Türk Hava Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı (Association for Development of Turkish Air Forces) had launched a donation campaign with the slogan “Think about Cyprus, produce your own jets”. The campaign was advertised by the newspaper Milliyet (Milliyet 1 March 1971, p. 3). This campaign signified that Turkey was intended to prepare its air forces for an intervention in Cyprus. On 24 July 1971, Turkish Prime Minister Nihat Erim made a

103 Clerides (1989a: 352) as well notes that, in a statement he made on 24 December 1969, Chaglayangil praised the establishment of Provisional Turkish Administration, and stressed that Turkey needed to help the ethnic Turks in Cyprus in their resistance.
statement and accused Makarios of violating the Cypriot constitution. Erim expressed that, any constitutional amendment that would render Turkish Cypriots an ineffective ethnic minority in Cyprus was unacceptable to Turkey (Milliyet 25 July 1971, p. 3). On 12 November 1971, Erim made another statement and expressed that Turkey was ready to launch a military intervention in Cyprus in case of any Greek Cypriot aggression against Turkish Cypriots (Milliyet 14 November 1971, p.1).

As explained in section 3.2, from 1969 to 1972, the Greek Junta made noticeable efforts to achieve an inter-ethnic settlement and they even tried to remove Makarios from Presidency. However, all attempts failed. In June 1972, Turkey and Greece appointed constitutional experts to help Denktash and Clerides to move forward. The Junta appointed the Judge Michail Decleris, and the Turkish government appointed Prof. Orhan Aldikacti (Clerides 1989b: 194-195).

On 4 August 1972, Richard Fyjis-Walker, Counsellor at the British Embassy in Ankara, met Ecme Barutchu, the head of the desk for Greece and Cyprus at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On 8 August 1972, Fyjis-Walker reported on his meeting with Barutchu. According to what he was told by Barutchu, although the Turks supported the involvement of Decleris and Aldikacti in the inter-communal talks and they favoured the resolution of the deadlock, they were not optimistic. The Turkish Government was moving towards a separatist solution in Cyprus, and this was signaled particularly by its support beyond Turkish Cypriots’ insistence on their local autonomy demands (Fyjis-Walker despatch, 8 August 1972).
On 2 November 1972, Beattie, wrote to Fearn, and provided information about the inter-communal talks. According to Beattie, on 27 October 1972, Aldikacti had submitted to De Cleris a proposal that members of the police forces in unmixed Turkish Cypriot villages would be composed of Turkish Cypriots. In the same vein, Aldikacti had also suggested that the President of the House of Representatives should be a Greek Cypriot, and he would have two deputies: one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot. The President of the House and his deputies would be selected by the joint votes of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of the House. The Turkish Cypriots’ veto rights over taxation legislation should be abolished. The Vice President should lose his veto rights and his powers should be negotiated in the future (Beattie despatch, 2 November 1972; see also Clerides 1989b: 234).

On 4 November 1972, Denktash visited Ankara, and on 7 November 1972, John Harrison, the First Secretary of the British Embassy in Ankara, sent a telegram to Fearn and reported about Denktash’s visit. In his visit to Ankara, Denktash stated that he was not after the partition, however, in no case he would give up the local autonomy demands. Harrison made a reference to the meeting between Haluk Bayulken, who succeeded Chaglayangil as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of United Nations, held in April 1972 in New York. Bayulken had told Waldheim that Turkey “could not accept anything less than some sort of federation”. Harrison therefore concluded that, Turkey would not urge Turkish Cypriot leadership to change their manner about the local autonomy demands (Harrison despatch, 4 November 1972).
On 22 November 1972, Denktash, Clerides and Tafall were accompanied by Declaris and Aldikacti in negotiations about which Beattie reported on 4 December 1972. The Greek Cypriot side had proposed a new constitutional amendment to abolish the Vice President’s right and duty to participate in the presentation of credentials by new Ambassadors. Although the Turkish Cypriots were willing to accept the abolition of the Vice President’s veto rights, they opposed this latest proposal since it could transform the Vice Presidency into a totally symbolic and politically ineffective office (Beattie despatch, 4 December 1972).

On 24 October 1973, British High Commissioner in Cyprus, Stephen Olver, reported about the recent developments in the inter-communal talks. Olver noted that, on 3 August 1973, the Greek Cypriot side asked for the abolishment of Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, however the Turkish Cypriot side rejected this offer. With the relevant offer, Makarios wanted to maximize Cyprus’s sovereignty and minimize Greek and Turkish interventions. However, in Turkish Cypriots’ perspective, the guarantees provided by Turkey were the only insurance preserving their communal rights against Greek Cypriot majority. Olver also argued that, although no forms of Enosis had been negotiated since 1968, Ankara was not convinced. The island was strategically important, and Ankara’s priority was to impede the unification of Cyprus with Greece. On the other hand, since Turkey was perceived as a neighbouring threat to Cyprus, the main fear of Greek Cypriots was the partition. However, ironically, even the Turkish Cypriot leaders were not sure whether Turkey had sufficient military preparations and weaponry power to intervene in Cyprus (Olver despatch, 24 October 1973).

---

104 The relevant right and duty was provided to the Vice President by the Article 38.
On 27 March 1974, Denktash went to Ankara and met Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit. After their meeting, Ecevit made a speech on behalf of his government. He expressed that Turkey supported the establishment of a federal state in Cyprus. His statement was as follows:

We talked about the Cyprus Question with Mr. Denktash. His visit to Ankara was beneficial. I learned from him various facts about the Cyprus Question. Our government shall make all the essential efforts for a solution based on an independent and federative state. Anyone who has good intentions can profoundly rely on our good intentions (Milliyet 28 March 1974, p.11).

Makarios was totally dissatisfied with Ecevit’s statement. Inter-communal negotiations were suspended till 14 June (PIO, 6 April 1974; Clerides 1989b: 295-300). On 14 June 1974, Clerides and Denktash met each other and the talks continued. However, the dispute on the local autonomy could not be resolved.

As explained in Chapter 1, in multi-ethnic power-sharing democracies, the minor group(s) and their political elite tend to ask for further de-centralization of government, and the major group and its political elite tend to demand more centralization. Additionally, the political elite of the major group might also be tempted to limit the veto rights of the minor group(s). With regard to the abolition of Turkish Cypriots’ veto rights in the legislative and executive branches of government, Makarios could dispose of the political power provided to Turkish Cypriot political elite under the constitution. Furthermore, he could have enabled the Greek Cypriot rule over the island on the basis of their political will, without Turkish Cypriot involvement.
On the other hand, Makarios was opposed to Turkish Cypriots’ autonomy in their local affairs. Autonomy in local affairs would mean further de-centralization of the state. In a de-centralized state, the Greek Cypriot majority might once again be faced with Turkish Cypriot secessionism. This thesis contends that Makarios’s strategy in the inter-communal talks corresponded to Greek Cypriot interests, as the major ethnic group, and his own interests, as a political leader. However, thanks to the support of Ankara, they did step back. Turkey clearly encouraged and supported her ethnic kin to not to give up the local autonomy demands.

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has shown that President Makarios became the supreme leader of Cyprus following the Turkish Cypriots’ withdrawal from the executive and legislative branches of government. As regards to Greek politics, Makarios was allied with the King and his anti-Enosis transition was synchronized with the King’s exile. Since the political scene in Greece was dominated by the Colonels and Makarios had no chance of retaining power during their rule, the President abandoned his Enosis policies. The isolated Turkish Cypriot community played an important role in consolidating Makarios’s regime and Greek Cypriots’ economic well-being. Under such conditions, Enosis was hardly a high priority for the President, once his own interests and his ethnic group’s interests are taken into account. Having considered the sovereignty, an independent Cypriot state under Greek Cypriot control appeared more profitable to Makarios.

At the beginning of the bi-communal talks, the Turkish Cypriot leadership agreed to accept the coercive demands of the President. However, they tried to obtain
further autonomy over local administration in exchange for Makarios’s assimilative demands. Turkish Cypriots were supported by their “homeland” Turkey, and they did not give up their local autonomy demands. Makarios rejected all the Turkish Cypriot demands regarding this issue. The unresolved situation in Cyprus worried leading members of the NATO who persuaded the Junta to press Makarios to moderate his hard line on local administration. However, the President did not step back. He violated the traditional “homeland nationalism” of Greek Cypriots by ignoring the Junta’s (the homeland's) demands and advice. In a sense, he was refusing to consider the Greek Junta as the center of Hellenism, responsible for the common good of the Greek Cypriots.

In addition to the facing pressure from the Greek Junta, Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey, the President was also challenged by Greek Cypriot terrorism. The terrorists attempted to depose the President. However, they failed to achieve their goal. They did not oust Makarios or obtain a return to pro-Enosis policies. The President retained maximum popularity and support amongst the Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, not only Makarios, but also the Communist party AKEL and the Socialist Party EDEK might have endangered their political careers if union had occurred during a military dictatorship (See Markydes 1977: 59). Nevertheless, it appears clear that the most profitable solution to the Cyprus conflict in terms of both the President’s and Greek Cypriots’ interests would have been a Greek Cypriot-dominated state with an assimilated Turkish Cypriot minority, instead of unification with Greece.
When Brubaker’s (1996: 108) concepts of “homeland nationalism” and “nationalizing nationalism” are taken into consideration, it appears obvious that Makarios’s “nationalizing nationalism” was in conflict with Junta’s “homeland nationalism”. Makarios appears to have aborted the first and preferred the latter. Such a transition completely corresponded with the President’s political interests and his ethnic group’s economic (and also political) interests. And, as regards the concept of “elite interests”, it appears clear that Makarios’s nationalist policies were entirely in accord with his pursuit of political power and with the interests of his ethnic group. This was unwelcome to the Greek Junta, Greek Cypriot terrorists the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey. Constructing a national identity which alienated his adversaries and manipulating symbols favoring an Independent, integrated and Greek Cypriot-dominated Cyprus, supports both hypotheses of this thesis. The next chapter shall investigate “the others” and the how the President, in his speeches, manipulated the “symbols” of the Greek Cypriot nationalism
IV. NATIONAL IDENTITY

The previous Chapter of this thesis has clarified what policies the President followed in order to maximize his own political power and serve the Greek Cypriots’ interests. It also analyzed the power competition between the King and the Junta, the Junta’s absolute hegemony in Greece, the roles of the Greek Junta, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership as anti-Makarios powers. And it explained the economic development enjoyed by Greek Cypriots and Greek Cypriot terrorism directed against Makarios and his pro-Independence policies. Cypriot scholars (Stavrinides 1975; Markydes 1977; Stamatakis 1991; Mavratsas 1998; 2010; Kizilyurek 2005; Loizides 2007; Peristianis 2008; Anagnostopoulou 2010) indicate that, the national identity of Greek Cypriots was re-constructed during the Junta’s reign in Greece (1967-1974), the community favoured Greek Cypriot nationalism instead of the Greek nationalism and President Makarios led this process with his pro-Independence policies. This chapter shall analyze Makarios’s political speeches and examine how did the President try to re-construct the national identity of his community. This chapter considers whether the speeches of President Makarios corresponded with his pro-Independence policies, and whether he identified Greek Cypriot terrorism, Turkish Cypriot leadership, Turkey and the Greek Junta as the “others”. This chapter also examines the “symbols” used by the President in his political speeches.

4.1. The “feasible solution”

As previously stated in this thesis, in June 1967, during the absence of Turkish-Cypriot members, the Cypriot House of Representatives unanimously approved a pro-Enosis resolution. On 25 June 1967, Glafkos Clerides, the President of the
House of Representatives, made a speech in Famagusta (a city located in Northern part of the island). During his speech, he made the following statement:

I shall continue to struggle, either from my position as President or Member of the House of Representatives or as an ordinary citizen, until the whole of Cyprus, unified and undivided, is delivered into the arms of the Mother Country. In no case, I shall let my name be associated with the offer of even a fraction of Cypriot territory in return for Enosis… I interpret the warm welcome accorded to me as a manifestation in support of the policy of President Makarios and his Government (PIO 25 June 1967)

Makarios was in agreement with the legislative branch about policies to unite the entire island with Greece. On day after Clerides’s speech in Famagusta, the House of Representatives unanimously approved a resolution affirming its policies in favour of an “undivided” form of Enosis (PIO 26 June 1967). However, although Makarios had been in favour of the “undivided” Enosis (that is, without any territorial concessions to Turkey), in early 1968 he declared that his solution for the Cyprus Conflict would involve the maintenance of an independent Cypriot state.

As explained in the previous chapter, this decision followed King Constantine’s removal from the political scene of Greece. On 12 January 1968, the President said in a speech that:

The Cyprus Problem has entered a critical stage. The two main factors that contributed to this were: the failure of Greco-Turkish dialogue and the recent withdrawal from Cyprus of the Greek forces…I am aware that, owing to the recent unfavourable developments, there is an uncertainty and concern amongst the Greek Cypriots and the question which is uppermost in their minds is as to the future course and the prospects of a feasible solution…I have repeatedly stated in the past that we desire to live in harmony with the Turks of Cyprus. We do not wish to deprive them of their rights as equal citizens, far less do we aim at their extermination. On the contrary, we are prepared to grant to the Turkish Cypriots additional privileges….I consider it necessity on this occasion to stress that the Constitution of an independent and unitary state should be governed by democratic principles, be approved by the people and be subject to amendment by democratic machinery, in accordance with the will of the people as a whole (PIO 12 January 1968)
He also declared in this speech that he had decided to re-run the Presidential elections and seek Greek Cypriot approval of the switch to a pro-Independence policy.

This speech is crucial for Cypriot History since it was the first time the President spoke out in public about re-constructing the Greek Cypriot national identity in favour of a “nationalizing nationalism”. In so doing, he indicated the failure of the dialogue amongst the two homelands (Greece and Turkey) for the resolution of the Cyprus Question. As the President noted, his preference was to a settlement agreed by the Cypriots themselves. It should also be one that would keep Cyprus “unitary” and “independent” rather than aiming retaining Enosis as the political goal for the Greek Cypriots. The terms “unitary” and “independent” of course clashed with the ideas of Enosis, “double-Enosis” and secession.

It is a very important fact that in this speech the President referred to Turkish Cypriots as “equal citizens” instead of an “equal community”. In the previous chapter, it was seen that the President was trying to limit Turkish Cypriot veto rights and to abolish the strict equality the two communities enjoyed under the 1960 constitution, of. As Lijphart (1977) argues, in a multi-ethnic power-sharing democracy, not only are all citizens are individually equal; the ethnic groups sharing political power are also equal. Nonetheless, in a bi-communal power-sharing democracy, the quantitative advantages of the majority is checked and balanced by the minority. At this point, the President is clearly expressing sympathy towards Turkish Cypriots enjoying rights as “equal citizens”. However, he does not support their having rights as an “equal community” with the Greek
Cypriot majority. In a visual documentary the President complained about the power-sharing between the two communities. “In no other country” he said, “the 18% of the population of a country claimed the right to manipulate the fate of the other 82%” (Makarios 1975).

The President also articulated his aim of re-establishing peace between the communities and said that Greek Cypriots wanted to “live in harmony” with the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot secessionism was preventing peace. But the President’s wish to treat Turkish Cypriots as “equal citizens” instead of an “equal community”, suggests that the kind of “harmony” he envisaged would have been coerced and, in fact, his historic speech contained all Brubaker’s elements of “nationalizing nationalism”. In other words, the President was attempting to launch a process that would unite the Cypriot people as a whole, eliminate “homeland nationalism”, and put an end to Turkish Cypriot secessionism.

After the President declared himself in favour of independence, his supporters took up the slogan of “Cyprus for Cypriots”, and thereby demonstrated their approval of the national identity he constructed. However, the President and his supporters were criticized by the anti-Makarios press. For instance, the Newspaper *Patris* (20 January 1968, p.1) asserted that it was essential for the Greek Cypriot people to determine their future and that instead of presidential elections there should be a referendum in which they were invited to choose between independence and *Enosis*. The newspaper argued that Makarios was setting up a trap for Greek Cypriots by terminating the struggle for *Enosis*. And according to the newspaper, his supporters’ slogan “Cyprus for Cypriots”

207
represented an unwelcome break with the long-waged Greek Cypriot struggle for union with Greece.

During the electoral campaign, the President replied to the opposition’s criticisms. At the threshold of his pro-Independence transition and his re-construction of the Greek Cypriot national identity, he constantly drew a distinction between what was “desirable” and what was “feasible” (see also Kizilyurek 2005: 118). In one of his public statements, he explained this distinction as follows:

I said in a recent statement that the feasible solution does not always coincide with the desirable [one]. This has given a pretext to the small opposition group to make various charges against the government and the overwhelming majority of the people of Cyprus. I do not want to question the patriotism of those in the opposition. I sincerely feel, however, that the political line of the opposition, which is trying to represent as anti-Enosisists a percentage exceeding 95% of the Greek Cypriot people, can only do harm. I will not dwell more on this point. The Greek Cypriot people have sufficient political maturity and judgement as to be able to judge and decide. I only wish to say that the painful experience of the last years has proved that the cause of Cyprus has been harmed more by the national overbidding than by national underbidding in connection with it (PIO 5 February 1968).

In this way, the President indicated that Enosis was “desirable” and Independence was “feasible”. The term “national overbidding” likewise referred basically to the struggle for Enosis. Makarios did not say he was an anti-Enosis leader. However, he regarded Enosis as a dangerous goal which endangered Cyprus’s security. The distinction between the “desirable” and “feasible” was a way of stressing that Enosis was still a national ambition but maintaining the integrity of the Cypriot state was to be embraced as the priority goal for Greek Cypriots.
As previously indicated, the President often used the terms “unitary state” and “independent state”. It is also noteworthy that the President’s sense of democracy was based on a majoritarian essence, instead of a pluralist one. Lijphart (1977) argues that power-sharing is essentially a pluralist form of political representation since it expands the political rights of the minority by rendering it equal with the majority. However, the President wanted to abolish power-sharing and make Greek Cypriots dominant in the island. For instance, regarding the process of inter-communal negotiations, his red lines were plain:

We are not going to accept partition. We are not going to accept a constitutional arrangement which does not enable the democratic expression of the will of the majority to rule the politics. We are not going to accept territorial concessions (Eleftheria 25 February 1968)

We want to live peacefully together with the Turkish Cypriots in a unitary and undivided Cyprus. All separatist tendencies and partition plans are unacceptable…. We are disposed to grant to the Turkish Cypriot community certain privileges, the extent and degree of which must certainly not come into conflict with the notion of a unitary state…. I must stress, however, that, as far as everything else is concerned, the constitution, on the basis of which the Cyprus State will be governed, should be devoid of separatist elements and should constitute the expression of the will of the people as a whole…. (PIO 29 February 1968)

Once the majoritarian sense of democracy is holds sway power-sharing is abolished and Greek Cypriots hold the reins. Thus, majoritarian democracy would legitimate the coercive Greek Cypriot nationalism driven by the President. In order to summarize the basic list of duties for the Greek Cypriots, the President asked the Greek Cypriot community to review their sensitive attachment to the idea of Enosis. In addition, Makarios asked them to embrace a peaceful and coercive form of co-existence with Turkish Cypriots. However, this coercion would not come from Greek Cypriots using violence; it would be applied as the outcome of the inter-communal talks led by the President of the Republic, Makarios, and the
President of the House of Representative, Clerides. The President only asked for the support of his community and re-election in the 1968 elections in which he won 95% of Greek Cypriot votes (As mentioned above, the terms “unitary state” and “independence” were the two main symbols that the president used to re-construct Greek-Cypriot national identity).

According to Fazil Kutchuk, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and the Vice-President of the Republic, Makarios’s aim was nothing but Enosis. Kutchuk hardly trusted Makarios’s sincerity on Independence and, to him, the restriction of Turkish Cypriot veto rights would have constituted the first phase of Makarios’s Enosis strategies. On 22 September 1966, Amishadai Adu, Deputy Secretary-General of Commonwealth, sent a telegram to Commonwealth Office and informed about a letter written by Dr. Fazil Kutchuk to Arnold Smith, Secretary General of Commonwealth, prior to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’s held on 25 September 1966 in London. In his letter, Kutchuk said:

The distinguished statesmen attending the conference are, no doubt, are aware of the tragic events of December 1963... and of how the Greek Wing of the Government of Cyprus usurped governmental authority and resorted to sets of violence in order to subjugate or eliminate [the] Turkish Community of Cyprus and eventually to annex Cyprus to Greece by destroying the independent Republic of Cyprus… It is also well known that the Greek leaders would not hesitate to distort facts or to pay lip service to such lefty principles as “unfettered independence” and to also deceptive declarations such as “roundtable talks between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus without outside interference” in order to mislead the public opinion and achieve their aim through unorthodox methods (Adu despatch, 22 September 1966)

After Makarios came out in favour of remaining independent, Kutchuk repeatedly stated that the President had changed his methods but not his ultimate goal. On 7
February 1968, during the electoral campaign, Kutchuk stated that: “The President had replied to the criticisms of the Greek Cypriot opposition by emphasizing that, neither he nor the 95% of the community were anti-Enosists. This clearly shows that Makarios has made no changes in his ideals.” (Halkin Sesi 8 February 1968, p.1) On 17 June 1970, while the inter-communal talks were deadlocked due to the dispute over local administrations, Kutchuk made another statement regarding what he called the “pro-Enosis” tendency of Makarios. His statement was as follows:

As it is known to everyone, when he was elected as the Archbishop in 1950, Makarios had sworn to achieve the Enosis. Since that day, he kept faith with his pledge. He might have changed his methods. Nonetheless, since he has not achieved the goal of Enosis yet, it can not be asserted that he has given up the pursuit of Enosis (Halkin Sesi 18 June 1970, p.1).

While Kutchuk did not believe that the President had abandoned the struggle for Enosis, Greek statesmen and Greek Cypriot extreme nationalists were equally suspicious about whether the President had sincerely desired Enosis. For instance, Andreas Papandreou, the ex-Prime Minister of Greece, notes that Makarios “always talked about Enosis, however his actions always aimed at independence” (Papandreou 2006: 203). Likewise, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Greek Cypriot terrorists who emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s tended to accuse Makarios of not remaining loyal to the idea of Enosis. This thesis is not, however, concerned with whether or not the President was sincere about Enosis. Only he knew that. However, it is undeniable that in late 1967 and early 1968 Makarios began working to re-construct Greek Cypriot national identity so that it would accord with a desire for “Independence” instead of Enosis.
On 25 February 1968, when the presidential elections were held, Makarios gained the support he asked from his community. He gained over 95% of the votes, while his opponent, Dr. Takis Eudocas, who opposed to Makarios’s pro-Independence political line and supported the pro-Enosis line, gathered less than 5% of the votes. According to Clerides, AKEL’s support to Makarios was an important factor beyond his electoral victory, since AKEL’s electoral power was around 30% of total Greek Cypriot votes (Clerides 1989a: 214-215). On the other hand, Kutchuk was elected as the Vice President, since he was the only Turkish Cypriot candidate.

4.2. Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey as Makarios’s “others”

The President’s statements regarding the proposals put forward by Turkish Cypriots during the inter-communal talks (1968-1974) show that Makarios used the symbols of “unitary state” and “partition”. Shoring up the state’s integrity was the primary goal for the Greek Cypriot community; and the symbol of “partition” was used to criticize Turkish Cypriot demands, which were contrary to his political preferences. In particular, he indicated that the Turkish Cypriot leadership was an “internal other” and their ethnic “homeland” Turkey was an “external other”. In Makarios’s speeches, Turkish Cypriot leadership constituted an internal danger and a threat to Cyprus’s integrity. For instance, in the course of remarks about Turkish Cypriot calls for greater local autonomy, the President made the following statements:

It is essential to be optimistic, and expect that the Turkish Cypriots will have empathy towards our anxieties and will contribute to the progress of bi-communal talks for the resolution of the Cyprus Question.... We have made our signs of good intention quite clear. However, as we have repeatedly articulated, there are certain principles in our solution agenda and we cannot make concessions from them.... The solution of the Cyprus Question
cannot violate the borders of the integrity of a unitary state. The Turkish Cypriot leadership talks about the unitary state. However, they talk about a unitary state containing entrenched autonomy for the local administrations.... We will never accept such separatist demands that shall lead to partition (PIO 18 May 1969; Alithia 19 May 1969)

The Turkish Cypriot leadership insists on partition plans. The Turkish leaders speak occasionally about a unitary state, particularly when they address world opinion [sic.]. But their whole attitude and activities betray orientations in the contradictory direction. The intention and aim of the Turkish Cypriots is the maintenance of the existing Turkish pockets in the form of autonomous cantons, and, moreover, their participation in the central power and the other state services. In my opinion, federation is the aim of Turkish Cypriots, and this can hardly be concealed behind the concept of local administration. Needless to say that once the perquisites and conditions for a federal regime have been created, it would be easy to achieve the partition in a subsequent level (PIO 19 July 1969)

At this moment, I will not articulate a direct imagination regarding the future of Cyprus. However, I would like to stress that, as long as we struggle within an undivided domestic front, our future depends particularly on us.... It is known that the rhythm of progression in the inter-communal talks, seeking for a democratic solution, is unsatisfactory. This is because of the officials of Turkish foreign policy, who assert that further concessions from Turkish Cypriots are unacceptable.... Any further concessions from the Greek Cypriot side are also out of the question, and our Turkish Cypriot citizens require making sense of this, in order to refrain from self deception. The proposals of the Turkish Cypriot leadership lead to territorial dichotomy and political trichotomy in Cyprus.... If the Turkish Cypriot side refuses to compromise and to resolve the current deadlock in the inter-communal talks, we are determined to encounter any incidents.... Further concessions from our side endanger the nation. The generosity has its borders. We have to learn from our previous experiences. We must observe the past with a microscope and we must observe the future with a telescope (PIO 4 October 1969; Charavghi 5 October 1969, p.1).

The partition plans of the Turkish Cypriots are becoming more obvious with the passage of time... For some time now, there is a separatist situation in Cyprus. The Turks aim at the consolidation of this situation and later on they may proclaim into a state the areas under their control. I sincerely believe that the proclamation into a state of Turkish controlled areas, which does not exceed the 2% of the Cyprus soil, would not be suit in the Turkish Cypriots’ interests. But if the Turkish Cypriots, motivated by various reasons, proceed with proclamation of a state, the Cyprus Government will find it necessary to take all appropriate measures for its dissolution (PIO 19 August 1970).
We are holding talks with the Turkish Cypriots and our position as interlocutors is being weakened on account of imprudent acts and manifestations by Greek Cypriots. I understand that an obstructionist tactic is being followed by the Turkish side at the talks. And the reason for this obstruction is the expectation of serious incidents and a chaotic situation amongst the Greeks of the island. In such a case, conditions favouring the plans of the Turks will be created (PIO 8 February 1973).

In the speeches that have just been quoted, the President implies that Turkish Cypriot demands for further autonomy were aimed at partition. He also suggests that autonomy at the local government level goes against the principle of the “unitary state”. However, there is another important and interesting point in these statements. This is his reference to Cypriots as a “people” and his assertion that the “separatist” demands of Turkish Cypriots endanger the people. This conception of Turkish Cypriots and their leadership as threatening the entity of the Cypriot people fits in with Prizel’s (1998) concept of “internal others”. The President identifies himself as the leader of the people. He tries to “nationalize” (Brubaker’s term) the Cypriots via inter-communal talks. Meanwhile, he accuses the Turkish Cypriot Leadership of being responsible for deadlock of the negotiations and he invites them to step back from what they were doing to deadlock the talks.

As Horowitz (1985) notes; in a power-sharing democracy, if one ethnic group’s contribution to the national economy is substantially higher than that of the other, this makes an ethnic conflict likely to occur. It is a fact that Greek Cypriots, the richer ethnic group, had to pay additional taxes on behalf of Turkish Cypriots, the poorer ethnic group. On one occasion, during a dispute in the House of Representatives prior to the Turkish Cypriots’ withdrawal, it said that the total
Turkish Cypriot contribution to the joint revenues was 9.5% despite their total population constituting 18% of the whole (Clerides 1989a: 431-432). From Horowitz’s perspective, an ethnic conflict in Cyprus was not surprising. Moreover, it has earlier been stated in Chapter 1 that larger ethnic groups or their political elite might try to limit the political rights of the lesser ones (See: Kellas 1991; Andeweg 2000: 510; Mushtaq & Zakariya 2011). The assimilative policies of the President also accord with this proposition since they were serving Makarios’s interests as a political leader, and Greek Cypriots’ communal interests.

As previously noted in Chapter 1, the absence of cross-ethnic voting might lead the political elite to neglect the demands of the other ethnic group(s) within the state and it also increases their chances of increasing ethnic nationalism (see Horowitz 1991). According to Article 63 of the Cypriot constitution (see Appendix 1), Greek Cypriots could only vote for Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives and Turkish Cypriots could elect only the Turkish Cypriot members of the House. More importantly, Article 1 of the Cypriot constitution provides for the President of Cyprus to be a Greek Cypriot, and he would be elected by the Greek Cypriots. As indicated above, the President could enjoy broader political power and defend his ethnic group’s interests more effectively if he could force Turkish Cypriot leadership to give up their demands regarding the local autonomy. He was elected by Greek Cypriots. In a sense, he was not responsible to Turkish Cypriots. But, it is important to note that, during the inter-communal talks, the President did not encourage Greek Cypriots to try to assimilate with the Turkish Cypriot minority with violent methods. Furthermore,
although he was a priest, he did not utilize religious symbols in constructing the national identity.

It is also noteworthy that, while Makarios indicated Turkish Cypriot leadership as an “internal other”, he found himself labeled as the “other” by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and their newspaper *Halkin Sesi*. For instance, on 14 February 1968, Rauf Denktash made a statement and asserted that the Turkish Cypriot community could proclaim an independent government. “If” he said the government remains totally under Greek Cypriot control and the Turkish Cypriot community is deprived of its rights, we will need to proclaim a government, as sovereign as the government of Makarios. We do not wish to secede, but we expect Makarios to respect our constitutional rights. The independent Republic of Cyprus is based on the political equality of the two communities. Makarios’s proposal aiming to provide minority rights to us constitutes an attempt to violate our political rights as the equal partners of the state (*Halkin Sesi* 15 February 1968, p.1).

On 3 January 1970, the newspaper accused Makarios for the deadlock of the negotiations, and his criticism towards Turkish Cypriot leaders was reflected as “the same old story by Makarios” (*Halkin Sesi* 3 January 1970, p.1). According to the newspaper, Makarios tended to deadlock the talks and put the blame on Turkish Cypriot leaders. On 9 January 1970, the newspaper asserted that the local governance demands of Turkish Cypriot leadership were rejected because Makarios’s basic goal was to render Turkish Cypriots an ineffective minority under a Greek Cypriot-ruled state. Moreover, the newspaper accused Makarios of conducting violence in 1963-1964, in order to force Turkish Cypriot community to give up its political rights as the equal partner of the state.
Although the President and his pro-Independence policies were being targeted by the pro-Enosis terrorism, during the sharpest stage of Athens-Nicosia crisis, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash accused Makarios of seeking for Enosis. On 2 July 1974, Denktash made the following statement:

The Cyprus Problem is the problem of the two equal communities who are independent based on the constitution of independent Republic of Cyprus. Our equality as the Turkish Cypriot community is guaranteed and preserved by the constitution. Thanks to Turkey’s role as a guarantor state, we have so far managed to maintain the independence of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot leadership, motivated by their desire for Enosis, has many times targeted the independence of the state. The only obstruction against the Enosis has been the resistance of Turkish Cypriot community and the support of Turkey. Makarios’s anxieties about the independence of Cyprus are not genuine. He has made inadmissible attempts to abolish the constitutional aspects guaranteeing the independence. He is a leader who has tried, and who is still trying to prepare a juncture enabling him to destroy the independence. If he manages to abolish our communal equality, nothing can prevent him from destroying the independence (Bozkurt 3 July 1974).

On the other hand, in Makarios’s point of view, Turkey was an “external other”, utilizing Turkish Cypriots in order to achieve her strategic targets. He indicated Turkey as an external threat directed against Cyprus’s integrity and sovereignty. In press conferences, in his public statements and in the speeches he made in ceremonies and massive demonstrations, Makarios accused Turkey of having expansionist plans addressing Cyprus’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, he constantly argued that Turkey tended to use the Turkish Cypriot community as an instrument enabling her intervention in Cypriot politics. The “otherness” of Turkey can be observed through the following speeches made by Makarios:

Since the events in Cyprus of 1963, our relations with Turkey are disturbed and they further deteriorated by the Turkish bombardment of the island in
August 1964 and also by threats for a military invasion of Turkey in Cyprus that were constantly repeated. Speaking about our relations with Turkey, I do not mean that the relations of the Turkish community of Cyprus with Turkey which are very good. The cooperation between the Turkish community and Turkey is such that, whatever political initiative of this community is always in full conformity with the views of Turkey. Even in the local talks, any position taken by the Turkish Cypriots means that such is the position of Turkey on any given issue. So when they say we are talking with Turkish Cypriots, in reality we are talking with Turkey through Turkish Cypriots (PIO 17 December 1969).

