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For My Dearest June
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To the friend who typed this thesis over a period of five years I should like to record my great thanks for this unique contribution. We have been partners in the production of this completed typescript. In her enormous help towards its eventual production the sheer professionalism of her approach has been quite outstanding and the standard both in quality of presentation and in typewritten accuracy has been nothing less than superb.

Above all I thank the members of my family for being a constant source of support encouragement and criticism. I have valued their advice throughout. Without June this thesis would neither have been begun continued nor ended.

21 AUGUST 1983
This thesis is about the White House staff. Primarily it covers the period from the 1930's to the 1970's: from being first established to being well embedded in the American political system. Although the main body of research and writing relates to the White House staff of six Presidents - Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon - additional reference where appropriate or where the opportunity arose is made to their successors: Ford, Carter and Reagan.

The argument of this thesis can be very simply stated. The White House staff are a very large and influential part of the modern Presidency. They now occupy a pre-eminent position in the presidential decision-making process. An understanding of the White House staff is now absolutely essential to an understanding of the framework of advice that culminates in any presidential decision. The prime characteristics of the staff are unique proximity to the President and virtually complete accountability to him alone. These contribute to a mutual confidence between President and staff that sustains the basis of staff influence. Over five decades they have far outgrown and transformed their original purposes both in size and power irrespective of the differences, and emerging similarities, in the ways Presidents have organized them. This progress was virtually uninterrupted and was not properly monitored. Experience has shown and evidence does confirm that the White House staff long inhabited a constitutional vacuum where the normal operation of the system of checks and balances effectively ceased to apply. Despite dramatic revelations of manifest abuses of power the position has been improved only partially. Although the permanent need for a staff has been recognized and they are now firmly entrenched in the structure of the Presidency of the United States the potential for abuse remains.

S BENN AUGUST 1983
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Throughout this thesis the White House staff are referred to in the plural. As an official and definable entity "The White House Office" is consistently spelt with four capital letters. The more general term "the White House staff" embodies no official definition and is deliberately spelt with a lower case "t" and "s".

When referring to White House staff members individually or collectively without name the masculine pronoun has been used. The author wishes to make it clear that this practice has been adopted merely as a stylistic convenience as it reflects the historical and current imbalance between men and women on the White House staff.
Power attracts advice. Wherever the executive authority is vested in a single individual he or she will both need and find attracted to them those who give advice on how that power should be used. The Presidency of the United States is the supreme example of that principle. Presidents need advice and presidential power cannot be effectively exercised without it. The President needs help and thus he needs advisers. His power creates their power - which is sustained by a proximity to Presidents that is unique and all pervasive. The White House staff are those that best exemplify the attraction to and uses of his power but inevitably this brings the risk that power will be abused. In a Democracy this risk should not be run. In the United States it is.

This thesis is about the nature, origins, establishment, growth, development, organization, and accountability of the White House staff to the President. The staff were officially created five decades ago. What then began as a tiny group of personal assistants has since emerged as a major power centre at the very heart and at the very highest level of American politics.
It is a transformation for which there is neither specific constitutional provision nor adequate constitutional safeguard. For far too long the staff escaped both serious notice and sustained criticism. This thesis addresses itself to hitherto untouched areas of research on the White House staff that are well overdue for academic study.

The American Presidency is arguably the single most powerful elective political office in the world. Given the fact that the United States is still the most powerful country in the world, and that the President formally exercises executive power on a scale greater than any other Head of State or political leader now or throughout human history, it is obviously of the highest importance that we should try to understand the framework of advice which culminates in any presidential decision. A President's entire political existence is a continual process of decision. How he makes up his mind is often as crucial as what he decides to do or not to do. At his level, political and administrative decisions are no longer easily separable; they are often no more than two sides of the same coin.

The Presidency is by any normal standards an impossible job. In addition to the many (familiar and well documented) roles that he must fulfil - Head of State, Commander-in-Chief, Chief Executive, political leader, party leader, Leader of the Western World - there is now one other. Organizing the Presidency has become a major and critical part of his job. The allocation of his time, and for what purposes, are vital questions to which he must immediately address himself. This begins on Day One. When a President walks into the Oval Office for the first time on the assumption of power what resources does he have at his command? Apart from the behemoth of the federal government itself, on whom can he call for help? Whom and what does he have at his personal direction to help him organize and manage this vast power? How does he use and utilize them? With what results?
The difference in the answers that can be given to these questions over the past fifty years is nothing less than revolutionary. In 1933 incoming President Roosevelt was only able officially to call upon a tiny handful of personal assistants at an annual cost of a few tens of thousands of dollars. In 1983 incumbent President Reagan was able officially to call upon literally hundreds of persons working in various guises under his overall personal direction at a combined annual official cost of well over thirty million dollars (a mammoth increase even in real terms). Such a fundamental difference can only be accounted for by a fundamental reason. This is best reflected primarily by the growth in size and power of the White House staff to the President.

The size of the White House establishment at the disposal of a President is by any standards awesome to Western political eyes. No other political leader in a democracy comes remotely close in their ability personally to command such political resources as does the American President. Direct help numbers several hundred; indirect help even more. In the discharge of their work their most distinctive characteristic is a primary loyalty to the President as an individual rather than to the Presidency as an institution. That this is simultaneously their most distinctive strength and weakness is a fact whose consequences pervade this study.

The size and power of his White House staff can be expressed in practical, political and personal terms. In practical terms the staff surround the modern President 24 hours a day. They organize his schedule and appointments. They are more than his eyes and ears. They are his political life support machine. Their political power flows decisively from the regular direct access to the President that is their political lifeblood. A President's senior White House staff get to know on a daily basis more about what the President is thinking, and how his mind works, and how he approaches his
power as President, than anyone else. This proximity in itself has now become political power of a substantial and valid kind. They also organize the machinery that keeps him informed, control the flow of paperwork on his behalf, and convey decisions to the world outside the Oval Office. In a very personal sense the President's own freedom over the organization of his staff goes virtually unchallenged. That they are so organized in a manner best suited to the President's own personal political style and working methods should not disguise the independent institutional influence they have perforce acquired in the process.

Undeniably there are few routes to the top in any political system as short as those of which the senior members of a President's White House staff can and have been capable. There are essentially three paths to the summit of political power in liberal Western democracies. Firstly, there is the long and hazardous path of elective office, ever subject to the external discipline of the ballot box. Few reach the very summit - there have been only nine Presidents in 50 years - and they have nearly all been decidedly middle-aged. Secondly, there is the equally long, though more secure, route upwards of the career bureaucracy, subject to the internal discipline of the professional structure. This is epitomised by a civil service whose senior figures emerge at the top similarly middle-aged. Generally these two are the dominant paths. But in the USA there is a third route to the heart of the highest levels of American politics: by way of appointment. For those thus favoured the elevation can be as sudden as the rewards are great.

Among all appointees the White House staff stand out as a very special and superior case. Their resulting influence and power has both a collective and an individual dimension. As a collective entity the President's staff are entrusted with a part in policy and decision making that in no other
country can come to those who often are so relatively young. As individuals their range of responsibilities, whether in domestic or foreign affairs, has on occasion been vast; so too has their influence far outstripped that of many members of the Cabinet. Such men (and overwhelmingly they have been men) are subject to no external or official discipline at all save that of maintaining the confidence of their respective Presidents. They escape entirely from any constitutional provisions providing for the prior advice and consent of the Senate to their appointment - as is the case in respect of all other official presidential advisers or appointments. Accountable to no-one but the President they sometimes can achieve more influence than many if not most official advisers put together. History has clearly shown the heights which such men have reached. Equally, the depths are also now on record. If power attracts then no less has 'absolute' power attracted 'absolutely': with results that can in part be measured by the years of prison sentences meted out to those who too readily have mistaken loyalty to their 'king' for loyalty to their country.

One of the necessary features - and definitions - of a democratic political system is that the potential for abuse of power be minimized. It is the test of a democracy that political advisers should be accountable for the advice they give to the person or persons who have designated official political power. In Britain, for example, although the fiction is still maintained that the Monarch acts on the advice and consent of Privy Counsellors and Ministers, such advice as is received, from the Prime Minister and Government of the day through the Houses of Parliament, is binding. They in turn (with the notable exception of the House of Lords) are held accountable to the electorate. For official advice the Government largely relies upon a strong Civil Service that is held accountable as a career bureaucracy.
In the United States today this test is only partially upheld. Although the President's main official advisers remain, in constitutional terms, the individual members of his Cabinet (who are all accountable to Congress) this advisory relationship has degenerated into what Walter Bagehot would have correctly identified as the 'dignified' element of the Constitution. Collectively they have long been effectively superceded by a White House staff that has now taken on much of the 'efficient' element as the top power structure permeating presidential government.

That the White House staff are now an integral part of the Presidency is so unquestionably the case as no longer to be in dispute. Modern American political history, not least in the 1970's, has been decisively shaped by their presence. That history cannot now be written without a real understanding of the White House staff. They are the organized advisory system in which Presidents have come to have most confidence. There is no modern Presidency that can adequately be described, defended, analysed or criticized without both an open acknowledgement of the political power that the President's White House staff have achieved in their own right and a sure knowledge of their role and organization.

Yet the issues raised in this study extend far beyond the times in which we live or the country upon which it is focused. They touch upon questions of political organization that have characterized many political systems down the ages.

In the analysis of any political system certain elementary questions remain as essential as they are eternal. What is the structure of power? How is power exercised? By whom? With what result? In the Western world, no less than in those many other countries and systems where there is an
identifiable executive power, there are other questions equally of importance. From whom do those with executive power take advice? To what extent is that advice binding or advisory?

Whatever the political system there has always existed, and will always exist, advisers. They have been, and are, known by different names in different settings and in different ages. Throughout human history people have been interested in those to whom Pharaohs, Caesars, Emperors, Popes, Princes, Queens, Kings, Prime Ministers and Presidents have turned to for advice. Other questions have had equal fascination and importance. How was that advice given? What was the power of the adviser?

The theme of 'the power behind the throne' - so universal in its application - has long exerted as strong a hold on the imagination of people without power as it has on the minds of those with power. Niccolo Machiavelli's famous dictum that "the first impression that one gets of a ruler and of his brains is from seeing the men that he has about him" remains (even with its sexist bias) as true today as it was when it was written hundreds of years ago. Why? Because it retains an essential validity that transcends the age in which he lived and the political system about which he wrote.

This validity is nowhere better demonstrated than in the historical parallels one may draw between the ages. The White House staff resemble nothing so much as the courtiers of a Medieval court, entirely dependent upon their 'Prince' for grace and favour, power and influence. Indeed their terms and conditions of employment bear striking similarities, as do some of the titles bestowed upon them. The bond of mutual confidence between President and adviser, if strong, can accomplish much; if weak, can accomplish little; if broken, can accomplish nothing.
Nor is this the only point of similarity between the Medieval world of the Prince and the modern world of the Presidency. Where Medieval Princes were subject merely to the occasional individual scrutiny of a Machiavelli, today's Presidents are subject to the constant collective scrutiny of the mass media. As the White House is overwhelmingly the source of so much information about the President and the Government of the United States, and as the White House staff tend to be the prime purveyors of such information, it is not surprising that the Press and media cluster round to feed upon them. Indeed, the accreditation of so many hundreds of representatives of the national and international Press and Newsmedia to the White House Press Office resembles nothing so much as the accreditation of foreign ambassadors in bygone centuries to the court of a Prince. They are ambassadors of news: both trivial and profound. Their ever-present watchfulness can occasionally yield rewarding fruit. No better harvest was there than the Watergate era.

Information is power - decisively so in the later part of the twentieth century. We are living through the Information Revolution. Not only does this affect every part of our daily lives it also poses clear challenges for any political system and can be a direct threat to its prevailing political establishment. In so doing it has heightened our understanding of the political issues thrown up in its wake. 'Freedom of Information' is a cry as politically significant for our age as 'Universal Suffrage' or 'No Taxation Without Representation' was in past ages. Watergate was about the abuse of power precisely because it was about the abuse of information. This greatest domestic political crisis of the modern American era was a crisis primarily about information: who did what to obtain it; who did what to cover it up; who did what to unravel it; and who did what to
prevent its recurrence. The resolution of this crisis embraced every major component of the structure of American government and involved both a classic exposition of, and argument about, the extent of the political information and hence political power to which each component was entitled. It should have come as no surprise (although to some extent, from past neglect, it did) that the role of the President's White House staff was absolutely central both to the origins, the course, and the meaning of Watergate.

To take but one example, it was no coincidence that the growth of the White House staff and the progressive claims made by successive Presidents for "executive privilege" should have gone hand in hand. For a country which, unlike Britain, has no Official Secrets Act this doctrine always presented the possibility of unwarranted expansion. This reached a climax in President Nixon's breathtaking assertion that all present and former members of the staff were an extension of the President and thus immune from questioning - unless the President waived his rights and gave his approval. Information could be withheld, he argued, because only the President had the right to decide what the public had the right to know. In the famous Watergate Tapes case before the United States Supreme Court in 1974 this unprecedented interpretation was developed into a modern equivalent of the Medieval theory of Divine Right.

Watergate engendered more general public interest in the White House staff than had any other single event in four decades. Yet over this period the position of the staff had gradually strengthened until its effortless superiority over its rivals for power was laid bare in successive congressional hearings and Press investigative reports. President Nixon's resignation, despite its being a decisive defeat for him, did little
seriously to undermine the underlying dominance of the system he had both inherited and sustained. Roosevelt’s Presidency, with its twin emergencies of Depression and World War, had already shifted the legislative initiative from congressional offices and hearing rooms to the offices of the federal government. Subsequent Presidents, in varying degrees, encouraged further developments: such as the gradual transfer of the engine room of domestic and foreign policy-making and policy implementation from outlying Cabinet departments and federal offices to the powerhouse they created for themselves under the auspices and control of the White House.

The signs of such a fundamental shift in power are now never far from the surface of the daily process of presidential politics. The Press and TV, with a diversionary and unhealthy preoccupation that nevertheless comes naturally, constantly present and interpret political events in personal terms. The share of this coverage apportioned to the White House staff is as prominent as it is increasingly dominant. Much is trivial - but underneath there is one grain of truth. The people in government who matter are those closest to the President or those who most authoritatively speak on his behalf. In this, the staff enjoy several advantages over all rivals.

From the moment of election the President-Elect must begin to form his Administration. The new President is immediately faced with the need to select those with whom, through whom, and by whom he means to exercise his presidential power. The first and overriding job to be tackled has now become the creation of his embryonic White House staff without whom he is paralysed. It is principally through this group (a ‘transition staff’ whose organizational roots now reach well back into the long presidential
campaigns that precede electoral success) that a President sets about the serious business of organizing the transition and preparing for office. In the absence of any formal authority during this period the effective political power of the President-Elect is transmitted through his staff. This pattern, once established, has in recent times proved to be a dominant if not decisive influence on the future structure of decision-making in that Presidency. If ever reasons were required for a study of the White House staff they manifestly begin to accumulate from a new President's first day. To see the wood from the trees requires a broadly based approach - and such an one is offered here.

The course of this thesis follows a straightforward path. The method chosen is to explore first the difficulties of arriving at a workable definition of the White House staff and to build outwards from this essential starting point. Chapter I thus addresses itself to the question of definition. Chapter II takes the form of an analysis of the literature which, as a by-product, well elucidates the scope and nature of the vast gaps in research work on the White House staff - gaps which later chapters seek to fill. Chapter III traces the origins and establishment of the staff both in the wider historical context and, more particularly, in the immediate circumstances surrounding their creation. Chapter IV sets out the growth of the White House staff and exclusively tackles the job, in a simultaneously descriptive and investigatory manner, of constructing a comprehensive factual basis upon which the wider arguments of the thesis are founded. Chapter V surveys the development and organization of the staff, analysing both the general and specific political forces that have shaped their emergence, the manner in which successive Presidents have chosen to organize them, and those factors common to each Presidency which tend to influence that organization in certain directions.
Thereafter attention is turned specifically to one major theme of this study: the accountability of power. Chapter VI considers and explores the various ways in which the White House staff are held accountable to the President, taking in such diverse areas as executive privilege and ethical standards en route. Chapter VII, the final chapter, is entirely devoted to a detailed analysis of the accountability of the White House staff to the Congress. It is a chapter that, until the 1970's, could not conclusively be written because the agenda for reform was being actively pursued; yet now, in the 1980's, looks unlikely to be rewritten because that agenda has fallen into dissuetude. Of the conclusions that will be drawn we can at least say here that the continuing attraction of the White House staff to students of the Presidency deserves at least to be directly proportional to the attraction of the staff to the Presidents they serve.
CHAPTER I

THE QUESTION OF DEFINITION
INTRODUCTION

The question of definition arises because the White House staff pose unique problems as an object of comprehensive academic inquiry. These problems are interlinked. As such it embraces not one problem but several interlinked problems. Before we launch into the analysis of literature and the succeeding chapters these are important matters that need to be tackled first. A good deal of preliminary work must be done on defining the subject itself. This work has never been adequately done. As a result the field of inquiry is not clearly understood. Certainly it is more complication than it appears at first sight and more extended than it is usually presented as being.

The problems begin with the very use of the term "The White House staff" itself. Except insofar as it first came into being to describe the original administrative assistants established with The White House Office in 1939 this term has never been employed with precisely the same meaning since. For many years "The White House staff" has been used ubiquitously by politicians, press, and public alike but in different senses and with no common understanding or knowledge of exactly whom were being so described. For the purposes of academic inquiry it is not enough to rely on vague general notions that the White House staff work in the White House (though they do) or are personal appointees of the President (though they are). We need to establish a valid and workable definition, or principles that will lead us to construct one, with which we can examine, describe and analyse the growth, development and organization of the White House staff.
The difficulties that arise in pursuit of this aim, indeed their very existence, arise out of the secrecy that has surrounded this subject and the lack of critical attention devoted to it hitherto. Foremost among them is the question of primary source material and whether such sources are reliable. Problems of definition and source material are really two sides of the same coin. Different definitions must be examined together with the different bases of source material from which they arise.

