Turkey’s Middle Eastern pendulum under contesting geopolitical mentalities and representations (1923-2010)

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ABSTRACT

This project was initially born out of a curiosity to investigate why Turkey in the 2000s so fervently reclaimed itself in Middle Eastern politics. Such curiosity was further buttressed by additional questions like 'why now?', 'is this the first time?', 'has Turkey ever indicated a similar interest in the region?' and 'are there common patterns with cross government, cross time and cross leadership explanatory power?' Thus seeking answers in a broadened perspective, a most pertinent challenge was to develop a heuristic model.

This effort brought Turkish 'state culture' to the forefront. Earlier scholarly work had already provided hindsight with regards to 'strategic culture' through a security based understanding. But this time Turkish leaders' expressly geography based reasoning required further scrutiny by analysing contending geopolitical discourses from the early days of Turkey until the present day.

This is how this research came across geopolitics in critical scholarship. As a result, the novel perspective to analyse as to how Turkey behaves in the Middle East is centred on the premise of 'geopolitical culture'. It covers many aspects of discursive geography in which perception and representation with historical ad continuum remain two key themes.

The analyses in this study are therefore socially and historically contextual, and are not singlehandedly restricted to the views of individual Turkish leaders. The two most prominent traditions, i.e. Kemalism and Conservatism, keep producing rediscovered discourses on the global political space, Turkey's geography, and sense of geo-cultural belonging. What remains beneath are two distinct, competing and highly irreconcilable geopolitical mentalities to impact foreign policy in an exercise highly imbued with domestic power relations.

This is to hint at the freshness of the theoretical perspective with a particular emphasis on geographical influences on Turkish foreign policy through the prism of the Middle East.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADD= Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Association of Ataturkist Thought)
ANAP= Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
AK Party= Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
AP= Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
CHP= Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party)
DP= Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)
DSP= Demokratik Sol Partı (Democratic Left Party)
DYP= Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)
FP= Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
MFA= Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MGK= Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council)
MHP= Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (National Movement Party)
MNP= Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)
MSP= Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
MÜSİAD= Müstakil İşadamları Derneği (Independent Businessmen Association)
RP= Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
SHP= Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Partı (Social Democratic People’s Party)
SP= Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)
TUSKON= Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu (Businessmen and Industrialists Confederation of Turkey)
TÜMSİAD= Tüm Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği (Association of All Industrialists and Businessmen)
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INTRODUCTION

Analysing Turkish foreign policy is never an easy task. A multitude of factors and actors are at play in a context of ever dynamic interaction. Under these circumstances, how national interest is invoked in the face of external stimuli is always a complex phenomenon. In formulating answers to this broad question; examining prevalent mentalities, perceptions and modes of representation held by influential actors in Turkish society is a necessity since foreign policy is ultimately based on ideas, familiar assumptions and dispositions about the world, one’s own self, and others which is grounded on geographical situatedness. Such an exercise is deeply related to how Turkey’s global positioning is construed and/or constructed in relation to identity/policy formation.

In fact, every major piece on Turkish foreign policy starts with a reference to Turkey’s unique geographical location. That Turkey is located between Europe and Asia hosting key sea lines, major transportation and energy links across the Middle East, the Balkans, and Caucasia appears quite frequently in academic literature. Surrounded by seas at three corners (the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean), the geographical, cultural and civilizational connections enjoyed with the Muslim world en route Europe accompany claims about Turkey’s exceptional (mostly strategic) geographical situatedness.

As Kalaycıoğlu notes, such a location often elicits different depictions for the political or strategic location of the country.¹ A country of an overwhelming Muslim majority located at the intersection of two continents with a secular system in a traditionally conservative polity whose face is turned towards the West in its quest for modernization but whose roots and past are located in the East were elements of any attempt to understand Turkey and its foreign policy. For some, Turkey is squarely a western and European country. For others, it constitutes an extension of the Muslim world. The terms used to describe Turkey range from

a “status quo power” to a “medium power”, from a loyal “flank” to “peripheral” country and, after the Cold War, a “bridge” or a “crossroads”.

These are all discursive spatial formations that act as tools of physical as well as cultural/civilizational boundary drawing in line with the eastern and western characteristics of Turkey in different periods. Perceptions of geography, identity, security, national interest and foreign policy are thus limitlessly intermingled in such discursive practices. Although these depictions are not necessarily impartial, objective or neutral, they ultimately help inform one’s understanding of Turkey’s foreign policy entanglements.

What indeed is common in these perspectives is the rather unwitting use of “geopolitics”. Put differently, mentally defining Turkey’s place in the world (Western vs. Eastern, European vs. Middle Eastern, Muslim vs. Christian, developed vs. underdeveloped, modern vs. traditional, etc.) through which its foreign policy flows was a geopolitical exercise in itself. Surprisingly geopolitical inquiry as a holistic approach on Turkish foreign policy arrived rather late in academia.

Very little is written about how the Turkish elite and policy makers themselves perceive the world and their country’s global location/surroundings and how this translates into external action. Most analyses are conformist and treat conceptions about Turkey from a single perspective, i.e. that of the modernist Kemalist elite. They singlehandedly emphasize Ankara’s robust journey toward the west (Europe) and unquestionably index Turkish foreign policy to its strong western orientation. Pointing to such overwhelming continuity, Robins authoritatively argued that before more recent times “the study of Turkish foreign policy did not exist”. This is simplistic and incomplete as Turkish society and the ruling elite do not

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entail Kemalists or proto-Kemalists alone. Conservatives, with their nationalist and pious touch, constitute an equally viable tradition that dominated the political scene in Turkey on many occasions since 1950.

A wider perspective needs to take into consideration the modern history of Turkey which bears witness to two distinct mentalities about Turkey’s geopolitical standing in the world and its surroundings. Over its ninety years of existence, different and to a large extent rivalling pictures of Turkey’s place, identity and neighbourhood produced by each tradition competed for dominance. As both traditions impacted in different ways the cognitive map of various Turkish policy-makers, a better recount on Turkish foreign policy needs to reflect how this socio-historical struggle translates into discourses and policy outcomes.

This thesis is an attempt to provide one. It will illustrate geographical influences on Turkish foreign policy. In so doing, it will draw on the theoretical underpinnings of geopolitics, a sub-discipline in international relations. Taking the simplest of definitions, geopolitics will be used in this study to mean geographical influences of power relations in international politics. As such, a dynamic approach to geopolitics rather than a static and deterministic one will be preferred. It will be consulted as a critical discipline which considers socially constructed notions about world politics, a state’s perceived “geopolitical self” by its influential social actors, and its role and mission perceptions in global affairs. In this context, spatial perceptions of danger and security, drawing (mental/physical) boundaries and hence foreign policy priorities will be taken as strong referents in explaining state behaviour. Geopolitics will also be taken to reflect the domestic constellation of power and the operation of foreign policy-making mechanisms in translating such notions into practice.

The following therefore is not a simple recount of the physical characteristics of Turkey’s geographical situatedness and how this reflects onto foreign policy choices. In other words,
this is not research about “what Turkey's geography is” but rather “what it means or stands for” in Turkish culture.

To understand Turkey and its foreign policy, one has to begin with “seeings”. That is so if one acknowledges the transformative capacity of human-beings over the world and does not subscribe to the view that “the structure/system” has a priori ontological existence over human action. On Turkey’s part, the ways of seeing are hardly ever simple or objective regardless of the subject of that glance. It is more often than not culturally and politically motivated. For example, to simply regard Turkey as western or Middle Eastern is a politically motivated act in itself. The political ways of seeing, constructing and representing by external actors are equally crucial.

Domestically, Turkey’s geographical embeddedness is understood differently by two broad groups, Kemalists (republicans) vs. Conservatives. At the outset, it must be acknowledged that these two traditions are not necessarily monolithic or fixed. There are variants in each strand. They endlessly try to transform themselves in response to contemporary challenges. But such a dual categorization helps address dominant geopolitical understandings, reasonings, trends, modes of representation and options for foreign policy practice in each tradition.

This exercise is pertinent in understanding Turkey and its foreign policy since different imaginations about one’s own self and those around it ultimately produce different understandings and policy outcomes. As noted by Kösebalan, “shifting imaginations denote shifting security (and national interest) perceptions and identity, that is, the perceptions about who we are and who our friends, rivals, and enemies are”. Therefore, each mentality and imagination brings about different sets of foreign policy possibilities, options and priorities.

The fact that holders of such imaginations usually act on different impulses, reflexes and motivations makes a big difference in foreign policy. For Turkey, this helps explain ups and downs as well as mood swings back and forth on the Middle Eastern pendulum.

To coherently address such complex dynamics, an integrated heuristic conceptual framework needs to be developed with reference to geopolitical thought, which is a major task undertaken in this study.

In this context, Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical background and analytical tools offered in geopolitics. As such, theoretical underpinnings of classical geopolitics are elaborated first with reference to the writings of its prominent scholars. This part of the conceptual framework relies heavily on the realist/rationalist perspective. The second part is devoted to critical geopolitics. It draws heavily on the constructivist and post-structuralist approach. The purpose is to underscore the importance of ideational factors as expressed in discourses in the formulation of practical geopolitical reasoning, i.e. foreign policy. This is a relevant concern in the case of Turkey because it bears a heavy influence in shaping foreign policy discourses, mentalities and action. Thus, analytical tools such as geopolitical culture, geopolitical traditions, geopolitical discourses, geopolitical imaginations/imaginative geographies, and geopolitical visions/codes are introduced. This chapter shows how discourses of geography, security, danger, identity, power and foreign policy relate to and influence each other.

In light of this background, Chapter 2 addresses the ideational foundations of Turkish foreign policy by exploring Turkish geopolitical culture. The discussion includes but is not limited to the way geographies are given meaning in the cognitive map of Turkey’s elite. Such would
be what Gerard Toal calls geographic imaginations. In this vein, an analysis of how two contending geopolitical traditions (Kemalist vs. Conservative) perceive the world, Turkey's geographical locatedness, its geo-cultural belonging, surroundings (the Middle East in particular), national mission and borders as well as the principle tools Turkey has at its disposal in envisaging two contesting visions for regional policy will be provided. It will be indicated in this context how separate geographical imaginations developed by each tradition represent the crystallization of two distinct mentalities about the global position of Turkey and its neighbourhood.

Chapter 3 is about domestic constellation of power in Turkey. This will provide a historical and social background for the thesis. It will also constitute the link between ideational foundations and foreign policy practice. Using the quadripartite analytical framework developed by Michael Mann, this chapter illustrates how geographical imaginations ultimately translate into state behaviour through social networks of power. Thus aspects of Turkish geopolitical culture that highlight the origins and evolution of sui generis interaction among social sources of power are discussed. An overview of the organization of foreign policy bureaucracy and the process of foreign policy making in Turkey accompanies this exercise.

The Middle East is selected as the case study to support the thesis. This neighbouring region is one of the most enduring for Turkey whose political map remained largely in shape over ninety years. Besides it provides a litmus test for practical reflections of Turkey's geopolitical culture. The rest of the thesis therefore will provide a systematic analysis of Turkey's Middle Eastern policy. The focus will be on how members of two major geopolitical traditions, for real or imaginatively, construed their country's spatial situatedness and neighbourhood, and how such interpretations impacted perceptions of national interest, priorities and formulation

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of Turkish foreign policy. It is also possible to trace practical ramifications of identity debates and domestic power struggles in Turkey as well as how reactions by external actors are factored in for foreign policy action. The practice also stands testimony to waves of activism and retreat in Turkey's engagement with the Middle East under Kemalist and Conservative influences.

The first part of the case study covers 1923-1983. Chapter 4 lays the groundwork for highlighting the nuances within the period as to why Ankara's dealings with the region cannot be treated within a straitjacket notion of Kemalist westernism. This will be exemplified by practice particularly in the 1950s where conservative figures began to make a more visible imprint on regional policy. It will also be demonstrated why Turkey largely subscribed to westernist consensus during the period and how this impacted Middle Eastern policy.

Chapter 5 covers the interval from 1983 to 2010. The chapter revolves around practical reasonings developed within long-lasting geopolitical mentalities by various political figures who acted as intellectual warehouses in informing Turkish foreign policy. Covering roughly a timespan of three decades, the impact conservative politicians went after in altering some key tenets of republican dispositions in external affairs and each time how their Kemalist opponents responded is underlined throughout the chapter. The story on what unfolds after 2010 is yet to be observed, studied, and later on analytically told.

Through an analysis on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in a relatively broad interval, this study will make a contribution to better understand the relationship between space-based geographical reasoning, national interest, identity formation and foreign policy. This thesis will enrich and broaden earlier geopolitical studies on Turkish foreign policy by adopting a more systematic heuristic approach to Turkey's socio-political development and
geopolitical culture. Since there is more than one way of giving meaning to Turkey’s geographical location, contesting notions of geographical imaginations at the domestic level around Turkey’s place, identity and neighbourhood will be consulted in conjunction with similar notions externally conferred upon Turkey as referents in explaining the mood swings in Ankara’s regional policy. A systematic examination of such a variety of interrelated dynamics will provide a better understanding of Turkey’s geopolitical culture and its foreign policy.

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RESEARCH DESIGN

This section outlines the research design employed in the dissertation. It will first identify the research question(s) and why a case study approach is preferred. As such, the rationale for selecting Turkey's relations with the Middle East as the primary case study is explained. A justification for the methodology employed and range of sources used will follow.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND STRATEGY:

It is a rather common trait to see a general interest in foreign policy translates into academic inquiry. This is all the more pertinent if one finds himself/herself in the making of a particular aspect of that policy. For a coherently argumentative analysis, the difficulty of transferring such an interest in Turkish foreign policy into academic research lies in drawing the limits of the investigation agenda. A central question is thus critical in setting the boundaries of research. In this study, how Turkey's geographical situatedness is perceived, imagined and/or constructed in a culturally enframed surrounding in a way to condition foreign policy behaviour is the central research question. In other words, how and why Turkey's spatial situatedness is historically construed/constructed to restrict or enable certain forms of external action is the key theme. A supplementary question is why Ankara indicates periodical acts of engagement and retreat in its Middle Eastern dealings.

Three broad questions therefore define the scope of this study. These are how do Turkish elites picture global affairs and how do they mentally construct meta-spaces, i.e. the East and the West (what geopolitical imagination they ascribe to) in understanding the world? How do they see Turkey's geographical, cultural and ideational attachment and belonging (what geographical imaginations they adhere to)? Hence what identity do they stipulate for Turkey? Consequently, why and how do they act ambivalently or enthusiastically in dealing
with the Middle East (second tier geographical imaginations in constructing simplified versions of regions or clusters of countries)?

Seeking answers to these questions, this research aims to manifest the complex links between different notions around Turkey’s geographical/geo-cultural situatedness and how these reflect on foreign policy choices in the Middle East. Placing the analysis in a socio-historical context helps better understand, explain and analyse waves of active engagement and distancing Turkey indicates in this region.

Scholarly writing on foreign policy requires locating the study within an academic discipline. As noted earlier, this study relies on the theoretical underpinnings of geopolitics in its contemporary (critical) strand. In exploring answers to the research questions, the main hypothesis tested is that among the variety of factors that are influential in understanding, explaining and analysing Turkish foreign policy, geopolitical considerations (geographical and geo-cultural) loom uniquely large. That does not curtail the necessity to relate such considerations with other variables in Ankara’s external dealings. But by attempting to explore this dimension, the main purpose of the research is to make a contribution to the literature by exposing how space-based reasoning and geographical influences inform Turkey’s foreign policy from the optic of the Middle East.

**SELECTION OF THE CASE STUDY:**

A case study approach, a favoured strategy when “how” and “why” questions are being posed and when the research deals with complex and ambiguous phenomena, which contain a large number of variables and relationships and are difficult to overview and predict, is preferred in this study. Such an approach is explanatory in seeking answers to the research

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question and testing the hypotheses about a general phenomenon like Turkey’s external behaviour in the Middle East. That the research agenda relates to a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident\(^7\) is a further reason to use this approach.

Turkish foreign policy is not easy to explain and understand since a large number of variables are at play. As such, the existence of diverse social and political groups and their perception of Turkey’s geographical locatedness and national interest, history, and identity are all (with differing degrees) influential. That’s is why Turkey offers an intriguing case to study competing notions and storylines about a place where foreign policy sometimes becomes not only a subject but also an instrument of spatial-cultural identity construction. Additionally, one cannot offer a full account of Turkey’s foreign policy without considering the context in which it is made. The context therefore relates to how the foreign policy bureaucracy and decision-making mechanism work. But any attempt would be incomplete unless it addresses the ever evolving power relations among different societal actors in Turkey which are closely linked to public policy decision-making. Given these considerations, a case study approach is a good fit for the purposes of this research.

A single case study approach is adopted in this study. Turkey’s relations with the Middle East will be the main focus of analysis. This region is selected basically for three reasons. First, it is the most enduring neighbourhood whose shape remained largely intact since modern Turkey’s inception. Second, Turkey’s somewhat troublesome relationship with the Middle East indicates starkly acts of non-involvement, distancing, engagement, retreat and isolation usually followed one after the other. The region is therefore a core feature of Turkish foreign policy. Third, the Middle East is a permanent hotbed of contention for different social groups in Turkey where one can trace foreign policy ramifications of contesting understandings on

Turkey’s geopolitical placement, its identity, culture, history and notions on how to construe/represent this oriental region.

To give the preferred case study more traction, a broad timespan covering nearly nine decades (1923-2010) will be consulted. Such a choice will allow for a thorough exploration of the subject matter. It will thus lend room to combine different methods to illuminate a complex topic like Turkish foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY/CHOICE OF SOURCES

As noted by Allison, academic analysis employs description, explanation, prediction, evaluation, and recommendation as related, but logically separable methods to understand the problems of foreign affairs. Understanding the dynamics involved in the making of Turkish foreign policy is thus important not only for a descriptive but also an explanatory analysis to make educated predictions towards the future.

Since this dissertation aims to build a heuristic model to understand and explain Turkish foreign policy, a major challenge is to indicate causal relations between theoretical discussion and foreign policy practice. It is not always possible to circumvent the problems relating to this challenge by employing merely one method of investigation. To the contrary, a researcher is expected to be flexible with regards to methods s/he uses because it is extremely difficult to formulate a research problem so that s/he can find all the answers with resort to a single method. In this context, triangulation defined as “approaches that use multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, sources of data and methodologies” is an approach of extreme value. Triangulation implies that findings from one method need to be

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cross-checked and cross referenced with those gathered through others. Confidence in the validity of research findings is hence significantly improved. It will also be much more reliably ensured that fair and accurate judgments can be made about research findings.

The methods employed in this research are mainly qualitative analysis supplemented by personal perspectives based on professional experience and insights as well as process tracing with resort to primary and secondary source materials. None of the methods is superior but rather complementary to each other and provide for enriched empirical accuracy and analytical cohesiveness.

Two major methodological tools are employed in this research; textual analysis at large and discourse analysis in particular. As noted by McKie, textual analysis is a methodology to gather information about how human beings make sense of who they are, and of how they fit into the world in which they live in.\textsuperscript{10} It is a well-suited strategy when studying nation state behaviour which is the outcome of an inter-dynamic process where decision-makers try to make sense of a complex world and of themselves in devising polices. To understand and explain how such decisions are made, researchers need to interpret texts (speech acts, books, magazines, etc.).

In this respect, discourse analysis is a sub-branch in textual analysis that focuses on language. It is a key research tool since it is through language that reality (in this case geography) is constructed, represented and ultimately given meaning. Following post-structuralist linguistic philosophy, language/discourse therefore serves as a machine that generates, and as a result constitutes/constructs world politics.\textsuperscript{11} Furthermore, following Campbell’s line of reasoning practices in foreign policy discourse are also instrumental in the

formation of geopolitical identities. The same is true for inter-state relations. It is also the main tool to expose Foucaultian power-knowledge nexus which stipulate that discourses try to discipline and exert control over society. But the purpose of discursive strategy is not to read behind the discourse or discover the reality behind it. The purpose of discursive research is to work with what has actually been said or written, exploring patterns in and across the statements and identifying the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality. The important point here is the link between the text and its context as meanings shift between social and political settings.

As a research theory and method, discourse analysis is significant for the purposes of this study when it comes to identifying prevalent modes of representation as well as exposing power laden relations, all of which take place in geography/space based discourses produced by elites as guidelines for foreign policy action. The underlying power relations embedded in these representations and common sense assumptions in geopolitical culture that uphold them will thus be better exposed. Besides, through discourse analysis, it will be shown how certain geopolitical discourses (in the form of storylines, scripts and narratives) help shape competing identities and justify certain choices in attaining foreign policy goals. With a view to provide a better reflection of the context under which discursive practices are performed and the decision-making mechanism works, process-tracing is employed as an additional analytical tool of investigation. By definition, this procedure is grounded on the unfolding events or situations over time which help draw descriptive and causal inferences

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12 Ibid.
14 JØRGENSEN, M., & PHILLIPS, L. p.20
from diagnostic pieces of evidence.\textsuperscript{17} Process tracing is thus an essential form of inquiry within case study, which evaluates hypotheses about the causes of a specific outcome in a particular case.\textsuperscript{18} Since this research follows a chronology of events in illuminating the causal relations between geopolitical considerations and foreign policy outcomes in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East, process tracing is a method of great value for hypotheses testing and cross-referencing.

In this context, a considerable amount of primary sources used in this research are discursive acts performed by the prominent Turkish political leaders/elite, intellectuals, scholars and military brass. These are the most powerful actors in shaping the overall geopolitical discourse in Turkey. The aim is to allow for deeper analysis which helps uncover the underlying motivations and objectives of decision-makers. Books, compilations and online resources are consulted to trace such discursive acts. The relevant websites of government branches, internet and newspapers are also examined. When newspapers and internet are used as primary data, due diligence is paid to reflect exact quotes. Additionally political party and government programmes, speeches, official statements, policy papers, and brief notes are also used where applicable.

Choosing a single data set runs the risk of bias since it is possible for the researcher to select data that is more convenient in testing his/her hypothesis. To avoid this, data used in this research is collected through a variety of English and Turkish sources including secondary and archival data. Materials such as works of former foreign policy makers, newspaper databases and Turkish, American and British journals are also employed. A broad survey of books, journal articles, and monographs by think tanks, academics and newspapers is also provided.


In a nutshell, foreign policy discourses and representations in Turkey in the form of primary and secondary material are part of the sources used. The aim is to provide an elaborate and rich input for qualitative analysis. No effort has been spared throughout this research to avoid *post-facto* reasoning, i.e. not to simply reconstruct the past from today’s perspective. The sources are therefore carefully reviewed and crosschecked. A large amount of evidence is taken into consideration to present a credible account of the research.

Another set of primary sources used in this study which adds to the strength of research is based on my personal experience of being a member of the Turkish Foreign Service for 14 years. The unique chance of having worked on the Middle Eastern dossier for almost ten uninterrupted years as a diplomat in Turkish Embassies in Baghdad and London and the Office of Turkish President forms the basis of that experience. One needs to be vigilant that professional involvement in foreign policy can be simultaneously an asset and weakness. On the one hand, it provides an ability to craft well-informed analyses based on personal in-depth knowledge and insights. On the other hand, it poses a challenge of reconciling the prevalent practical policy making habit of ignoring the theoretical underpinnings of foreign policy with an attempt to write coherently about foreign policy within the remits of an academic conceptual framework. Every attempt will be made throughout this research to overcome this challenge while not shying away from making use of personal insights and observations.

A key decision in structuring this thesis was whether to prefer a chronological or topical order. Since the research relies on a case study that aims to understand and analyse how the state of affairs between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours is brought about, a blend of both suits well. As such, Chapter 2 intends to indicate the causal links between the theoretical debates introduced in Chapter 1 and how they frame the mindset of key decision-makers in Turkey. This is why it has been topically organized to allow for a comparison
between the two dominant geopolitical mentalities in Turkey. Chapter 3 is also structured around key topics of power relations and foreign policy apparatus while not losing touch with chronological inquiry. Chapters 4 and 5 are about the specific case study. They are based on chronological order in indicating the influence of factors and dynamics introduced in previous chapters.

The critical literature review in this research is used to first pinpoint the overwhelming tendency to fix Turkish foreign policy in general and Ankara's relations with the Middle East to a search for greater security. Constructivist theorizing on Turkish foreign policy is also highlighted with a view to indicate a second trend of analysis based on identity. The literature review will also be instrumental to identify the relevant geopolitical factors which are rather recently included in Turkish foreign policy analysis and most importantly to detect gaps where original research is needed.
LITERATURE REVIEW

There is broad scholarly consensus lately that a new dynamism in Turkish foreign policy has surfaced in the 2000s. As the argument goes, a country which traditionally adopted integrating with the West atop its foreign policy agenda and largely neglected the rest of its immediate neighbourhood began to pursue a visibly more active foreign policy. In the same line, this new activism indicated itself most starkly towards the Middle East both through improved bilateral relations and increased mediation/facilitation efforts. These studies usually pointed out that the Middle East was a region traditionally approached with extreme caution and reluctance by Turkish policy makers. But this time under the AK Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party), the Middle East constituted the nexus through which the new activism in Turkish foreign policy revealed itself. It was therefore generalized that Turkish foreign policy behaviour with regards to the Middle East under AK Party government was unprecedentedly active, assertive and dynamic.

One crucial shortcoming undermines such claims. They offer a rather simplistic snapshot view elaborating on a rather short period of time. A broader overview indicates that there is not one but five intervals when Ankara displayed acts of engagement with and retreat from Middle Eastern politics. It was under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk that the first wave of somewhat ambivalent Middle Eastern activism started. By the mid-1930’s, Turkey on the one hand

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championed the establishment of the Saidabad Pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan while on the other hand employed active diplomacy to resolve the status of Mosul-Kirkuk and Alexandretta (Hatay). The second wave of rigorous Middle Eastern engagement came under the Democrat Party in the 1950s. PM Menderes embarked on an ambitious agenda to form a Middle Eastern alliance (Baghdad Pact) to enhance Turkey's prestige and stature. Turgut Ozal's reign in power in the 1980s marked the third wave of Turkish Middle Eastern activism. During the period, Turkey incrementally returned to the centre stage of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), initiated establishment of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), focused on increasing regional trade, pursued an agenda of security cooperation with neighbouring countries and actively supported the American role in the First Gulf War. The fourth line of somewhat voluntary activism was displayed under different coalition governments during the 1990s when the Middle East fared quite high in Ankara's foreign policy agenda. At different intervals during the period, Turkey not only improved relations with Israel significantly but also engaged heavily with Middle Eastern Muslim countries. Finally, the fifth wave of activism is displayed under AKP government in the 2000s which stirred a lively debate about an orientation shift in Turkish foreign policy.

What is common in all these intervals is that Turkey almost invariably experienced mood swings in its regional dealings. Moving back and forth on the Middle Eastern pendulum, each wave of Turkish activism was followed by a state of retreat, distancing and isolation as if Ankara was regrouping for the next phase. This is an interesting observation that begs an elaborate scrutinization. In line with the introduction offered so far, a discussion of Turkish geopolitical culture is a good fit to understand and offer an explanation to this phenomenon.

However, let alone this particular aspect, there are only a few works in the literature that touch specifically on the Middle Eastern connection of Turkish foreign policy. As noted by Philip Robins, “there is not as many comprehensive works, as there should be, in the academic literature that exclusively deals with Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour in Middle
Most studies tend to deal with the Middle East *inter alia* a number of dealings with other regions. The ones taking the Middle East as their main focus of analysis are rather limited in number and are mostly confined to short articles.

This part of the dissertation aims to critically review the current literature on Turkish foreign policy, and where available, with regards to the Middle East. The literature available offers insights basically under four lines of argumentation, namely security (realist), identity (constructivist), political economy (liberal) and Europeanization/globalization (norm-based). All claim to explain the vibrancy and dynamism in the style, tone and substance of Turkish foreign policy, at times it is displayed, exclusively through their own prism yet failing to coherently address acts of withdrawal and states of aloofness. It would therefore be useful to explore the main arguments in each strand.

**Security based explanations** tend to prioritize the importance of international and regional balance of power to explain Turkish foreign policy behaviour. Adhering to the realist/rationalist perspective, the proponents of this school reduce Turkey to a passive object in the international system and a bit player (middle power) in a global game. The ultimate goal of Turkish foreign policy is portrayed as a search for greater security and survival in an anarchic world. This strand particularly focuses on the shape of the international system (bipolarity, multipolarity/unipolarity) in imposing security constraints on Turkey. Secondly, regional balance of power as reflective of the shape of the international system is also a strong referent in explaining Turkish foreign policy. For this school, Turkey’s waves of

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21 Despite not covering the time period this research aims to shed some light onto, one needs to acknowledge the comprehensive work by Philip Robins as the first study dealing with Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, for an elaborate analysis see ROBINS, P. (1991). *Turkey and the Middle East*. New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press.


activism in the Middle East correspond either to conformity with the bigger balance of power (between the US and others) and/or a power vacuum in the region.\textsuperscript{24} Turkey, in this line of reasoning, appears acting as either a practitioner of the agenda of bigger powers or filling in regional power vacuums. In a nutshell, Turkey, in search for greater security in a zero-sum global game is pictured as simply adapting itself to the shape of the international and regional security environment.\textsuperscript{25}

**Identity based explanations** emphasize the ongoing sub-national politico-cultural identity clashes within Turkish society. On rather simplistic terms, Turkish society is pictured as comprising of a westernizing Kemalist elite and its Islamist reactionary forces, both of which are with varying degrees coloured with nationalism and liberalism, in harbouring different sets of foreign policy agendas.\textsuperscript{26} As the argument goes, Kemalist westernism is the norm not only setting the direction of Turkish foreign policy and but also a strong referent in explaining Ankara’s rather ambivalence and reluctance in engaging with Middle Eastern politics.

**Political economy insights** claim that, in more recent times, the reason why Turkey engages with countries in the Middle East is that the domestic economic agents demand new markets, trade and investment opportunities and unhindered flow of energy resources. In this understanding, Turkey is conceptualized as a trading state.\textsuperscript{27} It is therefore argued that the


\textsuperscript{25} ALTUNIŞIK, M. B., & MARTIN, L. G. (2011). Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP. *Turkish Studies*. 12, p. 569-587.


rise of a new Anatolian bourgeoisie whose economic interests lie in improved relations with the Middle East is a major factor to consider to understand Ankara's acts of regional engagement.\textsuperscript{28} As Turkey trades and invests more in the Middle East, its foreign policy needs to emphasize creation of a regional environment conducive to business.

There are also attempts at linking these insights with globalization and Europeanization.\textsuperscript{29} Globalization is understood as a process in which intense relationships and interdependencies across different cultures, peoples, countries and economies are facilitated by advances in information technologies and increased capital and investment flows.\textsuperscript{30} The argument here is by increasingly subscribing to western values of libertarian democracy, rule of law and free market, Turkey is becoming more and more exposed to the influences of globalization whereby its foreign policy foregoes a substantial transformation. The European Union in this process serves as a strong agent of change for Turkey by serving as the main anchor for reform in transforming Turkish politics, economy, society and hence foreign policy. The EU thus alters the tone and style of Ankara’s Middle Eastern dealings away from rationalist coercion and confrontation to liberal cooperation.

One needs to critically assess to what extent such explanations catch the reality and explore whether a more holistic account could be provided by developing a comprehensive


\textsuperscript{30} Definition offered in the website of World Health Organisation, available at \url{http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story043/en/index.html} (consulted on April 23, 2012)
conceptual framework. In light of the brief overview so far, the following seminal pieces are reviewed to first exemplify how Turkey, its foreign policy and its Middle Eastern dealings are conceptualized. The key purpose is to help identify questions relevant to the case study (Middle East), point out the scholarly gap in terms of a heuristic perspective and see through the opposing views.

William Hale offers a rather comprehensive and authoritative summary of Turkey’s foreign relations in his work titled *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774.*\(^{31}\) As a confessed realist scholar, Hale classifies Turkey as a “middle power” and scripts its foreign policy as dictated by the international system. Looking “out” instead of “in”, his focus does not leave much room for domestic drivers of foreign policy. He prioritizes the imperatives of the international security environment over the choices made by individual agents within the state. For Hale, it is the system that forced the Turkish state to anchor its foreign policy to the west in the first place rather than the individual decision-makers’ express desire to make Turkey western as he considers the west the only option available at the time. Such a deterministic approach makes him miss the impact of the debates in Turkey about its geopolitical identity, the meaning given to Turkey’s geography and spaces around it as new roles and behaviours were appropriated for the new state. Therefore, he underestimates the role of domestic ideational dynamics which proved very influential in shaping Turkish foreign policy.

“*Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*”\(^{32}\) edited by Baskın Oran is yet another study that provides an overall account of Turkey’s external relations. The framework developed in this study subscribes Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour to a mix of its culture, history and geography as well as to the developments in its domestic polity and dynamics in the international system. But overall, it is fixated on a rationalist approach as the

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author argues that the foremost objective of Turkey’s foreign policy is security and survival in an anarchic world. Consequently this study strives to establish some degree of continuity in foreign policy behaviour throughout a large time span. To fit a model that has explanatory value at all phases, William Hale’s ‘medium power’ concept is borrowed to describe Turkey’s international standing. As such, Turkey is expected to behave in reaction to the developments in the international arena and its own impact on the global system is treated as marginal. In this context, Turkey can act autonomously as long as it is prepared to pay a price. Geopolitical analysis (in fact, the word “geopolitics” is not used at all and references are made to “Turkey’s geostrategic location”) is beyond the scope of this study.

Turkey however, as explained earlier, turned more “daring” than “cautious” or “ambivalent” in Middle Eastern politics at different intervals throughout its existence. Such changes cannot be ascribed to systemic factors alone since evidence suggests that other considerations were also at play. At the times it was displayed, Turkey’s Middle Eastern activism was bold in defying traditional role conceptions expected of a “middle power”. Instead, such notions were mostly accompanied by a different conception of Turkey and/or the Middle Eastern region. Emboldened by the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, these were mostly facilitated by the domestically brewed interpretations that prioritized the advantages of Turkey’s pivotal geopolitical location and a fresh interpretation as to what it means to have the geographies around Turkey. Although the wine remained the same in the sense that the space of and around Turkey did not change, the bottle through which the Turkish leaders perceived and presented these places substantially changed. This in turn fundamentally altered the ease and confidence with which Turkey began to handle its relations with the Middle East. Therefore, any analysis would be incomplete unless a thorough explanation is provided on

33 Ibid, p. 11.
34 Turkey is described as a ‘Strategic Medium Power’ in p. 9.
35 Ibid.
36 This perspective established in a previous article by Malik Mufti is elaborated thoroughly in MUFTI, M. (2009). Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea. Basingstoke [England], Palgrave Macmillan.
how old geographies are given new meanings in order to understand the sea changes in Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy.

Philip Robins’ *Suits and Uniforms* provides crucial insights on the complex dynamics of Turkish foreign policy. His research is thematic rather than region-based. Reminiscent of the middle power thesis, he considers Turkey a *status quo* power, which chose a westernist orientation in external affairs since it provided clarity of goals and stability. The book is an excellent grasp of the key processes and players through which Turkish foreign policy is made. Robins identifies the political power holders (the government-PM, the President and Minister of Foreign Affairs) and the security establishment (the military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs-MFA) as the key stakeholders, the interaction amongst whom results in Turkey’s individual policy positions. With an attempt to provide an integrated approach to analyse Turkish foreign policy, he also considers the interplay between the external and internal factors. To him, security-related, ideological, historical and economic factors are the ideational and material determinants of Turkish foreign policy.

This research is in serious need of revision since the locus of attention in terms of foreign policy making has changed considerably over time. It does fail to capture how the operation of power, coercive and institutional as well as diffused and discursive, in Turkey has transformed over ninety years. This is a serious drawback since it has a direct reflection on the key processes of foreign policy making. Equally important is the need to revisit the three broad arguments that Robins makes, i.e. Turkey is a status quo power, its external relations are firmly westwards and there is more caution than daring in Turkish foreign policy. All of these arguments fall in plain contrast to the changes that took place in how Turkey handles its external relations in the Middle East over a broader timeframe.

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38 Ibid, p. 6-7
On the other hand, the analysis on the influence of Kemalist and conservative paradigms (Robins calls the latter Islamist) on Turkish foreign policy is inadequate. Particularly troublesome is the inaptness to locate conservatism in proper historical context in time and within the broader culture. To address that in an article published in the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies three years later, Robins highlights “Turkey’s Normative Geography” and “Turkey’s Elite Competition” upon which he concludes that Turkey is a double gravity state. According to him, Turkish foreign policy is motivated by two factors: a Middle Eastern identity and an EU membership goal. The former does not amount to a geopolitical analysis in itself but rather a sketch of what the Middle East and Europe stand for in terms of values and norms governing political conduct among states, the effects of which is claimed to lie at the core of Turkish foreign policy behaviour. Robins argues that thanks to competing sets of values (European and Middle Eastern), two-headedness is detectible in the actions of Turkish foreign policy elites. However, the author claims that Turkey’s subscription to two sets of foreign policy norms does not necessarily hinder foreign policy effectiveness. Turkey is still able to produce uniform foreign policies. In this line of thought, he, in a further 2007 article examines Turkish foreign policy since 2002 and exemplifies that there is an ongoing tension lately between the Kemalist state and post-Islamist government.

“Turkish Foreign Policy, Old Problems, New Parameters” edited by Mustafa Aydin is one of the recent compilations, which argues for a recent change in Turkish foreign policy. The purpose of the volume is not only to reflect upon factors enabling policy change but also its repercussions. A shift in domestic civil-military balances, style and conduct of Turkey’s new leaders and impact of different ethnic and religious groups are cited as domestic structural factors influencing foreign policy. A brief reference is made to Turkey’s geopolitical location in Chapter 5 as a means of construing significance of the political tradition that Turkey’s current

41 AYDIN, MUSTAFA (edit 2010), Turkish Foreign Policy, Old Problems, New Parameters, Spain, UNISCI, p.6.
ruling party, AK Party, grew out of.\textsuperscript{42} Turkey’s activist foreign policy stance vis-à-vis the Middle East is explained as a result of the Islamic roots of the AK Party, which claims to better understand the complexities in ex-Ottoman lands and its broader hinterland. The remainder of the argument emphasizes regional dynamics such as disunity among Arabs and failure of the American administration to create a regional order after the invasion of Iraq in 2003.\textsuperscript{43}

Graham Fuller’s “The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World” provides an elaborate geopolitical hindsight. Fuller perceives a gradual evolution of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East over the course of thirty years. In his account, Turkey’s move started in the economic arena (a shift to export oriented growth and allowing Islamic banking) roughly after the military coup in the early 1980s. Subsequent Turkish governments’ foreign policy overtures in the Middle East, such as in the case of Syria and more visible participation in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) activities, are presented as hard evidence for this gradual move. Turkey’s latest involvement in this region is seen as nothing but transcendence of this process to the strategic arena.\textsuperscript{44} For Fuller, “Turkey’s growing vision of its geopolitical place in the world”\textsuperscript{45} is presented as a major factor in paving the way for the proactive and dynamic policy line. Little articulation is provided, however, as to what this new vision entails. Thus, the multitude of structural factors in the areas of politics, economy and geopolitical culture are largely overlooked. More importantly, no attention is paid to the growing impact of geopolitical reasonings across Turkish policy makers.

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid. p.140.
\textsuperscript{43}Ibid.p.220.
\textsuperscript{44}Ibid.p.39-47.
Bill Park’s “Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in A Globalized World” captures the recent political, economic and social transformation in Turkey through the prism of globalization. There are two occasions in this volume where a brief geopolitical analysis is provided. In Chapter 3, the reasons for isolationism in regional affairs are sought in the mantra of Kemalism, which prioritizes security and adopts a “zero-sum-approach” in external relations.46 Accordingly, this line of thought identifies Arabs of the Middle East with conflicts, backwardness, unintelligence and treachery. The second reference is made in Chapter 7 whereby Park recognizes that Turkish foreign policy lately is “in stark contrast to the wary, unimaginative and cautious approach that hitherto shaped Ankara’s engagement”.47 He also points out the difficulty of locating Turkey geopolitically.48 In this context, the fact that Turkey is part of a variety of regions all at the same time is given as part of a new understanding in re-conceptualizing Turkish foreign policy and hence driving its recent activism. The environment in which such an active stance is pursued is portrayed as one where “power is being transferred from a Eurocentric to Asiacentric international system”.49 Yet these factors are enlisted with a view to expose how open the Turkish political system, economy and society have become in the age of globalization. Thus, the main purpose is establishing the links between the process of globalization and how it impacts Turkish foreign policy.

Only a small share of research in this area deals with the impact of geopolitics in its critical brand. The ones that do are all short academic articles lacking a comprehensive theoretical foundation, which somewhat weakens their argumentation. Besides, these are interval-specific analyses looking at Turkey mainly throughout the 2000s.

48Ibid, p. 103.
49Ibid, p. 110.
In this context, Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat in an article published in 2007 apply critical geopolitics to Turkish foreign policy. This article places Turkey’s re-orientation towards the Middle East in the framework of the concept of geographical imagination. The authors cite the comprehensive transformation in the political, economic and national security realms, policy-making procedures and civil-military relations in Turkey as the main factors that paved the way to a new imagination. There are two criticisms that the article begs. First, it captures a brief period in analysing the ideational basis of Turkish foreign policy. Second, its ahistorical nature when it tries to explain the ideational basis of policy change, i.e. a new geographic imagination is also problematic. It fails to capture that the new geographers of the era simply have taken up some of the key themes already available in Turkey’s geopolitical culture and rebranded them in practice. The same is true for Kenan Dağcı’s article, “Turkey’s New Geopolitical Imagination and EU Membership” which employs a similar yet theoretically less sophisticated framework only this time with regard to Turkey’s EU integration process.

Another article co-authored by Bülent Aras and Hakan Fidan associates with the same research agenda. The authors point to a culture of geopolitics which is about geographical representations, apprehensions and symbolizations that is socially constructed through historical experiences and interactions, as a factor to reckon with in the making of regional foreign policy. Yet the authors once again suffer from ahistoricity and uncontextuality in dealing with the emergence of a new geographical imagination as a driving force behind Turkish foreign policy.

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Keeping the same optic, İbrahim Kalın bases his analysis on critical geopolitics, too. He uses the notion of “geopolitical imagination”, without much theoretical elaboration as to what it entails, to analyse Turkey’s enhanced interest in Middle Eastern affairs. His is another article that takes systematic analysis at its core with an insistent focus on the nature of international balance of power. The only real theoretical novelty is branding this analysis under the concept of “geopolitical imagination”.

Some of these articles suffer, with one degree or the other, from the following theoretical fallacy. Once an author bases his analysis on “geopolitical imagination”, an analytical tool borrowed from critical geopolitics scholarship, he, in fact, from a heuristic perspective is referring to “geographical imagination”. The latter term, as will be elaborated in further detail in the first chapter, is about placing a country globally in the mental geographical picture of its elite and people, i.e. earmarking a place for it in world affairs. It is also about giving political meaning to the geographies one sees a country’s foreign policy directed at. A “geopolitical imagination” on the other hand is about meta-geopolitical schemes in dividing the world (or as one might call it international political space) map into large spaces. The use of “geopolitical imagination” in these studies is out of proper theoretical context and hence inappropriate.

Secondly, although the analyses offered in these articles are thought-provoking and novel, most fell short of situating imagined geographies, whether geographical or geopolitical, which are nothing but ideational analytical tools into proper social, cultural and historical context. Put differently, albeit recognizing the social and cultural embeddedness of imaginative spaces, these articles only focus on the practical foreign policy implications for a single group, political party or a few leading individuals within rather brief moments in time, a matter of decades at most. Thus, they leave aside the geo-cultural historical background and the

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underlying social power relations that enable the constitution of these imageries in the first place, an equally crucial consideration that critical geopolitics scholarship needs to look into.

Pınar Bilgin’s “Turkey’s Geopolitics Dogma” is one of the latest pieces that goes beyond such fallacies in exposing the link between identity, geopolitics and foreign policy.\textsuperscript{54} The author names the historical centrality of geopolitical assumptions and language to Turkey’s security imagery of “geopolitics dogma” through which she problematizes why and how different Turkish actors resorted to the same set of images and notions derived from classical geopolitical thought to justify exactly opposite policy positions. Cutting across popular, formal and practical strands of critical geopolitics, the article astutely manifests the abuse of geopolitical thought in Turkey by a variety of actors to enhance competing political agendas, particularly in foreign policy.

One of the most illuminating geopolitical readings of Turkish foreign policy is provided in an article by Bilgin and Bilgiç in 2010.\textsuperscript{55} The authors do not only take geopolitical analysis in its appropriate social, cultural and historical context but also afford a comparison between the two rivalling geographical imaginations that so far guided Turkish foreign policy. The identification of elements of continuity and change in Turkey’s external dealings with resort to these two imageries is also an excellent fit. However, they seem to mistake a mere foreign policy interest in a region, the Middle East, with the wider ideational scheme of a geographical imagination. They thereby force the limits of continuity in Turkey’s behaviour in the Middle East from 1983 onwards despite apparent differences among the position of primary foreign policy actors whilst disregarding the historical backdrop upon which more recent geopolitical representations took place.


The use of imagined geographies/geographical imaginations in this new area of research on Turkish foreign policy is based on the strength of this analytical tool in shaping and legitimizing attitudes, dispositions, policies and practices. But such uses disregard mostly, what Al Mahfedi calls, the relationship between national subjectivity and imagined geographies.\textsuperscript{56} They are conceptualized in such a way as if it is possible to work through imagined geographies as analytical constructs in disparate national contexts.\textsuperscript{57} This is where they fall erred and inadequate. Without the national context, such analyses are nothing beyond highly personalized leader specific accounts of certain episodes in Turkish foreign policy. Such an attitude runs counter to a central pillar of geopolitical study, that ‘geopolitics is a cultural and political practice beyond a manifest reality of world politics’.\textsuperscript{58} Put differently, it is the cultural politics of place and space that matters. As Derek Gregory emphasizes ‘culture involves the production, circulation, and legitimization of meanings through representations, practices, and performances that enter fully into the constitution of the world’.\textsuperscript{59} A more appropriate account therefore must acknowledge the social and cultural embeddedness of actors who construct and use geopolitical knowledge in drawing the boundaries of possible, justified and legitimate in Turkish foreign policy. This requires a study of “the culture of geopolitics” which shapes the general contours of possibility and meaning as a concomitant factor in the production of grand strategy and external policy. The culture of geopolitics encompasses both academic and non-scholarly accounts of space and place which come in equal weight in the constitution of the assumptive worlds of decision-makers. The whole exercise drives from a state’s spatial situatedness in its most concrete form (in the sense that there is a concrete geographical basis to it) and particular experiences/traumas in history.


\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, p.8.

CONTRIBUTION OF THIS WORK

In light of the literature review thereof, a key challenge this study undertakes is to bring a novel perspective to understand and analyse Turkish foreign policy. This is inevitably linked to Turkey’s culture, history, politics, economy, ideological polarization and social evolution. That is why this research is based on critical geopolitics which aims to uncover the power-knowledge nexus employed in the production and use of geopolitical knowledge to guide grand strategies and foreign policy. As indicated so far, this perspective is rather inadequately applied to Turkish foreign policy.

Having identified the scholarly gap in the literature, this research aims to enrich the discussion by elaborating in three broad dimensions. First, it will explore in more detail the intellectual debates available in Turkish geopolitical culture in ascribing Turkey a place, mission and role in international affairs. This part contributes by adding a more nuanced understanding with regards to the socio-cultural context of ideational bases of the two competing geographical imaginations as well as the traditions that enframe them. Secondly, it will expose how these imaginations relate to the geographies (Middle East in particular) around Turkey. This is a crucial concern since the way places in Turkey’s vicinity are scripted has a conditioning impact on the courses of action available for policy makers. Thirdly, by offering an analysis of domestic power dynamics in Turkey this research hopes to address the permanent “how” question in any research.

Adopting such a research agenda allows room for in-depth analysis of Turkish foreign policy that emphasizes;

- the unhindered and ever lingering influence of space-based reasoning in informing foreign policy that goes back to the early years of state, nation and identity formation;
• and as such, how the world per se is divided, labelled and identified as composed of two (perceivably) irreconcilable political, cultural and civilizational spaces, the West vs. the East, through which the orientation of Turkey and its foreign policy is sought;
• in this context, the way different societal actors took up the challenge of ascribing a new position to Turkey in global affairs, i.e. how the two longest lasting traditions, Kemalism vs. Conservatism, propagated competing storylines about the West and the East, the place of Turkey in between, and what meaning the geographies around Turkey should hold;
• how imagined geographies about foreign places around Turkey’s vicinity and geographical imaginations about Turkey itself are developed as guides for external action;
• the way in which not only these discursive formations are used as a means of shaping foreign policy but also exercising diffused power;
• the impact of and evolution in the interaction among a myriad of social networks of power (a mix of political, military, economic and ideological power) in constituting one or the other geopolitical tradition and translating their imagination into practice;
• identification of and transformation over time in the key processes and mechanisms of foreign policy making in Turkey.

Thanks to the breadth and multiplicity of the topics covered, this study hopes to provide a multifaceted, multi-causal, historically and culturally contextual and dynamic analysis of Turkish foreign policy in a holistic manner through both a topical and chronological order. As such, this research aims to break away from perspectives fixated on security and structural (systemic) dynamics. Instead it draws scholarly attention to domestic factors since they are, more often than not, insufficiently and unsystematically addressed in the literature.
The research is principally placed within the area of international relations with a specific focus on foreign policy. Therefore, the major contribution it seeks is on public (foreign) policy. Due to the nature of the broader research topic, it can also be located at the intersection with the discipline of political science. This is because foreign and domestic policy is closely knitted as the theoretical model developed in the study stipulates. In this vein, understanding Turkish foreign policy requires no less than an effort to understand the evolution of Turkish politics and society. Peculiarities of Turkey’s geography, history and culture and the way they are given meaning to, are very much pertinent for studying Turkish politics and foreign policy. This is why it is possible to classify this research as belonging to Area Studies (within Turkish Studies) as well.
CHAPTER 1- CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Snyder and Walt stipulate that three criteria are important in assessing the scientific value of research: precision and logical consistency, creativity/originality, and empirical validity. This chapter aims to develop an integrated conceptual framework that can meet such criteria and provide the analytical tools to examine Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. As argued by Hilsman, conceptual models are best regarded not as simply “true” or “false” but as differentially useful depending on the circumstances. In this context, this work aims to make a contribution by devising a conceptual framework based on critical geopolitics and applying its theoretical underpinnings to the specific case study. The goal is to provide a heuristic explanation for Turkey’s waves of activism in and withdrawal from Middle Eastern politics.

Adopting critical geopolitics as the backbone of the conceptual framework in Turkish foreign policy is justified because as noted by Stone, “in terms of theoretical models Turkey's external relations are invariably wrapped within a traditional geopolitical (balance of power) analysis or couched within realist rhetoric of Turkey's national interests at the expense of alternative models--e.g. constructivism.” Critical geopolitics not only offers rich insights by pointing to the constructivist elements impacting policy preferences but also emancipates the Turkish foreign policy research agenda from external structural imperatives.

Choosing this framework is also justified from an academic point of view since “the overwhelming body of work in critical geopolitics has focused on contemporary US and

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European colonial powers as if they were the sole active forces in world politics. Adding Turkey as an empirical case through the lens of its Middle Eastern policy, will no doubt enlarge the scope of scholarly debate and allow for an enriched understanding.

I. GEOPOLITICS

“We all must learn geography in order to learn history.”

(Walter A. McDougall)

As an intellectual tradition and an expression of state interest and identity, geopolitics helps people visualize the world in certain ways through maps, atlases, ideas, representations and connotations. Depictions such as the West, the Middle East or the Third World are not merely geographical names but representations by which political meanings are attributed to different parts of the world. It is through geopolitics that places are labelled and identified into smaller units and made politically meaningful. It is the process through which the Planet Earth is translated into the (Political) World. It should be borne in mind that such descriptions are not fixed but are in constant production and reproduction. In addition to influencing daily lives, geopolitics very much informs official discourses in foreign policy, power relations and identity.

Geopolitics can be traced back to the universities, geographical institutes, and centres of learning in rivalling empires of the late 19th century. It was originally crafted as a strategic means of making advances in imperial rivalry. Geographers of this era laid the foundations of

geopolitics by emphasizing the conditioning influence of physical geography on foreign policy. As a term and discourse, geopolitics is rooted in the relationship between geography (space) and politics (power). As such states and interstate relations are prerogative for this discipline.

One also needs to bear in mind the slight difference between political geography and geopolitics. The former maintains that “understanding geography is fundamental to understanding politics”. Geopolitics on the other hand looks at this relationship the other way around. It is concerned with “geographic influences on power relationships in international relations” or “spatial study and practice of international relations”. To make a comparison; “geopolitics is concerned with the spatial requirements of a state while political geography examines only its spatial conditions”. That being noted, it is obvious that the two approaches are quite close to each other.

In affording a definition to geopolitics, a term coined by Swedish scholar Rudolf Kjellen in 1899, Saul Cohen offers the following.

“The analysis of the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the other hand, political processes. The settings are composed of geographical features and patterns and the multi-layered regions that they form. The political processes include forces that operate at the international level and on those on the domestic scene that influence international behaviour. Both geographical

70 GOODALL, Dictionary of Human Geography, p.191.
settings and political processes are dynamic, and each influences and is influenced by the other. Geopolitics addresses the consequences of this interaction.”\textsuperscript{71}

This approach to geopolitics, which is today dubbed classical (orthodox) geopolitics is about translating space into politics (interstate power relations). Another definition offered by Toal, stipulates that “geopolitics is discourse about world politics, with a particular emphasis on state competition and the geographical dimensions of power”.\textsuperscript{72} It is in fact how geographies of the world are made politically meaningful within a culture of geopolitics and through an ever going process of competition and struggle for power. In other words, geopolitics is an attempt to see “the political world” and one’s place in it. A foremost requirement is to “visualize a map of the world and place one’s feet squarely in history and geography while at the same time keeping one’s eyes upon a speculative future.”\textsuperscript{73}

Classical geopolitics scholars and its practitioners of statecraft seek “a God’s eye view of the world”.\textsuperscript{74} Some go further in asserting that what they see is scientifically objective. However, scholars of this strand mostly have certain biases and thus do generate, wittingly or unwittingly, theories that serve their particular agendas. Geopolitics therefore almost always comes with apolitical agenda and a national bias. The novelty of the discipline lies in acknowledging its subjectivity and trying to critically assess why and how certain meanings are attributed to the understanding of the world in justifying policy positions.

Geopolitics is historically very much informed by the realist school of thought in seeing the world composed of a struggle between competing states with reference to geography. It does also take into consideration constructivist elements. The “political world” today is not simply

\textsuperscript{73} GÖKMEN, SEMRA R (2010). \textit{Geopolitics and the Study of International Relations}, PHD Thesis,Middle East Technical University, p.19
out there to observe just like in physics. To the contrary, it is made known through the socially constructed processes in one’s home country and the geopolitical representations in other countries that are interacted with, which are reflected onto geopolitical discourses. As noted by Dijkink, geography only acquires meaning through historical events and through a way of life that geographical determinists alone have tried to explain directly on the basis of the physical environment. Therefore, as Flint puts it, the goals of geopolitics in understanding, analysing and being able to critique world politics and (state behaviour) require us to work with more than one definition.

II. CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS

Underlying Characteristics

There is a tendency in the literature to attribute the roots of geopolitical scholarship to the rise of European imperialism. The theory and practice of classical geopolitics is thereby closely linked to 19th century Germany. In fact, the period between the end of the 19th century and the end of World War II can be considered the ‘high time’ of geopolitics since it had a strong imprint on international relations.

An underlying feature of this school of geopolitics is that “the influence of geographic environment over the actions of men is thought to represent a natural rather than a historic relationship”. As such, “it is concerned with the implications for power politics of the geographical attributes of states, and of their spatial locations…In the abstract, geopolitics traditionally indicates the links and causal relationships between political power and geographic space; in concrete terms it is often seen as a body of thought assaying specific

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strategic prescriptions based on the relative importance of land power and sea power in world history....The geopolitical tradition had some consistent concerns, like the geopolitical correlates of power in world politics, the identification of international core areas, and the relationships between naval and terrestrial capabilities.”