The security reasons invoked by Turkey to justify her opposition to *Enosis* are not sincere arguments. And a proof of this is the fact that among other things, she invokes security reasons also in the case of a fully and really independent Cyprus. It is probable that Cyprus may be in danger from Turkey. But not the other way round... Greece has made many efforts to dispel the fears of Turkey. But since the fears are not genuine, there is no way to remove them. I think that Turkey is opposing *Enosis* because she wants to have a foothold in Cyprus, either through a special status for the Turkish community in the island or in another way (PIO 24 February 1970).

Turkey is interested in the Turkish Cypriot community. But we do not recognize Turkey any rights on Cyprus so that direct consultations with Ankara for the solution of the Cyprus problem may become necessary. Irrespective of this, the fact is that the talks with Turkish Cypriots can be considered as talks with Turkey considering that Ankara gives all the guidelines and instructions which determine precisely the position and the political line of the Turkish community in Cyprus (PIO 26 June 1970).

With hecatombs of sacrifices we have put an end to the colonial rule and won independence. The independence we won has many restrictions imposed by foreign interests. But even this restricted and mortgaged independence is being threatened and endangered today. Expansionist tendencies by Turkey and ever increasing greed by the co-habitant Turks and plans are being hatched behind scenes are assuming the shape and dimensions of a serious threat to the territorial integrity of our island, constituting a danger to the very national survival of the Greek Cypriot people.... The future of Cyprus is the concern of its own people. Turkey, however, is threatening. She is exercising pressure and blackmail. We shall not be daunted and we shall not give in to pressures and blackmail.... The Greek Cypriot people are ready for every sacrifice for their freedom. (PIO 11 July 1971)

An independent, sovereign and unitary state were from the outset the terms agreed upon which formed the basis of the local talks and the framework within which a solution to Cyprus problem had to be sought. It is a fact that from time to time the Turkish side made vague statements about a federal solution to the problem. A few days ago, however, a statement by the Turkish Prime Minister spelled out clearly and formally the demand for a
This inadmissible Turkish demand upsets the basis of the talks, makes their failure inevitable, and, consequently, renders their continuation superfluous. If the Turkish Cypriot leadership, encouraged by Ankara, insists on the unreasonable demand for federation and the deadlock of the talks becomes permanent, the Cyprus problem shall once again preoccupy the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council (PIO 6 April 1974).

Makarios’s perception of Turkey's “otherness” suits well to Prizel’s (1998) concept of “external other”. As Prizel notes, if the ethnic minorities in their states stand for further political rights and receive support from foreign states to that end, the Eastern leaders might characterize the foreign states supporting the minorities as “external others” and accuse them of external intervention. President Makarios tended to argue that, the Turkish Cypriot leadership was manipulated by Turkey, and the deadlock of the inter-communal talks was caused by the intransigent guidance of Turkey. He also tended to drew attention to potential expansionist policies of Ankara.

### 4.3. Greek Cypriot terrorism as Makarios’s “internal other”

The previous chapter has shown that some Greek Cypriots turned to terrorism to try to oust the President. Since the terrorists targeted the political position of the President, the obvious reaction would be for him to “alienate” the terrorists by addressing them as the “internal other”. At the ideological level, the President utilized a familiar symbol: “Partition”. He accuses the terrorists of damaging the Cypriot state’s integrity and security. And, since the terrorists opposed Makarios’s anti-Enosis policies, Makarios attacked the terrorists’ push for Enosis. Thus, on 1 September 1969, the President Made the following speech on the state’s Radio and Television channel PIK (the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation):
My life in the past twenty years has been a constant struggle for Cyprus. The love and the confidence of the Greek Cypriot people have elevated me to the leadership of the struggle, and Cyprus's struggle has become an inseparable part of my life.... The activities of the terrorist organisation called “National Front” which has been in existence for some months ... now are undermining our struggle. Murders and attempted murders, planting of bombs, threatening leaflets and threatening letters against journalists, against persons holding public offices and persons working in Government services and at the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation are the main features of the criminal and anti-national actions of the so-called “National Front”. “Quo vadimus” is the anguished question of our people, the question of all those who love this country.... I will oppose this Antinational Front [emphasis added] even if this results in my becoming its target.... I consider it my duty and obligation to struggle so that Cyprus may get rid of this scourge, of this curse, which has hit the island. It is indeed sad that during these critical moments Cyprus is passing through, instead of the people concentrating their undistracted attention on outside dangers, an internal danger has appeared. Cyprus’s enemies are rejoicing because they unexpectedly find Greek collaborators in their plans concerning the solution of the Cyprus problem.... It has been said by some that the “National Front” constitutes probably an organisation which will struggle for Enosis and will oppose any other solution of the Cyprus problem. I do not believe that this was the object of the establishment of the “National Front”. But even if this were so, Enosis cannot be achieved by bombs and the murders of Greeks or by cries of national overbidding.... In the present circumstances the people’s unity constitutes a safeguard of firm defence and unyielding national resistance against those having designs on the territorial integrity of our island.... (PIO 1 September 1969; Charavghi 2 September 1969, p.1)

In these words, the President identified the National Front as an “internal danger” to the Cypriot state. In referring to the organization as the “anti-National Front”, he used the same term as Charavghi, the pro-Makarios newspaper of the political party AKEL. Before police eliminated the National Front, the terrorist organization was responsible for serious crimes up to and including the attempt on Makarios’s life. On 27 May 1970, at a press conference at the Presidential Palace, the President said:

Personally I am determined to fight without hesitations, reservations or consideration of personal dangers so that Cyprus may get rid of the anguish of the accursed epidemic of unlawful organizations which constitute an internal enemy hitting our people who are struggling for their freedom....The activities of the “National Front” include the murder of senior police
superintendent Philippos Evripidou, the assassination attempt against the Director of the Public Information Office, Mr. Miltiades Christodoulou and the attack on the Limassol Port Police Headquarters. What are the ultimate aims of the illegal organizations? They claim to be fighting for Enosis... But can Enosis be realized through the crippling of the state and the creation of Chaos? Partition of the island will be the result of the continuation of the activities of illegal organizations, and this is probably their ultimate aim: partition and double Enosis\textsuperscript{105}. This, however, will not happen (PIO 27 May 1970; Charavghi 28 May 1970).

The assassination attempt against the life of Miltiades Christodoulou, the Director of the Public Information Office, underlines the importance of the attention paid to the PIO by this thesis. Since Christodoulou, the government’s spokesman, directly reflected the President’s re-construction of the national identity, it might be assumed that the National Front considered him an important as important target as the President himself. After the National Front was eliminated, Grivas and his terrorist organization, EOKA B, became the new dangers for the government. On 29 October 1971, the President made the following statement about Grivas and EOKA B:

The government has enough information and knows many details about this illegal activity, which can serve no national purpose except from \[sic.\] the partitionist plans of the Turks. Those who believe that it is possible to carry out a national struggle for the achievement of Enosis through armed groups and hideouts, by far by far exceed all limits of seriousness. Against whom will the groups being formed in the name of General Grivas turn their weapons? Their weapons will be turned against the Government, against the organs of the State, against Greek [Cypriot] citizens, and probably, against the Turks [Turkish Cypriots]. But no matter what their target will be, in the final analysis, the grim reality will be this. Cyprus will suffer the blows. The national cause of the Greek Cypriots will suffer from the injuries. The armed groups will become allies of the enemies of Cyprus. Those plotting against the territorial integrity of our island will find an unexpected ally... A new EOKA is being established, they argue, to fight for the achievement of Enosis. It is to say the least, the ultimate naïveté to wage an Enosis struggle through armed groups and an organization on the EOKA model.

\textsuperscript{105} The President utilised this term quite often. In President’s terms, the “double Enosis” referred to the share-out of the island by Greece and Turkey. President had opposed even a military base to be left to Turkey as an exchange for Enosis.
Conditions today are different. EOKA fought at the time with support of the entire Hellenism, against a colonial regime, against a foreign government. Against whom will a struggle by an organization similar to EOKA be waged today? (PIO 29 October 1971)

With this speech, Makarkios identified General Grivas and EOKA B with “partition” and re-emphasized the importance of the “territorial integrity” of Cyprus. On 5 August 1973, after Grivas had accelerated his attempts to force Makarios to resign in favour of a pro-Enosis President championing the cause of Hellenism, Makarios accused Grivas of endangering Cyprus’s territorial integrity once again:

Grivas speaks about talks between Greece and Turkey which in his view would lead to Union with Greece but were torpedoed by myself. Grivas must be either uninformed on this matter or he is naive. On many occasions we stated that we had no objection to Grece-Turkish talks on the Cyprus question as long as the basis and object of such talks would be the Union with Greece. If, however, the talks would have a basis not on *Enosis* but independence of Cyprus then we do not think that they should be conducted between the Governments of Greece and Turkey... The question asked by the vast majority of Greek Cypriots is for what reason Grivas came to Cyprus and has remained in hiding for the last two years. He says a lot in his proclamation about his intentions and the aims of his arrival here. But nothing in this is clear and concrete. His followers pompously declared .... that Grivas came to Cyprus to realize Enosis... The plan submitted to me by Grivas was very simple and dangerously naive. The so-called plan included nothing else apart from my resignation and the election of a President enjoying common confidence, who would undertake a struggle for Enosis, regardless of the views of the Greek Government... I remarked to Grivas that no *Enosis* struggle could be carried out without the approval of the Greek Government, the more so [if that] struggle [were] carried out in disagreement with or in opposition to the policy of the Greek Government. It would lead to the isolation of Cyprus and instead of achieving *Enosis*, it would create a certain danger of partition... Since his arrival in Cyprus, Grivas has been engaging in forming armed groups and in terrorism, manifested through blowing up police stations, through murders and recently through the wretched method of kidnappings and taking hostages. And the question [asked] by everybody is whether Grivas really believes that through such acts and deeds *Enosis* is furthered. Such a belief is proof of insanity (PIO 5 August 1973)
In this statement, the President first underlines an important point relating to the Greco-Turkish meeting in Evros (where the Greeks offered a military base to the Turks in exchange for Enosis) by pointing out that the Greek government’s policy had been “divided Enosis” rather than “Enosis”. Second, the President draws attention to the fact that, there had been a Greco-Turkish agreement on the independence of Cyprus. However, thirdly and more importantly, Grivas and his terrorist activities are still endangering Cyprus’s territorial integrity. The President often equates such threats with the initial phases of “partition”.

It is also important that, the President repeatedly accused Grivas of exploiting the name “EOKA” for his illegal and harmful activities. Makarios expressed that Cypriots owed their independence to EOKA. However, according to Makarios, EOKA B, claiming to be the extension of EOKA, was damaging the national interests of Greek Cypriots. On 27 January 1973, the President said

Recent activities of General Grivas’s armed groups have created a nationally unpleasant and harmful situation... The seizure of weapons from the National Guard and the Police, the stealing of radio telephones and other equipment for use in illegal activities, the throwing of bombs, the incitement of innocent students to disorder, the circulation of leaflets threatening government organs and other activities of the terrorist nature are not acts of heroism. No national struggle can be carried out by such methods, which can only lead to national disaster. The General’s armed groups pose as a second EOKA. I am grieved that EOKA’s struggle is being smeared in such a way... Neither the government, nor the people, will tolerate continuation of terrorism (PIO 27 January 1973).

4.4. The “homeland” is challenged: The Junta as the “external other”

This section, examines the President’s re-construction of national identity by moving from “homeland nationalism” to “nationalizing nationalism” via the analysis on his political speeches. This section will show that the President constantly
reiterated that the future of Cyprus had to be decided by the Cypriots themselves and that no other nation had the right to determine their future or that of their island. However, it is also noteworthy that, while the President alienated Turkish Cypriot leadership, Turkey and Greek Cypriot terrorists, he refrained from alienating the Junta till July 1974. It was not difficult for Makarios to predict that, provoking the Greek Junta with the speeches he made in Cyprus or abroad would create serious aftermaths. The Cypriot army was officered by mainland Greeks appointed by the Junta.

For instance, on 14 November 1969, during a press conference, a Swiss journalist, Arthur Stierli, asked the President whether he would have liked to a swift return of parliamentary democracy in Greece. It was obvious that the President avoided giving an answer that could anger the Junta. “You will allow me to avoid comments on this matter” he said (PIO 14 November 1969). After the attempt on his life, although there was information as expressed by Clerides, British and Turkish diplomats (see section 3.3) that some leading members of the Junta were included in the assassination plot, President Makarios said no more than he felt “the deepest pain because there were Greek Cypriots acting on their own, or as instruments of others, and making such an attempt” on his life (PIO 8 March 1970). He made no references to the Junta after the attempt on his life.

On the other hand, when the keyword “Junta” is used at the PIO database, no result is founded before 15 July 1974. The President and PIO (led by his spokesman) sharply refrained from utilizing the term “Junta” which implies an anti-democratic dictatorship. The Junta was referred to as “Greek government” in
Makarios’s speeches and in PIO press releases. In July 1974 however, when it became certain that there was a collaboration between the Junta of Ioannidis, EOKA B and Greek officers in the Cypriot army against Makarios, and Greco-Turkish relations were also damaged due to the Aegean crisis, the President clearly turned Greek Cypriots public opinion against the Junta, and this led to the Junta to oust him.

As long as Colonel Papadopoulos was in power, Makarios refrained from indicating the Junta as an “external other”. However, the Greek Cypriot Left had alienated the Colonels. On 6 May 1968 a mass demonstration in Nicosia, calling “Democracy to Greece” was organised by EDEK (led by Dr. Vasos Lyssarides) and AKEL (led by Ezekias Papagiannou) who were opposed to the Junta of Colonels. Afterwards, Lyssarides and Papagiannou made the following statements:

A year ago, Greece was paralyzed. The Greek people were silenced, the Greek press was silenced and the political leaders were put into the jail… However, now it is time for the Greek people to break the Junta’s walls. Without the support of the external powers, the Junta’s regime automatically collapses… The coup in Greece constitutes a typical example of the worldwide strategies of Imperialism… The Junta betrayed Greece and Cyprus. The Junta receives orders from external powers and its officers are full of enmity against Greek and Cypriot peoples. Because of the Junta, the nightmare of Hellenism, the partition, is kept alive. The Junta, with its political stance, has signed for partition. The Junta depicts Communism as a nightmare and violates human rights in order to enhance its dictatorship. In the Europe of the 20th Century, the Junta still represents the thought of the Medieval [era]… The Junta is in collaboration with its chauvinist counterparts in Ankara and serves the interests of NATO and Imperialism. As soon as it finds the appropriate basis, it will try to achieve the partition of Cyprus. The Junta is a catastrophic enemy, not only for Greeks, but also for the Cypriots (Lyssarides).

The re-establishment of Democracy in Greece, of course, cannot be achieved by two political parties. All the democratic organizations, all the democrats and the entire people are to be included in this struggle. A new
resistance has been commenced in Greece. A resistance against the dictatorship and a resistance against the instruments of the foreign interests. It is a fact that the struggle of the Greek people is rather difficult. However, the history of the Greek people is full of heroisms, and there is no doubt that they will attain the liberty and the democracy they deserve. There are no chances of survival for tyranny, for Imperialism and for fascism. Democracy, is the most progressive, the most patriotic and the most powerful regime. We demand the withdrawal of the Junta from the office, in order to open the way for democratic elections, representing the free political will of Greek People. Let this demonstration constitute a tiny contribution to the re-establishment of the democratic, liberated and glorious Greece. Long live Greece. Long live Democracy (Papagiannou).

(Charavghi 7 May 1968, p.6.)

The leaders of the Greek Cypriot Left, made their own contributions to Makarios’s manipulation of the symbol of “partition”, particularly via the media and, in so doing, they alienated the Junta, its officers in the Cypriot army, the Greek Cypriot terrorists, the USA and Turkey. This accords with Brass’s (1991: 15) assumption that the political elite co-operate with each other in the transformation of National Identities. Since Papagiannou and Lyssarides would probably have lost their standing as political leaders if Cyprus united with Greece under an anti-Communist regime, they co-operated with the President in changing the notion of Greek Cypriot identity. The President, however, avoided alienating the Junta until conditions changed dramatically in 1974.

The Greek Cypriot Left, particularly AKEL’s newspaper Charavghi, repeatedly used the symbol of “partition” (and double-Enosis) so as to suggest that, in Greek Cypriots’ eyes, the President was the key opponent of “partition”. For instance, on 2 November 1971, Andreas Ziartides, the leader of AKEL’s trade union PEO (Pan-Cypriot Federation of Workers), was reported in Charavghi as having said that: “The PEO shall maintain its dynamic support and contribution to Makarios in order to prevent bloodshed and partition” (Charavghi 2 November 1971, p.1). On 1
January 1972, the newspaper referred to the Turkish newspaper, *Tasvir*, in claiming that the USA intended to divide Cyprus between Turkey and Greece (*Charavghi* 1 January 1972). On 15 February 1972, with reference to French newspaper *Le Monde*, *Charavghi* argued that the Junta had reached to a secret agreement with Ankara about the implementation of the double-*Enosis* (*Charavghi* 15 February 1972, p.6). On 29 May 1972, *Charavghi* stressed that thousands of Greek Cypriot students had the previous day demonstrated near the Presidential Palace in a show of support for the President. In so doing, they carried banners with the slogan “Makarios: The barrier against the Partition” (*Charavghi* 29 May 1972, p.1).

While the Greek Cypriot Left accused the Greek Junta of engineering the division of Cyprus, they reflected Archbishop Makarios as the only one who can impede the partition. However, it is noteworthy that, the leaders of AKEL and *Charavghi* did not alienate Turkish Cypriots, and this was the very difference between AKEL and Makarios. However, the party did not tempt to urge Makarios to change his stance against the Turks of Cyprus. In re-constructing Greek Cypriots’ national identity via the symbol manipulation in his speeches, President Makarios repeatedly manipulated the symbol of “EOKA heroes”, who had lost their lives during EOKA’s struggle for Enosis. But he recognised them as heroes who symbolised Cypriots’ integrity and liberty, not the struggle for Enosis. Two-and-a-half years’ earlier, at a memorial ceremony for Andreas Dimitriou and Michael Koukkis, two EOKA fighters who had been killed during the combat against the British, he said:

[The] struggles and sacrifices of Dimitriou and Koukkis, as well as other national martyrs strengthen faith and self confidence in the Greek Cypriots’
souls, constructing the wall of national resistance to pressures from many directions. Those having designs against Cyprus’s territorial integrity will run [into] this wall. Our resistance will not bend under any pressures. … It is a pity that amongst the Greek Cypriots, who have fought and sacrificed themselves to attain their liberty and who are still fighting and sacrificing themselves to integrate their liberty, there are groups of people or individuals who have undertaken the unholy task of [being] a traitor, leading Cyprus’s enemies and those plotting against the island....The wall will not collapse. And the enemy will not pass.... (PIO 24 August 1969)

It is interesting and important that, in praising the patriotism of EOKA heroes, the President refrained from using the term "Enosis".

On the other hand, Makarios constantly argued that the political future of Cyprus was to be determined by Cypriots. He constantly articulated that no foreign manipulations, including Junta's manipulations were acceptable to him. On 12 September 1970, the President told the third non-aligned summit held in Lusaka that:

The situation has basically not changed since our last [non-aligned] meeting in Cairo in 1964, although internally the tension has been reduced and an effort is being made through local talks for finding a peaceful solution... We are aiming at a democratic solution securing our complete freedom and our unrestricted sovereignty.... I wish to emphasize that the Cyprus problem can be easily solved if approached in its simplicity, but it is impossible to solve if approach[ed] in its artificial complexity as it is made to appear as result mainly of external intervention and interference... We shall continue to strive for a peaceful solution... We shall continue to show good will but we shall not yield to the imposition on us of any solution. We shall not accept any solution which is contrary to the internationally accepted norms and principles of democracy, freedom and justice and contrary to the wishes of our people... (PIO 12 September 1970)

This message, aimed at the national as well as the international scene, contained no reference to Enosis or the Hellenic character of Greek Cypriots. Instead, he emphasized that Cyprus was a free and sovereign state. On the other hand, he strongly protested about external interference and stressed that an externally-
imposed ‘solution’ would be totally unacceptable. The Cyprus Problem had to be solved by the Cypriots themselves and not by external powers. This statement provides a good example of what Brubaker calls “nationalizing nationalism”. It is also important that, the President had determined a task for Greek Cypriots. They should to be aware of external interferences and protect the sovereignty of Cyprus. In another statement, Makarios said

The negotiator on behalf of [the] Turkish Cypriot community is Mr. Denktash; but as he empathetically stated, he accepts Ankara’s directives as they came out of the Koran. The position of [the] Greek Cypriot side, which Mr. Clerides represents, is different on this point. We co-operate with Athens, but we do not always accept their instructions as if they came out of the Bible (PIO 8 October 1971)

In his aforementioned statement, Makarios expressed that he differed from the Turkish Cypriot leadership on one specific aspect. While the Turkish Cypriot leaders voluntarily followed Ankara’s manipulations in their policies regarding inter-communal talks, Makarios refused to fulfil Junta’s demands. On 16 February 1972, when the Junta was putting pressure on the President regarding the inter-communal talks, Makarios and his foreign minister, Spyros Kyprianou, welcomed the Norwegian Ambassador at the Presidential Palace. In addition to more general issues affecting both countries, they discussed Norwegian aid to Government of Cyprus, the UN Peacekeeping force in Cyprus (Norway was a leading contributor to peacekeeping but did not participate in UNFICYP). After the meeting, the President made the following statement:

Although the problem of Cyprus is still unresolved.... we hope that a new approach will be found which will make possible a breakthrough towards a just and democratic solution. There will be, perhaps, an attempt [to] impos[e] a solution from [the] outside We shall resist any such attempt. The
people of Cyprus should have the last word in [the] determination of their future. (PIO 16 February 1972; Agonas 17 February 1972, p.1)

The President did not identify the Junta as the source of the “external pressure”, however he once again said that the future of Cyprus would be decided by the inter-communal talks. This represented a strong emphasis on “nationalizing nationalism” as the basis of the national identity he was trying to construct.

On 6 April 1973, David Popper, US Ambassador to Cyprus, reported in a confidential telegram to Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State that on 5 April 1973, EDEK’s newspaper Ta Nea (The News) had made a direct and sharp accusation against Greek officers in the National Guard. The newspaper claimed that these officers were co-operating directly with Grivas and EOKA B. Popper also drew attention to Miltiades Christodoulou’s statement accusing Lyssarides of damaging Greco-Cypriot relations which were restored by mutual efforts of Papadopoulos and Makarios (Popper despatch, 6 April 1973).

On 25 November 1973, Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis ousted Papadopoulos and appointed General Fedonas Gizikis as the President of Greece. Due to his absolute control over the armed forces and police forces, Ioannidis managed to impose his dictatorship on Greece. On 27 January 1974, Grivas died and Makarios declared three days of national mourning. On 28 January, Makarios offered amnesty to the EOKA B members, on condition that they dissolved the organization. They refused to do so. In May 1974, a substantial quantity of arms was stolen from a Cypriot Army training camp and the theft was subsequently credited to EOKA B. In May and June 1974, the government discovered within the
army anti-Makarios cells under Greek officers who were collaborating with EOKA B and engaging in anti-Makarios and pro-Enosis propaganda. The refusal of EOKA B members to dissolve the organization even after Grivas’s death, their continued illegal activities, and their apparent collaboration with the Greek officers loyal to Colonel Ioannides, clearly demonstrated to Makarios that the Junta, Greek officers in the National Guard and the EOKA B had formed a front against him. He had to take a firm stand and he significantly changed his attitude towards Athens (Tasca despatch, 29 November 1973; Grant despatch, 28 January 1974; Rush despatch, 17 May 1974; Clerides 1990: 278-318).

On 6 May 1974, Henry Tasca, US Ambassador to Greece, sent a telegram to the State Department and informed about the internal situation in Cyprus. According to Tasca, the support he provided to EOKA B corresponded to Ioannidis’s interests. If the Cypriot police eliminated EOKA B, Ioannidis and his government would lose an important card against Makarios. Tasca also noted that, Greek Cypriot leftists established armed bands led by Lyssarides (Tasca despatch, 6 May 1974). As regards the Greek officer’s involvement in political activities, on 16 May 1974, Makarios stated: “The army, in any country, should confine itself to its purely military mission. The national education of the youth is not a task of the army”. In the same statement, the President also for the first time said that “some Athens circles support EOKA B” (PIO 16 May 1974; Charavghi 17-May 1974, p.1).

While Ioannidis’s support to EOKA B dissatisfied Makarios, the Greco-Turkish relations were also damaged due to the Aegean Crisis. On 29 May 1974, Turkey sent a vessel, accompanied by warships, to explore for oil in an area of the
Aegean Sea claimed by Greece. On the same day, the Junta accused Turkey of violating Greek continental shelves and asked Turkish Government to recall the ships. This led to a Greco-Turkish dispute. The dispute was reported to State Department by Tasca’s telegram on the same day (Tasca despatch, 29 May 1974). On 1 June 1974, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Spyridon Tetenes, made a statement and argued that the ships sent from Turkey constituted a violation against Greek continental shelves, the Junta could find it essential to charge Greek naval forces to pursue the Turkish ships and Greece would not negotiate the Aegean dispute with Turkey, unless the ships were recalled (Milliyet 2 June 1974). According to a telegram sent by James Spain, Deputy Chief of Mission in Ankara, Turks were dissatisfied with the Greek demands. Turan Gunesh, Mister of Foreign Affairs, made a statement on 3 June 1974 and argued that, the Junta aimed to provoke a Greco-Turkish conflict in order to increase its domestic popularity by exploiting the anti-Turkish feelings of Greek people (Spain despatch, 3 June 1974) . While the collaboration between Greek Cypriot terrorists, Greek officers in the National Guard and Ioannidis was surfaced, the Athens-Ankara relations were also damaged.

On 2 July 1974, President Makarios wrote to his Greek counterpart, General Gizikis. His letter, which was released in full to the public, constituted a direct manipulation of “nationalising nationalism”. In it the President for the first time identified the Junta, the government of his “homeland”, as an “external other”. It marked a turning point and so angered the the Greek Junta that 13 days later the Junta launched its coup against President Makarios. In the letter, Makarios had not minced his words, saying that it was “with profound grief” that he had:
to set out to you certain inadmissible situation and events in Cyprus for which I regard the Greek Government responsible. The National Guard, which is staffed and controlled by the Greek officers, has been from the outset the main supplier of men and material to EOKA B, the members and the supporters of which gave themselves the ringing titles of “Enosists” and “Enosis camp”. I have many times asked myself why an unlawful and nationally harmful organisation which is creating divisions and discords cleaving rifts in our internal front and leading the Greek Cypriot people to civil strife is supported by Greek officers… However, the Greek officers’ support for EOKA B constitutes an undeniable reality. The National Guard camps in various areas of the island and nearby sites are smeared with slogans in favour of Grivas and EOKA B and also slogans against the Cyprus Government and particularly myself… I am sorry to say, Mr. President, that the root of the evil is very deep, reaching as far as Athens. It is from there that the tree of evil, the bitter fruits of which the Greek Cypriot people are tasting today, is being fed and maintained and helped to grow and spread. The guilt of circles of the military regime is proved by documents which were found recently in the possession of leading cadres of EOKA B…I cannot say that I have a special liking for military regimes, particularly in Greece, the birth-place of democracy… The Cyprus state should be dissolved only in the event of Enosis. However, as long as Enosis is not feasible it is imperative that the state status of Cyprus should be strengthened. By its whole attitude towards the National Guard issue, the Greek Government has been following a policy calculated to abolish the Cyprus state…I do not desire interruption of my co-operation with the Greek Government. But it should be borne in mind that I am not an appointed prefect or locum tenens of the Greek Government in Cyprus, but an elected leader of a large section of Hellenism and I demand an appropriate conduct by the National Centre towards me…. (PIO 6 July 1974; Clerides 1989b: 320-325)

President Makarios thus complained about the Junta supporting EOKA B and its illegal activities, expressed unhappiness with the existence of a military dictatorship in Greece, and accused the Junta of threatening the survival of the Cypriot state. More importantly, Makarios emphasised that he was the elected Greek Cypriot leader and the Junta should recognise that he was not behoven to them and they should not try to dictate policies to Cyprus. In terms of Brubaker’s approach, “homeland nationalism” requires a motherland, the political centre of an ethnicity, manipulating and supporting the policies of her ethnic relatives in
transnational borders. Makarios’ letter underlining Cyprus’ existence as an independent state and asking the homeland to respect Cyprus’s sovereignty constitutes the most powerful example of Makarios’s “nationalizing nationalism”. At this point, in addition to his manner towards the Junta, Makarios’s demands from Athens were also provocative. He asked Athens to recall the Greek officers serving in the National Guard.

Clerides (1990: 333-335) claims that, after the letter was sent to Gizikis, he constantly tried to convince Makarios that the coup was imminent. He advised the President to inform the permanent members of the Security Council that a coup d’état was expected at any moment. According to Clerides, even Papadopoulos (who was significantly more moderate compared to the extreme nationalist, Ioannidis) had attempted to oust Makarios. Ioannidis was greatly provoked by the letter and the coup became a near certainty. But it was his good relations with Ankara that, according to Makarios, motivated Papadopoulos to try to oust him. He also thought that Ioannidis was so disliked by Turkey (particularly because of the Aegean dispute) that Ankara was unlikely to agree with him on a peaceful form of partition, and he could not risk a Greco-Turkish war by staging a coup. Actually, 10 days before the coup, the President himself expressed that he had not expected a coup. On 5 July 1974, in a press conference, he was asked a question about the possibility of an Athens-sponsored coup. “In my view, there is no likelihood of a coup” he said (PIO 5 July 1974).

On 11 July 1974, the Cypriot police captured Lefteris Papadopoulos, a leading member of EOKA B, and seized important documents enlightening future plans
and cells of the organisation. On 12 July 1974, this was reported to State Department by Rodger Davies, US Ambassador to Cyprus (Davies despatch, 11 July 1974, ). On 12 July 1974, Tasca sent a telegram and noted that, if Ioannidis was to accept Makarios’ demands and recall the Greek officers, his domestic prestige would seriously be damaged. So, he was unlikely to recall the officers. Tasca also asserted that, with the letter he sent to Gizikis, Makarios aimed to utilize the Greco-Turkish dispute. According to Tasca, the Junta was in trouble with Turkey and Makarios saw this as a good opportunity to urge Ioannidis to terminate the support he presented to EOKA B (Tasca despatch, 12 July 1974).

After the capture of Papadopoulos by the Cypriot police, on 13 July 1974, Makarios made another statement. He once again criticized the Greek attitudes towards Cyprus. He said

I have not so far had any reply or reaction from Athens. In any case, regardless of the reaction of the Greek Government, on 20\textsuperscript{th} of July, the numerical strength of the National Guard will be reduced. I shall go ahead with the implementation of my decisions in order to turn the National Guard, which is now virtually under the control of Greek Government, into an organ of Cyprus Government. What however, I am anxious to know is whether the Greek Government will give orders for the dissolution of EOKA B, the terrorist organisation which has led the Greek Cypriots to the brink of civil war and which is supported and maintained by cadres of the Greek military regime. My objective is that, the National Guard should be staffed by Greek Cypriot officers [emphasis added]... I would not describe the situation as critical unless the Greek Government is determined to create civil war conditions in Cyprus by continuing to encourage and support the terrorist activities of EOKA B (PIO 13 July 1974).

In his aforementioned statement, the President argued that, with the support presented to EOKA B, the Junta was leading Greek Cypriots into a civil war. Archbishop Makarios also emphasized that, he aimed to put the National Guard under his government’s control by removing mainland Greeks and appointing
Greek Cypriot officers. He significantly labeled the Junta of Ioannidis as an “external other” threatening Greek Cypriots’ security.

On 15 July 1974, the National Guard, supported by ELDYK, attacked on the Presidential Palace with tanks and armoured vehicles. Makarios managed to leave the Palace alive and accompanied by a few members of the Presidential Guard, managed to reach Paphos. However, the PIK (Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation) radio station announced that Makarios had been killed and the National Guard had seized power. EOKA B came out of hiding and helped the National Guard to establish the government after the coup (Clerides 1990: 342). Kyriacos Sevariades, a leading member of EOKA B, was appointed to the Ministry of Labour (Davies despatch 16 July 1974). Nicos Sampson, the leader of the PP, who was appointed to the Presidency by the National Guard, broadcast the following statement:

Greek Cypriot People, In the name of God and men, and my honorary selection by the Armed Forces of our people, I have assumed to-day the duties of the President of Cyprus Republic. You are all aware of the happenings so far which have necessitated the salutary intervention of the Armed Forces of our country. Thus, I am particularly proud to assume to-day my lofty duties, being convinced that the Cyprus boat, which is now in peril, will be steered to the harbour of spiritual tranquility and the unity between the people and the Army. The aims of my government are: 1) Immediate restoration of law and order, 2) Restoration of tranquility and order in the ranks of the Church…. 4) Continuation of the procedure for the solution of the Cyprus problem through the enlarged inter-communal talks…. Long live the Greek people of Cyprus, Long live the Armed Forces of Cyprus, God is with us (PIO 17 July 1974).