This does not exhaust the preliminary ground that needs to be covered. Our discussion must take us further. When we are more familiar with these problems we shall then be in a position to consider in greater depth the essential components of the White House staff that will have been identified. This consideration will be undertaken with a view to ascertaining each such component's historical basis together with a preliminary investigation into the presumed grounds of proper authority upon which each rested for so many years.

This chapter therefore falls into three interlocking parts. Firstly, we explore the problems involved in reaching a definition of who the White House staff are. Secondly, we examine the problems of primary source material concomitant upon various definition. Thirdly, we research the basis upon which the staff have rested for their proper authorization in the first forty years of their existence. These problem areas, once covered, will leave us freer to concentrate for the remainder of this study on the major questions of political importance posed by the White House staff.
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION

Who exactly are the White House staff? To paraphrase Oscar Wilde the answer, like truth itself, is rarely pure and never simple. It is not possible to give a single all-embracing definition of the White House staff that is both technically precise and politically meaningful. This difficulty is compounded when comparing the White House staffs of different Presidents.

Broadly speaking the dilemma is this: to define as the complete White House staff only those who can be objectively identified as such by whatever technical criteria exist would involve leaving out of account those who by other standards or by political criteria should equally be termed members of the staff. Conversely, any attempt at a political definition of the White House staff may at first glance entail curious, or apparently arbitrary, decisions as to whom to include and whom to leave out.

Such technical criteria as do exist are the product of historical and bureaucratic factors; such political criteria as can be found to exist are the product of men, institutions, and changing circumstances. The disadvantage of the latter in being not susceptible to precise measurement is more than matched by that of the former in being but an imperfect representation of the real world.

There is no escape from the unique problems thus posed in our search for a valid and workable definition. There are no neutral criteria. In the absence of neutral criteria any definition may appear to be reduced to mere personal interpretation. Moreover whatever the criteria determined upon an added complication is their liability to vary from Presidency to Presidency.
These points will emerge more clearly as we proceed. To inaugurate our discussion we can identify four categories of definition. First: the legal definition. Second: the physical definition. Third: the technical definition. Fourth: the political definition. On our brief tour d'horizon we should consider these as convenient starting points.

THE LEGAL DEFINITION

The legal definition of the White House staff could be put as follows: those positions to which the President is authorized by law to appoint persons to be known as his White House staff. The presumed advantage of a solidly based legal definition would be twofold. Firstly, it would convey a certainty of meaning, since the law would be precise as to which positions were White House staff positions. Secondly, such a definition would serve as a suitable base from which valid comparisons could be drawn between different presidencies.

But there are insurmountable drawbacks to this approach. The law has indeed been precise and for that reason it is clear just how precisely inaccurate it has been as a workable definition in this context. Such legal definition as can historically be said to have existed for the White House staff along these lines rapidly became completely out of date, verging on the bizarre, and for all practical purposes has been useless. Those positions on the staff that were properly authorized by law amounted only to a small and decidedly motley collection which bore virtually no relation whatsoever to the large modern White House staff. (This situation is considered in more detail in part three of this chapter.)
Moreover, there is another drawback. In legal terminology, the term "the White House staff" by itself does not exist and never has. Although coined originally by the Brownlow Committee in its 1937 report, it has since been nowhere explicitly established in law. The nearest approach made to this term can be found in the budgetary classifications and legislative enactments which refer to those employed in "The White House Office". There they are variously described as "individuals" or "employees" or "personnel" but not by the collective noun "the White House staff". Even were "The White House Office staff" properly to comprise a legally defined group this would leave us a long way short of a realistic definition, as we shall shortly see.

Any definition of the White House staff, therefore, that resorted to the law can only have produced a legal irrelevance. This in itself has not been without significance. Neither has been its corollary. While the staff may not have been "illegal" (in the normally understood sense of that term), neither can they be said to have existed for their first forty years on any proper legal foundation. The full consequences we leave to a later chapter. Meanwhile this study proceeds on the basis that no legal definition of the White House staff could be of real value.

THE PHYSICAL DEFINITION

A definition of the White House staff based on their physical location rather than their legal position is not such an absurd idea. Above all it would convey the fact of physical access to the President which is a political advantage that the staff are uniquely able to exploit. A
physical definition could take this form: all those persons who work in the West Wing of the White House. Not only would such a definition adequately reflect their proximity to the President, it would also be true as far as it goes. Apart from the household staff and security guards all those who work in the West Wing can indeed be counted as members of the White House staff.

But such a definition would not go far enough. The White House staff have long since grown so large (however one defines them) that it has been impossible to house them all in one place. Indeed, as early as 1937, President Roosevelt confessed that the White House offices in the West Wing were already too small and would have to be expanded.\(^1\) Shortly thereafter the staff began to spill over to the adjacent State, War and Navy building, such that by the end of World War Two a sizeable number were situated there because office space in the West Wing had run out.\(^2\)

By 1958 that building had absorbed so many White House staff that special steps had to be taken to enlarge the jurisdiction of the White House Police in order that their protection services be extended to cover those staff working across the street from the West Wing.\(^3\) Yet it was still possible at that time to distinguish between members of the White House staff and others at work in the same building employed by other entities in the Executive Office of the President (notably BoB personnel). The latter were still in the majority.

This balance, however, was soon to change as the White House staff continued to grow. By 1960 it was officially acknowledged that most of the White House staff paid out of the appropriations for "Special Projects" were in fact located in the Executive Office Building\(^4\) (the re-named State, War and Navy building). As more White House staff moved into
the EOB throughout the 1960s more of the other EOP personnel were moved out to make way. By 1972 the White House staff numbered many hundreds. A further physical expansion had consequently taken place, such that the Comptroller General then stated that his definition of the White House staff encompassed all those situated in "the Executive Mansion, the old and new Executive Office Buildings, and any other location in or out of Washington DC where services are performed for the White House". One might almost term this the 'octopus' definition, as the staff's 'tentacles' appeared to be reaching out in so many directions. Indeed a nascent awareness of such an implication subsequently obliged a seniorOMB official to submit a memorandum on this subject to a Senate appropriations subcommittee. Two years later, at similar hearings, the then Nixon Administration revealed another, symbolic, development. Most of the White House Office staff, it was admitted, now worked in the old EOB. Only a minority were thus located in the West Wing itself - a far cry from 1939.

Our postulated definition has thus long been overtaken by events. Its value as a barometer of the size of the staff has been more than offset by its imprecision as a workable basis for research. Neither can any physical definition be successfully enlarged to include the old and new EOBs, despite the likely predominance of White House staff in those buildings. The exact number and kind of staff working in each location has never been made available. Moreover to some extent - with regard to CIA and White House Communications personnel - it remains a secret.

For practical purposes, therefore, any definition of the staff based on its physical location, although interesting, is amorphous. A more specific definition is necessary.
THE TECHNICAL DEFINITION

The technical definition relies for its force upon one, or a combination, of the varied official definitions of the staff which are available. But there are several problems. None of these official definitions are sufficient in themselves to encompass the entire White House staff. They each suffer from serious deficiencies. Moreover, none are mutually exclusive, for they overlap one with another in certain ways. These points are best illustrated by taking a closer look at some of the forms that a technical definition can take.

The first such definition that presents itself is as follows: those persons listed as members of The White House Office staff by such official publications as the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL; or the CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY; or by other regularly published but private sources such as the CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY or NATIONAL JOURNAL. What are the advantages of such a definition? In these publications, and especially in the first two mentioned, a regular listing of those persons in The White House Office is published on an annual basis. Not only are their names given but also their staff title. They thus form an identifiable group. An official listing has appeared on a regular basis ever since The White House Office was officially established in 1939, and for this reason it can be used to provide a basis for legitimate comparison between one President's staff and another. At first sight it would appear that the problem of definition is quite easily resolved.

But there are at least three grounds on which such a definition must fail. Firstly, despite the fact that these publications (excepting the
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY) all claim to receive their listings of White House staff from the same source, there are nevertheless many instances of discrepancies between them. These are only increased when the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY is also taken into account. The second ground raises a wider and more important question. However accurate these listings they only record the number of senior, commissioned, members of the WHO staff (which range approximately from ten to fifty depending on the Presidency). But there is more to a full understanding of the White House staff than just its senior members. These listings do not, for example, give any indication of the number of middle-ranking staff, or the number of support staff, which have progressively come to play an important part in the ability of the senior staff to do its job. Thirdly, this definition would leave completely out of account many other persons and groups in respect of which it can be argued that they too were members of the White House staff (as we shall shortly see). In other words, using this definition, we restrict ourselves to the tip of the iceberg.

There is a second form that a technical definition might take: all those persons who have received a commission from the President to serve as members of his White House staff. The United States Constitution, in the course of describing the powers granted to the President in Article II Section 3, makes reference to the fact that the President "shall Commission all the Officers of the United States". Naturally there is nothing in the Constitution about the White House staff, (neither is there any mention of the Cabinet), but certain staff members are indeed commissioned by the President. (Like many presidential commissions these are often framed and proudly displayed on office walls). As with the first technical definition that we considered, a group of commissioned persons appears to form an identifiable group and thus affords a workable
basis for legitimate comparison between presidencies. Moreover it would also seem to overcome the second objection raised above, for there is apparent reason to believe that a definition based on commissioned staff does take into account middle-ranking personnel. For example, 81 persons were sworn in on 21st January 1969 as members of the staff, whereas only 46 were listed in the GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL for that year.

However, there are clear and straightforward drawbacks to this definition. First, no list of the names and staff titles of commissioned staff has ever been made publicly available. Second, it clearly does not take into account the full range of staff support. The rank of commissioned personnel can still exclude important middle-ranking staff. Third, this too leaves largely out of account the majority of those on the White House staff employed elsewhere than in The White House Office. In short, any attempt at a definition based on the concept of commissioned staff has none of the real advantages, and all the disadvantages, of the first technical definition discussed. The question we are left with is whether any technical definition exists which can successfully embrace any wider group of White House staff. This leads us to consider the value of the United States Budgets.

The third form that a technical definition could take is the official budgetary definition: all those persons who are paid from that part of the US Budget which is entitled "The White House Office - Salaries and Expenses". This definition meets one of the criticisms we have just encountered. The US Budget provides annually figures of all personnel paid out of The White House Office appropriation - not just the top few
dozen. These figures have for over thirty years numbered in the hundreds, and have undoubtedly included middle-ranking White House staff, as well as support staff (such as clerical and secretarial assistance). More significant still seems to be such a definition's potential for expansion to include other categories for which figures have been published in US Budgets. Examples here would include "Special Projects", "The National Security Council - Salaries and Expenses" and "The Domestic Council - Salaries and Expenses". Finally, as US Budget figures are available for the whole period here under study they would seem suitable as the basis for valid comparisons between different presidencies.

But these apparent gains are matched, upon closer examination, by considerable disadvantages. Firstly, the names of White House staff have never been given in US Budgets. They are currently 'listed' only as an anonymous numerical total. (In earlier years the gross numbers of staff holding certain staff titles were given but this practice was phased out in the early 1960s). Secondly, in certain cases - such as Special Projects - even the gross totals of staff employed have not been made available. Thirdly, the staff are not normally individually differentiated as regards salary levels. These such figures are often only crude averages rather than being individually precise. Fourthly, and most important, figures obtained from US Budgets can be very inaccurate. This has been officially acknowledged on two occasions during the past 40 years, in FY 1947 and FY 1971, which led to attempts to make US Budget figures reflect more honestly the true size and cost of the staff. This will be considered in more detail later. Suffice it to say here that, without prejudice to these partially successful attempts, the fact remains that US Budget figures must be treated with great caution.
From our discussion so far it is clear that we have yet to formulate a workable definition of the White House staff that has political meaning. Certainly no single technical definition can by itself take us very far. The missing 'ingredient' is a political framework that enables us to piece together what we have already covered - and more besides - into a complete whole.

THE POLITICAL DEFINITION

A political definition of the White House staff need not be mutually exclusive of these other definitions. The reason for a political definition is simply that we must search beyond the limitations imposed on these others if we are to grasp the true political significance of the White House staff. Yet a political definition must still strive to be a practical one, based on the firm ground of ascertainable fact to the best extent possible. A combination of the two is not easy to obtain.

The question we are trying to answer here is this: what does a political definition take into account that is excluded from other definitions? A good way to begin answering this question is to give an example. Consider President Nixon in 1972, at the height of his Presidency. What was the size and cost of his White House staff? Who exactly were his White House staff? The legal definition would have us believe that there were less than 20 staff, while the physical definition points to such a large number that they could not all be housed together. Neither is very helpful. On the other hand some of the technical definitions at least give us a more concrete indication. There were 53 members of Nixon’s senior commissioned White House Office staff, according to official
publications,\textsuperscript{13} while the US Budget put the number being paid from The White House Office appropriation at 544.\textsuperscript{14} (This latter figure would include the former.) The budgeted cost of these staff was given as $9.5m (to the nearest $\$m).

But this simply does not give us the complete picture. Two obvious omissions stand out. Firstly, no account has yet been taken of the National Security Council staff. This operated under the direction of Henry Kissinger, one of the most important members of the Nixon White House staff. The NSC staff officially numbered no less than 76 personnel in 1972.\textsuperscript{15} The fact that they were not classified under "The White House Office" heading in the US Budget should not detract from the necessity of including them in any political definition of the Nixon staff. The NSC staff may have been highly specialised when compared with those in the White House Office, but some of the latter were no less experts in other areas. The essential justification for including the NSC staff in any political definition is borne out by a simple comparison. The NSC staff provided staff support for Henry Kissinger in his capacity as Assistant for National Security Affairs in the same way that WHO staff provided staff support for Clark McGregor in his capacity as Counsel for Congressional Relations; or staff support for H.R. Haldeman in his capacity as Assistant to the President.

The second obvious omission is that no account has yet been taken of the Domestic Council staff. In exactly the same sense as we have just described they provided staff support for John Ehrlichman in his capacity as Assistant for Domestic Affairs. In 1972 the Domestic Council staff numbered 80 personnel.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, adding this figure to that for the NSC staff total we find that no less than 156 persons should be added to the original total figure of 544 which we derived solely from the technical
definition of The White House Office. Together with these extra personnel we must add over $4m to the total figure of the cost involved.\textsuperscript{17}

Yet there is still more that a political definition must take into account. Firstly, adjustments have to be made to take into account the number of persons that were "detailed" to work on the White House staff. Most detailees, as they are called, work on a full-time basis and thus become de facto members of the White House staff. Such persons are never recorded in official figures for The White House Office, but occasionally their presence and extent of their presence is made known elsewhere. In 1972 it can be inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that there were at least between 20 and 40 staff on detail to The White House Office.\textsuperscript{18} But detailing did not stop there. Figures released to a congressional appropriations subcommittee reveal that Kissinger's NSC personnel strength was considerably supplemented by a further 53 personnel detailed to work on the NSC staff from other departments and agencies.\textsuperscript{19} Although comparable figures for the Domestic Council were never made available it is possible to conclude that overall we should add at least 75 extra personnel to our running total of White House staff.

Secondly, the reader should be aware that there were in 1972 various other funds at the disposal of the President, which could be, and were, used for his White House staff. These were all in addition to formal appropriations for The White House Office. They included the fund for Special Projects, which in 1972 was authorized at $1.5m.\textsuperscript{20} Some of this money went directly towards the employment of persons to serve on the White House staff. While exactly how much was not officially revealed in the US Budget,\textsuperscript{21} it was admitted to Congress the following year that at least 14 additional staff were paid for by the Special Projects fund.\textsuperscript{22} Another potential source of finance for his staff was the so-called "Emergency Fund", which in 1972
made $1m available for use at the discretion of the President. Moreover, one must also take into account the "Expense of Management Improvement" fund, which had frequently been used to finance staff activity in the past, and for which $700,000 was requested by the Nixon Administration in 1972.

Thirdly, there is one more element of the Nixon White House staff that we have not yet taken into account. This was peculiar to the Nixon Presidency because President Nixon chose to include it among his White House staff in 1971. It was not otherwise so considered by any other President, (and it is not clear how long Nixon himself continued to do so). The element in question was the Office of Science and Technology (OST), which in 1972 operated under the direction of the Science Advisor to the President, Dr. Edward E. David Jr. Dr. David, like Dr. Kissinger, was listed by the Nixon White House as a member of the White House staff. Where Dr. Kissinger's staff were formally called the NSC staff, Dr. David's staff were formally called the OST staff. They numbered in 1972 22 personnel (not counting support staff) at a budgeted cost of some $2.3m.

We are now at last in a position to add together these multifarious parts of the Nixon White House staff: firstly, in respect of its total cost. The budgeted cost of the NSC and Domestic Council staffs was in 1972 over $4.5m. To this we must add the well over $3m provided by the various additional funds, and the well over $2m budgeted cost of the OST staff. Together this amounted to over $10m annually in addition to the $9.5m appropriated for The White House Office. And what number of staff was President Nixon able to maintain with this annual sum of over $19.5m? From The White House Office itself came 554, as given by the US Budget, to which some 20-40 additional staff were detailed. The NSC staff numbered 76, with a further 53 on detail. The Domestic Council staff were officially budgeted
at 80 personnel (to which we are unable to add possible extra detailees for lack of information). The OST staff numbered over 20 staff. Special Projects funded at least a dozen or more White House staff. In short, over 275 staff should be added to our preliminary total of 554, making the Nixon White House staff in 1972 number well over 800 persons. (Even at this stage we are not in a position to finally account for all the facilities and back-up resources that enabled the White House to function as it did. This indirect aid undoubtedly ran into many more millions of dollars and many more hundreds of personnel.) At this point, however, we call a halt. Irrespective of such indirect aid (with which this study is not concerned), it is clear that a political definition of the Nixon White House staff in 1972 provides the necessary extra dimension that is lacking in all other definitions.

What holds this political definition together? Upon what principles rest our assertion that President Nixon's White House staff in 1972 comprised the elements which we have identified?