Therefore, classical geopolitical reasoning underscores the importance of physical-geographical determinants such as proximity to oceans and continental landmass in driving policy. Thus, being a sea or land power is treated as an important factor in determining international relations and one’s own policy choices. In classical geopolitics, policy prescriptions are believed to flow from the geographical position of a country, the relative location with regard to other powers, the lines of transport to important resources, the distribution of the population over the territory, etc., as argued by Dijkink. In the words of Gray, classical geopolitical thinking “defines the players (which are territorially organized states or those aspiring to become), frequently defines the stakes for which the players contend, and always defines the terms in which they measure their security relative to others”. It is therefore safe to argue that classical geopolitics is deterministic in the sense that it assumes that geography pre-frames (world) politics, and hence external action.

Classical Geopolitics and Foreign Policy

In light of these considerations, a brief overview of classical geopolitics through the writings by some of its prominent scholars will be elaborated hereafter. Such an exercise is necessary because classical geopolitics despite its claims of being “objective” and providing “a God’s eye graze” on topography and political human interactions upon it, serves as the basis on which critical inquiry into geopolitical reasoning takes place. The main concern here

is to indicate the relationship between classical geopolitical thinking and foreign policy
behaviour.

Rudolf Kjellen, the forefather of the term “geopolitics”, elaborated on the political processes
that a state engages in order to be powerful. Of the major hallmarks of demopolitik (politics of
demography), sociopolitik (politics of sociology), ecopolitik (economy), Kratapolitik (politics of
government and constitution) and geopolitik, Kjellen attached utmost importance to the latter.
He used the term to describe the location, form, surface and physical characteristics of the
territory of a state and the study of these characteristics. For him, geopolitics was not
legalistic or idealistic but rather realistic. He adopted the organic theory of state in stipulating
that “more vigorous and advanced cultures have the right to expand its ‘domain’ and control
more territory.”82 It was again Kjellen who interpreted autarky, i.e. self-sufficiency, as a
source of state power which guided mercantilist policies until the end of World War II.

Friedrich Ratzel, a German geographer well known for his work titled “Politische Geographie”
(1897) and the paper on “Laws on the Spatial Growth of States” (1896), bases his analysis
too on an ‘organic theory of state’. He argues that states, just like any living organism, need
to grow to absorb less successful and smaller states. In his account, expansion and political
growth is considered healthy as it adds to a state’s strength.83 Borrowing Darwin’s survival of
the fittest thesis, Ratzel foresees survival of the most civilized and developed states in the
system.84 In his understanding, a country and its people are closely linked to its land (space)
without which it is neither possible to talk about a country nor its people.

The biggest part of Ratzel’s legacy in this regard lies in the concept of lebensraum (living
space). He seems to adhere to realist and rationalist perspective in seeing international

84 TOAL, G. (1996). Critical Geopolitics...
politics as a constant struggle for survival in which the state was required to adapt itself to environmental conditions.\textsuperscript{85} The choices he foresaw were rather simple; a state must either grow or die just like any organism. Thus, Ratzel treated German people as an organism in desperate need for a living space. In his mind, it was the ultimate destiny of Germany to expand because it simply served a geographical organic need. Therefore, Ratzel called this a policy objective for the primacy of the German state.\textsuperscript{86} His ideas were later taken by Adolf Hitler and his Nazi accomplices.

One of the most well-known figures in classical geopolitics is Sir John Mackinder. He indeed developed geopolitics as a separate field of study and called for “educating the citizens of the worldwide (British) Empire (how) to visualize distant geographical conditions.”\textsuperscript{87} Mackinder’s utmost desire was to develop a theory to maintain Britain’s imperial supremacy against rising continental powers like Germany and Russia. In today’s terminology, Mackinder used geopolitics interchangeably with geo-strategy.

His address on “The Geographical Pivot of History” whereby Mackinder hinted on his famous Heartland theory is important in the evolution of geopolitical thought. Beginning his analysis with an authoritarian claim that “geography as a science of discovery and exploration is over”,\textsuperscript{88} Mackinder combines history, geography and politics in order to promote a way of seeing the world in its totality.\textsuperscript{89} He was more interested in relative gains rather than acquiring new territories\textsuperscript{90} because in the post-Colombian epoch virtually no part of the world remained unexplored.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, p.123.
Mackinder saw the era of sea-powers coming to an end and with the advent of railroad transport, he stipulated that controlling an area of the world which he called Heartland was crucial in terms of global distribution of power and resources. In his mind, the Heartland which pretty much covered today’s Eastern Europe and the landmass under Russian control in Euro-Asia held the key to global supremacy. He then divided the world into the “pivot area, (Heartland), the inner crescent and the outer crescent”. Thus came his famous dictum that “who rules East Europe commands the Heartland, who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island, who rules the World-Island commands the world”.91 In his eyes, the doomsday scenario for Europe would be an alliance between Russia, the pivotal land power and Germany, an emergent sea power. Thus, he propagated that a buffer zone, “a tier of independent states between these two countries”92, must be established. This idea indeed came to practical fruition during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

The significance of Mackinder’s work lies, in the words of Toal, at “its God’s eye global view, its division of the globe into vast swaths of territory and its sweeping story of geography’s conditioning influence on the course of history and politics”.93 It was after all Sir Mackinder who laid the foundations of modern day geopolitical imagination and visualization by establishing an image of the World as a whole in terms of time, space and development.

Major General and Prof. Dr. Karl Haushofer brought geopolitics to its zenith in continental Europe. He embraced Ratzel’s organic state theory and argued that a state had the right to wage just wars to enhance its lebenraum. He called for expanding a state’s territories to

91 Ibid.
include people from similar and related cultures (pan-regionalism).\textsuperscript{94} An emphasis on autarky was also another strong suit in Haushofer’s theory.\textsuperscript{95} The real refinement he brought into geopolitical reasoning was on borders as living organisms. Unlike the conventional understanding, he argued that all borders were dynamic and ever changing as a state searches for its \textit{lebensraum}, autarky and pan-regionalism.\textsuperscript{96} To him, Mackinder’s Heartland would provide Germany all it needed in this respect. The landmass of Eurasia-Africa which was the largest, most populous, and richest of its time, was exposed as the ‘pivot’ or centre of gravity of all human existence.\textsuperscript{97} With such an ambitious strategy calling for colonial acquisition and territorial growth, the ideas of Haushofer did not only serve as a strong inspirer but also a source of legitimization for Nazi policies. With regards to his academic imprint, it was indeed Haushofer’s association with the Nazi war machinery that caused a pause in the evolution of geopolitics as a separate social discipline in international politics.

The Dutch-born American scholar Nicholas \textbf{Spykman} is known for introducing European geopolitical thinking to the US. At a time when Wilsonian liberalism seemed triumphant across the Atlantic, Spykman told Americans that “foreign policy is about power rather than ideals and the struggle for power is the real name for world politics.”\textsuperscript{98} He also called for an end to isolationism and passivity in American foreign policy in the aftermath of World War I. As Spykman puts it, “geography does not argue, it simply is”\textsuperscript{99} thus making it impossible for a state to escape from its geography. Spykman characterized the geographic location of a state as “the most fundamental factor in its foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{100} According to him, “the full meaning of a given location can be obtained only by considering the specific area in relation

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Ibid}. p.226.
\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Ibid}. p.221.
\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Ibid}. p.128.
\textsuperscript{99} SPYKMAN, N. J. (1938). Geography and Foreign Policy, II. \textit{The American Political Science Review}. 32, p.236.
\textsuperscript{100} SPYKMAN, N. J. (1938). Geography and Foreign Policy, I. \textit{The American Political Science Review}. 32, p.40.
to two systems of reference: a geographic system of reference from which we derive the facts of location, and a historical system of reference by which we evaluate those facts.\textsuperscript{101}

Spykman is also well known as the Rimland theorist. He identified the “inner crescent” in Mackinder’s theory as the “Rimland”, the geopolitical area holding the key to global domination as he explained;

“The Rimland of the Eurasian land mass must be viewed as an intermediate region, situated...between the heartland and the marginal seas. It functions as a vast buffer zone of conflict between sea power and land power. Looking in both directions, it must function amphibiously and defend itself on land and sea.”\textsuperscript{102}

In his account, the maritime region around Eurasia is seen as “the great circumferential maritime highway of the world.” The oceans, due to modern technology and advanced means of navigation and communication, are “not barriers but highways.”\textsuperscript{103} Hence his formula was “whoever rules the Rimland commands Eurasia, and whoever rules Eurasia commands the world.”\textsuperscript{104}

III. CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

Introduction

The body of work, which aims to revisit and unpack the foundational assumptions of classical geopolitics that has developed since the 1980s can be described as critical geopolitics. This

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} SPYKMAN, H. J. (1944), p.43.
strand provides a framework of analysis for the relationship between territoriality and politics. It assumes, in the words of Muller, that classical geopolitical reasoning constructs, administers, and organizes space through language.\textsuperscript{105} Muller defines critical geopolitics as the examination of “the very construction and social effects of geopolitical imaginations and geopolitical identities- the imaginary spatial positioning of people, regions, states and the shifting boundaries that accompany this positioning”\textsuperscript{.106} As such, this rather new approach tries to better understand the cultural origins, biases and theoretical limitations of classical geopolitics.\textsuperscript{107} Geopolitics and geopolitical knowledge \textit{per se} is not taken-for-granted as innocent, objective and impartial. To the contrary, classical geopolitics is criticized for envisaging geographical determinism and justifying imperial hegemony and superiority of Western European civilization. Instead of being a descriptive term intended to cover the study of foreign policy and grand statecraft, geopolitics is re-conceptualized as a form of political discourse.\textsuperscript{108} It is, what Toal calls, “a culturally and politically varied way of describing, representing and writing about geography and international relations.”\textsuperscript{109} In this context, production of geopolitical knowledge is itself problematized and treated as an essentially contested political activity.\textsuperscript{110}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{107} BORDONARO, F., \textit{Rediscovering Spykman in Exploring Geopolitics} website, (consulted on March 22, 2012), available \url{http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Publication_Bordonaro_Federico_Rediscovering_Spykman_Rimland_Geography_Peace_Foreign_Policy.html}
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{footnotesize}
This is why the naturalist approach in classical geopolitics, namely claiming a neutral gaze on geopolitical reality is heavily criticized.\textsuperscript{111} Geopolitics in the new strand of thought is understood as “a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas.”\textsuperscript{112} Therefore, an underlying claim is that geopolitical discourses are all human constructions, biased and in service of those who construct them. Subsequently, geopolitics is construed as prejudiced with power. The critical approach “involves deconstructing the ways in which political elites have depicted and represented places in their exercise of power”.\textsuperscript{113} It tries to deconstruct “the hegemonic fixations of spatial imaginations”,\textsuperscript{114} thus deconstructs the supposedly “objective” geopolitical knowledge and exposes the power-knowledge relationship behind these constructions. In a nutshell, the post-structuralism embedded in critical geopolitics necessitates closer scrutiny and critical self-reflection on the power relations involved in the socio-cultural construction of geopolitical knowledge.

**Centrality of Discursive Analysis**

The theoretical underpinnings of critical geopolitics are usually traced back to the writings of Michel Foucault on the archaeology of knowledge. Modern day scholars such as Agnew, Toal, Dodds and Dalby base their analysis on Foucault’s critical and deconstructive approach whereby the objectivity of geopolitical knowledge is problematized. Foucault’s strong call for a closer scrutiny of the power/knowledge nexus in discourse is the starting point in critical analysis. As such, the broad assertion that there is no knowledge separable from the processes of power is strongly embraced in critical thinking. In the words of Toal and Agnew,  

\textsuperscript{111} TOAL, G. (1996).  
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
“geopolitical writing is a highly ideological and deeply politicized form of analysis”. 115 As such, “it produces knowledge to aid the practice of statecraft (foreign policy) and further the power of the state”. 116 Therefore, critical geopolitics is an attempt to “problematicize theoretical enterprise that places the existing structures of power and knowledge in question”. 117 The research agenda of critical geopolitics is about critiquing geopolitical discourses in order to understand why and how they are constructed the way they are to supplement certain agendas.

Hence, this new approach to geopolitics is more discourse oriented. It understands geopolitics as a form of political discourse of power and space. It is through discourses that spatial, cultural and political boundaries are created in defining “self” in the face of a threatening “other”. Discourses in this understanding are not merely texts, speeches and images but are language, ideas and practices which articulate, limit and position subjects. According to Bialasiewicz et al. “discourses refer to a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible”. 118 Discourses are thus linguistic and cartographic constructions which aim to constitute the objects they speak of. One shall not be mistaken, however, that if policy makers thought differently of the world, it would be become different. Critical inquiry’s concern with discourse does not involve a denial of the world’s existence or the significance of materiality. 119 In this context, discourses are conceptualized not only as language (discursive) but also as language and practice (performative). 120 Discursive signification, i.e. communicative construction of

116 Ibid.
meaning in a system of signification, lies deeply beneath critical analysis in geopolitics. It is not simply descriptive but normative and institutive. In other words, discursive representations and practice at the same time constitute ontological effects. Through reiterated practices discourse produces effects of which it names.\textsuperscript{121} Recitation and reiteration as limitations/enablers on policy reveal the importance of discourses in constituting geopolitical/geographical imaginations of policymakers and (foreign and security) policies that are followed accordingly.

As noted by \textbf{Toal} and \textbf{Agnew}, there are four general observations about geopolitical discourses and political elites.\textsuperscript{122} First is that “simply describing a foreign policy problem is implicitly and tacitly normalizing a particular version of the world. To designate a place is to open up a field for possible taxonomies and trigger a series of narratives, subjects and appropriate foreign policy responses”. As written by Said, merely to designate an area as ‘Islamic’ is to designate an implicit foreign policy”.\textsuperscript{123} Likewise, to designate an area/country in the West brings along a different set of foreign policy options. Secondly, most geopolitical reasoning is practical rather than formal. Practical geopolitics is related to policy making and using geopolitical reasoning as a means of justifying concrete foreign policy actions. As such, there is a strong relation between how foreign policy discourses are practiced and geographies are imagined. It relies on narratives and binary distinctions found in societal mythologies,\textsuperscript{124} which are self-ascribed. The third is that geographical knowledge has a reductive nature which is filtered and suppressed to fit into simple geographical categories. Geopolitical reasoning actively suppresses the complex geographical reality of places in favour of simpler and controllable geopolitical abstractions.\textsuperscript{125} Fourthly, political elites in the core states have disproportionate influence on the constitution of dominant geopolitical

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid, p.194.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid, p. 195
\end{flushleft}
discourse. It does not mean however that geopolitical reasoning by the dominant power of peripheral or semi peripheral states remains unchallenged.

**Types of Geopolitical Discourses**

Critical geopolitics on micro and macro levels can be understood as consisting of geopolitical discourses and geopolitical cultures. Geopolitical discourses can be defined as public articulations and narrative codifications of the elements that make up a geopolitical culture.\(^{126}\) It is possible to identify three areas of study in critical geopolitics. These are formal (the way intellectuals of statecraft -academics mostly- study geopolitics), popular (ordinary people) and practical (foreign policy elite) geopolitics. It is possible sometimes that “practical” serves “formal” and “popular” while “formal” has “practical” ramifications. The boundaries among the three categories are not fixed but rather intermingled. Such categorization nevertheless merits benefit for analysis.

This research is closest to practical geopolitics which also carries inroads to the realm of formal geopolitics. Practical geopolitics is what Dodds and Atkinson call “everyday practice of statecraft whereby the world is spatialized into regions with imagined attributes and characteristics—leading to a mosaic of places of ‘danger’, ‘threat’, or ‘safety’ that underpins foreign policy.”\(^{127}\) For the purposes of this study, the narratives used by politicians, practitioners and intellectuals are the focal points of analysis. They are the ones through whom geopolitical representations are articulated in an attempt to set the limits and possibilities on foreign policy choices as well as to justify them.

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How geopolitical discourse shapes and is shaped by foreign policy is a major theoretical question. Nevertheless it is clear that these two are densely intertwined. As argued by Painter, it is through discourse that (foreign policy) is made meaningful and justified.\textsuperscript{128} Therefore, geopolitical representations of world politics (and one’s place in it) as manifested in geopolitical discourses help constitute and legitimize foreign policy behaviour. Thus, geopolitical representations are instrumental in informing which policy options shall be preferred over others.

Toal notes that a \textbf{geopolitical story-line} is “a relatively coherent foreign policy narrative and argument about a policy challenge that is defined in debate by competing antagonistic story-lines. They are discursively fashioned from geographical imaginations, traditions, visions and other aspects of geopolitical culture. In a debate, they help delimit the policy space within which a certain issue, event or drama is debated.”\textsuperscript{129}

The end product that is reflected in the geopolitical discourse is called \textbf{geopolitical script}. A geopolitical script is “what foreign policy leaders agree to say and perform publicly about a foreign policy question”,\textsuperscript{130} as defined by Toal. He argues that, geopolitical script is a formulaic and diplomatic way of speech acting that sometimes articulates one geopolitical storyline to the exclusion of others but sometimes deliberately chooses not to decide between them and acts in a manner that retains ambiguity, flexibility and superficiality in making foreign policy.


\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Ibid.} p.94
Another aspect of geopolitical discourses is **geostrategic discourse**. As stipulated by Toal, it can be understood as a form of geopolitical discourse that makes explicit strategic claims about the material national security interests of the state across a world map characterized by state competition, threats and dangers.\(^{131}\) It is usually culminated by national security bureaucracies. Preoccupied with scenarios of state competition, war fighting, resource scarcity, pervasive danger and insecurity, the national security bureaucracy claims a privileged position for itself beyond established foreign politics on the basis of the claim that it addresses transcendent national interests and existential concerns.\(^{132}\) Toal suggests that geostrategic discourse can be conceived as operating the same way as “**securitization**” in the form of “**geo-strategization**”.\(^{133}\) “It is making a discursive claim that a particular foreign policy crisis or challenge has the locational and transcendent material national interest qualities that make it “strategic”. In this perspective, geostrategic discourse is whatever intellectuals of statecraft and a state’s power structure make of it.”\(^{134}\)

**Concepts of Foreign Policy Analysis**

What critical geopolitics brings to the foreign policy analysis is that traditional constructivism pays less attention to the relationship between power and space in the creation of not only national and sub-national but more so of transnational/geopolitical identity by focusing specifically on the (trans)national dimension of imaginative geographies.\(^{135}\) In terms of foreign policy analysis, “critical geopolitics is thus located within the broader discussion of state sovereignty, spatial representation and identity formation simply because how discourses of representation are formed is central to the writing of foreign policy.”\(^{136}\) As


\(^{132}\) Ibid.

\(^{133}\) Ibid, p.97.

\(^{134}\) Ibid.

\(^{135}\) AL-MAHFEDI, (2011).p.3.

\(^{136}\) DODDS, K.-J. (1994). Geopolitics and Foreign Policy: Recent Developments in Anglo-American Political Geography and International Relations. *Progress in Human Geography Vol. 18*, p.188.
Campbell argues, state identity is a by-product of prevalent geopolitical discourses and foreign policy is performed in response to the threats, whether real or interpretative/representational, to this identity. It is therefore a political practice which plays a principal role in constituting, producing, and maintaining identity in relation to differences/dangers/others.\textsuperscript{137} The way security and national interest are framed thus is informed by geopolitical/geographical imaginations, which are determined by identity perceptions as displayed in discourses.\textsuperscript{138} Identity, security, national interest and foreign policy are interdependently shaped by each other in the process of constructing spatial discursive formations. Therefore, geopolitical scripture translates into an act of drawing mental maps of danger, threat and security in constitution and justification of identities, interests and foreign policy.

As noted by Dodds, these practices of (re)presentation that constitute foreign policy are important in establishing ‘understandings’: ways of seeing, knowing and speaking.\textsuperscript{139} In writing the story of space and foreign policy, conceptual abstractions such as identity, biases and perceptions are equally crucial as material factors like territorial borders, geographical situatedness and proximity. In this process, identity formation is not simply an act of attachment to a culture or civilization. More importantly, identity is spatially formed on the basis of a series of ‘exclusions’, which demarcate the boundaries of the state (domestic-inside) and the international system (external-outside).\textsuperscript{140} In the words of Dodds, critical geopolitics “is concerned as much with maps of meaning as it is with maps of states. The boundary-drawing practices … are conceptual and cartographic, imaginary and actual, social


\textsuperscript{138}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{139}Ibid.

and aesthetic.” Similarly, Campbell argues that “foreign policy, in this understanding, is not so much behaviour across boundaries. It is instead a specific form of boundary producing political performance. Foreign policy, then, is a political performance taking place in a historically carved out social space, and having, amongst its important effects, the constitution and reaffirmation of socially recognizable boundaries separating fields of practice on a global scale.” Foreign policy is not only a physical but also a social boundary-producing practice that enframes the state to contain challenges to the identity which results. As noted by Campbell, it is through this practice that “boundaries are constructed, spaces demarcated, standards of legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of history privileged and alternatives marginalized.” To sum up, foreign policy is about divisions of space and identification of spheres of interest. In this vein, the research agenda of practical geopolitics is twofold; to critically investigate geographical depictions that constitute foreign policy and how the divide between the domestic and the international is actually articulated in foreign policy discourse.

In terms of politics of identity, critical geopolitics renders repetition of themes as an effective method of constructing identity. As Dalby and Dodds note ‘repetition is an important facet of rendering particular understandings "common sense". The ideological production and reproduction of societies can, in part, be understood as the mundane repetition of particular geopolitical tropes which constrain the political imaginary’, and hence limits of bounded rationality for external action.

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144 Ibid. p.226.
Therefore, critical geopolitics does not analyse foreign policy by simply looking at actual practices but at the same time questioning how discursive representations of space are incorporated into foreign policy. That is because, as noted by Agnew and Corbridge, a simple description of a certain foreign policy situation is an act of geopolitics in itself.\textsuperscript{147} In so doing, certain assumptions about other states, peoples and regions are made. As noted by Sapiro, foreign policy is ‘the process of making the foreign or exotic, and thus different from the self, someone or thing. Given the usual esteem within which the self is constituted, the exoticizing of the ‘Other’ almost invariably amounts to the constitution of the ‘Other’ as a less than equal subject.’\textsuperscript{148} Categorizing and labelling space in this manner is an act that brings ideas and visions about that place and policies it follows. Those representations, whether in formal or practical assessments, “play an important role in consolidating elite interpretative schemes and also in constituting political representation of places and peoples.”\textsuperscript{149} By resorting to geopolitical representations, practitioners of statecraft try to legitimize a specific foreign policy position. Those who engage in such an act are as a result exposed to a set of policy possibilities and constraints. The way this spatial representative practice works can be analysed with reference to some key concepts in critical geopolitics as discussed hereafter.

The peculiarity about critical geopolitics is its authoritative rejection of agency-structure dichotomy. Critical scholars are dissatisfied with realist/neo-realist accounts which do not leave any room for human creativity. In this sense, an analysis of state behaviour based solely on the conditioning impact of systemic factors (structure) is not applicable in critical geopolitics. Instead, critical inquiry rests on the transformative ability of human-beings and on the proposition that collective human action leads to historical transformation in the system. As Amineh and Houweling put it;

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{149} DODDS, J.K. (1994). p.189.
\end{quote}
“The representatives of critical geopolitics take state-society relations as the unit of analysis. According to this view state-society complexes come into interaction through their (foreign) polices. By these interactions they create a "system level of social order". Since the mid-19th century, the system-level of social order is characterized by sequential industrialization of state-society complexes.”

Foreign policy practice then is a function of both internal and external dynamics. The internal dynamic is about how the world is spatialized and the place of one’s own self as well as that of others is socially and constructively constituted/represented. This inevitably necessitates a closer scrutiny of domestic distribution of power as it is crucial in understanding whose representative images and discourses of the world are reflected onto foreign policy practice. The external dimension is about the foreign policy practices and geopolitical representations of other (most influential) states in the system.

**a) Geopolitical Culture and Traditions**

Geopolitical culture refers to “interpretative culture and traditions within which a state makes sense of its identity and its encounter with the world of states, and codifies a set of strategies for negotiating that encounter”. In other words, “the geopolitical culture of a state is normally characterized by a series of antagonistic and competing geopolitical traditions that are drawn upon to help write similarly contending geopolitical storylines around foreign policy developments and dramas”. It is conditioned by factors like a state’s geographical situation, historical formation and bureaucratic organization, discourses of national identity

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and traditions of theorizing its relationship to the wider world, and the networks of power that operate within the state.\textsuperscript{153}

As noted by Toal, geopolitical culture is a product of prevalent geopolitical and geographical imaginations, the particular institutional organization and political culture (including geostrategic culture) of a state, and longstanding geopolitical traditions.\textsuperscript{154} It also refers to the cultural and organizational processes by which foreign policy is made.\textsuperscript{155} The role and mission of a state in foreign affairs, and popular perceptions of the danger, foreign policy priorities and security challenges facing a state in world affairs are reflected in its geopolitical culture.\textsuperscript{156} Some states have a strong sense of mission and destiny while others determine their relationship to the world as part of a larger community, e.g. NATO.

In assessing how foreign policy of a state is made, one cannot simply take its national interests for granted. One needs to look deeper into the particular ‘historical block’ or ensemble of practices which interpolate economic, political, ideological, religious and other motivations into what is called geopolitical culture.\textsuperscript{157} This is because, as argued by O’Loughlin, “state leaders and political decision makers can never just ‘read off’ the interests of their state or the meaning of international affairs from their geographical location or objective structures delimiting their state in the interstate system as classical geopolitics implies. Rather, foreign policy decision makers and elites \textit{construct the meaning of international affairs and their state’s interests within the geopolitical culture of their state}.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{155}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156}Ibid.
Geopolitical culture is also about the legitimating myths of a state and how state elites conceptualize their geographical situatedness, historico-cultural inheritance, and geopolitical circumstances within the world.\textsuperscript{159} It helps define friends and foes and how the national interest is evoked in a world of state actors. Though ostensibly an expression of uniqueness, geopolitical cultures are produced by borrowing, adapting, and reworking available discursive formations in the international arena whether mythical, historical, religious or scientific.\textsuperscript{160} It is therefore safe to argue that decision-makers see what is appropriate with reference to storylines embedded in the geopolitical culture they come from. Summarizing this point, O’Loughlin \textit{et. al.} acknowledge that:

\begin{quote}
“geopolitical culture is formed not only by the institutions of a state, its historical experiences and geographical embeddedness, but also by networks of power within society, debates over national identity, prevailing geopolitical (geographical) imaginations, codified geopolitical traditions and the institutional processes by which foreign policy is made in the state.”\textsuperscript{161}
\end{quote}

As defined by O’Loughlin, Toal and Kolossov, \textbf{geopolitical traditions} are the range of relatively formalized and competing schools of geopolitical thought that comprise the ‘high culture’ of a state’s geopolitical culture. Each tradition is a separate strand of thought on state identity, national interest and normative foreign policy priorities.\textsuperscript{162} They compete in interpreting a state’s position in world affairs. In debating each other, these foreign policy philosophies and geopolitical orientations are the building blocks from which intellectuals of statecraft produce particular geopolitical discourses and storylines.\textsuperscript{163} Each tradition can

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{160} \textit{Ibid.}
  \item \textsuperscript{162} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
produce its own narratives and geographical imaginations in stipulating a preferred course of action with regards to interstate affairs in line with how they perceive their state’s position in the world. Existing geographical representations can be taken as starting points and new discourses can be built on these representations. Quite often these two do not entirely contradict. As argued by Mamadouh, past geopolitical reasoning lines are resources for actors. However, they can be assets or liabilities, depending on whether they open or close options for identification with others and consequently for acting capabilities.\textsuperscript{164}

Within critical geopolitics, there is a tendency to use the term “geopolitical traditions" to describe histories of formal geopolitical thought. This however disregards geopolitics that does not explicitly call itself geopolitics.\textsuperscript{165} Beneath most societies there is a culture of hidden geopolitics that codifies ways of construing, representing and practicing discursive spatial formations. In this sense, all major states have well established geopolitical traditions that go back to the very process of state formation and development.\textsuperscript{166} It is therefore possible to identify geopolitical traditions disguised as expressions of geopolitical thought in poetry, philosophy or other artistic and literary fields.

As emphasized by Toal, taking geopolitical culture as the object of analysis enables avoiding two common misinterpretations of geopolitics: that it is based upon and responds to “the permanent realities of geography" or that it is an idiosyncratic product of an individual politician or academic.\textsuperscript{167} It would be misleading to reduce geopolitics to individualized visions with an overly personalized emphasis. To the contrary, geopolitics is always a culturally embedded practice operating across networks of power and needs to be approached as a field of competing geopolitical constructions vying to describe the conditions within which states operate and what normative strategy best realizes state and

\textsuperscript{165} TOAL, G. O (2004). p.89.
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Ibid.}
national interests.\textsuperscript{168} Toal also underscores that studying geopolitics as culture, therefore, “is a much sounder ontological position for it reifies neither the ‘economic’ nor the ‘political’ but postulates a dialectical (interconnected) relationship between the two within the historical context of particular signifying practices.”\textsuperscript{169} Foreign policy elites are located within a larger geopolitical culture and set of imaginative geographies (geopolitical and geographical imaginations) that create possibilities and constraints upon individual geopolitical entrepreneurship.\textsuperscript{170} As such, geopolitical and geographical imaginations, geopolitical traditions and geopolitical culture are densely interwoven in an attempt to formulate best strategies in the face of a domestic and international audience.

\section*{b) Geopolitical Imaginations}

Modern \textbf{geopolitical imagination}, as to distinguish from geographical imagination, is historically and geographically constructed discourses, which Agnew posits that “provide meaning, and rationalization to practice by political elites.”\textsuperscript{171} As such, it relates to geopolitical meta-schemes that divide the world into large swaths of territory according to some a political formula. In other words, it is a way of seeing, labelling and identifying the totality of the world.

One of the earliest systematic critiques of classical geopolitics is provided by John Agnew in “\textit{Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics}”.\textsuperscript{172} In his work, which is one of first of its kind, Agnew identifies three types of geopolitics that are reflective of modern geopolitical imaginations. These are civilizational, naturalized and ideological geopolitics.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{168} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{169} \textit{TOAL, G. Ó.} (1986). p.83.
\item \textsuperscript{170} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{172} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
During the early epoch (1815-1875) in European history, geopolitics was employed without making an overt reference to the academic discipline. This was named the **civilizational geopolitics** of the early era, characterized in the words of Agnew “by a commitment to European uniqueness as a civilization.”\(^{173}\) It emerged as a reaction to the chaos of the wars of religion through which Arab and Ottoman threats created loyalty to Respublica Christiana.\(^{174}\) The geographical realm of Europe was thus transformed into a cultural area. The world was rather simplistically divided into two, Europe and the Rest, in terms of cultural peculiarities. This gave rise to a feeling of European superiority as the most civilized and best governed of all the world regions, the former being the homeland of civilization while the latter of a colonial, peripheral, inferior and frontier character. As argued by Agnew, “outside this realm was an immense space of primitive and decadent political forms”\(^{175}\) that very well deserved European domination, hegemony and subjugation. Therefore, on very categorical and simplistic terms, the world was divided into civilized and not-so-civilized cultural spaces. Geopolitics, in this account, as an understanding of civilization and culture was the preordained determinant of state behaviour.\(^{176}\)

Civilizational geopolitics is resurrected in the post-Cold War era with Huntington’s **clash of civilizations** article which later is published as a book.\(^ {177}\) In the midst of an atmosphere of utmost uncertainty towards the future of world politics, he came up with an observation that the days of global ideological rivalry are gone. Upon this he based his thesis that contemporary conflicts will be among civilizations.\(^ {178}\) It was his belief that peoples’ identities have changed dramatically and so did world politics, hence the shape of international political

\(^{173}\)Ibid. p.86-94.


\(^{176}\)Ibid.


\(^{178}\)Ibid. p.22-23.
space through a dominantly cultural reasoning. His way of constructing “us” versus “them” dichotomies is reconfigured along cultural lines.\textsuperscript{179}

The novelty about Huntington’s civilizational geopolitics is that it is not explicitly based on West vs. the Rest type of duality as imbued with the earlier European civilizational discourse despite the fact that most of the discussion about his controversial division of world space took exactly this shape. Instead he proposes a multiplicity of civilizations through which he offers a rather simplistic world view composed of seven or eight civilizations.\textsuperscript{180} Thus ethnic, religious and regional differences are summarized under the broadest cultural entities which are called civilizations. Very broadly in Huntingtonian analysis the most prominent civilizations are Western, Muslim, Orthodox (Christian), Latin American, Japanese, Hindu, Chinese and African. He even developed a map to spatialize the cognitive cultural borders among major civilizations.

Huntington propagates that state behaviour is conditioned upon pursuit of power and wealth in which cultural preferences, commonalities and differences play the most crucial role. Through an over simplistic orientalist discourse, as Said coined the term, he sees the root cause of underdevelopment, authoritarianism and lack of participatory democracy in the underlying characteristics of each culture/civilization,\textsuperscript{181} which are, according to Huntington, at the same time sources of enduring conflict in world politics. Religious differences play a key role in visualizing world politics in such an antagonistic manner. The main causes of civilizational conflict in the post-Cold War era then, argues Huntington, are western universalism, Muslim fundamentalism and the rise of Asian powers. Despite identifying more than one culture and civilization in visualizing the world map, he nonetheless implicitly goes along with traditional binaries in further asserting that future global conflicts will be between


\textsuperscript{180} Ibid. p.34-36.

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid. p.28-29.
the West and the Rest (especially Chinese-Muslim alliance) and local clashes between Muslims and the others.\textsuperscript{182}

The **naturalized geopolitics** that developed in the period from 1875 to 1945 is about the origins of the academic field of geopolitics. In this epoch the dominant Euro-centric modern geopolitical imagination is normalized and naturalized. Nature and the physical environment of states is thought to constrain and direct state formation, nation building and foreign policy. Western (European) superiority, states as living organisms mentality, social Darwinism on a map, i.e. conceptions of the survival of the fittest and lebensraum, as elaborated earlier, were the key themes in naturalized geopolitics.

The third phase that lasted from 1945 until 1989 was called **ideological geopolitics**. It was with resort to two competing dominant ideologies, communism vs. capitalism that the shape of world politics and global space was determined. Therefore the world was once again spatialized in the form of antagonistic dualities along ideological lines, mostly the capitalist West vs socialist East, with a flavour of non-aligned third world.

As Toal notes, there are four characteristics of modern geopolitical imagination which all concern its Euro-centrism and ethno-centrism.\textsuperscript{183} These are “the seeing of the world as a unified whole that powerful actors must survey and subdue, the operation of a putative ‘view from nowhere’ that normalizes a parochial western gaze as the universal one, the turning of spatial differences into temporal differences (representing other regions as a phase of Europe’s past, for example) and the operation of a state-centric form of reasoning that traps world politics in a territorial-states-in-conflict grid of intelligibility”.\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{182}Ibid. p.255.
\textsuperscript{184}Ibid.
c) Geographical Imaginations

Geopolitical culture encompasses “geographical imaginations”, which in light of the discussion so far can be defined in rather simplistic terms as “boundary drawing practices between inside/outside, us/them, national self/foreign other”\(^{185}\), resulting in moral and physical boundaries that divide the world into “our” space and “their” space.\(^{186}\) In other words, “prevalent images, conceptualizations and discourses amongst the general population of where that state is positioned and located within the world’s community of states”\(^{187}\) refers to geographical imagination. Put differently, a mix of popular geopolitics and the geopolitical orientations of a state’s population is what geographical imaginations are.\(^{188}\)

Some of the pertinent questions regarding these imaginations are; “which civilization or cluster of nations is a state believed to belong to? Where in the world is the geopolitical identity of a state located vis-à-vis other states and identities? As such, who are its enemies and potential allies? What means are envisaged to keep and foster existing and potential allies?” In answering these questions, influential groups in the cultural life of a state define that state and nation within the world.\(^{189}\) As such, geographical imagination serves a vital building block of geopolitical culture.

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\(^{188}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{189}\) TOAL, G. O (2004). p.84.
The origin of geographical imagination (or imagined geographies as he uses the term) is usually traced back to Edward Said's famous piece Orientalism (1978). Said, as arguably the first critical geopolitical scholar, had had the strongest imprint on the evolution of critical discipline. As Dodds puts it, "if there is a single text that has influenced the existing critical geopolitics literature more than any other, it is probably Said's Orientalism". His work provided a framework by emphasizing the importance of the representational practices used by political elites to describe foreign affairs. In defining what critical geopolitics aims at, Toal reflects Said's line of argumentation in the following.

"The focus of critical geopolitics is [therefore] on exposing the plays of power involved in grand geopolitical schemes ... Fundamental to this process is the power of certain national security elites to represent the nature and defining dilemmas of international politics in particular ways ... These representational practices of national security intellectuals generate particular 'scripts' in international politics concerning places, peoples and issues. Such 'scripts' then become part of the means by which hegemony is exercised in the international system."

In this context, Said is believed to be the first to challenge and deconstruct fundamental systems of power and knowledge in the field of geopolitics. He creatively invested in earlier studies on myth, power, knowledge, and discourse by the likes of Levi-Straus, Barthes, Derrida, and Foucault in his critique of Orientalist studies. Said revealed the ways in which the Occident (the West) exploited, subordinated and constructed the Orient (the East) through the former's mechanisms of "knowledge" and "understanding". His purpose was to depict the spatial cultural bias in the "Western" world of itself and the "East" through which

191 Ibid. p.517.
geopolitical “knowledge” was used as a means for exercising discursive power. Such power lies in “the ability of Western countries to create particular understandings of the rest of the world, or classify weaker countries and their inhabitants.”\(^{193}\) This knowledge is usually unquestioned because it is reflected as uncontestably objective. “The authority of the knowledge given that it is largely unquestioned or countered by alternative images, allows for, or demands, particular foreign policy stances toward particular countries.”\(^{194}\) As argued by Flint, this is a two-way process. While portraying non-Westerners as “backward” and “uncivilized,” etc., Western countries and their geopolitical practices were painted, for self-consumption, as the exact opposite: “modern,” “the bearers of civilization,” etc., and hence the “natural” rulers of the globe.\(^{195}\) This self-portrayal was used to justify acts of oppression and hegemonic rule against non-Westerners.

Said thus tried to expose why geopolitical knowledge in the West did not necessarily reflect ground “truth” but it was produced in a political and cultural environment. All claims to geopolitical knowledge, for Said, then “were historically contingent, situational and incomplete.”\(^{196}\) This is the way in which one sees and understands the world and his/her place in it, as is called “imaginative geographies” or more popularly “geographical imagination”. In Said’s words, imaginative geography is;

“the universal practice of designating in one’s mind a familiar space which is “ours” and an unfamiliar space beyond “ours” which is “theirs”... this practice ‘help[s] the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away”\(^{197}\)


\(^{194}\) Ibid.

\(^{195}\) Ibid.


In this context, portraying the East as backward, uncivilized, primitive, barbaric, child-like and permanently disadvantaged vis-à-vis the West is at best dubious in terms of scientific objectivity. It is however a well-established geopolitical claim helping in the formation of European identity to differentiate it from the new worlds, and informs the set of policy choices any political leader finds before him/her in conducting foreign policy. Even today certain places such as the Middle East and Afghanistan are treated as permanent sources of danger and threat and, thus clearly “the other” as opposed to the “Western self” in modern geopolitical discourse.

Imaginative geography then is a means of geopolitical identity construction which equates spatial distance with cultural, ethnic and social difference, associating the non-spatial characteristics of ‘self’ and ‘other’ with particular places. 198

Contrary to classical geopolitics by which wise men of statecraft design grand strategies of power, critical geopolitics deals with spatial practices of statecraft both material and representational. Since geopolitics today is about world politics with a particular emphasis on state competition and geographical dimensions of power, to study geopolitics one must study discourse (on especially spatial representations). 199 Geopolitics in this sense is reconceptualised as a discourse that contributes to the cultural construction of the global geopolitical map. Thus, geopolitics analyses geopolitical culture, geographical imaginations, geopolitical visions and the resultant geopolitical discourses. Constructing a national community within demarcated boundaries involves construction of national identity, drawing boundaries between inside and outside and thus creating “self” and “other”, producing national history, and projection of a visual order of space such as national maps. Critical

geopolitics analyses all these factors. Table 1 below summarizes the theoretical discussion provided so far.

Table 1. Concepts in Critical Geopolitics

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Geopolitical Visions</th>
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<td>Geopolitical/geographical imagination is a reflection of the geopolitical vision of a country’s leaders (and its people), borrowing the latter term from D. Newman and S. Peters. In this</td>
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sense, geographical vision embodies representations of a country’s territorial limits, its geopolitical codes and national mission. In other words, geopolitical vision determines to a large extent what kind of geographical imagination a country will have. “Any idea concerning the relation between one’s own country and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a mission or foreign policy advantage” refers to geopolitical visions. In his analysis, Dijkink identifies five elements that are expected of a geopolitical vision.

- Some justification of the naturalness of the territorial borders or a core area reinforcing national unity,
- A geopolitical code (a list of friendly and hostile nations),
- A model to follow or to reject (a state to emulate),
- A national mission (such as imperialism),
- And assumptions about impersonal forces (such as modernization or free enterprise).

Dijkink’s concept of geopolitical vision, aside from the notion of geopolitical code, overlaps with the theoretical discussion on geopolitical culture. Therefore, this research takes the understanding offered by Toal with reference to the work of Gerry Kearns which posits geopolitical visions as perceptions of the world. Geopolitical visions refer to discursive accounts of the reorganization of world space and the emergence of a new world political map by the intellectuals of statecraft. Geopolitical visions are “wish posing as analysis”, i.e. normative pictures of the world. This is how powerful states construct the world political

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202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
map in ways that conform with their imaginings of it even as their practices contradict the
moral order they espouse. In other words, these are normative claims about the prevalent
geopolitical order or how it should be.

e) Geopolitical Codes

Ideas bear the capacity to shape foreign policy provided that they are coherently structured.
Geopolitical codes are as such defined as a set of strategic assumptions by Gaddis that
underlie foreign policy making. Geopolitical codes comprise of “a definition of a state’s
interests, an identification of external threats to those interests, a planned response to such
threats and a justification of that response”. In other words, it is how a country orients itself
towards the world. Geopolitical codes are comprised of five calculations.

- Identifying current and potential allies
- Identifying current and potential enemies
- Defining the means of maintaining current allies and fostering new ones
- Defining the means of facing existing and emerging enemies
- Representing the practices in the points above to domestic and global audiences.

Geopolitical codes provide important clues for the geopolitical component of belief systems.
They are therefore important analytical tools for understanding foreign policy behaviour.
As put by Taylor and Flint, a number of calculations are considered while formulating a country’s

211 Ibid.
212 Ibid, p.56.
International Interactions. 17, p.5.
geopolitical codes. These are identifying current and potential allies and enemies, and determining how the country can maintain its alliances and nurture potential allies, identifying how it can counter current enemies and emerging threats, and, finally, determining how it can justify the above-mentioned calculations to the public, and to the global community.\footnote{TAYLOR, P. J., & FLINT, C. (2000). Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality. (Harlow, Prentice Hall).p.62.}

Geopolitical codes reflect perceptions of identity including a country’s natural friends and enemies, about the essence of external threat perceptions, major international problems and how to deal with them.\footnote{GÜNEY, A. & GÖKCAN, F. (2010). The “Greater Middle East” as a “Modern Geopolitical Imagination” in American Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, 15, p. 24.} Geopolitical codes evaluate places and are the spatial expressions of geopolitical efforts to transform “a global space into fixed perspectival scenes”.\footnote{LUKE, T. & TOAL, G. “Global Flowmations, Local Fundamentalisms and Fast Geopolitics:” in HEROD, A., TOAL, G., & ROBERTS, S. M. (1998). An Unruly World?: Globalization, Governance, and Geography. London, Routledge, p.72-94.} In a way, geopolitical codes are the instruments by which decision-makers give meaning to their location in the world, determine their friends and foes, decide what set of relationships to have with others and how to justify (to domestic and international audience) the preferred course of action towards other countries.

These codes are not necessarily permanent but subject to change. They can change radically over a rather limited period of time. Radical changes in geopolitical codes are sometimes attestable to perceived foreign policy failure. But more often than not, change in geopolitical codes is due to an alteration in elite perceptions. Geopolitical codes can also be left or replaced by new ones in foreign policy discourse without an apparent structural
explanation.\textsuperscript{217} The reason behind change, as it appears, is not only the external milieu (environment) but also what policy makers imagine the external milieu to be.\textsuperscript{218}

The roles of identity, associated belief systems and national myths are important in determining a country’s geopolitical codes. The visualization of one’s own country and its position in relation to others is formed with reference to certain national myths, which form the basis for geopolitical codes.\textsuperscript{219} The fact that enemies are portrayed as barbaric or evil is tailored for the immediate situation, but it is based upon stories deposited in national myths that are easily accessible to the general public.\textsuperscript{220} This is important for mobilizing public support for foreign policy choices since ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy are emphasized. Geopolitical codes require “them vs. us” kind of dichotomy and emotional attachment to a place.\textsuperscript{221} In this way, ideological reference to national values, as well as to strategic concerns about resources and economics, become important in the formation of geopolitical visions.\textsuperscript{222}

To indicate the difference between the two, as put forward by Flint, a geopolitical code is more dynamic - it changes with changing circumstances – and is the product of state elites. It is an outcome of daily foreign policy calculations. A geopolitical vision on the other hand is the understanding of a state’s national history, character, or even destiny that is more stable and

\textsuperscript{217} HULIARAS, A., & TSARDANIDIS, C. (2006). (Mis)understanding the Balkans: Greek Geopolitical Codes of the Post-communist Era. Geopolitics. 11, p.466.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., p. 58.
\textsuperscript{221} DIJKINK, G. (1996). p.11.
is rooted in popular sentiment. The vision is the foundation that is mobilized to 'make sense' of the code.223

Table 2. Geopolitics as Culture: Key Concepts224

Domestic Distribution of Power, Geopolitical Culture and Imagination

As elaborated so far, in contrast to traditional geopolitics, critical geopolitics is not only about the impact perceptions of physical geography bears on foreign policy but on the analysis and deconstruction of geographical imaginations and arguments used to justify foreign policy positions. These discourses are constructed by intellectuals and practitioners of statecraft and thus reflect their gaze towards the world. Therefore, critical inquiry has to acknowledge


the workings of power networks in shaping the prevailing forms of geopolitical discourse in a state.\textsuperscript{225}

As argued by Toal, the geopolitical culture of a state is, among other factors, conditioned upon the particular institutional organization and design of foreign policy bureaucracies.\textsuperscript{226} Conflicts between and within the ministries of foreign affairs and defence sometimes produce a geopolitical culture that is powered by division and contradictory impulses and drives.\textsuperscript{227} A crucial feature having a decisive impact on a state’s geopolitical culture pertains to the way domestic power is distributed, i.e. how the foreign policy process works and who gets to make decisions.\textsuperscript{228} As argued by Toal, geopolitical discourses (and geopolitical culture) and social structures of power within states are closely interrelated.\textsuperscript{229} Therefore, fully grasping the operation of power not only necessitates an analysis of power struggles between states, as stipulated in the realist school, but also examination of the domestic sources of social power.

Following the sociological model developed by Michael Mann, societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power.\textsuperscript{230} These are overlapping networks of social interaction and organizations as well as institutional means of attaining certain goals.\textsuperscript{231} Mann identifies four bases of social power; political (party leaders and politicians, etc.), ideological (political parties, mass media, think tanks, religious institutions etc.), economic (business) and military (security and defence structures).\textsuperscript{232}

\textsuperscript{226}Ibid. p.7
\textsuperscript{228}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{231}Ibid. p.2
a) Political power is the centralized territorial regulation of social life by a state bureaucratic complex. As part of the complex, security forces exercise coercive power in enforcing the law. Those in control enjoy considerable power not only in areas like taxation and rules of capital accumulation but also in determining whose/which geopolitical representations are reflected in practice.

b) Ideological power is the power to shape, formulate and mobilize the values, norms and rituals that characterize human life. It derives from the need to impose meaning on the world. It is the power to steer culture in certain directions, to shape what values are predominant, what norms are to be considered legitimate and what rituals are to characterize the life of the community. When an individual or group monopolizes meaning in a community, it is a source of substantial discursive power. Besides, ideologies provide common norms that are necessary for collective cooperation. Ideologies thus increase the collective power of certain social groups over others. Ideological power is predominantly diffused, commanding through persuasion. Transcendentally an ideology may diffuse through the boundaries of economic, military and political power organizations.

c) Economic power is the power vested within the circuits of production, distribution, exchange and consumption in society. This is conceptualized in the Marxist sense in propagating that classes emerge out of the relations among different social groups in relation to the means of production, i.e. class-based analysis. The argument is that the dominant economic class controlling the means of production wields considerable amount of power. This is not however giving primacy to economics over other sources of power.

d) Military power is the power that comes from the organization of security and defence in a state. It resides with the military elite who run various state bureaucracies that are charged with national security. In some instances, military elites can take over the state apparatus or become future state leaders because
the role of military is considered so vital to the existence of a state and due to their perceived leadership qualities.\textsuperscript{\ref{233}}

These sources of social power produce different institutions in society. In this context, ideologies may create churches, mosques, and solidarity organizations; different economic classes can create their respective associations and have links to different media outlets; the need for physical defence brings about military structures and so forth.\textsuperscript{\ref{234}} These organized groups in a society may stand united in the face of a perceived external threat. But other than that, they do represent different agendas and interests which are articulated on behalf of different segments they represent. Thus, as put by Mann, the struggle to control ideological, economic, military and political power organizations provides the central drama of social development.\textsuperscript{\ref{235}} Societies are then structured primarily by entwined networks of ideological, economic, military and political power.\textsuperscript{\ref{236}}

To pursue their own interest and agendas, all domestic actors involved in social sources of power try to build geopolitical networks amongst like-minded players in order to capture the state apparatus because the rewards are so great.\textsuperscript{\ref{237}} In so doing, these social sources of power interact with each other and form entwined structural networks of power.\textsuperscript{\ref{238}} Hence, the interplay among power networks determines to a large extent which geopolitical tradition bears the strongest imprint in determining what type of imagination captures a state’s foreign policy agenda.

\textsuperscript{\ref{233}} This structure is barrowed from TOAL, G., DALBY, S., & ROUTLEDGE, P. (2006).p.10.
\textsuperscript{\ref{235}} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{\ref{236}} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{\ref{237}} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{\ref{238}} Ibid. p.11.
In this context, geopolitics *per se* is not a contest of ideas produced by free floating intellectuals in which truthful and intellectually superior arguments triumph over mendacious, flawed and weak ones.\textsuperscript{239} To the contrary, geopolitical discourses are merely a by-product of networks of power and reflect the influence of prevalent power structures,\textsuperscript{240} as remarked by Toal. In the end, it is the geopolitical scripts of the dominant power networks that are performed by a country’s elite. The purpose of the practical strand of critical geopolitics is to render the relations of power embedded in geopolitical discourses visible and manifest.\textsuperscript{241} After all, the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse.\textsuperscript{242} It is following the path of Foucault in trying to document how structures of power in society create structures of (geopolitical) knowledge that justify their own power and authority over subject populations.\textsuperscript{243} This is a crucial premise in this research.

**IV. GEOPOLITICS AS A COMBINED FRAMEWORK TO INFORM FOREIGN POLICY**

In light of the theoretical discussion so far, employing geopolitics as a framework of analysis reflects a combination of the following in foreign policy choices.

**A compelling geopolitical narrative, reflective of a geographical imagination:** In making sense of one’s geography, it is imperative to develop a distinct geographical imagination by highlighting the boundaries between “in” and “out”, identifying threats and dangers as well as a list of enemies and allies, and the ways to handle threats while forging and consolidating alliances without disregarding national role conceptions. Geopolitical knowledge grounded


\textsuperscript{243}Ibid.
upon space-based analysis will then allow for a compelling case for policy action. In this manner, the most striking aspect of geopolitical knowledge is its function as a source of policy initiation, consolidation and legitimization.

**Wide domestic consensus among sources of social power on geopolitical knowledge as a guide to inform foreign policy:** Geopolitical analysis as a means of informing foreign policy can come in handy to a variety of actors. Political parties, armies, business associations, media, think tanks, influential academic circles and universities can all be sources of geopolitical knowledge. The crucial question remains how to translate one’s geopolitical agenda into policy practice. In advanced democracies, convincing a state’s foreign policy bureaucracy (state department, ministry of defence and/or the army) or at least a significant portion of it is a must. In this respect, having holders of political power on one’s side is an indispensable requirement. As discussed earlier, legitimization is an aspect one cannot simply put aside in geopolitics. In this regard, political parties, mass media, think tanks, religious institutions etc. all play an important role. Having a considerable fragment of the business community behind a geopolitical project is also a valuable asset but not an absolute necessity.

**Presence of charismatic leaders:** Basing foreign policy action on geopolitics involves a lot of convincing, influencing and opinion management. It is useful to have leaders with developed oratory skills to sway people’s minds towards a certain direction both at home and in the forward theatres of policy action. This is all the more important if a country with relative disadvantage in the international system is trying to challenge established behavioural patterns. In this case, not only the public and opinion leaders at home need to be persuaded but also publics and the elite at large in the dominant systemic actors. It must also be remembered that projecting an attractive self-image through public diplomacy is of paramount importance in terms of winning the hearts and minds of those towards whom a country’s policies are aimed at.
A favourable geopolitical environment: Institutions such as think tanks, universities, media outlets, religious institutions, etc. operating locally, regionally and internationally help invaluably in justifying and legitimizing proposed policy choices by a state through their writings, declarations and discourses. This is because geopolitical knowledge as a means of foreign policy is not only declaratory but also performative and constitutive. It is only through iteration and reiteration that old/new meanings are attributed to space. Based on such attributions, established/suggested roles are ascribed to a state. Through these constituted and re-constituted meanings, behavioural patterns are expected of a country which are made legitimate and justified by institutions that operate in the ideological sphere.
CHAPTER 2 - TURKEY’S GEOPOLITICAL CULTURE

I. INTRODUCTION

Ideas, as in many other disciplines of life, are extremely important in shaping foreign affairs. They are particularly useful in understanding policies and policy change. After all, a policy in foreign affairs can be construed as embodiment of ideas about states, countries, the international system and the structured relationships among them. As noted by Goldstein and Keohane, “ideas influence foreign policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide roadmaps that increase actors’ clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium”. Hence, an understanding of the belief systems or ‘assumptive worlds’ of political actors can contribute to an explanation of external action and behaviour. Based on the images of one’s own self and its territoriality as well as of the images of other actor’s spaces; prescriptions about proper courses of action are appropriated.

The case of modern Turkey is no exception. A most striking aspect of the foreign policy choices Turkey makes, which is rather insufficiently studied in the literature, is the overwhelming influence of “geography/space” based reasoning. As in many other states, identity formation in the early Republican era was the outcome of a space-based series of

exclusions that virtually demarcated the boundaries between “in/out”, “internal/external”, “self/other”, “us/them”, “our space/ theirs”, etc. Thus the initial orientation of Turkish foreign policy was inextricably premised upon the geopolitical reasoning and spatial representations developed upon the discourses by the founder of the state, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Such a choice was due to a distinct geopolitical mentality which culminated in a deliberate westernist foreign policy orientation. But conceptions about Turkey’s territoriality were not singlehanded. In different contexts, spatial reasoning kept influencing Ankara’s external policies in different ways.

II. TURKISH GEOPOLITICAL CULTURE

The newly emerging literature on the practice of geopolitics in Turkey claims that as a separate discipline informing foreign and security policy, it has come into circulation during the Second World War through a series of articles published in newspapers.247 Pointing out that geopolitics in the classical sense is borrowed from the writings of German geopoliticians like Haushofer, such studies tend to emphasize the role of the Turkish military by virtue of its command over the discipline.

However, before anyone used the term geopolitics or there was a separate academic discipline called geopolitics, there was a way of thinking geopolitically both in the West248 and in Turkey. In fact, European “civilizational geopolitics” *per se* neither arrived late nor left

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hastily the lands of Turks. It was during the Ottomans’ longest century of decay,²⁴⁹ the 19th century, that the Young Turks movement strongly embraced the European way of seeing the world through cultural and civilizational binaries. As the new Turkish Republic was established under the leadership of a former Young Turk, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the impact of civilizational geopolitics as a means of state and nation building as well as identity and foreign policy formulation was profound as ever. Atatürk no doubt was steeped deep in the western culture but he was not the only one. In fact, both Turkey’s forefathers and their intellectual opponents perceived the world through the prism of European “civilizational geopolitics”. The modern geopolitical imagination that broadly divided world space along civilizational lines, i.e. the East vs. West, created a bipolar image of global space in Turkish geopolitical culture.