Nicos Sampson did not mention that the coup had been sponsored by the Greek Junta but Makarios was certain that the Colonels were behind it. From an
abandoned radio station in Paphos, Makarios called upon the Greek Cypriot people to resist the Junta:

Greek Cypriot People! The voice you are hearing is familiar. You know who is talking to you. I am Makarios. I am the one whom you elected to be your leader. Contrary to what the Junta of Athens and its agents here wanted, I am not dead. I am alive, and I am with you, as a co-fighter and the standard-bearer in our common struggle. The Junta’s coup failed. I was the target of the Junta, and as long as I am alive, the Junta shall not be successful. The Greek Cypriot people do not bear dictatorships and coups. The Junta used tanks and armoured vehicles in order to stage the coup. However, the resistance of the Presidential Guard and our people has stopped the tanks and the armoured vehicles. The only achievement of the Junta was their takeover of the radio station of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, which enabled them to make broadcasts full of lies and to proclaim the governmental change. Do not obey the directives imposed by the Junta via the radio station. Greek Cypriot People, the Junta is determined to devastate Cyprus and realize the partition. However, the Junta shall not be successful. Offer resistance to the Junta in every way you can …. Do not be afraid. Make clear your position and your decision to resist, and struggle. All of you enlist in the legal forces of the state. The Junta must not be successful. And the Junta shall not be successful. Now the struggle is holy and victory is ours. Long live the freedom. Long live the Cypriot Hellenism. Long live the nation (Charavghi 15 July 1975, p.1, Clerides 1990: 338-339).

In calling on the Greek Cypriot people to fight against the Junta, Makarios was again using the symbol of “partition”. Since he had already designed the Greek Cypriot national identity so as to maintain Greek Cypriots’ awareness of the challenges to Cyprus’s independence and integrity, he was able to present resistance against the Junta as a duty for the Greek Cypriot people. But the claims he made in his speech did not accord with reality. The National Guard had taken over the Presidential Palace but Makarios did not mention this because he wanted to motivate the Greek Cypriots to resist.
Late in the evening of the day of the coup, 15 July 1974, 1,000 Greek Cypriots demonstrated against the coup near the Greek Embassy in London, which required the deployment of 200 policemen near the Embassy (The Times 16 July 1974, p.5). There was sometimes violent Greek Cypriot resistance to the National Guard in Nicosia, Famagusta, Paphos and Limassol. In 15-19 July 1974, around 500 people were killed during the intra-Hellenic conflict. The majority of the killed people were the civilians and policemen who resisted. The Greek Cypriot troops of the National Guard constituted the second largest group who lost their lives. The mainland Greek troops and officers were the smallest group amongst the killed people (Milliyet 19 July 1974, p.6; Peristianis 2008: 356). Around 1,000 Greek Cypriots, including pro-Makarios policemen, communists and supporters of Makarios were arrested. The elected Government’ Spokesman, Miltiades Christodoulou, and the EDEK leader, Vasos Lyssarides, were amongst those arrested (Milliyet 19 July 1974, p. 1; p. 10).

On 15 July 1974 Rauf Denktash announced that the coup was an intra-Hellenic conflict and asked the Turkish Cypriot community to not to leave their enclaves and to not to get involved in the conflict between the National Guard and the supporters of Makarios. Turkish Cypriots followed Denktash’s directives (Milliyet 16 July 1974, p. 6).

On 16 July 1974, Makarios decided to leave the island and continue his anti-Junta struggle outside Cyprus. The British soldiers sent a helicopter to Paphos and they took Makarios to the British base in Akrotiri106 (located in Southern part of the island). There he boarded a Royal Air Force plane which took him to London. On 17 July 1974, he met Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, and James

---

106 According to Malcolm (1996), the British had pre-planned to save Makarios. Based on the pre-prepared plan, if the Colonels ousted him, the British would send a helicopter to Makarios and take him to Akrotiri.
Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, who made it clear that they still regarded him as the legal head of the state. But when Makarios asked whether the UK would intervene militarily to restore the constitutional order in Cyprus, the British made it clear they had no such intention and advised him to apply to the UN Security Council. On 17 July 1974, the Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, was in London to meet his British counterpart, Wilson. He told Wilson that the constitution had been overthrown by an anti-democratic movement sponsored by Greece. Turkey and UK, as the other guarantor powers, were obliged to restore constitutional order in Cyprus and he wanted joint military action. Wilson offered Ecevit two options. The first was to go to the Security Council, the other was US mediation. Ecevit was not satisfied with this feeble response. Cyprus’s future was, he said, endangered with the coup, and Turkey could not afford to sit back (Kissinger despatch, 18 July 1974; Milliyet 18 July 1974, p.1; Clerides 1990: 341-345).

On 19 July 1974, Makarios arrived in New York to address the Security Council which he called on to put an end to the Greek sponsored regime in Cyprus with the following words:

I knew all along that the illegal organisation [EOKA B] had its roots and supply resources in Athens....In the camps of the National Guard, the Greek officers were conducting open propaganda in favour of that illegal organisation and turned the National Guard from an organ of the state into an instrument of subversion.... A few days ago documents came into the hands of the Cyprus police clearly proving that 'EOKA B' was an appendage of the Athens regime.... I then found it necessary myself to address a letter to the President of the Greek regime, General Gizikis, asking him to give orders for the cessation of the violence and bloodshed by 'EOKA B' and for its dissolution. I also requested him to recall the Greek officers serving with the National Guard, adding that my intention was to reduce the numerical strength of this force and to turn it into an organ of the Cyprus State....The Greek Ambassador in Cyprus called on me, on instructions from his Government, in order to explain to me that the decrease in the numerical
strength of the National Guard or the withdrawal of the Greek officers would weaken the defence of Cyprus in case of danger from Turkey....I replied that as things developed I consider the danger from Turkey of a lesser degree than the danger from them. And it was proved that my fears were justified. As I have already stated, the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus. The Turks of Cyprus are also affected. The coup of the Greek junta is an invasion, and from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks.... The Security Council should call upon the military regime of Greece to withdraw from Cyprus the Greek officers serving in the National Guard, and to put an end to its invasion of Cyprus.

(source: York University 2004)

In this statement Makarios identified the Greek Junta as the “external other” and accused it of making Cypriots suffer. Clearly, he did not regard the Greece of the Greek Junta as a center of homeland nationalism. On the contrary, the Junta was an enemy.

John Scali, the US Ambassador to UN, reported on the Security Council debates in a telegram to State Department sent on 19 July 1974. According to Scali, Panagiotacos, who represented Greece on the Security Council, claimed that the coup was an internal Cypriot matter, Athens was not involved in it and his government would maintain its non-intervention stance towards Cypriot affairs. On the other hand, Osman Olcay, the permanent Turkish represented demanded the removal of Greek Officers from Cyprus. The representatives of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Romania and India supported Makarios’s stance and accused Greece of sponsoring the coup (Scali despatch, 19 July 1974; Clerides 1989b: 357-363).

---

107 The full text of Makarios’s speech at the Security Council is provided by the York University webpage.
108 The full text of Makarios’s speech at the Security Council is provided by the York University webpage. Since the webpage also provides President’s speech in a sound file, there is no reason to consider this source as unreliable. Furthermore, the full text of Makarios’s speech at the council is also provided by Clerides (1990: 351-357), and it has no difference to the text provided by the York University.
However, while the Security Council was debating the crisis, Turkey launched its military intervention on 20 July 1974. Ankara justified its military intervention by reference to Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkish troops landed on Kyrenia (a city located in Northern Cyprus). On the same day, in another unclassified circular telegram, Scali sent details of the resolution which the Security Council had passed unanimously at the end of the debate. Resolution 353/1974 expressed grave concern about “the serious threat to international peace and security, and […] a most explosive situation”, called for a ceasefire, demanded “an immediate end to foreign military intervention”, and requested “parties” immediately to withdraw their military personnel other than apart from the 650 Turkish and 950 Greek soldiers whose presence in Cyprus was provided for under the 1960 Treaty of Alliance (Scali despatch, 20 July 1970; Clerides 1990: 474-475).

The Greek Junta failed to prevent Turkey, which used its army, air force and navy, to land 25,000 soldiers on the island. The Junta also failed to send additional forces to Cyprus whose the National Guard of 11,000 soldiers could not withstand the Turkish intervention. The Turkish army managed to reach to the Turkish Cypriot enclave in Nicosia and to safeguard the Nicosia-Kyrenia corridor. The first phase of the Turkish military campaign put around 7% of the Cypriot territory under Turkish Control. On 22 July 1974, Greek and Turkish governments announced cease-fire. Due to his military failure against the Turks, Ioannidis lost prestige and he asked Gizikis to hand power back to civilians on 23 July 1974. One day later, Constantine Karamanlis returned from exile and became Greek Prime Minister. Sampson also resigned and on 23 July 1974, Clerides assumed the duties of the Acting President of the Republic. The Turkish army managed to
reach to the Turkish Cypriot enclave in Nicosia and safeguard the Nicosia-Kyrenia road (Stoessel despatch, 24 July 1974; Clerides 1990: 17-36). On 9 August 1974, Cypriot leaders and the Foreign Ministers of the guarantor states met in Geneva in order to negotiate the future of Cyprus. British Minister of Foreign Affairs, James Callaghan, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georgios Mavros, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turan Gunesh, Greek Cypriot representative, Glafkos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot representative, Rauf Denktash, were present (Clerides 1990: 44).

On 9 August 1974, Clerides had the impression that Gunesh and Denktash were likely to demand the establishment of a federation. He claims that he phoned Makarios, and the Archbishop expressed that the establishment of a bi-zonal federation, or any federation on a geographical basis, was unacceptable to him. On 12 August 1974, Denktash demanded a bi-zonal federation which would put 34% of the island under Turkish Cypriot control, gather the Turkish Cypriots in the North and Greek Cypriots in the South. On the other hand, the proposal of Gunesh foresaw the establishment of a multi-cantonal federation, which would put 34% of the island under Turkish Cypriot control. Clerides and Mavros demanded the restoration of the 1960 Constitution and the maintenance of the inter-communal talks for a peaceful settlement. However Gunesh and Denktash refused their demands. On 13 August 1974, Clerides asked for 48 hours to consider the proposals of Gunesh and Denktash. Mavros asked for 36 hours to fly to Athens and discuss the issue with his government. Callaghan supported Clerides, and expressed that it was a reasonable demand. However Gunesh refused to wait and the Conference broke up (Clerides 1992: 45-79; Birand 1975: 238-279). At this
point, it is important to note that, what Clerides told about Makarios’s stance was to a
great extent valid. The President himself had told in a visual documentary that “a bi-
communal federation [was] totally unacceptable” to him (Makarios 1975).

On 14 August 1974, Turkey launched the second phase of her military campaign.
The second phase of the intervention had placed nearly the 36% of the island
under Turkish (and Turkish Cypriot) control. The Turkish military campaign was
terminated with the ceasefire on 16 August 1974. With the Turkish intervention,
inter-communal violence grew. The coup, the Turkish intervention and the inter-
ethnic violence in Cyprus (15 July 1974-16 August 1974) caused huge
casualties. Around 3,500 Greek Cypriots, 500 Turkish Cypriots, 500 Turkish
troops and 100 Greek troops lost their lives\footnote{109}. The island was divided. Greek
Cypriots were gathered in the South, the part of the island that was free of
Turkish soldiers, and Turkish Cypriots were in the North, the part which was
under the control of Turkish army. With the division of Cyprus, around 200,000
Greek Cypriots and 60,000 Turkish Cypriots became refugees (Artuc 1989: 317-
ELDYK 2013). On 19 August 1974, 2,000 Greek Cypriots demonstrated near the
US Embassy in Nicosia. They protested the US government and held Kissinger
responsible for the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. During the demonstration,
armed groups fired at the Embassy and Rodger Davies, US Ambassador to
Cyprus, was killed (Milliyet 19 August 1974, p.10).

\footnote{109} The period 1963-1974 caused around 5,000 Cypriot casualties. Amongst those, 2,000 were
“missing persons”, who are strongly believed to have been massacred and buried to unknown
locations. So far, the remains of 494 “missing persons” have been identified and returned to their
families (CMP 2014).
There is no doubt that, the coup had led to the Turkish military intervention and the de facto partition of Cyprus. Nevertheless, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot political elite have divergent ideas about the reasons having led to the coup.

According to Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash, Junta had overthrown Makarios in order to materialize the Enosis. In a visual documentaty he was interviewed, Denktash said the following:

On 15 July 1974, early in the morning, I heard gunshots. I switched on the radio and learned that the coup had been staged. It was announced that, Makarios had been killed and Nicos Sampson was appointed as the new President. I felt anxious because Nicos Sampson, who came into power, was insane and he was a murderer. As soon as I heard about the coup, I expressed to my people that it was an intra-Hellenic issue and asked them to not to get involved. I immediately contacted Ankara and I asked Turkey to take action. It was the last chance of Turkey to impede the Enosis and [military] intervention was essential (Denktash 1999).

According to Greek Cypriot political elite however, the coup was staged for another reason. Spyros Kyprianou, who succeeded Makarios as the elected President of Cyprus (1977-1988), Patroclos Stavrou, the Under-Secretary to the President (1960-1990), and Vasos Lyssarides, the leader of EDEK (1969-2002), asserted that the Junta and its Cypriot followers were not intended to unify Cyprus with Greece. Their aim was to overthrow Makarios in order to open the way for the

---

110 This study focused particularly on President Makarios as its core actor of analysis. The role of USA in the Cyprus Conflict was not neglected; however it did not constitute a central analytical concern. Nonetheless, there have been studies which argued that both the Greek coup and the Turkish military intervention were phases of an American conspiracy, aimed at the partition of Cyprus. In Washington's point of view, the partition was a formula that could satisfy both Greece and Turkey. The partition could also neutralize the Soviet and NAM cards played by Makarios. Furthermore, the UK had not allowed the USA to utilize the sovereign British bases in Cyprus during the Yom Kippur War (1973). This led USA to give the green light to Turkish military intervention, in order to safeguard its interests in Mediterranean via the Turkish army. Therefore, although Washington, particularly Kissinger, knew about the coup and the Turkish intervention in advance, the US government did not try to deter Turkey and Greece (See Fouskas 2001; O’Malley & Craig 2001).
“double- Enosis”\textsuperscript{111}. In a visual documentary they were interviewed, they made the following statements:

Makarios had not believed that a coup would be staged. He believed that the Junta had some patriotism and it would estimate the consequences of a coup.... They [Greek Junta and its Cypriot followers] certainly did not have the aim to realize the Enosis.... On the one hand, they told young Greek Cypriots that realizing the Enosis was a national duty. They directed the youth against Makarios since he was anti-Enosist. They opposed to Makarios’s policies in the name of Enosis. On the other hand, however, they supported solution formulas that had nothing to do with the Enosis. They urged Makarios to make concessions and accept Turkish [Cypriot] proposals, for the resolution of the Cyprus Question. Probably, before they staged the coup, some of them expected the double-Enosis to be the consequence...(Kyprianou 1992)

The dictatorship in Greece had placed its associates into the National Guard and Cypriot police forces. It used them against the legal government of Cyprus. I think the foreign powers, particularly Americans, led the Junta and its Cypriot supporters to think that they could resolve the Cyprus Question if Makarios was eliminated. Most probably, Americans, particularly Kissinger, characterized the double-Enosis as an acceptable solution for Greece. Makarios would be assassinated, the coup would be staged and Turkey would be allowed to invade Cyprus. Turkey would takeover the %20 of Cyprus, leave the rest of the island to Greece and the double-Enosis would be realized. The background of this treason [the coup] was apparent in realities of Cyprus. The violence and terrorism of EOKA B directed against the Cypriot society and the Cypriot state had aimed to prepare a background that would lead to the coup (Lyssarides 1992).

The coup was staged on 15 July 1974. It was Monday.... By the next they, the Junta and its Cypriot associates had taken the entire Cyprus under their control.... So, why the Junta of Athens did not proclaim the Enosis immediately?... They did not proclaim it [Enosis] on Tuesday, they did not proclaim it on Wednesday, they did not proclaim on Thursday. On Thursday, the so-called “President” of the so-called “government” established after the coup, Nicos Sampson, organized a press conference and made statements. After having said some lies, he was asked a question about the future of the inter-communal talks aimed at the resolution of the Cyprus Question. “They will go on” he said. He did not even talk about the Enosis (Stavrou 1992).

Following the restoration of democracy in Greece, the leaders of the fallen Junta were brought to judgement. On 22 October 1974, the Greek Attorney General,
Dimitris Tsevas, ordered an investigation be launched against Papadopoulos, Ioannidis and 25 other high ranking officers of the fallen Junta. This was reported on the same day by the US Ambassador to Greece, Jack Kubisch, in a limited telegram to Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State (Kubisch despatch, 22 October 1974). The elite of the fallen Junta were accused of high treason and, on 23 August 1975, after a trial that took nearly ten months, Papadopoulos and two others were sentenced to death, while Ioannidis and eight others were given life imprisonment, and 15 others were sent to jail for between five and 25 years. However, the following day, 24 August 1975, the death sentences penalties were commuted into life sentences (Milliyet 24 August 1975 p.1; Milliyet 25 August 1975). Papadopoulos, Ioannidis and all the others who were given life sentences stayed in prison for the rest of their lives.

Makarios came back to Cyprus and resumed the presidency on 7 December 1974 (Clerides 1992: 138) After his return to his office, Makarios continued speaking against the Greek Junta for the events leading to the Turkish military intervention and the division of the island. On 15 July 1975, on the first anniversary of Junta-sponsored coup, Makarios made the following statement at the Presidential Palace:

Greek Cypriot People, memory today turns to an ill-omened day and a mournful anniversary. On these walls of the Presidential Palace the prologue [to] your big national tragedy was written. A year to the day, on 15 July 1974, junta putschists attacked with heavy arms and brought down the Presidential Palace, my death being their target. The ruins of the Presidential Palace were to be my grave.... But the Presidential Palace ruins did not become my grave. They became the Junta’s grave. The All-Good God, whose providence and grace I praise, foiled my planned death. And near the ruins of the Presidential Palace, symbol of resistance against the fallen Junta, I am standing today with the spirit upright, addressing to you greetings of esteem (PIO 15 July 1975).
CONCLUSION

As stated in the previous Chapter, an independent and unitary Cypriot state, with limited veto rights for the Turkish Cypriots and consolidated governmental control over the local administrations was advantageous to the President. Assimilating the Turkish Cypriot leadership would enhance his political power. And as long as Greece was under military dictatorship, he had nothing to gain from union with Greece where the Colonels gained absolute control over the Greek political scene, particularly after the King’s exile. Meanwhile, the independence of Cyprus provided significant economic growth to the Greek Cypriot community. Thus, the President had no serious important reasons to seek *Enosis*: Greek Cypriots would not profit (either economically or politically).

The President did not accept Turkish Cypriot demands for further autonomy in local administrations. Meanwhile, the Greek Junta acted as the “homeland” and tried to dictate policies to Makarios, urging him to accept Turkish Cypriot demands. In Greco-Cypriot relations, “homeland nationalism” had two dimensions. The first dimension was unification nationalism. Makarios abandoned this dimension of “homeland nationalism” in 1968, when he entered into inter-communal talks. The second dimension was Athens’s manipulation of her ethnic kin’s policies. Makarios refused to follow the Junta’s dictates on Cyprus and insisted that the destiny of Cyprus was to be determined by the Cypriots themselves. He also emphasised that he was the leader of an independent state. All the policies he followed and all the statements he made after January 1968 clearly referred to “nationalizing nationalism”. The President tried to assimilate Turkish Cypriots and create a Cypriot state reflecting the political will of the Greek Cypriot majority.
In order to enhance the “nationalizing nationalism”, the President often utilized the symbol of “partition”. “Partition” played an important role in President’s re-construction of Greek Cypriot national identity. His emphasis on the “unitary state”, the “independence” and a “feasible solution” also contributed to his re-construction of the Greek Cypriot National Identity. Based on the new modifications of the national identity, the President encouraged Greek Cypriots to revise their attachment to the idea of *Enosis* and to embrace the maintenance Cyprus’s independence and integrity as the highest goal. Since he identified Greek Cypriots as deserving to rule the Cypriot state because they comprised the vast majority of the islanders, his policies and his re-construction of the national identity can clearly be described as the “Greek Cypriot nationalism” (See also Stavrinides 1975; Kizilyurek 2005; Loizieds 2007).

Additionally, Makarios indicated that Turkish Cypriot leadership and Greek Cypriot terrorists were the “internal others” damaging Cyprus’s integrity. On the other hand, for Makarios, Turkey was an “external other” having expansionist policies directed against Cyprus and using Turkish Cypriots as an instrument enabling her to intervene in Cypriot politics. While the Greek Cypriot Left, as loyal supporters of the President, alienated the Greek Junta, criticized its “pro-partition” tendency and pronounced it the an enemy of Greeks and Cypriots, the President refrained from trying to turn Greek Cypriots against the Junta of Papadopoulos. However, when Ioannides’s direct collaboration with Greek officers and the EOKA B was detected, Makarios changed his attitude to the Greek Government.
In his letter to the Junta, which was also given to the PIO, the President clearly spoke the same language as the Greek Cypriot Left. He referred to Junta’s regime as a “dictatorship” and accused Athens of sabotaging the survival of the Cypriot state. He also clearly told the Junta to respect Cyprus’s sovereignty. Once the President clearly turned Cypriots against the Junta, with the letter he sent to Gizikis, the Junta and the Greek officers in the Cypriot army overthrew him. In terms of the concept of “homeland nationalism”, the Junta could be seen as aiming to fulfil its role as the centre of Hellenism by eliminating President Makarios and thereby “solving” the Cyprus Question.

With regard to the two hypotheses of this thesis, the national identity constructed by the President was assimilative towards the Turkish Cypriots. That is, the President aimed to assimilate Turkish Cypriot political demands and enhance Greek Cypriots hegemony, and his own political position in Cyprus. Thus 

_Hypothesis 1_ has validated. On the other hand, since unification with a military regime and acceptance of its preferences regarding the Cyprus Question was contradictory to the interests of Greek Cypriots and their leader, President Makarios preferred “nationalizing nationalism” and abandoned his attachment to “homeland nationalism”. In seeking to create a Cyprus ruled by Greek Cypriots, he found himself at the centre of the conflict between his “nationalizing nationalism” and the Junta’s “homeland nationalism”. _Hypothesis 2_ has also been proved to be valid. This thesis has thus successfully achieved its goals and proved the validity of both hypotheses derived on the basis of Brass’s Instrumentalist approach.
V. CONCLUSIONS

Before clarifying and discussing the conclusions reached by this thesis, it is essential to highlight the limitations of the research and how the gap caused by the relevant limitations was covered. As mentioned in the Introduction, the archives of AKEL and Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs\(^{112}\) could not been used because the documents were closed. The two archives could have been amongst the valuable sources of data for the analytical concerns of this thesis. Furthermore, on 15 July 1974, when the Cypriot army staged the coup, the circulation of pro-Makarios newspapers was banned until the resignation of Nicos Sampson on 23 July 1974. Nonetheless, the relevant deficiencies were covered via the visits at the National Archives in Kew (TNA) and the PIO. Additionally, the visits to the Grand Library of Near East University and to the Dr Fazil Kutchuk Museum for the Halkin Sesi archives and the utilization of online sources such as the State Department archives and Milliyet archives have also been useful in filling the gaps.

As explained in the Theoretical Framework, this thesis had two hypotheses. The Hypothesis 1 was: *In case there is an ethnic conflict in an “Eastern” and multi-ethnic power-sharing democracy and the major group is also richer than the other(s); its leader is likely to construct a national identity aiming to coerce the minor ethnic group(s).* As Chapters 2 and 3 indicated, Greek Cypriots were more heavily populated and richer than Turkish Cypriots. Makarios made his first attempt to “coerce” the Turkish Cypriot community in November 1963, by trying to limit their veto rights. He tried again during the inter-communal talks (1968-1974). As stated in Chapter 4, Makarios regarded Turkish Cypriot leadership as a threat.

\(^{112}\) As mentioned in the Introduction, the documents of Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs covering the period 1969-1974 were closed.
to the integrity of the Cypriot people, and he encouraged the Greek Cypriots to support a constitutional amendment that would enable the majority (Greek Cypriots) in effect to rule over the minority (Turkish Cypriots).

Limiting the Turkish Cypriot political elite’s veto rights would increase Makarios’s political power as the leader of Cyprus, and would guarantee Greek Cypriots’ dominance on Cypriot politics. Due to their local autonomy demands during the inter-communal talks, Makarios labeled Turkish Cypriot leaders as the “internal others”. He accused Turkish Cypriot leaders of following “partitionist” plans and leading the talks to deadlock. On the other hand, Ankara supported and encouraged Turkish Cypriots’ demands for local autonomy. This led Makarios to characterize Turkey as an “external other”. He identified Turkey as an external threat directed against the integrity of Cyprus. In criticizing Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, the President tended to use the “partition” as a symbol. He manipulated Greek Cypriots to stand for a unitary state and oppose separatist solutions. This thesis proves the validity of Hypothesis 1, when assessing Makarios and Cyprus during the years 1967-1974.

Hypothesis 2 was: If an “Eastern” state is dominated by an ethnic group, the dominant ethnic group has a “homeland”, and unification with the “homeland” or loyalty to the political manipulations of the “homeland” contradicts to the interests of the ethnic group and its leader, the leader of the ethnic group is likely to construct a national identity favouring “nationalising nationalism” and opposing “homeland nationalism”. As noted in Chapter 2, unification with the “homeland” Greece was the primary political goal of Greek Cypriots towards the end of British
era (1955-1959). However, as shown in Chapter 3, independence brought significant economic growth for Greek Cypriots and the unification with the military dictatorship that ruled Greece in 1967-1974 would have deprived Greek Cypriots of their democratic rights. It would also have deprived President Makarios of the political power he enjoyed.

Greek Cypriot terrorism (1969-1974) forced Makarios to return to the pro-Enosis political line. Furthermore, Papadopoulos forced him to accept Turkish Cypriot demands for local autonomy, and Ioannidis offered direct support to Greek Cypriot terrorism targeting Makarios. He also instigated a coup overthrowing the Cypriot government. Accordingly, as Chapter 3 indicated, the Junta’s machinations conflicted with the interests of Makarios and Greek Cypriots. As Chapter 4 pointed out, Makarios identified the terrorists and the Junta of Ioannidis as threats to the integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. In other words, for Makarios, Greek Cypriot terrorists were “internal others”, and the Junta of Ioannidis was an “external other”. Chapter 4 also showed how Makarios persuaded Greek Cypriots to stand up for a sovereign, independent and integrated Cyprus; to resist outside pressures (particularly those emanating from Greece); and, abandon the Enosis dream. In re-constructing Greek Cypriot national identity to achieve this end, President Makarios constantly used the same symbol, and he accused the terrorists and the Junta of leading Cyprus to “partition”. Thus, this thesis also proves the validity of Hypothesis 2. Therefore, in answering its research question (see page 23), this thesis concludes that the “elite interests” affected Makarios’s shaping of Greek Cypriot national identity to a great extent.
Prizel argues, the political relationship between the nation and its “others” is “dialectical”. Meanwhile Brass asserts that there is a parallel relationship between the national identity, the interests of the political elite and the interests of their ethnic group. This thesis also proves the validity of both notions. Makarios aimed to preserve the independence and the integrity of Cyprus by transforming the Republic into a Greek Cypriot-ruled state. Turkish Cypriot leaders, Turkey, Greek Cypriot terrorists and the Junta opposed this idea, and Makarios referred to them as the “others”. Moreover, the independence was politically profitable to the President and his ethnic group, since Greece was under a military dictatorship.

Having shown the validity of its hypotheses, this thesis concludes that, as Brass, Gellner, Breuilly, Hobsbawm and Anderson suggested, national identity is a perception that can be socially constructed. Moreover, the political aims play a crucial role in national identity’s construction and reconstruction. As this thesis has shown, Makarios and his Greek Cypriot compatriots abandoned their age-old national ambition for Enosis in favour of struggling to retain the independence and sovereignty of a Cypriot state dominated by Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, their “nationalising nationalism” led them into a sharp conflict with their “homeland” (Greece), and this caused the Junta-sponsored coup of 15 July 1974. As Cypriot scholars, Loizos (1975), Kizilyurek (2002), Loizides (2007), Peristianis (2008) and Mavratsas (2010) assert, the Greek Cypriots’ transition from Greek nationalism to Greek Cypriot nationalism contradicts Berghe, Hutchinson and Smith’s view that national identity is essentially a static and pre-given form of consciousness.
Regarding literature on National Identity, Chatterjee (1986) and Prizel (1998) put forward thorough examples of analyses of leaders’ political speeches, and Kizilyurek (2005) has successfully adopted it in his case study on Cyprus. All three scholars have concluded that the speeches of political leaders (or leaders of struggles for independence) shape the national identity of the nation, construct the perception of the “other(s)”, and form the backdrop for the political course of society and the state in respect of ethnic minorities, the former colonial power(s) and foreign states. The conclusions reached by this thesis do not disprove the conclusions of Chaterjee, Prizel and Loizides. However, this thesis contributes to the literature via its theoretical and analytical framework that combines the Instrumentalist approach of Brass (1991), the analytical models of Prizel (1998) and Wodak (2009) focused on political speeches of leaders, and the distinction between the “nationalising nationalism” and “homeland nationalism” which was generated by Brubaker (1996).

A significant number of studies have challenged, and, to a noticeable extent, disproved the approaches of the anti-Modernists (Smith, Berghe and Hutchinson), and this thesis is no exception. Peristianis (2008), who focused on the society (Greek Cypriots), followed Gellner in theorizing that ethnic identities and national identities can be constructed (and reconstructed) over time and concluded that the socio-cultural transitions affecting Greek Cypriots have shaped their fluctuating attachment to Greece. On the other hand, Kizilyurek (2005) followed Breuilly and theorized that nationalist movements seek to give greater political power to the nation. Greek Cypriot nationalism sought to transform the Republic of Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot-ruled state. This idea was attractive to Greek Cypriots, as it
motivated the community to abandon the passion for Enosis and to ignore Greek Junta's manipulations about the inter-communal talks.

This thesis followed a different path. It focused on the perceptions of President Makarios, and reached the conclusion that "elite interests" played an important role in Greek Cypriots' detachment from Greece in 1967-1974. Therefore, the conclusions of Peristianis, Kizilyurek and this thesis are that Gellner's, Breuilly's and Brass' accurately account for Nationalism, on the condition that the analytical and hypothetical concerns target a transition regarding the national identity.

It is known that President Makarios aimed to keep Cyprus and Cypriots united. However the deadlock of inter-communal talks, the Junta's coup, Turkish military intervention and the de facto partition prevented the President from reaching to his target. Thus, Cypriots failed to become a nation. The anti-modernist approaches, represented particularly by Smith, Hutchinson and Berghe, argue that the nations are productions of the peaceful co-existence of different ethnic groups, or the supremacy of the dominant group(s) over the lesser group(s). Due to the failures of the Cypriot constitution and inter-communal talks, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots failed to co-exist as a nation. Furthermore, Turkey's support of Turkish Cypriot leadership and her military intervention in Cyprus did not enable Greek Cypriots to assimilate Turkish Cypriots. These historical facts hardly contradict the anti-modernist theories. However, there were some specific factors which led Greek Cypriots to abandon the policies that aimed to unify Cyprus with their "homeland" Greece; encouraged the community to ignore the political manipulations of the Junta; and led them to embrace the Greek Cypriot
nationalism. Thus, in 1967-1974, the national identity of Greek Cypriots was reconstructed.

According to Peristianis, the reconstruction of the Greek Cypriot identity was largely based on a socio-cultural infrastructure. On the other hand, for Kizilyurek and this thesis, the reconstruction of Greek Cypriot national identity had a political basis. Using the Greek Cypriot case as an example, this thesis, along with Peristianis and Kizilyurek, largely disprove the anti-modernist argument that nations essentially have “ethnic origins”. In keeping with the modernist approach, this thesis will instead conclude that nations and potential nations come into existence via the foundation of democratic states. Consequently Greek Cypriot nationalism emerged with the foundation of an independent Cypriot state, the failure of the Cypriot constitution, the growth of the Cypriot economy and the crystallization of Greek and Turkish policies on Cyprus.