First, all these staff were the personal appointees of the President. This is certainly the position in theory. But such was the size of the White House staff by 1972 that it had become less true in the literal sense, even though it remained the basis of their existence. Most of Nixon's senior staff can be said to have been personally appointed by him. Those in receipt of a presidential commission were all officially presidential appointees. In other respects this was by no means always the case. In the Nixon White House a few senior staff had perforce acquired, in a presidentially approved delegation of power, the actual responsibility for the appointment of the vast majority of the political staff. Thus by 1972 the actual responsibility for appointing members of the NSC staff lay with
Kissinger, while Ehrlichman undertook a comparable task vis-a-vis the Domestic Council staff. H.R. Haldeman, in addition to his having been bequeathed an overall supervisory role, took special responsibility for the employment of staff in The White House Office. In practice, therefore, the White House staff were either the personal appointees of the President or of his senior staff.

Second, none of the staff we have identified required confirmation by the US Senate as a condition of their appointment. This fact immediately distinguishes all presidential White House staff from other personal appointees of the President; whether in the Cabinet departments or other agencies or elsewhere.

Third, the staff were subject entirely to presidential discretion in all aspects of their employment, irrespective of the provisions of law that governed employment elsewhere in government (the only, partial, exception in 1972 being the status of NSC staff).

Fourth, the extra sources of financial support identified as available to the President were subject entirely to presidential discretion. This fact distinguished them from other financial items in the EOP budget. This discretion extended to the Special Projects fund, the Emergency Fund, and the Expenses of Management Improvement fund. In practice it was exercised in 1972 by H.R. Haldeman on behalf of President Nixon. All these funds were used, in varying degrees, either to support existing White House staff or to finance the creation of new White House staff.

Fifth, the staff performed such personal and political work for the President as he alone determined. Although The White House Office and
the National Security Council are both statutory bodies, neither the staff employed under those headings nor any other part of the Nixon White House staff in 1972 had statutorily prescribed duties. President Nixon, like other Presidents, enjoyed complete control over the nature and purposes of the work undertaken by his White House staff.

Sixth, the staff served the personally preferred decision-making apparatus of the President. They were used by the President to organize, prepare and execute that category of decisions which it constitutionally falls to the President to decide entirely in his own way. Established within the EOP in 1972 were many advisory bodies to the Chief Executive. The White House staff represented the "inner" advisory ring, designed to serve the President. They were in this way distinguished from those comprising the "outer" advisory ring, intended primarily to serve the Presidency. If and when a President takes a direct personal interest in one of these "outer ring" bodies, to the extent that he incorporates it completely within his personally preferred decision-making apparatus, its staff thereupon are brought within the meaning of the term: the White House staff.

Seventh, the form and organization of the staff were entirely matters for the President alone to decide. This fact is in marked contrast to presidential influence in all other areas of government. President Nixon in 1972 had a completely free hand in regard to the structure of every part of his White House staff, beginning with The White House Office. This also applied to Special Projects staff, and to the Domestic Council and its staff, which owed its very creation to presidential fiat. Although the composition of the NSC is formally prescribed, the structure and organization of its staff are equally subject to presidential discretion.
Eighth, the staff identified included all those who were described by the then White House itself as members of the White House staff. It has been very rare for any White House to promulgate its own definition of the staff, but where it can be said to exist then it must be taken into account. (In the case of the Nixon White House it must be noted that the Nixon definition was many months old by 1972.)

Finally, the staff were all ultimately accountable to the President alone: the man and not the office. This is the vital element in the relationship between every President and his White House staff. The corollary is no less important. Their loyalty to the President outweighs their loyalty to the Presidency. However, such was the size of the staff by 1972 that this principle of accountability had in practice undergone substantial modification. The relationship of complete dependence upon, and accountability to, the President remained strongest at the senior staff level, where it carried a powerful personal connotation. The remainder of the staff were in practice more accountable to whichever senior staff member carried responsibility for supervising their work. Their accountability to the President thus operated indirectly at one or more steps removed.

These are the underlying principles that have enabled us to identify the White House staff of President Nixon in 1972. In combination these principles lead us to a definition of what we may call the political White House staff. It remains to add one further ingredient. Any workable definition must also include the non-political support staff.

They are easily defined. They are the secretaries and clerical assistants, the records and files staff, the correspondence clerks, and even the White House switchboard operators (who enjoy a formidable reputation for their
ability to track down whomsoever the President or his staff wish to speak to, no matter where around the globe they are to be found). By and large, the support staff survive changes of Presidency for the very reason that they are non-political. Yet they are not without political significance. Their contribution is by no means confined to providing an institutional memory in regard to administrative procedure. On the contrary, the very fact that they number in the hundreds is itself one measure of their ability to greatly assist the work that the political staff are able to do.

Most of the White House support staff are carried on the payroll of The White House Office, and were thus included in the Budget totals for WHO staff in 1972 to which we have already referred. Likewise a proportion of the Budget personnel totals for the NSC and Domestic Council staffs (though not for Special Projects or OST staff) also reflected the presence of non-political support staff. Broadly speaking the technical budgetary definitions thus take their existence satisfactorily into account. The 1972 figure of over 800 persons similarly does so. The point is worth making. The political definition of the White House staff used in this study therefore incorporates such non-political support staff as existed during the Presidency in question.

We are now able to make clear, by applying and translating these principles into successive historical contexts, whom we shall identify as "the White House staff" in the presidencies here under study. This can be done without unduly pre-empting an historical account of the growth of the staff.

When the White House staff were first established in 1939 by President Roosevelt they were all contained within the budgetary heading of The White House Office. For a short period the White House staff were synonymous
with The White House Office staff. But this soon began to change. In consequence The White House Office staff by themselves became a progressively smaller fraction of the White House staff. After 1940 the first expansion of the political definition of the staff occurred with the creation of the Emergency Fund, which by 1945 funded additional Roosevelt staff members.

The White House staff during the Truman Presidency continued to comprise these two elements to which, in 1947, was added a third: the National Security Council staff. Truman immediately made it clear that he intended the NSC to be a presidentially-run body. This was reflected in the physical location of its staff, which were moved from the Pentagon to the West Wing. It was also signalled by Truman’s initial decision that a Special Consultant from his WHO should serve as Executive Secretary of the NSC staff, and the listing of a subsequent Executive Secretary as a member of The White House Office. Finally, the use of detailed personnel began to grow during the Truman years, which counted as de facto staff.

President Eisenhower consolidated this hold on the NSC staff by appointing as its director a Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The use of detailed personnel also continued. But there were two new developments which enlarged the political definition of the White House staff. Firstly, there was the establishment in 1954 (in a supplemental appropriation act) of the Expenses of Management Improvement fund, which provided among other things money for the study of staff organization. Secondly, Special Projects was established in 1956. This was a major development, which provided additional funds and additional personnel for the White House staff.
The White House staff in the presidencies of both Kennedy and Johnson continued to comprise those elements bequeathed by President Eisenhower. The staff thus consisted of those employed in The White House Office; by Special Projects (of which there were large numbers in these years40); on the National Security Council staff; and finally those personnel detailed in respect of each. This latter category grew substantially. In addition there was available the financial resources of Emergency Fund and the Expenses of Management Improvement.

The political definition of the White House staff under President Nixon was expanded with the establishment in 1970 of the Domestic Council and its staff. They operated under the direction of the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs. All other elements of the staff continued in existence.

In the short period of the Ford Presidency the definition was contracted in two respects. Firstly, Special Projects was eliminated as a separate category (being subsumed within The White House Office). Secondly, the Expenses of Management Improvement fund similarly disappeared (into OMB). By the time President Ford left office the White House staff consisted of those serving in The White House Office and on the NSC and Domestic Council staffs. They continued to have available extra financial resources in the fund for Unanticipated Needs (the renamed Emergency Fund).

With the arrival of President Carter in 1977 the political definition of the staff once again changed. In Carter's reorganization of the EOP in October 1977 the Domestic Council and its staff were abolished, and The White House Office readjusted. Apart from WHO and NSC staffs the Carter White House staff subsequently consisted of those in the newly-created
Office of Administration and those working as members of the new Domestic Policy staff. The fund for Unanticipated Needs continued at Carter's disposal. President Reagan brought further changes in 1981 with the abolition of the Domestic Policy Staff and its (partial) replacement by a new Office of Policy Development. Within the White House in recent decades none have been subject to greater organizational mutation than the domestic affairs staff.

In conclusion, the problem of definition is not easily resolved. We have considered four different approaches to this question which we can summarize in this way. The legal definition may be academically interesting but has rarely had any practical relevance. The physical definition offers something to bear in mind but essentially amounts to no more than a curiosity. The technical definitions have a great deal in their favour, incorporating invaluable statistical and other basic information, but in themselves they inadequately embrace our subject. Only the political definition that builds upon these technical definitions by widening their area of application offers the best way forward. This emphasizes the extent to which the staff exists primarily to serve the President, as distinct from the Presidency. This enables us to take proper account of the growth, and diversity, of the White House staff that has taken place over the past forty years. Not subject to Senate confirmation, chosen only by the President or in his name, and working directly or indirectly for the presidential purpose, the White House staff inevitably work for the man first and the institution second.

Having thus argued the case for a political dimension in defining the White House staff, we can now re-consider in more detail what constitutes those technical definitions to whose existence we have already referred. What primary source material do we have to hand? How reliable is it? What problems may be involved in its interpretation?
THE PROBLEM OF PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL

There is a problem with primary source material on the White House staff. We have already discussed the question "who are the White House staff?" in our search for an adequate definition. We must now ask the same simple question in the context of primary source material. Who were the White House staff who worked for successive Presidents since 1939? What can we find out about them? What were their names? What were their staff titles? What work did they do? These are only the most elementary factual questions.

Many a study of politics encounters difficulties in connexion with primary source material, especially when the subject is American politics and the work is undertaken at a distance. But the problem pertaining to a study of the White House staff is of a different, and higher, order. One important price to be paid for having neglected the staff for so long has been simply that the most elementary information about them was never recorded in the first place. The White House itself now readily acknowledges this fact. In consequence there are considerable difficulties involved in the process of compiling a record of each President's staff. The research undertaken to this end in the present study represents the synthesis of all the available primary source material.

The problems encountered in handling this primary source material, being of the essence of this study, demand attention here. This examination is tackled in three self-explanatory stages. Firstly, we shall examine the general sources which are common to most presidencies. Secondly, we shall examine the more specific sources, which have a particular bearing on one Presidency only. Thirdly, under the heading of "Qualifications and Reservations" we shall more precisely delineate their limitations and the difficulties in their interpretation.
GENERAL SOURCES

There are several general sources of information available to aid the task of compiling as complete a record as possible of each President's White House staff. Some are of an official character; some semi-official or private. None are mutually exclusive, for they all overlap one with another in what they can tell us about the staff. This fact alone implies that none of these sources are definitive in themselves, which is indeed the case. However, they can be loosely divided into two groups: those that contribute information on the senior staff, and those that contribute more general statistical information.

Firstly, there is the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL. The Foreword to this publication says it is "the official handbook of the Federal Government....describing the agencies of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches." It is published annually, usually in June or July, by the Office of the Federal Register (National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration). Technically the MANUAL is a special edition of the FEDERAL REGISTER, pursuant to federal regulations. The MANUAL provides the names and job titles of senior, commissioned, White House Office staff. In personal correspondence with this writer the Deputy Director (Presidential and Legislative Division) of the Office of the Federal Register explained the basis on which their choice of names is made:

"The list of White House staff included in the US Government Manual is made available to the Manual staff by the White House Personnel Office."
"Each of the Federal agencies included in the Manual makes the determination of which positions will be included in the top personnel listings submitted." 44

Secondly, there is the CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY. This is another official publication, compiled under the direction of the US Congress Joint Committee on Printing, and is therefore congressionally sponsored. It, too, is published annually, although not at the same time as the MANUAL. The DIRECTORY usually appears in March at the beginning of a new Congress, and in January at the beginning of a new session. The DIRECTORY also provides the names of the senior members of the White House staff together with their job titles. The following extract from a letter by the DIRECTORY'S Publications Director makes clear on what basis their selection is made:

"Specially, where White House personnel is concerned, this Committee deals directly with the White House personnel officer. That particular office decides the number of people who shall be listed. I do not know what criteria are used although I do know the list is composed principally of Presidential appointments and those are the people closest to the President." 46

Thirdly, there is the CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY. Unlike the two preceding publications the STAFF DIRECTORY is privately published, and dates only from 1959. It contains a similar range of information to these two others but is arranged in a different manner. It is published annually,
most often in or around April of each year. As to the principle for
inclusion on which the STAFF DIRECTORY operates, the Editor-Publisher in
answer to this writer replied that

"the listing of the White House, as many of the other listings
in the book, are just as the Department or Agency furnishes
them in view of the interest our users have in their respective unit." 48

Thus the position is clear. All three publications operate on exactly the
same principles and methods in printing their lists of White House staff.
They all print whatever names and titles are made available to them by the
White House Personnel Office. And yet, as we shall shortly see, their res­
pective lists are by no means identical.

Fourthly, there are such publications as the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
WEEKLY REPORT together with its annual counterpart, the CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY ALMANAC, and the NATIONAL JOURNAL. The WEEKLY REPORT, although
privately published, is an authoritative guide to events and developments
of various kinds. As its title implies, the WEEKLY REPORT concentrates
mainly on Congress; yet periodical interest is taken in members of the
President's White House staff, especially his congressional liaison staff.
Occasionally it provides its own, rather haphazard, listing of the senior
staff. The NATIONAL JOURNAL by contrast concentrates more on the adminis­
trative side of the Presidency. The CQ ALMANAC has since the 1960s devel­
oped an interest in, and provided crude statistics on, certain features of
the White House staff; for example, on staff turnover. Generally speaking,
however, its attention is limited to what it considers to be the most senior
staff members, in which categorization it does not rely only on official
White House sources. The resulting selectivity is unfortunately not
matched by any clear and consistent guide to CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S own criteria in listing the senior staff; whom it includes and whom it leaves out. Neither does it adopt a straightforward approach to staff titles, which often tend to be invented by CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY to convey a better sense of staff members' responsibilities.

Fifthly, there is the United States Budget. This is a source of much detailed information on every Presidency. Although it has never provided the names of the White House staff nor (in recent years) their staff titles, it does provide crude figures for the overall size and cost of the White House staff. Published annually, the US Budget has progressively become available in a variety of forms of which the US Budget Appendix is the most useful for the purposes of this study. Despite the caution with which US Budget figures should be treated (see infra) it is a source of information of a kind that is obtainable nowhere else.

In what major respects is this so? First, it provides an overall figure for the numbers of personnel employed under the appropriation for The White House Office, the National Security Council and the Domestic Council. Second, it provides a comparable figure for overall cost. Third, it provides a breakdown of salary levels for the senior and middle-level staff by giving salary grades and their accompanying salary ranges. Fourth, it provides on occasion the number of 'ungraded' personnel (which are political staff) although the relation to salary grades has never been given. Fifth, it provides a breakdown of costs by broad function. For example, this gives some clue to the amount spent on staff travel, on printing and reproduction costs, on supplies and materials, equipment, and several other items. Such information can on occasion be very useful. Separate from the Budget, but intimately connected with it, are the hearings held before the congressional appropriations subcommittees that supervise presidential requests for White
House staff. Historically they have rarely produced any worthwhile additional information on the staff. However, partly as a result of Watergate, it must be said that recent such hearings have indeed become an occasion for the publication of hitherto unpublished material of great value.

This concludes the group of general sources. They have at least one merit: that of regular publication. This provides the researcher with at least the possibility of drawing legitimate comparisons between presidencies. The same cannot be said of more specific sources, although their merits may lie elsewhere.

SPECIFIC SOURCES

Specific sources of information on each President's White House staff are generally available but the quality of the information obtained varies greatly. Past neglect of the White House staff as an object of academic research has been well reflected in the general unavailability of information from presidential libraries, despite the 20thC tendency for Presidents to establish these pyramid-like monuments expressly to house every scrap of paper relating to their presidential years.48a

This pattern is set by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, whose Director wrote to this writer that "unfortunately, no complete list exists which would give you the names and positions of all those who worked on President Roosevelt's staff".49 Unlike some others, the Roosevelt Library has managed to produce two partial listings. Firstly, two detailed wall charts were compiled showing the organization of the White House: one depicting 1937,50 and the other 1942. Together they show the impact of the
establishment of The White House Office in 1939. Secondly, a report was prepared in 1943, with the President's approval, entitled The White House Executive Office: Its Functions and Records. This latter proved to be less a complete listing of White House staff than a guide to their papers and records as deposited in the Library.

The Harry S. Truman Library, by contrast, can be credited with the most serious attempt at listing the White House staff who served under President Truman. Two lists were in fact produced. First was a simple alphabetical listing of staff, whether political or clerical, who worked in The White House Office 1945 - 53. It listed their names, their staff titles, and their dates of service where appropriate. The second list issued related to the "professional staff" only and was arranged functionally by job title. This is particularly useful because it not only gives the names of many middle-level White House staff but also reveals which were assigned to which senior staff. Furthermore it contains many names unaccountably missing from the other list, and provides invaluable information on the names of personnel detailed to work at the White House together with their department or agency of origin. Comparable information on other presidencies is not available until the Nixon years.

The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library has been unable to match the efforts of its predecessor. "We regret to inform you," wrote the Director, "that we have no complete compilation of these names (of White House staff) available". In its place the Library has available a privately published publication entitled the White House Staff Book 1953-61. By no means a comprehensive guide to the White House staff under President Eisenhower, it contains brief biographical sketches of most senior staff members, which in some cases reveals names and staff titles not previously listed elsewhere in official sources. But this list fails to include all the commissioned
The impetus for the release of this one document derived from the parallel attempt to rearrange the way in which the US Budget presented its own statistical figures on the same subject. But there was no follow-up by the Nixon White House, whose efforts began and ended in April 1971.

