D'Oro, G ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5990-8089 (2018) Between ontological hubris and epistemic humility: Collingwood, Kant and the role of transcendental arguments. British Journal for the History of Philosophy.

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This paper explores and defends a form of transcendental argument that is neither bold in its attempt to answer the sceptic, as ambitious transcendental strategies, nor epistemically humble, as modest transcendental strategies. While ambitious transcendental strategies seek (but fail) to meet the sceptical challenge, and modest transcendental strategies accept the validity of the challenge but retreat to a position of epistemic humility, this form of transcendental argument denies the assumption that undergirds the challenge, namely that truth and falsity may be legitimately predicated of the conditions of knowledge. As a result, although this form of transcendental argument is not truth-directed, it is not vulnerable to a charge that is often levelled against modest transcendental arguments, namely that they amount to the adoption of a strategy of sophisticated capitulation. This form of transcendental argument, which is implicit in Collingwood’s conception of philosophy as the search for absolute presuppositions, takes transcendental arguments in a pragmatic direction that does not leave the framework of transcendental idealism intact. It nonetheless remains true to Kant’s conception of philosophy as a second order activity and to his goal of defending our entitlement to hold on both to the standpoint of theoretical and that of practical reason.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in British Journal for the History of Philosophy on TBC, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbjh20.”
Uncontrolled Keywords: transcendental arguments, ambitious transcendental arguments, modest transcendental arguments, pragmatism, Collingwood, scepticism
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment
Depositing User: Symplectic
Date Deposited: 01 May 2018 10:00
Last Modified: 21 Dec 2019 01:30
URI: https://eprints.keele.ac.uk/id/eprint/4798

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