Kauffman (1996) was amongst those scholars who maintained that “elite interests” play a significant role in intra-state and inter-state conflicts that arise out of ethnic nationalism. However, unlike Kauffman, who thought Nationalism manipulated by the political elite might lead ethnically differing nations and ethnic groups into conflict and violence, this thesis has proved that the nationalism imposed by the political elite can also lead ethnic groups or nations sharing the same ethnicity into conflict and violence. There are many possibilities for future studies: relations between Russia and ethnic Russians in Crimea, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, Malaysia and ethnic Malaysians in Singapore, China and ethnic Chinese in Singapore, Hungary and ethnic Hungarians in Romania, Albania and ethnic
Albanians in the Republic of Kosovo, and Serbs and ethnic Serbs in Kosovo. All these might shed further valuable light on the relationship between the national identity and “elite interests”, with regard to “nationalizing nationalism” and “homeland nationalism”. Brass’ Instrumentalism might suit the hypothetical purposes of such studies. Single case studies and comparative case studies might be conducted. The Russian invasion of Crimea (February 2014), where the ethnic Russians constitute the majority, can be analyzed and accounted for based on the conventional wisdom and the existing analytical approaches within the field of Nationalism studies. However, the analytical and hypothetical approaches of this thesis might constitute an appropriate example for the students within the field to examine the policy of ethnic Russians (and their political elite in particular) favouring the unification with their “homeland” Russia.

The success of this thesis in demonstrating the validity of its hypotheses suggests that it might be useful for Nationalism studies to work towards generating an inclusive theoretical framework that would include the essential concepts regarding nationalism in ethnically divided societies. This thesis focuses on Cyprus and its key concepts are “national identity” and “elite interests”. Its theoretical framework includes a significant range of other concepts including “consociation”, “the other”, “homeland nationalism”, “nationalizing nationalism” and “symbols”. Such concepts have important connections to the political history of Cyprus. As Breuilly (1993) notes, Nationalism in each society is shaped by its own sui-generis historical background. In the case of Cyprus, its “consociational” democracy was an important element that could not be neglected. Students of Nationalism must not to ignore such distinctive political and historical features of the society they
investigate. Conversely Brass’ theory and analysis did not include the concepts of “nationalizing nationalism” and “homeland nationalism” which were adopted from Brubaker and combined into the “Instrumentalist” approach. Students concerned with Nationalism might find it useful to combine other approaches in order to fill the gaps that their chosen theoretical approach might lack when applied to a particular case study.

Breuilly (1993: 12-14) also advises students concerned with Nationalism to fully establish the type of nationalist movement they analyze. According to him, identifying a nationalist movement as "ethnic nationalism" or "civic nationalism" enables the students to analyze the movement within a political framework. Although this thesis follows Brass’ “Instrumentalist” theoretical approach, it does not neglect the beneficial advice of Breuilly. This thesis defines Greek Cypriot nationalism as an "ethnic", "assimilative" and "nationalising" type of nationalism. This enables the thesis to account for the relationship between Greek Cypriot nationalism and the political conditions, including other nationalist mobilizations (Greek nationalism and Turkish Cypriot secessionism) concerning Cyprus. If students intend to analyze a specific case of nationalism, as done in this thesis, they might follow Breuilly’s advice and diagnose the type of nationalism as "ethnic nationalism", "civic nationalism", "secessionism", "assimilative (coercive) nationalism", "homeland nationalism" or "nationalizing nationalism".

In methodological terms, the “documentary research” and the analysis of political speeches used in this thesis benefited from drawing on primary and secondary literature in three languages: Greek, Turkish and English. Moreover, the tri-lingual
nature of the research contributed to the hypothetical and analytical approaches of the thesis. It would be desirable if other studies of Nationalism in multi-ethnic societies could draw on materials written in local languages, or at least draw on assistance from a suitably qualified native speaker. In her analysis on Albanian nationalism and the Albanian struggle for independence, Guy (2008:11) claims that she essentially ignored local sources she did not know the Albanian language. She indicated her inability to utilize these Albanian documents as the primary limitation of her thesis. Therefore, the tri-lingual analysis of this thesis constituted a distinctive methodological aspect.

Consequently, this thesis has made a contribution to the literature by examining the relationship between national Identity and elite interests in an ethnically divided society, whose major ethnic group sought a political transition from “homeland nationalism” to “nationalising nationalism”. It is well known in the literature that national identity and elite interests might lead to intra-state and inter-state conflicts between different ethnicities. However, this thesis concludes that national identity and elite interests might also lead to political conflicts and violence between ethnic groups and their “homelands” representing the same ethnicity.
REFERENCES

Archival Documents cited in the text

The National Archives (TNA), Kew, United Kingdom

TNA, FO 371/179998, CC 2291/50, Telegram, No, 301. ‘Cyprus Question’, UK Permanent Representative in UN, Lord Caradon to Foreign Office. 24 November 1965.


TNA, FCO 9/1153, WSC 1/6, Telegram, No: 20. ‘National Front’, First Secretary of British High Commission in Cyprus, Timothy Daunt to FCO. 7 January 1970.
TNA, FCO 9/1153, WSC 1/6, Telegram, No: 40. 'Unclassified'. British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Peter Ramsbotham to FCO. 22 January 1970.


TNA, FCO 9/1153, WSC 1/6, Telegram, No: 356. ‘Cyprus’, British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Peter Ramsbotham to FCO. 19 May 1970.


TNA, FCO 9/1162, WSC 3/358/2, Telegram, No: 376. ‘Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Relations’, British Ambassador in Athens, Robin Hooper to FCO. 30 July 1970.

TNA, FCO 9/1162, WSC 3/358/2, Telegram, No: 66. ‘Cypriot/Greek Relations’, Head of Southern European Department, Robin Fearn to FCO. 14 August 1970.

TNA, FCO 9/1153, WSC 1/6, Telegram, No: 207. ‘Cyprus: Internal Security’. First Secretary of British High Commission in Cyprus, David Beattie to Head of Southern European Department, Robin Fearn, 14 October 1970.

TNA, FCO 9/1153, WSC 1/6, Telegram, No: 48. ‘Murder in Cyprus’, British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Peter Ramsbotham to FCO, 21 October 1970.


TNA, FCO 9/1507, WSC 10/10, Telegram, No: 60. ‘Cyprus’, British Ambassador in Athens, Robin Hooper to FCO. 11 February 1972.

TNA, FCO 9/1507, Draft Telegram, No: 70. Southeastern Department, 14 February 1972.


TNA, FCO 9/1493, WSC 1/1. Telegram, No: 119. ‘Cyprus: Intercommunal Talks’, First Secretary of the British High Commission in Cyprus, David Beattie to Head of Southern European Department, Robin Fearn. 2 November 1972.

TNA, FCO 9/1493, WSC 1/1. Telegram, No: 121. ‘Cyprus: Intercommunal Talks’. First Secretary of British Embassy in Ankara, John Harrison to Head of Southern European Department, Robin Fearn, 7 November 1972.

TNA, FCO 9/1493, WSC 1/1. Telegram, No: 130. ‘Intercommunal Talks’, First Secretary of the British High Commission in Cyprus to Head of Southern European Department, David Beattie. 4 December 1972.


US National Archives and Record Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland

National Archives, Department of State. NICOSI 00778 061645. ‘Provocative Articles in Leftist and Pro- Grivas Papers Cause Government to Threaten Crackdown’, US Ambassador to Cyprus, David Popper to Department of State. 6 April 1973 [Online] Available at: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=17827&dt=2472&dl=1345


**Press and Information Office, Nicosia, Cyprus**


PIO, 1967. *President’s Telegram to King Constantine.* [press release]
30 December 1967 [online] Available at:
http://www.piopressreleases.com.cy/easyconsole.cfm/page/search

PIO, 1968. *The Text Issued by Turkish Cypriot Leadership on 29 December 1968: Re-organisation of the Turkish Cypriot Administrative System.* [press release]
2 January 1968 [online] Available at:
http://www.piopressreleases.com.cy/easyconsole.cfm/page/search

Available at: http://www.piopressreleases.com.cy/easyconsole.cfm/page/search

PIO, 1968. *Statement by the President of Republic* [press release] 5 February 1968 [online] Available at:
http://www.piopressreleases.com.cy/easyconsole.cfm/page/search

PIO, 1968. *Address By His Beatitude Archbishop Makarios at His Investiture Ceremony as President of Republic of Cyprus at the House of Representatives.* [press release] 29 February 1968 [online] Available at:
http://www.piopressreleases.com.cy/easyconsole.cfm/page/search

http://www.piopressreleases.com.cy/easyconsole.cfm/page/search

http://www.piopressreleases.com.cy/easyconsole.cfm/page/search
[Accessed 26 April 2014]

PIO, 1969. *President’s Speech at Kelokedhara Village Today’* [press release]
18 May 1969 [online] Available at:
http://www.piopressreleases.com.cy/easyconsole.cfm/page/search


**Memoirs**


**Books**


**Journal Articles**


Hampshire, E. 2013. ‘Apply the Flame More Searingly: The Destruction and Migration of the Archives of British Colonial Administration: A Southeast Asia Case


**Newspapers**


Charavghi, 1969. “Το Μέλλον Εξαρτάται Από Ημάς” [“The Future Depends on Us”] (in Greek) 5 October 1969, p.1


Charavghi, 1971. Ο Λαός Υποστηρίζει Ολόψυχα την Πολιτική του Μακαρίου. [The People Profoundly Supports the Policy of Makarios] (in Greek) 2 November 1971 p.1


Charavghi, 1972. *Μακάριος Θα Απορρίψει Όλες τις Απαιτήσεις των Αθηνών* [Makarios Will Resist against All The Pressures of Athens] (in Greek) 15 February 1972


Fileleftheros, 1962. Ο Κύριος Ντιρβάνα Απέκρουσε τις Δηλώσεις του Δολοφονημένου Γκουρκάν [Mr. Dirvana Disclaimed the Statements of Gurkan, who was Assasinated] (in Greek), 23 May 1962, p.1.


Machi, 1967. Οι Τρομοκραταί Συνεχίζουν τας Προκλήσεις εις Κοφίνου [The Terrorists Maintain Provocation in Kophinou] (in Greek) 7 April 1967, p.1


The Times, 1974. *Demonstrators march on Greek Embassy*. [online] 16 July 1974, p.5. Available at: [http://find.galegroup.com/ttda/newspaperRetrieve.do?sgHitCountType=None&sort=DateAscend&tabID=T003&prodId=TTDA&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchId=R1&searchType=BasicSearchForm&currentPosition=2&qrySerId=Locale%28en%29%2C%29%3AFQE%3D%28bx%2CNone%2C8%29Cypriots%3AAnd%3ALQ_E%3D%28da%2CNone%2C10%29%2907%2F16%2F1974%24&retrieveFormat=MULTIPAGE_DOCUMENT&userGroupName=keele_tr&inPS=true&contentSet=LTO&&
Interviews


PhD Theses


Peristianis, N. 2008 *Nation, Nationalism, State, and National Identity in Cyprus*. PhD. Middle Sex University.

Websites

[Accessed 27 November 2013]

[Accessed 28 May 2014]

Cyprus Mail. 2013. *So Close to Ending a Tragedy*. [online] Available at: http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/11/24/so-close-to-ending-a-tragedy/
[Accessed 27 November 2013]


[Accessed 27 November 2013]


[Accessed 18 April 2014]


Appendices

Appendix 1:

The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus

Part 01 - General Provisions

Article 1

The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities of Cyprus respectively as hereinafter in this Constitution provided.

Article 2

For the purposes of this Constitution:

1. the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church;

2. the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems;

3. citizens of the Republic who do not come within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article shall, within three months of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, opt to belong to either the Greek or the Turkish Community as individuals, but, if they belong to a religious group, shall so opt as a religious group and upon such option they shall be deemed to be members of such Community:

Provided that any citizen of the Republic who belongs to such a religious group may choose not to abide by the option of such group and by a written and signed declaration submitted within one month of the date of such option to the appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers opt to belong to the Community other than that to which such group shall be deemed to belong;

Provided further that if an option of such religious group is not accepted on the ground that its members are below the requisite number any member of such group may within one month of the date of the refusal of acceptance of such option opt in the aforesaid manner as an individual to which Community he would like to belong.
For the purposes of this paragraph a "religious group" means a group of persons ordinarily resident in Cyprus professing the same religion and either belonging to the same rite or being subject to the same jurisdiction thereof the number of whom, on the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, exceeds one thousand out of which at least five hundred become on such date citizens of the Republic;

4. a person who becomes a citizen of the Republic at any time after three months of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution shall exercise the option provided in paragraph (3) of this Article within three months of the date of his so becoming a citizen;

5. a Greek or a Turkish citizen of the Republic who comes within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article may cease to belong to the Community of which he is a member and belong to the other Community upon -

(a) a written and signed declaration by such citizen to the effect that he desires such change, submitted to the appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers;

(b) the approval of the Communal Chamber of such other Community;

6. any individual or any religious group deemed to belong to either the Greek or the Turkish Community under the provisions of paragraph (3) of this Article may cease to belong to such Community and be deemed to belong to the other Community upon -

(a) a written and signed declaration by such individual or religious group to the effect that such change is desired, submitted to the appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers;

(b) the approval of the Communal Chamber of such other Community;

7. (a) a married woman shall belong to the Community to which her husband belongs.

(b) a male or female child under the age of twenty-one who is not married shall belong to the Community to which his or her father belongs, or, if the father is unknown and he or she has not been adopted, to the Community to which his or her mother belongs.

**Article 3**

1. The official languages of the Republic are Greek and Turkish.

2. Legislative, executive and administrative acts and documents shall be drawn up in both official languages and shall, where under the express provisions of this Constitution promulgation is required, be promulgated by publication in the official Gazette of the Republic in
both official languages.

3. Administrative or other official documents addressed to a Greek or a Turk shall be drawn up in the Greek or the Turkish language respectively.

4. Judicial proceedings shall be conducted or made and judgements shall be drawn up in the Greek language if the parties are Greek, in the Turkish language if the parties are Turkish, and in both the Greek and the Turkish languages if the parties are Greek and Turkish. The official language or languages to be used for such purposes in all other cases shall be specified by the Rules of Court made by the High Court under Article 163.

5. Any text in the official Gazette of the Republic shall be published in both official languages in the same issue.

6. (1) Any difference between the Greek and the Turkish texts of any legislative, executive or administrative act or document published in the official Gazette of the Republic, shall be resolved by a competent court.

(2) The prevailing text of any law or decision of a Communal Chamber published in the official Gazette of the Republic shall be that of the language of the Communal Chamber concerned.

(3) Where any difference arises between the Greek and the Turkish texts of an executive or administrative act or document which, though not published in the official Gazette of the Republic, has otherwise been published, a statement by the Minister or any other authority concerned as to which text should prevail or which should be the correct text shall be final and conclusive.

(4) A competent court may grant such remedies as it may deem just in any case of a difference in the texts as aforesaid.

7. The two official languages shall be used on coins, currency notes and stamps.

8. Every person shall have the right to address himself to the authorities of the Republic in either of the official languages.

Article 4
1. The Republic shall have its own flag of neutral design and colour, chosen jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

2. The authorities of the Republic and any public corporation or public utility body created by or under the laws of the Republic shall fly the flag of the Republic and they shall have the right to fly on holidays
together with the flag of the Republic both the Greek and the Turkish flags at the same time.

3. The Communal authorities and institutions shall have the right to fly on holidays together with the flag of the Republic either the Greek or the Turkish flag at the same time.

4. Any citizen of the Republic or any body, corporate or unincorporate other than public, whose members are citizens of the Republic, shall have the right to fly on their premises the flag of the Republic or the Greek or the Turkish flag without any restriction.

Article 5

The Greek and the Turkish Communities shall have the right to celebrate respectively the Greek and the Turkish national holidays.

Part 02 - Fundamental Rights and Liberties

Article 6

Subject to the express provisions of this Constitution no law or decision of the House of Representatives or of any of the Communal Chambers, and no act or decision of any organ, authority or person in the Republic exercising executive power or administrative functions, shall discriminate against any of the two Communities or any person as a person or by virtue of being a member of a Community.

Article 7

1. Every person has the right to life and corporal integrity.

2. No person shall be deprived of his life except in the execution of a sentence of a competent court following his conviction of an offence for which this penalty is provided by law. A law may provide for such penalty only in cases of premeditated murder, high treason, piracy jure gentium and capital offences under military law.

3. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary -

(a) in defence of person or property against the infliction of a proportionate and otherwise unavoidable and irreparable evil;

(b) in order to effect an arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c) in action taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection
when and as provided by law.

Article 8
No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.

Article 9
Every person has the right to a decent existence and to social security. A law shall provide for the protection of the workers, assistance to the poor and for a system of social insurance.

Article 10
1. No person shall be held in slavery or servitude.

2. No person shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.

3. For the purposes of this Article the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include -
   (a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 11 or during conditional release from such detention;
   (b) any service of a military character if imposed or, in case of conscientious objectors, subject to their recognition by a law, service exacted instead of compulsory military service;
   (c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the inhabitants.

Article 11
1. Every person has the right to liberty and security of person.

2. No person shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases when and as provided by law: -
   (a) the detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
   
   (b) the arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court;
   
   (c) the arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

   (d) the detention of a minor by a lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;

   (e) the detention of persons for the prevention of spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
the arrest or detention of a person to prevent him effecting an unauthorised entry into the territory of the Republic or of an alien against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.

3. Save when and as provided by law in case of a flagrant offence punishable with death or imprisonment, no person shall be arrested save under the authority of a reasoned judicial warrant issued according to the formalities prescribed by the law.

4. Every person arrested shall be informed at the time of his arrest in a language which he understands of the reasons for his arrest and shall be allowed to have the services of a lawyer of his own choosing.

5. The person arrested shall, as soon as is practicable after his arrest, and in any event not later than twenty-four hours after the arrest, be brought before a judge, if not earlier released.

6. The judge before whom the person arrested is brought shall promptly proceed to inquire into the grounds of the arrest in a language understandable by the person arrested and shall, as soon as possible and in any event not later than three days from such appearance, either release the person arrested on such terms as he may deem fit or where the investigation into the commission of the offence for which he has been arrested has not been completed remand him in custody and may remand him in custody from time to time for a period not exceeding eight days at any one time:

Provided that the total period of such remand in custody shall not exceed three months of the date of the arrest on the expiration of which every person or authority having the custody of the person arrested shall forthwith set him free.

Any decision of the judge under this paragraph shall be subject to appeal.

7. Every person who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.

8. Every person who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.

Article 12

1. No person shall be held guilty of any offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute an offence under the law at the time when it was committed; and no person shall have a heavier
punishment imposed on him for an offence other than that expressly provided for it by law at the time when it was committed.

2. A person who has been acquitted or convicted of an offence shall not be tried again for the same offence. No person shall be punished twice for the same act or omission except where death ensues from such act or omission.

3. No law shall provide for a punishment which is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence.

4. Every person charged with an offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

5. Every person charged with an offence has the following minimum rights: -

(a) to be informed promptly and in a language which he understands and in detail of the nature and grounds of the charge preferred against him;

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

(c) to defend himself in person or through a lawyer of his own choosing or, if he has no sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given free legal assistance when the interests of justice so require;

(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;

(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

6. A punishment of general confiscation of property is prohibited.

Article 13

1. Every person has the right to move freely throughout the territory of the Republic and to reside in any part thereof subject to any restrictions imposed by law and which are necessary only for the purposes of defence or public health or provided as punishment to be passed by a competent court.

2. Every person has the right to leave permanently or temporarily the territory of the Republic subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law.
**Article 14**
No citizen shall be banished or excluded from the Republic under any circumstances.

**Article 15**
1. Every person has the right to respect for his private and family life.

2. There shall be no interference with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary only in the interests of the security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the public morals or for the protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by this Constitution to any person.

**Article 16**
1. Every person's dwelling house is inviolable.

2. There shall be no entry in any dwelling house or any search therein except when and as provided by law and on a judicial warrant duly reasoned or when the entry is made with the express consent of its occupant or for the purpose of rescuing the victims of any offence of violence or of any disaster.

**Article 17**
1. Every person has the right to respect for, and to the secrecy of, his correspondence and other communication if such other communication is made through means not prohibited by law.

2. There shall be no interference with the exercise of this right except in accordance with the law and only in cases of convicted and unconvicted prisoners and business correspondence and communication of bankrupts during the bankruptcy administration.

**Article 18**
1. Every person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

2. All religions whose doctrines or rites are not secret are free.

3. All religions are equal before the law. Without prejudice to the competence of the Communal Chambers under this Constitution, no legislative, executive or administrative act of the Republic shall discriminate against any religious institution or religion.

4. Every person is free and has the right to profess his faith and to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice or observance, either individually or collectively, in private or in public, and to change his religion or belief.

5. The use of physical or moral compulsion for the purpose of making
a person change or preventing him from changing his religion is prohibited.

6. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in the interests of the security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the public morals or for the protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by this Constitution to any person.

7. Until a person attains the age of sixteen the decision as to the religion to be professed by him shall be taken by the person having the lawful guardianship of such person.

8. No person shall be compelled to pay any tax or duty the proceeds of which are specially allocated in whole or in part for the purposes of a religion other than his own.

**Article 19**

1. Every person has the right to freedom of speech and expression in any form.

2. This right includes freedom to hold opinions and receive and impart information and ideas without interference by any public authority and regardless of frontiers.

3. The exercise of the rights provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary only in the interests of the security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the public morals or for the protection of the reputation or rights of others or for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

4. Seizure of newspapers or other printed matter is not allowed without the written permission of the Attorney-General of the Republic, which must be confirmed by the decision of a competent court within a period not exceeding seventy-two hours, failing which the seizure shall be lifted.

5. Nothing in this Article contained shall prevent the Republic from requiring the licensing of sound and vision broadcasting or cinema enterprises.

**Article 20**

1. Every person has the right to receive, and every person or institution has the right to give, instruction or education subject to such formalities, conditions or restrictions as are in accordance with the relevant communal law and are necessary only in the interests of
the security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the public morals or the standard and quality of education or for the protection of the rights and liberties of others including the right of the parents to secure for their children such education as is in conformity with their religious convictions.

2. Free primary education shall be made available by the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers in the respective communal primary schools.

3. Primary education shall be compulsory for all citizens of such school age as may be determined by a relevant communal law.

4. Education, other than primary education, shall be made available by the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers, in deserving and appropriate cases, on such terms and conditions as may be determined by a relevant communal law.

**Article 21**

1. Every person has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

2. Every person has the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. Notwithstanding any restriction under paragraph 3 of this Article, no person shall be compelled to join any association or to continue to be a member thereof.

3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are absolutely necessary only in the 'interests of the security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the public morals or for the protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by this Constitution to any person, whether or not such person participates in such assembly or is a member of such association.

4. Any association the object or activities of which are contrary to the constitutional order is prohibited.

5. A law may provide for the imposition of restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, the police or gendarmerie.

6. Subject to the provisions of any law regulating the establishment or incorporation, membership (including rights and obligations of members), management and administration, and winding up and dissolution, the provisions of this Article shall also apply to the formation of companies, societies and other associations functioning
Article 22

1. Any person reaching nubile age is free to marry and to found a family according to the law relating to marriage, applicable to such person under the provisions of this Constitution.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall, in the following cases, be applied as follows: -

   (a) if the law relating to marriage applicable to the parties as provided under Article 111 is not the same, the parties may elect to have their marriage governed by the law applicable to either of them under such Article;

   (b) if the provisions of Article 111 are not applicable to any of the parties to the marriage and neither of such parties is a member of the Turkish Community, the marriage shall be governed by a law of the Republic which the House of Representatives shall make and which shall not contain any restrictions other than those relating to age, health, proximity of relationship and prohibition of polygamy;

   (c) if the provisions of Article 111 are applicable only to one of the parties to the marriage and the other party is not a member of the Turkish Community, the marriage shall be governed by the law of the Republic as in sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph provided: Provided that the parties may elect to have their marriage governed by the law applicable, under Article 111, to one of such parties in so far as such law allows such marriage.

3. Nothing in this Article contained shall, in any way, affect the rights, other than those on marriage, of the Greek-Orthodox Church or of any religious group to which the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 2 shall apply with regard to their respective members as provided in this Constitution.

Article 23

1. Every person, alone or jointly with others, has the right to acquire, own, possess, enjoy or dispose of any movable or immovable property and has the right to respect for such right.

The right of the Republic to underground water, minerals and antiquities is reserved.

2. No deprivation or restriction or limitation of any such right shall be made except as provided in this Article.

3. Restrictions or limitations which are absolutely necessary in the interest of the public safety or the public health or the public morals or the town and country planning or the development and utilisation of
any property to the promotion of the public benefit or for the
promotion of the rights of others may be imposed by law on
the exercise of such right.

Just compensation shall be promptly paid for any such restrictions
or limitations which materially decrease the economic value of such
property:
such compensation to be determined in case of disagreement by a
civil court.

4. Any movable or immovable property or any right over or interest
in any such property may be compulsorily acquired by the Republic
or by a municipal corporation or by a Communal Chamber for the
educational, religious, charitable or sporting institutions, bodies or
establishments within its competence and only from the persons
belonging to its respective Community or by a public corporation or a
public utility body on which such right has been conferred by law,
and only -

(a) for a purpose which is to the public benefit and shall be specially
provided by a general law for compulsory acquisition which shall be
enacted within a year from the date of the coming into operation of
this Constitution; and (b) when such purpose is established by a
decision of the acquiring authority and made under the provisions of
such law stating clearly the reasons for such acquisition; and
(c) upon the payment in cash and in advance of a just and
equitable compensation to be determined in case of disagreement
by a civil court.

5. Any immovable property or any right over or interest in any such
property compulsorily acquired shall only be used for the purpose for
which it has been acquired. If within three years of the acquisition
such purpose has not been attained, the acquiring authority shall,
immediately after the expiration of the said period of three years,
offer the property at the price it has been acquired to the person
from whom it has been acquired. Such person shall be entitled within
three months of the receipt of such offer to signify his acceptance or
nonacceptance
of the offer, and if he signifies acceptance, such property
shall be returned to him immediately after his returning such price
within a further period of three months from such acceptance.

6. In the event of agricultural reform, lands shall be distributed only
to persons belonging to the same Community as the owner from
whom such land has been compulsorily acquired.

7. Nothing in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article contained shall affect
the provisions of any law made for the purpose of levying execution
in respect of any tax or penalty, executing any judgement, enforcing
any contractual obligation or for the prevention of danger to life or
property.

8. Any movable or immovable property may be requisitioned by the Republic or by a Communal Chamber for the purposes of the educational, religious, charitable or sporting institutions, bodies or establishments within its competence and only where the owner and the person entitled to possession of such property belong to the respective Community, and only -

(a) for a purpose which is to the public benefit and shall be specially provided by a general law for requisitioning which shall be enacted within a year from the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution; and

(b) when such purpose is established by a decision of the requisitioning authority and made under the provisions of such law stating clearly the reasons for such requisitioning; and

(c) for a period not exceeding three years; and

(d) upon the prompt payment in cash of a just and equitable compensation to be determined in case of disagreement by a civil court.

9. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article no deprivation restriction or limitation of the right provided in paragraph I of this Article. in respect of any movable or immovable property belonging to any See, monastery, church or any other ecclesiastical corporation or any right over it or interest therein shall be made except with the written consent of the appropriate ecclesiastical authority being in control of such property and the provisions of paragraphs 3, 4, 7 and 8 of this Article shall be subject to the provisions of this paragraph: Provided that restrictions or limitations for the purposes of town and country planning under the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article are exempted from the provisions of this paragraph.

10. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article, no deprivation, restriction or limitation of any right provided in paragraph 1 of this Article in respect of any vakf movable or immovable property, including the objects and subjects of the vakfs and the properties belonging to the Mosques or to any other Moslem religious institutions, or any right thereon or interest therein shall be made except with the approval of the Turkish Communal Chamber and subject to the Laws and Principles of Vakfs and the provisions of paragraphs 3, 4, 7 and 8 of this Article shall be subject to the provisions of this paragraph: Provided that restrictions or limitations for the purposes of town and country planning under the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article are exempted from the provisions of this paragraph.

11. Any interested person shall have the right of recourse to the court
in respect of or under any of the provisions of this Article, and such recourse shall act as a stay of proceedings for the compulsory acquisition; and in case of any restriction or limitation imposed under paragraph 3 of this Article, the court shall have power to order stay of any proceedings in respect thereof. Any decision of the court under this paragraph shall be subject to appeal.

**Article 24**

1. Every person is bound to contribute according to his means towards the public burdens.
2. No such contribution by way of tax, duty or rate of any kind whatsoever shall be imposed save by or under the authority of a law.
3. No tax, duty or rate of any kind whatsoever shall be imposed with retrospective effect: Provided that any import duty may be imposed as from the date of the introduction of the relevant Bill.
4. No tax, duty or rate of any kind whatsoever other than customs duties shall be of a destructive or prohibitive nature.

**Article 25**

1. Every person has the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
2. The exercise of this right may be subject to such formalities, conditions or restrictions as are prescribed by law and relate exclusively to the qualifications usually required for the exercise of any profession or are necessary only in the interests of the security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the public morals or for the protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by this Constitution to any person or in the public interest: Provided that no such formalities, conditions or restrictions purporting to be in the public interest shall be prescribed by a law if such formality, condition or restriction is contrary to the interests of either Community.
3. As an exception to the aforesaid provisions of this Article a law may provide, if it is in the public interest, that certain enterprises of the nature of an essential public service or relating to the exploitation of sources of energy or other natural resources shall be carried out exclusively by the Republic or a municipal corporation or by a public corporate body created for the purpose by such law and administered under the control of the Republic, and having a capital which may be derived from public and private funds or from either such source only: Provided that, where such enterprise has been carried out by any person, other than a municipal corporation or a public corporate body, the installations used for such enterprise shall, at the request of such person, be acquired on payment of a just price, by the Republic or
such municipal corporation or such public corporate body, as the case may be.

**Article 26**

1. Every person has the right to enter freely into any contract subject to such conditions, limitations or restrictions as are laid down by the general principles of the law of contract. A law shall provide for the prevention of exploitation by persons who are commanding economic power.

2. A law may provide for collective labour contracts of obligatory fulfilment by employers and workers with adequate protection of the rights of any person, whether or not represented at the conclusion of such contract.

**Article 27**

1. The right to strike is recognised and its exercise may be regulated by law for the purposes only of safeguarding the security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public order or the public safety or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the inhabitants or the protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by this Constitution to any person.

2. The members of the armed forces, of the police and of the gendarmerie shall not have the right to strike. A law may extend such prohibition to the members of the public service.

**Article 28**

1. All persons are equal before the law, the administration and justice and are entitled to equal protection thereof and treatment thereby.

2. Every person shall enjoy all the rights and liberties provided for in this Constitution without any direct or indirect discrimination against any person on the ground of his community, race, religion, language, sex, political or other convictions, national or social descent, birth, colour, wealth, social class, or on any ground whatsoever, unless there is express provision to the contrary in this Constitution.

3. No citizen shall be entitled to use or enjoy any privilege of any title of nobility or of social distinction within the territorial limits of the Republic.

4. No title or nobility or other social distinction shall be conferred by or recognised in the Republic.

**Article 29**

1. Every person has the right individually or jointly with others to address written requests or complaints to any competent public authority and to have them attended to and decided expeditiously; an
immediate notice of any such decision taken duly reasoned shall be
given to the person making the request or complaint and in any
event within a period not exceeding thirty days.

2. Where any interested person is aggrieved by any such decision or
where no such decision is notified to such person within the period
specified in paragraph 1 of this Article, such person may have recourse
to a competent court in the matter of such request or complaint.

Article 30
1. No person shall be denied access to the court assigned to him by
or under this Constitution. The establishment of judicial committees
or exceptional courts under any name whatsoever is prohibited.

2. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, every person is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent, impartial
and competent court established by law. Judgement shall be
reasoned and pronounced in public session, but the press and the
public may be excluded from all or any part of the trial upon a
decision of the court where it is in the interest of the security of the
Republic or the constitutional order or the public order or the public
safety or the public morals or where the interests of juveniles or the
protection of the private life of the parties so require or, in special
circumstances where, in the opinion of the court, publicity would
prejudice the interests of justice.

3. Every person has the right -
   (a) to be informed of the reasons why he is required to appear
      before the court;
   (b) to present his case before the court and to have sufficient
      time necessary for its preparation;
   (c) to adduce or cause to be adduced his evidence and to
      examine witnesses according to law;
   (d) to have a lawyer of his own choice and to have free legal
      assistance where the interests of justice so require and as provided
      by law;
   (e) to have free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand
      or speak the language used in court.

Article 31
Every citizen has, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
any electoral law of the Republic or of the relevant Communal
Chamber made thereunder, the right to vote in any election held
under this Constitution or any such law.

Article 32
Nothing in this Part contained shall preclude the Republic from
regulating by law any matter relating to aliens in accordance
with International Law.
Article 33
1. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution relating to a state of emergency, the fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed by this Part shall not be subjected to any other limitations or restrictions than those in this Part provided.