As of this writing the prospects of a Gerald R. Ford Library are uncertain. However, irrespective of whatever information on Ford's White House staff that may or may not become available from such a quarter, the Ford White House does deserve credit for breaking new ground while in office. In December 1974 the Office of the White House Press Secretary released a series of background press releases on President Ford's White House staff. This went several steps further than the only previous precedent of 1971. First, while containing the names and staff titles of staff members, it also included an outline of the general principles upon which the Ford staff were to operate. Second, the Ford White House released the transcript of a briefing on this subject given by the Assistant to the President in overall charge of implementing such principles. This press briefing, for background use only, was nevertheless the first time that any President had allowed an open discussion on the role and purpose of his White House staff. It was with justification that the Staff Secretary stated in a letter to this writer: "To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that information of this type has been released".56

In conclusion, such specific sources of primary information as have been outlined can in certain cases provide valuable additional information on the White House staff of a particular President. But its varying quality taken as a whole precludes its use as more than a supplementary back-up to the regular sources earlier outlined. It is to these that we now return as we discuss the caveats that must be entered here about their usage.
QUALIFICATIONS AND RESERVATIONS

The principal primary sources of information, of both general and specific application, that we have introduced are those upon which the student researching this subject is forced to rely. But it is the degree to which these sources are properly handled that determines the success of any attempt to construct a comprehensive and accurate picture of each President's White House staff. There are several pitfalls of interpretation to be avoided in their handling. The reliability of some of these sources must therefore be further examined. They all will be found to suffer from an incompleteness, even within their own terms of reference. This is perhaps best illustrated by considering some of the many respects in which this is true.

First, the US GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL, CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, and CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY are all subject to the risk that their published lists will be incomplete. A member of the White House staff who serves for any length of time less than the (usually) one year interval between the dates of their successive publication could well escape inclusion in any published list. An important example of such an omission occurring can be found in the Nixon Administration. John Connally, who had served President Nixon as Secretary of the Treasury in 1971, returned in 1973 to serve on the White House staff as a Special Advisor. He did not, as it happened, stay very long: only a matter of months. However, the fact of his presence on the staff completely escaped mention in the CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY. Another example can be found in the Kennedy Administration. No mention was ever made by any of these three publications of the fact that Chester Bowles served on the Kennedy staff in 1961-2 before leaving for India as Ambassador. Another series of examples can be found
in the period after the Kennedy assassination. For varying periods of up to several months most members of the former President's White House staff stayed on to help the new President. Some stayed longer than others, with those who had been closest to Kennedy not unnaturally among the first to leave. However, the ORGANIZATION MANUAL and the CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY make no mention of Sorensen, Schlesinger or even Salinger (the first of Johnson's four Press Secretaries) as ever having served on the Johnson White House staff at all.

Second, the ORGANIZATION MANUAL, DIRECTORY, and STAFF DIRECTORY lists draw only upon those members of the staff who are paid out of the official fund: "White House Office - Salaries and Expenses". They only provide a list of WHO names, and leave out all those others whose source(s) of compensation may lie elsewhere. For example, we know that over a period of many years many members of the staff were in fact being paid by the Special Projects fund or were listed as ungraded. Both the President's Science Advisor and his Water Resources Advisor, and their staffs, were paid out of Special Projects as far back as the Eisenhower Administration. One prominent example of a Nixon staff member not listed in the ORGANIZATION MANUAL or its counterparts, but who in fact served on the staff from 1969 onwards, was Alexander Haig. He was chosen by Kissinger soon after January 1969 to act as his deputy, although not paid from White House Office funds.

Occasionally a person has been appointed by a President as an advisor - though not to The White House Office staff as such. One such example was the appointment of Dr. Eric F. Goldman by President Johnson as co-ordinator of a program "to channel the nation's best thinking" to the President.
For all practical purposes Goldman was for a while a member of the White House staff (where he worked as Johnson's equivalent of Kennedy's Schlesinger). As such, Goldman was accepted as a staff member by CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, which listed him more than once as a key member of the staff. But neither the ORGANIZATION MANUAL, DIRECTORY, nor STAFF DIRECTORY make any mention of Goldman whatsoever.

Third, certain publications have on occasion listed as members of a President's White House staff persons who were not officially on the pay-roll of The White House Office, but were paid from other funds. This is the reverse circumstance of the above, and it only emphasizes the fact that no definition of the staff can afford to depend entirely on any one source of information.

Examples can be drawn from the Nixon Presidency among others. In 1973 the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and General Government asked for and received a list of the names and positions of personnel then currently being funded by the Special Projects fund. This list was subsequently printed in the hearings. Included were the following: Charles DiBona, a Special Consultant; Virginia Knauer, a Special Assistant; and Kenneth Cole Jr., the Executive Director of the Domestic Council, and John Ehrlichman's deputy. The first two, DiBona and Knauer, were both listed in the ORGANIZATION MANUAL, DIRECTORY and STAFF DIRECTORY as members of The White House Office staff. Technically neither should have been so listed as neither were paid from White House Office funds. And yet, in the political sense, it is true to say they were all members of the White House staff.

Fourth, it must be emphasized that information obtained from United States Budgets on the White House staff must be treated with considerable caution.
It can present a considerably misleading impression of the true size and cost of the staff. We should first examine how this should be so before discussing the reasons why.

Consider that item in the US Budget entitled: "The White House Office - Salaries and Expenses". Over the years there were allowed to develop considerable discrepancies between official figures as to its size and cost and actual fact. While The White House Office staff grew in size and cost most of this growth was concealed elsewhere than in the official figures given in successive US Budgets. At times such discrepancies became very large indeed. For example, by 1970 the official figures for the cost of The White House Office reflected only about two-fifths of the actual cost. This was because they only represented about two-fifths of the staff actually employed. According to the White House itself, of the 576 members of The White House Office staff in 1970 only 208 were officially recorded under the appropriate heading in the US Budget for that year.

Twice since 1939, in FY 1947 and FY 1971, major attempts were made to make official US Budget figures reflect more honestly the actual numbers and cost of White House personnel. But it must be said that neither attempt was completely successful. Certainly, in the absence of a sustained follow-through, in neither case did it take long for discrepancies once more to reappear. These discrepancies were due to several factors: among them the increased use of detailed personnel, who were carried on payrolls of a variety of departments and agencies; and the increased use of the so-called 'ungraded' category for political staff.

But none of this exactly explains why such loopholes were allowed to characterize official US Budget accounts. The answer, when you dig deeper,
is simply that the White House was never required either to keep precise records or to publish them. In the absence of pressure to do either it should not be surprising that there was an equal absence of pressure to prevent these many discrepancies from appearing. On the contrary they served a very useful purpose. They successfully helped to shield the staff from what otherwise might have been a greater interest in its rate of growth and the reasons for it. However unintentionally, successive Administrations acquiesced in the progressive distortion of official statistics as reported in US Budgets. The student in this field must be alert to the consequences of such acquiescence.

Fifth, no source of information on the staff has ever taken into regular consideration the practice known as "detailing". Although certain persons are carried officially on the payrolls of various government departments and agencies they can be detailed to work full-time for the White House, and thereby become de facto staff members. This practice has been so long established that it well predates the appearance of The White House Office itself. It gradually became more and more prevalent until by the end of the Johnson Administration approximately half those working on the President's staff were detailed personnel. Yet nowhere has there been available a list of those on detail. US Budget figures in this connexion mislead rather than inform. Only in the 1970s has there been any official divulging of the numbers detailed to work for the White House. The names of such persons have been produced by the Administration for the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees, although not on a regular basis.64 It is from one such list that an example can be found of the kind of person prone to be excluded except through these means. J. Fred Buzhardt,65 who served President Nixon in the Office of Special Counsel, was a prominent
staff member during 1973-74. But as he was on detail to the White House his name did not, for some time, appear in the ORGANIZATION MANUAL or the CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY. 66

Sixth, all published listings of the White House staff by name exclude those who are "ungraded personnel". These often remain the most anonymous part of a President's staff. Records of even the numbers of ungraded personnel are not regularly kept. This was made clear in correspondence between the Chairman of the US Civil Service Commission and the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee. In a letter from the Chairman, Robert E. Hampton, to congressman Morris K. Udall, a senior committee member, dated 15th February 1972, he admitted that "some of the information requested (by Udall) is not available". He continued: "The information we maintain on these positions has been a function largely of our anticipated needs for data and our available resources. Although the records kept have varied over the years....we have generally tried to keep our records to a minimum". 67

Historically, the ungraded staff positions were restricted to, and used primarily for, the non-political housekeeping functions associated with the Executive Residence. But the advent of the Nixon Administration witnessed a significant change in the use of ungraded positions. For the first time on a large scale many high-level policy employees were taken on board and classified anonymously as ungraded personnel. No better reflection of this anonymity was the surprise expressed by many political figures, and commentators, that so many of those involved in Watergate had at one time served on the White House staff. In the case of E. Howard Hunt even the White House itself didn't realise that he had been on the payroll. 68 A more normal example of the kind of policy employee employed
under the "ungraded" heading was Kenneth W. Clawson. He held the title of Executive Director of the Office of Communication (at a salary of $40,000 p.a., only slightly below the top salary rate) and was a significant member of the middle-ranking Nixon White House staff.

Seventh, all regular sources leave out of account middle-ranking members of the staff. This applies both to the ORGANIZATION MANUAL on the one hand and the US Budgets on the other. Middle-ranking staff are neither the top few dozen, as named by the ORGANIZATION MANUAL, nor the general collection of clerical and secretarial support staff that predominate as nameless figures in the US Budget. The importance of these middle-ranking staff members has grown in proportion to the expanding size of presidential staffs. For this reason it is from the Johnson-Nixon period that the most prominent examples can be found of middle-ranking staff who normally escaped inclusion in an officially published list.

One such example is Larry Higby, who served under H.R. Haldeman as his principal deputy (and indeed was popularly known as "Haldeman's Haldeman") during the entire period 1969-73 that Haldeman himself was on the Nixon staff. Higby's name never once appeared on any list of the ORGANIZATION MANUAL during these years, while on the DIRECTORY or STAFF DIRECTORY lists his name did not finally appear until after Haldeman's departure in 1973. Similar examples emerge from the Johnson years. Nowhere in any listing of President Johnson's staff will you find mention of the fact that Jim Moyers (brother of Bill) worked as an Administrative Assistant, or that Hayes Redmon worked as an assistant to Bill Moyers.

The magnitude of this problem becomes more evident with further research. There have been many other middle-ranking staff whose "passion for anonymity" was not so much volunteered by them as enforced. For example,
none of the following - Albert Cantril, William Blackburn, Charles Maguire, Jon Robson, James Gunther, Fred Bohen, William Graham, Martin Nimitz, Stan Ross, Ben Wattenberg, Ervin Duggan or Thomas Cronin - ever appeared in any listing of the Johnson White House. Yet they all served on the Johnson domestic policy staff. All such persons were clearly involved in political work and should certainly be counted as proper members of the White House staff.

Eighth, in all sources there are other omissions, related to the above, which impede our understanding of the structure of a President's White House staff. No regular listing of any presidential staff has ever revealed the names or the numbers of middle-ranking staff assigned to work for individual senior staff. These omissions have increased in relevance as the staff have grown in the 1960s and 1970s. They bear directly on the structure and organization of the staff. In the case of a White House staff system clearly organized on hierarchical lines, such as those of Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon, it is occasionally possible to infer, from the ORGANIZATION MANUAL lists, which middle-ranking staff may have been assigned to which senior staff. From this we can infer the relative importance with which certain functional areas of staff operations may thereby have been regarded. But such inferences fall short of unassailable judgement in the absence of corroborative evidence from elsewhere.

The White House staff lists prepared, retrospectively, by the Harry S. Truman Library are unique in providing clear indications on this score. The fact remains, however, that such assignations of middle-ranking staff were never provided during the lifetime of the Truman Presidency itself. It was in this respect that the Nixon Administration must be credited with breaking new ground. In the White House Staff List which it released in
April 1971 it did reveal which middle-rank staff were apportioned among which senior staff offices. A comparable exercise by President Ford in December 1974 was more limited in this respect. We must conclude that these examples of enlightenment have been isolated cases and exceptions to the rule.

The rule has been that such matters are covered by a veil of secrecy. For example, in the case of those above referred to who worked on the Johnson domestic policy staff, it was never officially acknowledged which of them worked principally for Bill Moyers, Harry McPherson, Joseph Califano, or Douglass Cater. Similar omissions characterized the Nixon years. For example, in January 1969 President Nixon appointed Arthur Burns to his White House staff as a Counsellor (a brand new staff title with hitherto unprecedented Cabinet rank), and Robert Ellsworth as an Assistant to the President. These two appointments occupied the first two positions in the official rankings and were published as such by the CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY. But no mention was made of the fact that Burns was assisted by Wesley McCain; nor that Ellsworth was likewise assisted by Daniel Hofgren and Jonathan Rose. They escaped official mention. But the confusion is only enhanced by the fact that other middle-level staff assistants to these two men were published. Eventually, in the case of Rose, his existence did surface. But more often than not this never happened: for example, in the case of Patrick Anderson, who worked as a junior-level speechwriter in the Kennedy White House; or Tex Lazar, who worked for one of Nixon’s top speechwriters Ray Price.

Ninth, and finally, there can be no guarantee whatsoever that any primary source of information of any kind or in any combination can yield an
absolutely accurate guide to the White House staff of any President in the years 1939-77. Accurate records were never required to be kept and as a result none ever were. It cannot be emphasized enough that no White House has ever published a complete list of the names, titles, job descriptions, or salaries of all persons serving on the White House staff. In this connexion, as the Publications Director of the CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY pointed out, "I have inquired at various times whether or not the White House Press Office publishes a list of all White House staff. At all times I have been advised that they do not". In this respect at least, a large part of the staff have had their passion for anonymity successfully retained.

THE PROBLEM OF PROPER AUTHORITY

In this third part we turn to consider the problem of proper authority for the White House staff. We have seen that a political definition of the staff leads us to a better understanding of how extensive that staff have become. One question that now arises is the basis upon which its multifarious aspects have come into existence. Upon what claim to proper authority has each part of the White House staff relied?

This has hitherto been a completely neglected area of concern in writings on the White House staff. So far we have but lightly touched upon it during our consideration of the legal definition. Have the staff grown on a sound legal basis? The evidence suggests quite the reverse. For nearly forty years the staff's growth was a legal hotchpotch of amalgamated
parts. In the following pages we illustrate their variety and trace their historical origins and usage. The problem of proper authority is inextricably bound up with a major theme of this study: the accountability of power. By here considering the staff in the context of their supposed proper authority we lay essential groundwork for our later discussion.

The White House staff have historically drawn upon several different kinds of authority for their collective existence. This final section of the chapter (which was written from the perspective of 1978) concentrates on the near forty-year period between Roosevelt's creation of the staff in the late 1930's and Jimmy Carter's arrival in the later 1970's. During that period we can identify four kinds of authorization that had been used to sustain the White House staff.

Firstly, we shall examine the permanent statutory authority that remained in force throughout the whole of this period. Secondly, we shall consider such other pertinent authority as has existed with a bearing on the staff. Thirdly, we shall itemize the annual legislatively-based authorizations under the auspices of which the vast majority of the staff were routinely authorized en bloc and which remained the presumed and accepted basis of authorization until well into the Carter Presidency. Fourthly, we will briefly examine and evaluate proposals that had emerged by 1978 for conferring a proper new authorization for the White House staff. We begin, however, with an examination of the permanent statutory authority that accumulated over the years since the formal establishment of the White House staff in 1939.
Permanent statutory authority for The White House Office staff is principally to be found in Title 3 of the United States Code, under the generic heading "Office and Compensation of the President." Three subsections from this title constitute the main provisions currently governing the employment of staff. The first of these is headed "Compensation of secretaries and executive, administrative, and staff assistants to President". It reads thus:

3 USC 105

The President is authorized to fix the compensation of the six administrative assistants authorized to be appointed under section 106 of this title, of the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, of the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, of the Executive Secretary of the Economic Opportunity Council, and of eight other secretaries or immediate staff assistants in the White House Office at rates of basic compensation not to exceed that of level II of the Federal Executive Salary Schedule.

The President is therefore authorized to employ a total of 17 assistants, 9 of which are designated by title (including the 6 Administrative Assistants). This motley collection of staff assistants, singled out for what seems like special attention, in fact reflects nothing more than the last date upon which this subsection was (somewhat haphazardly) updated during the Johnson Presidency. In 1964 Johnson sponsored a measure (Public Law 88-426) which repealed pay distinctions among the top fourteen staff positions. In so doing, permanent authorization
was also given for one or two other staff positions that just happened to be extant at that time, such as the Executive Secretary of the Economic Opportunity Council. Subsequently, however, this subsection was not updated to take into account the enormously changed nature of White House staff positions. For example, some of the staff positions here referred to had completely disappeared by the Nixon Administration in the 1970s. Countless more had been invented.

The second subsection is headed "Administrative Assistants". This first appeared back in 1939 and refers to the original Administrative Assistants granted to President Roosevelt. It reads:

3 USC 106

The President is authorized to appoint not to exceed six administrative assistants and to fix their compensation in accordance with section 105 of this title. Each such administrative assistant shall perform such duties as the President may prescribe.83

Like the previous subsection (with which there is a degree of overlap), this one too was completely out of touch with reality by the 1970s. The staff position of Administrative Assistant was last used regularly by President Johnson,84 while this last direct link with the nomenclature of the original White House Office staff of 1939 was finally broken when President Nixon discontinued this title for his senior staff.85

The third subsection refers to a practice which has certainly not been discontinued. It is headed "Detail of employees of executive departments to office of President" and reads as follows:
3 USC 107

Employees of the executive departments and independent establishments of the executive branch of the Government may be detailed from time to time to the White House Office for temporary assistance.86

This subsection stands out, alone among the others, in having retained its relevance throughout these last forty years. Despite occasional attempts, of varying intensity, to reduce the numbers of detailed personnel, every single President has made use of them. In so doing all Presidents have invoked 3 USC 107 as sufficient justification. However, we shall later discuss the degree to which the authorization provided here has been breached, in spirit if not in practice.

