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D'Oro, G ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5990-8089
(2005)
Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind.
Inquiry, 48 (5).
395 - 412.
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Idealism and the philosophy of mind (GDoro).pdf - Accepted Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial. Download (208kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that as an attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic metaphysics, the idealist alternative bears some similarities to anomalous monism, but that it is superior to it because it is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. I conclude that this idealist alternative should be given serious consideration by those who remain unconvinced that a successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental is compatible with the pursuit of a naturalistic agenda.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | philosophy, philosophy of mind |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Divisions: | Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment |
Depositing User: | Symplectic |
Date Deposited: | 11 Nov 2014 11:45 |
Last Modified: | 17 Dec 2018 11:51 |
URI: | https://eprints.keele.ac.uk/id/eprint/48 |
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