2. The provisions of this Part relating to such limitations or restrictions shall be interpreted strictly and shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.

Article 34
Nothing in this Part may be interpreted as implying for any Community, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the undermining or destruction of the constitutional order established by this Constitution or at the destruction of any of the rights and liberties set forth in this Part or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for therein.

Article 35
The legislative, executive and judicial authorities of the Republic shall be bound to secure, within the limits of their respective competence, the efficient application of the provisions of this Part.

Part 03 - The President of the Republic, The Vice President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers

Article 36
1. The President of the Republic is the Head of the State and takes precedence over all persons in the Republic.
   The Vice-President of the Republic is the Vice-Head of the State and takes precedence over all persons in the Republic next after the President of the Republic.
   Deputising for or replacing the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or temporary incapacity to perform his duties is made as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. In the event of a temporary absence or a temporary incapacity to perform the duties of the President or of the Vice-President of the Republic, the President or the Vice-President of the House of Representatives and, in case of his absence or pending the filling of a vacancy in any such office, the Representative acting for him under Article 72 shall act for the President or the Vice-President of the Republic respectively during such temporary absence or temporary incapacity.

Article 37
The President of the Republic as Head of the State -
(a) represents the Republic in all its official functions;

(b) signs the credentials of diplomatic envoys appointed under Article 54 and receives the credentials of foreign diplomatic envoys who shall be accredited to him;

(c) signs -

(i) the credentials of delegates appointed under Article 54 for the negotiation of international treaties, conventions or other agreements, or for signing any such treaties, conventions or agreements already negotiated, in accordance with, and subject to, the provisions of this Constitution;

(ii) the letter relating to the transmission of the instruments of ratification of any international treaties, conventions or agreements approved as provided in this Constitution;

(d) confers the honours of the Republic.

**Article 38**

1. The Vice-President of the Republic as Vice-Head of the State has the right to -

(a) be present in all official functions;

(b) be present at the presentation of the credentials of the foreign diplomatic envoys;

(c) recommend to the President of the Republic the conferment of honours of the Republic on members of the Turkish Community which recommendation the President shall accept unless there are grave reasons to the contrary. The honours so conferred will be presented to the recipient by the Vice-President if he so desires.

2. For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article, the necessary information shall be given to the Vice-President of the Republic in writing in sufficient time before any such event.

**Article 39**

1. The election of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall be direct, by universal suffrage and secret ballot, and shall, except in the case of a by-election, take place on the same day but separately:

Provided that in either case if there is only one candidate for election that candidate shall be declared as elected.

2. The candidate who receives more than fifty per centum of the votes validly cast shall be elected. If none of the candidates attains the
required majority the election shall be repeated on the corresponding
day of the week next following between the two candidates who
received the greater number of the votes validly cast and the candidate
who receives at such repeated election the greatest number of the
votes validly cast shall be deemed to be elected.

3. If the election cannot take place on the date fixed under this
Constitution owing to extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances
such as earthquake, floods, general epidemic and the like, then
such election shall take place on the corresponding day of the week
next following.

Article 40
A person shall be qualified to be a candidate for election as President
Vice-President of the Republic if at the time of election such person-
(a) is a citizen of the Republic;
(b) has attained the age of thirty-five years;
(c) has not been, on or after the date of the coming into operation
of this] Constitution, convicted of an offence involving dishonesty
or moral turpitude or is not under any disqualification imposed by a
competent court for any electoral offence;
(d) is not suffering from a mental disease incapacitating such
person from acting as President or Vice-President of the Republic.

Article 41
1. The office of the President and of the Vice-President of the Republic
shall be incompatible with that of a Minister or of a Representative or of
a member of a Communal Chamber or of a member of any municipal
council including a Mayor or of a member of the armed or security
forces of the Republic or with a public or municipal office.
For the purposes of this Article "public office" means any office of
profit in the public service of the Republic or of a Communal
Chamber, the emoluments of which are under the control either of
the Republic or of a Communal Chamber, and includes any office in
any public corporation or public utility body.

2. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall not,
during their term of office, engage either directly or indirectly, either
for their own account or for the account of any other person, in the
exercise of any profit or non-profit making business or profession.

Article 42
1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic are invested
by the House of Representatives before which they make the
following affirmation:-
"I do solemnly affirm faith to, and respect for, the Constitution and
the laws made thereunder, the preservation of the independence and
the territorial integrity, of the Republic of Cyprus".

2. For this purpose the House of Representatives shall meet on the
date the five years' period of office of the outgoing President and the outgoing Vice-President of the Republic expires, and in the case of a by-election under paragraph 4 of Article 44 on the third day from the date of such by-election.

Article 43
1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall hold office for a period of five years commencing on the date of their investiture and shall continue to hold such office until the next elected President and Vice-President of the Republic are invested.

2. The President or the Vice-President of the Republic elected at a by-election under paragraph 4 of Article 44 shall hold office for the unexpired period of office of the President or the Vice-President of the Republic, as the case may be, whose vacancy he has been elected to fill.

3. The election of a new President and Vice-President of the Republic shall take place before the expiration of the five years' period of office of the outgoing President and the outgoing Vice-President of the Republic so as to enable the newly-elected President and Vice-President of the Republic to be invested on the date such period expires.

Article 44
1. The office of the President or the Vice-President of the Republic shall become vacant -

(a) upon his death;

(b) upon his written resignation addressed to the House of Representative through, and received by, its President or Vice-President respective:

(c) upon his conviction of high treason or any other offence involving dishonesty or moral turpitude;

(d) upon such permanent physical or mental incapacity or such absence, other than temporary, as would prevent him to perform effectively his duties.

2. In the event of a vacancy in the office of the President or the Vice President of the Republic, the President or the Vice-President of the House of Representatives respectively shall act, during such vacancy, as President or Vice-President of the Republic, respectively.

3. The Supreme Constitutional Court shall decide on any question arising out of sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 1 of this Article on a
motion by the Attorney-General and the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic upon a resolution of the Representatives belonging to the same Community as the President or the Vice-President of the Republic respectively, carried by a simple majority: Provided that no such resolution shall be taken and no item shall be entered on the agenda or debated in the House of Representatives in connection therewith unless the proposal for such resolution is signed by at least one fifth of the total number of such Representatives.

4. In the event of a vacancy in the office of either the President or the Vice-President of the Republic, the vacancy shall be filled by a byelection which shall take place within a period not exceeding forty-five days of the occurrence of such vacancy.

**Article 45**

1. The President or the Vice-President of the Republic shall not be liable to any criminal prosecution during his term of office except under the provisions of this Article.

2. The President or the Vice-President of the Republic may be prosecuted for high treason on a charge preferred by the Attorney-General and the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic before the High Court upon a resolution of the House of Representatives carried by a secret ballot and a majority of three-fourths of the total number of Representatives: Provided that no such resolution shall be taken and no item shall be entered on the agenda or debated in the House of Representatives in connection therewith unless the proposal for such resolution is signed by at least one-fifth of the total number of Representatives.

3. The President or the Vice-President of the Republic may be prosecuted for an offence involving dishonesty or moral turpitude upon a charge preferred by the Attorney-General and the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic before the High Court with the leave of the President of the High Court.

4. (1) The President or the Vice-President of the Republic upon being prosecuted under paragraph 2 or 3 of this Article shall be suspended from the performance of any of the functions of his office and thereupon the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 36 shall apply.

   (2) The President or the Vice-President of the Republic on any such prosecution shall be tried by the High Court; on his conviction his office shall become vacant and on his acquittal he shall resume the performance of the functions of his office.

5. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article the President or the Vice-President of the Republic shall not be liable to prosecution for any offence committed by him in the execution of his functions but he may be prosecuted for any other offence committed during his term of
office after he ceases to hold office.

6. No action shall be brought against the President or the Vice-President of the Republic in respect of any act or omission committed by him in the exercise of any of the functions of his office: Provided that nothing in this paragraph contained shall be construed as in any way depriving any person of the right to sue the Republic as provided by law.

Article 46
The executive power is ensured by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

The President and the Vice-President of the Republic in order to ensure the executive power shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. The Ministers shall be designated respectively by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic who shall appoint them by an instrument signed by them both. The Ministers may be chosen from outside the House of Representatives.

One of the following Ministries that is to say the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Finance, shall be entrusted to a Turkish Minister. If the President and the Vice-President of the Republic agree they may replace this system by a system of rotation.

The Council of Ministers shall exercise executive power as in Article 54 provided.

The decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by an absolute majority and shall, unless the right of final veto or return is exercised by the President or the Vice-President of the Republic or both in accordance with Article 57, be promulgated immediately by them by publication in the official Gazette of the Republic in accordance with the provisions of Article 57.

Article 47
The executive power exercised by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic conjointly consists of the following matters that is to say:

(a) determining the design and colour of the flag of the Republic as in Article 4 provided;

(b) creation or establishment of the honours of the Republic,

(c) appointment by an instrument signed by them both of the members of the Council of Ministers as in Article 46 provided;
(d) promulgation by publication in the official Gazette of the Republic of the decisions of the Council of Ministers as in Article 57 provided;

(e) promulgation by publication in the official Gazette of the Republic of any law or decision passed by the House of Representatives as in Article 52 provided;

(f) appointments in Articles 112, 115, 118, 124, 126, 131, 133, 153 and 184 provided; termination of appointments as in Article 118 provided and of appointments made under Article 131;

(g) institution of compulsory military service as in Article 129 provided;

(h) reduction or increase of the security forces as in Article 130 provided;

(i) exercise of the prerogative of mercy in capital cases where the injured party and the convicted person are members of different Communities as in Article 53 provided; remission, suspension and commutation of sentences as in Article 53 provided;

(j) right of reference to the Supreme Constitutional Court as in Article 140 provided;

(k) publication in the official Gazette of the Republic of decisions of the Supreme Constitutional Court as in Articles 137, 138, 139 and 143 provided;

(l) replacement by a system of rotation of the system of appointment of a Turkish Minister to one of the three Ministries of Foreign Affairs or of Defence or of Finance as in Article 46 provided;

(m) exercise of any of the powers specified in paragraphs (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Articles 48 and 49 and in Articles 50 and 51 which the President or the Vice-President of the Republic respectively can exercise separately;

(n) address of messages to the House of Representatives as in Article 79 provided.

**Article 48**

The executive power exercised by the President of the Republic consists of the following matters, that is to say:-

(a) designation and termination of appointment of Greek Ministers;

(b) convening the meetings of the Council of Ministers as in Article 49 provided, presiding at such meetings and taking part in the discussions
thereat without any right to vote;

(c) preparing the agenda of such meetings as in Article 56 provided;

(d) right of final veto on decisions of the Council of Ministers concerning foreign affairs, defence or security as in Article 57 provided;

(e) right of return of decisions of the Council of Ministers as in Article 57 provided;

(f) right of final veto on laws or decisions of the House of Representatives concerning foreign affairs, defence or security as in Article 50 provided;

(g) right of return of laws or decisions of the House of Representatives of the Budget as in Article 51 provided;

(h) right of recourse to the Supreme Constitutional Court as in Article 137, 138 and 143 provided;

(i) right of reference to the Supreme Constitutional Court as in Article 141 provided;

(j) publication of the communal laws and decisions of the Greek Communal Chamber as in Article 104 provided;

(k) right of reference to the Supreme Constitutional Court of any law decision of the Greek Communal Chamber as in Article 142 provided;

(l) right of recourse to the Supreme Constitutional Court in connection with any matter relating to any conflict or contest of power or competence arising between the House of Representatives and the Communal Chambers or any of them and between any organs of, or authorities in, the Republic as in Article 139 provided;

(m) the prerogative of mercy in capital cases as in Article 53 provided;

(n) the exercise of any of the powers specified in Article 47 conjointly with the Vice-President of the Republic;

(o) addressing messages to the House of Representatives as in Article 79 provided.

**Article 49**

The executive power exercised by the Vice-President of the Republic consists of the following matters, that is to say:-

(a) designation and termination of appointment of Turkish Ministers;
(b) asking the President of the Republic for the convening of the Council of Ministers as in Article 55 provided and being present and taking part in the discussions at all meetings of the Council of Ministers without any right to vote;

(c) proposing to the President of the Republic subjects for inclusion in the agenda as in Article 56 provided;

(d) right of final veto on decisions of the Council of Ministers concerning foreign affairs, defence or security as in Article 57 provided;
(e) right of return of decisions of the Council of Ministers as in Article 57 provided;

(f) right of final veto on laws or decisions of the House of Representatives concerning foreign affairs, defence or security as in Article 50 provided;

(g) right of return of laws or decisions of the House of Representatives or of the Budget as in Article 51 provided; (h) right of recourse to the Supreme Constitutional Court as in Articles 137, 138 and 143 provided;

(i) right of reference to the Supreme Constitutional Court as in Article 141 provided;

(j) publication of the communal laws and decisions of the Turkish Communal Chamber as in Article 104 provided;

(k) right of reference to the Supreme Constitutional Court of any law or decision of the Turkish Communal Chamber as in Article 142 provided;

(l) right of recourse to the Supreme Constitutional Court in connection with any matter relating to any conflict or contest of power or competence arising between the House of Representatives and the Communal Chambers or any of them and between any organs of, or authorities in, the Republic as in Article 139 provided;

(m) the prerogative of mercy in capital cases as in Article 53 provided;

(n) the exercise of any of the powers specified in Article 47 conjointly with the President of the Republic;

(o) addressing messages to the House of Representatives as in Article 79 provided.

**Article 50**

1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic, separately or conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision of
the House of Representatives or any part thereof concerning -

(a) foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic in international organisations and pacts of alliance in which the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey both participate.

For the purposes of this sub-paragraph "foreign affairs" includes -

(i) the recognition of States, the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations with other countries and the interruption of such relations. The grant of acceptance to diplomatic representatives and of exequatur to consular representatives. The assignment of diplomatic representatives and of consular representatives, already in the diplomatic service, to posts abroad and the entrusting of functions abroad to special envoys already in the diplomatic service. The appointment and the assignment of persons, who are not already in the diplomatic service, to any posts abroad as diplomatic or consular representatives and the entrusting of functions abroad to persons, who are not already in the diplomatic service, as special envoys;

(ii) the conclusion of international treaties, conventions and agreements;

(iii) the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace;

(iv) the protection abroad of the citizens of the Republic and of their interests;

(v) the establishment, the status and the interests of aliens in the Republic;

(vi) the acquisition of foreign nationality by citizens of the Republic and their acceptance of employment by, or their entering the service of, a foreign Government;

(b) the following questions of defence:-

(i) composition and size of the armed forces and credits for them;

(ii) (nominations des cadres - διορισμοί στελεχών - kadrolara tayinler) and their promotions (και η προαγωγή αυτών - ve bunlardaki terfiler);

(iii) importation of war materials and also explosives of all kinds;

(iv) cession of bases and other facilities to allied countries;

(c) the following questions of security:

(i) (nominations des cadres - διορισμοί στελεχών - kadrolara tayinler) and their promotions (και η προαγωγή αυτών - ve bunlardaki terfiler);
distribution and stationing of forces;

(iii) emergency measures and martial law;

(iv) police laws.

It is specified that the right of veto under sub-paragraph (c) above shall cover all emergency measures or decisions, but not those which concern the normal functioning of the police and the gendarmerie.

2. The above right of veto may be exercised either against the whole of a law or decision or against any part thereof, and in the latter case such law or decision shall be returned to the House of Representatives for a decision whether the remaining part thereof will be submitted, under the relevant provisions of this Constitution, for promulgation.

3. The right of veto under this Article shall be exercised within the period for the promulgation of laws or decisions of the House of Representatives as in Article 52 provided.

Article 51
1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall have the right, either separately or conjointly, to return any law or decision or any part thereof of the House of Representatives to the House for reconsideration.

2. On the adoption of the Budget by the House of Representatives the President and the Vice-President of the Republic, either separately or conjointly, may exercise his or their right to return it to the House of Representatives on the ground that in his or their judgement there is a discrimination.

3. In case a law or decision or any part thereof is returned to the House of Representatives as in paragraph 1 of this Article provided, the House of Representatives shall pronounce on the matter so returned within fifteen days of such return and in the case of return of the Budget as in paragraph 2 of this Article provided the House of Representatives shall pronounce on the matter so returned within thirty days of such return.

4. If the House of Representatives persists in its decision the President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, promulgate the law or decision or the Budget, as the case may be, within the time limit fixed for the promulgation of laws and decisions of the House of Representatives by publication of such law or decision or Budget in the official Gazette of the Republic.

5. Whenever the President or the Vice-President of the Republic exercises his right to return as provided in this Article he shall immediately notify the other of such return.
6. The right of return under this Article shall be exercised within the period for the promulgation of laws or decisions of the House of Representatives as in Article 52 provided.

**Article 52**
The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall, within fifteen days of the transmission to their respective offices of any law or decision of the House of Representatives, promulgate by publication in the official Gazette of the Republic such law or decision unless in the meantime they exercise, separately or conjointly, as the case may be, their right of veto as in Article 50 provided or their right of return as in Article 51 provided or their right of reference to the Supreme Constitutional Court as in Articles 140 and 141 provided or in the case of the Budget their right of recourse to the Supreme Constitutional Court as in Article 138 provided.

**Article 53**
1. The President or the Vice-President of the Republic shall have the right to exercise the prerogative of mercy with regard to persons belonging to their respective Community who are condemned to death.

2. Where the person injured (βλάβεν πρόσωπον - zarargoren kimsemagdur) and the offender are members of different Communities such prerogative of mercy shall be exercised by agreement between the President and the Vice-President of the Republic; in the event of disagreement between the two the vote for clemency shall prevail.

3. In case the prerogative of mercy is exercised under paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article the death sentence shall be commuted to life imprisonment.

4. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall, on the unanimous recommendation of the Attorney-General and the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic, remit, suspend, or commute any sentence passed by a court in the Republic in all other cases.

**Article 54**
Subject to the executive power expressly reserved, under Articles 47, 48 and 49, to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic, acting either separately or conjointly, the Council of Ministers shall exercise executive power in all other matters other than those which, under the express provisions of this Constitution, are within the competence of a Communal Chamber, including the following:-

(a) the general direction and control of the government of the Republic and the direction of general policy;

(b) foreign affairs as in Article 50 set out;
(c) defence and security, including questions thereof as in Article 50 set out;

(d) the co-ordination and supervision of all public services;

(e) the supervision and disposition of property belonging to the Republic in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and the law;

(f) consideration of Bills to be introduced to the House of Representatives by a Minister;

(g) making of any order or regulation for the carrying into effect of any law as provided by such law;

(h) consideration of the Budget of the Republic to be introduced to the House of Representatives.

Article 55
The President of the Republic convenes the meetings of the Council of Ministers. Such convening is made by the President of the Republic on his own motion or on being asked by the Vice-President of the Republic in due time for a specific subject.

Article 56
The agenda of any meeting of the Council of Ministers is prepared by the President of the Republic at his discretion and is communicated to all concerned prior to such meeting. The Vice-President of the Republic may propose to the President any subject for inclusion in the agenda of any meeting. The President of the Republic shall include such subject in the agenda if it can conveniently be dealt with at such meeting, otherwise such subject shall be included in the agenda of the meeting next following.

Article 57
1. On a decision being taken by the Council of Ministers such decision shall be transmitted forthwith to the office of the President and of the Vice-President of the Republic respectively.

2. The President or the Vice-President of the Republic or both shall have the right of return, within four days of the date when the decision has been transmitted to their respective offices, of such decision to the Council of Ministers for reconsideration, whereupon the Council of Ministers shall reconsider the matter and if they persist in such decision the President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall, subject to paragraph 4 of this Article, promulgate by publication such decision:

Provided that the exercise of the right of return shall not, in cases where the right of veto exists, prevent either the President or the Vice-President of the Republic or both from exercising the right of veto,
within four days of the transmission to their respective offices, of the decision persisted upon.

3. If a decision relates to foreign affairs, defence or security as in Article 50 set out, the President or the Vice-President of the Republic or both shall have a right of veto which they shall exercise within four days of the date when the decision has been transmitted to their respective offices.

4. If the decision is enforceable and no right of veto or return has been exercised as in paragraph 2 or 3 of this Article provided, such decision shall be forthwith promulgated by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic "by publication in the official Gazette of the Republic unless the Council of Ministers otherwise states in that decision.

**Article 58**

1. A Minister is the Head of his Ministry.

2. Subject to the executive power expressly reserved, under this Constitution, to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic, acting either separately or conjointly, and to the Council of Ministers, the executive power exercised by each Minister includes the following matters:-(a) the execution of laws relating to, and the administration of all matters and affairs usually falling within, the domain of his Ministry; (b) preparation of orders or regulations concerning his Ministry for submission to the Council of Ministers; (c) the issuing of directions and general instructions for the carrying out of the provisions of any law relating to his Ministry and of any order or regulation under such law; (d) the preparation for submission to the Council of Ministers of the part of the Budget of the Republic relating to his Ministry.

**Article 59**

1. No person shall be appointed as a Minister unless he is a citizen of the Republic and has the qualifications required for a candidate for election as a member of the House of Representatives.

2. The office of a Minister shall be incompatible with that of a Representative or of a member of a Communal Chamber or of a member of any municipal council including a Mayor or of a member of the armed or security forces of the Republic or with a public or municipal office or in the case of a Turkish Minister with that of a religious functionary (din adami). For the purposes of this paragraph "public office" has the same meaning as in Article 41.

3. The Ministers shall hold office in the case of the Greek Ministers until their appointment is terminated by the President of the Republic and in the case of the Turkish Ministers until their appointment is
terminated by the Vice-President of the Republic.

4. Any person appointed as a Minister shall, before entering upon his office, make before the President and the Vice-President of the Republic the following affirmation:-
"I do solemnly affirm faith to, and respect for, the Constitution and the laws made thereunder, the preservation of the independence and the territorial integrity, of the Republic of Cyprus."

Article 60
1. There shall be a Joint Secretariat of the Council of Ministers headed by two Secretaries, one belonging to the Greek Community and the other belonging to the Turkish Community, who shall be public officers.

2. The two Secretaries of the Joint Secretariat of the Council of Ministers shall have charge of the Council of Ministers' Office and shall, in accordance with any instructions as may be given to them by the Council of Ministers, attend its meetings and keep the minutes thereof and convey the decision of the Council of Ministers to the appropriate organ or authority or person.

The Constitution - Appendix D: Part 04 - The House of Representatives

Article 61
The legislative power of the Republic shall be exercised by the House of Representatives in all matters except those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers under this Constitution.

Article 62
1. The number of Representatives shall be fifty: Provided that such number may be altered by a resolution of the House of Representatives carried by a majority comprising two-thirds of the Representatives elected by the Greek Community and two-thirds of the Representatives elected by the Turkish Community.

2. Out of the number of Representatives provided in paragraph 1 of this Article seventy per centum shall be elected by the Greek Community and thirty per centum by the Turkish Community separately from amongst their members respectively, and in the case of a contested election, by universal suffrage and by direct and secret ballot held on the same day. The proportion of Representatives stated in this paragraph shall be independent of any statistical data.

Article 63
1. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article every citizen of the Republic
who has attained the age of twenty-one years and has such residential qualifications as may be prescribed by the Electoral Law shall have the right to be registered as an elector in either the Greek or the Turkish electoral list:
Provided that the members of the Greek Community shall only be registered in the Greek electoral list and the members of the Turkish Community shall only be registered in the Turkish electoral list.

2. No person shall be qualified to be registered as an elector who is disqualified for such registration by virtue of the Electoral Law.

Article 64
A person shall be qualified to be a candidate for election as a Representative if at the time of the election that person-

(a) is a citizen of the Republic;

(b) has attained the age of twenty-five years;

(c) has not been, on or after the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, convicted of an offence involving dishonesty or moral turpitude or is not under any disqualification imposed by a competent court for any electoral offence;

(d) is not suffering from a mental disease incapacitating such person from acting as a Representative.

Article 65
1. The term of office of the House of Representatives shall be for a period of five years.
The term of office of the first House of Representatives shall commence on the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution.

2. The outgoing House shall continue in office until the newly-elected House assumes office under paragraph I of this Article.

Article 66
1. A general election for the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Sunday of the month immediately preceding the month in which the term of office of the outgoing House expires.

2. When a vacancy occurs in the seat of a Representative such vacancy shall be filled by a by-election to be held within a period not exceeding forty-five days of the occurrence of such vacancy on a date to be fixed by the House of Representatives.

3. If an election under paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article cannot take place on the date fixed by or under this Constitution owing to
extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances such as earthquake, floods, general epidemic and the like, then such election shall take place on the corresponding day of the week next following.

**Article 67**

1. The House of Representatives may dissolve itself only by its own decision carried by an absolute majority including at least one third of the Representatives elected by the Turkish Community.

2. Any such decision shall, notwithstanding anything contained in paragraph 1 of Article 65 and paragraph 1 of Article 66, provide for the date of the holding of the general election, which shall not be less than thirty days and not more than forty days from the date of such decision, and also for the date of the first meeting of the newly elected House which shall not be later than fifteen days after such general election and until such date the outgoing House shall continue to be in office.

3. Notwithstanding anything in paragraph I of Article 65 contained, the term of office of the House of Representatives to be elected after dissolution shall be for the unexpired period of the term of office of the dissolved House. In case of dissolution within the last year of the five years' term of office, a general election for the House of Representatives shall take place both for the unexpired part of the term of office of the dissolved House, during which any session of the newly elected House shall be considered to be an extraordinary session, and for the subsequent five years' term of office.

**Article 68**

Whenever a House of Representatives continues to be in office until the assumption of office by a newly elected House under either paragraph 2 of Article 65 or paragraph 2 of Article 67, such House shall not have power to make any laws or to take any decisions on any matter except only in case of urgent and exceptional unforeseen circumstances to be specifically stated in the relevant law or decision.

**Article 69**

A Representative before assuming duties as such in the House of Representatives and at a public meeting thereof shall make the following affirmation:-

"I do solemnly affirm faith to, and respect for, the Constitution and the laws made thereunder, the preservation of the independence and the territorial integrity, of the Republic of Cyprus"

**Article 70**

The office of a Representative shall be incompatible with that of a Minister or of a member of a Communal Chamber or of a member of any municipal council including a Mayor or of a member of the armed or security forces of the Republic or with a public or municipal office or, in the case of a Representative elected by the Turkish Community,
of a religious functionary (din adami).

For the purposes of this Article "public office" means any office of profit in the service of the Republic or of a Communal Chamber the emoluments of which are under the control either of the Republic or of a Communal Chamber, and includes any office in any public corporation or public utility body.

**Article 71**
The seat of a Representative shall become vacant-

(a) upon his death;
(b) upon his written resignation;

(c) upon the occurrence of any of the circumstances referred to in paragraph (c) or (d) of Article 64 or if he ceases to be a citizen of the Republic;

(d) upon his becoming the holder of an office mentioned in Article 70.

**Article 72**
1. The President of the House of Representatives shall be a Greek, and shall be elected by the Representatives elected by the Greek Community, and the Vice-President shall be a Turk and shall be elected by the Representatives elected by the Turkish Community. Each shall be elected separately as above at the same meeting at the beginning and for the whole period of the term of office of the House of Representatives.

2. In case of any vacancy in either of the offices provided in paragraph 1 of this Article, an election as provided in such paragraph shall take place with all due speed and at an extraordinary session if necessary in order to fill such vacancy.

3. In case of temporary absence or pending the filling of a vacancy as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article in either of the offices of the President or the Vice-President of the House, their functions shall be performed by the eldest Representative of the respective Community unless the Representatives of such Community should otherwise decide.

4. In addition to the President and the Vice-President of the House there shall be appointed from amongst the Representatives and by the President and the Vice-President of the House respectively two Greek and one Turkish Clerks of the House and two Greek and one Turkish Administrative Clerks of the House who shall be attached respectively to the office of the President and the Vice-President of the House.

**Article 73**
1. Subject to the ensuing provisions of this Article, the House of
Representatives by its Standing Orders regulates any matter of parliamentary procedure and of functions of its offices.

2. There shall be a Committee to be known as the Committee of Selection consisting of the President of the House as Chairman, the Vice-President of the House as Vice-Chairman and eight other members elected by the House of Representatives at its meeting after the election of the President and the Vice-President of the House, six from amongst the Representatives elected by the Greek Community and two from amongst the Representatives elected by the Turkish Community.

3. The Committee of Selection shall set up the Standing Committees and any other temporary, ad hoc or special Committee of the House of Representatives and shall appoint Representatives to be members thereof and in so doing due regard should be had to the proposals made by the Greek and the Turkish Communal groups or political party groups in the House for such setting up and appointments. The appointments to such Committees shall be subject to the provisions of the paragraph next following.

4. The Greek and the Turkish Communal groups and political party groups in the House of Representatives shall be adequately represented on each of the Standing, and of any other temporary, ad hoc or special, Committee of the House:

Provided that the total number of the seats on such Committees distributed respectively to the Representatives elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities shall be in the same proportion as that in which the seats in the House are distributed to the Representatives elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities respectively.

5. Every Bill on being introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred for debate in the first instance before the appropriate Committee.

With the exception of those which are considered to be of an urgent nature, no Bill shall be debated by a Committee before the lapse of forty-eight hours after its being distributed to the Representatives constituting such a Committee.

With the exception of those which are considered to be of an urgent nature, no Bill which has passed the Committee stage shall be debated in the House of Representatives before the lapse of forty-eight hours after it has been distributed to the Representatives together with the report of the Committee.

6. The agenda of the meetings of the House of Representatives, which shall include any additional subject proposed by the Vice-President of the House, shall be drawn up and presented to the House of
Representatives by the President of the House.

After the presentation of the agenda to the House of Representatives, any Representative may move any addition or amendment to such agenda, and such motion shall be decided upon by the House of Representatives.

7. No Representative can speak at any meeting of the House of Representatives unless he registers his name in the proper Register or unless he obtains the permission of the person presiding at such meeting.

Every Representative who has complied with such formality is entitled to be given reasonably sufficient time, having regard to the particular subject, to speak and to be heard at the relevant meeting. The speeches shall be made in order of the registration or of oral request, as the case may be, of those who desire to speak:

Provided that where there are opposite views held, a speaker shall, as far as practicable, follow another one who supports the opposite view. But Representatives speaking on behalf of the Committees or of the Political party groups of the House of Representatives shall not be subject to such order of precedence.

Representatives desiring to speak in connection with motions with regard to any matter relating to the agenda, the application of the Standing Orders or the closure of the debate shall be given precedence in time over the Representatives desiring to speak in connection with the subject of the debate, and in such a case two Representatives, one in favour and one against the motion, shall be allowed fifteen minutes each for their respective speeches.

8. All speeches in the House of Representatives shall be made from the rostrum of the House and addressed to the House of Representatives. All speeches and other proceedings in the House and at all the Committee meetings shall, simultaneously as they are being made or taking place, be translated from the official language in which they are being made or taking place into the other official language.

9. Save as otherwise provided in the Standing Orders, interruptions of the speech of a Representative or personal attacks against any Representative unconnected with the subject under debate, both in the House and at the Committee meetings, are prohibited.

10. The votes in the House of Representatives shall be jointly counted and recorded by one Greek and the Turkish Clerk of the House.

11. The minutes of the debates in the House of Representatives shall comprise all proceedings fully.
The minutes of the proceedings of the Committees shall be kept in a summary form. Upon objection to the minutes of a meeting of the House of Representatives through the oral submission of a Representative at the first following meeting or by a written objection sent to the President of the relevant meeting, the House of Representatives may decide to correct such minutes accordingly.

12. Any political party which is represented at least by twelve per centum of the total number of the Representatives in the House of Representatives can form and shall be entitled to be recognised as a political party group.

Article 74
1. The House of Representatives shall meet on the fifteenth day next following a general election and thereafter in each year on the corresponding day in such year without summons for its ordinary session.

2. The ordinary session of the House of Representatives shall last for a period of three to six months in each year, as the House of Representatives may determine.

3. The House of Representatives shall be summoned to an extraordinary session by the President or the Vice-President of the House on the request of ten Representatives addressed to both the President and the Vice-President of the House.

Article 75
1. The meetings of the House of Representatives shall be open to the public and the minutes of its debates shall be published.

2. The House of Representatives may, if it thinks necessary, hold secret sessions on a resolution carried by a three-quarters majority vote of the total number of Representatives.

Article 76
1. The President of the House shall declare the commencement and the end of every meeting.

2. The President of the House in declaring the end of a meeting shall at the same time announce the date and time fixed, with the consent of the House of Representatives, of the meeting next following and shall present to the House of Representatives the agenda of such meeting and thereupon the provisions of paragraph 6 of Article 73 shall apply.

3. Any agenda shall be printed and distributed to the Representatives at least twenty-four hours prior to the meeting, but if such agenda relates to the topic already under debate such distribution may be made at any time prior to the meeting.
Article 77
1. The quorum of the House of Representatives shall consist of at least one-third of the total number of its members.