Apart from these three principal subsections there are in addition several others of subsidiary relevance. For example, a related provision to 3 USC 107, to be found under Title 5, confers the right of cabinet and agency heads to retain the services of experts or consultants for government purposes. This includes any subsequent detail to the White House. The relevant part of the US Code, under the heading "Employment of experts and consultants: temporary or intermittent", is as follows:

5 USC 3109

(b) When authorized by an appropriation or other statute, the head of an agency may procure by contract the temporary (not in excess of 1 year) or intermittent services of experts or consultants or an organization thereof, including stenographic reporting services.
However, an agency may pay a rate for services under this section in excess of the highest rate payable only when specifically authorized by the appropriation or other statute authorizing the procurement of the services. 87

5 USC 3109 was included among a listing of the statutory authority that the Nixon Administration considered applicable to the authorization of The White House Office. 88 Consultants appointed under this subsection have in turn been detailed to work for the White House. One interesting feature of this subsection is that the restrictions placed on cabinet and agency heads in the matter of hiring consultants appear to be stricter than those that apply to the White House. The provisions of 3 USC 107, as noted, confer a wider measure of discretion upon the President or his staff. For example, 3 USC 107 has no one-year time limit, as there is here, on the procurement of consultants to the White House staff.

One subsection of Title 3 relating to the President which does not, on the surface, appear to apply to the White House staff is that entitled "Travelling Expenses". The wording is as follows:

3 USC 103

There may be expended for or on account of the travelling expenses of the President of the United States such sum as Congress may from time to time appropriate, not exceeding $100,000 per annum, such sum when appropriated to be expended in the discretion of the President and accounted for on his certificate solely. 89 (author's emphasis)
Any President does of course travel a great deal, irrespective of the year in question. How exactly such travel should be, or is, paid for has always been a matter for discussion, and, in campaign years, for argument.\textsuperscript{90} The figure of $100,000 p.a. here referred to is certainly notional,\textsuperscript{91} in that the true costs (which themselves can never be accurately determined) are far greater. The constitutional position of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces guarantees that, in theory as well as in practice, the costs as well as the practical arrangements of presidential travel should primarily be borne, directly or indirectly, by the Department of Defense. In such circumstances the relevance of the underlined phrase is that 3 USC 103 has been taken by recent Administrations to justify the provision of travelling expenses for the President's White House staff. This was the position implicitly taken by the Nixon Administration before a congressional appropriations sub-committee of the House of Representatives in 1974.\textsuperscript{92}

The Ford Administration took the same view. In a similar hearing before the equivalent subcommittee on the Senate side in 1975, the Administration witness asserted that the fund for presidential travel was actually intended to cover "the expenses of staff members travelling with the President in their official duties as staff."\textsuperscript{93} Yet it is of interest to note that elsewhere, in the detailed provisions for The White House Office in successive US Budgets, there are to be found two other items relating to staff travel. These are entitled "Travel and Transportation of Persons" and "Transportation of Things". In FY 1977 these two accounted for $195,000\textsuperscript{94} — nearly double that of the euphemistically termed "President's Travel". This latter's new interpretation well illustrates the way in which authority for the staff has been surreptitiously expanded; in this case, in the absence of a properly defined statutory provision for staff travelling expenses.
We turn now to sections of the US Code of more marginal relevance. That headed "Restrictions on purchase, operation, use and maintenance of passenger motor vehicles and aircraft" is included here in view of President Carter's new guidelines to his own staff upon his arrival in office. The subsection reads thus:

31 USC 638a

(a) Purchase or hire of vehicles
Unless specifically authorized by the appropriation concerned or other law, no appropriation shall be expended to purchase or hire passenger motor vehicles for any branch of the Government other than those for the use of the President of the United States, the secretaries to the President, or the heads of the executive departments enumerated in section 101 of Title 5.

The exact date of the drafting of this subsection is not known, but its reference to "the secretaries to the President" would appear to make it at least twenty-five years old. The staff position of Secretary to the President did survive into the Eisenhower Administration, but the last time there were several "secretaries" was further back still, in the Truman Presidency. The relevance of this subsection to modern experience is simply this: in terms of proper authorization, most if not all of the White House staff who have enjoyed the benefits of chauffer-driven cars during the last two decades have done so improperly. This practice reached its height in the Nixon years, with more staff being chauffer-driven than ever before, and sheer force of momentum carried it on through the Ford Presidency. However improper, it still persists. Although President Carter made it one of his earliest directives that no member of his White House staff should have the services of a limousine, this rule has since been relaxed.
This exhausts those parts of the US Code that pertain to the permanent statutory authority of the White House staff. Yet there is one further item that we should not overlook. Section 3101 of Title 5 does contain permanent legislation conferring general authorization for all executive agencies to employ such number of employees as the Congress may appropriate from year to year. Such employees are subject to the provisions of Title 5 relating to the classification of positions and the fixing of pay under the General Schedule.98

At first glance it might be thought that Section 3101 does in fact provide all the necessary permanent authorization for staff in The White House Office, if considered as an executive agency. But there are three arguments which refute this impression. First, the classification of positions for the staff is, as we have seen, completely out of date. Senior members of the staff are anyway not subject to the General Schedule but to the Executive Schedule. Add to that the fact that Section 3101 does not in any case cover those staff currently listed as 'ungraded' (see infra), and it is clear that this section cannot suffice as overall permanent authority. Second, no President has ever sought to justify the status of The White House Office, or other staff bodies, under the provisions of Section 3101 of Title 5. Third, recent Administrations have in fact admitted that the current position as regards authorization is untenable and quite inadequate.99 In these circumstances, therefore, no serious case can be made for Section 3101 as embodying permanent statutory authority for the White House staff.

On the contrary, it does nothing to remedy the problem of proper authorization. The extent of this problem is by now becoming more clear. The authority for the staff that we have already examined is far from
comprehensive and mostly out of date. Obviously the White House staff
must have been able, somehow or other, to grow and develop despite its
inadequate basis in statutory law. We now turn to consider what other
authority existed and whether or not it has been sufficient.

OTHER PERTINENT AUTHORITY

What other pertinent authority exists, or has existed, for the White House
staff? The answer appears not, at first sight, to be a great deal. Apart
from the position of the NSC staff, such authority in relation to the staff
bears less on their justification for existence than on their behaviour. In
this latter context we will consider the permissible political activity of
staff, and the delegation of powers to the staff.

We begin this section, however, with what can only be described as an
historical curiosity in the life of the White House staff. It arose from
a presidential Executive Order issued by President Nixon early in 1969.
The text ran as follows:

EO 11456

Section 1 There shall be in the
White House Office a
Special Assistant to the President
for Liaison with former Presidents.

Section 6 (a) The compensation and
expenses of the Special
Assistant and members of his staff
shall be paid from the appropriation
under the heading "Special" in the
Executive Office Appropriation Act
1969, or any corresponding approp-
riation which may be made for sub-
sequent fiscal years, or from such
other appropriated funds as may be
available under law. 100
On no other occasion has one position on the White House staff been established in this way. Although also created by Executive Order, The White House Office and the Domestic Council were, by contrast, groups of persons. This particular authorization for a Special Assistant first lapsed with the death of former President Johnson in January 1973. It was resurrected with Nixon's resignation in 1974 and strengthened with Ford's defeat in 1976.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The position of the National Security Council and its staff has always differed from other parts of the White House staff. This stems from the fact that the NSC was first established by congressional legislation rather than by administrative enactment. The NSC was formally established pursuant to Public Law 253 in July 1947. By virtue of Reorganization Plan No. 4, effective on August 20th 1949, the NSC was placed in the Executive Office of the President. Appropriations for the NSC have been straightforward. For example: "For expenses necessary for the National Security Council, including services authorized by 5 USC 3109..." The NSC staff have therefore derived their authorization directly from statute, unlike the rest of the White House staff.

POLITICAL ACTIVITY

The extent to which the White House staff are authorized to become involved in political activity has always been an unresolved question.
Obviously their very existence is a political fact and their work is political whatever task they perform for their President. Yet there are, predictably enough, arguments over the staff's proper political role in election years, especially in presidential election years. The most recent round was fought out in 1976.

An important step in the direction of an impartial civil service was the passage of the Hatch Act in 1939 (co-incidentally the year of the official establishment of the White House staff). This act restricted the rights of federal employees to fully engage in partisan politics. The Supreme Court ruled in 1973 that "the political influence of federal employees on others and on the electoral process should be limited." Because of the special nature of the White House staff the exact applicability of those parts of the Hatch Act which limit political involvement has never been entirely clear. Some participation in limited political activities has been generally accepted and allowed. For example, employees "paid from the appropriation for the office of the President" are exempted by 5 USC 7324(d)(1) from the general prohibition contained in 5 USC 7324(a)(2) against executive branch employees participating in "political management or in political campaigns". The Counsel to President Ford, Philip W. Buchen, interpreted this to mean that it "effectively places the White House staff in a position comparable to that of the personal staffs of members of Congress." 

Yet the fact remains that no precise dividing line now exists even for senatorial staff. As to presidential staff, no such line is likely to be drawn which clearly indicates when such employees are performing official duties and when those duties are political.
This problem has now been heightened by the new campaign spending legis­
lation which governs presidential elections. For example, how is one to apportion the costs of presidential travel during a presidential election campaign year? Whenever a President travels, and regardless of the purpose of any particular trip, he is accompanied by a number of persons. These include political aides from the White House staff, to­
gether with speechwriters, operations staff and others. The most recent instance of such a situation, in 1976, produced a ruling from the General Counsel of the FEC to the effect that "expenses for accompanying staff personnel will be charged...(to the appropriate political committee)...only if such staff personnel serve primarily as advance persons or other campaign staff members and do not provide support services to the Office of the President." The loophole in this language was subtle. The term "Office of the President" has no statutory meaning except insofar as it relates to the person of the President alone. Although its use here obviously implied more than that, it laid down no clear dividing line between White House staff who were necessary to support the "Office of the President" and those who were not.

DELEGATION OF POWERS

The statutory authority of the White House staff should be placed in the wider context of the statutory powers to which they are entitled. Such powers are in theory strictly limited. Under the provisions of the McCormack Act (1951) the President is implicitly debarred from making formal delegations of responsibility for his statutory functions to members of his White House staff. The McCormack Act authorizes the
President to delegate statutory functions, without relieving himself of responsibility for their proper performance, to the head of a department or agency, or any other official of the executive branch whose appointment is confirmed by the Senate. Such delegations must be in writing and published in the Federal Register.\textsuperscript{107}

The Act was passed primarily because no-one wanted the burden of the Presidency to be one of clerical tasks and paper shuffling. The authority conferred by the McCormack Act was intended to apply to routine functions and provides no authority to delegate what can be termed constitutional functions. The legislative history clearly indicated that the bill was designed to relieve the President from performing functions which did not have "any reasonable claim upon his time or attention".\textsuperscript{108} Whatever the nature of the relief thus afforded the President, his White House staff were to play no official part in its execution.

We have now covered the permanent statutory authority currently in force for the White House staff. The problem that we have immediately identified is simple. This authority is quite obviously insufficient to support the modern White House staff of today. This leads us to an equally simple question. How was the staff able to grow and develop for forty years in the absence of permanent statutory authority for the vast majority of its members? It cannot be pretended that this growth went magically unnoticed. It did not. But on what grounds was it justified? Such grounds must have been based on another form of authority to that hitherto considered. This alternative legitimacy merits full investigation.
ANNUAL LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

The principal grounds on which authority for the White House staff was historically based, or what until at least the 1970's were presumed to be the legitimate grounds, derived from the language of annual appropriation acts encompassing the staff. In such legislation the White House staff were not dealt with en bloc but in separate parts (all contained under the umbrella heading of the Executive Office of the President). Those parts which concern us here are those which, over time, together made up (or contributed towards) our political definition of the White House staff. Certain of these constituent elements of the staff repay closer examination as to their historical background, statutory basis, or habitual usage. While we will not at this stage delve into the historical background of The White House Office itself (which is dealt with in Chapter III) this is an appropriate opportunity to consider in some detail the antecedents of those elements of the White House staff that emerged and flourished in the statutory no-man's land that lasted for nearly forty years. For example, as we shall see, the habit of detailing had origins that well predated the creation of the staff; while other parts of the staff far outgrew the limited basis upon which they were first established.

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

The language contained in successive appropriation acts providing legislative authorization for The White House Office was not substantially altered in decades. It was presumed to confer the authority necessary to embrace the constantly growing numbers of WHO personnel. The following extract, which contains the key wording, has been taken from the Executive Office Appropriation Act, 1974, and was representative of the practice of the previous thirty years:
The White House Office - Salaries and Expenses

For expenses necessary for the White House Office.... at such per diem rates for individuals as the President may specify and other personal services without regard to the provisions of law regulating the employment and compensation of persons in the Government service.... to be accounted for solely on his certificate.\(^\text{109}\)

(author's emphasis)

Similar language has applied, as we shall shortly see, to other White House staff items. The underlined passage emphasized the enormous discretion that the President enjoys over the terms of pay and employment of his regular White House Office staff. (This simple fact appears to have finally dawned on public consciousness with the publication by NEWSWEEK magazine, in May 1977, of an article on White House staff salaries.)\(^\text{110}\)

It is hard to refute the proposition that the language of this annual appropriation act confers a carte blanche on the President.

DETAILING

As we have seen, the practice of detailing personnel from other government departments and agencies to the White House staff has been officially justified by 3 USC 107. However, this practice has proved such an important feature of the staff that its historical background needs to be covered in greater depth, and its statutory authority further explored. A thorough understanding of detailing is essential to any study of the staff.
The importance of detailing to the White House staff was well illustrated by the testimony of James Schlesinger before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and Executive Office, during hearings held in May 1970. The then Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget explained:

"For many years, White House Office staff costs have been only partially financed by the appropriation 'Salaries and Expenses, The White House Office'. Many staff personnel have been paid from appropriations to other Federal agencies under the statutory provision authorizing temporary detailing to the White House Office." (3 USC 107).

Another exchange at the same hearings emphasized that the detailing of personnel was by no means a practice of recent origin. When the Chairman, Senator Yarborough, asked: "Has this practice been going on for years — the practice of employees in the White House being paid by other departments?" he received the reply from James Schlesinger: "That practice has been going on at least since the Truman administration and may have antedated that." 112

Indeed it did. In the 1930s, for example, it was legitimized by no less an authority than the Brownlow Committee in its 1937 report. The key passage in this connexion was this:

"In the selection of these aides the President should be free to call on departments from time to time for the assignment of persons who, after a tour of duty as his aides, might be restored to their old positions." 113
This was one of the provisions of the Brownlow report that Roosevelt was informed of, and agreed to, in advance. No doubt this sentence was drafted with a view to the experience of the previous five years, during which many of the so-called Brains Trusters who surrounded President Roosevelt were in fact on the payroll of a department or agency. No doubt, too, the procedure which was implied in the report was intended to facilitate the best possible choice of the aides that the President wanted to work with him. It was always envisaged that such detailees could be sent back to the departments if necessary.

The experience of the Roosevelt years thus gave the practice of detailing a significant boost. Of its practical importance to the subsequent development of the White House staff there can be no doubt. But in order to more precisely determine its proper authority we must search even farther back for its legal origins.

These origins antedate both the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations. President Grant, for example, detailed generals from the War Department to work in the White House, as did President Arthur. The first provision of law relating to detailing was enacted in the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Expenses Appropriations Act, 1906. While nothing has been found in the legislative history of that act to explain the purpose of its enactment, it seems most likely that it was prompted, at least in part, by a ruling of the then Attorney General of December 22nd 1904. This held in effect that the Postmaster General had no authority to detail a registry clerk to the White House because of a lack of statutory authority for such a detail. According to a more recent
Comptroller General, nothing has been found in the legislative history of the language of 3 USC 107 that would suggest any limitation on the expressed detail authority provided therein. Neither did the lack of authorizing legislation for the original language suggest a limitation. This Comptroller General took the following view, according to testimony presented to the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service in May 1974:

"While the lack of authorizing language for a legislative item in an appropriation bill would under the rules of the House and Senate furnish basis for a point of order during debate, once the language is enacted it becomes law and entitled to the same force and dignity as any other duly enacted measure." 120

It was his opinion that the language of the specific provisions of 3 USC 107 was positively enacted into law by the codification of Title 3 of the USC by an Act of 25th June 1948. 121 In practice, every President has had complete discretion to do as he chooses in regard to detailing.

There are five major respects in which this degree of discretion is confirmed. Firstly, the language of 3 USC 107 does not require any specific presidential or executive actions to institute or continue a detail. In other words it can all be arranged very easily. Secondly, although 3 USC 107 only constitutes authority for temporary details, there is no stated maximum limitation. Whether or not a detail is 'temporary' within the meaning of 3 USC 107 would depend upon the individual circumstances of each detail. For the time being, however, the definition of 'temporary' is currently at the disposal of the President. 122 That is to say staff can be (and indeed have been)
retained on a permanently 'temporary' basis ad infinitum. Thirdly, there is no requirement that the detail must be documented in writing, or indeed made public in any way. It can be arranged quite informally and, if necessary, kept secret from public view. Fourthly, the authority of 3 USC 107 is not limited to details of permanent employees. There are no real restrictions on whom may be considered; the President has a free hand. Fifthly, the provision of 3 USC 107 does not require reimbursement for any detail. This removes completely any sense of financial limitation, because the funding of details can be carried on other parts of the government budget and not be made to accrue to The White House Office or any other closely related staff budget.

The President is thus given carte blanche vis-a-vis detailing. The language of 3 USC 107 is vague enough to permit a considerable degree of evasion of its general intent, and provides no remedy in such circumstances. Lest anyone think this a minor matter it should be recalled that in 1970 there were no less than 273 detailees to The White House Office alone. Since then, it is true, the numbers have been greatly reduced but the practice of detailing remains widespread.