Against this bipolar image of the world, locating Turkey geopolitically has never been easy. In this vein, the never ending quest to find answers to questions of “where in the world Turkey belongs to?”, “what identity should the new state have?” and “what do Turkey’s geopolitical location and its geographical surroundings stand for?” dominated the intellectual agenda of the Turkish elite. Without explicitly naming the practice they engaged in geopolitics, the Turkish intelligentsia by disseminating ideas on the whereabouts of Turkey’s place in the international theatre of states laid the foundations of thinking geopolitically in Turkey.

There was a perceivably irreconcilable distance between two distinct geopolitical spaces, the West and the East, symbolizing the developed, civilized and superior, and the less developed worlds respectively. Between these two cultural/civilizational meta-spaces, the Turkish elite sought Turkey’s place, identity, soul, character, orientation and future in world politics. As a result, two different notions, i.e. geographical imaginations, of Turkey competed

²⁴⁹ The original term is borrowed from the book titled Longest Century of the (Ottoman) Empire by Turkish historian İlber Ortaylı, see ORTAYLI, I. (1983). İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (Longest Century of the Empire). İstanbul, Hil Yayın.
for dominance. In the very same way Dalby and Toal point out, the Turkish case was no exception in which "multiple narratives rendered a particular place or (that) state in a number of ways simultaneously." 250

The study of geopolitics in the Turkish case therefore necessitates not only a study of those writings and readings that make an overt reference to the academic field but also a study of those, which perhaps rather unwittingly, engage in geopolitical reasoning, representation, scripting and entrepreneurship. This is because the usually unnoticed impact of "hidden geopolitics" has been as deep as its overt akin in Turkey. Moreover, focusing on the physical qualities of space in the Turkish case without considering the broader culture of geopolitics would at best be tentative and inadequate. Analysing such impact therefore involves placing geopolitical thinking, representations and practices in time, place and within a geopolitical tradition because context usually defines content in foreign policy. It is only through the study of the different historical means by which Turkish intellectuals (and not only practitioners) made sense of the global political space as well as Turkey's territoriality that one can understand how international politics was spatialized in Turkey as "a world characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas" 251 upon which foreign policy strategies were drawn up.

It is worth mentioning at the outset that Turkey's geopolitical culture has been largely shaped by the experience of replacing the Ottoman Empire. Losing an empire of nearly 600 years with territorial outreach in three continents was so traumatic an event that Turkish people suffered an identity crisis (a crisis arguably still relevant today) as well as ensuing feelings of insecurity. The latter stemmed from facing near extinction after the First World War. As part of this "post-imperial trauma", Turks found it rather hard to adjust to the loss of large swaths

of territory as well as to the prestige and leverage once enjoyed in the wider Muslim world. The impact of such a profound transition inevitably necessitated a recalibration of foreign policy in accordance with the new geopolitical conditions.

The critical question was whether Turkey would identify itself with the Ottoman heritage including a special connection with ex-Ottoman territories and its geopolitical legacy (leader and protector of the Muslim world, etc.) or would Turkey be organized as a nation-state associating its future solely in the West? As a result, two distinct geopolitical traditions produced different geographical imaginations and discourses with regards to the whereabouts of Turkey's global location, meaning of the geographies around Turkey and how its external relations, especially with the new states established in its ex-territories, should be operationalized.

Thus, subsequent years witnessed relentless efforts by two competing schools of thought, Kemalism and Conservatism, to ascribe Turkey a new position and a new identity in world affairs. Bernard Lewis, a keen observer and analyst of Turkey, calls this "an eternal conflict between pro-Western modernists (Kemalists) and anti-Western traditionalists (Conservatives) although the real picture is always somewhat more blurry. For once the latter seems to have lately embraced some elements such as democracy (if not necessarily pluralism), rule of law (with its limitations), a more liberal approach on human rights, free market, free enterprise, etc. associated with modernity. Likewise, there is no straitjacket notion of Kemalism that fits and explains all its variants. Therefore, this is by no means to deny the possibility of dividing each tradition into subgroups to have a more nuanced


understanding. Nevertheless the merit of such a rather simplistic categorization is that it helps address the dominant geopolitical understandings, reasonings, trends, modes of representation and practice propagated in each strand.

As Hansen contemplates, spatial construction of identity is all about delineation of space and construction of boundaries. The politics of identity employed in Turkey were territorial and spatial within the process of nation and state building. In this line, debates around identity formation focused on signifying boundaries (whether geographical or epistemological, physical or mental) for the sake of maintaining the relevance of geopolitical identities (western vs. eastern) these two traditions constituted. Hence, discourses signifying “others”, “enemies” and “threats” around two competing spaces, the East vs. West, were continuously produced and reproduced. As will be elaborated further, these were temporal as much as geographical and cultural/civilizational spaces represented by common themes of development, progress, modernity, transformation and backwardness. In a way there was a perceivably unspoken time difference between the East and the West, pretty much reflecting the linear conception of history. Constituting an essential component in the construction of these spaces; discourses of danger were mobilized against competing identities. Consequently, distinct sets of policy prescriptions were called for.

Before proceeding further, it is better to identify how these two terms, Kemalism/republicanism and Conservatism, will be used throughout this dissertation. By Kemalism/Kemalists, actors and institutions such as the Turkish military, CHP (Cumhuriyet

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254 It is always possible to add Turkist (nationalist), Islamist (religious) and Ottomanist (conservative-religious) categories to the analysis, for an example see UZER, U. (2011). *Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy the Kemalist Influence in Cyprus and the Caucasus*. London, I.B. Tauris.


Halk Partisi – Republican People's Party), defunct DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti – Democratic Left Party) and SHP (Sosyal Democrat Halkçı Parti – Social Democratic People’s Party), foreign policy bureaucracy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and judiciary will be referred to. This group also includes academics, columnists and other intellectuals subscribing to a Kemalist worldview. What binds such a variety of actors is a strict adherence to “European civilizational geopolitics” and the subsequent Westernist geographical imagination, which aspires to radically transform Turkey after the example of western modernization. At the same time, Kemalism propagates a vocal discourse scripting geopolitical identity of post-Ottoman Turkey in the west (Europe). Hence, Kemalists perceive western modernization of Turkey as a sine qua non for a strong nation state.\(^{258}\) From this flows the westernist orientation of Turkish foreign policy. A strict observance of nationalism, laicism (the French version of secularity) and independence looms large across Kemalists. Discourses attributing alternative geopolitical identities to Turkey (such as those from conservative circles) are approached with extreme caution and scepticism and are usually treated within a national security discourse trying to negate them by emphasizing the risks, threats and challenges posed to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Turkey.

Conservatives on the other hand refer to those elements of Turkish society who are not happy with Kemalists’ disassociation of Turkey from its past, former geopolitical space and geo-cultural heritage which includes religion. What unites them is a strong sense to ‘conserve’ all these olden qualities. Against a western modelled nation state, they propagate a post-imperial Turkey. Retrospectively, conservatives were scattered around political, academic and literary spheres of life and less so in the foreign policy establishment. Lately they are more visible in fields such as business, media, education and health. From 1923 to this day, the intellectual activities of conservatives centred on relating Turkey to three

spaces; a) the wide geography on which Muslims live (the Muslim East) including the Middle East, b) the Turkish speaking world, and c) the West.

The rivalry between these two well-established geopolitical traditions brought about another characteristic of Turkish geopolitical culture, namely domestic competition for power. Adherents of each tradition with an attempt to translate their own imagination into practice formed social networks of power in order to capture the state apparatus and sought broad support across all sources of social power. In this framework, the nature of the Turkish political system, role of the Turkish army and civil-military relations, restructuring of the Turkish economy and subsequent emergence of different social classes inevitably had a crucial influence on Turkey’s geopolitical culture and the character of its foreign policy. Furthermore, the nature of the policy-making process also had a great impact on policy practice. This needs to be conceptualized in relation to civil-military relations, political culture and the command enjoyed by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the most experienced institution over external relations. Lastly, geopolitical/geographical imaginations and practices of other state actors (the US, European countries and states in the Middle East, etc.) significantly shaped Turkish foreign policy.

**Kemalist Geopolitical Tradition**

Vying to re-locate modern Turkey in global affairs with resort to “civilizational geopolitics”, **Kemalism** represents one of the longest lasting geopolitical traditions in modern Turkey. Since the new Turkish nation state established in 1923 was a clear rupture from its Ottoman predecessor, Kemalism represented a geopolitical project of state and nation-building that aims to reformulate Turkey a position and a new identity in international politics by relying on a persistent westernist geopolitical discourse. Kemal Atatürk himself laid the foundations of this tradition and the geographical imagination. This is no doubt the tradition that had the strongest imprint on Turkish foreign policy. The new state established its own intellectuals,
and political and foreign policy elite to help produce (and reproduce) geopolitical discourses to propagate the new imagination to a domestic public which was deeply confused and astounded by long years of war fighting, humiliation and distress. Harbiye (War College) and Mülkiye (Civil Service School) played key roles in shaping the upbringing of the new elite. State-sponsored media and academia helped disseminate westernist discourse as a legitimate choice. A deliberate attempt at creating a loyal commercial-industrial bourgeoisie and middle class was also part of the Kemalist project. Thus subsequent revolutionary effort lead by Mustafa Kemal was a top-down process of formal, popular and practical geopolitical entrepreneurship.

a) Westernist Imagination

Coming from the ranks of the Young Turks movement of the late Ottoman period, Turkey's new leaders were, when it came to East-West (or as what Said later coined the Orient-Occident) relations, prone to the premises of civilizational geopolitics. In devising a new “self” in the face of a threatening “other”, storylines were drawn in dividing the world into two. In the very same manner European civilizational geopolitics labelled global spaces, so too did Kemalists come to perceive the world. The West was a cultural area associated with modernity, civilizational superiority and advanced economic and scientific development. It was an idealized notion of the West which mostly depicted Europe (the US as well as the time went by) most positively. The Islamic world represented its exact antonym. In other words, the Muslim world was everything that reform, progress and civilization were not. In this mental process of creating metaphorical binaries, the Muslim East was not capable of the rationality, positivism, progress and modernity that Turkey very much needed. As Andrew

Mango states, the East simply stood for superstition, inefficiency, lethargy, and dubious morals.²⁶⁰

As part of the vigorous geopolitical entrepreneurship Mustafa Kemal and his followers undertook, the most crucial aspect was ascribing a new place in world affairs to Turkey. Succeeding the Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey was, in the mind of Kemalist intelligentsia, neither a Caucasian nor a Middle Eastern country, likewise neither in the Balkans nor belonging to the Turkish speaking world (the latter was not a point of reference because Turkey was against irredentist movements such as those harnessed by Kurds, and hence did not seek ties with the Turkish speaking communities in Soviet Russia). Of all that was left was the West, which Turks fought a war of independence against.²⁶¹

Although only 5% of Turkey’s total landmass is in Europe, the place ascribed by Mustafa Kemal and his followers was based explicitly on a civilizational discourse representing the new state politically, culturally and geographically as part of the West. They defined modern Turkey as a western country in juxtaposition to its Asian or Middle Eastern alternatives²⁶² and thus carefully avoided any association with the Islamic world, the Ottoman legacy or Muslim identity. The western model was defined against the Ottoman and Muslim characteristics as these were thought of espousing the negation, anti-thesis and inverse of the Kemalist project. Supressing these features gave Turkey a new identity which strove to imitate the West. If Kemalist western identity was a positive one, its post-Ottoman conservative alternative (Eastern-Muslim) was clearly negative. In this regard, a strong European vocation was envisioned. The only way seen possible to become a modern and civilized country was

²⁶¹ Turkish historiography portrays Turks as winning a war of liberation against belligerent Greeks as well as against the British, French and Italian occupying forces through a number of battles fought between 1919 and 1922. This notion is produced and reproduced in Turkish history books that are taught as part of the formal curriculum in elementary and high school education.
by being part of Europe not only in geographical but also in political, economic, social, cultural and civilizational terms. Turkey’s new geopolitical “self” thus was western while “them” were associated with those unworthy countries and spaces in the Muslim East. As noted by critical analysts, this was a historical trajectory of Turkey whose past is rooted in the East yet whose future is sought in the West.\footnote{263}

In the effort, civilizational geopolitics was invoked in a somewhat deterministic manner to help justify, normalize and naturalize the firmly westwards orientation of Turkey. The new spatial relocation was simply deemed ‘historically natural and objective’ in shaping Turkey’s geopolitical practices. This was substantiated on the following by Kemal Atatürk.

“It is futile to try to resist the thunderous advance of civilization, for it has no pity on those who are ignorant or rebellious. . . We cannot afford to hesitate any more. We have to move forward… Civilization is such a fire that it burns and destroys those who ignore it. We will take our proper place within the (western) civilizational family.”\footnote{264}

The ideal of the young Republic was to “make Turkey a full-fledged member of the community of western European states on an equal footing.”\footnote{265} Ushered on the ashes of a lost empire, this marked a milestone in the orientation of the Turkish state in which the West constituted the main axis of Turkish foreign policy.

\textit{b) Emulating the West}

\footnote{265}\textsc{AKŞIN, A.} (1991). \textit{Atatürk’ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasi\textsc{\textemdash} [Atatürk’s Foreign Policy Principles and Diplomacy]}. Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.
Once relocated, radical western modernization constituted the *raison d’être* of Turkey and its foreign policy. Emulating the experiences of the West in an attempt to modernize, prosper and develop was set as the ultimate national goal. In a way, this project was thought to bring Turkey back to “civilization”, “development” and “strength” in the form of an express desire to be on *a par* with contemporary (western) civilization. 266 As Karaosmanoğlu puts it, “Turkey vied to join the West in spite of the West”. 267 The following words of Kemal Atatürk, uttered as tough negotiations took place with western powers at Lausanne Conference in 1923, epitomized this understanding. 268

“The West has always been prejudiced against Turkey... But we Turks have always and consistently moved towards the West. In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative.” 269

In order to survive and thrive, Turkey sought to “embrace and internalize all cultural dimensions that made Europe modern”. 270 Bozdağlıoğlu notes that “Turkey deliberately chose a complete adoption of western ways and abolition of all old institutions” 271 while Zürcher argues that “with Kemalist reforms Turkey tried to separate the links with its Middle Eastern neighbours by de-emphasizing its Ottoman past and its historical, cultural and religious links to the Middle East.” 272

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266 ATATÜRK, M.K (1933). Address on the Occasion of Tenth Year Anniversary of the Turkish Republic, available at [http://www.columbia.edu/~sss31/Turkiye/ata/onuncuyil.html](http://www.columbia.edu/~sss31/Turkiye/ata/onuncuyil.html) (consulted on April 16, 2012)
In this way, a transition was envisaged from Turkey being part (and arguably the centre) of the Islamic world to Turkey which would become part (even if it meant being on the margins) of the West by organizing as a nation-state around the new concept of Turkishness. The new domestic order was strictly secular, nationalist and western. This project foresaw a homogeneous, laicist (French version of secularism that calls for a strict separation between politics and religion), non-class based national unity, oppressing differences in Turkish society. The aim was to create a new state, a new society and a new individual modelled after the West as part of the eventual projection of formulating a new geopolitical identity in the global political space for Turkey in order to reach the imagined status of equality with the superior West.

**c) Naturalness of Turkey’s Borders**

It is widely recognized that with the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in July 1924, modern Turkey emerged as a sovereign and independent state. This treaty virtually carved up the territories which make up today’s Turkey. It signifies the territorial transition from an empire to a new nation state because by Lausanne boundaries with Greece, Bulgaria, Syria and Iraq were delimited. Turkey formally gave up any claim on the Dodecanese Islands and territories on the Arabian Peninsula such as Yemen and Hejaz. Thus, Syria (including Alexandretta) and Lebanon were left under French mandate. The UK gained control over Iraq, today’s Palestine, Israel and Jordan (Articles 3, 15, 17 and 20). Turkey renounced all its privileges over Libya and agreed to an internationalized and demilitarized regime on its Straits. In return all capitulations were lifted; Turkey retained a small share of territory in Eastern Thrace (Europe) and gained wide international recognition as the successor state after the Ottoman Empire.

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The importance of Lausanne in terms of geopolitical analysis lies in two dimensions. First of all, Lausanne signifies major concessions from the territorial limits of the new state in contrast to the cartographic vision originally enshrined in the National Pact prepared by Mustafa Kemal and his followers in 1919. The Pact, which was approved in the last session of Ottoman Parliament the next year, was the driving force behind the “liberation effort” that Mustafa Kemal led against western invaders. Defeating the Greek occupation forces in a number of battles between 1919 and 1922 and having scarce military and economic resources to hang onto the war effort, Turks, by Lausanne, were finally ready to make territorial concessions from the homeland they originally envisaged.

Map 1. Borders of Turkey

This is important because despite voluntarily conceding these territories, a psychological phenomenon called Sevres syndrome, dubbed after the never-executed 1920 Carthaginian Treaty of Sevres signed between the last Ottoman Sultan and allied powers dividing up the remaining territories of the empire, kept dominating the subconscious of the Turkish elite. It is so because, as noted by Lewis, had it been implemented the Sevres Treaty would leave Turkey “helpless and mutilated, a shadow state”, which is exactly what penetrated the Turkish alter ego. Consequently, the West as the ultimate model of modernity and civilization was much admired, yet equally feared for harbouring conspiracies against Turkey. “Sevres

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syndrome” in this context basically referred to a constant fear and anxiety that external and internal enemies of the young republic were after its ultimate partition and disintegration. As remarked by Jung, it refers to “the perception of being encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state”\(^{276}\) which lingers among nationalist circles, in the left and right alike, in Turkey. A feeling of mistrust and isolation from outsiders culminates in Sevres-phobia. Mustafa Kemal is quoted substantiating these anxieties by saying that “if we are perceived too suspicious with regards to the activities of foreigners, it is due to the fear of losing our very hard earned independence.”\(^{277}\) In particular, the military seemed to strongly embrace such an increased sense of insecurity.

This was supplemented by another worry which stemmed from perceiving Turkey’s geography exceptional. In the sense, Turkey’s south and east was perceivably doomed with instability, turmoil, and secessionist, irredentist and fundamentalist ideologies.\(^{278}\) Such a bleak perception served as the backbone of a lingering geopolitical anxiety about impeding Turkey’s territorial integrity and national unity. As a result, a fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory\(^{279}\) loomed large in Turkish geopolitical culture. It was believed that “Turkey was besieged by a veritable ring of evil”.\(^{280}\) The expression signifying such deep-seated anxiety in popular culture was “Turkey is surrounded by seas in three, by enemies in four corners”. Another expression claimed that “there is no friend of Turk but a fellow Turk!”


As highlighted by Bilgin, such non-material, non-military and non-specific insecurities (in the sense that there was not an easily identifiable specific counterpart/other/enemy against which such anxieties were directed at) were partly presented as justification to devise a western oriented foreign policy as early as the 1920s.\footnote{BİLGİN, P. (2009). Securing Turkey through Western Oriented Foreign Policy. New Perspectives on Turkey Vol 40. p. 113-116.} As Foucault outlines, the construction of cultural spaces is essential to how any society conceptualizes its existence.\footnote{FOUCAULT, M. (1986). Of Other Spaces. Diacritics 16. p.22-27.} In this perspective, geopolitical identity formation in Turkey was partially an attempt to get accepted and recognized as part of the western world in order to address these stumbling insecurities. Turkey sought westernization as a means of avoiding probable western intervention while also hoping to benefit from the privileges of membership in the western (European) family of nations.\footnote{Ibid. p. 117.}

Secondly, Lausanne provided a central theme, i.e. Turkey's territorial limits. Turkey largely identified the province of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace as its natural territorial homeland and willingly dropped all claims on Ottoman Arab provinces and the lands in the Balkans. Turkey was content with the arrangements in Lausanne except for Alexandretta (reunited to Turkey by a referendum in 1939), the status of Mosul and Kirkuk (left permanently under British rule in 1925 in accordance with the decision of the League of Nations) and the international regime on the Turkish Straits (reregulated by the Treaty of Monteux in 1936). It was so content that the remaining territories in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace served as the territorial basis for Turkey's westernist vision. These two reflected the natural boundaries of Turkey. To forge territorial attachment, Atatürk himself pioneered the development of a Turkish history thesis, by which ancient Sumerians and Hittites, as locals of Anatolia, were deemed Turkish in essence.\footnote{GEORGEON, F., & BERKTAY, A. (2006). Osmanlı-Türk Modernleşmesi , 1900-1930 (Ottoman-Turkish Modernization: 1900-1930). İstanbul, Yapı Kredi Yayınları. p.4.} In defending the naturalness of the new state's territorial core, Kemal Atatürk emphasized the principle of “remaining within national boundaries” for guiding Turkey's

\[\text{\footnotetext[1]{\textit{\textsuperscript{281}} BİLGİN, P. (2009). Securing Turkey through Western Oriented Foreign Policy. New Perspectives on Turkey Vol 40. p. 113-116.}}\]
\[\text{\footnotetext[3]{\textit{\textsuperscript{283}}Ibid. p. 117.}}\]
foreign policy. Encapsulated in his following words, this has gradually transformed Turkey into a survivalist status quo power which aimed to jealously guard its national sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.

“Many continents were home to Turks throughout history. Today Turks live in a vast homeland lying to the west of Asia and to the east of Europe which is recognized by the whole world within its delimited land and sea borders. Therefore, Turkish people today are satisfied with (the boundaries of) their homeland for their existence. This is because Turks are confident that their rich ancestral heritage will be preserved and further developed in this homeland.”

“It is our goal, within our national frontiers, to work for the real happiness and development of our nation and our country, relying above all our own strength for the preservation of our existence, to refrain from inducing our people to pursue deleterious aims and to expect from the civilised world human treatment and friendship based on reciprocity.”

The sanctity and inviolability of borders was a central theme in the Kemalist mantra. The non-irredentist motto, “peace at home, peace in the world”, by Mustafa Kemal envisioned indivisible and inviolable national borders. Such perception of borders and secluded territoriality were strongly linked to a rigid conception of homeland, national unity/homogeneity and sovereignty. Borders therefore marked not only the territorial demarcation of Turkey but also the limits of Ankara’s external action. A rather strictly legalistic understanding about the rigidity of borders led to a sense of self-encapsulation and enclosure even to the brink of “locked-in syndrome”. This was later taken as a central point of


contention by conservatives as it was claimed that “taken to the extreme, Turkey’s sacrosanct borders built mental walls around Turkey”\(^{287}\) making it virtually impossible to steer contact, interaction and cooperation beyond legal frontiers.

d) Kemalist Geopolitical Code

In an attempt to create a new monolithic polity, differences such as Islamic and Kurdish identities, and other minorities were perceived as threats to national unity and security.\(^{288}\) Hence, the major internal enemies of the Turkish state were identified as Kurdish nationalists and movements with Islamic motivation. Christian minorities were also seen as a source of unease, one of the reasons for exchanging populations with Greece in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne. These domestic challenges kept haunting Turkey’s external relations as they had cross-border ramifications, and hampered its influence over regional affairs significantly in the years to come.

In transition from the empire to the nation state, Turkey dropped ambitions for a global foreign policy agenda. Facing near disappearance after World War I, the national mission of Turkey in this vision was identified as survival within internationally recognized borders as an independent and sovereign state. Mustafa Kemal’s goal was to reinforce and preserve the territorial integrity of Turkey, which was put under jeopardy during World War I in pursuing high hopes. One could add a strong dimension of modernization, equated with European westernization, to Turkey’s new national mission. Consequently, Turkey, rather than pursuing

\(^{287}\) Turgut Özal, Turkish PM from 1983 to 1991 and President from 1991 to 1993, was among the first to air the harshest criticism on perceptions of Turkey's borders. For a brief see ÖZAL, T. (1992). Türkiye’nin Önünde Hâcet Kapıları Açılmıştır (Doors of Wishing is Opened Before Turkey). *Interview with Mustafa Çalık. Türkiye Günlüğü. No. 19.* p. 5-23.

a revisionist foreign policy agenda, embarked on a path of territorial consolidation to pursue its national interests. All of this was part of a geopolitical project aspiring to make Turkey part of the “Western world” based on civilizational geopolitics. Apart from that, the particularities were largely shaped subscription to Western style international and regional organizations such as the League of Nations, the UN, NATO and the Western European Union. Embracing the role of a peripheral country during the Cold War, just as its European partners kept imagining Turkey since the late 19th century, as the southern flank of the Alliance boded perfectly well with this national mission. In this vein, Turkey did not seek any territorial claim against any of its neighbours in the following decades if the case of Alexandretta is put aside which was a last attempt to strengthen territorial consolidation. In defining this mission, Atatürk stated that;

“We are not a people running after big dreams, like those fraudulents who chase things they cannot achieve. We drew the enmity, grudge and ill will of the whole world since we were perceived as pursuing big and imaginary dreams. We never pursued Pan-Islamism but said “we are and we will”. Likewise, we did not pursue Pan-Turkism while declaring to have been doing so. In response, our enemies said “we will kill (if necessary) not to let you”. This is the gist of the matter. This is how we increased the number of our enemies and their pressure upon us. Instead we shall be looking at the natural situation, what is at hand. We should know our limits.”  

“Neither the Islamic Union nor Pan-Turkism is a feasible policy for us. It is from now on the state policy of Turkey to live independently within our national borders as a sovereign state.”

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The experience of coming to the brink of total extinction while pursuing high hopes of territorial recovery during World War I led the new Turkish elite to have a lower level of ambition in foreign policy. The official discourse was shaped by Mustafa Kemal’s dictum, “peace at home, peace in the world”. Having introduced a dramatic transformation in the political, social, economic and cultural make up at home, all Turkey needed was a state of peace, stability and tranquillity in its external relations. Pursing overarching foreign policy agendas could put already fragile republican reforms in jeopardy. Mufti acknowledges that Kemal’s dictum was domestically interpreted as “unity and order” (hence “peace at home”), and externally as “to be left alone and leave others alone” i.e. “peace in the world”. This called for realism, insularism and caution in foreign policy. In other words, Turkey had to pursue goals aware of its limits, i.e. it no longer held an empire and a robust economic and military capacity. The new state instead had a rather mediocre image of itself about what it can or cannot achieve regionally and globally. Therefore Turkey had to have its feet based firmly on realpolitik. Pursuing any substantial modification in Turkish foreign policy was equated with adventurism and hence without good reason.

Conservative Geopolitical Tradition

Conservatism, the anti-thesis of Kemalism, developed over time in conservative intellectual circles. This tradition was with Turkey all along, just like Kemalism, having a historical trajectory stretching well to the Ottoman era. As it is usually understood in analysing

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Turkey and its politics, Turkish conservatism for the purposes of this research is not only a moral imperative to preserve religious and spiritual values or an attempt to reshape society in accordance with traditionalist principles. It is at the same time an integrated approach to portray, with resort to “civilizational geopolitics”, a distinct picture of world affairs and give meaning to Turkey’s geopolitical position.

Historically speaking, Aral notes that “…conservatism rejects Western-oriented foreign policy and xenophobic nationalism that mistrusts most of Turkey’s immediate neighbours.”295 To the contrary, conservatism is an out loud cry to keep the links between Turkey and its former (Ottoman) geopolitical space intact. Therefore conservatism, as much as a moral and political project, is an attempt to re-interpret world affairs and a call to retain contact with former geographies. In terms of academic probing, it deserves closer scrutiny as a separate school of thought since most of the permanent articulations of alternative modes of representation and discourses in Turkey are initially brewed in this tradition. Equally crucially, a distinct geopolitical mentality is developed by which later politicians took up the challenge of operationalizing its central premises in the realm of foreign policy.

Just like Kemalists, conservatives too did not make an explicit claim to having engaged in geopolitical entrepreneurship. Therefore, the geopolitical reasoning and discourses evolving around the writings of prominent conservative intellectuals296 have gone largely unnoticed in terms of geopolitical inquiry. These were geopolitical texts, as much as literary pieces, in imagining the world differently and defending an alternative place for Turkey in the international arena. Through the ideas disseminated in their writings, these intellectuals served the ideological backbone of an alternative tradition. Most of them were attendants of

296 The most prominent are but not limited to Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Necip Fazil Kısakürek, Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, Cemil Meriç, Peyami Safa, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Nurettin Topçu, Sezai Karakoç and others
western-style schools abroad (mostly France) or at home. Many visited territories both to the east and the west outside Turkey, thus were well exposed to the Western space, ideas and its geo-cultural traits. But conclusions they drew as to where Turkey is and how it should behave in foreign affairs differed fundamentally.

From the early days of Turkey, the conservative counter elite grew in size and intellectual activity challenging many of the prerogatives of the Kemalist establishment, first and foremost locating Turkey firmly in the West and the stereotypical inscription of the Middle East. They were the harshest critiques of the Kemalist project of state and nation building as the top-down revolutionary project did not bring any material gain for them and also seemed to have undermined their values and traditions. Westernist policies, domestic and foreign alike, were scripted as what made Turkey despicable in the eyes of the West.  

Conservatives dubbed the westernization effort blind mimicking (a cheap act of travesty) while naming Kemalist reformists copycat monkeys as it ran against where they saw Turkey’s belonging at.

The only exception is Turkey’s decision to remain in the Western camp of democracies during the Cold War, which was considered not a calculated policy choice but an act of divine intervention. This preference is nonetheless tacitly approved not merely due to strategic or security considerations but on the perception that with its atheist prerogatives, the communist ideology of Soviets posed a direct threat against the Muslim character of Turks and their distinct culture.

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300 Kısakürek provides the harshest critiques of the communist system and thereby significantly contributing to the construction of the “Soviet other” in the Conservative tradition via two books; KISAKÜREK, N. F. (1962). Her
communism are represented as a godless and atheist ideology and regime. Hence it constitutes a distinct “other” that Turks should avoid at any cost. Turkey therefore had every reason to refrain from interacting with such a dangerously evil regime.

As Mufti notes, frontrunners of this tradition differed significantly from Kemalists in embracing many of the post-imperial impulses and reflexes. These stemmed from a different conception of Turkey, as a post-imperial state. That is its geographical situatedness, perceptions about its borders, territorial outreach, zones of influence, identity, sense of belonging and cultural attachment were formulated in clear contrast to Kemalists. In this understanding, rejecting the Eastern and Muslim credentials of Turkey would contradict its past, culture and prospects for a better future. Conservatives outright challenged the Kemalist inclination to render anything reminding Turks of their Ottoman geopolitical heritage and Muslim identity as a backward baggage to drop. To the contrary, they rather strongly embraced it. As one observer put it, if the Kemalist predicament was based on a firm denial of the Ottoman past, the conservatives reconstruct that legacy as a paradise lost. This was believed what would re-give Turkey a distinct character as a great state and nation.

Therefore, this school of thought took pride in the Muslim character of Turks, glorified Islam, praised Ottoman accomplishments, embraced former geopolitical space (epitomized as the “Glorious East”), and eschewed narratives degrading Turks’ links to Muslims. The common storyline scripted Turkey as the natural leader of the Muslim and Turkish speaking worlds as the natural heir to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, a common theme in the conservative tradition was “to make Turkey great again” or to “bring about a resurgent Turkey”. Assertive

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303 Ibid. p.235.
pursuit of national greatness with a somewhat romanticized notion of post-imperial legacy was how this concept was translated into the field of foreign policy.

a) The Never Ending Controversy: The West vs. the East

A monthly review called the Great East offers the most succinct and systematic account of the geopolitical argumentation in this tradition. The Great East (and the following compilation by Kısakürek named Ideological Texture) is a critique of prevalent perceptions in the West about the East (Turks and Muslims), and representations in the East of itself. Some are textbook criticisms of western orientalist discourse at a time (in 1968) when Edward Said’s Orientalism had not yet earned itself worldwide reputation.

This line of reasoning is premised strictly upon “civilizational geopolitics”. The views expressed perceive East-West relations through the same glance and binaries as Kemalists’ but with a strong flavour of orientalist critique and self-criticism. In this dialectically representative approach, the East characterizes the cradle of sophisticated spiritual sciences while the West embodies excellence in material sciences and machinery. The West is described as the phantom of sheer reason lacking spiritual depth while the East is marred by a lack of interest in the material world with an extreme focus on spirituality. In this context,

304 Great East was in circulation between 1943 and 1978. The review brought together the ideas, beliefs and worldviews produced by poets, artists, writers, scholars and other members of conservative intelligentsia. It was edited by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, a conservative philosopher and poet. Throughout his whole life, Mr Kısakürek struggled against Kemalist ideology and spent over seven years in prison. Due to the content of the writings challenging Kemalist ideology, the Great East had been subject to numerous court cases. It was transformed into a daily paper, a weekly and a monthly magazine for a number of times. Kısakürek wrote extensively as an ideologue for the Great East to make it an alternative school of thought in politics, culture, literature and most importantly geopolitics even though he never made direct reference to the latter discipline.

305 The Ideological Texture is a collection of editorials by Necip Fazıl published in the Great East from the 1940’s onwards.

Kemalist policies are criticized for making Turkey a slave of the technologically soulless machine of western civilization by wasting the true spirit of Turks.⁴⁰⁷ Turkey is then located within the spiritual roots of the East while not disregarding the value of borrowing the principles that lent the West superiority over material substance.⁴⁰⁸

Some variants in the conservative tradition claim that the West has two faces. The first is about technological superiority, reason, progress, prosperity, universal values and contemporary civilization. The second magnifies the exploitative nature of the capitalist system and colonialism which pictures the west as harbouring an evil agenda against Turks.⁴⁰⁹ Consequently, imperialist and colonialist practices of the West are seen as a source of fierce criticism, scepticism and grave concern.⁴¹⁰ As noted by Aydın, conservatives’ critiques of the West (in Turkey)…. strengthened the occidentalist essentialism about the decadent, materialist, positivist, soulless, immoral, communist, individualistic, and “Masonic” West.⁴¹¹ By developing such discourses of danger and suspicion, conservatives tried to create an alternative identity for Turkey against an apparently occidentalist other. An inherent longing of umma (Islamic community) type cross border/transnational pan-Islamic solidarity and cooperation loomed large in the conservative mantra.

b) Easternism

Conservatives just like Kemalists sought an answer to the question of where in the world Turkey is and where it belongs. The answer, formulated in civilizational and cultural terms, was the exact opposite of the Kemalists’. Conservative intellectuals stipulated that thanks to

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religious, cultural and civilizational affinity and because it served the flagship of Islam since the 10\textsuperscript{th} century, Turkey belongs to the (Muslim) East.\textsuperscript{312} Accordingly Turkey is perceived fundamentally different from the west in terms of culture, civilization, historical backdrop, and even in the organization of society and economy. Given the social, economic and other difficulties Turkey faces, the remedy is prescribed as "rebirth in the East".\textsuperscript{313} The East in this conception is a purely cultural and civilizational space that transcends regions and continents. With its extra-territorial nature, the East, according to Turkish conservatives, encompasses all places that Muslims live. Henceforth Eastern Thrace, Anatolia, the Middle East, Central Asia, Far East and Northern Africa, all are situated in "the East" since they all are coloured with a common theme, Islam. In formulating this position, Necip Fazıl claims that:

\begin{quote}
"Everything came from the East; everything, everything; i.e. our spirit (identity). Jerusalem is there, Mecca is there, Kaaba is there. Adam first landed in the East. Noah’s ark is located there. Prophets Abraham, Moussa, Christ and Mohammad, all are from the East. We must believe in the East with no bigotry of geography."\textsuperscript{314}
\end{quote}

Despite an apparent acknowledgment and appreciation of its achievements, this school of thought is extremely wary of Western imperialist and colonialist legacy. Among other factors, western colonialism is thought to be a major factor why Turks and other Muslims are fragmented and lagging behind.\textsuperscript{315} Furthermore, Turkey is described a prey to Western capitalism and imperialism. It is, in fact, on the basis of an anti-westernist discourse that

\textsuperscript{313}Ibid, p.9.
\textsuperscript{314}Ibid, p.37.
conservative geopolitical identity of Turkey is constructed in which religion plays a key role.\textsuperscript{316} Mehmet Akif’s identification of the West as “the battered, single-toothed monster called ‘civilisation’”\textsuperscript{317} in the Turkish national anthem indicates how deep this “other”ing process towards the west goes. As early as 1920, Mehmet Akif describes western civilization as harbouring evil intentions, eternal animosity and a grudge against Turks which wishes to partition Turkish homeland.\textsuperscript{318} Necip Fazıl takes it further in citing Europe, the Americas and Australia among the list of hostiles for Turkey. Interestingly, the whole continent of Africa is designated among Turkey’s friends,\textsuperscript{319} most probably because Africans shared a common destiny with Turks in being subjected to western imperialism.

Thus, the significant “other” for Turkey is not the East or Muslims but rather the colonialist and capitalist West. It is around these colonialist, imperialist and capitalist ambitions of the West that Turkish conservatives produced alternative discourses of danger, insecurity and threats. According to Necip Fazıl, this discourse is very well substantiated because “Europeans never deemed Turks and Turkey part of their own family of nations”.\textsuperscript{320} As closer ties are called for with the Muslim world, conservatives are mostly aloof towards Israel since it is perceived an extension of the west in the East.

Some accounts in this line of thought reject deeming the West superior over the East or vice versa. The two are thought to be essentially compatible and to complement each other in providing a comprehensive whole. Race, religion and culture, which seemed to be the essential dividing lines between the Occident and the Orient in the former’s quest for

\begin{itemize}
\item DAĞI, İ. (2009) Beyond the Clash of Civilizations: The Rapprochement of Turkish Islamic Elite with the West, in ZANK, W. Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations?: Overlapping Integration and Identities. Aldershot, Ashgate.
\item ERSOY, M.A. (1921). Turkish National Anthem. Stanza 3. Line 4. English translation is available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki%C4%B0stikl%C3%A2l_Mar%C5%9F%C4%B1
\item Ibid. p.80.
\end{itemize
imperialist hegemony simply did not fit in the claims of universal modernity and civilizing mission of the West.\textsuperscript{321} Accordingly in some Turkish conservative circles, progressive values of Islam are strongly embraced while western values such as democracy, positive reasoning and free market and enterprise are not rejected. This is an attempt to offer a synthesis of the East and the West as a means of development, and a combined framework to guide Turkey’s revival.\textsuperscript{322} A combination the East and the West (art, science and technology of the West and “true character (mahiyyeti ruhiye)” of the East according to Mehmet Akif\textsuperscript{323}) is given as the remedy for overcoming the difficulties Turkey faces.

This requires Turkey to hinge onto its “true self” (Eastern Muslim identity). If a model is to be followed, it is not the West but rather the glorified experience of the Ottoman Empire\textsuperscript{324} which is pictured as providing a tolerant, multi-ethnic and multicultural order over vast territories for centuries. Domestically, this means Turkey would not be concerned with different ethnic identities as long as Turkish society was united around a common faith, Islam. Hence Kurdish identity and Islamic revivalism are not seen as threats to social harmony. Externally, this means easier interaction with Muslim states whether they host a sizable Kurdish population and strong religious sentiments or not.

c) The Impact of Conservative Tradition

It must be noted that Turkish geopolitical conservatism, as much as symbolizing a rejection of the Kemalist attempt to create a new geopolitical identity and space of action for Turkey, in essence, was not initially codified as a project of practical grand strategy or foreign policy. It

\textsuperscript{321} Ibid, p. 448-449.
\textsuperscript{322} PEYAMI SAFA’s book titled \textit{Doğu-Batı Sentezi (East-West Synthesis)} 1963, Yağmur Yayınları makes a strong case for creating a hybrid out of the long lasting debate in Turkey on the East vs. the West. He suggests taking in the superior characteristics of each would help remedy Turkey’s underdevelopment problems.
was largely a critique of the wrong-doings of Kemalist geopolitical engineering as well as a self-criticism about why the imperial Ottoman project eventually failed. What lessons Turkey should draw in order to cope with contemporary challenges of economic, social and scientific underdevelopment was also a key theme conservatives focused on. The most apparent foreign policy prescription, as an interim measure, was to manage the tough times until Turkey’s internal cohesion and strength was consolidated.\(^\text{325}\) However, Turkey was nostalgically hoped to make a decisive come back to global politics and acquire worldwide recognition.\(^\text{326}\)

On the other hand, conservatism, as an expression of thought and discourse did not present a coherent whole notably until the 1980’s as one writer after another kept contributing to its evolution. As a result, conservative reasoning remained in the formal and to some degree in the popular genre of geopolitics in Turkey. However, the way the world is pictured in this tradition heavily shaped the cognitive map of Turkish conservative elite.\(^\text{327}\) It provided the geopolitical framework through which global affairs were given an alternative meaning, distinct geopolitical pictures around the East and the West were portrayed, and different roles and expectations were ascribed to Turkey with regards to the future of its external relations. It did also provide alternative narratives around which dramas in world politics should be interpreted by future generations. In particular, the geopolitical views disseminated in the Great East served as a strong source of inspiration for later conservative political parties and politicians in Turkey. The ideological foundations laid in this school of thought thus influenced the geopolitical reasoning, modes of perception, representation and understanding of leading conservative figures, not least the National View Movement of Necmettin Erbakan (established in the 1960s and 1970s), Turgut Özal and AK Party leaders lately.

\(^{326}\) Ibid, p.460.
\(^{327}\) Abdullah Gül states that the single person having the most influence over his intellectual backdrop is Necip Fazıl Kısakürek while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publishes each year a message bowing before the beloved memory of the deceased.
**Table 3: Geopolitical Traditions in Turkey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tradition</th>
<th>Turkish National Interest</th>
<th>Social Basis</th>
<th>Cultural Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kemalist</td>
<td>Making Turkey part of the West in economic, political social and (if possible) cultural/civilizational terms.</td>
<td>CHP and other centre-left and centrist political parties, the military, top echelons of civilian bureaucracy and academia, Istanbul-Ankara based industrialists and businessmen</td>
<td>Exclusionary Turkishness within nation-state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Improved political and economic relations with the Muslim world.</td>
<td>MNP, MSP, RP, FP, SP, ANAP, AK Party tradition, burgeoning conservative bourgeoisie-“the Anatolian Tigers”, lately urbanized masses coming from Anatolian periphery, enlightened conservative intelligentsia.</td>
<td>Pluralistic in the sense that it embraces Islam, and ethnic and religious differences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3. Geographical Imaginations on Turkey’s Spatial Situatedness**

The Placement of Turkey by the West

The remark by David Newman needs to be noted in stating that “while the geopolitical (geographical) imagination of a state may be determined within, its actual positioning within the regional and global system is largely determined from without. As such, the geopolitical
imagination of a country’s population or political elites may often contrast with the geopolitical positioning of that state by other states within the system, resulting in inter-state tension and on the one hand, and attempts to become accepted on the other.”

An interesting aspect is to consider the way Turkey’s “western self” is perceived in the West itself. One therefore needs to scrutinize the concept of Europe as a spatial-temporal imaginary construction which in the Turkish imagination represents the most solid embodiment of the West.

It must be noted at first that while Turkish leaders chose to cut their links with Ottoman geopolitical culture, space and imagination, Europeans mostly did not. They kept identifying Islam with Ottoman Turks, which served as a distinct Oriental other before a common European identity. In this perspective, Ottomans were historically perceived in Europe but not part of Europe. Turks were present only as an alien force. This image has been produced and reproduced since the fourteenth century. As noted by Schultz, it was the formation of a western front against advancing Ottomans which first popularised the concept of Europe in the late fifteenth century. Hakan Yavuz takes the argument further in stating that in Europe through an Orientalist discourse, the Muslim ‘other’ was characterized as barbaric, authoritarian, lazy, repulsive, and incomprehensible.

A similar statement was made at the height of the Bulgarian uprising that Ottomans harshly repressed. As he left office as the leader of liberal opposition, William Gladstone (served as British PM between 1891 and 1894) wrote a pamphlet in August 1876 to criticize the position of the British government by arguing that “…[the Turks] were, upon the whole, from the black day when they entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity”.334 The pamphlet became popular with the British public and helped Gladstone to return to British politics a few years later. But his sentiments found no sympathy with PM Benjamin Disraeli who was acting in line with the policy of supporting Ottomans. This policy was established during the Crimean War as a means of containing the expansion of Russian power at the expense of British interests in the Balkans. Disraeli therefore was unhesitant in calling Gladstone’s pamphlet “...vindictive and ill-written ... of all the Bulgarian horrors perhaps the greatest”.

But even when the Ottoman Empire was accepted within the Concert of Europe via Paris Conference after the Crimean War in 1856 that pledged respect for sovereign independence and territorial integrity, it was not treated on an equal footing. It still was “the sick man of Europe” and of an origin fundamentally different than the Europeans. Ottoman state was kept alive as part of the greater balance of power in Europe among Britain, Germany, France, Russia and Austria, which had rather conflictual interests as to the resolution of “the Eastern Question”. This provided Disraeli and Bismarck of Germany with ample motive to organize a peace conference in Berlin once Russians conceded a large Bulgarian state under Moscow’s influence in 1878. Such considerations were not only at play within the contours of Anglo-Ottoman or Franco-Ottoman diplomacy but also in the new-found alignment between Germany and the Ottoman Empire before and during the First World War.

But beneath great power rivalry, cultural otherness/difference of Islam, represented by Turks, kept being a defining feature in the formation of a common European identity. As noted by Agnew, the ‘otherness of Turks’ had served as a ‘fundamental barrier’ to their participation in European civilizational geopolitics that drew hard lines around the European homeland. In this perception, the place of Turkey was seen as extra-European rather than complementary to it.

The same continues to some degree among policy-making circles in Europe to this day. While the European project evolved towards deeper cooperation, the European Community addressed the debate on a common European identity as early as 1973. The central themes were to “ensure the survival of the civilization which Europeans have in common”, “the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice - which is the ultimate goal of economic progress - and of respect for human rights”. It was yet again a clear identification of Europe as a distinct civilizational zone only open to other “European” nations that share the same values, culture, history, ideals and objectives. What united Europeans under a common identity was subscription to a shared civilization, history, religion, science, culture and democratic values. Raised on the ancient Greco-Roman civilizations and Judaic-Christian cultures, Europeans, in their encounters with others, kept a disavowed sense of cultural and temporal superiority, as argued by Strath. Thus, keeping the civilizational geopolitics optic, modern European identity was exclusionist and rigid for those without albeit diverse and plural for those within.

The modern day application, with varying degrees, excludes Turkey from the cultural and civilizational space called Europe. As noted by Küçük, “the debate on Turkey’s EU membership locates the construction of a European self-definition at the frontier of its Turkish-Islamic “Other.”... (in this imagination) Turkey is neither in Eastern Europe nor the Middle East, but rather a grey zone somewhere in between”.339 This is the reason why Turkey’s membership prospect raises the question about where the eastern boundaries of Europe are located. Ruben & Wolkersdorfer draws attention to extra-European placement of Turkey as follows.

“As it is neither rooted in its ‘own’ space nor is it represented as completely ‘different’, it is located in between two essential entities. Thus it is declared a space between binary oppositions, an ‘in-between’ which is located in time ‘between past and present’ and geographically between ‘Orient and Occident’. In this concept of hybridity, it becomes apparent how geopolitical representation – falling back (re)productively on the dichotomous fictions of the ‘civilised Occident’ and the ‘threateningly foreign Orient’ - repeatedly conceptualises Turkey as ‘different’ or ‘foreign’.”340

The lingering membership process to the EU is one of the clear testaments to this deep-seated geopolitical suspicion. For many Europeans, Turkey is too big, too poor, too far and ‘too different (Muslim)’.341 German Chancellor Kohl in the 1990s for example declared that Europe represented a community of values which had no business with Turkey. With the same line of argument, Wolfgang Schäuble, the then Chairman of the CDU/CSU, stated that Turkey’s entry into the EU was already closed simply for the reason that it did not belong to

the Western-Christian culture area.³⁴² As Philip Robbins states, it is once again seen during ‘the vivid controversy surrounding the European Constitution in 2004, notably in the course of the French (‘no’ vote in the) referendum, that the issue of full Turkish membership has best illuminated (yet again) the debate about European identity.’³⁴³ Deeming Turkey geographically and culturally non-European, former French President Sarkozy repeatedly stated that “Turkey is a very great civilization and culture but not a European one”.³⁴⁴ Likewise German Chancellor Merkel outlined her position by claiming that Turkey does not share the historical, cultural and historical roots with the rest of the EU.³⁴⁵ Hence, despite being a NATO member that largely embraces western values and way of life, Turkey is kept being treated as if on the geographical and cultural verge of Europe.

It is therefore safe to argue that geopolitical representations about Turkey in Europe were, and to some degree still are today, in considerable contrast to Turkey’s self-ascribed western geopolitical positioning. As such, Turkey is not only perceived extra-European but also subject to Europe’s civilizing mission.³⁴⁶ Ankara’s attempts at modernization/westernization mostly failed to alter this image in the west which largely took negative associations with Turkey. The positive representations around Turkey emphasized its character as the only Muslim country that can offer a suitable democratic and developmental model for the Islamic world. Turkey is therefore scripted as a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world but still outside the cultural/civilizational zone called Europe.

This is what led some observers to claim that Turkey suffers an identity crisis. Put differently, it is "a country caught between two continents, two traditions, [and] two trends in history". Some went further in asserting that Turkey displays strong features of a liminal state, neither belonging to European family of nations nor to the Muslim world. Drawing attention to such qualities, Huntington even identified Turkey as a textbook example for a "torn country". It was, among other factors, this gap between the imageries of Kemalists and Europeans that lent a strong motive to the Conservative tradition in the first place to produce alternative geopolitical discourses and representations for Turkey.

Representations around the Middle East

Kemalist: A Swamp

In order to understand Turkey's foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East, it is imperative to problematize Turkish and Arab historical and psychological inertia, i.e. geographical representations that bring along perceptions, apprehensions, stereotyping, prejudices and predispositions. That is because Kemalist Turkey operated on a "constructed reality" in its Middle Eastern dealings. State and identity formation in modern Turkey took in the totality of positive symbolizations around the West in defining the new "self" against the old, inferior, anti-modern and threatening "other", i.e. the Muslim East represented by Muslim peoples, places and cultures. This led to what can be called "Turkish Orientalism". The Middle East, as a place in this trajectory, was a reminder of "Ottoman backwardness and a potential threat.

to drag Turkey back into the dark ages\textsuperscript{350} of utmost incivility. It was the anathema of Turkish “Orient”. As a result, the Middle East was scripted as “a foreign space, wholly lacking in allure and best left to its own no doubt tragic fate\textsuperscript{351} invoking the analogy by Stephanson. Even discovery of a valuable asset such as oil did not change this perception much. For Kemalists, the Middle East symbolized “the unhappy association with Turkey’s past\textsuperscript{352} that needed to be kept at best at arm’s length. At least, this was the most influential and durable geopolitical script produced by the Kemalist elite. Albeit not being a geographical representation substantiated by facts, the binaries created in this discourse nonetheless pre-conditioned available courses of action for Turkey in the Middle East. As a result, the positions Turkey took under Kemalist leaders became a function of this westernist imagery.

In this context, a general perception prevailed among Turkish policy makers and the wider public in seeing the Arab Middle East as backward, uncivilized, instable, dogmatic, untrustworthy, lacking in democracy and struggling with religious fundamentalism.\textsuperscript{353} The memories of the Arab revolt lead by Sharif Hussein of Mecca in the First World War further accentuated these negative perceptions. Hussein’s decision to align with the British against the Ottoman Sultan (who was also the Caliph of Muslim umma) for the sake of his own tribe made a rubber-stamp imprint on Turks’ collective memory. As Robins argues despite the fact that it was only a limited number of Arabs that turned against the Ottomans and although the net effect of such a defection on the overall war effort had been relatively limited,\textsuperscript{354} Turks nevertheless cognitively associated most Arabs with treason and unreliability. Thereafter grew a dominant geopolitical mentality that equated Arabs with back-stabbing and

\textsuperscript{353}HANİOĞLU, Ş. (2013). Türk Orientalizminin Doğu’su olarak Ortadoğu (the Middle East as the “Orient” of Turkish Orientalism). \textit{Sabah} (\textit{Turkish Daily}). Available at \url{http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/haniogli/2013/05/19/turk-orientalizminin-dogusu-olarak-ortadogu} (consulted on May 23, 2013).
betrayal. The lands of Arabs in this perception were a reminder of the tragedies of that war. Therefore, Turkey developed a disavowed geographical and geopolitical ignorance about the Middle East. As noted by Özdalga, “academic neglect and ignorance of Arab culture and society have contributed to prevalent disrespect for Arabs, most noticeable among strictly secular nationalists.”

In this vein, mistrust against Arabs and negative stereotyping was very common in popular geopolitical culture. It was so deep that one common Turkish saying stipulated that it is never possible to mean business with Arabs (Araplarla iş olmaz). Likewise, another called to do no business with Arabs (“better not have the candy of Damascus or see the face of Arabs” (ne Şam’ın şekeri, ne Arab’ın yüzü). The word Arab had an immediate association with dark skin. As such, some Turks did not even hesitate to name their black pet dogs “Arab” in an act of denigration and arrogance. The only positive aspect was Arabic tunes incorporated into Turkish music popularly called arabesque. Even with this highly popular music, cultural connotations were pejorative as it was associated with Turkish people from the lowest social strata. The geography Arabs lived in was therefore popularly denigrated, mentally distanced and translated into an image of a foreign land for the production of discourses of danger in identity construction.

Thanks to such mental bordering, “othering and distancing, the complexities of Middle Eastern politics were reduced to a simplified stereotypical image of “swamp, bog, mud land,” in symbolizing the undesirability of dealing with Muslim Arab geographies. Thus, “sailing in the muddy waters of the Middle East”, a phrase commonly pronounced in Turkish foreign policy quarters, was cognitively perceived a risky enterprise that Turkey must carefully refrain from. In a way Turkey erected mental barriers before the legal frontiers with the states,

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peoples, countries and cultures in this region. Hence came the mantra “good fences make good neighbours” which promulgated to never interfere with inter-Arab disputes and refrain from meddling in Middle Eastern politics.

b) Conservative: The Land of Muslim Brethren

In stark contrast to Kemalism, the conservative mantra calls for a separate geopolitical code in dealing with the Middle East. Muslims, wherever they live, are represented as the people with whom Turkey should be befriended with. The conservative tradition sees not only the fate of Turks and Arabs interwoven but also sees Arabs not as the "other" to be avoided but "brothers and sisters" with whom Turkey shares a common past, religion, culture and civilization. Mehmet Akif poetically describes the relationship between Turks and Arabs in the following.

_Turks cannot live without Arabs; those who say otherwise are so insane,
Because Arabs are the right eye and the right hand of Turks with no room for disdain._ (original in Turkish, emphasis added)\(^{357}\)

Moreover, proponents of this tradition perceive Turks as the chief exponents of Islam. As such, the mission ascribed to Turkey is the same as its Ottoman predecessor; to serve as the leader of the Muslim world. Necip Fazıl calls this “a mission earmarked to Turks which is dictated by historical imperatives regardless of population size”.\(^{358}\) This reflects a psychological state of mind that sees Turks as the chosen nation in the service Islam. Just like the Ottomans once led the effort to disseminate the message of God; it is believed to be the manifest destiny of Turks to keep carrying the banner of the East (Islam)\(^{359}\) in modern


\(^{359}\) Ibid.p.69.
times. As the argument goes, destiny calls Turks to lead, either by total collapse or full recovery, one more time the whole Muslim world\textsuperscript{360} since the flag of Islam has fallen in Turkey, it can only rise again from Turkey.\textsuperscript{361}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tradition</th>
<th>Dominant Imagination</th>
<th>Image of the Middle East</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Popular Representation</th>
<th>Practical Representation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kemalism</td>
<td>Westernism</td>
<td>Swamp, bog, mud land</td>
<td>Code-1 The Significant Other Code-2 Indifferent, Neutral</td>
<td>Backward Islamic land</td>
<td>Territories of Arab betrayal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td>Easternism</td>
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<td>Code-1 Friendly exchange and engagement Code-2 Muslim solidarity</td>
<td>Ex-Ottoman Territory</td>
<td>Prey to imperialism, western capitalism, exploitation and manipulation</td>
<td>1. Historical responsibility to lead due to Ottoman legacy 2. Develop friendly relations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 4. Geopolitical Representations around the Middle East

**Arabs’ Image of Turks and Turkey**

Negative images and stereotypes were also not scarce in the Arab world. Self-inflicted Arab geopolitical imagery was equally distanced towards Turkey. For Arabs, the Ottoman past reminded them of a period of foreign domination.\textsuperscript{362} Perceiving Turks as ‘their former imperial masters’,\textsuperscript{363} they saw the root causes of Arab backwardness and underdevelopment in Ottoman “colonization” and “exploitation”. Turkey was held accountable for curtailing the

\textsuperscript{360}Ibid. p.50, 443.  
\textsuperscript{361}KISAKÜREK, N. F. (1978). Doğru Yolun Sapık Kolları (Deviant Followers of the True Path). İstanbul, Büyük Doğu Yayınları.  
development of Arab’s indigenous culture, society, identity and dignity. In some accounts, it was even blamed for attempting to Turkify Arabs under the Young Turk Revolution (1908).\footnote{364 For a thorough historical analysis of the origins of Turkish nation in relation to many different ethnic groups see MANGO, A. (2004). *The Turks Today*. New York, Overlook Press.}

In this regard, Dawn states that “Arab nationalism arose as an opposition movement in the Ottoman Empire”.\footnote{365 DAWN, C. E. (1991) *Origins of Arab Nationalism in The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. KHALIDI, R. ANDERSON, L., MUSLIH, M. & SIMON, R. S. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 23.} In the same fashion, Jung notes that the notion of “the terrible Turk”, the violent suppresser of Arab nationalism embodied by the Ottoman state, was a common denominator in the Arab imagery.\footnote{366 JUNG, D. (2005). *Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities*. Mediterranean Politics. 10, p. 4-5.} Turkey as a place in this trajectory simply symbolized the centre stage of Ottoman domination against which Arabs defined themselves, their new states and geopolitical identities. The image of the “brutal, imperialist Turkey” from centuries of Ottoman rule\footnote{367 For a detailed analysis on the image the legacy of Ottoman Turkey on the development of Arab nationalism, see ZEINE, Z. N. (1973). *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism; With a Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East*. Delmar, N.Y., Caravan Books. Chapter 5.} would thus inevitably cast a shadow in the relations between the new Turkish Republic and the Arab states.