2. The debate relating to any particular topic shall be adjourned once for twenty-four hours at the request of the majority of the Representatives of either Community who are present at a meeting.

Article 78
1. The laws and the decisions of the House of Representatives shall be passed by a simple majority vote of the Representatives present and voting.

2. Any modification of the Electoral Law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a separate simple majority of the Representatives elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities respectively taking part in the vote.

Article 79
1. The President or the Vice-President of the Republic may address the House of Representatives by message, or transmit to the House of Representatives their views through the Ministers.

2. The Ministers may follow the proceedings of the House of Representatives or any Committee thereof, and make a statement to, or inform, the House of Representatives or any Committee thereof, on any subject within their competence.

Article 80
1. The right to introduce Bills belongs to the Representatives and to the Ministers.

2. No Bill relating to an increase in budgetary expenditure can be introduced by any Representative.

Article 81
1. The Budget is introduced to the House of Representatives at least three months before the day fixed by law for the commencement of the financial year and is voted by it not later than the day so fixed.

2. Within three months from the end of the financial year the final accounts shall be submitted to the House of Representatives for approval.

Article 82
A law or decision of the House of Representatives shall come into operation on its publication in the official Gazette of the Republic unless another date is provided by such law or decision.
**Article 83**

1. Representatives shall not be liable to civil or criminal proceedings in respect of any statement made or vote given by them in the House of Representatives.

2. A Representative cannot, without the leave of the High Court, be prosecuted, arrested or imprisoned so long as he continues to be a Representative. Such leave is not required in the case of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for five years or more in case the offender is taken in the act. In such a case the High Court being notified forthwith by the competent authority decides whether it should grant or refuse leave for the continuation of the prosecution or detention so long as he continues to be a Representative.

3. If the High Court refuses to grant leave for the prosecution of a Representative, the period during which the Representative cannot thus be prosecuted shall not be reckoned for the purposes of any period of prescription for the offence in question.

4. If the High Court refuses to grant leave for the enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment imposed on a Representative by a competent court, the enforcement of such sentence shall be postponed until he ceases to be a Representative.

**Article 84**

1. Representatives receive from the Public Revenue remuneration defined by law.

2. Any increase of such remuneration shall not become operative during the term of office of the House of Representatives in which such increase has been made.

**Article 85**

Any question with regard to the qualifications of candidates for election and election petitions shall be finally adjudicated by the Supreme Constitutional Court.

**Part 05 - The Communal Chambers**

**Article 86**

The Greek and the Turkish Communities respectively shall elect from amongst their own members a Communal Chamber which shall have the competence expressly reserved for it under the provisions of this Constitution.

**Article 87**

1. The Communal Chambers shall, in relation to their respective
Community, have competence to exercise within the limits of this Constitution and subject to paragraph 3 of this Article, legislative power solely with regard to the following matters:-

(a) all religious matters;

(b) all educational, cultural and teaching matters;

(c) personal status;

(d) the composition and instances (βαθμού δικαιοδοσίας - dereceleri) of courts dealing with civil disputes relating to personal status and to religious matters;

(e) in matters where the interests and institutions are of purely communal nature such as charitable and sporting foundations, bodies and associations created for the purpose of promoting the well-being of their respective Community;

(f) imposition of personal taxes and fees on members of their respective Community in order to provide for their respective needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their control as in Article 88 provided;

(g) in matters where subsidiary legislation in the form of regulations or bye-laws within the framework of the laws relating to municipalities will be necessary to enable a Communal Chamber to promote the aims pursued by municipalities composed solely of members of its respective Community;

(h) in matters relating to the exercise of the authority of control of producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments and of supervision in their functions of municipalities consisting solely of their respective Community, vested in them by this Constitution: Provided that-

(i) any communal law, regulation, bye-law or decision made or taken by a Communal Chamber under this sub-paragraph (h) shall directly or indirectly be contrary to or inconsistent with any by which producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments are governed or to which the municipalities subject,

(ii) nothing in paragraph (i) of this proviso contained shall be construed as enabling the House of Representatives to legislate on any matter relating to the exercise of the authority vested in Communal Chamber under this sub-paragraph (h):

(i) in such other matters as are expressly provided by this Constitution.

2. Nothing in sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 1 of this Article contained
shall be construed as in any way curtailing the power of the House of Representatives to impose, in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, any personal taxes.

3. Any law or decision of a Communal Chamber made or taken in exercise of the power vested in it under paragraph 1 of this Article shall not in any way contain anything contrary to the interests of the security of the Republic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the public morals or which is against the fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed by this Constitution to any person.

Article 88

1. The power of imposing taxes under sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 1 of Article 87 of a Communal Chamber shall be exercised for the purpose of meeting the part of its expenditure provided in its budget in each financial year which is not met by the payment made to such Communal Chamber in respect of such financial year by the Republic out of its Budget as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article or by any other revenue which such Chamber may have in that financial year.

2. The House of Representatives shall, in respect of each financial year, provide in the Budget and make available for payment to both Communal Chambers in respect of their respective financial year for the purposes of their respective needs relating to matters within their respective competence an amount not less than two million pounds to be allocated to the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers as follows:-

(a) to the Greek Communal Chamber an amount not less than the sum of one million and six hundred thousand pounds; and

(b) to the Turkish Communal Chamber an amount not less than the sum of four hundred thousand pounds.

Provided that in the case of the increase of the minimum total amount payable to both Communal Chambers the allocation to each of the Communal Chambers of such increased amount shall be made in such manner as the House of Representatives may decide.

3. If a Communal Chamber so requests the taxes imposed by it shall be collected on its behalf and paid to such a Communal Chamber by the authorities of the Republic.

4. For the purposes of this Article and of sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 1 of Article 87 "member" includes corporate and unincorporate bodies to the extent of the interest held in such bodies by such members.

Article 89

1. The Communal Chambers shall, in relation to their respective...
Community, also have competence-

(a) (i) to direct policy ("determiner les principes directeurs") within their communal laws;

(ii) to exercise administrative powers in the manner and through such persons as may be provided by a communal law, with respect to any matter on which they are competent to exercise legislative power under the provisions of Article 87 other than those provided in subparagraphs (g) and (h) of paragraph 1 of such Article for which specific provision is made in the ensuing sub-paragraphs;

(b) to exercise control on producers' and consumers' co-operatives a credit establishments created for the purpose of promoting wellbeing of their respective Community and which will be governed by the laws;

(c) to promote the aims pursued by municipalities composed solely of members of their respective Community and to supervise - in their functions such municipalities to which the laws shall apply.

2. Nothing in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 1 of Article 87 and in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article contained shall be construed as precluding the creation of mixed and common institutions of the nature therein provided if the inhabitants so desire.

3. In the case where the central administration shall, on its part, proceed to control the institutions, establishments or municipalities mentioned in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article by virtue of legislation in force, such control shall be carried out through public officers belonging to the same Community as that to which the institution, establishment or municipality in question belongs.

Article 90

1. Subject to the ensuing provisions of this Article each Communal Chamber shall have power by or in its own communal laws to provide for the application (εφαρμογή - tatbik) of its laws and decisions.

2. A Communal Chamber shall have no power to provide in any of its laws or decisions for imprisonment or detention for any violation thereof or failure to comply with any directions given by a Communal Chamber in exercise of any power vested in it under this Constitution.

3. The Communal Chambers shall have no competence to use measures of constraint (αναγκαστικά μέτρα - cebir) to secure compliance with their respective communal laws or decisions and of the judgements of the Courts dealing with civil disputes relating to personal status and to religious matters within their respective
competence.

4. Where it becomes necessary to use measures of constraint in compelling compliance with any law or decision of a Communal Chamber or with any matter connected with the exercise of the authority of control or supervision by a Communal Chamber such measures of constraint shall, on the application by or on behalf of the Communal Chamber, be applied by the public authorities of the Republic which shall have exclusive competence to apply such measures of constraint.

5. The execution of any judgement or order of a court in connection with any matter within the exclusive competence of a Communal Chamber shall be carried out through the public authorities of the Republic.

Article 91
1. Each Communal Chamber shall once yearly prepare and adopt a budget of its revenue and expenditure for the ensuing financial year.

2. Such budget shall be voted by the Communal Chamber not later than the day fixed by a communal law for the commencement of the communal financial year.

Article 92
The number of the members of each Communal Chamber shall be determined by a communal law carried by a two-thirds majority of the total number of the members of the Communal Chamber concerned.

Article 93
The elections for both the Communal Chambers shall be by universal suffrage and by direct and secret ballot.

Article 94
1. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article every citizen of the Republic who has attained the age of twenty-one years and has such residential qualifications as may be prescribed by the respective communal electoral law shall have the right to be registered as an elector in the respective communal electoral list: Provided that the members of the Greek Community shall only be registered in the Greek communal electoral list and the members of the Turkish Community shall only be registered in the Turkish communal electoral list.

2. No person shall be qualified to be registered as an elector who is disqualified for such registration by virtue of the respective communal electoral law.

Article 95
A person shall be qualified to be a candidate for election as a member of a Communal Chamber if at the time of the election that person-
(a) is a citizen of the Republic and is registered in the respective communal electoral list;

(b) has attained the age of twenty-five years,

(c) has not been, on or after the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, convicted of an offence involving dishonesty or moral turpitude or is not under any disqualification imposed by a competent court for an electoral offence,

(d) is not suffering from a mental disease incapacitating such person from acting as a member of a Communal Chamber.

**Article 96**

1. The term of office of the Communal Chambers shall be for a period of five years commencing on such date as a communal law respectively shall appoint.

2. The outgoing Communal Chambers shall continue in office until the newly elected Communal Chambers assume office under paragraph 1 of this Article.

**Article 97**

1. A communal general election for a Communal Chamber shall be held at least thirty days before the expiration of the term of office of the outgoing Chamber.

2. When a vacancy occurs in the seat of a member of a Communal Chamber such vacancy shall be filled by a by-election to be held within a period not exceeding forty-five days of the occurrence of such vacancy.

3. If an election under paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article cannot take place on the date fixed by or under this Constitution owing to extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances such as earthquake, floods, general epidemic and the like, then such election shall take place on the corresponding day of the week next following.

**Article 98**

1. Either Communal Chamber may dissolve itself only by its own decision carried by an absolute majority.

2. Any such decision shall, notwithstanding anything contained in paragraph 1 of Article 96 and paragraph 1 of Article 97, provide for the date of the holding of the communal general election with respect to the Communal Chamber in question which shall not be less than thirty days and not more than forty days from the date of such decision and also for the date of the first meeting of the newly-elected Communal
Chamber which shall not be later than fifteen days after such communal general election and until such date the outgoing Communal Chamber shall continue to be in office.

3. Notwithstanding anything contained in paragraph 1 of Article 96, the term of office of the Communal Chamber to be elected after dissolution shall be for the unexpired period of the term of office of the dissolved Communal Chamber. In case of dissolution within the last year of the five years' term of office of the Communal Chamber concerned a communal general election for such Chamber shall take place for the unexpired part of the term of office of the dissolved Communal Chamber and for the subsequent five years' period of office of such Communal Chamber.

**Article 99**

Whenever a Communal Chamber continues to be in office until the assumption of office by a newly-elected Communal Chamber, either under paragraph 2 of Article 96 or paragraph 2 of Article 98, it shall not have power to make any laws or take any decisions on any matter except only in case of urgent and exceptional unforeseen circumstances to be specifically stated in the relevant law or decision.

**Article 100**

A member of a Communal Chamber before assuming duties as such in the Communal Chamber and at a public meeting thereof shall make the following affirmation:–

"I do solemnly affirm faith to, and respect for, the Constitution and the laws made thereunder, the preservation of the independence and the territorial integrity, of the Republic of Cyprus."

**Article 101**

1. The office of a member of a Communal Chamber shall be incompatible with that of a Minister or of a Representative or of a member of any municipal council including a Mayor or of a member of the armed or security forces of the Republic or with a public or municipal office and, in the case of that of a member of the Turkish Communal Chamber, with that of a religious functionary (din adami).

2. For the purposes of this Article "public office" means any office of profit in the public service of the Republic or of a Communal Chamber the emoluments of which are under the control either of the Republic or of a Communal Chamber and includes any office in any public corporation or public utility body.

**Article 102**

The Communal Chambers shall, by Standing Orders, make rules relating to all matters of procedure including the holding of ordinary and extraordinary meetings, the dates and duration of such meetings, the manner of voting and the transaction of business.
Article 103
1. The meetings of the Communal Chambers shall be open to the public and the minutes of its debates shall be published.

2. Any Communal Chamber may, if it thinks necessary, hold secret sessions on a resolution carried by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of its members.

Article 104
1. The laws or decisions passed by the Greek or the Turkish Communal Chamber shall be published in the official Gazette of the Republic immediately after being signed by the President or the Vice-President of the Republic respectively within fifteen days of the receipt by him of such laws or decisions.

2. A communal law shall come into operation on its publication in the official Gazette of the Republic unless another date is provided by such law.

Article 105
1. The President of the Republic with regard to the Greek Communal Chamber and the Vice-President of the Republic with regard to the Turkish Communal Chamber may, within fifteen days of the receipt by him of any law or decision passed by the respective Communal Chamber, return such law or decision to such Chamber for reconsideration.

2. If the Communal Chamber concerned maintains that the law or decision so returned to it shall stand, the President or the Vice-President of the Republic, as the case may be, shall sign and publish such law or decision in accordance with the provisions of the immediately preceding Article.

Article 106
1. A member of a Communal Chamber shall not be liable to civil or criminal proceedings in respect of any statement made or vote given by him in the Chamber.

2. A member of a Communal Chamber cannot without the leave of the High Court, be prosecuted, arrested or imprisoned, so long as he continues to be a member. Such leave is not required in the case of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for five years or more in case the offender is taken in the act. In such a case the High Court, being notified forthwith by the competent authority, decides whether it should grant or refuse leave for the continuation of the prosecution or detention, as the case may be, so long as he continues to be a member.

3. If the High Court refuses to grant leave for the prosecution of a member of a Communal Chamber, the period during
which such member cannot thus be prosecuted shall not be reckoned for the purposes of any period of prescription for the offence in question.

4. If the High Court refuses to grant leave for the enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment imposed on a member of a Communal Chamber by a competent court, the enforcement of such sentence shall be postponed until he ceases to be such member.

**Article 107**
The seat of a member of a Communal Chamber shall become vacant -

(a) upon his death; or

(b) upon his written resignation; or

(c) upon the occurrence of any of the circumstances referred to in paragraph (c) or (d) of Article 95, or if he ceases to be a citizen of the Republic or if he ceases to be qualified to be registered as an elector in the respective Communal electoral list; or

(d) upon his becoming the holder of an office mentioned in Article 101.

**Article 108**
1. The Greek and the Turkish Communities shall have the right to receive subsidies from the Greek or the Turkish Government respectively for institutions of education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to the Greek or the Turkish Community respectively.

2. Also where either the Greek or the Turkish Community considers that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters, professors or clergymen (κληρικοί - din adami) for the functioning of its institutions, such Community shall have the right to obtain and employ such personnel to the extent strictly necessary to meet its needs as the Greek or the Turkish Government respectively may provide.

**Article 109**
Each religious group which under the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 2 has opted to belong to one of the Communities shall have the right to be represented, by elected member or members of such group, in the Communal Chamber of the Community to which such group has opted to belong as shall be provided by a relevant communal law.

**Article 110**
1. The Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus shall continue to have the exclusive right of regulating and administering its own internal affairs and property in accordance with the Holy Canons and its Charter in force for the time being and the Greek Communal Chamber shall not act inconsistently with such right.
2. The institution of Vakf and the Principles and Laws of, and relating to, Vakfs are recognised by this Constitution. All matters relating to or in any way affecting the institution or foundation of Vakf or the vakfs or any vakf properties, including properties belonging to Mosques and any other Moslem religious institution, shall be governed solely by and under the Laws and Principles of Vakfs (ahkamul evkaf) and the laws and regulations enacted or made by the Turkish Communal Chamber, and no legislative, executive or other act whatsoever shall contravene or override or interfere with such Laws or Principles of Vakfs and with such laws and regulations of the Turkish Communal Chamber.

3. Any right with regard to religious matters possessed in accordance with the law of the Colony of Cyprus in force immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution by the Church of a religious group to which the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 2 shall apply shall continue to be so possessed by such Church on and after the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution.

Article 111
1. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution any matter relating to betrothal, marriage, divorce, nullity of marriage, judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights or to family relations other than legitimation by order of the court or adoption of members of the Greek-Orthodox Church or of a religious group to which the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 2 shall apply shall, on and after the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, be governed by the law of the Greek-Orthodox Church or of the Church of such religious group, as the case may be, and shall be cognizable by a tribunal of such Church and no Communal Chamber shall act inconsistently with the provisions of such law.

2. Nothing in paragraph 1 of this Article contained shall preclude the application of the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article 90 to the execution of any judgement or order of any such tribunal.

Part 06 – The Independent Officers of the Republic

CHAPTER I
The attorney-General of the Republic and the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic

Article 112
1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall appoint jointly two persons who are qualified for appointment as a judge of the High Court one to be Attorney-General of the Republic and the other to be the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic: Provided that the Attorney-General and the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic shall not belong to the same Community.
2. The Attorney-General of the Republic shall be the Head and the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic shall be the Deputy Head of the Law Office of the Republic which shall be an independent office and shall not be under any Ministry.

3. The Attorney-General and the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic shall have the right of audience in, and shall take precedence over any other persons appearing before, any court: Provided that the Attorney-General of the Republic shall always take precedence over the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic.

4. The Attorney-General and the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic shall be members of the permanent legal service of the Republic and shall hold office under the same terms and conditions as a judge of the High Court other than its President and shall not be removed from office except on the like grounds and in the like manner as such judge of the High Court.

5. In all matters affecting persons belonging to the Community of the Attorney-General of the Republic or of the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic, as such may be, the one belonging to such Community shall be consulted buy the other before any decisions is taken by the Attorney-General of the Republic: Provided that for the prosecutions in the courts exercising criminal jurisdiction composed of judges of one Community, the Attorney-General of the Republic or the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic, as the case may be, belonging to that Community, shall have the effective charge and responsibility.

Article 113

1. The Attorney-General of the Republic assisted by the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic shall be legal adviser of the Republic and of the President and of the Vice President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers and of the Ministers and shall exercise all such other powers and shall perform all such other functions and duties as are conferred or imposed on him by this Constitution or by law.

2. The Attorney-General of the Republic shall have power, exercisable at this direction in the public interest, to institute, conduct, take over and continue or discontinue any proceedings for an offence against any person in the Republic. Such power may be exercised by him in person or by officers subordinate to him acting under and in accordance with his instructions.

Article 114

1. The Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic shall have such powers and shall perform such duties as normally appertain to his office and also shall, subject to the directions of the Attorney-General of the Republic, exercise all the powers and perform all the functions
and the duties vested in the Attorney-General of the Republic under the provisions of the Constitution or by law.

2. The Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic shall act for the Attorney-General of the Republic in case of his absence or his temporary incapacity to perform his duties.

CHAPTER II
The Auditor-General and the Deputy Auditor-General

Article 115
1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall appoint jointly two fit and proper persons one to be the Auditor-General and the other to be the Deputy Auditor-General: Provided that the same Auditor-General and the Deputy Auditor-General shall not belong to the same Community.

2. The Auditor-General shall be the Head and the Deputy Auditor-General shall be the Deputy Head of the Audit Office of the Republic which shall be an independent office and shall not be under any Ministry.

3. The Auditor-General and the Deputy Auditor-General shall be members of the permanent public service of the Republic and shall not be retired or removed from office except on the like grounds and in like manner as a judge of the High Court.

Article 116
1. The Auditor-General assisted by the Deputy Auditor-General shall, on behalf of the Republic, control all disbursements and receipts and audit and inspect all accounts of moneys and other assets administered, and of liabilities incurred, by or under the authority of the Republic and for this purpose he shall have the right of access to all books, records and returns relating to such accounts and to places where such assets are kept.

2. The Auditor-General assisted by the Deputy Auditor-General shall, on behalf of the Republic, control all disbursements and receipts and audit and inspect all accounts of moneys and other assets administered, and of liabilities incurred, by or under the authority of the Republic and for this purpose he shall have the right of access to all books, records and returns relating to such accounts and to places where such assets are kept.

3. The powers, functions and duties of the Auditor-General provided in this Chapter may be exercised by him in person or by such subordinate officers acting under and in accordance with his instructions.
4. The Auditor-General shall submit a report on the exercise of his functions and duties under this Chapter to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic who shall cause it to be laid before the House of Representatives.

**Article 117**

1. The Deputy Auditor-General shall have such powers and shall perform such functions and duties as normally appertain to his office and also shall, subject to the directions of the Auditor-General, exercise all the powers and perform all the functions and duties vested in the Auditor-General under the provisions of the Constitution or by law.

2. The Deputy Auditor-General shall act for the Auditor-General in case of his absence or his temporary incapacity to perform his duties.

**CHAPTER III**

**The Governor and the Deputy Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic**

**Article 118**

1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall appoint jointly two fit and proper persons one to be the Governor and the other to be the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic: Provided that the Governor and the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall not belong to the same Community.

2. The Governor and the Deputy of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall be the Head and the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank shall be the Deputy Head of the Issuing Bank of the Republic which shall not be under any Ministry.

3. The Governor and the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall be either members of the permanent public service or shall be persons appointed under such terms and conditions as laid down in the instruments of their appointment.

4. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting jointly may, at any time, terminate the appointment of either the Governor or the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic or both as such Governor or Deputy-Governor, as the case may be.

5. In the case of such termination, the Governor or the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic or both, as the case may be, shall, subject to paragraph 6 of this Article, and to the provisions of this Constitution relating to the public service of the Republic, be given other suitable post in the permanent public service of the Republic if such Governor or Deputy-Governor was, immediately
before such termination, a member of such service.

6. Any disciplinary matter in connexion with the exercise of the functions of the Governor and the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall be within the competence of the Council established under paragraph 8 of Article 153.

Article 119
1. The Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic assisted by the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall administer the currency laws of the Republic and shall be in charge of the management of the Issuing Bank of the Republic and shall exercise all other powers and perform all other functions and duties within the domain of the Issuing Bank of the Republic.

2. The Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic assisted by the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall exercise all such powers and shall perform all such other functions as are conferred or imposed on him by law.

3. The powers, functions and duties of the Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic provided in this Chapter may be exercised by him in person or by such subordinate officers acting under and in accordance with his instructions.

4. The Governor assisted by the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall, with regard to the financial policy relating to his office, carry out the decisions of the Council of Ministers in this respect and the provisions of any law and, with regard to the manner of the carrying out of such policy, he shall consult and be guided by the advice of the Ministers of Finance.

5. The Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall submit half yearly reports on the state of currency, funds and securities of the Republic to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic who shall cause such reports to be laid before the House of Representatives.

Article 120
1. The Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall have such powers and shall perform such functions and duties as normally appertain to his office and also shall, subject to the directions of the Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic, exercise all the powers and perform all the functions and duties vested in the Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic under the provisions of this Constitution or by law.

2. The Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall act for the Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic in case of his
absence or his temporary incapacity to perform his duties

Article 121
Nothing in this Chapter contained shall be constructed as precluding the Issuing Bank of the Republic from becoming a Central Bank: Provided that in such case a case, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, the Governor and the Deputy-Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall be respectively the Governor and the Deputy-Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic.

Part 07 - The Public Service

Chapter 1 -
General Article 122
For the purposes of this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires "public office" means an office in the public service; "public officer" means the holder, whether substantive or temporary or acting, of a public office; "public service" means any service under the Republic other than service in the army or the security forces of the Republic and includes service under the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, the Cyprus Inland Telecommunications Authority and the Electricity Authority of Cyprus and any other public corporate or unincorporate body created in the public interest by a law and either the funds of which are provided or guaranteed by the Republic or, if the enterprise is carried out exclusively by such body, its administration is carried out under the control of the Republic but does not include service in an office the appointment to or the filling of which is, under this Constitution, made jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic or service by workmen except those who are regularly employed in connection with permanent works of the Republic or any such body as aforesaid.

Article 123
1. The public service shall be composed as to seventy per centum of Greeks and as to thirty per centum of Turks.

2. This quantitative distribution shall be applied, so far as this will be practically possible, in all grades of the hierarchy in the public service.

3. In regions or localities where one of the two Communities is in a majority approaching one hundred per centum the public officers posted for, or entrusted with, duty in such regions or localities shall belong to that Community.

Article 124
1. There shall be a Public Service Commission consisting of a Chairman and nine other members appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.
2. Seven members of the Commission shall be Greeks and three members shall be Turks.

3. Each member of the Commission shall be appointed for a period of six years, but he may at any time resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

4. The remuneration and other conditions of service of a member of the Commission shall be provided by a law and shall not be altered to his disadvantage after his appointment.

5. A member of the Commission shall not be removed from office except on the like grounds and in the like manner as a judge of the High Court.

6. (1) No person shall be appointed as a member of the Commission unless he is a citizen of the Republic, of high moral character and has the qualifications for election as a member of the House of Representatives.

   (2) No person shall be appointed as, or be, a member of the Commission who is, or within the preceding twelve months in the case of the Chairman or six months in the case of any other member, has been -

   (a) a Minister;

   (b) a member of the House of Representatives or of any Communal Chamber;

   (c) a public officer or a member of any of the armed forces;

   (d) an officer or employee of any local authority or of a body corporate or authority established by law for public purposes;

   (e) a member of a trade union or of a body or association affiliated to a trade union.

7. Where, during any period, a member of the Commission has been granted leave of absence or is unable, owing to absence from the Republic, or to any other cause, to discharge his functions as a member, the President and the Vice-President of the Republic may jointly appoint at his place any person who would be qualified to be appointed to exercise such functions, during that period.

**Article 125**

1. Save where other express provision is made in this Constitution with respect to any matter set out in this paragraph and subject to the
provisions of any law, it shall be the duty of the Public Service Commission to make the allocation of public offices between the two Communities and to appoint, confirm, emplace on the permanent or pensionable establishment, promote transfer, retire and exercise disciplinary control over, including dismissal or removal from office of, public officers.

2. The Chairman shall convene the meetings of the Commission and shall preside thereat:
Provided that -

(a) no meeting shall be held unless prior notice thereof has been given to all the members;

(b) on an equality of votes the Chairman shall not have a second or casting vote.

3. (1) Subject to the ensuing provisions of this paragraph any decision of the Commission shall be taken by an absolute majority vote of its members.
(2) If the question relates to an appointment or promotion to fill a vacant or newly created post, the decision whether such post shall be filled, under the provisions of this Constitution, by a Greek or a Turk, shall be taken by such absolute majority vote including at least the votes of two Turkish members of the Commission:
Provided that if such a decision cannot be taken on such majority, the question shall be referred by the Commission to the Supreme Constitutional Court for a decision; the decision of such Court shall be final and binding on the Commission.

(3) Where the question relates solely to a Turk any decision of the Commission shall be taken by such an absolute majority vote including the votes of at least two Turkish members. Where the question relates solely to a Greek, any decision of the Commission shall be taken by such an absolute majority vote including the votes of at least four Greek members.

(4) Where the question relates to the selection of the Greek or the Turk to be appointed or promoted, the decision shall, subject to subparagraph (3) of this paragraph, be taken by an absolute majority vote:
Provided that the unanimous recommendation, of five Greek members in the case of the selection of a Greek, or of the three Turkish members in the case of the selection of a Turk, shall be acted upon by the Commission.

Chapter 2 - The Accountant-General and the Deputy Accountant-General
**Article 126**

1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall appoint jointly two fit and proper persons one to be the Accountant-General and the other to be the Deputy Accountant-General: Provided that the Accountant-General and the Deputy Accountant-General shall not belong to the same Community.

2. The Accountant-General shall be the Head and the Deputy Accountant-General shall be the Deputy Head of the Treasury.

3. The Accountant-General and the Deputy Accountant-General shall be members of the permanent public service of the Republic.

4. The retirement and any disciplinary control, including dismissal or removal from office, of the Accountant-General and the Deputy Accountant-General shall be within the competence of the Public Service Commission.

**Article 127**

1. The Accountant-General assisted by the Deputy Accountant-General shall manage and supervise all accounting operations in respect of all moneys and other assets administered and of liabilities incurred, by or under the authority of the Republic and, subject to the provisions of this Constitution or of any law, shall receive and make all the disbursements of moneys of the Republic.

2. The Accountant-General assisted by the Deputy Accountant-General shall exercise all such other powers and shall perform all such other functions and duties as are conferred or imposed on him by law.

3. The powers, functions and duties of the Accountant-General provided in this Chapter may be exercised by him in person or by such subordinate officers acting under and in accordance with his instructions.

**Article 128**

1. The Deputy Accountant-General shall have such powers and shall perform such functions and duties as normally appertain to his office and also shall, subject to the directions of the Accountant-General, exercise all the powers and perform all the functions and duties vested in the Accountant-General under the provisions of this Constitution or by law.

2. The Deputy Accountant-General shall act for the Accountant-General in case of his absence or his temporary incapacity to perform his duties.

**Part 08 - The Forces of the Republic**

**Article 129**
1. The Republic shall have an army of two thousand men of whom sixty per centum shall be Greeks and forty per centum shall be Turks.

2. Compulsory military service shall not be instituted except by common agreement of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

**Article 130**

1. The security forces of the Republic shall consist of the police and gendarmerie and shall have a contingent of two thousand men which may be reduced or increased by common agreement of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

2. The security forces of the Republic shall be composed as to seventy per centum of Greeks and as to thirty per centum of Turks: Provided that for an initial period and in order not to discharge those Turks serving in the police on the 11th February, 1959, except those serving in the auxiliary police, the percentage of Turks may be kept up to a maximum of forty per centum and consequently that of the Greeks may be reduced to sixty per centum.

**Article 131**

1. The Heads and Deputy Heads of the army, the police and the gendarmerie of the Republic shall be appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

2. One of the Heads of the army, the police and the gendarmerie shall be a Turk and where the Head of the army, the police and the gendarmerie belongs to one Community the Deputy Head shall belong to the other Community.

**Article 132**

Forces which are stationed in parts of the territory of the Republic inhabited in a proportion approaching one hundred per centum only by members of one Community shall belong to that Community.

**Part 09 - The Supreme Constitutional Court**

**Article 133**

1. (1) There shall be a Supreme Constitutional Court of the Republic composed of a Greek, a Turk and a neutral judge. The neutral judge shall be the President of the Court.(2) The President and the other judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic:

Provided that in the case of a vacancy solely in the post of either the Greek or the Turkish judge the proposal of the President or the Vice-President of the Republic to whose Community the judge to be appointed shall belong shall prevail if the President and the Vice-President of the Republic do not agree on the appointment within a week of such proposal.
2. The seat of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be in the capital of the Republic.

3. The neutral judge shall not be a subject or a citizen of the Republic or of the Kingdom of Greece or of the Republic of Turkey or of the United Kingdom and the Colonies.

4. The Greek and the Turkish judge of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be a citizen of the Republic.

5. The President and the other judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be appointed from amongst lawyers of high professional and moral standard.

6. (1) The President of the Court shall be appointed for a period of six years. (2) The remuneration and other conditions of service of the President of the Court shall be laid down in the instrument of his appointment. (3) The conditions of service of the President of the Court to be laid down in the instrument of his appointment as provided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph shall include - (a) provision for his retirement on the same grounds as those on which the Greek or the Turkish judge may be retired under subparagraph (3) of paragraph 7 of this Article; and (b) provision for his dismissal on the same grounds as those on which such Greek or Turkish judge may be dismissed under sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 7 of this Article.

7. (1) The Greek and the Turkish judge of the Court shall be permanent members of the judicial service of the Republic and shall hold office until they attain the age of sixty-eight. (2) Without prejudice to any retirement pension, gratuity or any other like benefit he may have acquired under the provisions of any law, the Greek or the Turkish judge of the Court may at any time resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. (3) The Greek or the Turkish judge of the Court shall be retired on account of such mental or physical incapacity or infirmity as would render him incapable of discharging the duties of his office either permanently or for such period of time as would render it impracticable for him to continue in office. A judge so retired shall be entitled to all benefits and emoluments provided by any law in force for the time being. (4) The Greek or the Turkish judge of the Court may be dismissed on the ground of misconduct.

8. (1) There shall be established a Council consisting of the President of the High Court as Chairman and the senior in appointment Greek judge and the Turkish judge of the High Court as members. (2) This Council shall have exclusive competence to determine all
matters relating to -

(a) the retirement, dismissal or otherwise the termination of the appointment of the President of the Court in accordance with the conditions of service laid down in the instrument of his appointment;

(b) the retirement or dismissal of the Greek or the Turkish judge of the Court on any of the grounds provided in sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) of paragraph 7 of this Article.

