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Rorty's Philosophy of Consciousness

Tartaglia, James

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Abstract

This chapter begins by asking why Rorty would endorse a physicalist agenda which, on the face of it, ran counter to his aims in philosophy; and concludes both that his motivation was confused, and that he failed to detach physicalism from metaphysics and scienticism. I begin by showing the importance of metaphilosophy to Rorty's position on consciousness, and the centrality of consciousness to his overall project. I then summarize Rorty's position, which was essentially derived from Ryle, but uniquely driven by metaphilosophy. My assessment begins by disputing Rorty's thesis about the historical origins of the concept of consciousness, before following him into his favorite argumentative territory by talking about the social utility of first-person reflection on consciousness, and his own motivations for wanting to undermine such reflection. I conclude that because of his obsession with religion, Rorty became entangled in a scientistic agenda he should have opposed.

Online Publication Date Feb 14, 2020
Publicly Available Date Mar 28, 2024
Publisher Wiley
Pages 43-58
Book Title A companion to Rorty
Chapter Number 3
ISBN 9781118972168
DOI https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118972199.ch3
Publisher URL https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118972199.ch3
Related Public URLs https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781118972199

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