As Mustafa Kemal went ahead with the republican reforms in changing the Arabic alphabet to Latin and abolishing the Muslim caliphate and Ottoman sultanate on the way towards a western-oriented state; the distance between Turkey and the Middle East was widened culturally, linguistically and politically as these acts were regarded as Turkey’s ultimate turning its back to its Middle Eastern and Islamic character. Nevertheless misgivings, disdain and estrangement among Arabs vis-à-vis Turks and Turkey as a foreign place and people thereby grew stronger.

As a separate self-view began to take shape in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Arabs’ dominant geopolitical code was based on Prophet Mohammed’s *hadith* (his verse), authentic or otherwise, that called “to stay away from Turks as long as they do not meddle in your own
affairs (uturkû al-Turka ma tarkûkum)”. The modern interpretation given was to decisively distance away from and almost completely disregard Turks and Turkey. Thus, anxious of a prospective Turkish comeback as a force for regional domination, discourses of fear, danger and disaffection were a thing of exceptional frequency to reinforce a distinct sense of Arab identity and a common Arab geography. Besides, Arabs did not perceive Turks intelligible partners to do business with by making a mockery through the phrase “Turks are deprived of the capacity to understand (Atrâk bîla idrâk)” in their popular culture. Likewise, another common phrase called Turks stubborn and thick headed (aneed mittel el Turkî).

In this sense geographical, cultural, religious, historical and lingual affinity collided with constructed mental distance which in turn fed into a profound sense of mutual mistrust and resentment. The later attempts at modernization and secularization under Atatürk further deepened the divide per se between Turkey and the Arab geographies. This is due to the fact that the Muslim Middle East and Turkey represented the significant “other” if not the “enemy” in Turkish and Arab nationalist elite’s respective geopolitical imageries. As a result, both in Turkey and the Arab Middle East, mental bordering became a powerful practice just like legal boundary-drawing.

Reducing the complexity of the Middle East to a symbol of eternal conflict, a source of ultimate threats and the distinct “other” against which Ankara’s new identity was constructed; historical, cultural and religious ties and geographical proximity were not enough to keep Turkey and countries lying along its southern border close. Quite to the contrary, as expressed by Falih Rifki, a close friend of Atatürk, “the reforms blew up the bridges attaching Turkey to the Middle Ages” which was represented in the body of Muslim Middle East.

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Therefore, Turkey willingly subscribed to the new role of “intimate stranger” in this region. An observer called Turkey’s lack of interest in Middle Eastern politics as “benign neglect” while another described that Turkey behaved for well over half a century “almost literally as if the Middle East did not exist.” With westernist imagery lying at the core, at times Turkey’s Kemalists seemed to engage in Middle Eastern affairs, it was either drawn by events beyond its control, tried to make an example after its own success in westernization or was trying to prove its credentials as a trustworthy partner to its western allies. Nachmani characterizes Arab reaction to Turkey’s such efforts as the Middle Eastern subsidiary of Western civilization.

Besides, this region embedded a considerable Kurdish population and a number of Islamist groups, which were the two key existential threats identified for the new Turkish state with possible spill over effects. Hence, the Middle East was the ultimate origin for discourses of danger that are used in identity formation. The level of geographical abstraction and symbolization about the threats emanating from the Middle East was dazzling. Regardless of whether these perceptions were in any way proportional to the actual threat, Turkey chose to externalize the causes of domestic instability and unrest. Therefore, Ankara did not see this place within its sphere of interest and action. It was perceived a place “beyond the line” and outreach for Turkey. Instead the young Turkish republic saw nothing but trouble beyond its southern border. The Kemalist elite viewed Turkey a “lone wolf” in a hostile region. In a way, Turkey perceived itself entrapped by its geographical embeddedness while at the same time contradictorily trying to evidence its strategic significance by adopting an analogy which

can be read as “Turkey is important because it is located in such a bad neighbourhood”. In this vein, Turkey conceived itself a victim to its geopolitical situatedness and largely neglected exploring external action possibilities. Based on such perceptions that see Turkey located at the virtual epicentre of a Bermuda triangle, this has led some analysts to conclude that Turkey turned out to be a textbook example of an insulator thanks to its retraction from regional affairs. These perceptions reinforced the alienation of Turkey in Middle Eastern affairs.

III. CONCLUSION

This chapter has contextualized the theoretical framework developed in the first chapter with a view to build a conceptual structure for understanding, explaining and analysing Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour, in particular with regards to the Middle East. Consequently, the two longest-standing geopolitical traditions and mantras in Turkey are introduced in order to comparatively analyse how geopolitical discourses and representations produced in each tradition serve to enable, restrict and rationalize different sets of policy choices. In the meantime, the predominant geopolitical discourses and narratives in each tradition are highlighted to understand how the position, the role and mission ascribed to Turkey in global affairs are formulated as well as geopolitical representations around the Middle East.

It is hoped that this chapter indicates the crucial role Turkey’s geopolitical culture plays in framing possibilities of external action. By helping different Turkish actors construct competing representations of the world as well as the regions in Turkey’s close vicinity, geopolitics premieres an important role in the field of foreign affairs. It is through how different groups in the Turkish elite make sense of Turkey and its geography, its role and

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mission in the world and the places around Turkey, and not to mention perceptions of others that how geopolitical culture informs foreign policy.

That culture tells two rivalling stories to Turks; one that emphasizes the revolutionary nature of state and nation building in Turkey which is firmly westwards-oriented and puts a strong emphasis on a rupture between the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey, and the other underscoring the continuities in transition from an empire to a nation state. The former, in addition to being extremely wary of Turkey’s neighbours especially in the Middle East is contradictory suspicious of the newly found allies in the west. It is therefore rather mired by insecurities, risk averseness and non-assertiveness. Modesty, self-restraint and retrenchment are the main characteristics of Kemalist tradition. The attempt by conservatives which provide a different picture of the world is also expressly and overtly geopolitical in civilizational sense. Put differently, it is space as much as civilization and culture based that practical reasoning, justification, representation and discourse are produced. Yet conservatives are much bolder, self-confident, assertive and sympathetic to the Muslim world that wishes to unleash a complex yet interdependent and supposedly complementary pack of relations for Turkey in which the West is perceived nothing more than one of the crucial pillars. In embracing post-imperial reflexes and impulses, this strand is keen on pursuing “Turkey’s greatness” potential. The latter is rather less explored for Turkey the full results of which are yet to be seen.

Against this structure, the next chapter focuses on domestic networks of power and bureaucratic procedures through which geopolitical representations and discourses, some of which have been long available, some re-invented and yet some totally new, are produced and translated into foreign policy practice.
CHAPTER 3 - SOCIAL NETWORKS OF POWER AND TURKISH

GEOPOLITICAL CULTURE

I. INTRODUCTION

Geopolitical and geographical imagination as a building block for geopolitical culture, a means to guide foreign policy, and restrict or enable external action is strictly conditioned on how power is imbued within society. One can imagine the world, a region, a place or its international position in a million different ways but for such grand geopolitical schemes to capture the locus of foreign policy practice, it is imperative to consider the power play between different actors in a society. The type of political system, decision making mechanism and the relations between different networks of power are most relevant in construing how mass or elite geopolitical/geographical imaginations are translated into practice.

In attempting an analysis of power, this research rests on a simple definition, as provided by Morris, which is “the capacity to impact on outcomes and the ability to affect others.” 377

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to chronologically grasp the operation of power in Turkey with a view to set the dynamic context upon which contending geopolitical schemes unfold. The ever-going interaction among the political-bureaucratic process, the military’s weight in politics and organization of Turkish economy/business are essential components in this regard. Equally crucial is the ideological rivalry between religion vs. secularism in winning the hearts and minds of Turks. As such, Kemalism and Islam, as sources of ideological power to shape Turkish society, state and its foreign policy, are examined. An analysis on the operation of media outlets as a legitimizing apparatus for

competing geopolitical narratives is also provided. Lastly, an overview of the decision-making process with regards to foreign affairs is added to the equation. In this exercise, both formal and informal sources of power interact in the constitution and dissemination of the geopolitical discourses that Turkey operates at a given time.

On the other hand, this chapter aims to place the two long established geopolitical traditions within the evolution of political, social and economic life in Turkey. An outline of the competitive relations between two geopolitical traditions helps indicate what factors enabled or restricted the actions taken by the adherents of each school of thought in putting their geopolitical choices into reality.

The argument here is both strategic orientation of modern Turkey as well as policy initiation, consolidation and/or change in Turkish foreign policy, as is observed at different intervals in the case of the Middle East, are brought about in accordance with the following criteria.

a) A comprehensive, well-structured and compelling geopolitical narrative as a source of policy initiation, mostly reflective of a distinct geographical imagination.

b) A strong political government rooted in one of the well-established geopolitical traditions acquiring control over the state apparatus, i.e. single party government wielding stronger political power.

c) A change in the formal and/or informal structures of power in such a manner to alter the decision-making process in favour of the challengers. This is crucial due to the peculiarities of Turkish politics in which capturing political power alone does not guarantee realization of alternative foreign policy agendas.

d) Presence of charismatic leaders to provide leeway to a specific geopolitical project in actual policy practice by means of public persuasion and agenda setting.
II. SOCIETAL BASIS OF GEOPOLITICAL TRADITIONS IN TURKEY

It is better to demarcate the boundaries between Kemalist and Conservative schools of thought in terms of the societal base they are derivative of. The republican elite, (Kemalist/secular establishment), comprising of the CHP (during 1990’s DSP and SHP as well), the military, the bureaucracy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and judiciary) and the republican intelligentsia (academics, philosophers, media columnists and other urbanized opinion-makers) constitutes a solid societal basis for Kemalism. The last three pillars, army-bureaucracy-enlightened intelligentsia, can be named the “iron triangle” of Kemalist tradition. This tradition was initially allied with propertied locals and commercial bourgeoisie in bigger cities and western parts of Turkey (a commercial bourgeoisie), and later to a newly industrial bourgeoisie; the emergence and sustainment of which was enabled, encouraged and supported by the Kemalist establishment.

In analysing how this tripartite mechanism operates, it must be acknowledged that the Turkish army by controlling the meaning of “national security”, enjoying unequal weight in institutional decision-making mechanisms and being emboldened by a historical claim to preserve Kemalist westernist legacy and ideology wielded unmatched influence in setting the tone of dominant geopolitical discourse. The foreign policy bureaucracy, i.e. MFA, by subscribing to the ideological supremacy of Kemalism acted as a civilian force of empowerment or resistance depending on the political government of the day (the military and MFA will be referred to as the foreign policy establishment). Prominent Kemalist academics, philosophers, media columnists and other intellectuals provided justification and legitimization for the westernist policy choices through their writings, teachings, and discourses circulated in academia and media.

Masses living in Turkey's periphery, from the very beginning, had great difficulty in internalizing Kemalist geopolitical project of westernism, abandonment of Turkey’s eastern
placement and characteristics, and the Ottoman legacy. Secularism was also a difficulty. Rural communities including peasants, small farmers, and petty bourgeoisie (small and medium-size entrepreneurs, artisans, manufacturers) in central, eastern and southeast Anatolia in addition to conservative intellectuals in bigger cities have thus traditionally been wary of westernism. Their inclination was to conserve what they had; a post-imperial nostalgia of eastern-centric positioning of Turkey, piety, strong adherence to Turkey’s Muslim identity, strict observance of traditional values and immediate localism. There existed motive and ground among these people to look for alternative geopolitical agendas whilst rivalling geographical imaginations and geopolitical discourses were brewing in conservative circles. Post the 1980s, a flourishing pious commercial and industrial bourgeoisie as well as re-emerging tariqas and Sufi orders (Nakshibendi and Nur movements) became centres of attraction among the ranks of conservatives.

III. THE REPUBLICAN ERA


In applying Michael Mann’s quadruple model of social power, it must be noted that “different states crystalized differently.” The core interaction among social power networks in the early years of state formation in Turkey diverged significantly from that of western countries. In contrast to western experience, a rising industrial and commercial bourgeoisie was not the engine of change in Turkey. To the contrary, bureaucratic cadres (military and civilian) became the agents of change through revolution-from-above. In this regard a large number of people with military backgrounds were present under the roof of CHP, the political

party leading republican reforms. Thus from the very beginning, military and political power was densely entwined in Turkey. Through his charismatic qualities as the commander-in-chief who championed Turkey’s liberation effort, Mustafa Kemal made sure that the army was loyal to him and to the Republic. In the absence of effective multiparty contestation until the 1950s and capitalist class consciousness, these two sources of social power preponderated in determining the shape of Turkish state, society and Turkey’s geopolitical positioning from which its foreign policy sprang up.

Besides the early days of modern Turkey were characterized by a large segment of peasants, small farmers, and agricultural labourers. Sunar adds to this picture the presence of a considerable landowning class and the local notables of provincial towns (eşraf) through which he names the establishment of the Turkish state an accommodation between the civilian and military bureaucracy, and the commercial bourgeoisie and the landed class (eşraf). What must be noted in this tripartite interaction is that there was no relationship among these actors as equal partners. To the contrary, the congealment of political and military power was incomparably supreme. Holders of politico-military power “sought to control and depoliticize, rather than mobilize, the masses in the process of social change”.

As a result, it was the state that stepped in to foster economic development for creation of jobs, industries and wealth in what Polanyi names “an instituted process” brought into being by deliberate state intervention. Öncü calls this an effort by the pro-capitalist bureaucratic

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elite to create an industrial capitalist class\textsuperscript{386} while Mardin dubs it state-led growth of a class of Turkish entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{387} What underlies these analyses is that the new Turkish state was in search of an alternative bourgeoisie out of its own ranks to consolidate power behind its westernist geopolitical project.

This newly emerging bourgeoisie relying on the Turkish state as the chief credit-provider, buyer and the biggest employer,\textsuperscript{388} was producing mainly for the domestic market. It had almost no motive to look beyond Turkey’s borders for commercial or business interactions. As an inward looking class, the keep-to-itself stance of Turkey in regional affairs boded well with its interests. Besides, this class was obedient in nature since its relationship with the state was clientalistic and symbiotic.\textsuperscript{389} Similarly, medium size traders and farmers in western Anatolia, wage earners (\textit{memur}) in the public sector and employees of large private companies as well as urban artisans constituted the Kemalist middle class. Their loyalty to westernism as a geopolitical choice in determining the shape of the Turkish state, society and foreign policy was almost unhindered.

In this process, economic structures in the centre (urban areas) were strengthened at the expense of those in the periphery (rural parts of the country) thanks to the interventions in the market.\textsuperscript{390} In other words, the politico-military elite tried to enlarge social consensus around its westernist geopolitical entrepreneurship by creating a bourgeoisie and middle class of its own in urban centres while leaving socio-economic structures in the countryside

\textsuperscript{389}TEKELI, I., & İLKIN, S. (1982). \textit{Uygulamaya Geçerken Turkiyede Devletçiliğin Oluşumu (Etatism as It was Put into Practice in Turkey)}. Ankara, Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi.
with strong religious and conservative feelings open to marginalize. Zürcher holds the authoritarian character of early republican era accountable for the “huge chasm between the government and the people because the demands of the marginalized and relatively helpless sectors of society were never represented in state policy.” As a result, until the 1950s the bulk of the Turkish population remained isolated and traditional while the urban centres were modern and secular. Two Turkeys emerged in which political, military, economic and ideological power (Kemalism) crystalized in the centre while the rural, traditional, and pious Turkey lagged considerably behind. The net impact was an overwhelming dominance of westernist geopolitical entrepreneurship which was simultaneously accompanied by conservative discourses envisioning a different global positioning for Turkey.

**Kemalist Ideology: The Melting Pot?**

Kemalism in this context was presented as an ideology that Turks could give their loyalty to. In its simplest connotation, Kemalism refers to a set of ideas that aim to bring Turkey back to the level of contemporary civilization by westernizing, i.e. following the path of rationality (as opposed to faith) and positive science. Kemalism is developmentalist, reformist, revolutionary and state-centric. Kemalists attempt to make Turkey everything the West is and symbolizes of.

As an ideology, Kemalism was given shape more explicitly in the CHP Congress of 1931 whereby six principles i.e. republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, laicism and revolutionism, were codified as its central pillars. For its ardent followers these principles are considered sacrosanct. Kemalism proper was made part of CHP’s Statute in 1935 and two years later it was incorporated into the Turkish constitution. Due to the level of abstraction in

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these principles, Kemalism, as an ideology, was subject to much debate. For example, Bora & Gültekingil assert that it is an ideology of national modernization, which a large segment of Turkish society shares intensively.\textsuperscript{393} Scholars who emphasize the progressive elements of Kemalist ideology draw attention to its focus on independence, popular sovereignty, modernity and populism.\textsuperscript{394} More explicit expression of these principles is associated with democracy, rule of law, human rights, progress and economic development. For others, the underlying feature of Kemalism is authoritarianism and eclecticism.\textsuperscript{395}

Regardless of whichever aspect one prioritizes, as in every ideology, Kemalism tried to totalize and monopolize the meaning of what’s right and what’s not in Turkey. Any kind of thinking was denied existence without structuring a direct or indirect relation to Kemalism.\textsuperscript{396} Thus, Kemalism tried to inhibit geopolitical and intellectual discourses that did not befit the interests, agendas and discourses of those who hold onto this paradigm. It aimed at creating a collectivity of thought and action towards a myth of homogeneity of Turkey. In other words, Kemalists attempted at a monolithic modern state by keeping westernist, (Sunni Turkish) nationalistic and laicist outlook strong at the expense of largely excluding Allevites, Kurds, conservatives and non-Muslims (Armenians, Greeks, Jews, etc.).\textsuperscript{397} To this end, all the people of Turkey were defined as ‘Turks’ by the 1924 Constitution regardless of their racial or religious/sectarian background.\textsuperscript{398} Economy and social order were gradually transformed by a series of changes. In this vein, non-Muslim traders were excluded from Istanbul Trade Chamber in 1923. Likewise a law was enacted in 1926 to make Turkish compulsory in all


trade-business transactions. With unification of the Education Code (Tevhid-i Tedrisat) in 1924, adoption of western style Dress Code in 1925, Civil Code and Gregorian calendar in 1926, writing Islam out of the Constitution and transition from Arabic to Latin in 1928, changing to western metric system and shifting weekend holiday from Friday to Sunday in 1930s, a comprehensive transformation was aimed. Another law in 1934 banned using surnames which make reference to ethnicities other than Turkish. In supressing sub-identities, Settlement Law in 1934 described in great detail how Turkish speaking Christian population in Turkey would be exchanged with Muslim but non-Turkish people in Greece in line with the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. It was thus hoped that traditional, religious and ethnic/sectarian symbols would cease to serve as markers of difference in social life. By virtue of such steps and a persistent discourse, Kemalism created a myth asserting to have achieved total unification and cohesion on its westernist vocation, based on its ideological supremacy.

In terms of attaining supremacy in a religious society, the most crucial aspect was laicism (French version of secularism). In essence, it meant that the Turkish state would have an equal distance to every faith and religion in separating state and religious affairs. This, however, was not absolute neutrality. The state was actively involved in regulating religious life through the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). The reason was, just like Christianity in Europe, Islam for centuries used to serve as “a multifunctional peg on

which values, personalities, ideologies and power could be hung". The presence of religious institutions, Sufi orders and the *ulema* (religious experts), and the moral influence of religion over masses were perceived latent challenges to the power of Kemalist elite. Therefore, the Turkish state treated religion as a barrier to modernization and democratization which the West represented, and took measures to isolate it from political and public life.

In this context, with the abolition of the caliphate what had been “a religion penetrating into every crevice of daily life was cut off from these areas”. The extensive secularization effort included the abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, the abolition of religious courts, dissolution of religious orders (tariqat) and pious schools (medrese), disestablishment of Islam as the state’s religion and abandonment of Arabic alphabet, and unification of education system (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat*). Thus Turkey’s links with its imperial past were severed for good. By inculcating westernist discourses and through establishing control over pious activity, formal education and print media, it was hoped that religion could be deprived of its social appeal as a source of power and that the power of the Kemalist elite be inflated.

Turkish print and visual media was under strict state control until the early 1990s. Eleanor Oxford argues that “Turkish media has long been an official mouthpiece of the status quo, its main duty being the propagation of Kemalist ideology (and westernist worldview) whilst honouring and being sympathetic to the state-military relationship that has dominated

In the early years, “Cumhuriyet (Republic)” and “Akşam (Evening)” newspapers as well as “Kadro (Cadre)” magazine played key roles in propagating the Kemalist worldview. In the opposite direction, with the introduction of the “Law of Maintenance of Order (Takrir-I Sukun)” in 1925, the press in Istanbul was put under strict control and newspapers from the Islamic or extreme left were shut down. All newspapers adopting liberal or socialist positions were closed. By the 1930s, state controlled radio broadcasting started in Turkey as a further instrument of indoctrination. After the introduction of multiparty competition, dailies “Milliyet (Nationality)” and “Hürriyet (Freedom)”, both of which live up to this day, were established. But since these papers relied heavily on state subsidies and commercial benefits, their line of publication were compatible with Kemalist predispositions. In the 1960’s and 1970’s, greater degree of proliferation in terms of circulation and activity of mass media was achieved in Turkey. Yet due to problems of financial self-sufficiency, major media outlets had to develop clientalistic relations with the state, which inhibited in a way their ability to voice up counter narratives. It was against this backdrop that the support of the conservative masses in the periphery to the westernist project and laicist ideology was sought.

It needs to be noted that Kemalism for a long time stayed a collimator ideology in Turkey, one that breeds power by diffusing through the boundaries of economic, military and political power organizations. It enjoyed moral power over the masses and even political parties with more conservative leanings, which were espoused by Mustafa Kemal’s personal charisma.

413 Ibid. P.524
and the achievements of the newly established state. Although political power changed hands to the conservatives in 1950-1960, 1969-1971, 1975-1978 and 1979-1980 before more recent times, Kemalist institutionalization of power backed by its ideological influence that shaped the public space and framed the content of struggles over inclusion and exclusion to the state, remained, as bluntly remarked by Düzgün, largely intact from the early Republican period through the 1980s.414

Decision-Making in Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-1982

Against this backdrop, there is wide consensus in the literature that Turkish foreign policy for a long time remained a strictly restricted realm that was reserved to a few mandarins in the Turkish state.415 Decision-making was highly personalized and hierarchical. This was easy since three war veterans served long tenures in the early years.416 The legacy of Mustafa Kemal who singlehandedly formulated and observed the westernist orientation in Turkish foreign policy remained intact even after his death under his successor İnönü.417 This was also the period during which the Turkish foreign service (MFA) began to take shape albeit its contribution to policy making remained marginal. In the absence of real popular electoral competition and lack of public debate, westernism as a geopolitical choice in foreign policy enjoyed unchallenged supremacy.

416 Kemal Atatürk was the President until 1938. İsmet İnönü was the Prime Minister until 1937 with two brief interruptions, and later became the President from 1939 to 1945. Fevzi Çakmak was the Chief of General Staff until the end of Second World War. Besides, Tevfik Rüştü Aras ran the foreign affairs portfolio as the Minister until 1938, providing likewise continuity.
Once multi-party contestation was introduced in 1946 and the Democrat Party (DP) came to power four years later, the bipartisan consensus on Turkey’s western positioning remained unaltered against a rampant Soviet threat. However, DP leaders perceived the Middle East differently, mostly as a place populated by Muslim brethren. Another difference between CHP and DP was that the latter relied more on the input from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{418}

The MFA was a largely homogenous segment of bureaucracy which took pride in its westernist and nationalistic credentials. It was indeed one of the staunchest adherents of Turkey’s westernist orientation. Recruitment to the Turkish foreign service remained a nepotistic practice in which kinship relations and elitist (Kemalist and other) networks played a key role. Having completed academic studies abroad or in schools teaching in foreign languages in Turkey, those referred by serving or retired members of the MFA as well as by the civilian and military elite enjoyed considerable leverage in getting recruited to the job. The same applied to promotions, overseas postings and discharge. Though Ambassadorial postings required tripartite approval by the Foreign Minister, PM and the President, the MFA by carefully observing the line of promotions used to restrict the pool of eligible candidates. Given that out-of-MFA Ambassadors were a thing of exceptional rarity, the cohesive character of the MFA as a westernist institution in the Turkish bureaucracy remained almost unchallenged. Thus it sought institutional autonomy vis-à-vis holders of political power in overseeing the strategic direction of the Turkish state.

Consequently, the MFA gradually emerged as the safety-valve to keep foreign affairs in order against DP government when championing closer relations with the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{419} As Mufti notes, ‘governments came and went but the MFA as the republican institution overseeing

\textsuperscript{419} GIRGIN, K. (1993). 
foreign relations remained, making sure that the ship of state never veered too far off the course, and ever ready to shoot down the reckless schemes of elected politicians'. But this was no easy job as there was yet another major divergence, i.e. the Turkish Prime Minister replaced the President as the most powerful actor in shaping external policy. Consequently, the bipartisan nature of overall foreign policy-making and the top-down characteristics of external affairs as an area of expert craftsmanship remained similar. This ensured continuity in Turkey's western orientation but the MFA failed to determine the exact shape of Turkish action in the Middle East.

Consensus on foreign policy was disrupted for good soon after the 1960 coup d'etat. The liberal constitution introduced in 1961 created an environment of free debate where "westernism" as a geopolitical preference came under attack. It was not only the transformation of the institutional and legal setting but also changes in the political environment that fuelled these debates. The post-1960 period witnessed an increase in the number of actors interested in and wanting to have a say on foreign policy issues, and the entry into the Turkish Parliament (in the 1965 elections) of new parties (communists) with radically different views.

However, these dissenting voices were not strong enough to steer a change in the strategic orientation of Turkey. Among the two major political parties (CHP of Bülent Ecevit and AP of Süleyman Demirel) that ran the country during the 1960s and 1970s, none represented an alternative geopolitical agenda to compellingly instigate a change in Turkey's western-centric foreign policy. CHP, as the vanguard of Kemalism, simply conformed to the prevalent westernist orientation. AP (Adalet Partisi - Justice Party) of Demirel, relying on the electoral

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422 Ibid.
423 Ibid.
424 Ibid.
core of the defunct DP was careful enough to distance itself from the legacy of Menderes. Besides, AP was never a party of strong geopolitical convictions in running the external affairs portfolio as “Demirel never claimed any special expertise or even an interest in foreign policy” and mostly deferred the portfolio to the foreign policy establishment. The two other parties, namely MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi - National Salvation Party) of Necmettin Erbakan and (MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - National Movement Party) of Alparslan Türkeş embracing such a geopolitical narrative (Easternism/Asianism/Turkism) were junior coalition partners in the brief periods they were in office. Therefore, their impact on foreign policy remained limited. Instead they mostly chose to underscore the “national unity” clause on foreign policy despite their indigestions about the preferences of the bigger coalition partner.

Besides, the rise in the power of the military especially after the 1971 memorandum simply placed political actors in a rather marginal position in influencing foreign policy. In an environment of coalition governments (from 1961 to 1982) and with a powerful military (1971-1982), the MFA, as a relatively autonomous and coherent institution in the bureaucracy strived to enhance its role in foreign relations. İskit astutely remarks that ‘the Ministry tried to keep its autonomy and monopoly in the formation of foreign affairs and perceived politicians as the signatories of the decisions made by the bureaucrats of the ministry.’ As a result, two notions emerged in Turkish foreign policy. “State policies” referred to Kemalist policy preoccupations anchored to the west which the MFA and military strictly observed. Presented as reflecting the “national consensus” on foreign policy, these were presented as sacred, omniscient and unchangeable. “Government policies” on the other hand were about the choices made by the politicians of the day who were branded as neither experts nor competent enough to devise alternative courses of action.

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IV. NEO-LIBERAL ERA

Turkey Opens Up: 1982 -

A substantial reconceptualization of Turkish foreign policy did not arrive without a decisive change in the relative weight of social structures of power. This is what happened in Turkey after the coup d'état in 1980. Albeit operating within the remits of the authoritarian system established by coup-makers, the 1980s were ironically the period when Turkey went through a remarkable process of liberalization in politics, economy, society, culture and foreign policy. This process set in motion a new set of dynamics which eventually resulted in the emergence of new power centres. “The increasing economic and political power of pious Muslims changed the previous power structure where the Kemalists effectively ruled alone.”427 This inevitably reflected on foreign policy.

The politician who started this process was Turgut Özal who had unsuccessfully run for the parliament in 1977 as a candidate for Erbakan’s MSP. He was of a peripheral background from a conservative family.428 Özal was Kurdish in origin, a devout Muslim and a confessed follower of Nakhsibendi leader Zahit Kotku.429 Being an engineer and spending two years in the World Bank in the early 1970s, Özal was well exposed to western culture and ideas (especially liberalism). Thanks to the blend between moderate religious leanings and reformism, Özal managed to consolidate his hold on power from 1983 until the year he died

in 1993. He brought together a cadre of liberal, conservative, nationalist and welfarist approaches.  

The 1980s were the years Turkey reversed decades old import substitution which aimed at protecting the blossoming republican entrepreneurs and middle class in line with Kemalist etatism. Instead export-led-growth was embraced as the new mode of development through which the state’s role in the economy was gradually minimized. The new economy relied on the export potential of Turkey, foreign direct investments and capital inflows. Coupled with privatization of state owned enterprises, cheap credit opportunities, export subsidies, and trade and capital liberalization; new avenues were opened for small and mid-size entrepreneurs. Particularly important was the decision to allow interest-free finance houses which provided Turkey’s pious entrepreneurs with much needed capital.

Segments of the Turkish business community which were primarily oriented towards the lucrative internal market opposed liberalization. Forces of resistance were the Kemalist bourgeoisie composed of relatively large industrialists and traders. Those benefitting from the new policies were the pious conservatives in the periphery who were the disadvantaged under the import-substitute development strategy. Members of this new group established their own financial networks, organized themselves outside the control of the state, and challenged the pre-eminence of state-supported industrialists. Slowly but assertively, a new bourgeoisie and a new middle class came into being. These new classes are usually

treated as the “symbol or carriers of change” in Turkey as well as “the most significant support base” for conservative politicians.435

The clientele of these new classes supported free market competition and exposure to the world because they achieved economic power independently of state patronage.436 They preferred liberal policies and minimal state intervention.437 Thumann underlines that this new group, adapting skillfully to the requirements of time-space compression (globalization), considered itself far more progressive than the secular (military) officers, judges and civil servants (in foreign service) that have one way or the other ruled Turkey since 1923.438

The newcomers in economic power were extremely critical of the secular establishment and increasingly involved in shaping economic policy and asking for a voice in external affairs.439 Their regional and global interests diverged significantly from that of the big industrialists. As an outward looking class and far more eager to interact with places in Turkey’s close vicinity, they demanded peaceful relations in thesespaces. Thus they demanded regional security and stability.440 In other words, they pressured Turkish policy-makers for a Lebensraum where they could seek new markets, raw materials, finance and energy resources with a view to enhance their interests. This motivated Turkey’s conservative political leaders to take a much

437 Ibid.
more visible role in helping shape the peaceful and developmentalist territorial orders especially in the Middle East and Turkic-speaking world.

Old Wine in New Bottles: Religion Resurfaces

During the 1980s, crucial changes also took place in the social and ideological make up in Turkey. The speed at which population and urbanization grew far exceeded the rate of economic growth and industrialization.\(^{441}\) Rapid urbanization and unequal industrialization further deepened the inherent centre-periphery divide as urban centres attracted huge immigration flows. This has gradually eroded confidence of many Turks in the “state”, its institutions\(^ {442}\) and the established policy positions locking the direction of their country to the west in seeking solutions.

Under these circumstances, the coup-makers of 1982 who visualized Turkey’s place in the western “free world” against a rampant communist threat, once again relied on the functionalist perspective on religion. Justifying their intervention by unstoppable clashes between right (nationalist) and left (socialist) wing groups; they thought Islam could play a gluing role in overcoming ideological cleavages. Religion was thus rebranded as a force of social unity, harmony and stability.\(^ {443}\) This facilitated association of official ideology (Kemalism) with Islam but by not doing this at the expense of depreciating or ignoring the

\(^{441}\) Turkey’s population at its inception was approximately 12 million. By 1960 the figure was roughly 30 million. 50 million threshold was exceeded in 1985 and it reached over 70 million in late 2000s (Statistics are from the website of the State Institute of Statistics available at: http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do (consulted on January 8, 2013).


weight of westernist credentials.\textsuperscript{444} This was an attempt to exploit religion and mould it with national feelings as a common denominator for social order while preserving westernist outlook.\textsuperscript{445} The “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” was designed to reduce the appeal of radical leftist ideologies (communism) and also to diminish the influence of non-Turkish strands of Islamic thinking from Pakistan and the Arab world.\textsuperscript{446} It was also hoped that such a synthesis would block the impact of Kurdish nationalism and Iranian revolution surpassing Turkey.

In the following years, religion began to reshape the socio-cultural, socio-economic and political aspects of life in Turkey through tariqahs, Sufi orders (Nakshibendi and Nur movements), flourishing pious economic structures (business communities organized under MUSİAD (Müstakil İşadamları Derneği - Independent Businessmen Association), TUSKON (Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu - Businessmen and Industrialists Confederation of Turkey), TÜMSİAD (Tüm Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği - Association of All Industrialists and Businessmen), etc.) and its offshoots in politics (the National View Movement of Erbakan and lately AK Party). Religion was gradually transformed into a mechanism of social solidarity and became a core component of network groups.\textsuperscript{447} In a way, religion regained influence as a multifunctional peg, this time determining not only the shape of values, culture and identity but also economy, politics and power. Besides, it served not only as a core component of personal identification but also a source of collective identity calling for a repositioning of Turkey’s global standing.

One peculiar aspect in the rise of Sufi orders such as the ones led by Fethullah Gülen (\textit{Nurcular}), Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (\textit{Süleymancilar}), Nakshibendi leaders Zahit Kotku and


later Esad Coşan (İskenderpasha community) was that they were far more business-oriented and outward looking than those in the early republican era. Their activities were not confined to spiritual preaching, religious solidarity or divinity studies. To the contrary, they have turned into a powerful transnational network of people controlling financial, economic, cultural and educational activities worldwide.\footnote{KESKİN, T. (2012). Market Oriented Post-Islamism in TURAM B. \textit{Secular State and Religious Society: Two Forces in Play in Turkey}, Palgrave Macmillan.p.124.} They controlled financial institutions, newspapers, schools and other economic activities that were increasingly of transnational character with the object of integrating Turkey with the world.\footnote{ARAS, B. (1998). Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face. \textit{The Middle East Quarterly}, \textit{Vol 5. No.3.} p.23-29.} Avcı gives a list of religious media out of which it is possible to identify Samanyolu TV, Samanyolu Haber TV, Ayna TV, Bugün TV, CHA (World News Agency), dailies Zaman and Bugün as well as magazines Aksiyon and Sızıntı being associated with Gülen movement; a newspaper (Türkiye), two TV channels (TGRT and Akra FM), and a news agency (IHA) being associated with Naqshbandisect whereas one cable (Mesa), one local (Ege), and two main TV channels (Mar and Kadırga) can be linked to Qadiri branch.\footnote{AVCI, Ö. (2009). Türkiye’de İslam’ın Modern Görünümleri ve Medya Araçları: Samanyolu TV Örneği (Modern Islamic visibilities in Turkey and their communication channels: the example of Samanyolu TV). \textit{in}: G. Pultar, ed. \textit{Kimlikler Lütfen (Identities Please).} Ankara: O.D.T.Ü. Yayincilik, p.214.} In the field of education, Gulen’s followers operate around 1,200 international schools in more than 150 countries as of 2000s(mostly in Central Asia, Africa and Balkans).\footnote{HENDRICK, J. (2011). Media Wars and the Gulen Factor in the New Turkey. \textit{Middle East Report}. 41. p.42.} They also ran hundreds of preparatory courses for Turkey’s university entrance exam. The movement controlled financial institutions such as Bank Asya, the country’s largest “interest-free” bank, and Asya Finans.\footnote{SVANTE E. C. & KAY, M. K. (2015). The Naqshbandi-Khalidi Order and Political Islam in Turkey. \textit{Current Trends in Islamist Ideology}. Hudson Institute. p.13.} Nakshibendis on the other hand operated İhlas Finans. The Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), linked to Gulenists, was incepted in 2005 which became Turkey’s largest private business-related organization engaging in business activities towards Africa, Central Asia
and the Balkans. Menzil group created another association, TÜMSIAD, the same year with a membership base of 15,000 with a view to help forge business ties with Muslim countries. As noted by Svante and Kay, the movement of Süleyman Tunahan too gradually evolved into an organized group in Turkey and Europe – controlling several hundred mosques and Quranic schools in Germany alone.

The message of Turkish Islam as a vibrant ideological force also seems to have undergone a substantial transformation. It was no longer merely geared towards enhancing Islamic solidarity or an “umma” type of trans-boundary cooperation among Muslims. It was equally about easing the perceived tensions between Islam and Christianity, eastern and western civilizations, and hence promoting an agenda of inter-cultural/inter-faith dialogue, tolerance and harmony. This was particularly true for the congregation of Fethullah Gülen, a disciple of Said Nursi (the founder of Nur movement in Turkey). Ending state monopoly on media ownership in the post 1993 period simply magnified the leverage enjoyed by religion as a source of social power. Religious groups gained access to media outlets, which allowed them to reach a broader audience. Yet their activity and impact was largely dwarfed in comparison to Kemalist mainstream media.

Nonetheless, thanks to increased interaction with various people in the Middle East, the image of Arabs began to incrementally change in Turkish people’s perception. As the opportunity space was enlarged at home, these religious communities wished the Turkish state be more supportive of their activities abroad rather than acting as a force of hindrance.

Turkey under conservative politicians in a way accommodated the demands of religious movements as well in trying to connect Turkey with far away (physically or mentally) territories.

The response by Kemalists to the revival of religion was a process of securitization in which the object of security was laicism and integrity of the Republic.\textsuperscript{457} This was a partial success during February 28 process in which the military helped forge a broad societal basis to force the elected conservative government to resign. Ousted and shut down was not only RP of Necmettin Erbakan. Pious businessmen and religious orders also came under attack. The unexpected yield of this bold intervention was gradual erosion in the confidence to the military’s true motivations as the whole event was perceived a greedy act to grasp power from elected politicians. Besides, it soon became controversial that a strong clique within military pushed for such an action at the expense of undermining the overall command structure.\textsuperscript{458}

**The Crisis of Kemalism**

The rise of Islam as an outward looking, pro-business and pro-dialogue ideology coincides with another trend in Turkey, i.e. the crisis of Kemalism. The crisis became apparent once some of Kemalist prerogatives did not come true, contradictions emerged among its basic tenets and some of principles lost its contemporary relevance.

Going in reverse order, introduction of neo-liberal economic policy based on export-led growth made “etatism” by and large redundant. Secondly, making a choice between Kemalist principles of “populism” and “republicanism” versus “etatism” and “revolutionism” created a moral dilemma. In other words, the modernist democratic ideals of Kemalism which relied on


the popular will of people contradicted with its revolutionary, top-down, statist and authoritarian tendencies.\footnote{DİNÇŞAHİN, Ş. (2012). What Went Wrong with Kemalism? Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey, London, Vol. I: 2, p.17.} The illiberal stance on interpreting these principles created a rift between the westernized rulers and conservative people. On the one hand lied a strong and centralized state structure with a repressive and intolerant elite while on the other was alienated masses. Thirdly, Kemalism failed to forge a common unifying identity for all its nationals.\footnote{REYNOLDS, M. A. (2012). p.iii} Put differently, as Kemalists tried to oust religion from the social texture, they could not present a civic ideology to replace the old religious and social bonds.\footnote{Kemalism: A Short Introduction, the web site of Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, available at \url{http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0440} (consulted on January 10, 2013).} Instead they tried to assimilate ethnic and religious differences under the supposedly melting pot of Kemalist ideology and “Turkishness”.

The crisis of Kemalism was not felt earlier because Atatürk’s charismatic persona managed to disguise its inherent flaws. His cult, resembling the Mahdi/Saviour notion in Turkish-Islamic tradition succeeded in uniting a war torn nation.\footnote{BERKES, N. (1969). \textit{The Transformation of the Kemalist Regime}. Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University, Center for Middle Eastern Studies. p. 9.} With sweeping transformations in political, economic, social and ideological make up in the 1980s; imperfections about Turkish democracy, problems related to Kurds, Alevites and Christian minorities as much as Islamic revival emerged as outstanding issues. Thanks to the interpretation given to Turkey's geography at the centre of eternal conflict, turmoil and tension, these pervasive domestic problems motivated Kemalist leaders to adopt an insular and rather allergic tone towards Kurds, devout Muslims and to a lesser degree non-Muslim minorities. This uncompromising attitude was coupled with an inward looking geopolitical discourse and risk averse, defensive and aloof stance in regional affairs. This cyclical pattern not only failed to help solve Turkey's
democracy deficiency and its minority problems but also virtually locked the country in from the spaces surrounding Turkey.

Lastly Kemalism’s promise to make Turkey an equal partner in the western community of nations did not materialize. Even as a NATO member, Turkey had to endure deep disappointments. Most concretely, the unrealized bid to join the EU after 50 years further exacerbated such perceptions. Not offering any viable solutions, as an ideology and a geopolitical blueprint, Kemalism’s appeal to foster social and economic development, enhance democratic participation and civil rights and guide foreign policy came under serious criticism.

To sum up, post-1980s witnessed a process through which prerogatives of the Kemalist establishment increasingly came under attack. Until the late 1990s, the new networks of power comprising of conservative politicians, the pious commercial and industrialist bourgeoisie, religious orders and movements gradually gained the upper hand. Thus, the existing power relations that the Kemalist establishment normalized until the 1980s went under extreme strain by the combined force of these extensive transformations. This posed a serious challenge to the 50 years old social order shaped by the iron triangle of army-bureaucracy-intelligentsia backed by big business.

The relative shift in the domestic distribution of power accounts in part for the change in the tone, style and orientation of Turkish foreign policy which reflects the interests, agendas and preferences of emboldened conservatives. This gradual shift however was not an absolute transfer of power from one network to another. It was, as was ever, an ongoing competition between the two camps to determine the shape of the Turkish state, society, politics and
Two Contradictory Trends in Foreign Policy-Making: Post-1980’s

The last thirty years of Turkey is characterized by two reverse trends in foreign policy-making. During the 1980s and 2000s, the military and its civilian collaborators steadily strengthened their grip on power. The 1990s in particular were the high time for the military’s influence not only in foreign policy but also anything with a visible political connation. The only exception was how Özal handled the external relations portfolio. The second period starting in the 2000s on the other hand bore witness to a gradual decline in the weight of the military, yet not amounting to the point of total extinction.

a) The Rise and Rise of Foreign Policy Establishment: 1982-1999

Since the 1960s, the dichotomous relationship between weak government versus strong bureaucracy manifested itself starkly in the making of Turkish foreign policy. As noted by critical scholars, ‘foreign policy decision-making within coalition governments, together with the involvement of multiple autonomous actors, has always been very challenging in Turkish politics compared to situations in which decision-making power is less dispersed.’ In the absence of strong governments to bring fresh stimuli to the existing westernist geopolitical

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464 CUHADAR-GÜRKAYNAK, E., & ÖZKECECI-TANER, B. (2004). Decisionmaking Process Matters: Lessons Learned from Two Turkish Foreign Policy Cases 1. Turkish Studies. 5, p. 44.
discourse, the heavyweights in foreign affairs remained the military and MFA until the 2000s. Turkish foreign policy reflected the core interaction between these institutions. The first was believed to enjoy an unequal weight in determining policy outcomes. The latter served as a major source of expertise on issues pertinent to external relations and ran daily errands in policy implementation. Consequently, “foreign policy remained one sphere of politics where consensus among the traditional decision-making elites seemed strongest, to the extent that foreign policy was often regarded as ‘state policy’.”

As in every foreign service, the many functions performed by the Turkish MFA included collecting data on international relations, giving policy-makers an informed picture of world affairs, providing input for policy-making, drafting talking points and foreign policy speeches as well as taking part in implementation. These functions elevated the upper tier of the MFA to the privileged status of Turkey’s geopolitical storytellers. Together with the military brass, Robins calls them “high priests of Kemalism”. They were the ones giving shape to perceptions of what the international political space is, and what course of action to follow. These functions in themselves were sources of power. This is because the MFA made a claim of having expertise and authoritative knowledge on the discipline of foreign affairs, which was defined as an act beyond the grasp of ordinary citizens and politicians. Thus, it tried to establish itself with a reputation of professionalism, expertise, observing state traditions and risk-averse judgement.

By making sense of international relations, almost invariably with resort to the westernist imagery, the MFA exercised diffused power. It laid down the parameters within which “national interest” could be evoked. By also monopolizing the means (talking points, policy speeches and recommending policy positions) through which “national interest” is reflected in the discourse, the MFA aimed to function as the watch-keeper of Turkey’s overall foreign policy. In this respect, the role it played in framing policy and reproducing westernist geopolitical discourse proved greater in the absence of strong, charismatic and knowledgeable political figures with a challenging geopolitical narrative.470

This is probably why President Özal chose to conduct foreign policy without much consideration to the advice from the bureaucracy. For him, this was breaking away with bureaucratic tutelage. He tried to spare authority back to the elected government by challenging the sanctity of state traditions.471 Yet, as Robbins makes the authoritative claim, ‘it is better to treat the rise in Özal’s personal style as an exception rather than the rule since the foreign and security establishment made a notable come back after his death.’472

In this context, the 1990s were arguably the golden years of the Turkish army. If Turkish diplomats can be named stewards of Turkey’s western oriented foreign policy, the army’s perception of itself was the guardian of (secular and nationalist) domestic order and strategic

470 Information-providing, preparing talking points and drafting policy speeches are performed by various departments of Turkish MFA on a continuous basis. Consumers of these knowledge products are numerous. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is the first in line. Prime Minister, President and Speaker of Parliament are also regular customers. Besides members of Turkish MFA have permanent presence in these high offices. Throughout modern history, speech-writers of Turkish political leaders, especially in the field of external relations, were almost invariably selected among the files of the MFA. Since 2002, presence of Turkish diplomats in the higher offices continues. However, PM Erdoğan has brought in his own team of speech-writers who do not have MFA background, nonetheless drafting foreign policy speeches according to the taste of their master.


parameters of 'state policies'. Thus the MFA and the military shared a consensus in imagining Turkey an integral part of the Western/European world. In other words, these two were bounded together in complying with the westernist geographical imagination. As a result, their perceptions of national interest largely converged to the point that General Çevik Bir is quoted saying that “governments are like hats. One goes off and another comes in. What remains truly is the state”.

Throughout republican history, the army, just like the MFA, could secure a fairly established institutional and political autonomy. Relying on the self-styled military education, it achieved a fairly autonomous corporate identity among the officer corps. In this respect recruiting, promotion, discharge and assuming commanding positions in hierarchy remained a practice of the military’s internal affairs. As a result, those who did not subscribe to Kemalist worldview, imagination and ideology were either outright denied recruitment or barred during promotions. The military’s closed circuit education system also provided harmony and conformity around the westernist imagery. Thus, the army stood ready to protect the Kemalist state if necessary from both its own people and against external enemies.

The power of the military, in the post-1982 coup until the 2000s, was both coercive and diffused, deriving from formal and informal structures of power. The diffused power of TAF stemmed from its strict subscription to Kemalist ideology and coupling this concept with “national security”. The coercive basis of the military’s power crystalized around the

474 General Bir is quoted saying this to Turkish reporters in 1996 in defiance of PM Erbakan’s foreign policy overtures in the Muslim world as well as showing who is in charge against a PM who earned a reputation for his anti-Israeli rhetoric, statement available at http://www.gazetevatanemek.com/index.php/yazarlar/deniz-hakan/item/3482-menderesten-gunumuz-e-israil-icin-suriye-zapti-tampon-devlet-kurdistan.html (consulted April 10, 2013).
475 SMC is the institutional mechanism convening twice a year under the PM's chairmanship in order to decide on crucial matters pertaining to the organization of Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) to include promotions to the rank of general, force and army commands. In addition to the PM, Chief of General Staff, Commanders of Land-Navy-Air-Gendarmerie Force Commanders and top brass of the military (all serving generals and admirals). SMC decisions are still immune from judicial overview.
institutional mechanism called the National Security Council and by its reputation of not hesitating to interfere in the political process.\textsuperscript{476}

Surprisingly military interventions in Turkey in general enjoyed considerable popular support\textsuperscript{477} due to a deep seated feature of Turkish geopolitical culture. As an extension of Sevres-phobia, Turks prioritized order at the expense of temporary interruptions in democracy. The belief that “the worst order is better than a situation of complete chaos” loomed large in the collective memory of Turks. In this cognitive inertia, the experience of the anarchy-like situation in post-World War I Ottoman Empire was reproduced generation after generation. The military in this perspective was seen as the ultimate order-provider at times of crisis, economic distress and political insolvency.

Secondly, by defining what constitutes a threat, danger and challenge to Turkey’s “national security”, the military used to effectively dominate policy agenda in almost every dimension of governance. As Öztürk acknowledges, “thanks to the broad way in which national security was defined, the military was able to subsume all aspects of domestic, foreign, and security policy under it”.\textsuperscript{478} Such an interpretation gave the statements and recommendations issued by the military a powerful influence on the political process”.\textsuperscript{479} This in turn helped the military to promote its own legitimacy and perpetuate virtually veto power in politics with foreign policy being no exception during this period.\textsuperscript{480}


\textsuperscript{477} The Constitution of 1961 was approved by 61.7 % “yes” votes against 38.3 % “no”s. The 1982 Constitution on the other hand was endorsed by an overwhelming 91.3 % against 8.6%.


\textsuperscript{479} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{480} CIZRE. U. (2011). p. 61.
One should emphasize here the command the Turkish military used to enjoy over the discipline of geopolitics as a scientific method of strategy which went hand in hand with the authority to shape national security discourse. A deep sensitivity on national security lay beneath this military-minded geopolitical perspective, which produced an inward-focused geopolitical understanding that prioritized internal concerns. The argument can be taken further in stipulating that the Turkish military also successfully exaggerated security threats coming from the outside. Accordingly, the military produced a strong national security discourse in which it claimed to be authoritative and expert while normalizing its above-the-politics influential position.

In this process, Turkey’s so-called exceptional geography (in the sense that its south and east was doomed with instability, turmoil, secessionist, irredentist and fundamentalist regimes and ideologies) was used as a means of securitizing the discourse on foreign policy. As a result, a fear of loss of territory, an over-zealous attitude towards sovereignty and territorial integrity and seeing Turkey in the midst of great power rivalry to divide and disintegrate loomed large in Turkish security discourse. Going hand-in-hand with this enduring perception were threats from within i.e. Kurds, political movements with Islamic motives and also fears that Greek, Armenian or other Christian minorities are colluding with

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481 For an extensive and elaborate sketch of Turkish military’s (ab)use of geopolitics see YEŞİLTAŞ, M. (2012). Coğrafya Kaçınılmazdır:Jeopolitik Zihniyet ve Türkiye’de Ordu (Geography is Unavoidable: Geopolitical Mentality and the Military in Turkey). Paper presented at the workshop titled “Where Turkey is Located?: Geography, Geopolitics and Competing Storylines”. May 11. Marmara University. İstanbul/Turkey.


483 Ibid.


foreign powers to divide and destroy the country.\textsuperscript{487} Such perceptions in turn made sentiments of insecurity grow stronger. Consequently, as argued by YeĢiltaĢ, geopolitical discourses produced by the military on the one hand tried to consolidate and normalize its institutional role (safeguarding the homeland and the bastion of Kemalist regime) while simultaneously merging this institution’s conception of the “imagined (western) identity” with the official state ideology.\textsuperscript{488}

Regardless of whether perceptions were commensurate with actual threats or if they bear any justifiable ground, creating a heightened sense of geographical insecurity served an undeclared agenda of enhancing cohesion, obedience and submission within society. The mythicized conception of Turkish geographical exceptionalism in the sense that it called Turkey a victim of its geographical embeddedness, supported existing structures of power. In the words of Aras, such a discourse helped policy-makers create a strong sense of defending the homeland, mobilize support at home and preserve their hold on power.\textsuperscript{489} By the same token, this also fitted well with the increasing role of the military in reflecting a mirror image of domestic national security discourse onto foreign policy.\textsuperscript{490} This is particularly important with regards to the Middle East because the boundaries of plausible action for any elected government were pre-framed within the threat perceptions of the military.

The institutional coercive mechanism by which foreign policy strategies were formulated was the National Security Council (NSC), which was established in accordance with the 1961 Constitution. Originally it was composed of 10 members equally divided between the military and civilian government. The NSC Secretary General came from the ranks of the military as well. Albeit being dissipated of voting rights, he enjoyed considerable power in setting the


\textsuperscript{488} YEĢİLTAS, M. (2012). p.3.


\textsuperscript{490} Ibid.
agenda. The Council through the powers vested in it by the 1982 Constitution (the extinct Article 118) played a leading role in defining the internal and external threats, national security priorities and hence taking over the primary responsibility to formulate security policy (hereafter read synonymous with foreign policy). Article 118/3 of the 1982 Constitution also stipulated that the Turkish government had to give "priority consideration" to its decisions. By the token of this clause, it was inadequately answerable to the Parliament on matters of defence, foreign and security policy. Its Secretary General had also the power to monitor the executive decision-making by following up the implementation of NSC decisions.\footnote{NARLI, N. (2011). Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980–2002, \textit{Turkish Studies}, 12:2, p.218.} The oversight task vested with the Secretary General in practice brought about immense executive privileges in instructing foreign, interior and justice ministers and overseeing the intelligence services on matters of national security. This drew the analogy that with such vast executive powers, he was like a shadow “Prime Minister” running a “parallel government”. All in all, thanks to the considerable coercive and diffused power this institution wielded for the military, during the 1990’s the NSC was transformed into the principle decision making mechanism in Turkey.

Emboldened by its leading role and with an attempt to retain control over security-minded discourse, the military also formulated a National Security Policy Document. This classified document reintroduced in 1992 was prepared by the General Secretariat of National Security Council in coordination with the MFA and National Intelligence Agency. Basically it set the strategic priorities and enumerated domestic and external threats. Turkey’s foreign and security policy needed to conform to this document. No law or decree could be acted, and no international treaty or agreement could be signed which would contradict with the basic principles of this document.\footnote{UZGEL, İ. (2004).p.193.} It must have been approved by the Turkish government but
not introduced to the parliament since it was not a law itself.\textsuperscript{493} The document was yet another instrument setting the limits of bounded rationality for Ankara in dealing with the external affairs portfolio. In the post-Cold War era for instance, the document identified Iraq, Iran and Syria as threats to Turkey’s security since these were deemed supporting Islamist groups and Kurdish secessionists.\textsuperscript{494} Therefore, it was no easy job for Turkey’s elected politiciansto go beyond what was made possible, plausible and legitimate in Ankara’s relations with these countries.