(3) The proceedings of the Council under sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph shall be of a judicial nature and the judge concerned shall be entitled to be heard and present his case before the Council.

(4) The decision of the Council taken by a majority shall be binding upon the President and the Vice-President of the Republic who shall jointly act accordingly.

9. In the case of temporary absence or incapacity of the President or of the Greek judge or of the Turkish judge of the Court, the President of the High Court or the senior in appointment of the two Greek judges or the Turkish judge thereof respectively shall act in his place during such temporary absence or incapacity.

10. No action shall be brought against the President or any other judge of the Court for any act done or words spoken in his judicial capacity.

11. The remuneration and other conditions of service of the Greek and the Turkish judge of the Court shall be fixed by a law.

12. The remuneration and other conditions of service of any judge of the Court shall not be altered to his disadvantage after his appointment.

**Article 134**

1. The sittings of the Supreme Constitutional Court for the hearing of all proceedings shall be public but the Court may hear any proceedings in the presence only of the parties, if any, and the officers of the Court if it considers that such a course will be in the interest of the orderly conduct of the proceedings or if the security of the Republic or public morals so require.

2. When a recourse appears to be prima facie frivolous the Court may, after hearing arguments by or on behalf of the parties concerned, unanimously dismiss such recourse without a public hearing if satisfied that such recourse is in fact frivolous.

**Article 135**

The Supreme Constitutional Court shall make Rules of Court for regulating the practice and procedure of the Court in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon it by this Constitution, for prescribing forms
and fees in respect of proceedings in the Court and for prescribing
and regulating the composition of its registry and the powers and the
duties of the officers thereof.

**Article 136**
The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction
adjudicate finally on all matters as provided in the ensuing Articles.

**Article 137**
1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic, either
separately or conjointly, shall have a right of recourse to the Supreme
Constitutional Court under the provisions of this Article on the ground
that any law or decision of the House of Representatives or any
provision thereof discriminates against either of the two Communities.

2. A recourse under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be made within
seventy-five days of the promulgation of any such law or decision.

3. Notice of the filing of such a recourse shall be published in the
official Gazette of the Republic by the President and the Vice-
President of the Republic within a period of twenty-four hours from
such filing. Upon the publication of such notification in the official
Gazette of the Republic the operation of such law or decision shall be
suspended from the day following such publication until the Supreme
Constitutional Court determines such recourse.

4. Upon such recourse the Court may confirm or annul such law
or decision or any provision thereof or return it to the House of
Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in part:
Provided that in the case of annulment of a law or decision or any
provision thereof such annulment shall operate from the date of the
publication of the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court
under paragraph 5 of this Article without prejudice to anything done
or left undone under such law or decision or provision thereof.

5. The decision of the Court shall be notified forthwith to the
President and the Vice-President of the Republic and to the President
and the Vice-President of the House of Representatives and shall be
published forthwith by the President and the Vice-President of the
Republic in the official Gazette of the Republic.

**Article 138**
1. Where on the adoption of the Budget by the House of
Representatives the President and the Vice-President of the Republic,
either separately or conjointly, has or have exercised his or their right
to return it to the House of Representatives on the ground that in his or
their judgement there is a discrimination and the House has persisted
in its decision, the President and the Vice-President of the Republic,
either separately or conjointly, as the case may be, shall have a right of
recourse to the Supreme Constitutional Court on such
2. Such recourse shall be made within the period fixed by this Constitution for the promulgation of the laws or decisions of the House of Representatives.

3. Upon such a recourse the Court may annul or confirm the Budget or return it to the House of Representatives, in whole or in part.

4. The decision of the Court shall be notified forthwith to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic and to the President and the Vice-President of the House of Representatives and shall be published forthwith by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic in the official Gazette of the Republic.

**Article 139**

1. The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate finally on a recourse made in connection with any matter relating to any conflict or contest of power or competence arising between the House of Representatives and the Communal Chambers or any one of them and between any organs of, or authorities in, the Republic: Provided that nothing in this paragraph contained shall apply to any conflict or contest between any courts or judicial authorities in the Republic, which conflict or contest shall be decided by the High Court. For the purposes of this paragraph the expression "courts or judicial authorities in the Republic" does not include the Supreme Constitutional Court.

2. Where any question arises as to the competence of the Supreme Constitutional Court regarding any matter, such question shall be determined by the Supreme Constitutional Court.

3. Recourse to the Court under paragraph 1 of this Article may be made by -

(a) the President or the Vice-President of the Republic;

(b) the House of Representatives; or

(c) one of, or both the Communal Chambers; or

(d) any other organ of, or authority in, the Republic, if involved in such conflict or contest.

4. Such recourse shall be made within thirty days of the date when such power or competence is contested.

5. Upon such a recourse the Court may declare that the law or the decision or the act, the subject or the recourse, is void, either from the
time when the conflict or contest arose or ab initio, and without any legal effect whatsoever, either in whole or in part, on the ground that such law or decision or act was made or taken or done without power or competence, and in either case the Court may give directions as to the effect of anything done or left undone under such law or decision or act.

6. Any decision of the Court upon such recourse shall be forthwith notified to the parties concerned and to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic who shall forthwith publish it in the official Gazette of the Republic.

7. Upon a recourse under this Article the Court may order that the operation of the law or decision or act, as the case may be, which is the subject matter of such recourse, shall be suspended until the determination of the recourse; such order shall be published forthwith in the official Gazette of the Republic.

Article 140
1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting jointly may, at any time prior to the promulgation of any law or decision of the House of Representatives, refer to the Supreme Constitutional Court for its opinion the question as to whether such law or decision or any specified provision thereof is repugnant to or inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution, otherwise than on the ground that such law or decision or any provision thereof discriminates against either of the two Communities.

2. The Supreme Constitutional Court shall consider every question referred to it under paragraph 1 of this Article and having heard arguments on behalf of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic and on behalf of the House of Representatives shall give its opinion on such question and notify the President and the Vice-President of the Republic and the House of Representatives accordingly.

3. In case the Supreme Constitutional Court is of the opinion that such law or decision or any provision thereof is repugnant to or inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution such law or decision or such provision thereof shall not be promulgated by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

Article 141
1. The President or the Vice-President of the Republic may, at any time prior to the promulgation of any law imposing any formalities, conditions or restrictions on the right guaranteed by Article 25, refer to the Supreme Constitutional Court for its opinion the question as to whether such formality, condition or restriction is not in the public interest or is contrary to the interests of his Community.
2. The Supreme Constitutional Court shall consider such question and having heard arguments on behalf of the President or the Vice-President of the Republic, as the case may be, and on behalf of the House of Representatives shall give its opinion and notify the President and the Vice-President of the Republic and the House of Representatives accordingly.

3. In case the Supreme Constitutional Court is of opinion that such formality, condition or restriction is not in the public interest or is contrary to the interests of such Community such law or any provision thereof prescribing such formality, condition or restriction shall not be promulgated by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

Article 142
1. The President of the Republic with regard to any law or decision of the Greek Communal Chamber and the Vice-President of the Republic with regard to any law or decision of the Turkish Communal Chamber, may, at any time prior to the publication of such law or decision, refer to the Supreme Constitutional Court for its opinion the question as to whether such law or decision or any specified provision thereof is repugnant to or inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution.

2. The Supreme Constitutional Court shall consider every question referred to it under paragraph 1 of this Article and having heard arguments on behalf of the President or the Vice-President of the Republic, as the case may be, and on behalf of the Communal Chamber concerned, shall give its opinion on such question and notify accordingly the President or the Vice-President of the Republic, as the case may be, and the Communal Chamber concerned.

3. In case the Supreme Constitutional Court is of the opinion that such law or decision or any provision thereof is repugnant to or inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution such law or decision or such provision thereof shall not be published by the President or the Vice-President of the Republic, as the case may be.

Article 143
1. The President or the Vice-President of the Republic or Representatives consisting of at least one-fifth of the total number of a newly-elected House of Representatives shall have a right of recourse to the Supreme Constitutional Court on the question whether there exist such urgent and exceptional unforeseen circumstances as to justify a House of Representatives which continues to be in office until the assumption of office of a newly-elected House to make any laws or take any decisions as in Article 68 provided.

2. Such recourse, if made by the President or the Vice-President of the Republic shall be made within the period provided by this Constitution for the promulgation of the laws and decisions of the House of Representatives and if made by such Representatives shall be made
within fifteen days of the date when the new House first meets.

3. The decision of the Court shall be notified forthwith to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic and to the President and the Vice-President of the House of Representatives and shall be published forthwith by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic in the official Gazette of the Republic.

**Article 144**

1. A party to any judicial proceedings, including proceedings on appeal, may, at any stage thereof, raise the question of the unconstitutionality of any law or decision or any provision thereof material for the determination of any matter at issue in such proceedings and thereupon the Court before which such question is raised shall reserve the question for the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court and stay further proceedings until such question is determined by the Supreme Constitutional Court.

2. The Supreme Constitutional Court, on a question so reserved, shall, after hearing the parties, consider and determine the question so reserved and transmit its decision to the Court by which such question has been reserved.

3. Any decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court under paragraph 2 of this Article shall be binding on the court by which the question has been reserved and on the parties to the proceedings and shall, in case such decision is to the effect that the law or decision or any provision thereof is unconstitutional, operate as to make such law or decision inapplicable to such proceedings only.

**Article 145**

The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate finally on any election petition, made under the provisions of the Electoral Law, with regard to the elections of the President or the Vice-President of the Republic or of members of the House of Representatives or of any Communal Chamber.

**Article 146**

1. The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate finally on a recourse made to it on a complaint that a decision, an act or omission of any organ, authority or person, exercising any executive or administrative authority is contrary to any of the provisions of this Constitution or of any law or is made in excess or in abuse of powers vested in such organ or authority or person.

2. Such a recourse may be made by a person whose any existing legitimate interest, which he has either as a person or by virtue of being a member of a Community, is adversely and directly affected by such decision or act or omission.
3. Such a recourse shall be made within seventy-five days of the date when the decision or act was published or, if not published and in the case of an omission, when it came to the knowledge of the person making the recourse. 4. Upon such a recourse the Court may, by its decision -

(a) confirm, either in whole or in part, such decision or act or omission; or

(b) declare, either in whole or in part, such decision or act to be null and void and of no effect whatsoever, or

(c) declare that such omission, either in whole or in part, ought not to have been made and that whatever has been omitted should have been performed.

5. Any decision given under paragraph 4 of this Article shall be binding on all courts and all organs or authorities in the Republic and shall be given effect to and acted upon by the organ or authority or person concerned.

6. Any person aggrieved by any decision or act declared to be void under paragraph 4 of this Article or by any omission declared thereunder that it ought not to have been made shall be entitled, if his claim is not met to his satisfaction by the organ, authority or person concerned, to institute legal proceedings in a court for the recovery of damages or for being granted other remedy and to recover just and equitable damages to be assessed by the court or to be granted such other just and equitable remedy as such court is empowered to grant.

Article 147
The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate finally on a motion made by the Attorney-General and the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 44, with regard to the question of the existence of such permanent or temporary incapacity, or absence, otherwise than temporary, of the President or the Vice-President of the Republic, as would prevent him to perform effectively his duties as in sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 1 of Article 44 provided.

Article 148
Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 144, any decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court on any matter within its jurisdiction or competence shall be binding on all courts, organs, authorities and persons in the Republic.

Article 149
The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction -
(a) to determine any conflict between the two texts of this Constitution by reference to the text of the draft of this Constitution signed at
Nicosia on the 6th April, 1960, in the Joint Constitutional Commission
together with the schedule of amendments thereto signed on* by
representatives of the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, due regard being had to the
letter and spirit of the Zurich Agreement dated the 11th February, 1959,
and of the London Agreement dated the 19th of February, 1959;

(b) to make, in case of ambiguity, any interpretation of this
Constitution due regard being had to the letter and spirit of the
Zurich Agreement dated the 11th February, 1959, and of the London
Agreement dated the 19th February, 1959.

Article 150
The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction to punish
for contempt of itself.

Article 151
1. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part,
the Supreme Constitutional Court shall have exclusive competence
to decide finally on a reference made to it by the Public Service
Commission under sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 3 of Article 125.

2. Nothing in this Article contained shall preclude any recourse to
the Supreme Constitutional Court under Article 146 on a complaint
concerning any decision, act or omission of the Public Service
Commission.

Part 10 - The High Court and the Subordinate Courts

Article 152
1. The judicial power, other than that exercised under Part IX by the
Supreme Constitutional Court and under paragraph 2 of this Article by
the courts provided by a communal law, shall be exercised by a High
Court of Justice and such inferior courts as may, subject to the
provisions of this Constitution, be provided by a law made thereunder.

2. The judicial power with respect to civil disputes relating to
personal status and to religious matters which are reserved under
Article 87 for the Communal Chambers shall be exercised by such
courts as a communal law made under the provisions of this
Constitution shall provide.

Article 153
1. (1) There shall be a High Court of Justice composed of two Greek
judges, one Turkish judge and a neutral judge. The neutral judge
shall be the President of the Court and shall have two votes.

(2) The President and the other judges of the High Court shall
be appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President of
the Republic:
Provided that in the case of a vacancy solely in the post of either a Greek judge or the Turkish judge the proposal of the President or the Vice-President of the Republic to whose Community the judge to be appointed shall belong shall prevail if the President and the Vice-President of the Republic do not agree on the appointment within a week of such proposal.

2. The seat of the High Court shall be in the capital of the Republic.

3. The neutral judge shall not be a subject or a citizen of the Republic or of the Kingdom of Greece or of the Republic of Turkey or of the United Kingdom and the Colonies.

4. The Greek judges and the Turkish judge of the High Court shall be citizens of the Republic.

5. The President and the other judges of the High Court shall be appointed from amongst lawyers of high professional and moral standard.

6. (1) The President of the High Court shall be appointed for a period of six years. (2) The remuneration and other conditions of service of the President of the High Court shall be laid down in the instrument of his appointment. (3) The conditions of service of the President of the High Court to be laid down in the instrument of his appointment as provided in subparagraph

(2) of this paragraph shall include-
(a) provision for his retirement on the same grounds as those on which a Greek or the Turkish judge may be retired under subparagraph

(3) of paragraph 7 of this Article; and
(b) provision for his dismissal on the same grounds as those on which such Greek or Turkish judge may be dismissed under sub-paragraph

(4) of paragraph 7 of this Article.

7. (1) The Greek judges and the Turkish judge of the High Court shall be permanent members of the judicial service of the Republic and shall hold office until they attain the age of sixty-eight.

(2) Without prejudice to any retirement pension, gratuity or any other like benefit he may have acquired under the provisions of any law, any Greek judge or the Turkish judge of the High Court may at any time resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

(3) Any Greek or the Turkish judge of the High Court shall be retired on account of such mental or physical incapacity or infirmity as would
render him incapable of discharging the duties of his office either permanently or for such period of time as would render it impracticable for him to continue in office. A judge so retired shall be entitled to all benefits and emoluments provided by any law in force for the time being.

(4) A Greek or the Turkish judge of the High Court may be dismissed on the ground of misconduct.

8. (1) There shall be established a Council consisting of the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court as Chairman and the Greek and the Turkish judge of the Supreme Constitutional Court as members.

(2) This Council shall have exclusive competence to determine all matters relating to -

(a) the retirement, dismissal or otherwise the termination of the appointment of the President of the High Court in accordance with the conditions of service laid down in the instrument of his appointment;

(b) the retirement or dismissal of any Greek judge or the Turkish judge of the High Court on any of the grounds provided in subparagraphs (3) and (4) of paragraph 7 of this Article.

(3) The proceedings of the Council under sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph shall be of a judicial nature and the judge concerned shall be entitled to be heard and present his case before the Council.

(4) The decision of the Council taken by a majority shall be binding upon the President and the Vice-President of the Republic who shall jointly act accordingly.

9. In the case of temporary absence or incapacity of the President of the High Court or of one of the Greek judges or of the Turkish judge thereof the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court or the Greek judge or the Turkish judge thereof respectively shall act in his place during such temporary absence or incapacity: Provided that if it is impracticable or inconvenient for the Greek or the Turkish judge of the Supreme Constitutional Court to act, the senior in office Greek or Turkish judge in the judicial service of the Republic shall so act respectively.

10. No action shall be brought against the President or any other judge of the High Court for any act done or words spoken in his judicial capacity.

11. The remuneration and other conditions of service of the Greek judges and of the Turkish judge of the High Court shall be fixed by a law.

12. The remuneration and other conditions of service of any judge of the High Court shall not be altered to his disadvantage after his
Article 154
The sittings of the High Court for the hearing of all proceedings shall be public but the court may hear any proceedings in the presence only of the parties, if any, and the officers of the court if it considers that such a course will be in the interest of the orderly conduct of the proceedings or if the security of the Republic or public morals so require.

Article 155
1. The High Court shall be the highest appellate court in the Republic and shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any Rules of Court made thereunder, all appeals from any court other than the Supreme Constitutional Court.

2. Subject to paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article the High Court shall have such original and revisional jurisdiction as is provided by this Constitution or as may be provided by a law:
Provided that where original jurisdiction is so conferred, such jurisdiction shall, subject to Article 159, be exercised by such judge or judges of the High Court as the High Court shall determine:
Provided further that there shall be a right of appeal to the High Court from their decision.

3. The High Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, determine the composition of the court which is to try a civil case where the plaintiff and the defendant belong to different Communities and of the court which is to try a criminal case in which the accused and the injured party belong to different Communities. Such court shall be composed of judges belonging to both the Greek and the Turkish Communities.

4. The High Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue orders in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari.

Article 156
The following offences in the first instance shall be tried by a court composed of such judges belonging to both Communities as the High Court shall determine presided over by the President of the High Court:-

(a) treason and other offences against the security of the Republic;

(b) offences against the Constitution and the constitutional order:
Provided that in the appeal from any decision of such court the High Court shall be presided over by the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court in the place of the President of the High Court and
in such a case the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall have all the powers vested in the President of the High Court.

**Article 157**

1. Save as otherwise provided in this Constitution with regard to the Supreme Constitutional Court, the High Court shall be the Supreme Council of Judicature, and its President shall have two votes.

2. The appointment, promotion, transfer, termination of appointment, dismissal and disciplinary matters of judicial officers are exclusively within the competence of the Supreme Council of Judicature.

3. No judicial officer shall be retired or dismissed except on the like grounds and in the same manner as a judge of the High Court.

**Article 158**

1. A law shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, provide for the establishment, jurisdiction and powers of courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction other than courts to be provided by a communal law under Article 160.

2. Any such law shall provide for the establishment of adequate courts in sufficient number for the proper and undelayed administration of justice and for securing within the limits of their respective competence the efficient application of the provisions of this Constitution guaranteeing the fundamental rights and liberties.

3. A law shall provide for the remuneration and other conditions of service of the judges of the courts to be established under paragraph 1 of this Article. The remuneration and other conditions of service of any such judge shall not be altered to his disadvantage after his appointment.

**Article 159**

1. A court exercising civil jurisdiction in a case where the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the same Community shall be composed solely of a judge or judges belonging to that Community.

2. A court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a case where the accused and the person injured belong to the same Community, or where there is no person injured, shall be composed of a judge or judges belonging to that Community.

3. Where in a civil case the plaintiff and the defendant belong to different Communities the court shall be composed of such judges belonging to both Communities as the High Court shall determine.

4. Where in a criminal case the accused and the person injured belong to different Communities the court shall be composed of such judges belonging to both Communities as the High Court shall determine.
5. A coroner's inquest where the deceased belonged to the Greek Community shall be conducted by a Greek coroner and where the deceased belonged to the Turkish Community shall be conducted by a Turkish coroner. In case there are more than one deceased belonging to different Communities the inquest shall be conducted by such coroner as the High Court may direct.

6. The execution of any judgement or order of a court exercising civil or criminal jurisdiction, if the court is composed of a Greek judge or Greek judges shall be carried out through Greek officers of the court, if the court is composed of a Turkish judge or Turkish judges shall be carried out through Turkish officers of the court, and in any other case such execution shall be carried out by such officers as the court of trial shall direct.

**Article 160**

1. A communal law made by the Communal Chamber concerned shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, provide for the establishment, composition and jurisdiction of courts to deal with civil disputes relating to personal status and to religious matters which are reserved for the competence of the Communal Chambers by the provisions of this Constitution.

2. By such law provision shall be made for appeals against the decisions of such courts and for the composition of the courts by which such appeals are to be heard and determined and for the jurisdiction and powers of such appellate courts. A communal law made under this paragraph may provide that such appellate court may be composed of a judge or judges of the High Court either sitting alone or with such other judge or judges in the judicial service of the Republic as such law may determine.

3. Any such court as aforesaid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, shall apply the laws made by the Communal Chamber concerned:
Provided that nothing in this paragraph contained shall preclude a court of the Republic from applying in a case, where an issue relating to personal status or to religious matters is raised incidentally, the relevant communal law.

**Article 161**

Subject to paragraph 3 of Article 160 the courts of the Republic shall have power to apply also the relevant communal laws other than those relating to personal status and to religious matters.

**Article 162**

The High Court shall have jurisdiction to punish for any contempt of itself, and any other court of the Republic, including a court established by a communal law under Article 160, shall have power to
commit any person disobeying a judgement or order of such court to
prison until such person complies with such judgement or order and
in any event for a period not exceeding twelve months.

A law or a communal law, notwithstanding anything in Article 90 contained, as the case may be, may provide for punishment for contempt of court.

**Article 163**

1. The High Court shall make Rules of Court for regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court and of any other court established by or under this Part of this Constitution, other than a court established under Article 160.

2. Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph 1 of this Article the High Court may make Rules of Court for the following purposes:

(a) for regulating the sittings of the courts and the selection of judges for any purpose;

(b) for providing for the summary determination of any appeal or other proceedings which appear to the High Court or such other court before which such proceedings are pending to be frivolous or vexatious or to have been instituted for the purpose of delaying the course of justice;

(c) for prescribing forms and fees in respect of proceedings in the courts and regulating the costs of, and incidental to, any such proceedings;

(d) for prescribing and regulating the composition of the registries of the courts and the powers and duties of officers of the courts;

(e) for prescribing the time within which any requirement of the Rules of Court is to be complied with;

(f) for prescribing the practice and procedure to be followed by the Supreme Council of Judicature in the exercise of its competence with regard to disciplinary matters relating to judicial officers.

3. Rules of Court made under this Article may fix the number of judges of the High Court who are to hear any specified matter: Provided that in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by or under this Constitution no matter shall be determined unless the provisions of Article 159 are complied with and for the hearing of any appeal, including an appeal under Article 156, the High Court shall, subject to paragraph 2 of Article 160, be composed of all its members.

**Article 164**
1. Any appellate court created under paragraph 2 of Article 160 shall make Rules of Court for regulating the practice and procedure of such court and the practice and procedure of any court from which any appeal shall lie.

2. Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph 1 of this Article such appellate court may make Rules of Court for itself and for the Courts from which an appeal shall lie to it for the following purposes:

(a) for regulating the sittings of such courts;

(b) for prescribing forms and fees in respect of proceedings in such courts and for regulating the costs of, and incidental to, any such proceedings;

(c) for prescribing and regulating the composition of registries of such courts and the powers and duties of officers of such courts;

(d) for prescribing the time within which any requirement of such Rules of Court is to be complied with.


Article 165

1. All revenues and moneys, howsoever raised or received by the Republic, shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of the law, be paid into and form one fund to be known as the Consolidated Fund of the Republic.

2. All revenues and moneys, howsoever raised or received by a Communal Chamber, shall, subject to any communal law, be paid into and form one fund, to be known as the Consolidated Fund of that Communal Chamber.

3. Unless the context otherwise requires any reference in this Constitution to the Consolidated Fund shall be construed as a reference to the Consolidated Fund of the Republic provided in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 166

1. There shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund, in addition to any grant, remuneration or other moneys charged by any other provision of this Constitution or law -

(a) all pensions and gratuities for which the Republic is liable;

(b) the emoluments of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic and the salaries of the judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court and of the High Court, of the Attorney-General and of the
Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic, of the Auditor-General and of the Deputy Auditor-General, of the Governor and the Deputy Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic and of the members of the Public Service Commission;

(c) all debt charges for which the Republic is liable; and

(d) any moneys required to satisfy any judgement, decision or award against the Republic by any court.

2. For the purposes of this Article debt charges include interest, sinking fund charges, the repayment of amortisation of debt and all expenditure in connection with the raising of loans on the security of the Consolidated Fund and the service and redemption of debt created thereby.

**Article 167**

1. The Minister of Finance shall, upon receipt of the estimates of each Ministry and of each Independent Office of the Republic, cause to be prepared in respect of every financial year a comprehensive Budget of the Republic for that year which, when approved by the Council of Ministers, shall be laid before the House of Representatives.

2. The estimates of expenditure in the Budget shall show separately-

(a) the total sums required to meet expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund; and

(b) the sums respectively required to meet other expenditure.

3. The said Budget shall also show, so far as is practicable, the assets and liabilities of the Republic at the end of the last completed financial year, the manner in which those assets are invested or held and particulars in respect of outstanding liabilities.

4. The expenditure to be met from the Consolidated Fund but not charged thereon shall be submitted to the House of Representatives for adoption and if adopted shall be included in the Budget in respect of that financial year.

5. If in respect of any financial year it is found that the amount adopted by the House of Representatives for any purpose is insufficient or that a need has arisen for expenditure for a purpose for which no amount has been adopted a supplementary budget showing the sums required shall be laid before the House of Representatives for adoption and if adopted by the House of Representatives shall be included in the Budget in respect of that financial year.

6. The House of Representatives may approve or refuse its approval to any expenditure contained in a supplementary Budget but may not vote an increased amount or an alteration in its destination.
Article 168

1. No expenditure shall be met from the Consolidated Fund or other Public Funds except upon the authority of a warrant under the hand of the Minister of Finance:
Provided that the Minister of Finance shall not refuse to sign any such warrant for an expenditure provided for in the Budget.

2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article, no such warrant shall be issued unless such expenditure has been adopted in the Budget for the financial year to which the warrant relates in the Budget.

3. If the Budget has not been adopted by the House of Representatives by the first day of the financial year to which it relates, the House of Representatives may, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, by a resolution, authorise the meeting of any expenditure required, for a period not exceeding one month at any one time but in any event not exceeding two months in the aggregate, from the Consolidated Fund or other Public Funds as they may consider essential for the continuance of the public services shown in the Budget until the expiration of such period:
Provided that the expenditure so authorised for any service shall not exceed the proportion with respect to such period of the amount voted for that service in the Budget for the preceding financial year.

Part 12 - Miscellaneous Provisions

Article 169

Subject to the provisions of Article 50 and paragraph 3 of Article 57-
(1) every international agreement with a foreign State or any International Organisation relating to commercial matters, economic co-operation (including payments and credit) and modus vivendi shall be concluded under a decision of the Council of Ministers;

(2) any other treaty, convention or international agreement shall be negotiated and signed under a decision of the Council of Ministers and shall only be operative and binding on the Republic when approved by a law made by the House of Representatives whereupon it shall be concluded;

(3) treaties, conventions and agreements concluded in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Article shall have, as from their publication in the official Gazette of the Republic, superior force to any municipal law on condition that such treaties, conventions and agreements are applied by the other party thereto.

Article 170

1. The Republic shall, by agreement on appropriate terms' accord most-favoured-nation treatment to the Kingdom of Greece, the
Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for all agreements whatever their nature might be.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus between the Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to the United Kingdom.

**Article 171**

1. In sound and vision broadcasting there shall be programmes both for the Greek and the Turkish Communities.

2. The time allotted to programmes for the Turkish Community in sound broadcasting shall not be less than seventy-five hours in a seven-day week, spread to all days of such week in daily normal periods of transmission:

   Provided that if the total period of transmissions has to be reduced so that the time allotted to programmes for the Greek Community should fall below seventy-five hours in a seven-day week, then the time allotted to programmes for the Turkish Community in any such week should be reduced by the same number of hours as that by which the time allotted to programmes for the Greek Community is reduced below such hours:

   Provided further that if the time allotted to programmes for the Greek Community is increased above one hundred and forty hours in a seven-day week, then the time allotted to programmes for the Turkish Community shall be increased in the ratio of three hours for the Turkish Community to every seven hours for the Greek Community.

3. In vision broadcasting there shall be allotted three transmission days to the programmes for the Turkish Community of every ten consecutive transmission days and the total time allotted to the programmes for the Turkish Community in such ten transmission days shall be in the ratio of three hours to seven hours allotted to programmes for the Greek Community in such ten transmission days.

4. All official broadcasts in sound and vision shall be made both in Greek and Turkish and shall not be taken into account for the purposes of calculating the time under this Article.

**Article 172**

The Republic shall be liable for any wrongful act or omission causing damage committed in the exercise or purported exercise of the duties of officers or authorities of the Republic.

A law shall regulate such liability.
Article 173
1. Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of the Republic, that is to say, Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos by the Turkish inhabitants thereof:
Provided that the President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall within four years of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution examine the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the aforesaid towns shall continue.

2. The council of the Greek municipality in any such town shall be elected by the Greek electors of the town and the council of the Turkish municipality in such town shall be elected by the Turkish electors of the town.

3. In each such town a co-ordinating body shall be set up composed of two members chosen by the council of the Greek municipality, two members chosen by the council of the Turkish municipality and a President chosen by agreement between the two councils of such municipalities in such town. Such co-ordinating body shall provide for work which needs to be carried out jointly, shall carry out joint services entrusted to it by agreement of the councils of the two municipalities within the town and shall concern itself with matters which require a degree of co-operation.

Article 174
Within the limits of any such town no municipal tax, rate, fee or any other revenue shall be imposed or levied upon or collected from any person by any such municipality unless such person belongs to the same Community as the municipality concerned:
Provided that -

(a) fees payable in connection with the use of municipal markets, slaughter houses and other municipal places which are in the region within which the council of one of such municipalities in any such town exercises its jurisdiction;

(b) entertainment fees payable in connection with premises or places in the region within which the council of one of such municipalities in any such town exercises its jurisdiction;

(c) such fees as may be agreed upon between the two councils of such municipalities in any such town for any services additional to, or in excess of, those usually rendered by a municipality, to a person not belonging to the Community thereof, shall be paid to the council of such municipality:

Provided further that in case any service in the way of control, inspection and the like is rendered by one of the municipalities to a person belonging to the Community of the other municipality in any such town any fees in respect thereof shall be payable to the
municipality rendering such service.

**Article 175**

No licence or permit shall be issued to any person by a municipality in any such town not belonging to the Community of such municipality:

Provided that licences or permits relating to premises, places or building operations in the region within which one of such municipalities in any such town exercises its jurisdiction shall be issued by the council of such municipality and any service, control or supervision in connection with such licences or permits shall be performed by the council of such municipality and any such fee payable in respect thereof shall be collected by such council.

**Article 176**

Nothing in Articles 173 to 178, both inclusive, contained shall be construed as precluding a law to provide for town planning with respect to any such municipalities subject to the following conditions:

(a) the planning authority for any such town shall consist of ten members, out of whom seven shall be Greeks and three shall be Turks;
(b) all decisions of such authority shall be taken by an absolute majority:
Provided that no decision affecting a Greek municipality shall be taken unless such majority includes the votes of at least four Greek members, and no decision affecting a Turkish municipality shall be taken unless such majority includes the votes of at least two Turkish members;

(c) all matters of a town planning nature affecting any such town and any regulation of any such matter shall be entrusted exclusively to such planning authority.

**Article 177**

Subject to the provisions of Articles 173 to 178, both inclusive, each municipality in any such town shall exercise its jurisdiction and perform all its functions respectively within a region the limits of which shall be fixed for each municipality by agreement of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

**Article 178**

With regard to other localities, a special provision shall be made for the constitution of the organs of the municipalities in accordance, as far as possible, with the rule of proportional representation of the two Communities.
Part 13 - Final Provisions

Article 179
1. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic.

2. No law or decision of the House of Representatives or of any of the Communal Chambers and no act or decision of any organ, authority or person in the Republic exercising executive power or any administrative function shall in any way be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, any of the provisions of this Constitution.

Article 180
1. The Greek and the Turkish texts of this Constitution shall both be originals and shall have the same authenticity and the same legal force.

2. Any conflict between the two texts of this Constitution shall be determined by the Supreme Constitutional Court by reference to the text of the draft of this Constitution signed at Nicosia on the 6th April, 1960, in the Joint Constitutional Commission together with the Schedule of amendments thereto signed on* by representatives of the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, due regard being had to the letter and spirit of the Zurich Agreement dated the 11th February, 1959, and of the London Agreement dated the 19th February, 1959.

3. In case of ambiguity any interpretation of the Constitution shall be made by the Supreme Constitutional Court due regard being had to the letter and spirit of the Zurich Agreement dated the 11th February, 1959, and of the London Agreement dated the 19th February, 1959. * Note: date to be inserted later.