Indeed, the great difficulty comes less in trying to pinpoint its historical origin than in trying to estimate its contemporary prevalence. Concern that the officially published figures for the numbers of White House staff, as prepared for the US Budget, have not been accurate has only been expressed relatively recently. Both as a cause and a consequence of this, no effort was made by any Administration, prior to President Nixon's, to estimate the full extent of detailing. The following exchange, which occurred in 1970, well illustrates the point.
Senator Yarborough, during Senate appropriations hearings, asked these questions: "What was the quantum of it (detailing) for the past five years? Has it doubled this past year or two? What has been the number and cost over a five-year period?" The Administration witness replied:

"I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, there has been a substantial increase in the last year, but there are no records available on agency details for those years prior to this administration." 124 (author's emphasis)

Since then it has been the occasional practice to provide congressional appropriations subcommittees with information on the detailing of staff to the White House. For example, during hearings before the House for FY 1975, the Administration produced a listing of detailees for the subcommittee. 125 Interest in the White House was at its height at that time (May 1974) because of Watergate. By contrast, no list was provided the following year. 126 As if to emphasize the irregularity of the Nixon and Ford Administrations' bookkeeping, a list of detailees was once more provided in hearings for FY 1977. 127 In 1972 the Nixon Administration tried to claim that it had eliminated the borrowing of personnel from other departments, 128 although it was eventually shown that 22 were then currently on detail. 129 No other Administration has been so rash as to boast the elimination of detailing. In 1974 the Director of OMB testified that "we have a continual inventory in effect of details, particularly those that come into the White House....and we continue to watch over them to determine their justification." 130 Whether or not such a "continual inventory" is now really maintained, Congress has yet to be supplied with it on a regular basis. 131
The final point to consider here is the interpretation by recent Administrations of the authority of 3 USC 107 as put into practice. This is one of the questions central to the current debate about the proper authorization of the White House staff. Right up until the Nixon Administration, and especially during the 1960s, detailing went completely unchecked. It was so prevalent that by 1968 only half the actual complement of White House Office staff were listed as such—the rest were on detail. By 1970, there were 273 detailees compared to only 208 staff officially on The White House Office payroll. 132 This amounted to a serious abuse of the authority to detail.

The budget for FY 1971 introduced a new attempt at honesty. A determined effort was made to record all those staff actually working at the White House under one heading. Tom Steed, Chairman of the House appropriations subcommittee with jurisdiction over the White House, claimed the credit for having spurred the Johnson Administration into preparing this new budgetary approach, although it was not completed by the time Johnson left office. 133 However, the Nixon Administration certainly deserves its share of the credit for having supported this proposed change and actually implementing it. From FY 1971 onwards the number of detailees did drop substantially, although, as we have just noted, records of detailees were supplied only haphazardly.

The new approach towards detailing was formally outlined by Roy Ash, the Director of OMB in 1974 when he testified as follows:
"Detailing services a purpose, but it should be consistent with the policies that we have applied within the White House. We have also expressed that policy to the departments and agencies, that it should be used sparingly and for a good reason rather than as a general rule....and in doing so, we provide full motivation to a department giving up somebody in a detail, for a detailing job, to be very interested in getting that person back when he serves that purpose because he counts against that department's or agency's total manpower." 134

Later that year, after the Ford Administration had taken over, the Chief of Staff at the White House, Assistant to the President Donald Rumsfeld, told a White House Press Corps briefing that "as I recall the rule now is that we should not have detailees here for more than six months. That is to say, if a person is really going to be working in the White House he should be put on the White House rolls, otherwise he ought to be detailed back to the place from which he was detailed." 135 But figures released by the White House earlier that year (1974) showed that several of the staff detailed to the White House had been serving for at least ten months, and possibly even longer. 136

One good example of the convoluted way detailing can operate was afforded by the case of Bradley Patterson. He served as a Staff Assistant to Len Garment, a Special Consultant (later Counsel, and then Assistant to the President) on the Nixon staff. For at least four years (1970-4) Patterson was technically on detail from the National Advisory Council for Economic Opportunity. 137 Yet for all intents and
purposes he was a member of the White House staff. The extra twist, however, is that Patterson was technically detailed not to The White House Office but to the Domestic Council. This illustrates the political inter-changeability of staff, a point which was confirmed by the Comptroller General in a letter to H.R. Haldeman, dated 13th December 1972, which stated that "A detailed individual is considered to be any individual performing services for the White House... and not directly paid from the "White House", "Special Projects" or "Domestic Council" appropriations."\textsuperscript{138}

Detailing is one of those grey areas as far as the White House staff are concerned. It seems likely that it will always remain so. It is arguable that its use has in practice overreached its proper statutory authority, despite signs in recent years that the presumption in favour of using detailees has been gradually converted into a presumption against using them. The Carter Administration has emphasized this trend. Nevertheless, the record clearly shows that the statutory authorization for detailing personnel to the White House staff has been so wide-ranging that reliance against abuses of that authority depends only on an Administration's honesty and vigilance and not on proper oversight of the law as it presently stands. The problem of proper statutory authority for detailing is simply that it is inadequate and does nothing to prevent its abuse.

\textbf{CONSULTANTS}

The major difference between a consultant on the White House staff and a regular staff member is that the consultant is envisaged as being only
temporary, or a part-time staff member, and is therefore paid per diem for the work he or she does. The authorization language in the annual appropriation acts implicitly covers consultants in that part which reads:

"... (employment for consultants) at such per diem rates for individuals as the President may specify ... without regard to the provisions of law regulating the employment and compensation of persons in the Government service." 139

The discretion given to the President over their pay has effectively been absolute. Indeed it is also extended to the mode of appointment of consultants. For example, the Executive Director of the Domestic Council disclosed in April 1975 that consultants employed to work on the Domestic Council staff were in fact being paid from funds specifically set aside for the Vice President. "The reason", he explained, was because "our budget is rather strained at this time and his was in somewhat better shape." 140 Among other things, this episode emphasizes the extent to which staff support for the Vice President can where necessary be interpreted as another means of increasing the size of the overall White House staff. It also throws into greater relief the fact that staffing in the White House can be arranged quite without regard even for the meagre and inadequate statutory authority as does exist.

The only respect in which it may be said that the President does not have a completely free hand is that he is bound by an overall dollar limitation, or ceiling. But even this potential restriction was greatly eased in recent years. The Nixon Administration's FY 1971 Budget asked for and received a change in the appropriation language governing the dollar limitation. 141 Until then it had stood at $250,000 p.a. on the use of consultant services and other personal services. This was raised by no
less than $2m to $2,250,000, and the carte blanche language was retained.

UNGRADED PERSONNEL

The White House Office staff can be divided into various categories for the purposes of more easily identifying the statutory authority applicable. Among these are that group whose positions are recorded in the US Budgets as being paid according to General Schedule rates of pay or Executive Level pay grades; those who are detailed; and those who are listed as "ungraded" staff. As to the latter, whose names do not normally appear in any published listing, they depend upon the following definition in the US Code as authority for their position:

5 USC 2103

(a) For the purpose of this title, the 'excepted service' consists of those civil service positions which are not in the competitive service.

(b) As used in other Acts of Congress, 'unclassified civil service' or 'unclassified service' means the 'excepted service'. 142

Thus the 'excepted service' has come to mean all employees not in the competitive service, for whatever reason. Figures for the number of ungraded personnel have not always been regularly available, 143 but they have included some prominent members of the staff. This is confirmed by the salaries some of them have received. For example, it was calculated in 1974 that no less than one quarter of the ungraded positions on the staff were paid at rates in excess of $36,000 p.a. 144
Funds for these ungraded positions are included in the annual appropriations of the Executive Office of the President but do not necessarily all appear under The White House Office heading. The importance of ungraded personnel in this study is that these positions were used by recent Administrations to employ an increasing number of political staff in a manner which would otherwise have had to have been openly reported as further growth in the numbers of White House Office staff (as listed in the GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL). In short, the use of ungraded personnel was a convenient disguise for staff expansion. This was confirmed by a report prepared for the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, from which the following extract is taken:

"Long ago Congress gave the President authority to employ personnel notwithstanding civil service regulations governing qualifications, pay, etc...These positions have been described or labelled as 'ungraded'...The current Administration (President Nixon's) has made a basic policy change in the use of this authority. Now, many high-level policy employees are being employed without regard to civil service regulations."\(^{145}\)

A pertinent example of the kind of high-level policy employee thus labelled as "ungraded" was Kenneth W. Clawson. As we have already noted, he held the title of Executive Director of the Office of Communication. This was in effect a middle-ranking position in the Nixon White House staff organization.

Exemption of the White House staff from both the Classification Act\(^{147}\) and the General Schedule\(^{148}\) technically allows for the appointment of an unlimited number of ungraded personnel; the only proviso being that their rates of pay not exceed the maximum allowable.\(^{149}\) Thus it was possible for President Nixon, in his FY 1975 Budget, to add thirty
ungraded personnel to his staff without worrying that such an increase could be refused. This statutory ability to so easily swell the size of the staff well illustrates the extent of presidential discretion in action. Such discretion was also a salient feature of what was called "Special Projects".

SPECIAL PROJECTS

Although Special Projects, as a separate fund, was finally abolished in 1974 during Watergate it merits attention both as to its past history and the statutory authority under which it operated. The fund for Special Projects was added to the general store of White House resources by President Eisenhower in 1956. (However, such a fund had been advocated by the Brownlow Committee). He intended it to be used to bring assorted special staffs with special purposes into the White House, and for providing status-recognition for an interest group or programme. However, despite what may well have been a genuine intention to call upon Special Projects staff only for special purposes, it was not long before they came to be considered synonymous with The White House Office staff.

This was confirmed as early as 1960. On March 3rd of that year the House Appropriations Subcommittee on General Government Matters (which at that time had jurisdiction over the White House and Executive Office) held its annual hearings on the appropriation requests for FY 1961. During testimony on Special Projects, congressman George W. Andrews, the Subcommittee Chairman, asked Elmer B. Staats, then Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, whether "for all practical purposes the employees in this activity, known as special projects, are actually members of the President's
White House staff?" "That is correct", came the reply.\textsuperscript{154} When the Chairman pressed a related question, concerning a requested 46\% increase over the previous year for supplies and materials, and asked: "What is the difference between supplies and materials under this request and supplies and materials for The White House Office?", Mr. Staats replied, "I do not know of any difference".\textsuperscript{155} Then again, when discussion moved to the location of these Special Projects employees, it was admitted that "some of them are in the White House itself,"\textsuperscript{156} while the rest worked in the Executive Office Building across the street.

Considering this synonymity of purpose and practice it was not surprising that the Chairman should have wondered why all these separate funds were simply not amalgamated. In a candid reply, the Deputy Director explained that the device of a separate fund had resulted from the need "for more funds to expand his (the President's) own staff and in that sense it is really an extension of the White House staff."\textsuperscript{157} The Subcommittee appeared to be satisfied with this knowledge. Certainly no action was ever taken by Congress to merge the two together.\textsuperscript{158} Special Projects thus stayed as it was, while its own appropriation language conferred a "greater freedom"\textsuperscript{159} than that of The White House Office proper.

Special Projects operated only with the legislative authorization provided in successive annual appropriation acts of Congress. The wording remained standard:

"The fund is used by the President for staff assistance on special problems which arise from time to time but cannot be considered the responsibility of an existing agency...."
"...For expenses necessary to provide staff assistance for the President in connexion with special projects, to be expended in his discretion and without regard to such provisions of law regarding expenditure of Government funds or the compensation and employment of persons in the Government service as he may specify.... Provided, That not to exceed 20 per centum of this appropriation may be used to re-imburse the appropriation for 'Salaries and Expenses, The White House Office' for administrative services." 160

Two points stand out: firstly, the ceiling of 20% on reimbursing The White House Office. This was justified on the grounds that since 1956 the Special Projects appropriation was only meant "to augment the White House Office staff complement in new areas of activity". This provision was therefore designed more to perpetuate the illusion that Special Projects was a separate entity than to reflect the reality of its use. The second notable feature of this language was the absence of any dollar limitation on the per diem rates of pay, or other pay arrangements, for the staff employed. The Nixon Administration, using an argument that was shared by its predecessors, went on record that this language provided an essential degree of flexibility in hiring staff personnel. 162

The Nixon Administration certainly made use of this flexibility. Firstly, as congressman Roybal (D-Calif.) determined, "one of these White House special project funds actually paid the air fare and salary for a man to go to Los Angeles to commit a burglary." This was the Ellsberg break-in. Secondly, several important middle-level members of the Nixon White House staff were in fact employed, or funded, from the Special Projects account. These included (as we have already noted) Kenneth R. Cole Jr., a Special Assistant later to become Assistant for Domestic Affairs and
Executive Director of the Domestic Council; Charles DiBona, a Special Consultant; and Virginia H. Knauer, a Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs. The names of those funded from Special Projects were not made publicly available until Congress finally made inquiries as a result of the Watergate affair.\(^{164}\)

It is also pertinent to record that by funding these staff members the Nixon Administration directly contravened the pledge it had given Congress only a few years previously. In presenting the official requests for Special Projects in FY 1971, James R. Schlesinger, the then Director of OMB, had specifically stated to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury, Post Office, and Executive Office that:

"We intend to utilize the special projects fund for the purpose originally intended: that is, to deal with unanticipated needs that may arise, which are not covered by the emergency fund. The special projects appropriation will not be used to compensate regular White House personnel."\(^{165}\)

(author's emphasis)

On the contrary, it continued to be used precisely for that purpose.

The annual dollar amount appropriated under Special Projects during its two decades of existence was $1.5m. The exception was 1970 when it was raised by a further million to accommodate the presidential transition, and no less than 95 staff were funded from this account during FY 1970.\(^{166}\) When the fund was abolished in 1974 this not inconsiderable sum was not actually lost to the President and his staff. Instead it was completely merged with The White House Office item in the US Budget. When challenged by a House
appropriations subcommittee that this action nullified the difference between a fund that Congress now considered to have been improperly used (Special Projects) and The White House Office fund, Roy Ash, the Director of OMB replied: "This combines them all into one. There is no distinction. In effect it is a fungible commodity. Because it is fungible there is no way to distinguish which ones might have been in Special Projects." In other words the statutory authority for Special Projects was merged with that for The White House Office. After nearly twenty years of artificial separation they were appropriately reunited.

UNANTICIPATED NEEDS

Like other items of staff support for the President the fund for Unanticipated Needs, the renamed Emergency Fund, historically relied for proper authority only on the legislative language included in annual appropriation acts. However, when the title of this fund was changed in the 1970s the basis of its authority was affected to a certain extent. The appropriation language that is currently applicable reads as follows:

"For expenses necessary to enable the President to meet unanticipated needs, in furtherance of the national interest, security, or defense which may arise at home or abroad during the current fiscal year, and to pay administrative expenses (including personnel, in his discretion and without regard to any provision of law regulating employment and pay of persons in the government service or regulating expenditures of government funds)....."168

The origin of this fund can be traced back to 1940 when Congress recognised the need for the President to have limited funding available to meet
unplanned and therefore unbudgeted exigencies. It was then called the Emergency Fund. The history of many of the activities funded from this appropriation shows this intention to have been generally carried out. Either the staff activities funded were themselves of short-term duration, such as the funds needed for the presidential transition of 1974, or the fund was used to get something going on an emergency basis with the intention of going to Congress and asking for a permanent authorization and allocation of funds. Examples of the latter included the establishment, during 1973-74, of the Energy Policy Office and the Federal Energy Office within the EOP.

From 1940 until 1974 a regular annual appropriation of $1m was made under the heading of "Emergency Fund for the President". In 1974 under the general influence of Watergate Congress halved this appropriation and effected a basic change in the appropriation language under the new heading of "Unanticipated Personnel Needs". The following year, in preparing the US Budget for FY 1976, the language was slightly changed yet again (this time by the Administration) to its present form as given above. The word "Personnel" was removed from the title, according to testimony before a House appropriations subcommittee, because it sounded as if it implied a limitation on collateral expenses.

The irony of this fund's recent history lies therefore in the fact that the 1974 appropriation language conferred a wider measure of discretion on the President than did the old pre-1974 language which related to the Emergency Fund. Yet this change came about (during the height of the Watergate affair) at the very time that Congress was supposedly anxious to check presidential authority. This can best be appreciated from a reading of the Emergency Fund language as it existed during most of the period covered by this study:
"For expenses necessary to enable the President, through such offices or agencies of the Government as he may designate, and without regard to such provisions of law regarding the expenditure of Government funds or the compensation of persons in the Government service as he may specify, to provide in his discretion for emergencies affecting the national interest, security, or defense which may arise at home or abroad during the current fiscal year, $1,000,000: Provided, That no part of this appropriation shall be available for allocation to finance a function or project for which function or project a budget estimate of appropriation was transmitted pursuant to law during the (previous) Congress or the first session of the (current) Congress and such appropriation denied after consideration thereof by the Senate or House of Representatives or by the Committee on Appropriations of either body."175

This pre-1974 authority was thus stricter in two respects. First, the entire second half of the above was dropped in 1974. Second, the wording for Unanticipated Needs omitted the reference to "agencies of the Government". It was to the White House staff, rather than to any official government agency, that the President was thenceforth expected to turn when utilising this fund.

THE DOMESTIC COUNCIL

Unlike the National Security Council, the Domestic Council was established by presidential fiat and not by congressional statute. President Nixon, in March 1970, acted on the recommendations of the Ash Council on Executive Organization and proposed his Reorganization Plan No. 2 which included
the creation of a Domestic Council. His presidential message to Congress announced that the Council would be supported by a staff under an Executive Director who would also be a member of the President's White House staff. "Like the National Security Council staff", the Nixon statement ran, "this staff will work in close coordination with the President's personal staff but will have its own institutional identity." [176]

The Domestic Council came into existence by Executive Order 11541 on July 1st 1970. [177] This was too late to enable it to qualify for regular appropriations in FY 1971. Nevertheless, to illustrate the way in which strict legality is rarely observed in such matters, the Domestic Council staff was initially provided with White House staff using White House Office funds even though there was no legal statutory authority to do so. Later in the year, in the Supplemental Appropriations Act FY 1971, the Council received its first direct appropriation of funds, and authorization for its staff was written into the appropriation language. In FY 1972 the Domestic Council was considered alongside other standard White House items in the appropriations process for the Executive Office. The wording of the appropriation language which served as its legislative authority was as follows:

"For necessary expenses of the Domestic Council, including services as authorized by title 5, United States Code, section 3109, but at rates for individuals not to exceed the per diem equivalent of the rate for grade GS-18; and other personal services without regard to the provisions of law regulating the employment and compensation of persons in the Government service;" [178]

This language remained in force until the Domestic Council's abolition in
the Carter Presidency. The reference to 5 USC 3109 related to the employment of experts and consultants, while that to GS-18 related to the highest pay levels in the government service below the Executive Level grades.