On the other hand, the Office of Turkish President was also reserved to a military figure until Turgut Özal was elected to this post in 1989. Albeit being largely symbolic in terms of executive powers, the President was nonetheless a crucial actor in the larger system of checks and balances. Having a military-minded figure in this high post was important in preserving the westernist outlook of the country as well as in overseeing daily errands of foreign policy. On the other hand, up until the late 1990s the director of the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) was also drawn from the files of the military as well as half its personnel.\textsuperscript{495} Therefore, it can be argued that the 1990s were the golden age of the Turkish military’s engagement with domestic and foreign policy.\textsuperscript{496}

Given this background, it is obvious that the military and the MFA enjoyed a disproportionate advantage in framing practical geopolitical discourse and thus a westernist discourse heavily entangled with the military’s vantage point of “national security” prevailed. Thus, “foreign policy” and “national security” was inextricably linked. William Hale, in this entwinement, notes that “defence (security) policy (presented as foreign policy) was regarded as the


\textsuperscript{496} Ibid. p.177.
(military's) private preserve, outside the control of the elected politicians.\textsuperscript{497} To challenge these established parameters, as in the case of Özal, one had to not only develop an alternative geopolitical discourse but also play around existing structures of power and decision making.

\textbf{b) Empowering the Elected Government vis-à-vis the Foreign Policy Establishment}

A most decisive dynamic helping gradually change the domestic power relations in Turkey was the single party government since 2002. Winning 34.3 \% of the total vote in 2001 (and hence securing 362 seats in a Parliament with 550), the AK Party became the new beacon of hope for Turks who longed for political stability, clean politics and business-friendly government. Its initial strong pro-democracy, pro-human rights and pro-EU rhetoric with a traditionalist and conservative scent was alluring for millions whose experience a decade ago was fraught with fragile coalition governments that were largely opportunistic and lacked clear principles and policy vision. In contrast to the deep political fragmentation in the 1990s, the new millennium thus signalled a period of political stability and strong government for Turkey. So far as that what Turkey had afterwards was a single party government which kept strengthening its political mandate after each general election.\textsuperscript{498} Relying on such a strong political mandate, the AK Party was able to gradually reclaim the domestic landscape which during weak and fragmented coalition governments in the 1990s had fallen under the influence of a strong military. Enjoying landslide electoral victories one after the other, AK Party government was able to expand its area of manoeuvre in putting into practice its own geopolitical agenda as republican establishment was incrementally deprived of its role in the system.


\textsuperscript{498} AK Party won 46.58 \% of the vote in 2007 and 49.83 \% in 2012 while the number of AK Party deputies in the Parliament fell to 341 and 327 respectively thanks to the Turkish electoral system.
A major strength was the AK Party’s ability to bring in its own breed of charismatic leaders to Turkish politics. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Ahmet Davutoğlu enjoyed popularity only comparable to previous conservative figures like Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal. In terms of personal ratings, they remained for so long far more popular than any of the existing political leaders in Turkey. Many of the qualities, in the Weberian sense, expected of charismatic leaders such as charm, self-confidence, attraction and appeal were present in their personalities. Hence, they did not shy away from taking risks in order to challenge conventional behaviour patterns anticipated of Turkey in the international arena. In so doing, the theatrical oratory skills in articulating a new geographical imagination for Turkey proved a crucial asset. The ability to persuade, sway and direct public opinion was extremely crucial in galvanizing support behind preferred courses of action in foreign policy. As noted by Kendal & Carter, “by means of (creating an image of) possessing exemplary and exceptional personal qualities and demonstration of extraordinary insight and accomplishment”, the power and choices they had were made legitimate and acceptable. Thus, their self-styled patterns of action attracted Turkish public as well as the Muslim world. This inspired loyalty and obedience from the followers and some degree of admiration from the opponents in the conduct of foreign policy.

The relative power of political actors vis-à-vis foreign policy establishment (the military and the MFA) was enhanced in two ways. On the one hand, this has been instrumental in setting the foreign policy agenda by taking into consideration expectations and preferences of those who lay at the core of the AK Party’s electoral success, i.e. Turkish conservatives; the rising pious bourgeoisie, neo-liberal entrepreneurs and intellectuals as well as religious orders and

tariqas. On the other hand, the presence of charismatic figures running the foreign affairs portfolio with a strong political mandate made it easier to take over the role of geopolitical “storytellers/priests”. Having developed an appealing geopolitical narrative (Turkey the centre), elected politicians thus reclaimed control over foreign policy discourse. As a result, political leaders were transformed into the new Shamans in scripting the international political space, Turkey’s global position, what it means to have the geopolities around Turkey and how Ankara should behave. Enjoying simultaneously sweeping electoral success gave credibility to the holders of political power to re-assert control over the definition of concepts like “national security”, “foreign policy positions (as opposed to ‘established state policies’) and hence what constitutes “national interest”. In the end, charismatic leaders virtually sidelined foreign policy bureaucracy and turned it into a subordinate mechanism.

The second crucial development is the structural changes facilitated by EU-led reforms that challenged the primary positions of the military/bureaucratic elite by undermining the basis of their coercive and diffused power. Turkey was officially granted candidature for EU membership at the Helsinki Summit of 1999. Accordingly, accession negotiations commenced in October 2005. In this vein, a series of reforms, some of which well surpassed the reign of the AK Party, were initiated. The decision to limit the powers of the NSC was particularly critical since it triggered a comprehensive transformation in the domestic scene. The first wave of reforms in 2001 altered the status of NSC decisions by stipulating that the government would no longer “give priority consideration” but rather “assess” the recommendations by NSC. In accordance with constitutional amendments in 2003, the post of Secretary General was given to a civilian. In this process, selection of the Secretary General was left to the discretion of the PM in contrast to the old practice whereby the

504 The first civilian to assume the post of NSC Secretary-General was Ambassador Yiğit Alpogan (2004-2007). Succeeding him were two serving Ambassadors and now the position is filled in by a former Governor.
military chose the candidates. Besides, the Secretary General’s “coordinating and overseeing” task in the implementation of NSC decisions was transferred to the Deputy PM. Additionally, the number of military working at his office was reduced by not renewing the contracts of staff with military backgrounds. Besides more civilians were recruited. Furthermore, the composition of the NSC was redesigned in a way to increase number of civilian members. As a result, the NSC was transformed into a truly consultative organ. The Turkish military’s grip on issues of foreign and security policy was thus significantly relaxed, depriving it of a crucial institutional mechanism to impact foreign policy.

Another change was about the National Security Policy Document (NSPD), known as the Red Book. One of the latest versions of this document was prepared in 2005 amid criticisms over continuation of “military tutelage” and lack of transparency since the Turkish Parliament and the elected government was excluded from its preparations. In due process, passages from the supposedly confidential document were leaked to the press. Particular attention was drawn to the part which stipulated that “the military could take control (of power) in addressing internal and external threats to national security if necessary”. This was interpreted as a further basis to legitimize military interventions and was demonized by liberal circles. The established practice according a primary role to the military in setting the tone of security (and foreign) policy was thus increasingly questioned. Liberal NGOs such as İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Foundation) and Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği (Foundation of Contemporary Jurists and Barristers) were among the harshest critics. As a result, the AK Party went ahead in adopting NSPD-2005 by a Prime Ministerial decree. Yet criticisms from


the ranks of the AK Party were not absent. Remarks by Deputy PM Arınç in the Turkish Parliament which likened the NSPD to “the covert constitution of Turkey” were the fiercest.507

Such wide spanned criticisms could not achieve nullification of the document. But they prepared the ground for amore civilian-led updated version. As a new revision was underway in 2010, the reports appearing in the Turkish press emphasized that it was the elected government and not the military that gave the document its ultimate shape. Reportedly, Islamic fundamentalism (irtica) was no longer named a domestic threat. In instigating a process of comprehensive “de-othering”; Greece, Syria and Iraq were removed from the list of hostiles.508 Hence, the NSPD was streamlined in accordance with the new foreign policy posture of Turkey.509

One of the latest attempts by the military to retake influence came amidst the furore over electing the new President in 2007. The military top brass, which considered the AK Party a threat to the secular domestic order, issued the famous “e-coup” with a view to block the transfer of what was perceived as the last bastion of Kemalist establishment to conservatives. The “e-statement” by the Turkish General Staff in brief read as follows.

“The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) is watching the Presidential election process with concern. It should not be forgotten that TAF is a party to these discussions and is the

509 Among others Cemil Çiçek, the Speaker of Government at the time, and Abdullah Gül, President are quoted to have made these remarks. See news portal http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/11/22/milli.guvenlik.siyaset.belgesi.kabul.edildi/597105.0/index.html and Zaman (Turkish daily) http://www.zaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsByld.action?haberno=1050561&keyfield=. (consulted on January 3, 2013).
absolute guardian of secularism. Moreover, TAF... will demonstrate its attitude and actions in a clear manner when the time comes. Nobody should doubt this”.\[^{510}\]

Despite having a relatively less influential status in the Turkish political system, the symbolism around the Office of President as a force in broader checks and balances was still strong. The Turkish military felt alarmed by conservatives' taking over this post in addition to the executive and the legislative branches of government. It was a fear that the President under a conservative figure like Abdullah Gül would turn into another centre of power which would further undermine the authority of the military.

The military’s move was regarded by many as a veiled soft coup which aimed to restore confidence in the country’s Kemalist credentials (laicism in particular) and keep the tradition of military tutelage. Reactions, however, were diverse. Staunch Kemalists instantly embraced it and went on to publicly justify it by clinging to a quote from Mustafa Kemal which says “if it is a matter about the homeland, the rest (the means) are of no significance”, pretty much re-invoking the securitization and militarization discourse with a view to stimulate a heightened sense of insecurity and danger. This was followed by mass rallies organized under the auspices of Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (ADD-Association of Ataturkist Thought).\[^{511}\] The trouble this time was AK Party government took a bold step in publicly condemning the e-coup by calling it unconstitutional, anti-democratic and grossly inappropriate.\[^{512}\] This was the very first time in modern Turkey that an elected government stood against a plot by the military. Besides, the AK Party at the time was seen a much more of modern, western, liberal and progressive force thanks to its pro-EU, pro-democracy and business friendly record. The neo-nationalist (ulusalci) backlash by the Kemalist establishment was therefore conceived

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\[^{510}\] The statement is reportedly drafted by General Yaşar Büyükanıt, the Chief of General Staff at the time. Full text remained in the official web page of the Turkish General Staff until May 2012. Reports in Turkish media claimed that it was removed from the site upon the request of President Gül.


\[^{512}\] Full text of Government Spokesperson’s (Cemil Çiçek) statement in response to the military is available at http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/406662.asp (consulted on January 8, 2013)
unbecoming. Conservative, liberal and pro-democracy segments of Turkish society found the attempt abhorrent and an act undermining institutionalization of Turkish democracy.\textsuperscript{513} As noted by Kaya, some critics condemned the military for doing the job of opposition parties in removing elected governments from power. They emphasized that by doing so, the military had caused political opposition to remain weak, fragmented, ineffective and lazy.\textsuperscript{514} Thus, the attempted intervention largely backfired.

The next move by the Kemalist establishment (under the leadership of CHP) was to file a case at the Constitutional Court against the vote in the Turkish Parliament which elected Abdullah Gül as the country's new President on the grounds that a necessary quorum was not met. In response, the Constitutional Court with a controversial decision, rendered the vote null and void. The snap election called afterwards resulted in an enhanced political mandate for the AK Party, further consolidating its legitimacy, which went ahead in electing Abdullah Gül as the new President. This added further fuel to an already continuing process that began to shake the authority and credibility of the Turkish military in affecting politics, decision-making and official foreign policy discourse since it was increasingly viewed as a counterproductive force.\textsuperscript{515}

The civilian side of the foreign policy establishment was not immune from disempowerment either. Firstly, during the AK Party's reign, promotions and postings overseas in the MFA were more strictly observed. Talent and hard work kept being rewarded but also a workable team of foreign service professionals were chosen. This has arguably created the first crack in its institutional autonomy. Secondly foreign policy is opened to systematic input from non-


\textsuperscript{515}TAŞPINAR, Ö. (2008). ‘Ergenekon and “the Banality of Evil”,’ Today’s Zaman (Turkish daily printed in English) July 14.
MFA experts. The first part of this effort was keeping an academic figure as the Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to the Turkish PM since 2003\textsuperscript{516} and a separate team of speech-writers at the Office of the Prime Minister. The second part is related to the increase in the number of non-career Ambassadors.\textsuperscript{517} This had a dual function. Through such arrangements, the government not only ensured a stronger hold on the policy-making procedure but also on discourse and execution. In the very same manner, it also aimed to de-establish the MFA as the sole source of expertise on foreign affairs. Thirdly, the entry requirements to the MFA were re-arranged which resulted in the enlargement of the pool of eligible candidates for appointments.\textsuperscript{518} This was coupled with a growing eagerness to admit new diplomats in unequivocal numbers since 2009 with backgrounds far more diverse to overturn homogeneity and cohesion around the westernist imagery and uniform Kemalist ideology.\textsuperscript{519} This move is usually interpreted as an investment for the future as it is hoped that with the large number of new recruits, the future shape of the MFA will not be as monolithic as it currently is. Lastly, a new legal arrangement has been enacted to allow bureaucrats from other public institutions (from the rank of Department Head upwards) to be placed within the files of the MFA by an administrative act. In other words, the road for Turkish bureaucrats from other public institutions (who do not necessarily share the same conventional academic/professional background and expertise) to be transferred to the MFA without the entry standards and examinations is opened. This last step is perceived in the MFA corridors as a blatant attempt to break the institutional autonomy of the Ministry which takes pride in

\textsuperscript{516} The tradition is started in 2003 with Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu. This position is currently fulfilled by Prof. İbrahim Kalin at the Office of Turkish Prime Minister since Davutoğlu has left to assume the top job at the MFA in 2009.

\textsuperscript{517} A total of 11 non-MFA Ambassadors are posted abroad since 2002 with backgrounds ranging from divinity studies to medicine, from philosophy to agricultural and engineering studies.

\textsuperscript{518} Originally those having a bachelor degree in Economic and Administrative Sciences as well as Law were allowed to take the entrance examination.

\textsuperscript{519} 100, 70 and 68 respectively in the last three years on top of a service having a total of 900 diplomats.
professionalism and expertise. It is also criticized as an attempt to ensure the MFA’s total surrender and pacification by making it open to easier political manipulation.\footnote{520}{YİNAança, B. (2013). Turkish Foreign Ministry Facing an Existential Threat. \textit{Hurriyet English, (Turkish Daily)}. May 23. Available at \url{http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-foreign-ministry-facing-an-existential-threat.aspx?pageID=449&nID=47706&NewsCatID=412} (consulted on May 23, 2013).} All of these measures were accompanied by the emergence of an increasingly powerful pro-government media in Turkey from 2005 onwards.\footnote{521}{Akser, M., & Baybars-Hawks, B. (2012). Media and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Model of Neoliberal Media Autocracy. \textit{Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication}. 5, p.306.} In addition to the already conservative media outlets such as Yeni Akit, Yeni Şafak and Kanal 7; the state television TRT was also used as a legitimizing tool by the government. As argued by Kaya & Çakmur, with the seizure of the assets of the second biggest media conglomerate ATV-Sabah and its ultimate sale to a pro-government conglomerate, as well as with an “entente cordiale” established between the party and the mainstream media”, a clear pro-government slant was displayed across the press spectrum.\footnote{522}{Kaya, R., & Çakmur, B. (2010). Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey. \textit{Turkish Studies}. 11, p.531-532.} Enjoying a robust media backing hitherto not present for any of the previous conservative political parties,\footnote{523}{Yesil, B. (2014). Press Censorship in Turkey: Networks of State Power, Commercial Pressures, and Self-Censorship. \textit{Communication, Culture & Critique}. 7, p. 154-173.} the government’s ability to project justification for its policy choices was thus unprecedentedly enhanced.

On a final note, the military and the MFA continue to be important institutions in Turkey, among the relatively most organized, respected and influential. The net impact of political gerrymandering in the MFA’s institutional structure is yet to be seen. The somewhat rattled MFA keeps providing expertise, input and recommendation regarding the foreign affairs portfolio but the degree to which these are taken up by political decision-makers is not the same as before. Similarly, the legal backdrop which in the past was used as a means of legitimization and justification for the Turkish military’s intervention in the political process is still intact. In particular, article 38 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Act (calls on the
military to protect and safeguard Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as prescribed by the Constitution against internal and external enemies) continues to have *de jure*, if rather much limited *de facto*, relevance. Besides promotion and placement of army officers up to the rank of colonel still rests with the top brass which in a way predetermines who Turkey’s future generals will be.

It is nevertheless safe to argue that the last decade of affairs in Turkey tipped the civilian-military balance in favour of the elected civilians. This is probably why the symbolism around how the Turkish PM has established himself as the sole chair at the head table of Supreme Military Council meetings instead of the old tradition of both the PM and the Chief of General Staff presiding over the gathering was given with great excitement in the Turkish press in 2011.\(^5\) It is therefore clear that the military’s influence in shaping domestic politics as well as foreign and security policy has been significantly curbed.\(^6\)

**V. CONCLUSION**

The purpose of this chapter was to offer an analysis of “power” in Turkey using Mann’s quadri-partite model with a particular emphasis on how it serves to enable certain geopolitical schemes, as guides for foreign policy action, over the others. The dynamic and multi-causal framework of social networks of power is applied to Turkish case in order to provide a critical understanding of not only Turkish politics and foreign policy but also how such policy is made. This allowed an in depth analysis of the evolution in the decision making process with regards to foreign and security policy. Keeping the critical geopolitics optic, it is hoped that

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524 Widely circulated Turkish daily *Hürriyet (Freedom)* was published with the headline on the front page that reads as “A New Table Setting” while Star preferred “Single Chaired SMC” and *Bugün (Today)* “The Picture of Normalization”. Even the staunchly Kemalist *Cumhuriyet (Republic)* used “The SMC of the ‘Firsts’”. For an outline of the front page headlines of August 8, 2011, visit [http://www.gazetearsivi.info/2011/08/02082011-tarihli-gazete-mansetleri.html#manset](http://www.gazetearsivi.info/2011/08/02082011-tarihli-gazete-mansetleri.html#manset) (consulted on April 28, 2013).

this chapter provides a rich, contextual, historical and comprehensive understanding that goes beyond dichotomous simplifications such as secular vs. religious, civilian vs. military, progressive-modernist (ilerici-modern) vs. traditionalist-reactionary (gelenekçi-gerici), etc.

A major conclusion to draw is, as in every society, Turkey has transformed a lot in its nearly ninety years of history. The Turkish state, which started its life thanks to a joint military-bureaucratic effort, has been a scene for constant struggle by competing social forces. The Kemalist establishment bringing together political parties (most notably CHP and defunct DSP and SHP), the military, foreign policy bureaucracy, judiciary and its own breed of intelligentsia, bourgeoisie and middle class aimed to shape the direction of the Turkish state and its foreign policy as well as to consolidate its hold on power. Even when the Kemalist camp lost control over the political government, by relying on the joint power of the military, Kemalist ideology and bureaucracy, it sought to keep the shape of the Turkish state and its foreign policy orientation intact. Therefore, a substantial change in Turkish foreign policy was not possible without the emergence of alternative centres of power in which alternate geopolitical agendas carrying new blueprints for action were put in place.

The shifts in the domestic landscape facilitating such a change were numerous and intensified in the neoliberal mood of the post-1980s. In addition to political power changing hands, the empowerment of conservative bourgeoisie with a strong religious scent, the rise of religion as a progressive and outward looking ideology wedded with neo-liberalism, the crisis of Kemalism as an all-encompassing and fulfilling ideology as well as an erosion in the authority, credibility and influence of the military power in decision-making come to the fore. Sitting on the driver seat of change, however, was geopolitics as ever, and the competing geopolitical agendas that the well-established geopolitical traditions kept pursuing, as elaborated thoroughly in the previous chapter.
CHAPTER 4 - THE MIDDLE EAST IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: WESTERNISM SUPERSEDES (1923-1982)

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter and the following is to offer an analysis of Turkish foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East. Geopolitical inquiry through the glance of Turkish culture keeps lying at the core of these chapters. As such, this chapter and the next are an outline of the evolution of Turkish geopolitical culture in external action. It is hoped that the lingering impact of geopolitics on the practice of foreign policy in Turkey will be effectively demonstrated by highlighting the dominant geopolitical mentality in each period and the respective operational imageries produced.

The chapters are not organized to cover a strictly chronological time span as the purpose is to indicate which geopolitical tradition carries the strongest imprint on each period as well as the practical implications of the dominant imagination(s) brewed. The idioms used in the headings of each section aim to hint at that.

With brief exceptions reserved, there are two broad generalizations to make. The interval from 1923 to 1982 bears witness to the heavy influence of Kemalist westernism. It is also the period in which the seeds of Conservative geopolitical mantra are sewed (1950-1960). The dominance of westernism in this period is a deliberate policy choice as political parties overwhelmingly observant of Kemalist dispositions (including DP) ruled Turkey. At times when not-so strict followers of Kemalism held political power, their adherence is assured
either by ideological supremacy and social networks of power (foreign policy establishment in particular) or by the geopolitical placements and practices of other (more powerful) actors in the international arena.

II. WESTERNISM PAR EXCELLENCE (1923-1950)

From the very start, the world through a civilizational optic was distinctively bipolar in the Kemalist mantra. There was the civilized, developed, scientifically superior and modern West and its Eastern antithesis. The Ottoman legacy of Turkey was closely matched with the civilizational space called the East where Islam posed a difficulty for the new Turkish state. Although practical implications were incremental, the geopolitical positioning of Turkey in the West started the day the new republic was incepted. In substantiating this claim, Mustafa Kemal is quoted as having said the following to the French daily “Revue Des Deux Mondes” on October 23, 1923, the same day the new state is proclaimed a republic.

“The fall of Ottoman Empire started on the day the links with Europe were severed. We will not repeat the same mistake. For centuries, we have been moving towards the West. Even though our bodies were in the East, the West has always been the direction towards which our ideas (minds) have been oriented. Our policies, traditions and interests are making leeway to a European Turkey, a Turkey that is headed towards Europe. All our efforts are to establish a modern, western administration in Turkey. Is there a single nation that did not turn to the West in its quest for civilization? As a real person who wishes to march towards this direction breaks his/her chains, so will we.”

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In this imagination, a sense of disregard, ignorance and superiority loomed large over Arabs, the Arab culture and civilization in collating representations around the East as these espoused the exact opposite of the West. An awareness of cultural and civilizational difference as well as spatial and temporal distance, separation and segregation characterized Kemalist thinking. The level of disdain with the geography symbolizing Arabs was so strong that Atatürk placed a strong reservation in not getting involved in their affairs by saying “for centuries our people have been compelled to act in accordance with this absurd point of view. And what happened? Millions of them died, in every land they went to. Do you know how many Anatolian boys perished in the sweltering heat of the deserts of Yemen?”\(^{527}\) As observed by William Hale, since then, the message that Turkey should keep out of the Middle East has sunk deep into the Kemalist consciousness.\(^{528}\) Turkey’s relations with the Middle East were thus reduced to nothing but an extension of its pro-western orientation.\(^{529}\) In other words, under the Kemalist mantra at large, Turkey did not have an independent Middle East policy as this was inextricably linked to its relations with the western states system.

**The Early Republican Era**

Three things were absent in the external relations of Turkey in the first interval. First is the non-existence of post-imperial impulses. In other words, Turkey did not pursue post-imperial territorial claims but rather slight adjustments to fit in to the homeland envisioned in the National Pact. This has indicated itself in the form of a firm dismissal of pan-Ottomanist, pan-Islamist and pan-Turkic agendas. Second, Turkey rejected the idea about a federated partnership with potential Arab states which was highly praised during the Turkish liberation


effort. Third, "Turkey did not support nationalist independence movements in the Arab territories in the hope of creating independent states, which would be susceptible or receptive to Turkish influence." Instead a rather cautious, non-interventionist, aloof and hands-off approach to the region was adopted. This is because it was around this era that the Middle East in the Kemalist imagination was equated with the notion of a backward land marred with turmoil in which Islam introduced an element of irrationality to politics. The Middle East reminded Kemalists that "it was factionalism and the un-governability of the region" that brought the end of the Ottomans. It was thus perceived an uneasy and unattractive neighbourhood only to be dealt with if Turkish security concerns demanded it. That is why Ankara tried to avoid becoming embroiled in regional politics.

As Turkey deliberately distanced itself from the Middle East, the early years of Turkish behaviour were characterized by "detente without engagement and by deliberate neutrality without being isolated". A strong motivation for Turkey’s elite to distance from the Middle East was to ensure “peace at home”. Put differently, Turkey was trying to enhance legitimization for the new secular domestic order which was at the time highly centralized and timid. As part of the prevalent geographical imagination, the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 was a strong move for consolidating the domestic order. At the same time, the move signified Turkey’s voluntary ceding of the leadership role it used to play in the Muslim world. Coupled with the decision to send members of the Ottoman dynasty away, not only was it aimed to curb pro-monarchy, religious and ethnic (Kurdish) sentiments at home,

and cut the possible links they might have across borders but also to de-couple Turkey from its Ottoman Muslim past, neighbourhood and identity. Thus, the common link of Islam between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours was severely weakened by introducing an element of temporal separation.

To put its house in order, Turkey needed “peace abroad” too. Atatürk stressed on November 1, 1928 that “it is quite natural and therefore simple to explain the fact that a country which is in the midst of fundamental reforms and development should sincerely desire peace and tranquillity both at home and in the world”. Aiming to consolidate the territories constituting its “new homeland” and the new domestic order, Turkey’s reluctant interest with Middle Eastern affairs was first and foremost guided by an impetus to delineate its borders. To infer its difference from and establish cultural and civilizational superiority over this backward Islamic land, Turkey under Atatürk first sought demarcation. The outstanding problems were the status of Alexandretta (Hatay) in French-controlled Syria and Mosul/Kirkuk in British-ruled Iraq. Both provinces were considered integral parts of the homeland envisioned in the Turkish National Pact. This made France and Britain Turkey’s two key counterparts in the Middle East.

The dilemma for early Turkish leaders was that on the one hand they were still suspicious of the true intentions of the Europeans in the region but on the other hand these countries

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538 Turkey emerged as a sovereign and independent state controlling Anatolia and a small share of territory in the Eastern Thrace in 1923. The same is not true for most Arabs. Iraq remained under British rule till 1932. Syria was placed under French mandate until 1936. British occupation of Egypt lasted for almost 54 years until 1946. There was no kingdom in Saudi Arabia before 1932, no sovereign Lebanon prior to 1943 and no independent Jordan earlier than 1946. Israel was established in 1948 with Palestinians lacking a state for well over half a century. North African countries like Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco became sovereign states in the 1950s-1960s. Similarly colonial control over the Gulf states such as Oman, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain ended as late as 1960-1970s’. The shape of the political map of the Middle East, as is known today, was thus not fully complete for quite long. Therefore, Turkey’s immediate counterparts in the early years of the Republic were not Arab states in the Middle East but the western mandatory powers.
were from the civilizational space they wished Turkey to join. Consequently, the geopolitical
code in dealing with the problems in the Middle East was much less antagonistic towards
France and Britain as dialogue, negotiation and engagement were identified as the best
strategy. The code defined by Mustafa Kemal was aimed at reducing the number of Turkey’s
enemies and increasing its friends and allies. The purpose was to consolidate territorial
integrity, control over borders and curb possible threats to regional peace and security which
could directly reflect on the fragile state of affairs in Turkey.

The record of events with regards to the solution of territorial disputes shows not only the
effects of westwards geographical imagery but also a high degree of political pragmatism.
With regards to the Iraqi border, Turks initially wished today’s Mosul, Kirkuk and Suleimaniah
would be part of their homeland. The UK, which kept control over the region after World War
I, did by no means favour this idea. As the parties could not reconcile their differences, the
matter was referred to the League of Nations in June 1924 by the British government.
Following a line of earlier Kurdish uprisings, a sizable revolt was started in February 1925 by
(Kurdish) Sheikh Said who saw the abolition of the caliphate as against Islamic principles.
The upheaval took place in south eastern Turkey, right across the Iraqi border, at a time the
heat over the dispute over Mosul was mercurial. Ankara interpreted the revolt as a British
plot to discourage Turks to make any military attempt at Mosul. In the meanwhile, the
League declared the region Iraqi territory in December 1925. Pending some initial
hesitation, Turkey recognized the decision via a bilateral agreement signed with Britain in
June 1926 whereby it conceded Mosul to British-ruled Iraq while retaining 10% of oil

541 ÇOPUR, İ. (2001). Şeyh Sait İsyanının İrtica ile İç ve Dış Etkenler Açısından Değerlendirilmesi (An Assessment of
Sheikh Said Revolt with Regards to Internal and External Factors). Gnkur. ATASE Bşk.İliği Yayınları, Stratejik Araştırma
revenues for the next five years. With a total sum of 500 thousand British Pounds transferred, the oil aspect, too, was permanently settled.543

With regards to Alexandretta (Hatay), the issue arose as France decided to transfer sovereignty to Syria and Lebanon in 1936. Turkey asked France to grant Alexandretta separate sovereignty on the basis of Turco-French Friendship Agreement of 1921 which foresaw a sui generis status to the area.544 As the mandatory power, France argued that the proper authority to decide on the fate of Alexandretta was the League of Nations. French proposal to rest the issue with the League was accepted by the Turks in December 1937. By the end of January next year, the League recognized Alexandretta as a separate political entity though its external relations would be handled by Damascus.545 Local elections held in May brought 22 Turkish delegates in the Assembly of Alexandretta which contained a total of 40. In September, the Assembly declared independence with the name “Hatay Republic”.546 In June 1939, a Franco-Turkish agreement endorsed the next move by the Assembly which voted for integration with Turkey.547 Once the dispute regarding Hatay was settled, Turkey’s borders in the region were largely in shape. To Turkish elite’s satisfaction, this achievement was not smudged by any sort of contact with the indigenous people of the land, Arabs and Kurds, which was of no favour at that time.

The impact of integration of Hatay to Turkey was profound as it triggered greater distrust and resentment toward Turkey in the Arab world. For Turks dealt with the issue with the French, and not the Arabs, that led Damascus to never accept the move. Hatay was thus translated into a hotbed of contention in the following years between Turkey and Syria. In the broader

546 Ibid.
scheme of Turco-Arab relations, the incident was pictured as the last conspiracy by Ankara in collaboration with the colonialist West to undermine Arabs.\textsuperscript{548} The two places, the land of Turks and of Arabs, were thus further alienated from each other.

Closer to World War I, the Turkish elite had by and large completed many of the westernizing reforms at home and made Turkey part of the League of Nations in 1932. Accession to the League was reflected to the public as an affirmation of Turkey’s western positioning and an act of recognition by the West.\textsuperscript{549} In this atmosphere, a wave of accomplishment, pride and self-confidence stirred in Ankara. Thanks to the success of Turkish reformation which was guided by western values and positive science, Turks were now prescribing the ‘Atatürk solution’ to their troubled neighbourhood, i.e. westernisation, secularisation and collaboration with the West.\textsuperscript{550} Therefore, as much as they were disinclined to meddle in Middle Eastern affairs, a growing disinterest by western powers in the face of an imminent war led Turks believe that they could save the region by their own example.\textsuperscript{551} Capitalizing on its geographic position, Turkey believed that it could act as a go-between in the relations between the West and the Middle East which boded well with its propagated international image as a Western state.\textsuperscript{552}

This paved the way to the Saidabad Pact of 1937. Signed in Tehran on July 8, with the pact Turks distastefully attempted at the role of regional saviour. Bringing together Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, the parties pledged friendly relations, consultation on matters of common interest, non-interference in domestic affairs and respect for each other’s

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{MANGO} MANGO, A. (1957). p. 151.
\bibitem{ATHANASSOPOULOU} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
sovereignty and territorial integrity. For a country that had already indexed its strategic orientation westwards, the initiative was in line with the larger goals of territorial consolidation, regional stability, recognition as a (western) model and as a bridge between the two worlds. The crucial pillar of the pact was ‘rather than being an example of regional cooperation and collaboration, as it is sometimes claimed, the principles of non-interference in each other’s affairs’ that made it in line with the Kemalist mantra. To Turkey’s misfortune, the expected World War did actually break out before the ink on the protocol was dry. The war not only caused great battlefield destruction across Europe but also left Turkish dreams to set an example and serve as a bridge in European-Middle Eastern affairs in tatters. The experience was a solid reminder of the risky nature of the region for Turks.

**Wartime Strategy**

Between 1938 and 1945, Turkey’s operational geopolitical code was redefined by arch-Kemalist İsmet İnönü, the second Turkish President, to be characterized by impartiality, non-involvement, caution and risk averseness. Seeing the destruction and hazards of World War I, he was not eager to get Turkey involved in the second. Thus, Turkey tried to walk straight on a slippery slope with frowning eyes on Ankara from each direction. Carrying Atatürk’s legacy, İnönü, who singlehandedly formulated foreign policy, did not wish the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Turkey to be questioned. Busy with staying away from the war, Ankara had no appetite to look beyond its southern border and have any sort of entanglement with Middle Eastern affairs.

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The Advent of Cold War

In the aftermath of World War II, a different picture of the world was incrementally brought about. The global geopolitical paradigm moved away from civilizational lines with the advent of the Cold War. Old metaphors around the West (the First World) vs. the East (the Second World) were still in circulation but the political criterion according to which these spaces were defined and represented had substantially transformed. The new perception was bipolar and strictly coloured with ideology. The capitalist western democracies represented the "liberal free (western) world", and from a western perspective, the socialist Soviet (eastern) world its dark totalitarian antithesis.

The Turkish response in the form of adaptation to this new picture of global affairs took a lot of emphasis on security and being part of the “free world" but without much change in the civilizational discourse. The ideological geopolitics of the Cold War provided Turkswith the opportunity to readdress some of the old themes in Turkish geopolitical culture. In responding to foreign policy crises, they not only sought hard security assurances but also answers to their permanent insecurities between the east and west. Did Turkey need to reinvent itself in the face of the transformations taking place in the global political space or keep redressing its western orientation? Had Turkey successfully turned Western as their forefather had prescribed? Should the West reliably cater for Turks’ needs now? Would there be any merit in reconnecting to the East, i.e. the Arabs, Persians and the Muslims in the (Middle) East? What strategy to follow against the new beast in the land, Israel? Would Turks reproduce the newly created republican myths or the myths of the olden days of the lost empire? As such, should Turkey stick with the minimalist, risk free, calculated and reserved approach in foreign dealings or act boldly, assertively and ambitiously to bring back the glories of the golden age? These were all, one way or the other, appertaining to definition of Turkey's place and belonging in the world. In finding answers to these lingering questions, foreign policy was the one area where the Turkish elite could toy around with some of the
geo-cultural traits of their country. It was also the theatre through which the ruling elite had to taste the image, placement, role expectations and foreign policy practices of other actors in the system. The combination of all these factors created Turkish foreign policy behaviour in the new era.

At the conclusion of the War, Turkey had a new set of problems as the USSR refused to renew the 1925 Treaty of Friendship. The Soviets via three diplomatic notes from March 1945 to September 1946 demanded territorial concessions from Turkey (return of eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan to the U.S.S.R), a Soviet base in Turkish Straits and revision of the Manteaux Convention.\textsuperscript{556} As a result, the most existentialist threat for Turkey was no longer from Kurds or devout Muslims at home or their akin in the Middle East but more so from its Soviet neighbour.\textsuperscript{557} This required a change in the operational geopolitical code of impartiality and neutrality. The assurance was sought, and later received, from the west (the US). Turks therefore deemed being a founding member of the United Nations in June 1945 no simple business as this was interpreted as a means of reaffirming Turkey's acceptance in the western world. It was also a means of attracting attention to Turkey's hard security problems.

After the UN membership, the political assurance came with the Truman Doctrine (1947) which pledged support to countries like Turkey threatened by communism. Military aid worth of 100 million Dollars followed shortly as part of the Marshall Plan (1947). It was indeed this injection that later paved the way to the development of Turkey’s conservative middle class and entrepreneurs. As a result, the new security threat pushed Turkey towards the western world, of which the Turkish ruling class had already had an adamant longing all along. To further reinforce its western positioning, Turkey became a member in the Council of Europe


in 1949. İnönü characterized the move as an indication of Turkey’s safe placement within the West European community and talked about the monumental progress his country achieved as a rising star in the western civilizational family.\(^{558}\) To move further on, İnönü’s CHP applied for NATO membership in 1948, and getting no feedback renewed it in May 1950.

In the post-war priorities, the non-attractive Middle East under CHP governments did not fare as a matter of urgency. The only exception was the creation of an independent Israel. On this account Turkey fluctuated considerably. Wary of the complexities of the Middle East, at first Turkey wished to remain committed to the regional status quo. Ankara thus voted against the UN resolution creating Israel in 1947. It also appears that Israel’s arms deal with the socialist Czechoslovakia caused Turks to suspect that the new state was Soviet-backed.\(^{559}\) Akşin takes the opinion that “Ankara was apparently trying to avoid antagonizing the influential Jewish community in the United States, which could have jeopardized American aid to Turkey”.\(^{560}\) What is clear is that Turkish action was not grounded on any sympathy toward the Arab cause as the distasteful region was still a source of utmost disdain. A couple of years later, perceiving the steps taken to build stronger ties with the Euro-Atlantic defence community (Truman Doctrine, Marshal Plan, application for NATO membership and membership in the Council of Europe) as confirmation of the progress achieved en route its western future, Turkey recognized Israel as the first Muslim country ever. This time the confident arch-Kemalist İnönü remarked that “Israel would be a beacon of peace and stability in the Near East”.\(^{561}\) With the turn of events in a relatively short period of time, İnönü came to the conclusion that Turkey and Israel simply belonged to the same camp. İnönü therefore was convinced that a new regional status quo was established. Apart from this late move, the

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region for Turkey had long transformed from being in the “middle” to “far” in the East\(^{562}\) after the bitter memories of Saidabad Pact.


In the aftermath of the first genuine multiparty contestation bringing Democrat Party (DP) to power in 1950, there was little doubt on which direction the Turkish state would proceed. In this context, literature abounds in seeing DP era a continuation in Turkey’s western march. Some authors even claim that DP leaders simply kept doing everything to re-energize Turkey’s orientation towards the West.\(^{563}\) This is not without merit. Seeing through DP’s party and government programmes, one can find ample evidence to support the argument that there was much rhetoric of continuity in terms of Turkey’s western positioning. For example, it was declared in Democrat Party’s election manifesto that “let everyone, friend or foe, be reassured that our party will not instigate any change in foreign policy”.\(^{564}\) PM Menderes gave traction to what was meant in his speech to the Parliament in May 1950 by reaffirming Turkey’s commitment to the UN, the alliance with France and Britain, and the cordial ties with the US.\(^{565}\) Speaking to the press in Brussels, Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü reiterated a similar sentiment by emphasizing that “after the last elections, Turkish foreign policy which has been oriented towards the West since the World War II will continue with utmost dynamism in the very same direction”.\(^{566}\)


\(^{564}\) Ayın Tarihi(History of the Month), No:198, May 1950, p.60


The fact that immediately after assuming power the Democrat Party dealt with the request by the UN Secretary General in June 1950 to send troops to the Korean War in an auspicious manner appears to confirm that the new leadership was trying to put such words into action. In deliberating the matter with FM Köprülü, Menderes even argued for speedy action at the expense of bypassing a parliamentary debate.\textsuperscript{567} Against a rampant Soviet threat, a sense of impatience seems to have brewed in Ankara to make Turkey part of the “western free world”. Expecting security assurances against Soviets as well as more military and economic aid,\textsuperscript{568} with the Korean War, Turkey was trying to gain leverage to ensure its membership in NATO.\textsuperscript{569} But as Turkey renewed the application in August 1950, the North Atlantic Council convened to reject its bid.\textsuperscript{570} The fiercest opposition came from states like Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Netherlands, commonly voicing concerns that Turkey simply did not fit into the value system the westerners shared as part of their collective civilizational cluster.\textsuperscript{571} The UK also opposed as it held measures short of NATO membership (such as the Mediterranean Pact and the Middle East Command) to keep Turkey in the western orbit.

It was therefore not before the US policy of military containment against the Soviets that Turkey’s Cold War westernist positioning was accepted by western powers. With the communist threat on the rise in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Southeast Asia in the early 1950s, the cultural and civilizational complexities of Turkey’s bid were subordinated to the bigger struggle between “freedom” and “totalitarianism”.\textsuperscript{572} Thenceforth, Turkey became a member in the Alliance in 1952. The hope was that Turkey could play a key regional role, as a barrier, in the Middle East and the Balkans to keep the Soviet influence away.

\textsuperscript{568} Ibid. p.964.
\textsuperscript{569} ZAFER (Victory). Turkish daily. 26 July 1950.
An act as simple as Turkey’s NATO membership which was a strictly security-wise decision from a western perspective held a different meaning for Turks. In this case, Turks’ primordial civilizational perceptions associated with the West gave the event unmatched historical symbolization. NATO was represented as the bastion of Turkey’s ‘Western’ identity. Köprülü dubbed NATO “not a simple military defence structure but a broader solidarity and cooperation pact that aims to foster spiritual and material excellence”. He therefore did not hesitate to draw attention to the commitment of Turks to freedom, independence and democratic principles now represented by the Alliance. CHP delegate Barutçu also emphasized that accession to NATO was in line with the republican ideals. Likewise the CHP’s last Foreign Minister, Necmettin Sadak, wrote in his column that “the Atlantic Pact is not only a military and political cooperation forum but also a community of democratic civilizations, and by subscribing to the deal, Turkey will subsume both military and civilizational duties.” Thus, NATO not only helped cover Turkey’s hard security needs but also addressed its long standing civilizational insecurities. A decision taken with strategic geopolitical calculations guided by ideological polarisation of the world was interpreted as a means to confirm Turkey’s placement within the same flow of history, culture and civilization as that of the West. Turks, through NATO, wished to get rid of the stereotypical European image of Turkey as ‘the oriental other (“the enemy at gates”)’ or ‘the sick man of Europe’. Besides, it served well as part of the strategy for outreach to the (Muslim) East via the

575 Ibid. p.315.
578 For a detailed analysis on the impact of the writings of foreign policy intellectuals, in mirroring the perceptions and representations of Turkish practitioners of statecraft, on identity construction, please see YILMAZ, E., & BILGIN, P. (2005). Constructing Turkey’s “Western” Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft. International Journal. 61, p.39-59.
West as Turkey projected itself as the only country to provide for peace dividend in the Middle East. The short term yield of Turkey’s NATO membership was Soviets’ renunciation of territorial claims as early as July 1953 and an offer to renew the dépassé Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.

The Exception: A Different Geographical Imagery Vis-à-vis the Middle East

Despite being formed by former delegates of CHP and whilst not challenging Turkey’s western orientation, the founding fathers of the Democrat Party were nonetheless much more receptive to modes of representation in the conservative tradition. In domestic politics, it was manifested in DP’s willingness to reverse those republican reforms which were considered not having taken root. With regards to foreign policy, DP leaders were first of all extremely unhappy with the CHP’s minimalist, cautious and modest approach. Toying with common conservative themes instead, FM Fatin Rüştü Zorluvoiced the ambition to make Turkey “a great, powerful and respected state” while President Bayar promised Turks to make their country a ‘little America’. The propensity to act assertively and ambitiously, which is a historically naturalized notion in the conservative tradition, was uttered sharply by DP deputy Sıtkı Yırcalı in the wake of the decision to send Turkish troops to Korea with the following.

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582 The first Menderes government promised to keep the republican reforms which are largely accepted by the Turkish people but not those which are not.
“As has always been the case throughout history, Turkey has to serve as the cornerstone, the leader of the line-up in the Middle East as well as the world with an active foreign policy”.584

The difference was nowhere else more evident than towards the Middle East. For once the Democrat Party “abandoned the aloof attitude toward the Middle East”.585 The DP leadership was very much eager to move away from the status quo586 and saw greater good in engagement in order to elevate the international stature of Turkey. Turkish policy towards the region was non-doggedly ambitious, sometimes even bordering an overt bellicose discourse which is not understandable with a mere reference to Turkey’s westernist orientation. This is because the way Turkey placed itself in the Middle East as well as the role and mission Turkish leaders earmarked to their state were in clear contrast to the Kemalist paradigm. PM Menderes gave Turkey’s key geographical location as a major reason to play a bigger role in the Middle East.587 The region in fact from the very outset held a different meaning for DP leaders. Gone was CHP’s rhetoric of ‘the bog of the Middle East.’588 A sense of civilizational and spatial contiguity, shared values and historical-cultural commonality loomed large. DP leaders not only refused to draw hard lines against the region but also embraced the security concerns of the newly established Arab states.589

The Middle East now was the land of brotherly Arabs who were threatened by the evil nature of the godless communists, re-inscribing Turkish conservatives’ perceptions of the ‘Soviet other. That’s because the Soviets symbolized a mutual threat to a core element of the

588 Andrew MANGO uses the term “bog” as a synonym for the “swamp” metaphor. Both terms are attempts at English translation for the Turkish word “bataklık”, whichmore literally means “mud land”.
common culture, Islam itself. In DP leaders’ view, Muslims simply should not have bend down to the dangerous Soviet system. It is therefore no surprise that DP’s first government programme committed Turkey “to forge close relations with the Middle Eastern states, and mutually assist and secure each other’s interests, a.k.a. a necessity both for the region and global peace and security”.\(^590\) Turkey thus attempted for the second time at the role of regional saviour, this time not from an imminent war but from the atheist and expansionist Soviets who were seen as a threat to the community (umma) of Islam and common Muslim identity. Menderes indicated how close they held the region to Turkey with his following statement:

‘We are firmly connected to all Arab nations (of the region) with historical and social bonds of fraternity. (Today) there are real and serious reasons to remain so. It is our sincere goal to see each and every nation in the Middle East, our Arab brothers in particular, to their freedom, welfare and happiness. This is the (strongest) guarantee for our own national survival.’\(^591\)

In this context, Turkey was ready to reinstitute some other reflexes embedded in the conservative tradition. In this regard, an eagerness to lead the region towards what the Turkish ruling elite perceived as the free democratic world against its godless communist alternative appeared strong.\(^592\) As Turkish PM Menderes used to say, Turkey aimed at serving as the bulwark in the defence of the region against communist expansionism.\(^593\)

Right before NATO membership, FM Köprülü pledged that “Turkey would play the role


attuned to it in the Middle East with the most effective and vigorous manner.\(^{594}\) Some accounts cite FM Köprülü stipulating that Turkey would be a bridge, both culturally and geographically, between the East and the West,\(^ {595}\) hence employing for the first time the “bridge” metaphor in articulating a foreign policy strategy. The Middle East was thus arguably the region where most of Turkey’s foreign policy dealings took place during the decade, bearing it witness to the second ever wave of intense regional activism.

Trying to reconcile two imageries, one that foresaw a strong western vocation and the other scripting the Middle East as a land of opportunities and brotherly Arabs; developing friendly relations with Israel at the initial phases was no source of allergy for DP leaders. They were convinced that closer ties with Israel would be “one step closer to the West”.\(^ {596}\) On this score, Menderes government aimed at acting carefully with self-restraint for the fear of being labelled as pro-Israel by the brotherly Arabs.

The New Imagery in Action

The most cited policy practice whereby Turkey is depicted as an agent of the West in the Middle East is the Baghdad Pact. Having the American endorsement to Turkish ambitions to lead the region towards the West,\(^ {597}\) PM Menderes embarked on his ambitious agenda by pushing for a NATO-like regional security organization. To sell the idea to Arab states, Menderes took on a regional tour comprising Syria and Lebanon with a prospect to pass to Cairo in January 1955. His conversations in Damascus and Beirut were with no avail while


Cairo turned Menderes down by arguing that the Egyptian public was not ready for a visit.\textsuperscript{598} Moreover, Jordan and Saudi Arabia joined ranks with Egypt on January 30 during the Cairo Conference by claiming that "it would be betrayal to the Arab world to enter into alliance with Turkey which was friends with Israel".\textsuperscript{599} In between these overtures, Abdal Nasser of Egypt expelled Turkish Ambassador, Hulusi Fuat Tugay, and publicly denounced Turkish policy as anti-Arab.\textsuperscript{600} Turkey's special relations with Israel thus came to haunt its affairs with the Arab world as early as 1950s.

Shortly after seeing these disappointing signs, the Pact signed in Baghdad on February 24, 1955, between Turkey and Iraq was quite a surprise. The deal later on brought together Pakistan, Iran and Britain. Contrary to conventional explanations stipulating that the initiative was a purely western design to curtail Soviet regional ambitions and naming Turkey simply its executioner, Menderes reflected a different mentality as he uttered the following to one of his close aides (Sebati Ataman, DP deputy and later Minister of Industry) in Baghdad on the day of signature.

"Of course the Ottoman Empire cannot be resuscitated. But we can always look for ways of bringing the countries in the (ex-Ottoman) geography closer with due consideration to the contemporary circumstances…."The order previously established in this region in line with Islamic principles is gone with the Ottomans fading away. The region is now in full tatters as evidenced by the situation of Muslim countries. There is a need to re-establish a regional order in accordance with new principles so that peace and stability can be re-introduced to the region...Why wouldn't it be possible to conclude an accord on the (common) basis of Islam and bring all Muslims


\textsuperscript{599} ALBAYRAK, M. (2012). Turkish Foreign Policy in Democrat Party Era in KABADAYI, T. et. al. p.602

of the Middle East together? Turkey could lead such an effort. This is why we came here.  

His son, Aydın, further states Menderes' vision as “behind the visibly anti-communist rhetoric, the Baghdad Pact in fact aimed at bringing Muslims closer. The real purpose was to get the Muslims in the Middle East as close as possible”. In this context, Menderes did not hesitate to publicly emphasize the need to resolve the Palestinian issue and declare that his government would lead the efforts for a solution. It thus appears that helping build a regional order based on cultural similarities that Turks and Arabs in the Middle East shared was, from the very start, a strong motive for Turkish action.

This was no doubt facilitated by the expectations of Western powers of Turkey. The Americans’ willingness to suppress Soviet influence in the northern tier of the western alliance was a key factor. In the American perception, Turkey would be well suited for the role of regional leadership with its overwhelmingly Muslim population and secular regime. Besides, the long history Turkey had with Arabs would hopefully prove to be an asset. Concerns for an unhindered flow of Middle Eastern oil to western markets and the security of Israel were

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equally crucial.\footnote{HALLIDAY, F. (2005). *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge. p. 97-129.} As of January 1950, a Turkish diplomatic legation was already inaugurated in Israel with Menderes strongly arguing that “Arabs too should recognize Israel's right to survival” because for him the lingering Arab-Israeli conflict distracted the urgency of the threat from the Soviets.\footnote{SOYSAL, İ. (1986). *Turkish-Arab Diplomatic Relations After the Second World War (1945-1986)*. *Studies on Turkish on Turkish-Arab Relations, Annual*. p.253.} In a nutshell, the western perception and expectations of Turkey in the Middle East were a firm enabler for DP leaders’ self-ascribed regional leadership role. Thus, Turks’ image of the regional position of their country and the American placement of Turkey in the Middle East initially overlapped to a great degree.

Yet it would be ill-fated to see Turkey a mere enforcer of the western agenda in the region as the British and American documentary records reveal that Turks were no complacent ally on countless occasions.\footnote{For an analysis on the record of events based on American and British archives on which Turkey did not follow an eye-to-eye position with its Western allies in the Middle East please see SEVER, A. (1998).p.73-90.} More so, Turkey did not hesitate to pursue an agenda of its own at the expense of falling at odds with western allies. Cases in point are numerous. The first came when Egypt and Syria, both of which did not sign in for the Baghdad deal under Turkish leadership, contracted for a pact of their own in March 1955. Suspecting that it was Nasser’s Egypt that led the effort, Turkey pressured Syria to ensure defection and lure it to the Baghdad Pact.\footnote{SEVER, A. (1998). p.76.} Via diplomatic notes exchanged between Damascus and Ankara, Turkey declared that if Syria insisted on the rapprochement with Egypt, it would thwart bilateral relations.\footnote{YALANSIZ, N. (2012). *Turkey-Middle East Relations in the Cold War Era and the Great Powers*. *History Studies. Volume 4. 2*. p. 396.} The move however further pushed Syria towards Egypt which was already embroiled with the memories of Hatay’s integration to Turkey. Saudi Arabia shortly followed suit by joining the Syria-Egypt pact.\footnote{HUREWITZ, J. C. (1969). *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension*. New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by F.A. Praeger. p. 477.} Besides a wave of protests took place in the Arab streets which made the Americans and the British question whether Turkey was
overplaying its hand. The next round was Turks’ determination to take Jordan in to the Pact in the fall of 1955. Turkish President Bayar visited Amman between 3 and 4 November, urging his Jordanian counterparts to side with the initiative with a promise that “Turkish armed forces would come to Jordan’s aid if an unjust assault occurred”, implying an Arab-Israeli clash.⁶¹² Yet with American fears of antagonizing Israel and further alienating Egypt, Turks had to endure protests in the Jordanian streets encouraged by Nasser.⁶¹³

Overtaken by the heat of the developments, an opportunity for damage control had arisen when Nasser announced nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. Protested by Britain and France, the act triggered military action by the two in addition to Israel against Egypt. This prompted Turkey’s withdrawal of its Minister (the chief of Turkish legation) to Israel and downgrading of diplomatic relations to the level of Charge d’Affaires in November. Simultaneously Ankara announced that the Turkish representative would not return to Tel Aviv as long as the Palestinian question was not solved in compliance with the UN resolutions.⁶¹⁴ As Menderes hinted to the Turkish parliament, the central motivation was to show solidarity with Arab Egypt and block a possible Soviet take-over of a region of brotherly akin.⁶¹⁵ Another calculation in Ankara’s siding with the Arabs rather than Israel, just like the US did, was the hope to enhance the value of Turkey for Washington.⁶¹⁶ Even more importantly, Feroz Ahmad writes “Turks were hoping to replace the British in the Middle East⁶¹⁷ in a quest to take over the regional leadership. However, it was not for Turks but thanks to the decisive position of the US in the form of economic measures against Britain

⁶¹⁵MENDERES, A. (1956). Turkish Premier used to dramatize the event at the Parliament by suggesting that “the fall of the Middle East would mean for the Western camp the loss of defensive structures against the (Soviet) Russians from the Mediterranean to Japan”. Democrat Party’s Confidential Parliamentary Debate Records. Vol. 175. p.86.
and political pressure on other parties that put an end to the debacle. More strikingly Cairo would not forget Ankara’s alignment with the American position which foresaw “an international impartial regime for the Suez Canal”. As a result, Turkey not only failed to win back a favourable position in the region but also saw its regional ties deteriorated. As Menderes was keen on preserving the relevance of the Baghdad Pact, relations with Egypt remained cool. Full normalization of diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv also did not take place since Ankara dragged its feet in elevating the level of representation from legations to resident embassies.

In the aftermath of the Suez crisis, Turkey held onto its ambition of keeping the salience of the Baghdad Pact. In this respect, the possibility of Syria turning into a Soviet satellite in August 1957 led Turkey to push for solid American reaction. The US avoided direct military intervention and advised Turks to act “in the requested reinforcement of Arabs”. Yet Turkey had massed troops on the border the next month with fearful reports reaching Washington that “Turks wanted to go it alone in Syria whereas there were doubts and hesitations on the part of the (Turkish) military”. According to some accounts, even small scale military skirmishes were reported on the Turco-Syrian border. Just as the matter approximated to the character of inter-block rivalry in early October with Soviets and Syrians bringing it to the UN, Khrushchev’s surprise attendance to the 34th birthday celebrations of Turkey on October 29, at the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, toned the tension down. The whole saga eventually slipped away.

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621 Ibid. p.84.


Encountering the External Actors

It was around this time that Turkish leaders had to endure the Arab recoil crystalizing around Nasser’s Egypt. The effort culminated into concrete form on February 1, 1958, as Egypt and Syria declared a federation under the rubric ‘the United Arab Republic (UAR)’. To counter weight, Turkey put its support behind the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan on February 14. Furthermore, Ankara threatened to use force against the UAR. To deter Turkey, American Secretary of State Dulles had to warn that “if there is any reaction, it must be initiated by Arabs and not by Turkey or Western powers”.