Article 181
The Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and Constitution of the Republic concluded between the Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Treaty of Military Alliance concluded between the Republic, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey, copies of which are annexed to this Constitution as Annexes I and II, shall have constitutional force.

Article 182
1. The Articles or parts of Articles of this Constitution set out in Annex III hereto which have been incorporated from the Zurich Agreement dated 11th February, 1959, are the basic Articles of this Constitution and cannot, in any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal.
2. Subject to paragraph 1 of this Article any provision of this Constitution may be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal, as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article.

3. Such amendment shall be made by a law passed by a majority vote comprising at least two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belonging to the Greek Community and at least two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belonging to the Turkish Community.

**Article 183**

1. In case of war or other public danger threatening the life of the Republic or any part thereof, the Council of Ministers shall have power, by a decision taken in this respect, to issue a Proclamation of Emergency:

   Provided that the President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall, separately or conjointly, have a right of veto against any such decision which they shall exercise within forty-eight hours of the date when the decision has been transmitted to their respective offices.

2. Any such Proclamation shall specify the Articles of the Constitution which shall be suspended for the duration of such Emergency:

   Provided that only the following Articles of the Constitution may be suspended by any such Proclamation that is to say:- Article 7, only in so far as it relates to death inflicted by a permissible act of war; Article 10, paragraphs 2 and 3; Article 11; Article 13; Article 16; Article 17; Article 19; Article 21; Article 23, paragraph 8, sub-paragraph (d); Article 25 and Article 27.

3. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall, unless, separately or conjointly, they have exercised their right of veto as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article, promulgate forthwith such Proclamation by publication in the official Gazette of the Republic.

4. A Proclamation promulgated under the foregoing provisions of this Article shall be laid forthwith before the House of Representatives. If the House of Representatives is not sitting it must be convened as soon as possible for this purpose.

5. The House of Representatives shall have the right to reject or confirm such Proclamation of Emergency. In the case of rejection the Proclamation of Emergency shall have no legal effect. In the case of confirmation the President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall promulgate forthwith such decision of the House of Representatives by publication in the official Gazette of the Republic.

6. The Proclamation of Emergency shall cease to operate at the expiration of two months from the date of confirmation by the House.
of Representatives unless the House, at the request of the Council of
Ministers decides to prolong the duration of the state of emergency,
whereupon the President and the Vice-President of the Republic,
separately or conjointly, shall have a right of veto against such decision
of prolongation to be exercised in accordance with Article 50.

7. (1) While a Proclamation is in operation, notwithstanding anything
in this Constitution, the Council of Ministers if satisfied that
immediate action is required may, subject to the right of veto of the
President and the Vice-President of the Republic under Article 57 to
be exercised, separately or conjointly, make any ordinance strictly
connected with the state of emergency having the force of law.

(2) If no right of veto is exercised under sub-paragraph (1) of this
paragraph the President and the Vice-President of the Republic
shall forthwith promulgate by publication in the official Gazette of
the Republic such ordinance.

(3) Such ordinance if not sooner revoked shall cease to be in force
at the expiration of the emergency.

**Article 184**

1. Where any ordinance promulgated in pursuance of sub-paragraph
(2) of paragraph 7 of Article 183 provides for preventive detention-

(a) the authority on whose order any person is detained under that
ordinance shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for his
detention and, subject to paragraph 3 of this Article, the allegations of
fact on which the order is based, and shall give him the opportunity of
making representations against the order as soon as may be;

(b) no citizen shall be detained under that ordinance for a period
exceeding one month unless an advisory board constituted as
mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article has considered any
representations made by him under sub-paragraph (a) of this
paragraph and has reported, before the expiration of that period,
that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention.

2. An advisory board constituted for the purposes of this Article shall
consist of a Chairman, who shall be appointed jointly by the
President and the Vice-President of the Republic from among persons
who are or have been judges of the High Court or are qualified to be
judges of such Court, and two other members, who shall be
appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the
Republic after consultation with the President of the High Court.

3. This Article does not require any authority to disclose facts of
which disclosure would in its opinion be against the national interest.
Article 185
1. The territory of the Republic is one and indivisible.

2. The integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or the separatist independence is excluded.

Article 186
1. In this Constitution, unless it is otherwise expressly provided or required by the context-
   (1) "Community" means the Greek or the Turkish Community; "court" includes any judge thereof;
   "Greek" means a member of the Greek Community as defined in Article 2;
   "law" when used in relation to the period after the coming into operation of this Constitution means a law of the Republic;
   "person" includes any company, partnership, association, society, institution or body of persons, corporate or unincorporate; "Republic" means the Republic of Cyprus;
   "Turk" or "Turkish" means a member of the Turkish Community as defined in Article 2;
   (2) words importing the masculine gender include females and words in the singular include the plural and vice-versa.

2. Where a power is conferred by this Constitution to make any order, rules, regulations or bye-laws or to give any directions the power shall be construed as including a power exercisable in like manner to amend or revoke any such order, rules, regulations, bye-laws or directions.

Transitional Provisions Article 187
1. Any person elected-
   (a) as first President or first Vice-President of the Republic;
   (b) as a member of the House of Representatives or of any Communal Chamber,
under any law in force immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution shall be deemed to be the President of the Republic or the Vice-President of the Republic, a member of the House of Representatives or a member of the Communal Chamber concerned, elected respectively under the provisions of this Constitution.

2. All laws and regulations relating to elections expired on the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution and notwithstanding such expiration shall continue to be in force until a new electoral law is made by the House of Representatives or by any Communal Chamber, as the case may be, and in any case not later than eighteen months of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution with regard to any by-election to fill any vacancy occurring during such period in
the office of the President of the Republic, the Vice-President of the Republic, any Representative or any member of a Communal Chamber.

**Article 188**

1. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the following provisions of this Article, all laws in force on the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution shall, until amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal, by any law or communal law, as the case may be, made under this Constitution, continue in force on or after that date, and shall, as from that date be construed and applied with such modification as may be necessary to bring them into conformity with this Constitution.

2. Save where otherwise provided in the Transitional Provisions of this Constitution no provision in any such law which is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any provision of this Constitution and no law which under Article 78 requires a separate majority shall so continue to be in force:

Provided that the laws relating to the municipalities may continue to be in force for a period of six months after the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution and any law imposing duties or taxes may continue to be in force until the 31st day of December, 1960.

3. In any such law which continues in force under paragraph 1 of this Article, unless the context otherwise requires-

(a) any reference to the Colony of Cyprus or to the "Crown" shall, in relation to any period beginning on or after the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, be construed as a reference to the Republic;

(b) any reference to the Governor or the Governor in Council shall, in relation to any such period, be construed as a reference to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic, separately or conjointly, according to the express provisions in this Constitution to the House of Representatives in matters relating to exercise of legislative power other than those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers, to the Communal Chamber concerned in all matters within its competence under this Constitution, and to the Council of Ministers in matters relating to exercise of executive power;

(c) any reference to the Administrative Secretary or the Financial Secretary, shall in relation to any such period, be construed as a reference to the Ministry or Independent Office of the Republic for the time being charged with responsibility for the subject in relation to which reference is made;

(d) any reference to the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General, shall in relation to any such period, be construed as a reference to the Attorney-General of the Republic or the Deputy Attorney-General of
the Republic respectively,

(e) any reference to any other person holding a public office or to any authority or body, shall, in relation to any such period, be construed as a reference to the corresponding public officer or corresponding authority, body or office of the Republic.

4. Any court in the Republic applying the provisions of any such law which continues in force under paragraph 1 of this Article, shall apply it in relation to any such period, with such modification as may be necessary to bring it into accord with the provisions of this Constitution including the Transitional Provisions thereof.

5. In this Article -
"law " includes any public instrument made before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution by virtue of such law; "modification" includes amendment, adaptation and repeal.

**Article 189**
Notwithstanding anything in Article 3 contained, for a period of five years after the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution-
(a) all laws which under Article 188 will continue to be in force may continue to be in the English language;
(b) the English language may be used in any proceedings before any court in the Republic.

**Article 190**
1. Subject to the ensuing provisions of this Article any court existing immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, as from that date and until a new law is made regarding the constitution of the courts of the Republic and in any event not later than four months from that date, continue to function as hitherto but constituted, as far as practicable, in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution:
Provided that any pending proceedings, civil or criminal, part heard on the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution shall continue and be disposed of, notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, by the court as constituted in such a case.

2. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution and until the Supreme Constitutional Court established thereunder is constituted within a period not later than three months of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, the registry of the High Court shall be the registry of the Supreme Constitutional Court.

3. The registry of the High Court shall be deemed to be the registry of the Supreme Constitutional Court for all its purposes, including a recourse, until such Court is constituted. the constitution of such Court shall be effected not later than three months of the date of the coming
into operation of this Constitution.

4. In computing any time with regard to a recourse to the Supreme Constitutional Court under the provisions of this Constitution, the period between the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution and the constitution of such Court as aforesaid shall not be counted.

5. The Supreme Court existing immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution shall be deemed to be the High Court as established under this Constitution until the constitution of such Court under the provisions thereof; the constitution of such Court shall be made not later than three months of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution: Provided that a reference to the Chief Justice shall be a reference to the senior member of such Court, and such Court shall be deemed to be validly constituted during such period notwithstanding that its membership shall be below four.

**Article 191**

Any proceedings pending on the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution in which the Attorney-General on behalf of the Government of the Colony of Cyprus or any Department or officer thereof is a party shall continue, on and after such date, with the Republic or its corresponding office or officer being substituted as a party.

**Article 192**

1. Save where other provision is made in this Constitution any person who, immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, holds an office in the public service shall, after that date, be entitled to the same terms and conditions of service as were applicable to him before that date and those terms and conditions shall not be altered to his disadvantage during his continuance in the public service of the Republic on or after that date.

2. Subject to paragraph 1 of this Article the judges of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice and the judges and magistrates of the subordinate courts holding office immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Articles 153 and 157, as from that date continue to hold their respective offices as if they had been duly appointed thereto under the provisions of those Articles until an appointment is made under the provisions of those Articles and the provisions of this Constitution shall apply to them accordingly.

3. Where any holder of an office mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article is not appointed in the public service of the Republic he shall be entitled, subject to the terms and conditions of service applicable to him, to just compensation or pension on abolition of
office terms out of the funds of the Republic whichever is more advantageous to him.

4. Subject to paragraph 5 of this Article any holder of an office mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article whose office comes, by the operation of this Constitution, within the competence of a Communal Chamber, may, if he so desires, waive his rights under paragraph 3 of this Article and choose to serve under such Communal Chamber and in such a case such holder of such office shall be entitled to receive from the Republic any retirement pension, gratuity or other like benefit to which he would have been entitled under the law in force immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution in respect of the period of his service before such date if such period by itself or together with any period of service under such Communal Chamber would, under such law, have entitled him to any such benefit.

5. Any teacher who, immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, was a serving teacher and was in receipt of remuneration out of the public funds of the Colony of Cyprus and whose office comes, by the operation of this Constitution, within the competence of a Communal Chamber shall be entitled to receive from the Republic any retirement pension, gratuity or other like benefit to which he would have been entitled under the law in force before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution in respect of the period of his service before such date if such period by itself or together with any period of service under such Communal Chamber would, under such law, have entitled him to any such benefit.

6. Any person who, immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, being in the public service of the Colony of Cyprus is on leave prior to retirement therefrom or on transfer from that service to any service other than that of the Republic shall, irrespective of whether he is a citizen of the Republic or not, continue to be entitled to the same terms and conditions of service as were applicable to him under such circumstances before that date and such terms and conditions shall not be altered to his disadvantage.

7. For the purposes of this Article
(a) "public service" in relation to service before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution means service under the Government of the Colony of Cyprus and in relation to service after that date means service in a civil capacity under the Republic and includes service as a member of the security forces of the Republic;
(b) "terms and conditions of service" means, subject to the necessary adaptations under the provisions of this Constitution, remuneration, leave, removal from service, retirement pensions, gratuities or other like benefits.

8. Save as provided in paragraph 6 of this Article nothing in this Article
shall apply to a person who is not a citizen of the Republic.

**Article 193**
Any person who, immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, was in receipt of any pension or other retirement benefit out of the public Funds, including the Widows' and Orphans' Pension Fund, of the Colony of Cyprus shall on and after the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, continue to be paid such pension or other retirement benefit out of the public Funds of the Republic under the same terms and conditions as were applicable to such pensions or other retirement benefits immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution or under terms and conditions made thereafter not less favourable to that person and applicable to his case.

**Article 194**
The eligibility of any person to receive a pension under the Widows' and Orphans' Pension Fund shall, on and after the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, continue to be subject to the same terms and conditions as were in force immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution and shall not be altered to the disadvantage of any such person so long as such eligibility remains.

**Article 195**
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution contained, the person elected as first President of the Republic and the person elected as first Vice-President of the Republic, who under Article 187 are deemed to be the first President and the first Vice-President of the Republic, whether before or after their investiture as in Article 42 provided, conjointly shall have, and shall be deemed to have had, the exclusive right and power to sign and conclude on behalf of the Republic the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus between the Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland together with the Exchanges of Notes drawn up for signature with that Treaty, and the Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and Constitution of the Republic, between the Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Treaty of Military Alliance between the Republic, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey and the Agreement between the Republic, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey for the application of the Treaty of Alliance concluded between these countries, and such Treaties Agreements and Notes exchanged shall be thus validly concluded on behalf of the Republic and shall be operative and binding as from the date on which they have been so signed.
**Article 196**
The term of office of the first Communal Chambers shall commence on the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution.

**Article 197**
1. Any movable or immovable property, or any right or interest thereon, 'which, immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, was vested in, held by, or registered in the name of, the Government of the Colony of Cyprus or any other person or body, for and on behalf of, or in trust for, any school, or other body or institution which come, by or under the provisions of this Constitution, within the competence of the Communal Chambers shall, as from that date, be vested in, and be held by such person, body or authority as provided by a law of the respective Communal Chamber subject to such terms and conditions as such communal law may provide: Provided that no such law shall direct that any such property shall vest in, or be held by, the Communal Chamber itself.

2. Nothing in this Article contained shall apply to any bequest or other donation administered by trustees or to any vakf in connection with any educational purposes.

**Article 198**
1. The following provisions shall have effect until a law of citizenship is made incorporating such provisions -

   (a) any matter relating to citizenship shall be governed by the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty of Establishment;

   (b) any person born in Cyprus, on or after the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, shall become on the date of his birth a citizen of the Republic if on that date his father has become a citizen of the Republic or would but for his death have become such a citizen under the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty of Establishment.

2. For the purposes of this Article "Treaty of Establishment" means the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus between the Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

**Article 199**
The Turkish Communal Chamber shall have the right to receive from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the sums specified in the Notes exchanged between the Governor of the Colony of Cyprus, on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom and the representatives of the Turkish Community of Cyprus drawn up for signature on*.

* Note: date to be inserted later.
Joint Constitutional Commission
The Greek Government delegation
Professor Themistocles Tsatsos (Head of the Delegation) Mr. George Charbouris
Mr. Alexandros Lekkas Mr. Constantinos Choidas Mr. Demetrios Apostolides Mr. Demetrios Kyriazis Mr. Georgios Zotiades Mr. Demetrios Petrounakos

The Turkish delegation
Professor Nihat Erim (Head of the Delegation) Dr. Suat Bilge Mr. Sherif Kolhan Mr. Ahmet Asim Akyamach Mr. Kaya Pirnar Mr. Alaeddin Gulen

The Cyprus Greek delegation
Mr. Glafkos Clerides (Head of the Delegation) Mr. George Polyviou Mr. Michalakis Triantafyllides Mr. Tasos Papadopoulos The Legal Adviser: Mr. Criton George Tornaritis

The Cyprus Turkish delegation
Mr. Rauf Raif Denktash (Head of the Delegation) Mr. Halit Ali Riza Mr. Hakki Suleyman Mr. Ali Dana The Legal Adviser: Mr. Mehmet Nedjati

The Legal Adviser to the Joint Constitutional Commission: Professor Marcel Bridel His Assistant: Mr. Louis Bagi

Source: [www.presidency.gov.cy](http://www.presidency.gov.cy)
Appendix 2:

NO. 5475. TREATY OF GUARANTEE. SIGNED AT NICOSIA ON 16 AUGUST 1960

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:

**Article I**
The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.
It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

**Article II**
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

**Article III**
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

**Article IV**
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

**Article V**
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia. The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have signed the present Treaty. DONE at Nicosia this sixteenth day of August, 1960, in English and French, both texts being equally authoritative.

For the Republic of Cyprus:  
Archbishop Makarios, F.Kuchuk

For Greece:  
G. Christopoulos

For Turkey:  
V. Turel

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:  
Hugh Foot

Source: [www.mfa.gr](http://www.mfa.gr)
Appendix 3:  

KEY ACTORS & STATESMEN

CYPRUS

Archbishop Makarios III: President of Republic (16 August 1960- 15 July 1974; 7 December 1974- 3 August 1977)


Dr. Fazil Kutchuk: Vice-President of Republic (1960-1973)

Rauf Raif Denktash: Vice-President of the House of Representatives (1960-1973), Vice-President of Republic (1973-1974), Turkish Cypriot Representative at Inter-communal Talks (1968-1974)

Polycarpos Georgadjis: Minister of Interior (1960-1968)


Ezekias Papagiannou: Leader of AKEL (1949-1989), Member of House of Representatives (1960-1988)


Miltiades Christodoulou: Government’s Spokesman, Head of Press and Information Office

GREECE

Constantine II: King of Greece (1964-1973)


Constantine Karamanlis: Prime Minister (24 July 1974-10 May 1980)
Constantine Kollias: Prime Minister (21 April 1967- 13 December 1967)

Panagiotis Pipinelis: Minister of Foreign Affairs (1967-1970)

Veron Theodoropoulos: Head of Turkish and Cypriot Affairs in Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Constantine Panagiotacos: Ambassador to Cyprus

TURKEY

Suleyman Demirel: Prime Minister (1965-1971)

Nihat Erim: Prime Minister (1971-1972)

Bulent Ecevit: Prime Minister (1973-1975)

Sabri Chaglayangil: Minister of Foreign Affairs (27 October 1965- 26 March 1971)

Haluk Bayulken: Minister of Foreign Affairs (11 December 1971- 6 February 1974)

Turan Gunesh: Minister of Foreign Affairs (6 February 1974-18 September 1974)

Zeki Kuneralp: Directory General of Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ecmel Barutchu: Head of Greek and Cypriot Affairs in Ministry of Foreign Affairs

UNITED KINGDOM


James Callaghan: Minister of Foreign Affairs (4 March 1974- 5 April 1976)

Robin Fearn: Head of the Southern European Department of Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1969-1972)

Roger Allen: Ambassador to Turkey (1967-1969)

Michael Stewart: Ambassador to Greece (1967–1971)

Robin Hooper: Ambassador to Greece (1971-1974)


Peter Ramsbotham: High Commissioner in Nicosia (1969–1971)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Lyndon Johnson: President (1963-1969)
Henry Kissinger: Secretary of State (1973-1977)
Jack Kubisch: Ambassador to Greece (1974-1977)
Rodger Davies: Ambassador to Cyprus (14 January 1974- 19 August 1974)

UNITED NATIONS

U Thant: Secretary General (30 November 1961- 31 December 1971)
Kurt Waldheim: Secretary General (1 January 1971- 31 December 1981)
Osorio Tafall: Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus
Appendix 4:

Chronology of Historical Events

1 August 1571: Ottomans conquered Cyprus.

7 May 1832: Greece gained independence from the Ottomans.

4 June 1878: Cyprus became a British protectorate based on the British-Ottoman Defensive Convention.

5 November 1914: Britain annexed Cyprus.

23 April 1923: Turkish Republic was founded.

24 July 1923: Under the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey gave up her rights on Cyprus.

3 March 1925: Cyprus became British Colony.

21 October 1931: Greek Cypriots held a pro-Enosis riot and burned down Government House.

18 February 1952: Greece and Turkey joined NATO.

1 April 1955: Greek Cypriots founded EOKA and launched the pro-Enosis struggle. In the following four years, 600 people (including Britons, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots) were killed by EOKA.

3 March 1956: Archbishop Makarios, the leader of the pro-Enosis movement, was exiled to Seychelles.

20 December 1957: Turkish Cypriot leadership issued a pamphlet and launched the pro-partition struggle.

7 June 1958: Inter-communal violence broke out in Nicosia.

1 August 1958: Turkish Cypriots founded the TMT.

4 August 1958: EOKA announced a ceasefire.

5 August 1958: TMT announced a ceasefire. By then, the inter-ethnic violence (7 June 1958- 4 August 1958) had caused 110 casualties.

16 August 1960: Under the Zurich Agreements Cyprus gained independence from Britain. The Republic of Cyprus was founded. Under the Constitution the Turkish Cypriot minority enjoyed political equality with the Greek Cypriot majority. The Cypriot constitution provided significant veto rights to the Turkish Cypriot members of the executive and legislative branches. These rights were disliked by
the Greek Cypriot leaders. Under the Treaty of Guarantee Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom became the guarantor powers of the Cypriot state.

6 September 1961: President Makarios aimed to increase his international popularity and prepare the background for his future attempts to limit Turkish Cypriot veto rights. Accordingly, Cyprus became a founding member of Non-Aligned Movement.

11 February 1962: Polycarpos Georgadjis, Cypriot Minister of the Interior, made a statement which greatly provoked the Turkish Cypriot community.


23 April 1962: Ayhan Hikmet and Muzaffer Gurkan, two Turkish Cypriot journalists supporting inter-ethnic peace, were assassinated.

25 November 1963: Archbishop Makarios, President of Republic of Cyprus, asked for a set of constitutional amendments aimed at limiting Turkish Cypriot veto rights. Turkish Cypriots resigned from their political positions in the executive and legislative branches. Inter-ethnic violence broke out and Turkish Cypriots started gathering in enclaves.

4 March 1964: UN Security Council Resolution 183/1964 authorising the deployment of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). 6,000 UN troops were deployed in the island.

11 April 1964: Makarios visited Athens and met Greek Prime Minister, Georgios Papandreou. Under the Treaty of Alliance, Greece was not allowed to deploy more than 950 troops in Cyprus. However, Papandreou offered to send 10,000 Greek soldiers to the island, as a defensive measurement against potential Turkish aggression. Makarios accepted the offer.

4 June 1964: US President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu, and discouraged Turkey from sponsoring a military intervention of Cyprus.

5 June 1964: The National Guard (the governmental army of Cyprus composed of Greek Cypriot citizens) was established. General Georgios Grivas was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard.

14 July 1964: The US government puts forward the Acheson Plan which would have led to partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. Makarios rejected the plan.

8 August 1964: Turkish jets hit the National Guard forces besieging Turkish Cypriot fighters around the village Erenkoy. 33 Greek Cypriot soldiers were killed.

15 April 1965: Dervish Kavazoglu and Costas Mishaoulis, two members of AKEL, were assassinated.
16 November 1965: During the debates at the UN General Assembly, Makarios enjoyed significant support against Turkey from the Non-Aligned Movement and the Third World. General Assembly Resolution 2077, called on all states “to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and refrain from any intervention directed against it”.

21 April 1967: The Greek Junta, led by Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, seized power.

26 June 1967: In the absence of Turkish Cypriot members, the Cypriot House of Representatives enacted a resolution which foresaw the implementation of a pro-Enosis policy leading to the unification of the entire island with Greece.

10 September 1967: Greek Prime Minister Constantine Kollias and Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel met in Evros. Kollias asked Demirel to leave Cyprus to Greece and offered him a military base over the island in return. Demirel rejected this demand.

15 November 1967: The National Guard attacked Kophinou, a village within Turkish Cypriot enclaves, and 24 Turkish Cypriot fighters were killed.

3 December 1967: The Greek Junta recalled 10,000 Greek troops deployed in Cyprus and General Georgios Grivas, the Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard.

13 December 1967: King Constantine unsuccessfully tried to seize power in Greece.

29 December 1967: Turkish Cypriots founded the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration. By then, the inter-ethnic violence (1963-1967) had caused over 600 casualties.

12 January 1968: President Makarios declared that he abandoned the pro-Enosis line and his political goal was to settle with Turkish Cypriots via inter-communal talks in order to preserve the independence of Cyprus.

25 February 1968: Makarios won the presidential elections with 95% of Greek Cypriot votes.

6 May 1968: Greek Cypriot parties AKEL and EDEK organized a mass rally and asked for “Democracy to Greece”. The leaders of the two parties, Ezekias Papagiannou and Vasos Lyssarides, identified the Junta as an enemy of Greeks and Cypriots.

3 June 1968: Inter-communal talks started in Beirut. Glafkos Clerides represented Greek Cypriots and Rauf Denktash represented Turkish Cypriots.

13 August 1968: An attempt was made on the life of Colonel Papadopoulos. Greek investigators said the would-be assassin had received orders from the
Cypriot Minister of the Interior, Polycarpos Georgadjis. The Junta urged Makarios to demand the resignation of Georgadjis.

28 August 1968: On behalf of Makarios, Clerides asked Denktash to limit the veto rights of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives. Denktash agreed but demanded autonomy in local government for Turkish Cypriots. Makarios rejected this demand and the talks were deadlocked.

1 November 1968: Makarios yielded to the demand of Athens. Georgadjis resigned.

19 July 1969: President Makarios made a statement accusing Turkish Cypriot leaders of insisting on partition plans. Nevertheless, the inter-communal talks continued.

30 September 1969: The British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Peter Ramsbotham, met Makarios and asked him why he kept on avoiding any provision for separate ethnic authorities at the local level. The President told Ramsbotham that giving into Turkish Cypriot demands for autonomy could lead to federation or partition.

8 March 1970: An attempt on Makarios’s life was made. The culprits indicated that they received orders from Polycarpos Georgadjis.

15 March 1970: Polycarpos Georgadjis was assassinated while he was attempting to leave Cyprus.

23 May 1970: The terrorist organization, the “National Front”, attacked the Police Headquarters in Limassol.

27 May 1970: Makarios made a public statement stating that Greek Cypriot terrorism was likely to lead to partition.

18 June 1971: Colonel Papadopoulos sent a letter to Makarios. He asked the Cypriot President to accept Turkish Cypriot demands and resolve the Cyprus Conflict. In his letter, Papadopoulos also threatened Makarios with a coup.

11 July 1971: Makarios made a statement asserting that Turkey had expansionist plans targeting Cyprus and said that the Greek Cypriots were ready “for every sacrifice for their freedom”.

14 November 1971: Nihat Erim, Prime Minister of Turkey, made a statement and expressed that the Turkish Army was ready to intervene in Cyprus in case of Greek Cypriot aggression against Turkish Cypriots.

17 January 1972: Georgios Grivas delivered a secret message to the British High Commission in Nicosia and asked the British government to support him in his pro-Enosis struggle. The British government instructed the High Commission to ignore the message.
11 February 1972: Colonel Papadopoulos asked Makarios to resign since the latter had imported a substantial amount of Czechoslovak weapons and refused to hand them over to the National Guard. Makarios asked for Washington’s help. On the same day, the US Ambassador to Greece, Henry Tasca, met Papadopoulos and urged him to quit demanding Makarios’s resignation.

8 February 1973: Makarios managed to remain in office since he was the only candidate in the presidential elections.

8 March 1973: Cypriot Bishops called a Holy Synod, accused Archbishop Makarios of getting involved in politics, and defrocked him.

14 July 1973: Makarios summoned a Supreme Synod with the participation of Patriarchs, Archbishops and Bishops from Churches outside Cyprus. The Supreme Synod defrocked the Cypriot Bishops.

1 August 1973: Georgios Grivas and the terrorist organization he founded, EOKA B, kidnapped Christos Vakis, the Minister of Justice. Grivas asked Makarios to resign. Makarios refused to do so.

5 August 1973: Makarios publicly stated that the terrorist activities of Georgios Grivas and EOKA B had created a “certain danger of partition”.

24 August 1973: Papadopoulos publicly asked Grivas to stop using violence and disband the EOKA B. In so doing, the Junta leader satisfied Makarios.

25 November 1973: Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis ousted Colonel Papadopoulos and became the new leader of Greek Junta.

27 January 1974: Grivas died and Makarios declared three days of national mourning.

28 January 1974: Makarios offered an amnesty to EOKA B members on condition that they stopped violence and dissolved the organization. EOKA B refused to do so.

27 March 1974: Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, visited Ankara where he met the Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit. Ecevit declared that Turkey would support a federal solution in Cyprus. Although Makarios was dissatisfied with the Ecevit statement, the talks continued.

16 May 1974: Makarios implied in a press conference that the National Guard was involved in political activities directed against the Cypriot government and that the Greek Junta supported the EOKA B.

29 May 1974: Turkey sent a vessel, accompanied by warships, to explore for oil in an area of the Aegean Sea claimed by Greece. On the same day, the Junta accused Turkey of violating Greek continental shelves and asked Turkey to recall the ships. This led to a Greco-Turkish dispute.
2 July 1974: Makarios sent a letter to the Greek Junta accusing the Colonels of supporting the EOKA B, using Greek officers of the National Guard against him, and threatening the Cypriot state. He asked the Junta to recall Greek officers of the National Guard. Publication of the letter in newspapers greatly provoked the Junta.

11 July 1974: The Cypriot police captured Lefteris Papadopoulos, a leading member of EOKA B, and seized important documents enlightening the future plans of the organisation.

13 July 1974: Makarios publicly accused Athens of leading Greek Cypriots into civil war and called on the Junta to stop lending support to Greek Cypriot terrorists.

15 July 1974: The National Guard attacked at the Presidential Palace and overthrew the Cypriot government. Nicos Sampson was appointed as the President of Republic. Makarios managed to escape and, from an abandoned radio station in Paphos, called upon Greek Cypriots to resist the Junta-sponsored coup.

16 July 1974: Escorted by the British soldiers, Makarios went to the British base in Akrotiri and left Cyprus in order to process his anti-Junta struggle abroad.

17 July 1974: Makarios went to London and met British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. Wilson made it clear that, the British government still regarded Makarios as the legal head of the state. Wilson advised Makarios to apply to the UN Security Council.

19 July 1974: Makarios arrived to New York and, in an address to the UN Security Council, asked it to “call upon the military regime of Greece to withdraw from Cyprus the Greek officers serving in the National Guard, and to put an end to its invasion of Cyprus”.

20 July 1974: The Turkish army launched a military campaign and intervened in Cyprus. Ankara justified its action by reference to Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. With the Turkish intervention, inter-communal violence grew in Cyprus.

22 July 1974: The Greek and Turkish governments announced a cease-fire, and the bloodshed in Cyprus was temporarily terminated.

23 July 1974: The Greek Junta collapsed. Ioannidis asked Gizikhis to hand power back to civilians. Nicos Sampson resigned and Clerides assumed the duties of the Acting President of Republic.

24 July 1974: Constantine Karamanlis became the Prime Minister of Greece.

12 August 1974: During the Geneva Conference, Turan Gunesh, the Foreign Minister of Turkey and Turkish Cypriot representative Rauf Denktash, demanded the establishment of a federative solution that would put 34% of Cyprus under Turkish Cypriot control.
13 August 1974: Glafkos Clerides asked for 48 hours to consider the demand of Gunesh and Denktash. Gunesh refused to wait and the Conference broke up.

14 August 1974: Turkey started the second phase of her military campaign.

16 August 1974: The ceasefire terminated the violence in Cyprus. By then, the Greek coup (15-19 July 1974), the Turkish intervention (20-22 July 1974, 14-16 August 1974) and the inter-ethnic violence (20-22 July 1974, 14-16 August 1974) had caused more than 4,500 casualties. The second phase of the Turkish military campaign put 36% of the island under Turkish (and Turkish Cypriot) control.

19 August 1974: Rodger Davies, US Ambassador to Cyprus, was assassinated by armed groups during a Greek Cypriot demonstration near the US Embassy.

22 October 1974: An investigation was launched against Papadopoulos, Ioannidis and 25 other high ranking officers of the fallen Greek Junta. After the trial, Papadopoulos, Ioannidis and 10 others were given life imprisonment.

7 December 1974: Makarios came back to Cyprus and resumed the presidency. In spite of all his efforts, the President had failed to impede the partition.
Appendix 5:

Pictures of Makarios

Archbishop Makarios, President of Republic of Cyprus

Source: www.stripes.com
Archbishop Makarios and General Georgios Grivas

Source: www.lekythos.library.ucy.ac.cy
Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazil Kutchuk

Source: [www.tanea-london.net](http://www.tanea-london.net)
Archbishop Makarios and Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos

Source: www.902.gr
Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Glafcos Clerides

Source: www.Cyprus-mail.com
Map 3: Turkish Cypriot enclaves formed in 1963-1964

Source: www.nationmaster.com
Map 4: Sovereign British Base Areas in Cyprus

Source: www.kwintessential.co.uk
Map 5: Cyprus in 1975

Source: www.kwintessential.co.uk