EXPENSES OF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT

In 1954 Congress approved the establishment of a fund entitled Expenses of Management Improvement in the supplemental appropriations act of that year. It remained in existence as a separate item for twenty years until 1974. However, by the time Congress considered the FY 1976 Budget this fund had disappeared as a separate entity. Despite its non-political title the reason for its inclusion here is that this fund was on many occasions used to finance the White House staff, or to finance activities of direct relevance to their work. In this way it formed yet another part of the iceberg beneath the surface. During this 20-year span the fund at no time enjoyed permanent statutory authority, but rather relied on the legislative authority of its appropriation language, which was as follows:

"For expenses necessary to assist the President in improving the management of executive agencies and in obtaining greater economy and efficiency through the establishment of more efficient business methods in Government operations, including services as authorized by title 5, United States Code, section 3109, by allocation to any agency or office in the executive branch for the conduct......or examinations and appraisals of, and the development and installation of improvements in, the organization and operations of such agency or of other agencies in the executive branch....."180 (author's emphasis)
It is worth noting that unobligated funds at the end of each fiscal year were carried over to the next year and did not lapse to the Treasury (as was the case with other funds for the staff). To a certain extent this sidestepped the normal concern, which tends to be a bureaucratic fact of life, that all the allocated funds in any one year should be spent.  

The nature of this fund obviously prevented any Administration from being able to say in advance for what purposes the fund would be used in any given year. It was regularly asserted, however, that before any project request for funds was approved "we assure ourselves that we don't have any other way of financing it". From 1954 until 1971 the administration of this fund was directly under the control of the President, who operated it with the help of his staff. But on 22nd July 1971, by means of Executive Order 11609, President Nixon took the step of formally transferring responsibility for administering the fund to the Office of Management and Budget. (This order did not preclude the ability of the President to regain his authority to allocate the funds any time he chose to.) This action effectively changed the nature of the fund, and Congress eventually tumbled to the fact. Three years later, during hearings before the House appropriations subcommittee that covered the EOP budget requests, it dawned on the ranking Republican "that we have here, Mr. Chairman, a sort of "emergency fund" for OMB." He argued that this fund could therefore be dropped as a separate item and added to OMB's regular appropriation. This suggestion was argued against very strongly by the Administration, but the congressman's argument won the day. There was no sign of this fund in the FY 1976 Budget.

During its 20-year existence this fund was used to finance many management studies. Altogether there were 109 allocations from the fund, according
to the last available statistics provided in 1974 to both houses of Congress. Many were of direct relevance to the operation of the White House and the White House staff. Among these were numerous allocations provided for the "Presidential Advisers on Basic Organization and Administrative Improvement", which first received funds in January 1961 at the very end of the Eisenhower Administration. Subsequent Presidents authorized further allocations ranging from $15,000 to $100,000, in each of the years 1962-4, 1966-7, and 1969. The original study had recommended the use of experts and consultants to improve the advice available to the President. The subsequent studies acted upon that recommendation. For example, allocations from this fund were used by President Kennedy to finance several important presidential Special Consultants such as Robert Lovett and Richard Neustadt.

Other uses of this fund included a study of the handling of foreign affairs operational information in 1964, which was designed to modernize the flow and analysis of information coming to the White House National Security staff from other agencies. On the domestic side came a study entitled the "Management Information System" for the EOP, which received allocations from this fund under Presidents Johnson and Nixon totalling more than half-a-million dollars, and was designed to benefit The White House Office.

In July 1970, directly after the establishment of the Domestic Council, President Nixon authorized the "President's Advisory Council on Management Improvement". This was allocated considerable sums of money "to provide for an interchange of ideas with responsible operating officials throughout the executive branch, and prepare and submit reports to the President containing recommendations for improving specific Government operations." $150,000 in July 1970 was followed by $130,000 in
October of the same year, $74,000 in May 1971, $170,000 in August, $30,000 in December, $25,000 and $30,000 in June and July 1972, to be followed by a massive $325,000 in August 1972^{196} - the last such allocation. The work done by this Advisory Council directly prepared the way for Nixon's reorganization plans; especially the far-reaching one of January 1973 which involved a major increase in the power of the President's domestic affairs staff.^{197}

Finally, this fund was used by President Nixon to be of direct benefit to his most trusted White House staff. After the first reshuffle of his staff in the autumn of 1969 he commissioned a "Study of Administrative support operations of the White House Office" with funds from Expenses of Management Improvement. H.R. Haldeman, Nixon's Chief of Staff, had already assumed a position of administrative superiority by this time and Nixon's study was designed directly to further Haldeman's control over day-to-day White House operations. The avowed aim was to conduct affairs "in the most businesslike manner possible"^{198}: namely, "to review the existing administrative support organization, administrative procedures, communications control mechanisms, project and assignment control and identification mechanisms, use of office equipment, and the use of support personnel of The White House Office to make sure that the most responsive, economical, and effective administrative support is provided."^{199} Haldeman would not have been able to organize the Nixon White House as he did without help from, and the ability to commission, studies on organization from a fund of this kind.

Expenses of Management Improvement was finally abolished in 1974, on the initiative of the House of Representatives, whose Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government decreed in
a report on June 20th 1974 that "the appropriation request of $500,000 be denied in its entirety."200

EXECUTIVE RESIDENCE

The authority under which funds have been appropriated for the White House, as a building, should briefly be dealt with here. Its relevance in this context lies in its bearing on office space for the White House staff. Funds under this heading, which was formerly known as the Executive Mansion until Watergate prompted a downgrading of its title, were traditionally appropriated with the force only of the annual legislative language written into each EOP appropriation act. This language, to take a recent example from FY 1975, read as follows:

"For the care, maintenance, repair and alteration, refurnishing, improvement, heating and lighting, including electric power and fixtures, of the Executive Residence, and official entertainment expenses of the President." 201

Although there is no mention the White House staff per se it is clear from other sources that this fund has provided for the maintenance of the White House offices (with a small 'o'). Like painting the Firth of Forth bridge, this has often involved constant activity. For example, John Dean records that when he initially joined the White House staff he was struck by the extent of the alteration work that appeared to go on. "The White House", he wrote, "far more than any other government office, was in a state of perpetual internal flux. Offices were constantly exchanged and altered." 202 Indeed, in the Nixon White House, such matters
were taken very seriously. Dean again: "Success and failure could be seen in the size, decor and location of offices....Every day, workmen crawled over the White House complex like ants. Movers busied themselves with the continuous shuffling of furniture from one office to another as people moved in, up, down or out." Dean, like all other staff members, learned to read office changes as an index of their internal power struggles.

In view of the cost of this activity the question of whether such authority was sufficient is no moot point. Dean recorded that "the expense was irrelevant to Haldeman," and that they discussed, and discarded, the idea of revealing the expense incurred. Moreover, one clue that Haldeman did not believe this expenditure to be legally justified was reflected in the fact that he sought to have the appropriation language reworded to provide the President with even broader and more sweeping authority. The preferred language would have provided authority to "procure goods and administrative services in connection with the performance of his official duties." This proposed change was not effected during Haldeman's reign.

In conclusion we have seen from this examination that most of the White House staff have claimed as authority for their existence and funding the legislative language included in annual appropriations acts. But was this sufficient authority? In practice, the answer has been 'yes' for many years. Funds were appropriated without difficulty. The staff grew and developed in its different forms. In theory, however, it is now apparent that this supposed authority has been far from sufficient. The majority of the White House staff have for years existed in a kind of statutory vacuum.
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Moreover, this went quite unchallenged. As we explore the reasons for this extremely significant but simple fact we will come to understand that the problem of proper authority has been invested with a new dimension.

Why has there not been sufficient authority? The short answer is that appropriations by the House of Representatives for the White House staff were for years handled on an improper basis which broke House rules. In 1973 it was discovered that legislative authority had been included in the annual appropriation acts authorizing the employment of White House staff. Such language, or the lack of proper authorization, broke House Rule XXI, clause 2, which provided in part that no appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation bill for any expenditure not previously authorized by law. Most of the White House staff, as we have already seen, were not previously authorized by law. Those that were only amounted to less than 20 in The White House Office, an uncertain number of detailees (whose authority under 3 USC 107 was open to challenge), and members of the National Security Council staff. In pursuance of this rule points of order were therefore raised against those specific items in the bill providing appropriations for the White House staff. Those items included The White House Office, the Domestic Council, and Special Projects. These points of order were sustained and funds for the staff struck from the bill. Points of order were raised again the following year and again in the years 1975-7. In each case funds for the staff were denied by the House.

From 1973, therefore, the problem of proper authority suddenly became a practical problem. Suffice it to say here that, in the short term, it was resolved by technical means quite unsatisfactory as a long-term
solution. (An analysis of successive attempts at the latter forms the substance of a later chapter.) But it behoves us here to briefly consider the substance of the proposed reform of the statutory authority of the White House staff.

**PROPOSED NEW AUTHORITY FOR THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF**

Congress has had before it draft legislation, which it has considered in every year from 1974-8, to completely rewrite and update proper authority for the White House staff. Such legislation has been designed to supersede all forms of authority for the staff that we have examined here (save that for the NSC staff). In so doing it would produce a by-product of some interest: a more precise definition of the White House staff than has hitherto officially existed.

The most recent version of White House authorization legislation (as of this writing) was embodied in H.R. 11003, which passed the House of Representatives on 13th April 1978 by a vote of 265-134. The bill was divided into several major sections. These will be briefly examined in turn.

The first major section of the proposed new authority was included under the heading "Assistance and Services for the President", whose provisions were mirrored in the second major section headed "Assistance and Services for the Vice President". In both cases the employment of personnel was suitably authorized, free from any other legal constraints (such as obtain in the Civil Service). The pattern of both sections was similar. Firstly, the legislation provided for a series of limits on
the staff able to be employed at certain salary levels. For example, the President was restricted (in descending order of salary grade) to 25 staff at Level II, 25 at Level III, 50 at level GS-18, and "such number of other employees as he may determine to be appropriate" at lower levels; (thus preserving an important measure of presidential discretion). Secondly, the President was authorized to procure the "temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants", on the condition that their per diem salary rates did not exceed those comparable for Level II. Ostensibly to be employed only for periods up to one year, the President was nevertheless allowed to extend this period at his discretion. Thirdly, the President was authorized to incur expenditure for the official expenses of The White House Office; entertainment expenses; and the costs of White House staff while travelling with the President. However, all such expenditure was made subject to the right of the Comptroller General to provide an external check if and when it was thought necessary.

The third part of the legislation related to the Domestic Policy Staff and the Office of Administration, both newly created by President Carter; the former having superceded The Domestic Council upon its formal abolition. Here too the pattern was similar. Firstly, various limitations were placed on the staff to be employed at certain salary grades. For example, the Domestic Policy Staff was authorized no more than 6 staff at Level III, 18 at level GS-18, and an unlimited number at GS-16 or below. Secondly, both staff bodies were authorized to procure their own experts and consultants. Thirdly, official expenses were sanctioned, where appropriate.
The fourth part dealt with the old Emergency Fund, since 1975 renamed (in full) "Assistance to the President for Unanticipated Needs". The authorization took the form of a dollar ceiling (currently $1m) on expenditure "for the furtherance of the national interest, security, or defense, including personnel needs". An added feature of the legislation (contrasting with habitual usage since 1940) was the obligation placed on the President to submit a yearly report to Congress setting out the expenditure from this fund and the purpose(s) for which it was spent.

The fifth part authorized detailing but on condition that all detailees remaining with the White House staff in excess of 180 days should have their departments or agency of origin reimbursed by that part of the White House staff to which they had been detailed. The sixth part of the legislation introduced a brand new feature of the proposed new authority (which had been subject to additional amendment on the House floor). The President was to submit an annual "Personnel Report" to both houses of Congress (and made public) containing essential information on the White House staff. This was to include the names, salaries, job titles and job descriptions of all staff together with those on detail and those employed as temporary experts or consultants.* Finally, the legislation incorporated a "General Pay Limitation" to prohibit the employment of staff at salary levels in excess of GS-16 which is the middle- to junior-level staff salary grade.

The significance of this proposed new authority for the White House staff is threefold. Firstly, it would contribute towards an accepted and improved definition of the staff which would enhance the general level of present understanding. At the bare minimum it would clearly embrace more than merely

* See Appendix 1.1 for the first such report submitted, although the range of information eventually provided was strictly limited.
The White House Office. Secondly, it would a priori provide a proper statutory basis for a staff for whose present position there is patently a non-existent or insufficient basis today. Thirdly, the publicly available Personnel Report to Congress effectively offers the prospect of a comprehensive record of the staff for the first time in decades. Until the Bill becomes an Act its full impact in these areas cannot finally be judged.

POSTSCRIPT

At the time this chapter was written the final outcome of the passage of White House staff authorization legislation was unknown. It finally reached the statute book in November 1978. (Chapter VII is specifically addressed to its progress over a number of years.) This Postscript briefly re-considers the tentative conclusion reached above as to the legislation's possible significance in the context of this chapter's discussion.

White House staff authorization legislation did indeed make a contribution towards an accepted definition of the White House staff; but it fell short of comprehensively identifying all those staff whom we have argued in this chapter should be included. White House "personnel" were defined only as those employed under five "Reporting Offices" which included: The White House Office; the Office of the Vice President; the Domestic Policy Staff; and the Office of Administration. Apart from the fact that recent Presidents have tended to reorganize staff units (e.g. Reagan's abolition of the Domestic Policy Staff and its replacement by a new Office of Policy Development) this still left out of account White House staff employed under the NSC or Unanticipated Needs budgetary headings (among others).

The new legislation did at least provide for the first time a proper statutory basis for the employment of White House staff; replacing and updating most of the inadequate authorization on which this chapter had (at its time of writing) been largely based. This was the minimum improvement required by Congress.

Finally, the legislation proved to be a severely limited step forward in terms of the information made publicly available about the staff. (See: Chapter VII.) The President's obligation to furnish Congress with an annual "Aggregate Report on Personnel" does not extend to revealing either the names, salaries, job titles or job descriptions of his staff. A facsimile of the first historic report is given as Appendix 1.1.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has covered a good deal of the preliminary ground on our subject and uncovered some of its major problem areas. Firstly, we have argued for a political definition of the White House staff, albeit incorporating as firm a foundation as possible of all available factual information. This ensures the realistic and academic approach best suited for this field of study. Any other approach would be too narrow. Secondly, we have reviewed the primary source material and examined in detail those elements of it that provide us with most of our hard-core factual information. The ensuring critique has clearly demonstrated the nature and extent of the limitations imposed by these sources upon the researcher in this field. Thirdly, we have considered the basis upon which the White House staff are established today. In accordance with our broadly-based political definition this has involved an examination of the many different aspects of the staff's existence that lie outside The White House Office alone. What conclusions can we reach at this stage?

First the White House staff are much more extensive than is commonly supposed or officially indicated. They certainly comprise far more than merely those employed in The White House Office. There is a myriad of different staff entities and of funds available for the staff. In addition, a supplementary supply of staff from elsewhere in government, detailed to the White House, is readily available.

Second the true size and cost of the White House staff are still unknown. This is either because of deliberate official secrecy or inadvertent official ignorance. We do not yet know who they all are. A complete list of all White House staff has never been made regularly available. For years many such pertinent records were simply not kept. Official sources only release certain, and in themselves incomplete, information on the staff.
Third the White House staff progressively ceased to have any proper statutory basis in law. That this should have amounted to illegality was less of practical importance than it was politically significant. Nevertheless, such was the accumulative illegality by 1978 that the transition staff which served President-Elect Carter between November 1976 and January 1977 actually had far more legal basis for its existence (under the terms of the Presidential Transition Act 1963217) than both the outgoing Ford staff that they replaced and the incoming Carter staff that they became.

Fourth Presidents have historically enjoyed virtually absolute discretion in all matters relating to the White House staff: their terms of employment, hiring and firing, salary, job title, and function. Until 1978 the only restrictions that operated upon a President were the upper limit on the top salary grade for his most senior staff, and the overall dollar limitation affixed to the various staff budgets. But even these budget constraints could be, and have been, effectively circumvented by using detailees. Since 1978 the President's carte blanche has only lightly been circumscribed.

The subject of the White House staff is thus a complex one; more so than might have at first been thought. This chapter has sought to tackle several of the immediate problems encountered by the student in this field. Together these comprise a single question of definition that in some degree still defies final resolution. But we have emerged with an enhanced understanding of the question that will prove of lasting value throughout this study. The most remarkable aspect of other literature on the White House staff has been its lack of such an understanding. Indeed the attempt has all too often simply not been made. The question of definition, in all its forms, has therefore been almost totally ignored. This omission will become apparent as we turn to our analysis of the literature.
CHAPTER II

ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE
INTRODUCTION

The White House staff may have progressively escaped from the restrictions that the term "a passion for anonymity" was designed to impose upon them, but the same cannot be said of their place in the extensive literature on American politics. By any standards that place is quite inadequate. For too long the growth and development of the White House staff escaped serious and sustained attention. For a far longer period its development and operation escaped serious and sustained criticism. It has now become widely accepted that the White House staff can occupy a powerful position in any Presidency, but this has not been reflected in political writing to a degree commensurate with this new-found understanding. To date there have been few contributions specifically aimed at improving the debate on the purpose and effect of the White House staff.