Against this backdrop, it was an unbecoming development for Turkey to see a military coup by General Abdalkerim Qasim ousting the regime in Baghdad with the lives of King Faisal and Premier Nuri Said claimed as collateral in early July 1958. Having a friendly regime whose PM was educated in Turkey faltered at the hands of coup-makers, Turks perceived the region in pieces. Therefore, an unhesitant Menderes ordered Turkish Armed Forces en mass the border with a prospect to move towards Baghdad alongside a similar order for deployments around the Syrian border to overturn possible counter reaction. The calculation in Ankara was that with Iraq out of the equation in the Baghdad Pact, Turkey’s regional leadership ambitions would be shelved permanently. Determined to go alone, Menderes only hoped moral support from the US, which to his dislike, did not arrive. Under American and British pressure to wait for the Iraqi opposition to do the job against Qasim, and reluctant about the position of the Turkish foreign policy establishment (the military and MFA), Menderes finally caved in. But when President Chamoun from Lebanon which was practically in a state of civil war since May and King Hussein of Jordan requested western

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intervention, Turkey showed no hesitation to let American troops to station at NATO bases in Adana.  

After seeing the weight of the Baghdad Pact lightened after the coup in Baghdad, Turkey and Israel tried engagement around the concept of the Periphery Pact (bringing together Iran, Sudan and Ethiopia as well). Tel Aviv and Ankara found enough motive in late 1958 to conclude a number of agreements in order to create an alternative centre of gravity in the region. Among the things agreed, military and intelligence cooperation, secret political dialogue and technical cooperation in defence industries come to the fore. Failing to enlist American support to their initiative because Washington believed that Nasser and his pan-Arabist agenda was the most credible force to curtail the communist spread over Iraq and Syria, the parties could not see through the full yields from this initiative.

These events indicate that Turkey was not simply acting as an agent of the West (Washington in particular) in the Middle East. Within the confines of Cold War geopolitics, Turkey was testing with vigour the degree of independence it could enjoy in pursuing some of the conservative leanings in foreign policy. Even to the extent that US President Eisenhower complained “Turkey went beyond Soviet containment to a vision as a regional power pursuing its own interests”. Turkey’s decisive return to the Middle East therefore was not a mere response to the compelling external threat but the result of a deliberate

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policy choice in pursuit of power and prestige. The exercise was guided by a distinct geographical imagery vis-à-vis the Middle East which portrayed it as a land of opportunities and brotherly Muslims craving for Turkey’s leadership/saviour ambitions. Few months before being overthrown by a military coup in 1960, Sebati Akman reports Menderes saying that “I think the most robust political agreements fail to pass the test of time. They last only a few years… whereas the actual reality rests on ‘the words of God’… (Therefore) why shall not we conclude long lasting agreements among nations and countries that share the same religion and culture?” This was hoped would turn Turkey into a regional power and unleash the process towards a resurgent Turkey just like in the good old days of the Ottoman Empire.

The trouble was the gap between the geopolitical imageries of Turkish leaders and both their Arab and Western counterparts. For once, US President Eisenhower came to the quick conclusion that Ottoman rule of the region was “too unfavourably remembered”. Soviets were funnelling a similar image that “the military block led by Turkey in the Middle East made Arab nations think that Turkey is trying to get them under its own sovereignty again”. By acting too ambitiously, Turkey also antagonized the leaders of the Arab world, Egypt in particular. The leadership in Cairo clearly had ambitions of its own. The imageries and positioning of Nasser, which was portraying Egypt as the leader of the Arab world with the Arab League (1945) as its core instrument, was able to make strides towards not only a pan-Arab but also pan-Islamist agenda. The two countries were after prestige, power, influence and regional leadership on the same terrain with competing impulses. The interventionist courses of action Ankara took during the crises in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan contributed to a growing Arab discontent which resurrected (for real or imagery) enmities vis-à-vis Turkey. The key factor that kept Turks at bay was the cordial relations established with

Israel. For Egypt propagating the view that “the state of Israel was a dagger at the heart of Arab territories”, Turks’ attempts to penetrate the world of Arabs with firm American and British backing and strong ties with Israel was a liability. The problem was not necessarily Turkey’s unchallenged western orientation per se but rather the perception that “cast Turkey in the image of docile tool of Western power” or “the running dogs of Western imperialism”.

Thus, despite the initial determination to get closer to the Middle East by assembling the Arabs around Turkey against a common threat (Soviets), Ankara’s project failed. Thanks to the expectations gap and the seemingly irreconcilable difference in the geopolitical imageries of dominant actors, Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours found themselves drifted away from each other. As a result, an initiative promulgated to unite and lead the region ended up with further fragmentation. Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen remained on the one hand, and Turkey, Iraq and Iran on the other. Jordan and Lebanon stayed neutral, and Israel was further isolated. Iraq finally withdrew from the Baghdad Pact in 1958, leaving the Eisenhower Doctrine as the only tangible initiative that all parties could give their broad commitment to. Even on that score, Egypt, Iraq and Syria defected by establishing closer ties with Moscow. The bitter experience of the Baghdad Pact taught Turks another lesson.

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644 Named after the speech President Eisenhower gave at the American Congress on January 5, 1957, the term refers to a firm commitment on the part of the US "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." It was delivered within a "Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East". Eisenhower’s main concern was singling out the Soviet threat in the Middle East by committing the US for military action had the circumstances required.
about the hardship of penetrating the Arab world and the difficulty of meaning real business in the Middle Eastern region.


The Turkish military’s takeover in 1960 had no doubt a variety of motivations. As indictments against President Bayar, PM Menderes and FM Zorlu indicate, unhappiness about being excluded and marginalized in foreign policy decision-making is crucial.\textsuperscript{645} One can add a dominant suspicion as to whether Democrat Party leaders had attempted at derailing Turkey’s orientation. The vigour and boldness with which the relations with the Middle East are handled was a central theme in accentuating such suspicions. From this perspective, it was no surprise that Turkish military started out with putting in extra checks into the system with a view to ensure republican continuity. The creation of the National Security Council (NSC) as a means of overseeing security affairs, and with it almost anything relating to internal and external affairs portfolios, was a key decision. Furthermore, the first elections held under the junta’s supervision brought İsmet İnönü back in 1961 this time as the PM. The calculation was with the NSC and through the Kemalist networks of power (the MFA and the military), western orientation of Turkey could remain unchallenged. The aim was to ensure the primacy of the West, and the non-interventionist, non-presumptuous and risk free attitude in the external dealings of Turkey.

On keeping the western orientation and Kemalist inscription of the Middle East intact, the record was largely a success. In terms of timidity; the following two decades can also be characterized mostly with perseverance, with Cyprus being the biggest exception. İnönü was quick in reverting to his risk-averse stance towards foreign entanglements and initial disenchantment with the Middle East. Coming to power in 1965, Demirel whose conservative tendencies were the strongest, did not follow DP’s line in foreign policy. To him, what

\textsuperscript{645} MUFTI, M. (1998). p.44.
mattered in the affairs of state was continuity. Therefore, with little to no particular interest in foreign affairs, Demirel deferred the portfolio to his long time FM İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil. Ecevit posed no exception in the central direction of Turkey but only in style. Besides, the Turkish military once again directly intervened in the political process in 1971 removing Demirel from office which fed into his ambivalence. From then on, coalition governments were the rule which further strengthened the role of the foreign policy establishment.

**Turkey the Geographical Barrier**

The novelty about Cold War geopolitical placement of Turkey is discursive construction of the concept of “barrier”. With it, the Turkish elite portrayed the country as an indispensable partner in the containment of Soviet power. Double assurances were sought with this. On the one hand, it served to re-confirm a sense of (cultural and civilizational) belonging to the Euro-Atlantic family of nations. The security studies scholarship emerging in the 1950s considered states under the Alliance’s umbrella a ‘security community’. The term coined by Karl Deutsch basically referred to common values, norms and principles centring on a common ‘way of life’ which the security community strives to preserve. Depicting Turkey as a (western) barrier against the threatening “Soviet other” fitted well in this framework. In the event, the feelings of insecurity and danger emanating from the Soviets for Ankara were instrumental not only in suppressing domestic ethnic, sectarian and ideological differences (hence peace at home) but also differences of opinion on alternative impulses that Conservatives had earlier propagated. It also covered well the sensitivities associated with the Kemalists’ primary instinct of survival, independence, and insularity.

**References**


On the other hand, “the barrier” metaphor provided an external justification for Turkey’s western positioning through an argument of functionality. More precisely, Turkey used the geopolitical script that Ankara represented and defended the western values (of democracy, rule of law, free market, free enterprise, etc.), culture and security amidst the toughest of geographies. Turks imagined their country the geographical extension and cultural outgrowth of the West, and wished to align their policies accordingly. The westernist imagery re-invented though the “barrier” metaphor thus enjoyed wide support across the political spectrum, helping ensure clarity of goals in external policy as well as homogeneity, cohesion, unity and obedience within Turkish society. The terminology used in instrumentalizing this function was quite rich. Concepts such as “flank, front, outpost, frontline, bulwark, gateway, gatekeeper, etc.” were all employed to describe the insurmountable role of Turkey. Metaphors such a “buffer”, “bastion” or “fortress” that were used to describe Turkey’s location also served to foster such an image. That the size of the Turkish army which was only bested in sheer numbers by the US was cited one of the most critical factors in the barrier function Ankara performed. On top of Turkey’s strategic geographical location, this was used to consolidate the strong position of the Turkish military in domestic and foreign politics in so far as that foreign and national security policy was perceived to be one and the same thing.

Such a geopolitical positioning did not develop in vacuum. Externally the perceptions and expectations of Turkey by the US and European allies in safeguarding the southern flank of NATO served as a means of mutual reconstitution. Westerners by and large subscribed to the pragmatic notion of seeing Turkey as a barrier, too, beyond which it would be difficult for

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649 For an elaborate study on the roots of Turkish “geographical” exceptionalism, see YANIK, L. (2011). Constructing Turkish Exceptionalism: Discourses of Liminality and Hybridity in post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy. Political Geography. 30, p.80-89.


the communists to stray. The strategic geography of Turkey could also be used as a springboard of action against the Soviets over a tripod of terrain covering the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East had the circumstances so required. In practical terms, as Aybet argues, Turkey was “both an important asset in the defence of the Middle East, and an essential component of the defence of Western Europe thanks to its geostrategic location and because of its (large) armed forces.” 652 Having the longest border with the Warsaw Pact of any NATO member as a front/flank state, the mission and roles expected of Turkey were “to counter balance the military imbalance in Europe against the Soviet threat” 653. Time magazine cartographically described this mission as “to button down the ‘free world’s southern flank.” 654 These expectations were so deeply internalized across the Atlantic that even when the Cold War approached to a close, “the critical role Turkey played in the Middle East in helping defend the vital sea and land lanes of communication which cross the region as well as providing a potent barrier to the region’s enormous oil reserves” 655 were still emphasized.

In this context, the Europeans’ cultural way of seeing Turkey at the periphery of the continent did not cause much worry for the Turkish elite as the latter seemed confident in having proved their country’s strategic significance in the midst of a bad neighbourhood. This is because Turkey’s geography which was instrumentalized in a security discourse gave Turks the impression that their country was accepted not only to the security community of NATO but also to the cultural zone called the West. As a result, propositions on Turkish geographical uniqueness and cultural/civilizational images of Europe could mostly enjoy a working relationship under the banner “Turkey the barrier”. The trouble was the over premium Turks placed on the significance of Turkey’s geography and its role as a fence. The

653 Ibid.
654 Guardian of the Southern Flank. The Time, October 12, 1953.
The degree of independence and pragmatism of Western powers did not work to Turks’ advantage. This intrinsically ran counter to the logic of Cold-War geopolitics. Because just like everything else the relative significance and particularities of any geography during the period were simplistically subsumed within the perceptions around the bigger struggle between the two blocks.\textsuperscript{656}

**Phase I. The Faithful Ally of the West (1960-1965)**

Turks’ initial perception of their country’s geopolitical standing was firm as evidenced by many steps taken during the period. For starters, the military junta expressed continuation of the commitment to NATO and CENTO (the name given to Baghdad Pact in 1958 after Iraq withdrew).\textsuperscript{657} Selim Sarper, a seasoned Turkish Ambassador, was the junta’s choice for the position of FM who would keenly observe Kemalist predispositions. The leader of the *coup*, General Gürsel rejected an invitation from the Soviet leader Khrushchev for neutrality.\textsuperscript{658} PM İnönü reiterated a likewise overture by assertively stating that Turkey was committed to the Western system and therefore neutrality was not an option. In return, Ankara was hoping to rely on the US and NATO for financial aid in order to correct its ailing economy as well as strengthening its military capacity.\textsuperscript{659} Besides Turkey became a founding member in the OECC (later OECD) in 1961 and the signed a partnership document with the European Economic Community (the nucleus of the EU) in 1963. It was hoped that placement of Turkey in the West would be acknowledged, institutionalized and consolidated in the economic field with the OECC,\textsuperscript{660} which was regarded as a framework for Turkey’s


\textsuperscript{660} YANIK, L. (2012). p.36.
integration into Europe and the civilised world.\textsuperscript{661} The ECC on the other hand symbolized the endpoint in Atatürk’s vision of reaching the same level of progress with western civilization.

Against this background, Turkish foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East was nothing like the Menderes era. The region was initially reduced to a vehicle through which Turkey could prove its added strategic value to the West. The days of boldness, ambition, zeal and near bellicose discourse were over. Turkey was no longer the initiator of regional schemes or policies of its own making. It simply was responding to external stimuli. Put differently in order to distance from the Democrat Party era, Ankara turned much more reactionary. The behavioural patterns were highly timid, reluctant and cautious; seeking balance and limited to small scale engagement, if at all necessary.

In this vein, there was no hesitation for Ankara in the early 1960s to act in line with western interests in the region. Turkey was prompt (the second after Jordan) to recognize Syria when it declared independence from the UAR in September 1961. Turkish action was grounded on the perception that Egypt and Syriawere ruled by the most anti-western regime in the Middle East. The decision added further fuel to already soured relations with Cairo which cut all diplomatic relations with Ankara.\textsuperscript{662} The voting record of Turkey during 1961 when serving as a non-permanent member in the UN Security Council was also in line with western expectations.\textsuperscript{663} Capitalizing on the positive atmosphere of the Periphery Pact, Turkey also kept Tel Aviv on a positive footing. During the eight years the Pact lasted, agricultural cooperation as well as dialogue and joint planning in the military field took root.\textsuperscript{664} The exchange of visits between Chiefs of General Staff was accompanied by a 1964 meeting in

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\textsuperscript{663} CRISS, N. B. (1997).
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Paris with PMs İnönü and Eshkol in attendance. Until the second half of the 1960s, air force training and participation in military exercises were of regular occurrence.

Phase II. The Confused Ally: Measured Westernism (1965-1983)

What Ankara did not anticipate at the time was the degree of pragmatism western powers could enjoy in relations with Turkey. This was manifested most astutely on two occasions. First was during the Cuban missile crisis (1962) and the second over the issue of Cyprus (1964). On the first, the US struck a deal with the USSR to withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey in return for the Soviets' reciprocal action in Cuba. During the negotiations between Washington and Moscow, Turkey was not consulted tat-e-tat but debriefed at NATO later on. Nevertheless Turkey was not completely left alone as President Kennedy pledged to replace Jupiter missiles in Turkey with American Polaris submarines deployed in the Mediterranean. The incident anyhow showed how vulnerably Turkey’s interests were indexed at the mercy of Washington. Second and more critical was the famous Johnson letter saga. At a time when inter-ethnic tensions on the Cypriot island were on the rise, PM İnönü made it clear to Washington that Turkey was determined to act unilaterally based on the Guarantee Agreement of 1959. US President Johnson’s letter telling Turks to simply ward off or face the Soviets alone was a slap of utmost frustration for Ankara. İnönü immediately called his planned US visit off and stated to Time magazine that “if (our) allies

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666 Ibid. p.42-45, 53.
do not change their position, the Western alliance can go dissolved..." and "...asa new world (order) is established according to new circumstances, Turkey would no doubt find its (proper) place in this new world". In assessing the incident, Bülent Ecevit who became CHP’s leader in 1964 argued similarly that “Ankara realized that its one-dimensional national security approach did not cover all contingencies”. In assessing the incident, Bülent Ecevit who became CHP’s leader in 1964 argued similarly that “Ankara realized that its one-dimensional national security approach did not cover all contingencies”.  

The net fallout was erosion in the authority of the West (the US in particular) as a reliable partner. A growing suspicion that the West would not come to Turkey’s aid if a real threat emerged resurrected the insecurities emanating from the Sevres-phobia. Consequently Turks drew the lesson that they should “never become so dependent on anyone again”. Equally disturbing for Ankara was that most Arab states either due to non-aligned solidarity or suspicions over the use of the island as a forward staging base by Western powers to aid Israel did not lend their support to the Turkish thesis (the British bases on the island, to the continuation of which Turkey had no objection, were already used in the 1956 Suez Crisis against Egypt). On December 18, 1965, Egypt, Iraq and Syria voted in favour of the UN resolution reaffirming the sovereignty of Greek-dominated Cyprus and the illegality of any external (Turkish) intervention. Only Iran and Libya supported Turkey. Hence the rhetoric of diversification of Turkey’s external relations that started in the late 1950s gained visibly more strength. It was a time when there was almost unanimous consensus in Ankara that Turkey needed to revise its policy options and turn multi-dimensional.

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Discouraged by these developments, a change in the geopolitical code was a must. Therefore, the notion that dominated Turkish foreign policy behaviour until the early 1980s can be called “measured westernism”. Whilst Turkey’s strategic orientation remained solid, a faintly roughed up Ankara believed that some distance vis-à-vis its relations with the West (the US) was the right strategy. This was, however, nothing beyond a tactical measure which was assuredly declared by the initiator of the policy, Hamit Batu, a senior diplomat from the ranks of the MFA. He articulated the refined strategy with a call for closer ties with Europe (as opposed to the US), a rapprochement with the USSR (even to the point of concluding an aid and credit agreement in 1964 and an industrial assistance agreement in 1967 which were used to finance a number of heavy industry plants) and closer ties with the non-aligned movement (Third World). The expectation was that Europe would become the third force vis-à-vis the Soviets and the US, and Turkey’s position in Europe would only be secured if Ankara could establish itself with some prestige in the non-aligned world including the Middle East.

The three dominant political figures, PMs Ecevit and Demirel and their coalition aide Erbakan developed different discourses in operationalizing this vision. In the 1960s and 1970s Ecevit became famous for “Third Worldism”, Erbakan for “Easternism” and Demirel, as the most pragmatic of all, “managing fine-tuned relations with the Arab Middle East and the West”. In all three accounts, the Middle East fared fairly high. The oriental region thereafter was translated into one of the central pillars upon which Ankara could base its measured...
response to the west (the US foremost). Furthermore, it was translated into a vehicle through which Turkey could seek an alternative, yet not necessarily substitutive, web of relations.

The overall scripture of the Middle East was much like the dominant Kemalist storyline, one that is risky, unattractive and dangerous. Yet it was the area Turks sought relative autonomy, greater freedom of action and support for its foreign policy priorities. Turkish leaders thus felt hesitantly compelled to relate with the region but never to the point of genuine identification with. As a result, the main tenets of the new regional strategy were equality among state parties, non-interference in the domestic affairs of Middle Eastern countries and in inter-country disputes. One could add guided neutrality to the list as Turkey had to make some tough choices during the period in the conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbours as well as in the Palestinian dispute. In practical terms, this notion was operationalized as an affirmation of the Palestinians’ right to statehood while recognizing Israel’s legitimacy to live as an independent state.

In this regard, Ankara also saw CENTO whereby Turkey had earlier contemplated itself as the chief state of western forward defence posture, as a proper instrumental tool. CENTO’s headquarters had already moved from Baghdad to Ankara in 1959 following Iraq’s exit. The fact that ‘the principal attraction of the organization for other parties was the machinery which it afforded for obtaining military and financial aid’ helped Ankara’s hand. In this context, it was not business as usual for the Turkish and Pakistani Presidents and Iranian Shah to convene in Istanbul in June 1964 as the meeting resulted in the establishment of an organization to promote economic, technical and cultural cooperation with the name of ‘Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD)’. It was different from CENTO but assuredly

not to belittle it. Expectations were economic collaboration as well as attracting non-committed countries in the region, e.g. Afghanistan, Kuwait and even Iraq. The new organization was in line with Turks' desire for broadening their freedom of manoeuvre which caused the British and the Americans to suspect whether the Turks would be drifting away. In the subsequent years, the initiative was marred with small achievements due to insufficient funds, divergent interests and agendas, and administrative difficulties albeit an initially ambitious agenda. RCD remained in operation till the end of 1978, but a state of dormancy subsumed from 1979 to 1984, making its function as a useful lever for Ankara vis-à-vis its relations with the West questionable.

When AP won a majority ticket in 1965, very little was known of its foreign policy convictions aside from the fact that Demirel rose on the legacy of Menderes's defunct DP. It soon emerged that as a pragmatic politician, he was of very little foreign affairs interest. During the nine years Demirel served as the PM from 1965 to 1980, he never employed a strong geopolitical discourse nor ever challenged the overall policy direction. It has to be noted that Demirel was the subject of overt and covert interventions by the Turkish military in 1971 and 1980 which in part accounts for his reluctance. The bigger part remaining he simply was not a man of grand vision or change but rather continuity. With Anatolian conservatives lying at the core of his constituency, Demirel heeded only selectively to the sensitivities of his people toward the Arab Middle East. That’s why he started with a pledge in 1965 that “it would be a priority for Turkey to establish genuinely close and multifaceted relations of friendship and fruitful cooperation on various areas with the brotherly countries in the Middle East and Maghreb” and that “Arab states could rely on Turkey’s sympathy and support for

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their legitimate causes. However, this was accompanied by a commitment to develop friendly relations with the non-aligned countries in Africa and Asia without challenging Turkey’s westernist anchor. On clarifying how this would fit in to the relations with Israel, FM Çaglayangil authoritatively declared in February 1967 that “good relations with Arab countries would not take Ankara’s ties with Israel hostage”.

This last point seemed in contradiction with the foreign policy establishment’s position as Ankara had already signalled how it hoped to operationalize Middle Eastern politics as an instrument of measured distancing vis-à-vis the relations with the West in 1966. The Turkish military at that time decided to end the Periphery Pact with Israel which was on-and-off for the last eight years. Besides the Turkish Director of Military Intelligence told his Israeli counterpart that Turkey was going to freeze bilateral relations because the US supported the Greek Orthodox Church’s claims over historical ties to Istanbul. By slightly guiding the balance toward Arabs, the establishment hoped to break with the utter international isolation suffered on the issue of Cyprus and prove Ankara’s nuisance value to Washington. To see upon which impulses Turkey would act and who would steer the policy, i.e. Demirel’s elected government or the emboldened military, one has to consider the turn of events in the following years.

The opportunity presented itself as the tensions rose between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1967. In clear contrast to the position Turkey took in the 1956 Suez Crisis, the guided neutrality policy led Demirel not to side with Israel and the US in the armed conflict. Turkey carefully refrained from actively engaging in the war and Ankara rejected Washington’s

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696 Ibid. p.64.
697 Ibid. p. 42-43, 45, 56, 64.
request to use airbases in Adana to resupply Israel. The same meticulous approach was displayed in not condemning Israel as the aggressor. Anxious about the infringement of the regional status quo, Turkey even allowed Russian aircrafts to use its airspace to deliver humanitarian aid to the belligerent Arabs, i.e. Syria, Egypt and Jordan. During the conflict PM Demirel announced that he was against forceful acquisition of territory. Similarly when the issue was brought to the UN, FM Çağlayangil declared that “Ankara would not recognize Israel's territorial gains achieved in fait accompli by use of force”. He also uttered the sensitivities of Turkish people on the holy sites in Jerusalem. The choices Turkey made during the conflict partly reflected the preferences of Turkish conservatives who were much more sympathetic to the Palestinians and the Arabs’ cause, and in larger part the establishment’s guided neutrality doctrine. To strike a balance, Ankara supported the UN Resolution 242 which demanded Israel withdraw from territories occupied in the recent conflict but acknowledged the right for all states to live in secure and recognized boundaries. Turkey’s limited, cautious and rather rhetorical engagement in the conflict therefore did not necessarily mean a break away from the established non-interference clause toward a region where a disavowed sense of distaste and resentment prevailed.

The same scenario repeated itself in 1973 when Arabs and Israel clashed once more. The guided neutrality on both occasions worked to the advantage of Arabs backed by Moscow

699 AYKAN, M. B. (1993). The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s. p.95.
while infuriating Israelis and Washington.\textsuperscript{706} Ankara’s neutrality in each case was established later on by a strong call on the acknowledgement of Israel’s right to survival within secure borders. The military conflicts were a chance for Ankara to show that the West was not the only option there was. Thus, Turks aimed to achieve an independent, elastic and diversified approach regarding the Middle East.\textsuperscript{707} Additionally Turkey favoured a risk-averse policy that sought a speedy return to \textit{status quo ante bellum}. The non-interference and guided neutrality characterizing such behaviour was later defined as ‘traditional Kemalist policy’\textsuperscript{708} albeit it was Demirel’s conservative government in power in 1967 and an interim administration in 1973 that commenced such policy. For Turkey zigzagged considerably vis-à-vis the Jewish state since its establishment in 1948, PM Ben Gurion’s statement in the 1950s that “Turkey treated Israel as its mistress (Arabs being its wife)”\textsuperscript{709} was further strengthened by the course of developments in the 1960s to 1970s.

Regardless of the true intentions of the political elite, the foreign policy establishment was adamant that Turkey’s engagement with the Muslim Middle East would not amount to anything more than a tactical measure. It was simply beyond conception that any deviation could be incurred on Ankara’s steadfastly pro-Western foreign policy. The issue rose up when an invite was sent to the Turkish President for the first Islamic Summit Conference in Rabat in 1969. The proposed agenda was to discuss the fire at the Al Aqsa Mosque and the status of Jerusalem following Israel’s occupation of the eastern part of the city in 1967.\textsuperscript{710} The first question in Ankara was whether Turkey should participate at all. The problem for the Kemalist establishment was twofold. First of all, it was an issue of contention whether laicism, a core principle in the Turkish constitution, would fit in well with Ankara’s participation

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{706} AYKAN, M. B. (1993). The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s. p.97.
\textsuperscript{708} CRISS, N. B. (1997).
\end{footnotesize}
in a gathering of Muslim states. Demirel who represented the conservative tradition argued that it was a political and not a religious meeting[^711] and so Turkey should participate. An equally crucial worry for the establishment was to keep the western orientation of the Turkish state unquestioned. In other words, Ankara’s participation in the Summit by no means had to prejudice Turkey’s geopolitical positioning as a member of the western community and an ally in NATO.[^712] The last question was at what level Turkey should attend had it so been decided. Here the preference of the government was attending at the level requested, i.e. the President. The firm opposition by the foreign policy establishment paved the way to the following formula; Turkey would participate but only as an “observer” and at the level of FM. 

As a result, Ankara participated with a delegation headed by FM Çağlayangil.[^713]

The OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) Declaration regarding the issues of Palestine and Israel was accepted with a reservation stipulating that Ankara’s concurrence was conditioned in so far as the declaration was compatible with the UN resolutions (where Turkey applied guided neutrality) and with the fundamental principles of Turkish foreign policy (westernism).[^714] Ankara’s reluctance to take sides infuriated the Arabs (Egypt and Algeria) and caused criticisms at home. The unconvinced Abdi İpekçi, the editor of a major Turkish paper, opined that Demirel’s government had only participated in the Rabat Summit to woo conservative voters in advance of the approaching general elections in Turkey.[^715] 

Ankara’s hesitancy on how to relate to the activities of the OIC continued in the early 1970s with a rather uncommitted stance. The Ministerial meeting held in Jeddah in 1970 was attended at the level of the MFA’s Secretary-General who did not participate in

[^713]: Ibid. 
In the following years Ankara avoided regular participation in OIC meetings whilst supporting the proposal to establish a Secretariat. When a Charter was drafted in 1972 during the OIC Summit in Jeddah, Ankara held back on the grounds that the general principles of its foreign policy (westernism) and the secular constitution were not quite compatible.

Close to the mid-1970s, a number of factors begged Ankara’s immediate attention. The first was the violent crackdowns in Baghdad and Damascus in 1968 and 1970 which resulted in pro-Soviet regimes. With the Baath Party taking over control of the government in Iraq and Syria, the new ideological colouring of the region was a serious challenge for Ankara. The second was the oil shock of 1973 in the face of an already deteriorating economy. The fact that Arab countries started using oil as a political weapon began hurting Turkey in two ways. Firstly, a net increase in the price of Turkey’s oil exports for which Ankara relied overwhelmingly on foreign producers was incurred. To help it remedied, Ankara established credit lines with oil-producing Arab countries. Secondly, the oil shock ultimately caused European markets with which Turkey had established majority of its commercial ties to shrink. Coupled with a decline in the remittances from Europe, PM Demirel drew attention to the growing current account deficit and the shortage in foreign currency reserves in his idiosyncratic style that “Turkey was in dire need of 70 cents”. Therefore, Ankara needed to diversify the external markets for Turkish consumer goods and workers in which the Arab world seemed vastly suited.

217Ibid.
219FIRAT, M. & KÜRÜKÇÜOĞLU, Ö. (2002). Ortadoğu’yla İlişkiler (Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East) in ORAN, B. Turkish Foreign Policy. sp.794.
That Ankara's unilateral intervention in Cyprus in 1974 triggered an arms embargo by the US lasting for three years (1975-1978) further deepened the economic crisis and the international isolation Ankara suffered. When Turkish action was debated at the UN with resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus, most Western nations either voted against them or abstained. Neither the Soviets nor the non-aligned world or Muslim countries backed the Turkish position, all of which fed into a deep sense of loneliness, frustration and resentment.

The inclusion of the MSP in the coalition government formed in 1973 lent an extra motive to mend fences more quickly with the Muslim world despite the fact that Erbakan’s net imprint on the overall foreign policy strategy was rather limited. The somewhat besieged Ankara was therefore forced to show a growing eagerness to strengthen ties with the Arab world. Turkey’s reluctant return to the oriental region thus gained a somewhat accelerated pace without impeding the established principles.

To this end, Ankara struck deals with Tripoli in the second half of the 1970s to send Turkish workers in thousands to Libya and receive a continuous oil flow in favourable terms. Via similar favours established with Iraq (with the pipeline carrying oil from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan constructed in 1977) and Saudi Arabia, the net share of Arab states in

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Turkey’s overall trade volume increased from a mere 5% prior to 1973 to 34% in 1981 thanks in large part to Turkish oil purchases.\textsuperscript{727}

In this context, Turkey supported registration of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in the UN in 1973.\textsuperscript{728} Ankara shortly began contributing to the OIC budget in 1974 and by injecting Turkish capital became a full member of the Islamic Development Bank the next year.\textsuperscript{729} In the very same line, Turkey voted in 1975 for the UN resolution that equated Zionism with racism.\textsuperscript{730} During the period, Ankara’s stance can neither be characterized strictly pro-Arab nor anti-Israel as the main concern for Turkey was to register its neutrality as a western state in the form of benevolence in the affairs of a region of utmost distaste. In line with this strategy, Ankara vigorously resisted calls from the Arab states after the wars in 1967 and 1973 to cease diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. For instance, once a resolution was tabled in the OIC Summit in Lahore in 1974 calling all states to break relations with Israel, Turkish FM Turan Güneş was quick to put in Ankara’s unwavering reserve that it would not follow suit.\textsuperscript{731}

In May 1976, Ankara under the threat by Necmettin Erbakan of MSP to dissolve the coalition government \textsuperscript{732} unenthusiastically hosted the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Istanbul. It was perhaps one of the moments Erbakan made his limited influence felt as strongly as possible in getting Turkey closer to the Arab world. During the conference, Ankara proposed establishment of a statistical, economic and research centre (SESRIC) as well as a research centre on history, art and Islamic culture (IRCICA) in Turkey. The centres


\textsuperscript{728} AYKAN, M. B. (1994) p.76-77.


\textsuperscript{732} Interview with Necmettin Erbakan (1979) cited in Cumhuriyet (Turkish daily). August 2.

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were established in Ankara in 1978 and Istanbul in 1979. Turks also promised the PLO an office in Ankara in 1976 but there was no hurry after the conference to act on that. A number factors were crucial in the delay. The PLO’s support to Greek Cypriot theses and the subsequent failure to endorse OIC decisions, the fact that Turkish left-wing radical and Kurdish separatist groups got training in PLO camps in Lebanon, Ankara’s belief that the PLO supported Kurdish secessionist movements and provided refuge to Armenian terrorists in Bekaa Valley, the Organization’s tendency to resort to violence and Turkish fears that a close engagement with the PLO would adversely affect Ankara’s chances of receiving economic aid from the West seemed to have all played a role.

The overriding circumstances were created with the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli agreement. In 1978, there was a conservative Demirel-Erbakan government in Ankara. The bigger coalition partner supported Cairo’s move but Erbakan advocated that Egypt simply was selling off the Palestinian cause. When ardently Kemalist Ecevit formed a coalition government next year, he was convinced that the accords would have no positive impact on the solution of the Palestinian dispute. In order to balance the scale, Ecevit hosted PLO leader Yasser Arafat in Turkey in October 1979. During the visit, the PLO’s Office in Ankara was inaugurated with a quasi-diplomatic status at the level of Charge d’Affaires just like the diplomatic representative of Israel in Turkey. Turks were trying to strike a balance between the Arabs and Israelis as Ankara was suspicious that the PLO was still harbouring terrorist groups (Kurds, left-wing radicals and Armenians) of whose training activities the PLO never promised an end.

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733 Ibid.
735 AYKAN, M. B. (1993). The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s. p.100
737 AYKAN, M. B. (1993). The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s. p.100
On the other hand, Ankara had voiced a declaration of intent to formally approve the OIC charter (the Founding Agreement of 1972) during the Seventh Conference in Istanbul. That the document included a resolution calling on the participants "...to preserve Islamic spiritual, ethical, social and economic values" and to "...promote Islamic solidarity among member states"\textsuperscript{738} in particular was a source of great worry for Ankara. Unsure about how the foreign policy establishment would react, successive Turkish governments did not keep the promise and postponed the parliamentary debate to see if the laicism clause in the Turkish constitution bode well with the charter.\textsuperscript{739} Due to such deep-seated insecurities, it was not until 1981 that a Turkish PM was present in an OIC Summit as the military coup after 1980 was more accommodating towards the role of Islam in Turkey.\textsuperscript{740}

By the start of the 1980s, the Turkish economy was still deteriorating with great difficulty in covering the cost of oil exports. The fact that the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran brought about skyrocketing oil prices in addition to a potential unfriendly regime in Tehran simply accentuated the impetus to pay more respect to Arab sensitivities. In this regard, when the Israeli Parliament passed a bill in July 1980 declaring Jerusalem in its entirety the eternal capital of Israel, Ankara’s reaction was harsh. Turco-Israeli relations deteriorated quickly with Ankara’s decision to shut its Consulate in Jerusalem down.\textsuperscript{741} Furthermore, Turkey decided to withdraw all personnel from its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv except for a second secretary who would serve as the Turkish Charge d’Affairs by the end of August.\textsuperscript{742}

\textsuperscript{738} Full text of the 1972 Charter is available at \url{http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff46.shtml} (consulted on May 31, 2013).
\textsuperscript{739} BOLUKBAŞI, S. (1999), p.27.
\textsuperscript{740} KOÇER, G. (2006). Türk Dış Politikasında Din Unsuru (Religion as A Factor in Turkish Foreign Policy). \textit{Akademik Orta Doğu Vol 1: 1}.
The general posture of Turkish policy did not change under the military junta in the aftermath of September 12. Diligent of not veering too far, Ankara did not allow the debacle to escalate to the point of severing diplomatic relations with Israel as Arabs suggested when Tel Aviv adopted a bill to extend the jurisdiction of Israeli law to the occupied Golan Heights in December 1981. In this line, Turkey was careful in not totally undermining its western credentials when a draft resolution was voted at the UN General Assembly in February 1982, condemning Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights, calling Israel an non-peace loving country, criticizing the “no” vote of the US in the Security Council a month earlier on the same matter asking for appropriate measures against Israel, and called on U.N. agencies and international organizations to tailor their relations with Israel to punitive terms.

By the end of the period, the share of Middle Eastern states in Turkey’s trade volume was increased but Ankara’s overall relations with the Arab world remained in limbo. Relations with Israel were sour. The non-partisan approach of Ankara proved unsuccessful in satisfying most parties in the region. New dimensions were added to regional affairs which factored in the perceptions by and of Turkey. On top of the Baath takeovers in Syria and Iraq, continuity of opportunism and Soviet-friendliness in Cairo further coloured Ankara’s preoccupations about the region. Kurdish, Armenian and radical Turkish groups getting trained in the PLO camps in Lebanon was yet another factor. In addition to the conception that equated Turkey with being an agent of the West in the Middle East and a constant reminder of Ottoman hegemony, Ankara’s willingness to undertake construction of big dams on the Tigris River from the mid-1960s onwards strengthened Ankara’s image as a hostile country for Arabs.

745 For a detailed analysis on the emergence and perseverance of “water issue” in impacting Turkey’s relations with Iraq and Syria see ERDOĞAN, İ. (1998). Su Sorunu, Ortadoğu ve Türkiye: Bölgesel Bir Analiz (The Problem of Water, the Middle East and Turkey: A Regional Analysis) in DAĞI, I. D., & BAĞCI, H. Türk Dış Politikasında Gelenek ve Değişim (Tradition and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy). Ankara, Siyasal Kitabevi.
With varying degrees, all were influential in setting the respective imageries parties developed in the following decades while dealing with each other.

V. CONCLUSION

The first sixty years of the Republic bears testimony to the pervasive influence of civilizational geopolitics. Turks, either Kemalist or Conservative, saw the world through civilizational binaries that crystalized around positive or negative symbolizations associated with the West or the East. Between these binaries, two geopolitical traditions contested in determining where Turkey is as well as how to construe the Middle East. In the process, westwards orientation of the state was elevated to the status of prevalent norm. This affected domestic and foreign policy alike. So strong was the impact of westwards positioning that aside from Necmettin Erbakan and his disciples, nobody practically challenged it.

Nonetheless when it came to the Middle East, it was not only the legacy of Ataturk but also the opposing conservative mantra that shaped Ankara’s geopolitical practices. A competing geopolitical scripture of the region preponderated as to how Turkey should place itself in the Middle East and how it should ultimately behave. As long as the region remained a beacon of distasteful bitterness, risk and danger, as Kemalists propagated, policy-makers in Ankara approached it with caution, reluctance and extra diligence. Based on this geographical imagination, Turks chose to be timid and reactionary, trying to avoid unnecessary volume of intensity in regional entanglements. But at times when foreign policy figures in Ankara identified themselves more easily with Islam and traditional values, perceptions of the region diverged significantly. As the power of the Kemalist establishment remained the strongest, conservative influence in Ankara's geopolitical practices was rather limited in scope but nevertheless profound. During the 1950s, a sense of genuine care for the countries in the region led Turkey to act much more confidently and boldly as compared to what Kemalists
would have preferred. This was not, however, always gentle as Ankara was in the first place after its own interests.

The way Turkey acted throughout the period was no doubt conditioned by the geopolitical imageries and practices of other state actors as Turks were always watchful of how their somewhat romanticized western partners approached Turkey and the Middle East. As such, they never pursued regional policies in isolation from the dealings of western powers. In practice, Turks learnt with due price that in addition to the western powers', the practices, ambitions, perceptions, imageries, modes of representation and visions of the regional actors had also to be factored in.

I. INTRODUCTION

Whereas the first 60 years of the Turkish Republic has enjoyed an almost unquestionably robust westwards direction in which the Middle East was reduced to an icon of deliberate non-identification and mostly a subject of Turkey’s reluctant foreign policy entanglements, the era starting with Turgut Özal in the early 1980s symbolizes increasing levels of association with the region while Turkey’s singlehanded placement in the West is approached with more unease. This chapter therefore signifies a rupture, with brief exceptions reserved, in the perceptions around the place, identity and orientation of Turkey as well as the modes of representation around the Middle East. That such questioning did start during the Cold War stands testimony to the impact of domestic determinants at the expense of systemic imperatives in influencing Turkish foreign policy.


A New Conception of Civilizational Space

Özal’s ANAP (Anavatan Partisi - Motherland Party) was under heavy influence of the conservative school. Yet as a catch-all party, ANAP was where conservative, religious, nationalist and liberal tendencies met. The challenge for Özal was to develop a foreign policy design that would fit all. He came up with a discourse of (geo-cultural) synthesis with a view to reduce what he perceived as Ankara’s overdependence on the West. In the process, he kept toying with civilizational geopolitics.
At first, Özal criticized Europeans for exercising ethnocentrism and a racist collective subconscious against Turkey. For Özal, the Europeans claimed superiority of the West, and hence simply tended to bestow all things regarded as just and good on themselves and attributed everything unworthy to others whom they considered inferior. He was convinced that Europeans considered the Aegean Sea not an extension of the Mediterranean but an insuperable demarcation line between the West and rest. To him, such a tormented image of superior European self by creating mental barriers before geographies called for disaster.

Against this grotesque image, Özal tried to evidence how deeply Muslims, Turks and Turkey, by harnessing a civilizational space of their own, were involved in the evolution of western civilizational cosmos. He argued for a unity of human civilization and space in which ancient Greek, Roman, Judaic-Christian and Islamic-Turkish cultures all partook. Özal did not accept the East and the West as “self-enclosed” geopolitical entities in the structuring of civilizations but rather called for a singular space in intermingled continuities. It was an attempt to go beyond simplistic conceptions of geo-cultural typology (East-West) as spaces of difference, temporal separation and inequality towards an understanding of a common space of hybridity. The present day reflection for Özal had to be harmonious existence of Eastern (Muslim-Turkish) and Western (Christian-European) civilizations as both owed much to each other with mutual barrowing and adaptation being ordinary practice for centuries. He foresaw the ultimate re-joining of these two locales in Turkey’s accession to the EC as this would resolve the ages-old tension between the West and East.
Turkey: The Land of (Geo-Cultural) Synthesis

By reducing the distance and difference between the East and the West to almost none, one of the aims for Özal was to rid Turks' mind of binary oppositions. He claimed that throughout the republican history, Atatürk’s motto “peace at home, peace in the world” was interpreted rigidly as a means of self-contained identity that precluded any active involvement outside Turkey’s borders. It thus restricted the limits of bounded rationality for external action around Turkey’s bounded and stable territoriality against the spatial and cultural "otherness" of Muslims. Özal believed that republican policies of timidity and non-interference had produced a state of insularity by constructing (mental) walls around Turkey with a sacrosanct conception of borders. In the sense Rose stipulates, Özal “challenged (existing) oppressive definitions of identity by rethinking the spatialities which give both material and symbolic structure to those definitions”. Thus not only Europe/West was constructed as a familiar space that is “ours” in the reconstitution of Turkey's new identity but also Eastern and Muslim spaces which were considered as “theirs” and beyond reach in the Kemalist mantra. Reconstructing Turkey's spatial position and identity this way obliged it to come to terms with many of the geographical and cultural influences in the production of a new cross-boundary identity. This goes in both directions, the East and the West (Islamic and Judeo-Greco-Roman-Christian). By overriding the Kemalist conception of spatiality and identity, Ozal posed to get Turkey rid of mental barriers and make it great again.

From this sprang how Özal imagined the place of Turkey in a hybridist notion of space; a land of synthesis that combines in itself two meta places and many cultures that predate

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and permeates over opposing binaries in the construction of the Eastern and the Western geographies.\footnote{Ibid. p. 296-297.} With a foot in Europe and Asia, Turkey was presented as a living example of hybridity of space. Thus, Turkey was deemed Asiatic and European, Easterner not less than Western, oriental as well as occidental. Such a synthesis was what Özal hoped would “\textit{put an end to the identity crisis of Turks}”.\footnote{ÖZAL, T. (1991). p.297.} In this vein, the location of Anatolia as the centre stage for many civilizations was given as evidence that it serves as a melting pot of spaces.\footnote{Ibid. p.86, 172.} For Özal, the fact that Turkey went through an extensive process of westernist reformation did not render the indigenous features of Anatolia (religion, traditional customs, and other cultural values) any less relevant since they were extremely resilient in the face of alien civilizational intrusion.\footnote{Ibid. p.266.} To the contrary, such diversity and richness were used as a means to justify active pursuit of national interest. Foreign policy, which was touted in a spirit of economic liberalism, was once again the area to discursively and practically construct the new identity. In this context, Özal argued that “Turkey should be an indispensable power for both the East and the West. This is only possible through a dynamic, active and honest foreign policy that does not hastily change its orientation and zigzag haphazardly.”\footnote{BARLAS, M. (1994). \textit{Turgut Özal’ın Anıları (Memoirs of Turgut Özal)}. İstanbul, Sabah Kitapları. p.121.}

**Conservative Reflexes Re-Emerging: A Different National Mission**

Özal brought back greater level of ambition, self-confidence and zeal to Turkish foreign policy, comparable only to but far exceeding the DP era. His style reflected utmost dynamism, boldness, unorthodox style and adaptability.\footnote{DOĞAN, K. (1994). \textit{Turgut Özal Belgeseli (Documentary of Turgut Özal)}. Kavaklidere, Ankara, Türk Haberler Ajansı. p.315.} Özal harboured ambitions to transform Turkey into a regional power hub, a common theme in the conservative school, which found its most astute expression in his own dictum “again great Turkey”, implying
enhancement of Ankara’s international stature.\textsuperscript{764} To mark his broader ambition, Özal was also associated with the rhetoric of “jumping an age (çağ atlamak)”. Regional cooperation based on economic incentives was a central pillar in order to resuscitate a “great Turkey”. What characterized Özal’s foreign policy handling was “to depart from established policies, to take calculated risks, and to search for new alternatives and options.”\textsuperscript{765} Therefore, the Özal era in Turkish foreign policy bears witness to the third genuine wave of intense activism in Middle Eastern politics.

\textbf{The Synthesis as a Guide to Foreign Policy}

In re-establishing Turkey’s global placement, Özal was unhappy with the notion that saw Turkey as an appendage of Europe. The West was no longer seen as the ultimate direction of Turkish foreign policy but rather just another dimension.\textsuperscript{766} Particular importance was paid to Turks’ Ottoman and Islamic roots as these were perceived what would provide Turkey the basis for giving Ankara a greater say in world affairs.\textsuperscript{767} For Özal, “the greater the weight of Turkey in the (Muslim) East, the greater it would be in the West”.\textsuperscript{768} Put differently, the Muslim world was instrumentalized as the space to elevate Turkey’s global standing. Hence, Özal championed closer ties with Muslim states, which were justified through a civilizational discourse. He stated that “the reason why we approach to the Muslim world is because we have cultural and religious ties with these brotherly countries.”\textsuperscript{769} The novelty was Özal’s refusal to part ways with the West. With a legacy covering both the Western and Muslim

\textsuperscript{766} \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{769} ÖZAL, T. quoted in GOZEN , R. (2009). \textit{İmparatorluktan Küresel Aktörliğe Türkiye ‘nin Dış Politikası} (Turley’s Foreign Policy from the Empire to the Global Actor). \textit{Ankara, Palme}. p. 81-82.
civilizations and cultures, he was ready to give up neither the east nor the west. As he usually humorously questioned “why should not Turkey make use of the advantages of both?” Thanks to his dual outlook, Lawday called Özal “a statesman whose mind is in the West yet whose heart belongs to the East”. Özal’s therefore was not an attempt to change Turkey’s orientation altogether but rather to reduce its dependence on the West and diversify its options for a multidimensional and multifaceted foreign policy.

The Conservative Image of the Middle East Re-Visited

In practical terms, connecting more closely with the Middle East was what Özal thought would constitute “spreading out the weight of Turkish trade and political power”. When gently challenging Ankara’s firmly established westwards location, Turkey’s Muslim roots thus became much more visible and pronounced. This stemmed from an express sympathy for the Muslim world which was no less than towards the West. Foreign policy was, alas, the area to discursively reconstruct the new state identity. In the act, the rigidly established boundaries between "in" and "out", "us" vs. "them" were flexed to allow room for additional dimensions and areas of manoeuvre. A closer identification with the Middle East as a token of Turkey’s Ottoman and Islamic heritage simply served to this purpose. Ozal therefore was

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770 He used the bridge metaphor to inscribe both the geo-cultural synthesis notion he developed earlier and to infer Turkey’s difference from the West in terms of religion and values. The speech he gave in October 1989 stands testimony on how he perceives Turkey’s distinct character as a bridge which is available in ÖZAL, T. (1989). ...Speeches: 16-31 October 1989. Ankara. Basın Yayın Tanıtma ve Halka İlişkiler Başkanlığı. p.85.


vocal in emphasizing Turkey's placement and sense of belonging to the Middle East in addition to the West.\textsuperscript{776} The oriental region no longer was a cursed geography that Turkey had the unfortunate fate of having had to live with but the land of people with whom Turks shared a common geography, history, religion and culture. Likewise it no longer was a symbol of permanent turmoil, danger and threats but rather a zone of strategic significance with promising prospects of economic cooperation. Justifying Ankara's engagement with the Middle East through such a geopolitical discourse, the region was elevated to the status of a land of opportunities and not merely challenges.\textsuperscript{777}

**The Practice: The Early Özalian Epoch (1983-1989)**

As part of the new geopolitical imagery, countries in the Middle East were not seen as foreigners but friends and potential allies.\textsuperscript{778} As Eralp argues, this was a deliberate policy choice by the new ruling elite which strived to develop an easy-going and pragmatic relationship with the Arab and Muslim world.\textsuperscript{779} Fuller interpreted Ankara's rapprochement with the Muslim world as a mere reflection of Özal's personal interest to promote Islamic lifestyle at home.\textsuperscript{780} In fact the re-definition of Turkey's geopolitical positioning amidst two spaces, the East and the West paved the way for greater interest in the Muslim world. Coupled with a fresh and non-fouled image of the region, Turkish policy towards the Middle East, by means of discourse and practice, took a visible upturn. Consequently political, economic and social interaction and high level visits proliferated.

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\textsuperscript{777} Ibid.


In this context, Turkey was brought back to the centre stage of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) by permanently undertaking the chair of the COMSEC (Committee on Social and Economic Cooperation) in the 3rd Islamic Summit in 1984, three years after the inception of the committee. At the Summit, Turkey was for the first time represented by its President, Kenan Evren upon Özal’s persuasion. Thereafter the OIC, which used to be a venue of reluctant participation by Turkish leaders, was transformed into an area of regular high level attendance. Ankara’s expectation was, in addition to soliciting Muslim states’ support to its foreign policy priorities, to stimulate joint investments and boost cooperation in trade, industry, finance and energy.

Reducing restrictions before economic cooperation served as a prelude to the eradication of mental borders between Turks and its Muslim neighbourhood. Once economic interdependency was established, in the words of Özal, these countries “would inevitably think twice before doing anything to harm each other’s interests”. With an attempt to solidify this vision, Turkey took the lead in the establishment of regional cooperation schemes. The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which rose on the legacy of inept Regional Cooperation for Development, was inaugurated in 1986 by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in order to promote economic, technical and cultural cooperation. The economic utility of ECO remained marginal until the wave of enlargement in 1992 which took in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as members. Even after that, creating a common trade area by establishing a preferential

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trade regime remained far from sight. The symbolism from Ankara’s perspective, however, was high since it signalled a growing eagerness to do business with the Muslim world.

These were all linked to the new model of economic development Ankara adopted which aimed at integrating Turkey with the international capitalist economy. This required capital inflows, foreign direct investment, export markets and continuous flow of energy and raw materials. Economic factors thus began to have a growing role in Turkish foreign policy. In the process, owners of Turkey’s baby industries in the avidly conservative Anatolian heartland insisted on better relations with those geographies with whom they shared a similar culture, civilization and traditional values, i.e. the Muslim world. In the face of a wave of protectionist measures engulfing Europe, the Middle East fared high as the hydrocarbon-rich Muslim countries in the region constituted an important link and market. In this context, Yavuz opines that “the aim of Turkey was buying oil, paying the money for this oil as late as possible, attracting foreign (direct) investment and increasing Turkey’s exports to those (Arab) countries.” This boded well with the synthetist notion of space to guide external policy. As a result, many representatives from the Turkish government and business community visited Middle Eastern countries, signing agreements and concluding deals.

All of these considerations weighed heavily during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Despite the western pressure to isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran and the growing uneasiness from the Turkish foreign policy establishment over Tehran’s “regime export” rhetoric, Özal chose to remain neutral in the conflict.⁷⁹² Turkey’s geographical location as a commercial conduit towards the West was instrumentalized for foreign policy objectives.⁷⁹³ The calculation paid off. The level of trust by both parties to Ankara initially was strong. Iran and Iraq chose Turkish Embassies in each other’s capitals to represent their interests. Ankara’s economic relations with Tehran and Baghdad flourished too. Turkish goods were exported to both countries in increasing volumes. In return Turkey purchased 60% of its oil exports from Iraq and an additional 100,000 barrel per day from Iran.⁷⁹⁴ As of November 1985, Ankara and Baghdad agreed to build a second pipeline running parallel to the existing Kirkuk-Yumurtalik line with a capacity of 1.4 million b/d,⁷⁹⁵ the second line becoming operational in 1987. Both ran in full capacity thereafter since the Gulf route for Iraq was effectively closed.⁷⁹⁶

Economic relations with the rest of the Middle East also flourished.⁷⁹⁷ Turkey’s exports to the region rose from 15 % in 1979 to a solid 35 % until the mid-1980s, and remained around 20 %.⁷⁹⁸ Turkish companies won 18.3 billion Dollars of construction contracts from the Middle Eastern countries in the period 1974-1990.⁷⁹⁹ Libya became the biggest market for Turkish contractors followed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Likewise investment capital began flowing

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⁷⁹⁵Ibid.
from the Arab world, making Saudi Arabia and Iran the biggest investors in Turkey during 1984-1986. In addition, Kuwaiti and Bahraini banks opened branches in Turkey. A sense of economic and commercial euphoria prevailed.

The boom in economic and commercial relations gradually faded away after 1986, the date declining oil prices caused the Middle Eastern markets to shrink on top of the destructive effect of the on-going war between Iraq and Iran. Nonetheless when Iraq failed to pay the bill for Turkish exports, Ankara was adamant to issue export credits, which by the end of the war amounted to 2.5 billion Dollars in Iraqi debt (of which Baghdad paid 600 million Dollars in 1990). Trade volume with Iran fell to 350-400 million Dollars by 1989 from a record high 2 billion Dollars, and Ankara ran out of patience to freeze credits to Iraq around the same time. To compensate, Ankara’s attention was once again reverted to Europe. By 1989, the share of European Economic Community reached 48 % of Turkey’s total foreign trade. Yet Turkey’s interest in getting involved in Middle Eastern affairs did not disappear.

In addition to the economic yield, Ankara found another impetus to remain close to the region. A common concern, Kurds, relating to four countries (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria) made Ankara’s entanglement enticing. As observed by Pellitiere, the worry for Turkey ‘which was home to some 10 million Kurds and faced an active Kurdish separatist movement on its own territory’ was that ‘both Iran and Iraq by arming the Kurds to fight a proxy war in northern Iraq risked destabilizing the whole Turkish-Iraq-Iran triangle’. That promises for regional autonomy being mentioned several times during the overtures including Baghdad, Tehran, Damascus and Iraqi Kurdish leaders, Jalal Talabani and Masood Barzani, caused Ankara

worry. The Syrian regime, which was at the time embroiled in a dispute with Ankara because of the latter’s ambitious scheme to build major hydroelectric dams on the Euphrates river, calculated that it could use the PKK as a trump card.\textsuperscript{807} With Alexandretta’s integration to Turkey still not accepted, Damascus thus decided to harbour the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which used Syria and its protégé Lebanon as a safe haven.\textsuperscript{806} Baghdad’s decreased authority in northern Iraq provided another free sanctuary for the PKK to carry out its violent cross-border assaults in Turkey. The common interest between Iraq and Turkey prompted renewal of the 1978 agreement in October 1984 by allowing each side to pursue Kurdish factions some 18 km into the other’s territory.\textsuperscript{809} From 1983 onwards, the first date of such cross-border operations mounted by Ankara in northern Iraq, the PKK and Kurds transformed the image of the region to one in which the fate of the two geographies, Turkey and the immediate Middle East, seemed linked.

Özal’s two grand schemes of regional cooperation, Peace Pipeline (1986) and GAP (1983), were thought \textit{inter alia} as a means of addressing the Kurdish problem and developing economic ties with the region. Through these projects, he wished to achieve ‘peace through dependency’\textsuperscript{810}. The former, a 21 billion Dollars project, was envisaged to pump in water from Ceyhan and Seyhan rivers of Turkey to hydrocarbon-rich Arab countries that would in return transfer crude oil to Turkey.\textsuperscript{811} One of the water pipelines would run from Turkey to Syria, Jordan, and Israel and the other through Iraq to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.\textsuperscript{812}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{808}Ibid.
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GAP (South Anatolia Project), on the other hand, with a cost exceeding 32 billion Dollars\textsuperscript{813} was about construction of a series of dams on the Tigris and Euphrates in the southeast of Turkey in order to boost agricultural cultivation, electricity generation and water management. Özal thought of GAP as means of transforming the region into the “bread basket” of the Middle East and allowing regular water flow to downstream Arab countries. This was hoped would help create an additional impetus for Arabs and Turkey to get rid of their historical grievances and cooperate.

In this context, as Özal visited Damascus, Turkey signed a protocol with Syria in 1987 ensuring 500 cubic metres/second water flow as well as economic cooperation in return for the latter’s renouncement of its support to the PKK.\textsuperscript{814} What Ankara received, however, was not full surrender of PKK leader (Öcalan) but rather a denial that he was in Syria and his temporary replacement in Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{815} A dismayed Özal in 1989 accused Syria of breaching the protocol and threatened Damascus to reduce water flow and annul the 1987 economic cooperation scheme.\textsuperscript{816}

Turkish governments throughout republican history approached Iran with scepticism since Persians were of a different culture and sect of Islam. The Pahlavi dynasty’s westernizing reforms, Shah Reza’s utter appreciation of Atatürk, and the fact that the Cold War strategy of Iran was aligned with the Western bloc somewhat clouded such perceptions and led to cooperation (Saidabad and Baghdad Pacts, CENTO and RCD). Yet a competitive as well as cooperative détente presided over the character of Turco-Persian relations.


\textsuperscript{815} KOSEBALAN, H. p.125.

\textsuperscript{816} ERHAN, Ç. & KÜRKÇÜOĞLU, Ö. (2001). Ortadoğu'yla İlişkiler (Relations with the Middle East) in ORAN, B. \textit{Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy) II:1980-2001}. p.137.
Whilst Özal was trying to re-position Turkey in global affairs, Iran after the Islamic revolution was pursuing a “neither West, nor East” policy in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{817} The relative thaw in bilateral ties during the period therefore largely stemmed from both countries’ ability to de-couple ideology from benefit, leaving aside historical rivalry for the sake of economic cooperation. During the period, the forebears of the Islamic Revolution in Tehran spared no effort in voicing regime export rhetoric, attacking secular symbols of the Turkish state (the controversy about the use of veil/headscarf in Turkey around 1989 caused a diplomatic crisis during which Ankara came to the brink of expelling the Iranian Ambassador), trying to manipulate the Turkish Alevite community and even supporting ultra-religious figures like Cemalettin Kaplan, an anti-regime preacher living in Germany with a sizeable followers group.\textsuperscript{818} Likewise they accused Turkey of providing shelter to Iranian dissidents.\textsuperscript{819} But as Tehran fought a war against Baghdad, the new regime needed Ankara as a commercial outlet. Turks also criticized Tehran for being too soft and not so forthcoming vis-à-vis Ankara’s struggle against the PKK, and with regards to the calls for autonomy in northern Iraq.\textsuperscript{820} Tehran’s intrinsic sympathy towards religious groups in Turkey and Kurds, the two persistent threats to the republican order, no doubt agitated the Turkish military which still enjoyed considerable influence in Ankara,\textsuperscript{821} but not so much for Özal. Iran was a large and important neighbour that had to be managed rather than contained or confronted.\textsuperscript{822} Turkey thus did not shy away from engaging with Tehran. Economic ties kept flourishing and trade volume reached a solid 2 billion Dollars. Iran became a major operator in the Turkish finance

\textsuperscript{817} For an elaborate account see ROBERTS, M. J. (1996). Khomeini’s Incorporation of Iranian Military. \textit{McNair Papers 48}.


sector with a total capital investment of 2.1 billion Dollars in 1986. The two countries also joined forces in establishing the ECO in 1986 with a view to boost economic incentives. The general mood of bilateral relations, however, under the Turkish military’s shadow, remained tense, measured but still non-belligerently cooperative.

While Ankara moved towards Arabs and kept Persians at bay, relations with Israel remained low key well until 1985. The Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982 was a crucial development to this effect. Israel, however, was the mirror image for one of the two worlds Turkey wished to remain part of. Özal therefore argued that relations with Israel were necessary for Turkey to play a role in the solution of Middle Eastern problems. Ankara therefore welcomed Tel Aviv’s invitation to participate in the elimination of the ASALA camps in Lebanon and acted neutral at the UN on a resolution about Israeli occupied Golan Heights. Besides, Turkish Airlines started direct flights to Israel in 1986. The Foreign Ministers of both countries met in New York the next year on the margins of the UN General Assembly, which was followed by an increase in the number of diplomats in the Israeli Embassy in Ankara. This was a tough position to maintain when the first intifada in December 1987 caused public outrage in Turkey. Ankara’s policy then turned much more pro-Palestinian. The Turkish Parliament officially condemned “the violent actions of the Israelis against the Palestinians living in the occupied territories and the inhuman violation of

826 ASALA is an Armenian terrorist organization that carried out assassinations of Turkish diplomats and attack against Turkish interests heavily during the 1980s.
Palestinians’ human rights.”\textsuperscript{829} Turkey was also quick to recognize the Palestinian state declared by the PLO in Algeria in 1988. It was not until December 1991 when Israelis and Palestinians launched a new phase of negotiations by Madrid Conference on October 30 that Turkey and Israel could reinstate normalized relations by reappointing Ambassadors to both capitals. In this context, Israeli President Herzog visited Istanbul in July 1992 to attend the celebrations for Turkey’s acceptance of Jewish refugees from Spain five centuries ago.

\textbf{The Late Özalian Era (Post-Cold War): Turkey the Bridge}

The dissolution of the Soviet Union not only relieved Ankara of its decades-old primary security imperative, but also caused suspicions about Turkey’s western credentials. The Turkish republican elite and people, which had rationalized Turkey's placement in the West during the Cold War thanks to its geopolitical location and function as a geographical flank/barrier, were confused. A diminished sense of geopolitical significance stirred in Ankara which was accentuated by similar concerns in Europe and across the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{830} Turks then felt obliged to refine, or redefine, their country's geopolitical standing in an attempt to prove continued relevance and value. Even before Huntington’s “\textit{Clash of Civilizations}” article and Fukuyama’s “\textit{End of History}” which revived civilizational geopolitics in the new era, Turks were trying to make sense of their geography by re-branding some of the old geo-cultural and civilizational discourses in Turkish geopolitical culture.

One response came from Özal himself. In an attempt to consolidate his vision for a functioning hybrid out of Turkey’s Muslim-eastern qualities and western vocation, Özal gave metaphorical traction to relocation of Turkey as a geo-cultural blend at the intersection of the


East and the West. Sitting atop two continents, Asia and Europe, and adjacent to a geography stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East, Caucasia and Central Asia, Özal re-presented Turkey as a bridge not only between these physical geographies but also cultural and civilizational spaces.\textsuperscript{831} It was therefore Özal who popularized the bridge metaphor in Turkish geopolitical culture.\textsuperscript{832} Moreover, Turkey’s location by possession of Anatolia (Asia Minor as Özal calls it) at the heart of Eastern Mediterranean, which was pictured “as a historically cultural framework common to the Middle East and Europe”\textsuperscript{833} was given as proof that it could serve as a bridge in north-south relations (between the “haves” and “have-nots”). In this vein, “occupying a peninsula which joins two continents, extending from the east to west at the north-eastern end of the Mediterranean and being the sovereign of the Straits and a neighbour of the Middle East”, wrote Özal, “gives Turkey strategic significance.”\textsuperscript{834}

The “bridge” metaphor by inspiring discourses that located Turkey at the “crossroads of cultures”, “straddling civilizations” and “intersection of continents” is later elevated to a pragmatic status above a mere geopolitical representation.\textsuperscript{835} As such, it was taken up by a variety of actors and leaders from right and left of the political spectrum. To distinguish in which geopolitical tradition one player is located, a rather simple question of “which comes first for Turkey, the East (Muslim space) or West?” suffices. The answer to this question determines where the specific actor employing the bridge metaphor places Turkey’s identity, cultural attachment and sense of civilizational belonging as well as indicating his/her own

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\textsuperscript{832} It was during Özal’s premiership that the second suspension bridge (Fatih Sultan Mehmet) spanning the Bosphorus Strait was constructed. The Second Bridge, as it is also called, was opened by Özal himself in 1988. The construction of the First Bridge on the other hand had been completed in 1973.


\textsuperscript{834} \textit{Ibid}. p.342.

\textsuperscript{835} For an elaborate analysis on the use of “bridge” metaphor in describing Turkey’s geopolitical situatedness by Turkish foreign policy elite, see YANIK L.K. (2009). The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision: “Bridging” Turkey’s Location, Role and Identity After the End of the Cold War. \textit{Geopolitics}. 14, p. 531-549.
cultural embeddedness within a geopolitical tradition. For conservatives like Özal, it was a handy instrument in helping justify Turkey’s reconnection to the Muslim world without much fury from arch-Kemalists at home and proving continued significance as a geographical springboard for Ankara’s traditional western allies.

**Turkey in the Bridging Act (1989-1993)**

The growing emphasis on Turkey’s bridging qualities became visible as Ankara tried to forge closer ties with the newly independent Turkish republics and Balkan countries, and use Turkey’s geography as a leverage to contribute to western interests in the Middle East. The events leading to the Gulf War was crucial. First it marks a period when Özal, now sitting in the Presidential Palace, started to go beyond the symbolic powers vested in this office. Secondly, the Gulf War was perceived as an opportunity for multiple gains (“gamble for one to get three” in the words of Özal). It was also a time when the Middle East was in the midst of irreversible change of which Turkey had to take full benefit from. By firmly aligning with the US and its western allies, Özal wished to maximize the benefits from Turkey’s strategic location as a bridge. He was thus adamant in proving Turkey’s advantageous location in the efforts towards war despite the risks to Turkish economy and security. This, in turn, was hoped would improve Turkey-U.S. cooperation in defence and trade. A primary objective was to expand Turkey’s political role and influence in the region.

In this context, Ankara went ahead in shutting the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline in August 1990 which had a combined capacity of 1.5 million barrel per day. All regular trade with Iraq was suspended. Turkey allowed the U.S. to use Incirlik airbase as part of the military campaign. The whole saga, however, was not a contention free exercise since Özal tried to solely steer

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the policy. As he sought authorisation to invite foreign powers to Turkey and send Turkish troops abroad, Özal faced opposition from ANAP’s backbenchers. In the end, these powers were granted only if Iraq strikes first. Likewise the request to send a Turkish contingent to join the forces amassing in Saudi Arabia was rebuked. The disagreement on the strategy on Iraq and feelings of unfair treatment in the decision-making process resulted in the resignations of Ali Bozer, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Safa Giray, Minister of Defence in October. Özal’s instructions to deploy troops along the Iraqi border and to investigate the legal status of Mosul and Kirkuk had the impression that a Turkish invasion was on the way and thus alienated the military brass as well. Necip Torumtay, Chief of General Staff, followed suit in resigning in December. These did not, however, deter an eager Özal to let American airplanes use Turkish airspace and İnçirlik air base to fly sorties over Iraq.

It was clear that Turkey’s foreign policy establishment and Özal were acting upon two different geopolitical mentalities. The military and political opposition as well as the MFA’s higher ups pointed out what a swamp the Middle East was and the inflammatory nature of regional conflicts. In light of the Kemalist imagination, they all defended avoiding taking sides and not meddling in the region’s affairs. Özal to the contrary saw a window of opportunity to make use of Turkey’s location to this adjacent region for political, economic and security gains.

838 Ibid. p.69-70.
841 For a summary of the arguments voiced by these actors in reflecting the Kemalist geographical image of the Middle East, see MUFTI, M. (2009). p. 69-75
The same applied to relations with Israel. With the Arabs ceasing to exist as a monolithic bloc on the Palestinian issue after the Gulf War,\(^\text{842}\) Turkey was freed of the pressure to distance away from Tel Aviv. Israel was seen as a good alternative as a go-between in Ankara’s relations with the West (Washington in particular). As the PLO and Israel made headway towards an agreement at the Madrid Conference in 1991, the Turkish government announced that the level of representation in Ankara of both the PLO and Israel was raised to the status of Ambassadors.\(^\text{843}\) Real normalization of relations began with the visit of Turkish Tourism Minister Abdulkadir Ateş (the first by a Turkish minister in twenty-seven years) in June 1992 and the signing of a Tourism Cooperation Agreement.\(^\text{844}\) Since then, Turkey took part in the multilateral working groups related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, especially those dealing with economic development, water and arms control.\(^\text{845}\)

In closing the Özal episode in Turkish foreign policy, as argued by Öniş, one thing is clear; “Özal’s … influence was important in helping to transform a self-enclosed society, with a mediocre image of itself, to an outward and forward-looking society that aimed to participate and play an active role in the geographies surrounding Turkey”.\(^\text{846}\) This was enabled by and justified through a civilizational discourse in the formation of a new geographical imagination both vis-à-vis Turkey’s global spatial positioning and the image of the Middle East.


Özal’s legacy was owned up by neither the new generation of leaders (Mesut Yılmaz) from his own party nor leaders from its conservative akin (Süleyman Demirel and Tansu Çiller).

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Yılmaz for once did not run an apparent geopolitical narrative while mildly pledging to integrate Turkey into Europe.\textsuperscript{847} SHP, under the leadership of Erdal İnönü (late President İsmet’s son) and Murat Karayalçın, was merely a pro-western political force just like the reinvigorated CHP under Deniz Baykal and Hikmet Çetin. All of these political factions were much more conventional-minded when it came to foreign policy dispositions. Put differently, they were eager to keep what Turkey had since Atatürk, i.e. a strong western anchor and a fouled image of the Middle East. Demirel was no exception. Now the Turkish President in 1993, he simply conferred to continuity while distancing himself from what he called Özlal era adventurism.\textsuperscript{848} Tansu Çiller, leading DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi - True Path Party) after Demirel, appeared as the big coalition partner in the governments that run Turkey between 1993 and 1996. She was an urban westernized woman upholding Kemalist predispositions, hence not harbouring alternative geopolitical convictions. The most likely contenders were RP of Necmettin Erbakan and DSP of Bülent Ecevit. The former represented Easternism \textit{par excellence} while the latter carried positive images on the Middle East. Both parties challenged established parameters of Turkish foreign policy while they hang onto political power.

Continuity along westernist preoccupations was ensured by the military. Özlal’s demise created a vacuum in political leadership that would only be filled in by the military amidst a decade of weak, fragile and ineffective coalition and/or minority governments which lasted until 2002.\textsuperscript{849} The military was successful in steering a robust reversion to westernist imagery. It was backed by the MFA which was trying to re-establish itself as an influential actor observant of Kemalist principles. Kemalist media columnists, academics and Turkish big business were also aligned with the westernist establishment. As a result, the perception about the place and orientation of the Turkish state as well as the image of the Middle East


\textsuperscript{849} KOSEBALAN, H. p.126.
once again returned to status quo ante. The next ten years were, therefore, of no resemblance to Özal in terms of vision, modes of representation, imagination, zeal, ambition and practice in Ankara’s Middle Eastern dealings.

In this context, the poor record of the coalition governments in handling the economy and addressing the PKK’s terrorist campaign in Turkey led to a militarized notion of foreign policy under strategic considerations. Foreign policy was reduced exclusively to an outpost of Ankara’s security posture. The new discourse was dominated by the military which prioritized threats to the territorial integrity and Kemalist (western/secular) character of Turkey.\textsuperscript{850} A dual feeling of abandonment by the West and entrapment amidst a turbulent geography largely clouded foreign policy judgement in Ankara.\textsuperscript{851} Turkey, as a result, was transformed from the liberal cooperative actor of Özal years into “a coercive regional power”.\textsuperscript{852} Consequently, Ankara employed an overtly bellicose discourse, either using limited force or other confrontational measures. The famous “two and a half war” strategy penned by Şükrü Elekdağ, a veteran (R) Ambassador, stipulating that Turkey had to be prepared to fight wars against Greece, Syria and PKK simultaneously captured the general mood of the era.\textsuperscript{853}

The Image of the Middle East under National Security Considerations

The PKK was the most existential security problem Ankara had to deal with since the early 1980s. Yet except for the brief period Özal recognized Turkey’s Kurdish question and tried to remedy it by hosting Iraqi Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Masood Barzani in Turkey


\textsuperscript{853} Elekdağ ran a series of articles in the Turkish daily *Milliyet* on December 2, 3 and 4, 1994, to this effect. He then published a piece at Turkish MFA’s journal. See, ELEKDAĞ, Ş. (1996). 2 1/2 War Strategy. *Perceptions (Journal of International Affairs)*. Vol.1. No.1.
between 1989 and 1993, and by seeing GAP as a further alleviating step to address the root causes of the problem; Ankara kept acting as if the PKK was merely a foreign breed. Ankara was in complete denial of the domestic political, socio-economic and cultural context upon which it was born and flourished. The period of coalition governments in the 1990s was years of denial. Hence, Turkey chose to address the PKK, arguably the single most clouding factor in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East, as an external problem. As Ankara devised measures to counter the PKK, a rising Islamic current in domestic politics caused an increased military mindedness. It was suspected that RP of Necmettin Erbakan drew its ideological, financial and external support from the Middle East. Thus the region gradually lost its meaning as a normalized geographical terrain. Instead old notions of “swamp” and “bog” were resurrected. It was once more translated into a region of utmost disdain against which Ankara’s security policy entanglements had to be directed against.

To set the stage in the new era, this was a time Ankara had to live with the repercussions of Iran-Iraq and the First Gulf wars. In the aftermath of the war, both Tehran’s Islamic revolution export rhetoric and insensitivity against secular symbols of Turkish state continued. In Iraq, the Gulf War kept the job half-done as Saddam Hussein remained in power. The authority of Baghdad in northern Iraq waned thanks to the no-fly zone imposed in 1991. A geographical vacuum on the verge of Turkey’s southern border where the PKK could reorganize and regroup emerged. Additionally, emergence of a self-ruling Kurdish entity in northern Iraq increased ethnic awareness among Turkey’s own Kurds. Infuriating Ankara, northern Iraq effectively became a safe haven for the PKK with training camps and check points in abundance. Turkey thus became avocal supporter of Iraq’s political unity and territorial integrity. Under these circumstances, Ankara and Baghdad tried normalization of

relations. Turkey on its part worked through diplomatic channels to remove sanctions against Iraq. Around the same time, Syria too was playing the PKK card against Ankara. The PKK established training bases in Syrian-controlled Lebanon and was using Syrian soil to carry out violent attacks in Turkey. Iran was also believed to having been involved with the PKK by providing bases and direct logistical support. Ankara, Baghdad and Damascus were at odds on a different issue as well, i.e. share of water from the rivers born in Turkey, all of which re-coloured the Turkish elite’s perceptions about the Middle East negatively.

**Turkish Security Policy in the Middle East**

*a) From Demirel to Çiller and Yılmaz (1993-1996)*

Having successfully curbed the PKK’s activities domestically in the early 1990s, the securitized minds in Ankara eyed on a new policy course which had basically two and a half tenets. First, to root the PKK out of northern Iraq by assuring collaboration of the two Kurdish factions, KDP (lead by Masood Barzani), KYB (under Jalal Talabani), and American troops stationed on Iraqi territory as part of the Northern Watch. Second, to force the Syrian regime to deport the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and cut the logistical links the PKK enjoyed with Damascus, Bekaa Valley and Tehran. The half measure related to Ankara’s long standing worries about its own disintegration. Fearing it would re-energize Kurdish secessionist sentiment in Turkey, curtailment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq was a major motive.

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Perceiving enemies more than friends in the Middle East, Ankara’s republican elite was forced to redefine the operational geopolitical code. They would no doubt have preferred going along with the non-involvement and non-engagement strategy but it was no longer tenable. Hence, Ankara adopted a much more antagonistic, belligerent and interventionist posture. Turkey, in the words of Kalaycioğlu, “drifted further into the politics of the Middle East vis-à-vis the influences of Iraqi and Syrian Baathist regimes of the 1990s”\(^{860}\) out of feelings of insecurity and geographical entrapment.

It was under these circumstances that the Turkish military launched an extensive cross-border operation into northern Iraq in March 19, 1995, with 35,000 armed men, backed by heavily armoured vehicles and attack aircraft as combat support.\(^{861}\) The six weeks long operation aiming to destroy PKK camps was planned and executed solely by the military. Turkish generals informed PM Çiller and President Demirel at the last minute,\(^{862}\) a scenario repeating itself in similar incursions in the years to come. Whilst military operations were underway, the news about a meeting in the Hague on April 12, 1995, by participation of delegates from Turkey, Iraq and Iran to establish a “Kurdish parliament in exile” infuriated pundits in Ankara. Following American efforts to bring the PUK and KDP around the same table in Dublin by August and September, and Iran’s hosting of Iraqi Kurdish leaders for talks, Turks were stunned that things were getting out of hand. Therefore, in March 1996, a plan to create a secure zone in Iraqi territory along the Turkish border was aired. But it was a hard swallow\(^{863}\) and drew criticisms of Baghdad, Arab capitals and Washington\(^{864}\) which finally waned in the winds.

\(^{863}\)Ibid.
The fate of Turkey's engagement with another neighbour, Syria, was also heavily tainted by security perceptions. Now considering Damascus an adversary, Ankara was not hesitant in flirting with a confrontational rhetoric. By the fall of 1993, PM Çiller who had established a close relationship with the Turkish military, called Syria a source of terrorism.865 A National Security Council meeting in October called for tougher measures against Damascus which were materialized in the form of covert attacks on PKK camps inside Syria and Bekaa Valley of Lebanon in 1994 and 1995.866 Syria on its part was worried about Ankara’s return to the Middle East as a regional hegemon dominating Arabs.867

In this context, the news about anti-aircraft missile sales to Greek Cypriots by Damascus in 1991 outraged Turkish policy makers.868 The Greek-Syrian defence agreement in March 1995 which allowed for wartime use of each other’s air bases also irritated Ankara. Turks not only felt encapsulated throughout their southern border but also surrounded by unfriendly alliances in the Mediterranean and the Aegean. Deputy PM Çetin accused Syrians and the Greeks for “conspiring on a mission to encircle Turkey”.869 As Damascus convinced Egypt and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council in December the same year to support its position over the water dispute with Turkey,870 suspicions over Syria were voiced more freely in the Turkish media. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deniz Baykal blamed that Damascus was using the water card to wash the blood of terrorism off its hands. In January 1996, Ankara questioned the fair share of water flow from Syria-born Asi (Orontes) river to Turkey. It was the end of the same month that Turkey for the very first time demanded handover of PKK

870 The six countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait and Oman) pledged their support to Syria with what was later named Damascus Declaration (December 1995).
leader Abdullah Öcalan from Syria.\textsuperscript{871} By the end of February 1996, it was President Demirel this time who hinged on an antagonistic discourse by calling on Damascus “to give up its support to terror as a means of foreign policy”.\textsuperscript{872}

With regards to Iran, Turkish rulers were convinced that the PKK found refuge in the mountainous triangular area where the borders between Turkey, Iraq and Iran merged. Tehran was adamant in not allowing Turkey to pursue infiltrations into Iranian territory to root PKK terrorists out but turned a blind eye every now and then if Turkish military operations in the border area hit Iranian dwellers.\textsuperscript{873} The most drastic measure debated in Ankara against what was seen as Iran’s short-of-satisfactory cooperation vis-à-vis the PKK was a short lived cross border raid to kill or capture some 300-400 terrorists.\textsuperscript{874} On that matter, the deliberations among PM Çiller, FM Çetin, President Demirel and top military brass resulted in pursuing not a military but rather diplomatic course of action.

It was under these circumstances that an increasingly insecure Turkey began searching for reliable partners in the Middle East. Utterly resentful and equally distasteful of the Muslim countries in its southern neighbourhood; Ankarathus rediscovered an old path, i.e. relations with Tel Aviv. From the perspective of the security-minded elite in Ankara, Israel and Turkey were very much alike in a geography doomed with nothing but trouble. Just like the republican Turkey, Israel too had a strong western anchor, identified with Europe and the West, had enjoyed close ties with the US, shared Turkey’s disgraceful image of the Middle East as encircled by hostile regimes,\textsuperscript{875} upheld democratic values and was sensitive about


\textsuperscript{875} WALKER, J. (2006). Turkey and Israel's Relationship in the Middle East. \textit{Mediterranean Quarterly}. 17, p. 60-90.
secularism. In the mental maps of Turkish decision-makers, Israel was the gateway back to the western community of nations.

Military cooperation stood on the primary axis of the Turkish-Israeli thaw. In this context, with its excellence in military sophistication, willingness for arms sales, and influence in Washington, the Jewish state could come handy in Ankara’s fight against the PKK which exploited the sympathies of the countries in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood. Cordial ties with Israel were at the same time a means of reaffirming Ankara’s western placement and preserving the Kemalist character of the Turkish state (unitary, nationalist and secular). Sharing this view, Turkey for Israel could provide access to the newly independent Turkish republics for political and economic ties. Cooperation against Iran, which Tel Aviv accused for its links with Hamas, was also a key theme. For Turkey, improved relations with Israel constituted an additional axis in response to what was perceived as Syria’s provocations about the PKK and water issues.

That embassies were now fully functional after a long halt, The Turkish-Israeli Business Council had been in place since March 1993 and the good memories of Israeli Foreign Minister Peres’ visit to Turkey in April 1993 to attend Özal’s funeral still fresh, there was a solid basis for Ankara to lurch forward. In July 1993, Israeli Tourism Minister Uzi Baram visited Turkey and signed a tourism agreement, the first ever public deal between the two countries. Turkish FM Hikmet Çetin took on his first ever visit to Israel on 13-15 November shortly after the Declaration of Principles in Washington sealing the Oslo Accord between the Israelis and Palestinians. The visit ended with a framework agreement on the future of bilateral relations. High level visits then proliferated. Weizman became the first Israeli President to officially visit Turkey in January 1994. Israeli FM Peres visited Turkey in April.

Çiller was the first ever serving Turkish Prime Minister to visit Israel in November. Demirel reciprocated Weizman in March 1996 by becoming the first ever Turkish President visiting Israel.

But the real deal came in the military field. It was the Turkish generals rather than Israelis that precipitated this vector of the relationship.\(^{879}\) In June 1994, The Turkish Air Forces Commander became the highest level military official to visit Israel. He came back bearing fruit. The Security and Secrecy Agreement marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish-Israeli relations. In the period afterwards, a number of military contracts and deals took the bilateral relations to new heights. An agreement worth 600 million Dollars to upgrade 54 F-4 fighter jets in Turkey's inventory by Israel was the first of its kind.\(^{880}\) Strategic dialogue was established between the Ministries of Defence in September 1995 with senior diplomats involved.\(^{881}\) A deal on joint military flight training was signed after the first dialogue meeting. In a secret visit Turkish General Bir (the military's number two) paid to Israel in February 1996, a “Military Training Cooperation Agreement” was concluded which foresaw strategic cooperation, intelligence sharing, and transfer of Israeli surveillance technology to monitor Turkey’s borders.\(^{882}\) Holding regular air exercises and ground staff training was also part of the deal with further clauses allowing Israel landing rights in Turkey. Despite its secret nature, the Turkish military leaked details of the deal to press which was in Ankara a time of shaky coalition government. The leakage was both a sign to the domestic audience about who was in charge in controlling Turkish foreign policy and a warning to Syria to end its support to the PKK.\(^{883}\) As the political developments in Turkey prepared the groundwork for a notoriously religious government towards June 1996, relations with Israel had already grown.

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in scope and depth under the military’s strategic stewardship while Turkey’s soured ties with the Arab world and Iran painted a bleakly distasteful image of the Middle Eastern region.

b) The Exception: Easternism at Its Height (June 1996-June 1997)

In terms of geopolitical discourse, the clearest exception in the decade was Necmettin Erbakan’s short reign in power. Born into a prestigious family of judges in Turkey’s Black Sea region, Erbakan attended engineering faculty of Istanbul Technical University (ITU) until 1948. Being classmates with Demirel and Özal, he continued his studies in Germany where Erbakan received an MA and PhD in mechanical engineering. Upon his return to Turkey, Erbakan became a lecturer at ITU where he was later made a professor. Erbakan earned himself a political career by mobilizing Anatolian bourgeoisie and peripheral middle class under National View (Milli Görüş) movement from the 1960s onwards. The movement was built on the ideological foundations of the Sufi Naqshbandi order, and thus carrying strong imprints from the conservative tradition; first and foremost stronger links with the Muslim world where Turkey’s identity, belonging and interests were believed to lie. With its anti-Western, anti-Semitic and pan-Islamic views, Erbakan’s movement was also in tandem with the trends in political Islam of the day—particularly the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.884

Erbakan had managed to gain enough votes (8 to 11%) to appear in three coalition governments from February 1974 to January 1978 and adopted a rhetoric calling for the closure of NATO bases in Turkey, withholding Turkey’s application to European Economic Community (EEC), breaking relations with Israel and turning completely opposite direction on matters such as defence, diplomacy, trade and commerce.885 For him seeking Turkey’s future in the west was so existential a trouble that Erbakan called such efforts “treason to our

885 Interview with Necmettin Erbakan (1979) cited in Cumhuriyet (Turkish daily). August 2.
history, civilization, culture and sovereignty.\textsuperscript{886} However, aside from labelling the EEC a Christian club trying to undermine the Islamic world and depicting pro-western Turkish elite as part of the Zionist plot to turn Muslim countries against one another,\textsuperscript{887} Erbakan did not leave a decisive mark on Turkish foreign policy in the 1970s. It was due to the fact that MSP was a junior coalition partner aligning with the centre left CHP of Ecevit and the centre right AP of Demirel back then. 1996 was different. Erbakan now sat at the office of Prime Minister and was very much eager to follow his erstwhile tendencies. He thus embarked on an all-out offensive against anything of western nature in the Turkish state. As Dağlı notes, this was because “Erbakan … was against all values represented by the west. …in terms of identity, discourse and policy, it was raised upon a foundation of anti-westernism”.\textsuperscript{888} The ultimate objective was to cut Turkey’s links to the West and reposition the Turkish state geographically, politically, economically and culturally in the Islamic world.

Foreign policy was no exception. During this period, formal geopolitical reasoning of conservative thinkers was translated into practice through a purely easternist imagery. Erbakan thus kept promising withdrawal from NATO and revoking the Customs Union with the EU. He even propagated a Union of Muslim States under Turkey’s leadership.\textsuperscript{889} In this context, Erbakan was very careful not to pay an official visit to any western capitals in his capacity as the PM.

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This was a source of concern and worry in western capitals including Washington.\textsuperscript{890} For some of the countries in the Middle East, a change of government in Turkey was a welcome development. Hafiz Asad of Syria was the first congratulating Erbakan hoping to ease the bellicose discourse Turkey adopted against Damascus. Tehran too believed to have a like-minded partner in Ankara whose piety was an asset. These expectations did not go unaddressed as Erbakan sent formal and informal emissaries to Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran in order to remove the PKK and water issues as impeding factors in bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{891} This at the time fell in stark contrast to the established position Kemalists took.

Foreign policy during the period was a major area of contestation with Erbakan on the one hand, his coalition partner FM Çiller and the foreign policy establishment on the other. This was a time when rivalling geographical imaginations about the position of Turkey and the images about the Muslim world clashed. It was also a fight about who was in charge in steering the strategic direction of Turkey.

In this context, Erbakan had won the ballot box with a promise to stop American flights over Turkish bases and improve relations with Iraq.\textsuperscript{892} Yet in spite of his anti-western discourse, Erbakan was forced to renew existing agreements on the US military bases in Turkey.\textsuperscript{893} Reportedly, Erbakan played hard ball against Washington in extending Turkey’s support by seeking assurances that the US would not undermine Iraq’s unity, cease activities toward an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, strictly follow UN resolutions, support Ankara’s fight against the PKK, and increase Turkish troop presence in Zakho (the latter being not accepted).\textsuperscript{894} Regardless of the details, the perception in Turkey was that Erbakan simply

\textsuperscript{893} OLSON, R. (1997). Turkey-Syria Relations since the Gulf War: Kurds and Water. Middle East Policy. 5, p. 179.
\textsuperscript{894} Ibid. p.186.
caved in to American demands. Frustrated but flamboyant was Erbakan’s general mood. Solidifying Turkey’s eastwards connections still was strong in his vision.

Under these circumstances, Erbakan started on his mission to turn Turkey to the east. His official outbound visits were composed of two tours, against which the MFA had reportedly placed reservations against. The first leg from August 10 to 20, 1996, included Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. In Iran, Erbakan signed a landmark natural gas deal worth 23 billion Dollars and the associated trade and pipeline agreements. The two parties also discussed measures to enhance economic and military cooperation as well as Ankara’s rampant concern about the PKK. The pit stops in Asian Tigers reflected Erbakan’s attempt to realize an old dream of re-injecting Turkey into the Muslim world. On the other hand, these countries represented the model of development Turkish conservatives had long been advocating, i.e. preserving the national character (eastern) while promoting modernity and development. A confident and triumphant Erbakan declared during the tour that he wanted Turkey be a “Muslim Japan.”

The euphoria was short lived as Turkish generals outmanoeuvred him to sign a comprehensive military cooperation agreement with Israel upon his return to Ankara. The Defence Industry Cooperation Agreement entailed clauses on technical expertise and technology transfer as well as modernization of fighter jets in the Turkish Air Force by Israel. Despite his anti-Zionist and anti-Masonic discourse, Erbakan found himself in a position to market the agreement to his audience as “merely a business deal”. Yet his firm opposition could not block a further deal in December 5 on modernization of Turkey’s F-4 and F-5


896 Erbakan was an outspoken anti-Zionist who alleged Jews for sucking the blood of 6 billion human beings like Dracula. He pictured Zionism in a constant struggle to expand Israel at the expense of the territories of Turkey, Egypt and Iraq whose aim he saw elimination of Islam from the surface of the earth, for a detailed account see ERBAKAN, N. (1991). *Körfez Krizi, Emperyalizm ve Petrol* (*Gulf Crisis, Imperialism and Oil*). Kızılay, Ankara, Rehber Yayınları. p. 11-13.

fighter jets and M60 tanks by Israel. Likewise, he did not even know that Chief of Staff Karadayı paid a visit to Israel in February 1997. Besides, Erbakan was forced to give a green light to the ratification of a free trade agreement with Israel in April 1997 which was signed in March 1996. Ultimately Erbakan was shaking hands with the Israeli Foreign Minister in Turkey which stood a clear violation of his earlier election vow to cut relations with Tel Aviv. Robins explains this by the behind-the-scene involvement of the military in an attempt to humiliate Erbakan in order to prove that he could not wield much of an influence on policy-making or change Ankara’s overall approach to the Jewish state.

To reinvigorate his erstwhile tendencies, Erbakan’s second outbound tour composed of Egypt, Libya and Nigeria occurred between 2 and 7 October. While the stops in Egypt and Nigeria were mildly successful, Qaddafi’s disrespectful treatment of Erbakan in Libya resonated most resentfully in the Turkish media. That Qaddafi criticized in front of cameras Turkey’s treatment of the Kurds, NATO membership, relations with “Zionist” Israel, and asked for establishment of an independent Kurdish state simply exacerbated such sentiments.

During these visits, Erbakan propagated establishment of D-8 (Developing 8 as opposed to G-8) with a view to create a Muslim common market and Muslim security community. He hoped that through D-8 (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan), the power of Islamic states in world politics would be increased and Turkey would be relieved from its “dependence” on and “control” by the West. D-8 foreign ministers convened on October 22, 1996, in Istanbul for the first time with the aim to enhance economic and trade cooperation. Paralleling this, Turkey’s presence in policy-making issues in the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) was increased. Both initiatives, however,

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aside from a display of ambition, proved of limited value since perceptions and practices across the Arab Muslim world had to be factored in. D-8 was enthusiastically welcomed by ordinary Arabs but was equally regarded as unrealistic by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. They were not comfortable about Erbakan’s effort to turn Turkey into a leading regional power and set the agenda of the Arab world.902

Ultimately the Turkish military took the boldest step in galvanizing broad support across the public to overthrow Erbakan’s government via an ultimatum like memorandum in February 1997 (soft/post-modern coup). The rise of an Islamic reactionary current (irtica) stood as the backbone of the de-legitimatization campaign the military undertook. The Jerusalem Night organized by the RP mayor of Sincan/Ankara in January 1997 was the last nail on the coffin. That the Iranian Ambassador Bagheri participated and called on his audience to fight for the re-imposition of Sharia Law in Turkey was quickly translated into an iconic event. The whole saga soon became part of a securitization discourse in which “religion” and “laicism” were objects of securitization. Erstwhile foreign policy choices simply fell prey to this controversy.

As a result, this episode in Turkish foreign policy came to an abrupt end.903 Despite an overtly vigorous anti-western and erstwhile discourse, Erbakan’s practice did not amount to a shift in foreign policy direction. What he achieved was to add an Islamic vector to Turkish foreign policy. As Robins puts it, Erbakan’s foreign policy was rather characterized by continuity than change and his gestures towards the Islamic world were mostly seen complementary to the existing Turkish foreign policy orientation.904

c) Back to Square One (June 1997-January 1999)

When Mesut Yılmaz returned to the centre stage of Turkish politics after the coup, privatization and liberalism became the defining features of his premiership. EU adaptation and pragmatic good-neighbourliness were the catch phrases characterizing the spirit of the era. At the same time, the westernist consensus was thus comfortably rebuilt. ANAP's coalition partners, now the Deputy PM Ecevit and FM Cem, simply subscribed to this view. So did the military. Demirel kept acting as a force of republican continuity. All joined forces to push for the EU membership agenda. Yet the Turkish elite got frustrated by the rejection in the EU's Luxemburg Summit in December 1997. Then the attempt to keep Ankara's western credentials intact was sought through bilateral ties with the US and Israel. In this context, the Israeli Defence Minister paid an official visit to Ankara in December 1997, around the same time President Demirel attended the OIC Summit in Tehran. When Syria tabled a resolution in the Summit condemning Ankara’s military ties with Israel, Demirel walked prematurely out of the meeting. Turks once again felt singled out, isolated and entrapped in a worrisome neighbourhood.

Turkish government and the military were at odds with each other on regional policy. The military’s perception of the Middle East was still embroiled with a mirror image of domestic threat perceptions. A firm dismissal of political Islam and concerns over the PKK caused the military brass to perceive a merely troublesome geography to the south. Deputy PM Ecevit and FM Cem on the other hand were at much greater ease in interacting with the countries in this geography. Whereas the latter chose conflict avoidance and a softened enmity as a means to operationalize the prevalent geopolitical code, the military preferred a highly bellicose strategy. Initially the government got the upper hand. Its position was emboldened

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906 The term “region-based foreign policy” and how Turkey is positioned in world affairs through the “civilizational bridge” metaphor will be explored in greater detail in the section on Ecevit's coalition government from 1999 to 2002.
by the utter isolation Ankara had to suffer in Europe thanks to its human rights record related to the PKK, and the alienation in the Middle East following the heavy psychological toll of the soft coup.

Thus, the first year of the coalition government ushered in a series of peaceful diplomatic overtures. FM Cem was in Baghdad in February 1998 with an attempt to ease Iraq’s growing isolation and waning authority in the Kurdish dominated north. Ecevit publicly blamed Washington for trying to partition Iraq on the way towards an independent Kurdish state.\textsuperscript{907} In March, a Middle East department head from the Turkish MFA visited Damascus after which Cem met Syrian and Iranian Foreign Ministers.\textsuperscript{908} None of this boded well with the Turkish Armed Forces. They still were deeply enchanted by a growing unease about the fundamentalist reactionary current and Kurdish separatist threat associated with the Middle East.

Seeing no concrete outcome from these diplomatic engagements, the locus of Ankara’s entanglements in the Middle East quickly swayed towards the military’s antagonistic geopolitical code and thus turned belligerent once again. Syria whose power base had significantly deteriorated after the fall of its chief ally, the Soviet Union, was the top target. Ankara was now ready to show its teeth against Damascus. The honeymoon in Turkish-Israeli relations was a big asset to corner Syria which had territorial disputes with both countries. With Israeli PM Netanyahu for the first time sharply criticizing the PKK and condemning the prospects for an independent Kurdish state in May 1997,\textsuperscript{909} the Turkish security elite were confident that they had well offset the regional balances impaired after the Greek-Syrian accord. Turkey was now ready for coercive action.

\textsuperscript{908} Ibid.
It was no surprise under these circumstances that the initiator of the new strategy was the Turkish military. A proposal to exercise coercive diplomacy and limited use of force against Syria was tabled during a National Security Council meeting in July.\textsuperscript{910} The new Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, General Atilla Ateş, explicitly threatened Syria during a meticulously planned visit to the border town of Hatay (Alexandretta) in September.\textsuperscript{911} President Demirel reiterated this position with a harshened tone during his inaugural speech to the Turkish Parliament on October 1. The same day, the Chief of General Staff, General Kıvrıkkoğlu stated an “undeclared war between Turkey and Syria”. PM Yılmaz followed suit by announcing that the military was waiting for the order\textsuperscript{912} whilst Ecevit and Cem bandwagoned. Ankara justified its position with reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter regarding self-defence. Neither militarily prepared nor willing for armed confrontation, Damascus finally caved in. Öcalan was deported on October 8, first to Moscow. Then hopping from Italy to Greece and Kenya, he was lastly handed over to Turkey. In the aftermath, Ankara and Damascus signed the Adana Accord on October 21 on security cooperation which indeed heralded a new era in relations.

d) Turkey the World State, the Bridge and Region-Based Foreign Policy (1999-2002)

Once Mesut Yılmaz’s shaky coalition government was overthrown by a vote of no-confidence in November 25 due to corruption charges, Ecevit formed a minority government in January 1999. Abdullah Öcalan’s final delivery to Turkey in February 1999 boosted ratings of Ecevit greatly, giving him a neat majority in the parliament after the elections in May. Having formed a coalition government with the Nationalist Party, Ecevit and his old time foreign policy aide Cem thus got a second chance to leave a mark on Turkey’s geopolitical practices.

\textsuperscript{911}Suriye’ye Uyarı (Warning against Syria), \textit{Milliyet (Turkish daily)}, September 18, 1998.
It was under these circumstances that few notions were widely circulated as meta-descriptions to guide Turkish foreign policy, i.e. Cem’s “world state” and “civilizational bridge” discourse and Ecevit’s “region-based foreign policy” doctrine. Through these, Turkish leaders on the one hand tried to reconfirm Turkey’s placement in the European state system while on the other to prove that keeping the westernist imagination did not impede having a more forthcoming position towards the Middle East. The latter was justified by making a nostalgic inference to the regional policies of Atatürk era.

In an atmosphere of utmost disappointment and confusion (with the relations between Ankara and Brussels on hold, and questions raised as to the strategic utility of Turkey for western interests), Ecevit and Cem were striving to re-position Turkey as an exceptional country, a ‘world state’, “among major centres of the world and representing a unique blend of civilizational assets, historical experiences and strategic assets”. This is why Cem boldly emphasized that “all of the civilizations that have been part of Turkish history and geography need to be reconciled with one another in modern Turkey”. Ridding Turkey of the need to choose between what he called forced alternatives, in other words, the East and the West, Europe and Asia, Islam and secularism was what Cem had in mind. But this was an exercise about building a richer and more diversified cultural identity at home rather than questioning in any ways Turkey’s firm positioning in the west and a strong sense of European belonging. After all, Turkey was eternally deemed European in terms of geography and culture, as well as norms and values.

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In this vein, Turkey was projected as an extension of the west in the Middle East. The rigidly allergic republican perception of the region was thus dropped. Ankara subscribed to a more relaxed perception towards the Middle East in a similar fashion to Özal era. The region was once again more visibly associated with opportunities rather than risks and dangers. In this context, Ecevit championed his famous “region-based foreign policy” doctrine in which it was stressed that Turkey would derive its power and a more influential position in the international arena from a web of correct regional relations it would establish in its geographical surrounding. Through such a functionalist argument, Ecevit and Cem hoped they would re-prove Turkey’s continued relevance to and prospects for greater acceptance in the west.

The justification was through a geopolitical discourse. The bridge metaphor by portraying Turkey as a distinct space in between continents, cultures and civilizations was used as a means of policy legitimization. But it was instrumentalized differently. Whilst the term for Özal represented a strong sense of belonging to and identification with the Muslim world, Turkish leaders this time did not give up the Kemalist sense of superiority over the people and countries in the region. Turkey was thus conceptualized as a bridge at the crossroads of civilizations, a neutral ground where the two geographies, cultures and civilizations met. In other words, Turkey was neither on this nor on that side of the bridge but right at the distinct intersection of the two. Some scholars labelled this exercise liminality.

918 ECEVİT, B. (1995). Bölge-Merkezli Dış Politika, Yeni Türkiye. March-April. These views were reflected to the DSP party programme as well.
919 Ecevit for example would keep identifying “Turkey's historical function in the Middle East and the Islamic world in general, as vanguarding the progress towards modernization, democratization and secularism”.
920 Liminality applies to countries that have unclear ties to various economic or political communities, or to countries that are in the process of becoming a part of such communities. Turkey, as a country in possession of a dual Eastern and Western, or European and Asian identity on the way towards EU membership is sometimes prescribed as a liminal state. For a detailed analysis of liminality and Turkey’s liminal geopolitical positioning see YANIK, L. (2011). Constructing Turkish “Exceptionalism”: Discourses of Liminality and Hybridity in post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy. Political
The period these geopolitical discourses were employed was a time PKK-led violence in Turkey tended to die down and the threat of religious fundamentalism, for real or imaginary, practically expunged. There was almost no rationale for the military-mindedness to continue in Ankara as the two main objects of securitization lost their credibility. The military had thus lost two key backbones to justify its influence in Turkish politics and heavy-handedness in foreign affairs. Ecevit and Cem had every prospect to reinvigorate Turkey’s quest to join the EU and establish normalized relations with the Middle East. With regards to the latter, the atmosphere was ripe thanks to steps taken from 1997 onwards. As noted by Bilgin and Bilgiç, Bahrain had for the first time appointed an Ambassador to Turkey in 1998. Relations with Qatar and Oman were upgraded substantively, The Neighbourhood Forum Initiative was established in 1998 to introduce confidence building measures, and a joint Turkish-Greek Mideast Initiative was formed to mediate between Israel and Palestine.921

The voyage to reposition Turkey in global affairs thus started on a venture to revive Ankara’s membership bid to the EU. These efforts paid off as Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate for full membership in December 1999. Cem was highly credited for the outcome in Helsinki Summit. With the official candidature status granted, Turkish leaders were convinced that their country’s western credentials were consolidated.

Now they could embark upon the path of region-based foreign policy. In this context, relations with Israel kept flourishing. Participation of Israeli firms in military tenders and joint military exercises were routinized. Trade relations were boosted. Tourism was on the rise, and the two sides were exploring the possibility of building pipelines to carry water, gas and

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oil between. Turkish-Israeli relations went through a period of honeymoon. At the turn of the millennium, the two sides described it as strategic partnership. Yet this partnership remained precarious as it needed to be underpinned by solid improvement in the Israeli-Palestinian track. It was why Ankara was extremely uncomfortable with the developments after the collapse of Camp David II which led to the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000. Mistreatment of Yasser Arafat by Israel in 2001 and Israel’s occupation of territories in the West Bank in the spring of 2002 made Turkish leaders very much weary. Ecevit dubbed the latter act tantamount to “genocide”, a phrase which he later publicly declared as taken back.

In accordance with the Adana Accord, there was fertile ground to move Turco-Syrian relations to the next level. In this context, a delegation from the Syrian PM’s office arrived in Ankara in 1999 to reactivate the Joint Economic Commission, which was dormant since 1988. Sezer’s unanticipated visit to Damascus to attend Hafez Assad’s funeral in June 2000 signalled a new chapter in relations. He was the first Turkish President to set foot in Syria. In November, Syria’s Vice-President Khaddam was in Ankara bringing in a letter of intent from President Bashar Assad proposing realignment in bilateral relations. The Syrian proposal on Declaration of Principles aimed to address the two remaining issues, water and Hatay. Assad’s approach was based on developing economic ties as a prelude to address the two remaining problems. That boded well with Ankara’s eagerness to develop good neighbourly relations. By 2000, Turkey became Syria’s fourth largest trading partner with a trade volume of $ 724.7 million, up from $539.2 million in 1999.

Chief of Staff Turkmani visited Turkey in June 2002 to sign a security agreement. Military training and transfer of military technology, visits by military academies and joint military manoeuvres were envisaged in this context. In a very short span of time, Turkish-Syrian relations sailed towards new horizons, setting the stage for an enhanced spirit of cooperation.

While Syria’s links with the PKK were severed, Ankara suspected that the terrorist organization had found refuge in Iran. Based on such worries, cross border skirmishes between the two sides in July-August 1999 caused extreme uneasiness. Turkish war planes bombed border towns. Iranians in return arrested two Turkish soldiers in the border region. To avoid similar controversies, Turkey and Iran signed a security agreement on August 13 whereby they committed themselves to carry out simultaneous operations against the bases of terrorist groups (PKK and Mojahedin el Halq) in their respective countries. Economic incentives were equally crucial. In May 2000, the Turkish Undersecretary of Foreign Trade arrived in Iran with a large business delegation. Capitalizing on the deliberations during this visit, the Turkish-Iranian Business Council was established in November 2001. By December, Iran began pumping natural gas to Turkey in line with the agreement signed during Erbakan’s visit to Tehran in 1996. President Sezer’s landmark visit to Iran in June 2002 stood witness to the first meeting of the Business Council and a number of contracts for Turkish businessmen were awarded. Despite their ideological differences, and Sezer’s lecturing of Iranians in Tehran on Kemalism, the new foreign policy patrons in Ankara achieved a relative thaw in Turco-Persian relations.

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931 Iran ile Sicak İlişkiler (Warm Relations with Iran), NTV (news portal). May 31, 2000
The collapse of PKK terrorism prepared a new atmosphere to normalize relations with Iraq as well. Ankara’s hand now was freed to interact freely with Baghdad to help restore its authority in northern Iraq. Besides, Turkey had already endured a considerable amount of losses due to American policies of isolating Iraq and the US-led UN sanctions. A frustrated Ankara thus began voicing calls to lift sanctions against Iraq more vocally. In this context, FM Cem met UNSC Annan while Ecevit pursued a similar end during the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999. In May 2001, it was MFA Undersecretary Loğoğlu in Baghdad who took up the same matter. These efforts resulted in the relative easing of the sanctions regime. Trade relations flourished as a result, reaching almost pre-1991 Gulf War levels in April 2000. In this vein, Ankara decided to appoint an Ambassador in Baghdad in January 2001, which was run by a Charge d’Affairs since 1993. In September 2001, Undersecretary for Foreign Trade Tuzmen arrived in Iraq with a business delegation to attract new contracts for Turkish companies. The first cargo train in 20 years from Turkey to Baghdad shortly followed bearing 450 tons of goods under the UN’s ‘oil-for-food’ program. All signs indicated that Turkish-Iraqi relations began to steadily take off. But the attacks of September 11 in the US poisoned this cooperative atmosphere. While Washington made plans to launch a war against Baghdad with Iraqi Kurds as its chief ally, Ankara had every reason to avoid armed conflict. A fear of resurgent refugee spill, negative repercussions on Turkey’s ailing economy and fears of an independent Kurdish state once again came to the fore.

Capitalizing on the relative entente achieved in the Middle Eastern neighbourhood, the bridging act in Turkey’s region-based foreign policy came with a historic meeting of EU-OIC Joint Forum on Civilization and Harmony in February 2002. Convened in the aftermath of September 11 in Istanbul, a series of panels on civilizational dialogue and on global political

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933 Turkish Daily News, April 19, 2000.
934 Turkey to Send Ambassador to Iraq Next Week, Gulf News, January 6, 2001.
outlook were held with Foreign Ministers from OIC and EU members present. The initiative was crucial in demonstrating Turkey's bridging qualities between civilizational divides and the issues pertaining to the two meta geo-cultural spaces.

As general elections approached by the end of 2002, Ankara was undertaking extensive reforms to match the EU criteria to start membership negotiations. Its relations with Syria and Iran were significantly improved. Turkish leaders were trying to avoid, or at best minimize, the repercussions of a possible military operation against Iraq. Relations with Israel were based on solid foundations but timid. Sympathies toward the Palestinians forced Ankara to have balanced relations with both Israel and Palestine. While the drums of war echoed strongly across the Atlantic, Ankara seemed to be doing relatively fine in its Middle Eastern neighbourhood. Yet an aged Ecevit with an ever deteriorating health and a plummeting economy was eroding the popularity of coalition government at home.

IV. TURKEY THE CENTRE: A THREE-LEGGED GEOGRAPHICAL IMAGINATION (2002-2010)

In this atmosphere, the AK Party, which was founded by the reformist wing that parted ways with Erbakan's National View movement, won the elections in 2002. The leaders of the AK Party operated within the conservative mentality. Despite a vocal criticism of Huntington’s clashing civilizations thesis, Turkey’s new leaders keep acknowledging civilizations as self-enclosed separate entities with sui generis characteristics.935 Hence they associated state identities with civilizational clusters centred around geographical divisions of the globe. Such perceptions were preordained by primordial conceits. A shared sense of common history and Islamic faith culminated in belonging to the Muslim cultural constellation was a key factor.

This is where the novelty in colouring civilizational geopolitics with classical (naturalized) geopolitical analysis was brought about. In this effort, the intellectual work of Ahmet

Ahmet Davutoğlu takes a prominent position. He is widely recognized as the academic mastermind behind the new geopolitical reasoning that drives Turkey’s more recent foreign policy activism. The new exercise put forward under Davutoğlu’s intellectual courtship is conditioned on a civilizational discourse coloured with naturalized geopolitical claims in trying to “re-position Turkey from the periphery of international relations to the centre”. He authoritatively asserts that “Turkey has no chance to be peripheral, it is not a side line country of the EU, NATO or Asia.”

In an attempt to redecorate civilizational imbroglios, his understanding of geopolitics strives to produce supposedly objective, “God’s eye”, irrefutable and solid geopolitical knowledge to aid the practice of statecraft. The ultimate goal is to help enhance the power base of the Turkish state. This is why the conceptual framework of “Strategic Depth”, his famous book, is draws heavily upon the writings of classical geopolitical scholars. With an essentialist approach, the world is visualized in this perspective as comprising of a Heartland and a Rimland, the meanings of which are constructed with reference to Mackinder’s and Spykman’s theories.

The account offered by Davutoğlu is intriguing in two aspects both of which feed into a sense of geopolitical and geographical distinctiveness. As he strives to re-establish Turkey as a central country, his declared goal is to reinterpret Turkey’s geography (read as “naturalized

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936 Ahmet Davutoğlu is an international relations professor born in the conservative Turkish town of Konya who was made an Ambassador without portfolio in late 2002 upon recommendation by Abdullah Gül, the then PM of Turkey. He was named the Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to Turkish PM, a role which he kept until his appointment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009. Therefore, his influence has been aptly felt on Turkish foreign policy since 2002 both as an intellectual and practitioner of statecraft.


940 Haushofer, Ratzel, Kjellen, Mackinder, Spykman, Mahan and Seversky in particular.
(classical) geopolitics”) and history (read as “civilizational geopolitics”). Naturalized geopolitics is instrumentalized in this reasoning to prioritize the geographical and strategic advantages enjoyed by the Muslim world. Davutoğlu asserts that “the Muslim world, which turned into the intersectional arena of civilizational revival and strategic competition, becomes the focal point in international relations.”

Inspired by Mahan, he draws attention to the significance of chokepoints in the Rimland by claiming that “this geographical location brings about a great advantage to the Muslim world enabling it to control the choke points which divide the warm seas of the world while also bringing an extensive risk of attracting intra-systemic competition.” He also states that “almost all choke points in Eurasia as the keys of the Rimland are under the control of Muslim countries. The rest—the Cape of Good Hope, the Torres and Tasmanian Straits, the Strait of Magellan, the Panama Canal, and the exits from the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean—are located too far from the Heartland and the Rimland to play a decisive role in ultimate geopolitical supremacy in the Eurasian mainland.”

To substantiate such claims, Davutoğlu evidences the geopolitical advantages enjoyed by the Muslim world thanks to control over two-thirds of global oil reserves, the core and southern part of the Heartland (Central Asia) consisting of Muslim majority states, the control and influence of the Muslims over the passes from the Heartland to the coasts of the Rimland, the geographical link of Muslim communities in the Balkans (Bosnia-Albania-Kosovo-Macedonia-Western Thrace) and having an independent Muslim country (Kazakhstan) with nuclear capacity.

**Turkey the Geographical Pivot of History**

The next step is to ascribe a new place to Turkey within these grand geopolitical schemes. The question posed is “where Turkey is with regards to the on-going efforts towards a new

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942 Ibid.
943 Ibid.
944 Ibid. p.10-11.
world order and what does its geography stand for?" In answering this question, naturalized civilizational geopolitics constitutes the core of the argument. First, it is, as emphasized by earlier Turkish conservatives, recognized that Turkey has inherited the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in between the East and the West. Second, Turkey is portrayed as the only country where Mackinder’s heartland and Spykman’s Rimland depictions intersect.

In Davutoğlu’s account, the world is divided into core and peripheral areas in terms of strategic significance. The heartland in the Mackinderian sense is constitutively claimed to include not only Eastern Europe and Russian inland territories stretching to the North Pole but also Turkey (Anatolia). Following Spykman’s articulation, the strategic belt lying across the Western Europe-Turkey-Iraq-Pakistan-Afghanistan-India-China-Korea-East Siberia is pictured as the Rimland, control over which is thought to hold the key to the destinies of the world.

Based on this premise, Turkey’s geopolitical location is ascribed central strategic significance, which is epitomized in the following constitutive statement by Mr. Davutoğlu.

"Turkey is a country with a close land basin, the epicentre of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, the centre of Eurasia in general and is in the middle of the Rimland belt cutting across the Mediterranean to the Pacific [Emphasis added]"

Davutoğlu thus invokes geographical centrality thesis to the point of distinctiveness thanks to being located at the exact point where Mackinder’s Heartland and Spykman’s Rimland intersect. There are two elements of distinctiveness in this. First is geographical. With a little twist to make two prominent classical concepts that historically and intellectually never

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overlap, intersect, Turkey is elevated to the status of the only country occupying such a distinct geographical location. In a way it is implied that the geography of Turkey is distinct as it is at the core of both the Heartland and Rimland having access to three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia). The second element of distinctiveness relates to Turkey's position as a civilizational centre/hub between two distinct cultures, Western and Muslim. This is in a way depicting Turkey at the geographical pivot of a vast space ranging from the Middle East to the Balkans, from the Caucasus to the East Mediterranean and Black Sea to Central Asia. To rephrase, “Turkey is located right at the centre of Afro-Eurasian vast landmass”, as Davutoğlu repetitively claims, which brings with it a multitude of identities as a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country.

When assessed with the calls made in the prologue of this book where it is stated that the close land, sea and continental basins around Turkey constitute the heartland of the world island, it becomes clear that Turkey's place in the world is defined as a strategic geographical pivot, one that resembles Mackinder's heartland. With possibilities of access to such a vast space, Turkey's geographical situatedness is scripted as a major asset.

**Turkey as a Distinct Civilizational Centre/Hub**

Turkey in this naturalized version of civilizational geopolitics is thus established squarely at the core area of Islamic civilization yet at the intersection of many influences which makes it particularly distinct and unique. A further statement by Davutoğlu reads as “Turkey holds an important place in East-West, North-South divisions. From the East it is seen as an

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outgrowth of the West, while from the West it is an extension of the East".\textsuperscript{950} In the very same line, he argues that;

“Turkey is not just any old Mediterranean country. One important characteristic that distinguishes Turkey from say Romania or Greece is that Turkey is at the same time a Middle Eastern and a Caucasian country. Unlike Germany, Turkey is as much a European country as it is an Asian country. Indeed, Turkey is as much a Black Sea country as it is a Mediterranean one. This geographical depth places Turkey right at the centre of many geopolitical influences”

Davutoğlu thus rejects the perception of Turkey as a bridge between the Islamic and Western spaces since this would reduce Turkey to a mere instrument for the promotion of other states' interests. Instead, he reconstructs Turkey as a civilizational centre. With a sense of Turkish/Islamic/Ottoman distinctiveness, he envisages Turkey to assume the leadership of its own civilizational basin.\textsuperscript{951} In reaffirmation, Erdoğan stipulates that “Turkey has to build its imagination for future based on the distinct culture and civilization it has inherited upon this geography”.\textsuperscript{952} As a result, Turkey does no longer singlehandedly seek its strategic orientation towards the west but wishes to employ a diversified anchor in foreign policy by re-joining to ex-Ottoman geographies. This is an attempt to reconstruct Turkey as a power in its own right with a flavour of “Turkish Gaullism”.\textsuperscript{953}

In this context, inheriting the geopolitical legacy of the Ottoman Empire is reinterpreted deterministically. Greater involvement in regional affairs is justified by a sense of

\textsuperscript{950} DAVUTOĞLU, A. (2013). Teoriden Pratige Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar (Speeches on Turkish Foreign Policy: From Theory to Practice). p.51.
\textsuperscript{952} ERDOĞAN, R.T. (2009), address to the Seventh Eurasian Islamic Convention organized by the Turkish Office of Religious Affairs (May 19), courtesy of PM Erdoğan’s office.
geographical, cultural and historical continuity. Waves of migration that took place after the Cold War from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, Kosovo, Bulgaria and Macedonia are presented as proof in this regard. The fact that inhabitants of these countries chose Turkey as their final destination is explained with resort to a dominant geographical imagination beyond Turkish territories that kept seeing Turkey as the civilizational centre through which such problems could be resolved.  

Turkey’s new role to help address the problems in these regions is not presented as a political choice but a necessity in the view of its long-established historical, geographical, economic and cultural bonds. What happens in the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East is thus perceived in Turkey’s area of responsibility. The conclusion drawn is that Turkey cannot escape the consequences if a crisis hits its ex-territories. Besides, regional leadership ambitions are also naturalized and justified. The new way to deal with and even deter such crises is another novelty about the new geographical imagination. As the heir to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is seen destined to re-engage and reintegrate with the neighbouring zones rather than alienate itself (apparently with the Middle East before all others). This is what Davutoğlu calls “a historical responsibility” or “a call of duty” for Turkey, which is reminiscent of geopolitical determinism.

This dual effort aims to alter Turkey’s spatially fixed western identity by extending geocultural bonds to the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf and North Africa. Constructed as a central country, AK Party’s Turkey identifies strongly with all these

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955 ERDOĞAN, R.T. (2011) Speech delivered in presenting the new government programme at Turkish Grand National Assembly, (July 8).


regions based on a key common denominator, Islam and a most favourably remembered common Ottoman past. This calls for intra-civilizational solidarity and non-sectarian sympathy toward the Islamic world in guiding foreign policy. Turkey is thus constructed as the primus inter pares or the spokesperson in representing the Islamic civilization.\textsuperscript{959} As Erdoğan contemplates “it is Turkey that first represents Islamic values and the great historical accumulation of (Muslim) civilization in the Western world”.\textsuperscript{960} This is exemplified by Ankara’s utter willingness to Co-Chair the Alliance of Civilizations initiative with Spain in 2005 and get Mr. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu elected as the first ever Turkish Secretary General to the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 2004. At the same time, Turkey is positioned as the melting pot where western/European and eastern/Muslim civilizations centrally interact.\textsuperscript{961} This is, as the argument goes, what provides Turkey with “geographical and historical depth”, the sum of which amounts to “strategic depth”. In the AK Party mantra, this accords Turkey a leading role for regional dominance. Such justification is grounded in the following words by Davutoğlu.

\textit{“Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the capability of manoeuvring in several regions simultaneously, in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs”.}\textsuperscript{962}

The ultimate goal is to make Turkey a transregional power, a leader perhaps, in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{963} This stems from the assumption that “a country’s value in international relations

\textsuperscript{959} BALCI, A., & MIŞ, N. (2008). Turkey’s Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy? Turkish Studies. 9, 387-406.


\textsuperscript{963} WALKER, J. (2011). p. 7
depends on its geostrategic location.\textsuperscript{[964]} Turkey therefore wishes to capitalize on its exceptional geopolitical location as the epicentre of world politics as well as its position as a central civilizational hub just like its historical predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, which straddled the frontier between the East and the West.

The Image of the Middle East

AKP leaders’ perception of the Middle East fundamentally differs from that of the Kemalists but is akin to Özal’s. Classical naturalized geopolitics once again sifts through the lens through which this region is reconstructed and represented. The Middle East is seen as sitting at an interface between continents. Thanks to its historical role as a geographical centre, it holds the key to heartland Afro-Eurasia. Three considerations colour the significance of this region. First, it is located at the heart of the land basin of Turkey, one of the focal points for its regional policy. Second, the Middle East embodies interconnections to the outer frontiers of sea basins which Turkey is directly involved with. Third, it serves as a natural connection to Asia and Africa, i.e. a central geography for the policies Turkey envisions towards these continents.\textsuperscript{[965]} Coupled with the rich hydrocarbon deposits and commercial and transportation lines this region sits upon as well as thanks to civilizational affinity, Turkey, under Mr. Davutoğlu’s courtship, performatively perceives the Middle East as “the key to global political economy and strategic balances”\textsuperscript{[966]} and “an unavoidable natural hinterland for Turkey”.\textsuperscript{[967]}

It must be noted that the legal boundaries among Middle Eastern states are approached with extreme scepticism. Seen as mere identifications to mark territorialisation of new nation states, all borders, except for the Turkish-Iranian border which was demarcated by the

\textsuperscript{966}Ibid. p. 323.
\textsuperscript{967}Ibid. p.129.
Agreement of Kasr-i Shirin in 1639, are deemed unnatural.968 Historically interconnected communities, cities and geographies are thereby believed to have been separated and alienated from each other through borders by the turn of the 19th century.969 Turkish leaders liken these borders to badly knitted artificial walls and thus subject to exploitation for major power rivalry.970 It is claimed that de jure boundaries among the states in the Middle East are drawn in such a manner to ensure that no single power could exploit the rich oil and water resources alone.971 The borders in this understanding are only created to reflect the interests and agendas of colonial and imperial powers after World War I, which were further stiffened during the Cold War by planting land mines.972 Legal borders per se therefore, by means of widening the cognitive divide between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours, represent barriers to cooperation, integration and human contact. They are seen in service of simply creating competitive national identities, political consciences and rival areas for sovereignty.973 It is propagated that there is a discrepancy between the political geography (shaped by post-colonial state structures) and geopolitical frontiers (dictated by physical geography).974 This is seen as the underlying reason for inter-regional conflicts a source of instability.975 The new vision is to elucidate legal borders and turn them into simple political identifications by allowing greater flexibility in terms of transport, tourism, social and economic transaction as well as political dialogue.976 The famous “zero-problem with neighbours” doctrine with a growing emphasis on soft power and economic interdependence fits well to this goal.

971 *Ibid.* p.335
AK Party’s multipartite geographical imagination was developed at an atmosphere of utmost global transformation and influx. The attacks of September 11 radically changed the global scene by a revived reference to civilizational geopolitics in construing old geographies (the Orient, the Occident) and countries through a new glance, “the war on terror”. The vivid construction of meta-spaces in accordance with cultural differences as prescribed in the “clash of civilizations” thesis coloured general modes of representation and understanding. Whilst a global war (crusade) was contemplated against terror with preparations underway for military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and grand transformative visions framed for the so-called Greater Middle East, new allies were sought or old affinities rediscovered. Attempts by the Bush administration to cast Turkey as a moderately Islamic yet democratic model in the framework of the Greater Middle East Project was instrumental for the AK Party elite. Thus, AK Party’s Turkey with a self-ascribed geopolitically distinctive global positioning amidst contending civilizations and geographies was seen a feasible partner. As such, Turkey became a co-chair of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue Programme of the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative. The trend somewhat continued afterwards as President Obama reaffirmed this perception by saying; “Turkey’s greatness lies in its ability to be at the centre of things. This is not where East and West divide – this is where they come together”.

The AK Party Way: The General Contours of Foreign Policy (2002-2010)

Just as the geographical imagination(s) with regards to Turkey’s global positioning changed, so did the operational geopolitical code under the AK Party. The leitmotif “zero problems with neighbours” hinted at the general tenets of the new strategy. With an attempt to reverse the

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largely defensive posture of the 1990s, AK leaders initially identified enhanced engagement with neighbours and developing positive relationships as the best way to improve Turkey’s regional standing. They prioritized at first dialogue and cooperation over confrontation and coercion. Consequently, closer political and economic ties with neighbours were sought, new initiatives developed and some problematic chapters such as settlement of the Cyprus issue and relations with Armenia were addressed with positive stimuli. Ankara developed an interest, as never before, in playing regional roles as a facilitator, mediator, conciliator and arbitrator. A growing interest in playing similar roles in order to help ease intra-national tensions such as in Iraq and Lebanon was also quite new. The volume and intensity of such efforts made one analyst to conclude that “a sense of hyperactivity appeared in Turkish foreign policy, as if driven by a need to make up for the time lost”.\textsuperscript{980} Likewise, Kiriçi et. al. noted that “Turkish foreign policy became undoubtedly far more proactive and multidimensional than at any period in Turkey’s republican history”.\textsuperscript{981} Playing an enhanced role in various regions was hoped would give Turkey “global strategic significance”.\textsuperscript{982} To this end, a strong emphasis on Turkey’s soft power with its vibrant economy, EU accession process, improved democratic standards, culture and diplomacy was deployed.

Enabled by Turkey’s centrally constructed geopolitical re-positioning, engaging with the Middle East and the Muslim world was a privileged pillar in Ankara’s strategy. In this vein, Turkey’s renewed interest in deepening regional cooperation rested on three key tenets; continuous political dialogue, enhanced economic interdependence, and increased social and cultural exchange.\textsuperscript{983} Hence new mechanisms and tools were introduced to award

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{983} DAVUTOĞLU, A (2010). Turkish Policies and Peace in the Middle East, Lecture at the School of Global Affairs and Policy’–The American University in Cairo.
\end{footnotesize}
Turkey an enhanced regional role. High Level Cooperation Councils (HLCP)\textsuperscript{984}, visa free travel\textsuperscript{985} and free trade agreements\textsuperscript{986}, Yunus Emre Cultural Centres and TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency) were all instrumental.

In light of the perception by Turkey’s new conservative elite about the Middle East, and their attempt to relocate Turkey in the midst of three continents and two civilizations, prescriptions for the new Turkish foreign policy are characterized by a multi-layered, multidirectional and multidimensional outlook. This exercise aims to redefine Turkey’s relations with major international power hubs as an increasingly self-confident and independent player while at the same time creating a hinterland of its own that will be facilitated by closely knit cultural, economic and political interconnectedness.

In more specific terms, the path Ankara embarked upon entailed closer political and economic ties with Syria, Iran, Iraq, Kurds, North African, and Gulf states. Playing an intermediary role in the settlement of the Israeli-Syrian track of the Middle East Peace Process was also quite new to Turkish foreign policy. This was followed by a growing interest in the Israeli-Palestinian and intra-Palestinian dimensions (engaging with Hamas in particular), and a facilitation role on the dispute arising from Iran’s nuclear programme. Intra-civilizational solidarity and a quest to help address the outstanding problems of the Muslim world appeared as a major motive for Ankara. This is what led some observers to conclude that Turkey moved away from Western-oriented diplomacy to expanding its role and

\textsuperscript{984} Practically, a mechanism that envisages convening regular joint cabinet meetings lead by Heads of State/Government and attended by relevant Ministers to address different aspects of bilateral relations such as security, commerce, energy, transport, agriculture, etc. As of 2014, Turkey has established HLCP’s with Iraq, Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, Libya and Tunisia in the Middle East (negotiations with Jordan are under way since 2011). The overall total is 18 countries.

\textsuperscript{985} Reciprocal abandonment of visa requirements for Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan and the Gulf states are in place. Negotiations continue for a similar agreement with Iraq.

\textsuperscript{986} Turkey concluded 20 STAs so far to include Morocco, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Israel, Malaysia and Jordan.
influence among the Muslim and the Middle Eastern nations.\textsuperscript{987} As much as aiming at elevating Turkey's regional and global stature, Ankara’s regional engagement was also closely associated with expanding economic interests.\textsuperscript{988}

**The First Era (2002-2010): Euphoria of Zero-Problems with Neighbours**

The turn of a new page in Turkey’s dealings with the Middle East ushered on the positive vestiges of Ecevit-Cem era. But with a view to establish Turkey as a central actor, AK Party leadership embarked on a path to assertively incorporate Turkey into regional politics. Unlike the previous era, Turkey this time had less interest in proving its value to the west. Instead by seeking an enhanced regional role, Ankara wished to improve bilateral relations to the point of “zero-problems” and throw its weight behind efforts to resolve regional problems or ease tensions. The expected yield was to transform Turkey into an indispensable regional player.

Turkey's assertive involvement in Middle Eastern Affairs, ironically, started with non-engagement. Ankara's non-hinted refusal to let American troops use its territory as a base to stage a military incursion to Iraq in 2003 helped portray Turkey as a welcome player in Middle Eastern politics. This move freed Ankara from the image of Western “pawn” and opened greater space for manoeuvring. At the expense of souring relations with Washington, Ankara thus gained prestige not only in Iraq but also the Arab world. Turkish FM Abdullah Gül used this leverage in 2005 in convincing Sunni parties to participate in Iraq’s second round of elections which they originally planned to boycott.\textsuperscript{989} On the downside, Ankara (foreign policy establishment in particular) grew extremely weary that it was losing ground in post-intervention Iraq. With no Turkish troops on the ground, old fears about an independent Kurdistan were resurrected as the US took Iraqi Kurds as its chief ally. Under such

circumstances, preserving Iraq’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity remained the touchstone of Ankara’s Iraq strategy. To ensure that, Turkey took the lead in the establishment of Iraq’s Neighbours Initiative on January 23, 2003.990

While this initiative proved of some value, Turkish-Iraqi relations were increasingly clouded by two factors. First the new constitution introduced in 2005 transformed Iraq into a federal state between Arabs and Kurds. In the new structure, Kurds basically legalized their autonomous self-rule. Kurds’ prospects of seizing control over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk simply exacerbated Ankara’s worries. Second, the increasing number of attacks in Turkey by PKK militants after the end of unilateral ceasefire in 2004 agitated Ankara. Under the military’s guidance, cross-border operations in northern Iraq thus became a regular policy tool.991 The tensions were, however, eased by the promise of the Bush administration to provide Turkey with real time intelligence on PKK movements in Iraq, and the establishment of a trilateral security cooperation mechanism between Iraq, Turkey and the US.

Whilst the place of the PKK on the common agenda waned, relations between Ankara, Baghdad and Erbil flourished with reciprocal high level visits. In March 2008, Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani paid a working visit to Turkey upon the invitation of President Abdullah Gül. This was significant because the arch-Kemalist previous President Sezer did not invite Talabani due to his Kurdish background since 2005. In July 2008, PM Erdoğan was in Baghdad for the establishment of the High Level Strategic Council. With the accord, the two countries hailed each other as “strategic partners”. In this spirit, Iraqi PM Maliki returned the favour in December pledging his government’s support to Turkey’s fight against the PKK.992

By March 2009, it was President Gül’s term to visit Baghdad during which 48 MoUs were

990 The initiative included Iran, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait which was later joined by Iraq itself. Foreign Ministers came together 9 times formally, 3 times unofficially and 3 times in extended format to help forge a common understanding until the initiative waned from 2008 onwards.
991 The biggest of such incursions was named “Operation the Sun”. Between February 21 and 27, 2008, ten thousand Turkish troops marched to crash PKK outposts with heavy aerial bombardment.
signed on security, energy, education, transport, health, etc. In August, Turkey mediated between Iraq and Syria over an accusation that Damascus was behind the brutal bombings in Baghdad.

Equally striking was a change in Ankara’s attitude towards Iraqi Kurds. In October 2008, Turkey’s Special Representative for Iraq, Ambassador Murat Özçelik, for the first time met Mesut Barzani who now carried the title “President of Kurdish Regional Government”. Direct dialogue was established with Davutoğlu’s first ever visit to Erbil in October 2009. By March next year, Turkey opened a Consulate-General in Erbil. Shortly after Barzani was in Ankara in June 2010.

Three motives seemed crucial in this new-found rapprochement; to ensure cooperation against the PKK, benefit from the booming economic activity in the Kurdish region and prospects for energy cooperation. As a result, bilateral economic relations boomed. Turkish companies tapped into the Iraqi market in unprecedented numbers and volume. Turkish airlines established direct flights to Baghdad, Erbil and Basra. Likewise Turkish banks opened branches in Iraq. Trade volume eventually took off from a sheer $ 840 million in 2003\(^{993}\) to a solid $ 11,9 billion.\(^{994}\) Likewise, 3,200 Turkish companies operating in Iraq undertook $ 11.3 billion worth of infrastructure contracts until 2010.\(^{995}\) Much of this activity was largely with the Kurdish dominated northern Iraq. Furthermore, Turkey’s national oil company (TAPO) was in the winning consortiums in the tenders for Siba and Mansuriyah gas fields in 2010. Towards the end of the period, Turkey seemed to have achieved a great deal of normalization in relations with both Baghdad and Erbil.

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Whilst the AK Party took over government, the Assad regime was already in a cooperative mood on security matters. Hence, when dual terrorist bombings hit Istanbul in November 2003, Syria handed over 22 people allegedly connected people with the attacks. For the Syrian regime was increasingly isolated under the pressure of an antagonistic US administration, Turkey offered an opportunity to widen strategic options. Such isolation accentuated following the assassination of Lebanese politician Rafiq Hariri. A former official astutely described the mood by saying “when the Syrians think of threats, they look at Iran. When they think of opportunities, they look towards Turkey.”

Ankara therefore grasped the opportunity to re-introduce itself as cooperative regional actor by actively engaging with the Syrian regime. In this context, amidst American fury, Bashar Assad was invited in January 2004 to become the first ever Syrian President to set foot in Turkey. In December, PM Erdoğan was in Damascus to sign a free trade agreement. In April 2005, President Sezer landed in Damascus despite vocal criticism by the US administration. As a staunch Kemalist, Sezer was not moved by the AK Party’s grand ambition to re-position Turkey as a central regional actor. A rather simple concern over a tumultuous Iraq under American occupation guided Sezer’s behaviour, as he opined that “Syria and Turkey share the same views on the protection of Iraq’s territorial integrity and of its national unity”.

The AK Party government, on the other hand, was keen on intensifying economic cooperation and move along its vision to practically invalidate borders on. By October 2009, the High Level Strategic Council (HLSC) was established and a visa free travel agreement concluded. In the first HLSC meeting the next year, the establishment of a joint bank, fast rail connection between Aleppo and Damascus, interconnectedness between Turkish and Syrian

natural gas grids and joint customs gates were decided. Ankara even inculcated the idea of de-mining the Turkish-Syrian border for agricultural cultivation. These efforts paid off as trade volume rose from $ 729 million in 2000 to $ 2.27 billion in 2010. Both the historical controversy about Hatay (Alexandretta) and the water issue were hardly pronounced. So much so that the foundation stone of a joint “friendship dam” on Orontes (Asi) river (constituting the border between the two riparian countries) was laid by the Turkish and Syrian Prime Ministers.

As one analyst put it, “Ankara hoped improved relations with Syria would play a special role as its conduit to the Arab world where Turkey would like to expand its clout.” This was exemplified in August 2010 by the establishment of a quadripartite High Level Cooperation Council among Turkey, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon which was envisioned to evolve into a regional free-trade area encompassing free passage of goods, services, and people by focusing on trade, cross-border investment and visa exemptions. This was an integration scheme modelled after the EU via which Ankara hoped to eventually transform the authoritarian regimes in the region after its own example by proactively engaging.

Similar overtures were undertaken towards the Gulf. Both PM Erdoğan and FM (later President) Gül visited and hosted many times their monarchic counterparts. For instance,
King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia paid a visit to Turkey in August 2006, which was the first visit by a Saudi king in 40 years. On the other hand, a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was signed in 2005 as a prelude for a Free Trade Agreement. In 2008, strategic dialogue was established with the GCC.\textsuperscript{1006} Despite some explicit security underpinnings, the chief rationale remained economic.\textsuperscript{1007} As a result, investments in Turkey from the Gulf reached $8 billion from ground zero over ten years, Turkish companies were awarded $43.3 billion worth of contracts and invested $1.6 billion in the Gulf.\textsuperscript{1008} Trade volume peaked at $12.2 billion in 2008.\textsuperscript{1009} Ankara’s influence as a role model for democracy promotion, liberalization, reform, and structural transformation, however, remained extremely limited.

The relations with Iran were, too, grounded on the positive atmosphere of Ecevit-Cem era. In addition to cooperation against the PKK and PJAK (Party of Free Life of Kurdistan), economic incentives were strong. Ankara’s decision to stay out of the war in Iraq also led to some degree of convergence. Both countries were alarmed by a possible Kurdish state next door and disintegration of Iraq. Once the AK Party came to power, the thaw in relations was re-energized. Presidential/PM level visits were exchanged in unprecedented numbers resulting in a mood of solidified collaboration.\textsuperscript{1010} When Erdoğan visited Tehran as Turkish PM for the first time in 2004, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on security cooperation, with the PKK/PJAK as its main target, was signed.\textsuperscript{1011} Iranian forces occasionally bombed PKK/PJAK camps in northern Iraq the next year. Economic relations also flourished. A Memorandum of Understanding to transport 30 billion cubic metres of

\textsuperscript{1007} HÜRSOY, S. (2013). Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Economic Interests in the Gulf. Turkish Studies. 14, p. 503.
\textsuperscript{1009} HÜRSOY, S. (2013). p.513
\textsuperscript{1010} From 2002 onwards, Iranian Presidents appeared six times in Turkey on various occasions. Turkish Presidents were likewise four times in Iran. Turkish PMs on the other hand landed in Tehran for seven times. The number of similar reciprocal visits between the countries in 1979-2002 period was only three.
Iranian and Turkmen natural gas to Europe was signed in 2007. Preparations to conclude a Preferential Trade Agreement continued. With Iran becoming the second biggest gas supplier and an important source of crude oil to Turkey, trade volume reached $10.7 billion in 2010 from a sheer $1.1 billion in 1996. However, due to the high price of energy purchase, Ankara ran a chronic deficit of one-to-three or four in commercial ties with Tehran.

The bigger difference of the AK Party era pertained to Iran’s nuclear programme. Although the new government opposed Iran’s nuclear ambitions, intra-civilizational sympathies and Muslim solidarity lend extra motive not to share the West’s sense of urgency of the threat. Instead this was related to the wider perspective of a nuclear weapons-free Middle East, implying disarming Israel of such weapons. Therefore, when a new Strategic Concept was tabled in 2010, Ankara strongly opposed citing Iran as a threat for NATO’s ballistic missile defence architecture. Ankara did not favour sanctions against Iran either since this infringed Turkey’s economic interests. Ankara’s position aimed at avoiding a double catastrophe scenario. First, if Tehran developed nuclear weapons despite all efforts to the contrary, this would unequivocally impair the order in the Middle East. The new regional setting in all likelihood would favour Iran at the expense of Turkey. Likewise, a nuclear deal on Iran’s programme without Ankara would prove of similar effect. Second, a possible scenario of nuclear confrontation between Israel and Iran would be tantamount to disaster in destabilizing the region. Turkey’s regional interests would therefore be gravely harmed. Notwithstanding the success rate, Turkey by engaging in the resolution of this problem, not only aimed at avoiding such double jeopardy scenarios but also to enhance its prestige as a central regional actor. As argued by Jenkins, Ankara’s chief motivation in mediating was self-aggrandizement, “a desire to prove that when it came to the Middle East, it was Turkey, not

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the West, that possessed the necessary contacts, expertise and credibility to secure results." It was in this context, Turkey and Brazil brokered a deal in 2010 in order to provide a basis for negotiations between P-5+1 and Iran. The initiative was with no avail. Frustrated that an opportunity was missed, Ankara registered a "no" vote in the UN Security Council on further sanctions.

Another test case for the AK Party government was relations with Israel. On the one hand, AK leaders were moved deeply by sympathies towards the Palestinians while on the other couching Israel constituted an important pillar in the new vision to translate Turkey into a regional arbiter and power centre. To this end, Turkey was projected as an exceptional actor that can constructively engage both with Israeli and Palestinian. In this atmosphere, Ankara initially did not wish to jeopardize ties with Israel. Bilateral defence/industry cooperation, trade and tourism were solid assets for good relations. Therefore, cooperation between Israeli and Turkish militaries continued. Trade volume reached $2 billion Dollars in 2004 and further expanding to $4 billion Dollars in 2012. Similarly, Jewish lobbies vigorously worked for projecting a positive AK Party image in Washington.  

But this was not a trouble-free relationship. Tensions rose high when PM Erdoğan criticized the Israeli government in April 2004 by calling the assassination of Hamas leaders "state terrorism". He even declined PM Sharon’s request to visit Turkey. Sharon, in return, turned down Turkey’s offer to mediate between the Israelis and Palestinians in the case of Sharon government’s withdrawal from Gaza. Tensions were somewhat eased when FM Gül visited Israel in January 2005. Furthermore, PM Erdoğan was in Tel Aviv and Palestine in May to mend fences, becoming the first Turkish PM since Çiller to pay such a visit.

1017 Ibid. p.30.
Erdoğan’s extension of congratulations to Hamas, a terrorist organization in Israeli accounts, upon its election victory in January 2006 once again strained Turkish-Israeli relations. Sentiments soured further when FM Gül greeted Hamas leader Khaled al Meshal in Ankara next month. Ankaracı defended the move by claiming that Hamas was urged to renounce violence and recognize Israel’s right to exist. Israeli government spokesman Raanan Gissin responded with the question “how would you feel if we got together with Abdullah Öcalan?”

Nevertheless, both parties at the time valued Turco-Israeli relations and did not allow things to go from bad to worse. It was under these circumstances that Turkey offered to mediate between Hamas and Israel upon the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006. Although unsuccessful, it was enough to prove a gesture of good will on the part of Ankara. Presidents Peres and Abbas visited Ankara in November the next year addressing the Turkish Parliament one after the other for the first time. The two presidents even signed a framework agreement to build an industrial zone in the West Bank with Turkey. It was in this atmosphere of relative thaw that Tel Aviv was receptive to Turkey’s offer to mediate in the track two with Syria. Seeing its vulnerabilities in the 2006 Lebanon War has also to be factored in. PM Erdoğan’s then foreign policy advisor Davutoğlu travelled back and forth behind the scenes for indirect talks between Syria and Israel between May and December 2008. Erdoğan and Israeli PM Olmert agreed in Ankara in December 23 that sufficient ground was covered for the start of direct negotiations. With the outbreak of Operation Cast Lead five days later, the process broke down. Even afterwards, Davutoğlu met Hamas leader

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Meshal twice to broker a ceasefire.\textsuperscript{1024} This initiative failed to yield a breakthrough since Israel refused to lift the Gaza blockade.

An infuriated Erdoğan took the whole saga as an ultimate betrayal by the Israeli PM, and began hinging on a harsh rhetoric against Israel. During the 2009 World Economic Forum, the famous “one minute” incident further strained relations. Erdoğan lambasted President Peres by stating that “Israelis know how to kill (innocent people)”, and stormed out of the meeting. The Davos debacle increased Erdoğan’s popularity in the Arab world but significantly breached Tel Aviv’s confidence in his government. Relations hit an all-time low after the flotilla incident. In May 2010, Israeli commandos boarded a small boat named Mavi Marmara \textit{en route} breaking the Gaza blockade and killed nine Turkish citizens. Causing a huge backlash in Turkey, Ankara withdrew its Ambassador from Tel Aviv, cut all military and economic ties, and asked for a formal apology and compensation for the families of those killed. Diplomatic relations are yet to be fully normalized.

Until the fuse of the Arab Spring was lit in Tunisia by November 2010, Turkey seemed to have been doing relatively fine in its zealous Middle Eastern engagement. Despite certain setbacks in the EU accession process and imperfections around its model as a western-style Muslim democracy, Turkey overall was viewed positively across the Arab world. The AK Party government was popular. That is how economic and trade relations took off. Ankara’s efforts in mediating micro conflicts fared mildly successful too. Many in the west were surprised by Ankara’s expanding role in the Middle East but not yet with an alarmist tone. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, fearing a loss of primacy in certain areas, have been less enthusiastic about Turkey’s role in Palestine and intra-Arab affairs.\textsuperscript{1025} Iran, which harboured its own ambitions for regional leadership did not welcome Turkey’s quest for regional dominance. Based on strong nationalist tendencies; sectarian antipathy and regional rivalry

were defining features of Iranian position vis-à-vis Turkey\textsuperscript{1026} whereby pragmatic engagement was not the rule but the exception. Overall, a centrally located Turkey with the single exception of relations with Israel left a positive imprint until the Arab Spring.

**CONCLUSION**

The last thirty years of Turkish foreign policy is characterized by relentless efforts to break away with singlehanded westernist placement and move beyond what might be called geopolitical ‘locked-in’ syndrome. In discourses employed during the era, various Turkish leaders tried to open Turkey up to spaces which were traditionally approached with caution and aloofness. These efforts and the contending discourses developed were motivated by Turkish leaders' own geo-cultural embeddedness. Their quest to refine, define or redefine Turkey's global position between two culturally constructed meta spaces, the East and the West, were shaped by a strict adherence to civilizational geopolitics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Özal</th>
<th>The Military/Kemalist</th>
<th>Erbakan</th>
<th>Ecevit/Cem</th>
<th>Davutoğlu/Erdoğan</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Synthesis</td>
<td>West (Europe)</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>West/Bridge</td>
<td>Centre</td>
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**Table 4. Contending Geopolitical Placements of Turkey**

As indicated in the table above, the old -and new generation of conservative leaders tried to discursively redefine Turkey's position in global affairs with a clear tilt towards the Muslim East. The way they constructed Turkey’s place and identity significantly varied. So did the geopolitical discourses they employed. In the act, they constructed a distinctively different and positive geographical imagination around the Middle East. Such endeavours were usually accompanied by a growing tendency to act more actively and assertively in foreign policy. They interpreted Turkey's geopolitical situatedness and Ottoman legacy as central

\textsuperscript{1026} JENKINS, G. (2012) p.29.
assets to build bolder strategies. If not totally altered Turkey’s strategic orientation, they achieved some degree of autonomy and diversification in external relations.

Political actors subscribing to Kemalist dispositions on the other hand wished to jealously guard Ataturk’s westernist legacy. When trying to advance on a westernist path, hard core Kemalists adopted pathologic positions with high suspicions on the true intentions of western powers. These actors mostly approached the Middle East through an antagonistic, extremely weary and even allergic geographical imagery. At times the military’s shadow clouded the overall judgement in Ankara, such suspicions caused Turkey to keep itself alienated from its immediate neighbourhood and act with excess prudence. More liberal minded Kemalists kept identifying Turkey’s geopolitical situatedness in the West but approached the Muslim geographies in a more forthcoming manner. They changed the operational geographical code towards the Middle East but not the Kemalist sense of superiority over the region. Nevertheless, they too were successful to some extent in opening Turkey up to its immediate neighbourhood.
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the complex links between geography and Turkish foreign policy. The main question is how Turkey’s geographical situatedness, as couched up in constitutive discursive formations, impacts its external behaviour. To this end, a non-traditional heuristic model is developed. It is hoped that this would help emancipate research on Turkish foreign policy from rationalist and neo-realist explanations fixated on security. By injecting “geography” in critical scholarship as a key referent of analysis and through a post-structuralist agenda, this research hopes to enrich perspectives on Turkey’s external affairs. The first part of this final chapter will assess how critical geopolitics contributed to a better understanding of Turkey’s foreign policy which will be followed by main highlights and research findings in each chapter.

The central theoretical claim in this study is that foreign policy decisions are made within a culture of geopolitics whereby different societal actors first divide and give meaning to meta-spaces on a global map. This is followed by an exercise to make sense of a country’s territorial situatedness, spatial belonging, geo-cultural positioning, and representations around the surrounding spaces. From these spring identities, borders, national roles-missions, friends, allies, enemies, security threats, dangers and hence national interests. Geopolitical knowledge produced in this practice through discursive representations of space (images, imageries, imaginations, visions, etc.) interact interdependently in the formulation of foreign policy, identity and interest. Geopolitical culture thus determines the limits of bounded possibility and meaning as a crucial factor in the contours of foreign policy.

But home-grown spatial representations and discourses alone do not automatically produce foreign policy practice. First, those articulating such discourses need to hang onto influential power positions in a state’s decision-making apparatus. Socio-cultural and politico-economic
evolution of Turkey in a broad historical framework gives credence to this proposition. Secondly, albeit geopolitical positioning of a state can be determined within, its actual positioning in the international system is mostly determined by discursive practices of other states in the system. From a geopolitical perspective, therefore, foreign policy is not a one-way flow. To the contrary, the practice of grand strategy and statecraft takes into consideration geopolitical representations and practices of other state actors towards whom one’s foreign policy discourses and practices are directed at.

The crucial point here is that critical scholarship goes beyond rationalist perspectives in seeing interests of states as exogenous, given and fixed in accordance with the shape of the anarchic international system. Instead critical geopolitics recognizes the transformative power of collective action by human-beings over the international system. This area of scholarship first draws attention to indigenous factors and processes (in state-society complexes) in understanding the world, one’s own spatial self and others which do give meaning to the shape of global affairs. National interests in this approach are subjectively and discursively constructed in a culture of geopolitics which provides the key tools, images, labels and storylines in making international politics meaningful. The shape of the international system is then not taken-for-granted but rather determined by the sum total of the interaction amongst different state-society complexes through each other’s foreign policies.

In line with the theoretical model in Chapter 1, the point of departure here is not confined to physical characteristics of space but rather how geography is made meaningful in a culture of geopolitics through discourse. In other words, it reflects people’s core discursive interaction with their geography by taking into consideration the historical socio-cultural context upon which geopolitical representations and storylines are developed in relation to that country’s place in the international theatre of states. This exercise is inevitably linked to spatial perceptions of danger, threats, (in)security, identity, drawing (mental/physical)
boundaries, mission and role perceptions in the constitution or reconstruction of both the geopolitical self as well as others and other spaces.

That the Turkish elite and people drew different conclusions as to the repercussions of the shape of international political space, made sense of their country’s geographical situatedness, identities of geo-cultural belonging, interpretations/constructions of spaces around Turkey, and hence articulation of geopolitical storylines to support external action demonstrates that there are two permanent geopolitical mentalities in Turkey, i.e. Kemalist and Conservative. As addressed in more detail in Chapter 2, they can be categorized as the longest lasting geopolitical traditions dating back to the early stages of state formation. Both are mostly united in subscribing to European civilizational geopolitics which sees the world through opposing binaries. In this vein, both Kemalists and Conservatives have a bipolar image of the world in such a way to see a temporal separation between the West and the East as if they eternally live in different developmental stages. The former (Europe and Anglo-Saxon America) represents the ultimate beacon of economic development, scientific and civilizational superiority, modernity, and progress. The latter (Muslim world in particular) symbolizes everything the West is not, i.e. backward, underdeveloped, inefficient and traditional.

Analysing Turkish foreign policy in this context is in a way writing a history of Turkish geopolitical thought and action where Kemalists and Conservatives competitively strive to answer questions like “where in the world Turkey belongs to?”, “what identity should Turkey have?” and “what does Turkey’s geopolitical location and its geographical surroundings stand for?”. In seeking answers to these questions, both traditions try to discursively ascribe Turkey a global position, identity, orientation and future in international politics between the West and the East. The constitutive answers they come up with usually stand in contrast to each other.
Conservatives lean towards an understanding of a post-imperial state which owns up to the geo-cultural and geopolitical legacy of the Ottoman Empire. As such, they imagine Turkey at the territorial core of the Muslim East as the leader of the Islamic (Turkic) world. Geo-cultural continuities are perceived towards the east which is cherished with positive images. Turkey’s borders are deemed elusive and porous in enabling post-imperial contact and continuity. Conservatives are thus much more perceptive to umma type religious and pan-Turkic solidarity. The Middle East, as the topography dominated by Muslims, is represented as a space of brotherly akin and a natural turf for Turkey. Re-instituting peace and order in ex-Ottoman territories therefore becomes a naturalized notion in this tradition. Opportunities and historical responsibilities are prioritized rather than risks and dangers in engaging with these territories. Consequently, the style of diplomacy envisioned for Turkey in the conservative tradition is more self-confident, bold and daring which is hoped would eventually unleash a resurgent great Turkey.

Kemalists on the other hand imagine Turkey as a nation-state squarely located in the West in geo-cultural and civilizational terms. Such a revolutionary relocation of the country calls for separation of the links with the Muslim world and Ottoman legacy. Turkey’s historical connections and experiences with the Muslim East is remembered negatively in a mood of utmost disdain and undesirability. Thus Turkey’s southern neighbourhood is perceived eternally in trouble (instable, in turmoil, marred with secessionist, irredentist and fundamentalist ideologies) and unattractive. “Bog”, “swamp” or “mudland” metaphors iconize representations around this region. Kemalists instead index Turkey firmly westwards but equally suspect true intentions of western powers thanks to the experience of Sevres-phobia. A strong attachment to Turkey’s territorial core (Anatolia and Eastern Thrace), extreme sensitivity about independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty loom large in the Kemalist mantra. A rigid understanding in protection of the homeland and Turkey’s borders becomes the naturalized normal. Adherents of this tradition therefore are more cautious, risk-averse, timid, insular and caring in handling the external affairs portfolio.
It is these two broad imaginations that help shape the cognitive map of the world in Turkish people’s and elite’s mind, and call for two competing sets of assumptive worlds which provide simplification and clarity about goals and ends-means relationships in devising foreign policy strategies. It is in such a culture of geopolitics that meaning is given to Turkey’s spatial location, geopolitical positioning, and neighbourhood. Turkey’s foreign policy, security, identity, borders and grand strategies are endlessly debated under such a spatially carved framework.

As covered in detail in Chapter 3, each geopolitical tradition strives to acquire strong power positions in decision-making mechanisms and establish broad networks of social power amongst political, military, economic and ideological spheres of life with a view to translate its imagination(s) into practice. In this context, it must be noted that modern Turkey started its life with a western positioning in a deliberate attempt by the congealment of politico-military power. Kemalist ideology was the chief legitimizing tool which brought together a core establishment from political, military, economic and ideological walks of life. The military stood the ultimate guardian of the regime and did not hesitate to intervene in the political process to keep Turkey’s western march and secular system intact. As a relatively autonomous organization with area expertise, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did also act as a force of republican continuity. Against this backdrop, conservative-minded governments could not effectively challenge the supremacy of the Kemalist regime or alter Turkey’s western positioning in global affairs until the 1980s. It was in the neo-liberal mood of the Turgut Özal years that conservatives started to flourish more effectively not only in the political sphere but also in terms of economic and ideological activity. Özal’s self-styled handling of foreign affairs with novel geopolitical narratives helped side-line the foreign policy establishment and provided leeway to more colours from the conservative tradition in foreign policy. His death, however, resuscitated a Kemalist backlash during the 1990’s. As the competition went along, Turkey witnessed once again the revival of conservative impulses in
the 2000s under a strongly pious government under the AK Party with renewed zeal in style, rhetoric and practice. This was also a period of empowerment for conservatives in business, academia, media and religious walks of life which was accompanied by a relative weakening of the Kemalist establishment.

The clash between these two traditions thus gives an image that they are “locked in a tempestuous tango of engagement and opposition” in giving shape to Turkey’s character and foreign relations. This is where debates on a paradigm crisis, a double gravity state, tensions between a Kemalist state and political government, identity insecurity, torn identity and liminality come to the fore. Nowhere else is the practical implications of this picture more evident than Turkey’s mood swings on the Middle Eastern pendulum. That in nine decades of Turkey’s existence, Ankara showed five waves of activism and retreat stands testimony to this claim. The Middle East is like a litmus test to read through the dominant geopolitical mentality in each period shaping decisions in Ankara. That is why it is arguably the most important spatial terrain in attempting to provide a geopolitical analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour.

As demonstrated in Chapter 4, Ankara’s first ever wave of activism in the Middle East came under Atatürk’s leadership with two major leitmotifs. First, as epitomized in his dictum “peace at home, peace in the world”, Turkey aimed at consolidating its western positioning, territorial integrity, control over borders and curb possible inter-boundary threats to its western-modelled, and secular domestic order. Ankara therefore relied on active pursuit of peaceful diplomacy to resolve the outstanding status of Alexandretta and Mosul/Kirkuk during the

1920s and 1930s. Secondly, whilst republican reforms helped transform Turkey’s domestic landscape, a feeling of accomplishment and pride led Ankara to embark on the role of regional saviour with the Saidabad Pact of 1937 in the face of an imminent war. Prescribing the Atatürk solution i.e. western-centric modernization, secularization and collaboration with the west to the troubled Middle East, Turkey’s reluctant salvos amounted visibly to regional activism. Ankara’s strategy during World War II, however, was characterized by impartiality, non-involvement, and risk averseness as Turkey did not show any particular interest in regional affairs. The same continued until the 1950s as Ankara did not engage in Middle Eastern politics aside from manoeuvring around the hot topic of recognizing Israel’s independence.

Albeit subscribing to bipartisan consensus on Turkey’s western positioning, the first conservative-leaning Turkish government under the Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes did not have an uneasy imagination with regards to the Middle East. By contrast acting on conservative impulses, DP leaders saw a neighbourhood of brothers under an overt atheist and communist threat. In this second wave of regional activism, Ankara boldly asserted itself in Middle Eastern affairs in order to create the Baghdad Pact which was enabled by Washington’s position to contain Soviet expansionism. In trying to help bring order to ex-Ottoman territories, Turkey proved to be a non-complacent ally many times falling at odds with the preferences of the western camp. In pursuit of power and prestige in its own right, Menderes did not even hesitate to flirt with a near bellicose discourse against Arab neighbours. That proved to be problematic as both American and Arab (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen and Syria) perceptions of Turkey did not bode well with such an ambitious agenda which eventually widened the gap between Turkey and the Middle East.

The 1960 military coup uprooting DP elevated westernism to the status of the prevalent practical norm in Turkey. Besides a reversion to the Kemalist psyche of seeing the Middle East as troublesome was also established. Dissenting voices were present across the
political spectrum such as the communists and pro-Islamists in hoping to relocate Turkey or change the fouled image of the Middle East but none were powerful enough to do so. To the contrary, a notion of “barrier”, which was mutually constituted by the republican elite’s predispositions and the Cold War logic of ideological geopolitics, entrenched western positioning of Turkey. For the first five years after the coup, Turkey thus acted as a faithful western ally in the Middle East. But the trauma of the Jupiter missile crisis (1962), Johnson letter saga (1964) and Turkey’s later military intervention in Cyprus (1974) shook Turks’ confidence in the west. Therefore, Ankara saw measured westernism until the 1980s as the proper tactical response in its Middle Eastern overtures. The need for alternative sources of finance, commerce, hydrocarbon resources, and inclusion of Erbakan’s MSP in coalition governments were extra motives pushing Turkey to diversify away from pro-western choices.

The path towards socio-economic and political transformation undertaken after the military coup in 1980, however, enabled new variations in the course of geopolitical thinking in Turkey. After winning the first post-coup election, Turgut Özal himself took the lead in trying to go beyond simplistic conceptions of geo-cultural typology (East-West) as spaces of difference, temporal separation and inequality towards an understanding of a common space of hybridity and entwined partnership. Against this structure, he did not shy away from promulgating synthetic geo-cultural representations around Turkey. In this context, Turkey was presented as a living example of hybridity of space. In Özal’s words, Turkey was re-constructed as a land of synthesis that combines in itself two places and many cultures that predate and permeate over binary oppositions in the construction of the Eastern and the Western geographies.1034 Turkey was thus deemed Asiatic and European, Easterner not less than Western, oriental as well as occidental. Reconceptualising Turkey’s synthesized placement was associated with the “bridge” metaphor in the post-Cold War period. Whilst gently challenging Ankara’s singlehandedly westwards positioning, Ozal was equally vocal in

emphasizing Turkey’s placement in and sense of belonging to the Middle East. It was perceived as the land of people with whom Turks shared a common geography, history, religion, and culture as well as a zone of strategic significance. Ankara therefore kept Middle Eastern engagement as the chief touchstone of Turkey’s hybridist geo-cultural image.

In this sense, the Özalian epoch stands testimony to Ankara’s third wave of energetic activism in the Middle East. Restructuring Turkish economy after the neo-liberal model and emergence of PKK-led violent crackdown in Turkey provided further grounds to identify more intensively with regional affairs. This manifested itself in four ways. First, Turkey gradually returned to the centre stage of Organization of Islamic Conference by attending at highest levels in its meetings and hosting subsidiary organs such as COMSEC, IRCICA, SESRIC, etc. Secondly, Ankara tried to act in a mood of cooperation and dialogue in regional affairs with a view to enable greater commercial, financial, touristic and natural resource flows. Countries like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Libya thus became Turkey’s key economic partners. Thirdly, Ankara vigorously took the lead in establishment of ambitious regional schemes in a way similar to the DP era. In this context, the Economic Cooperation Organization was inaugurated in 1986. Two other major schemes of regional cooperation, namely Peace Pipeline (1986) and GAP (1983), were also initiated albeit with limited success. Fourthly, Turkey tried to capitalize on its hybridist qualities in a critical geographical location during the First Gulf War in 1991 for greater strategic gain.

Özal’s death in 1993 ushered in an era of weak coalition governments led by a new generation of politicians. Their ineffectiveness to provide economic stability, cool down PKK-led violence and reluctance to own up to Özal’s legacy re-brought the military to pre-eminence. The military was thus able to steer a reversion away from Özalian geopolitical thinking and practice towards republican dispositions around the westernist imagery. But there was still a mood of uncertainty externally at the time about Turkey’s post-Cold War geopolitical placement. Hence the security-minded Turkish elite’s feelings of abandonment
by the west and entrapment in a turbulent geography fed into stronger sensitivities around Turkey's territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty. With an unattractive imagination vis-à-vis the Middle East, what followed was a militarized notion of Turkish foreign policy which reduced external affairs exclusively to an outpost of Ankara's national security posture. Concerned with emergence of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq, Turkey was antagonistic, coercive, belligerent and interventionist towards its Middle Eastern neighbours. The only exception, which was perceived in ways similar to Turkey as a western modelled state in a tough geography was Israel. With military-strategic considerations lying at the core, that is why Turkish-Israeli relations went through a period of honeymoon in the 1990s.

Within this broad picture, there was one exception and an anomaly. The exception was the short lived RP-DYP coalition government. Pursuing a purely easternist imagery, Erbakan's government tried to relocate Turkey as the leader of the Islamic world and hence followed hard core conservative reflexes. Foreign policy was used as means of consolidating such an anti-occidentalist vision. In the two big trips Erbakan took to the Islamic world, an idea of establishing a D-8 group mirroring the G-8 was proposed. Energy deals were made. Financial and economic cooperation was envisioned. However, this attempt to reorient Turkey and its foreign policy was not risk free. Erbakan first found himself obliged to cut deals with the US and Israel and then resign under pressure by the military. The anomaly was the efforts by the coalition government led by Ecevit and his foreign policy guru Cem. Both subscribed to republican westernist imagery but not to an uneasy association with the Middle East. Whilst confessing to an uneasy neighbourhood, they did not necessarily see an unattractive Middle East. Picturing Turkey as a bridge instead between civilizations and its function as the outpost of European values in a difficult neighbourhood, Ecevit and Cem tried to cash in their country's geo-cultural situatedness to prove Turkey's value for the west. In other words, Turkey's geography and its relations with the Middle East were instrumentalized in a way to gain acceptance in the western community of nations in the post-Cold War period. The pace and vigour via which these two impulses were reflected into practice points.
to an intensified engagement which stands testimony to Turkey’s fourth wave of Middle Eastern activism.

The AK Party era is when the last wave of Turkey’s Middle Eastern activism is manifested albeit in a different geopolitical reasoning under the intellectual courtship of Ahmet Davutoğlu. Although subscribing to post-Cold War European civilizational geopolitics, the exercise put forward used classical geopolitical assumptions as an instrument to prioritize the geographical and strategic advantages enjoyed by the Muslim world with a view to envisage a greater room for the primacy and revival of Muslim culture and civilization. Thus a civilizational discourse coloured with naturalized geopolitical claims in trying to “re-position Turkey from the periphery of international relations to the centre” was visibly called for towards a three-legged re-imaginaton of/around Turkey. In the first leg, Turkey is re-imagined as the geographical pivot of history by being centrally located at the exact point where Mackinder’s Heartland and Spykman’s Rimland intersect. Secondly, Turkey is portrayed as a central civilizational hub thanks to its situation at the intersection of Europe and Asia, eastern and western civilizations and thus subscribing to a multitude of identities all at the same time. As the heir of Ottoman Empire which served as the chief frontrunner of the Islamic world, Turkey’s assumption of the leadership of its own civilizational basin is hence normalized and justified. The last leg of re-imaginaton pertains to the Middle Eastern neighbourhood. By sitting at an interface between continents, this region is discursively reconstructed as the key area to heartland Afro-Eurasia and hence a natural hinterland for Turkey.

Such reconstructions of Turkey’s image and location in global affairs as well as that of the Middle East feed into a sense of geo-cultural and geo-political distinctiveness to legitimize Ankara’s active pursuit of diplomacy and national interest towards greater influence, stature, weight and prestige in international politics. That such an exercise took hold in the psyche of the post-September 11 era, which paved the way to a revival of civilizational geopolitics,
lends a re-constitutive motive to AK Party leaders’ self-imagined discursive constructions. It is under these circumstances that Turkey in the 21st century embarked on a path towards re-energized Middle Eastern engagement on the basis of the infamous dictum, “zero-problems with neighbours”. The new strategy rested on three pillars; continuous political dialogue, enhanced economic interdependence, and increased social and cultural exchange. These were supported by new tools such as the High Level Cooperation Councils (HLCP), visa free travel and free trade agreements, Yunus Emre Cultural Centres and TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency) activities. Lastly, Ankara was eager to act as an intermediary in the resolution of regional disputes either between inter or intra-state parties as exemplified in back channel diplomacy in the Syria-Israel track, Iran’s nuclear programme, stabilization of Lebanon after the war with Israel in 2006, Iraq-Syria reconciliation and persuasion of Iraqi Sunnis in the political process, etc. That was the mentality and context which re-introduced Turkey to Middle Eastern politics once again in a cooperative mood through improved relations with Syria, Iran, Iraq, the Gulf and north African states in the first decade of the new millennium. The rather contrasting turn the AK Party took in its Middle Eastern dealings in the new decade requires a more nuanced understanding first on whether the three-legged imagination stands valid, second whether there is a change in the geopolitical code or a substantial change in the overall decision making mechanism.

In conclusion, the findings of this research indicate that the search for locating Turkey between the East and the West continues to this day. The two broad geopolitical traditions in Turkey that engage in such activity also remain intact. Variants exist in both camps. How they imagine Turkey’s geo-political and geo-cultural locatedness is also prone to variation in time. With each discursive spatial representation comes along a different conception of Turkey, its identity, and interests which is not purely material. In this exercise, at times compelling geopolitical narratives are produced; different sets of foreign policy possibilities, options and priorities are called for. The shift in the relative power and weight of diverse social groups in decision-making is what makes a difference in Turkish foreign policy. But
equally important is the mutually constitutive influence of external actors’ global positioning, mission and role expectations of Turkey. A combination of all these factors gives an image of a zigzagging pattern in Ankara’s Middle Eastern dealings. This cannot be deemed good or bad since Turkey is a country still in search for a proper place in global affairs. Nonetheless, the interdisciplinary and multi-causal model in critical geopolitics accurately explains discontinuity and change in Turkey’s regional policy.

On a last note, Turkey’s location at the intersection of many influences in a geography sitting on both Asian and European continents keeps stirring intellectual debate at home and abroad. Socio-political, and economic transformation in Turkey continues in parallel with geopolitical thinking in an attempt to giving proper meaning to its location. Shifts in the relative weight of social networks of power partake in the constitution, reconstitution and discursive representation of such an elusive geographical situatedness. Then perceptions/practices towards Turkey by other systemic actors in global affairs leave the door open for novel re-conceptualizations of Turkey’s location and hence endless possibilities for the future direction of Turkish foreign policy.
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