Whether or not this state of affairs owes more to their anomalous position in law or their unique political relationship to the rest of the structure of government is an open question. Certainly it owes not a little to the difficulties of obtaining what solid information about them exists, and in constructing some measure by which one President's staff can be compared with another. This, in turn, is partly derived from their real but nevertheless, to outsiders, intangible situation inside the White House. But the real reasons go deeper still. The academic community, in particular, bears a heavy responsibility for not, until recently, treating the White House staff as seriously as they deserved to be. This negligence was the price paid for a generation of political scientists who pinned their collective faith in, and built their collective political analysis upon, a "strong" Presidency. The Press and media, by and large, reflected this majority view, which, moreover, was well suited to their own natural preference.
Various excuses have been offered for this neglect, including the passage of sufficient time for adequate comparison and the accumulation of basic evidence. It is perfectly valid to argue that only with the passage of a sufficient period of time, and number of presidencies, could observers reasonably attempt the analysis of the growth in importance of the staff and of the differing methods of organization employed by different Presidents. But this argument begins to lose its force with the onset of the 1960s and the contrast between the incoming Kennedy Administration with its predecessor. To the discerning eye it is weakened still further during the Johnson years by the tendency to conduct government from the White House. And finally, quite irrespective of Watergate, it is demolished by the experience of the first term of the Nixon Administration when centralised White House power reached unprecedented administrative heights. The deteriorating applicability of this line of argument should, in and of itself, have prompted full-scale studies of the White House staff. But it didn't. Rather it seems more likely that Watergate alone finally brought the White House staff to the forefront of the agenda of political discussion and writing on the Presidency.

This chapter deals with the wide range of literature from which can be garnered information of some kind on the White House staff. What follows is designed, firstly, to bring this unwieldy array of political literature into some workable order; secondly, to identify for our purposes the principal categories of writing which bear on the staff; and thirdly, to analyse the kind of information that each of these categories tends to produce and the value we can place upon it in the present study. The first of these tasks is best explained in conjunction with the second; and to some degree the second is implicit in the third.

In most research enterprises there is a primary division to be made
between raw material on the one hand and secondary source material on the other. Broadly speaking, such a division can here be maintained but with the proviso that a number of subtle distinctions can also be brought into play. The first such distinction concerns what may be termed the progression of immediacy. This can perhaps best be described by reference to the diagrammatic device of a series of concentric rings around a central point. At the centre stands the President and his White House staff. The first ring around them consists of those others most immediately in contact with them: Cabinet officers and other government officials of various kinds. The next ring outward would contain the Press and the media. They are in frequent contact with the President and especially his staff but usually at a greater distance than some government officials. This progression away from the scene of the action next takes in those observers and writers on the Presidency from the academic community, whether students of political science, of public administration or, further away still, historians and biographers who write with both the advantages and disadvantages of dealing with their subject at a certain distance. Together they all form the last such concentric ring.

But this analysis would not be complete were it to ignore certain other kinds of writing. Although, taken as a whole, they do not fall cleanly into our pattern of concentric rings, in their own way these other writings represent another step in our progression away from the immediacy of the White House. These writings include political writing about the man before he became President; personal writing of one kind or another; sociological and psychological literature of interest; literature on the Medieval age (of great relevance as well as of great interest); and finally even includes works of political fiction which shed their own brand of light on what goes on in the West Wing.
Breaking the literature down in this way does not exhaust the subtleties with which we must deal. For example, as we shall see, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between the literature relating to senior and middle-ranking levels of the White House staff itself. As would be expected, this necessity increases in rough proportion to the growth of the staff in terms of its sheer physical size. Other distinctions can be made elsewhere, in other rings, as for example that between the White House Press Corps and other sections of the Press. Prestige aside, the former is in more frequent contact with the White House staff than the latter, and indeed may be considered to produce some of the best secondary source material available.

This leads us to consider the kinds of information that each of the groups that occupy our concentric rings tends to produce. As a general rule of thumb, even if it borders on a truism to say so, each group suffers to some extent from the disadvantages inherent in the advantages it has to begin with. Take, for example, the position of the political science community (irrespective of its predisposition to support, and reluctance to criticize, the growth of the 'strong' Presidency). The ability of the political scientist to take a more objective view of the organization of a President's White House staff and to gather differing interpretations together into a cohesive whole is more than matched by the inability to measure at first hand, or even to recognise, all the factors at work influencing the operation and behaviour of that staff. Then again, although the Press are a good and useful source of information on the day-to-day activities and attitudes of the staff, the Press still lacks the time (and/or inclination) to sift through and analyse this constant stream of information bombarding them, and to weigh what they receive in the wider context. This the historian is most easily able to do. This line of argument will be discussed in more detail in the pages that follow.
Before we begin our analysis one question presents itself. What counts as raw material or primary evidence for the purposes of this study? Insofar as it is about the President's White House staff the answer therefore jointly consists of what the Presidents and the staff themselves have to say. Anything originating elsewhere must be considered, in some degree, as a contribution to the general store of secondary source material. The progression of immediacy relates both to the intrinsic value that can be placed upon whatever writing is being considered and to its use in analysing the organization of a particular staff. The value that can be ascribed to each such contribution is not precisely proportionate to its proximity to the scene of the action. Proximity is a guide to its value; not an ironclad rule.

There is another subtlety that comes into play: the distinction between what is on and off the record. What Presidents and staff have had to say has often varied considerably when speaking off the record as against speaking on the record. Unsurprisingly, the former has usually been far more revealing than the latter because people naturally feel they have a greater freedom in saying what they think when not so strictly held accountable for what they say. But this presents a unique difficulty in the case of Presidents. Everything a President thinks, says, (tapes), or does can have a political impact. Presidents thus have a greater proportion of their views on the record than anyone else. Moreover this persists after a President has left office when, for reasons of self-justification, he is still likely to preserve previous on-the-record opinions. To some extent, therefore, any study of the President's White House staff will suffer from the imbalance of not adequately knowing what the President really thought about it all.

However, it is with the Presidents and staff themselves that this analysis begins. It primarily covers the period from Roosevelt to Ford and is divided, as already indicated, into four main categories. The second will deal with the Press and media; the third with the academic community; and the fourth will cover a wide range of other pertinent writings.
PARTICIPANTS

This category, unlike any other, does not consist of secondary source material. Rather, by definition, the body of literature that has been produced by participants should be regarded not only as raw material but as prime evidence for the purposes of this study. It uniquely draws upon, and explains, direct personal experience of the subject.

The primary division in this category must be that between the Presidents themselves on the one hand, and the members of the White House staff on the other. They constitute between them the two most intimate sides of the story. Yet we should not overlook a third important subdivision: namely, the literature emanating from Cabinet and Congress. Both participate in decision-making at the White House and are often in a position to observe at first hand, and be affected by, the relationship between a President and his staff. These three subdivisions do not entirely preempt or exhaust the full range of this category as further discussion will make clear.

PRESIDENTS

Turning first to the Presidents themselves it will be a responsibility of the present study to compile and analyse and discuss the views and opinions held by the Presidents on all aspects of their White House staffs. The process of compilation need not be here considered. It is unnecessary. The analysis, however, is more interesting. Presidential opinions come in a variety or forms at a variety of times and for a variety of reasons. This provides us with a convenient and simple means of analysis.

We can postulate four 'dimensions' with which to consider the body of literature produced by Presidents. The form dimension deals with the
various forms in which presidential opinions have been expressed. The main 'axis' of this form dimension runs from the formal expression of views to the informal. The time dimension distinguishes between presidential opinions on the basis of the differing times they were offered. The 'axis' associated with this time dimension covers the period from well before the Presidency to well after it. The event dimension seeks to distinguish presidential statements about their staff according to the different events that may have prompted such statements. Here the 'axis' may be considered to run from the individual to the mass event. The motive dimension attempts to differentiate between the varying motives behind presidential statements on the staff. The 'axis' can be considered to run from the general to the specific motive. These four dimensions will be taken in turn as vehicles for discussing the presidential perspective of the White House staff.

It is both remarkable and revealing that this perspective should have changed so little and deepened so much. For in examining different presidencies we are not always comparing like with like. For example, certain factors have permeated the history of the Presidency over the last forty years with markedly increasing effect. These factors include the enlarged power of the United States since the Second World War and the influence of foreign policy on the decisions of government. No less important has been the growing complexity of domestic government since the Depression in the 1930's forced its increased role in, and responsibility for, the lives of its citizens. These factors themselves have combined to produce a growing strain on the machinery of government, with a proportionately greater strain accruing to the Office of President. Presidents from Roosevelt onwards have faced the ever more complex twosided equation of unchanging human nature and human problems on the one hand and ever changing political problems on the other - the whole bundle
itself being a continuously changing mixture. It is just this changing frame of reference which these four dimensions encompass.

Taking first what we have termed the form dimension, we find a variety of forms through which Presidents have been known to express their view or opinions on the White House staff. These range from Executive Orders to other presidential statements such as Messages to Congress, Press Conferences, writings of one kind or another, and direct quotations found in other sources. On top of these come memoirs.

Certainly, if we had to rely exclusively on presidential memoirs for our understanding of presidential views on the White House staff then we could not pursue this line of inquiry very far or with much result. Of the Presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt only Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson and Nixon have written memoirs. None has ever devoted even so much as a small section directly to a description of their White House Office: whom it comprised and how it operated.

The advantage of memoirs lies in part in the very freedom they accord, by definition, for a considered judgement by a President examining and summing-up his own experience. Unhappily this has not necessarily prevented Presidents from producing work that is either uninformative or bland. For example, President Johnson never once addressed himself to the subject of his own White House staff in his memoirs The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency. Indeed his only reference to the staff at all was briefly in connexion with the changeover from Kennedy to himself and the impossibility of most of the former's staff to transfer their loyalties accordingly. "I could understand this", wrote Johnson, "although it complicated my task." While he did not go on to explain why and how at greater length, it was enough, perhaps, that he had thus identified
"loyalty" as the staff's most pertinent quality.

President Eisenhower, by contrast, did devote a few paragraphs to his immediate staff assistance in his memoirs *Mandate for Change* and *Waging Peace*. However, the element of self-justification which is bound to be present in all such memoirs is especially brought to bear on the subject of the White House Office - a feature which will receive further attention below. Perhaps the best Presidential memoirs of recent times are the two volumes by President Truman, *Year of Decisions* and *Years of Trial and Hope*, but they are not as informative a source of his views of the White House staff as are to be found elsewhere.

While in office Presidents issue a vast number of official statements and these can take various forms. One of these, for example, is the Executive Order. It was through the medium of the Executive Order that the White House Office was actually established. This was Executive Order No. 8248 issued on September 8th 1939 and entitled *The Reorganization of the Executive Office of the President*. In itself it was not a very long statement, and simply set out briefly the duties of the White House Office, the Secretaries to the President, the Executive Clerk and the Administrative Assistants to the President. Its purpose was merely to give the official Roosevelt explanation of how it was supposed to operate.

Another example of an Executive Order, although this time affecting only a single member of the staff rather than the whole entity, is provided by President Nixon's Executive Order No. 11456. Its title, *Special Assistant to the President for Liaison with Former Presidents*, is self-explanatory. Rare among official presidential statements on the White House staff it set out in some detail the duties that this post would entail. Yet another example of the use of an Executive Order as a means of reflecting...
presidential views on the White House staff and how it should operate is
provided, again, by President Nixon. After his re-election he promul-
gated Executive Order No. 26815 entitled Delegation of Functions to
Executive Director of Domestic Council. 9 It should be remembered that
whoever served in this capacity was also considered a senior member of
the White House staff, and so this order stands as a good example of the
way in which a President's views on the staff are contained in official
statements. Again, good but uncommon. The overwhelming majority of the
staff are accorded no such job description.

Another type of official presidential statement which was used as a
vehicle for the expression of presidential views on the organization of
the presidency has been the presidential Message. Once more, President
Nixon provides an example of this in action. In February 1972 he sent his
revised Departmental Reorganization Program to Capitol Hill for consi-
deration, accompanied by a President's Message to Congress. 10 President
Nixon dwelt at length on the need to make "a concerted and sustained
effort to reorganize the Executive Branch according to a coherent, compre-
hensive view", 11 and in the course of his analysis there can be discerned
valuable clues and references to his thinking on the proper state of
decision-making at the White House. This thinking has in turn a direct
bearing on the condition of his White House staff.

All presidential statements in public must of course be considered official,
but the form in which presidential views on the White House staff can be
most pointedly expressed occurs in the Press Conference situation. It has
been a remarkable feature over the years how little interest has apparently
been taken by the Press and media in the operation of the President's
White House Office, as measured in terms of questions asked at Press
Conferences. However, in the case of President Eisenhower, for example,
there were two occasions in 1958 when questions directly centering on the staff elicited forthright answers by the President and moreover in a manner which was not to be found later in his memoirs. This may perhaps be accounted for by the fact that the President was notably irritated at the questions even being put. But the fact remains that in answer to questions about "your general concept about the functioning of the White House staff, as you have organized it" and the "precautions" taken against a "palace guard" President Eisenhower offered perhaps the most heartfelt opinions he ever delivered on the subject. Other examples of Presidents at Press Conferences would include President Roosevelt's elusive description of staff aide Harry Hopkins in 1941, and President Nixon's response to a specific question on the proper role of staff members when dealing with regulatory agencies.

Occasionally a glimpse of the Presidential mind as it relates in a general sense to the problems of a White House Office can come in the form of other Presidential writings, besides memoirs. Two such examples of this can be found with Presidents Kennedy and Carter. President Kennedy, in 1963, wrote a Foreword to a slim volume entitled Decision-Making in the White House written by his Special Counsel Theodore C. Sorensen, who was in some ways Kennedy's closest staff member. Kennedy's remarks were brief but he nevertheless managed to emphasize that "the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer - often, indeed, to the decider himself." A tell-tale sign, perhaps, that even Presidents don't always know exactly how they organize their decisions - and their staff. In President Carter's case he wrote what one might term a 'campaigning autobiography' in which he set out his general thoughts on getting the best out of government. Although it is still too early to say exactly how one might relate the thoughts expressed in his book Why Not The Best to his actual performance in office, this provided telling
indicators of his desire for reorganization and his general approach to bureaucracy and its reform. For example, he described the changes that he sought to introduce as Governor and observed that "there was intense opposition from the bureaucrats who thrived on confusion, from special interests who preferred to work in the dark, and from a few legislative leaders who did not want to see their fiefdoms endangered." As it can be argued that his experience as Governor will greatly shape his Presidential attempts at reform, so too it can be argued that his experience of the bureaucracy will have an influence on the way he decides to organize his White House Office.

Yet another form in which Presidential views can emerge is that of the Press or Media interview. Generally speaking the occasions for exclusive wide-ranging interviews during a Presidency are few and far between, and anyway tend to concentrate on the issues and problems and successes of the day rather than on the machinery of government. For example, the interview given by President Kennedy entitled "Mid-Term Television Conversation on the Presidency". A somewhat different example was furnished by a book published ten years earlier entitled simply Mr. President. Its subtitle referred to its being based on "revealing interviews" with President Truman, and as regards the White House staff he certainly delivered his opinions in the straightforward manner for which he is especially remembered. "To make sure that I get the facts I need," said Truman, "I also had to reorganize the office and staff of the President." He went on to describe the broad outlines of his staff and the way he wanted things run - all very useful evidence of one President's methods.

A legitimate offshoot of the press interview can be the directly attributable quotation. Although this would give by definition the merest
glimpse into the Presidential mind it can be none the less informative for that; or colourful. In President Johnson's case the two qualities were typically combined in a remark which David Halberstam included in his book The Best and the Brightest. Here President Johnson elucidated what he meant by 'loyalty' in his White House staff. "I don't just want loyalty," said Johnson. "I want loyalty. I want him to kiss my ass in Macy's window and tell me it smells like roses. I want his pecker in my pocket." The language may be crude but the meaning is clear, not least the emphasis that Johnson placed on this particular quality. Certainly it tells us something of importance about the way Johnson wanted his White House Office to work which is not available from a reading of his memoirs alone.

To recap briefly, thus far we have seen that the prime evidence produced by Presidents on the subject of their White House Office and staff has come in about six principal forms, which we have together termed the form dimension. These six have been presidential memoirs, official statements such as Executive Orders, or Messages, answers given in Press Conferences, other writings of one kind or another, Press or media interviews and other directly attributable quotations of some kind. We should now turn to consider any ramifications ensuing from the differing times that presidential opinions have been proferred.

Presidential views on the White House Office can be distinguished one from another by reference to the time at which they were expressed. These possible variations together make up what we have termed the time dimension. Five principal distinctions come to mind. Firstly, there is anything the President might have said well before the time he became President. Secondly, there may be opinions expressed during the presidential campaign. Thirdly, we can distinguish the views of a President newly immersed in his
opening months of office from, fourthly, anything he may have to say during the rest of his presidency when he has settled down in the job. And finally there are those views which are the product of a man who has left the Presidency behind him. This is not to say that all Presidents have changed their views of the White House staff five times in their life. Nevertheless, on occasion, a certain shift in emphasis can be detected between what a President may have had to say at one time and at another. It might be thought that these distinctions are too fine: sometimes, it is true, they do indeed merge. But they remain defensible as major stages in a Presidential life, each of which brings with it its own special perspective.

The political background of Presidents in recent times has tended to spring from service in Congress, though not exclusively so. President Eisenhower is the most notable exception. Both President Franklin Roosevelt and President Jimmy Carter were Governors prior to their presidencies; and three Presidents served first as Vice President. But for those who did hold prior political positions, of whatever kind, this has also brought some experience of a political staff and how to organize it. Where appropriate this can give us clues as to his later treatment of a White House staff. For example, the obvious importance which President Johnson placed on loyalty in his staff can be traced back directly to a similar emphasis by Senate Majority Leader Johnson. Even in the case of the one President who did not have any specific political background, President Eisenhower, this did not prevent him from holding certain strong views on the way a staff should be organized well before his assumption of the office. "For years", wrote Eisenhower, "I had been in frequent contact with the Executive Office of the White House and I had certain ideas about the system, or lack of system, under which it operated." This is a very different tone from later remarks he made, as will be apparent below.
As regards anything a presidential candidate may have had to say during the course of the presidential election campaign there is a natural tendency to treat it with caution. As it happens, no presidential candidate - with the exception of Carter - has ever had occasion openly to say anything at all about either The White House Office or the ways in which the presidency should be organized. Any such opinions must be deduced in other ways. That President Carter should be that exception says a good deal about the imprint of Watergate and the Nixon Presidency upon the public mind. But the fact remains that Candidate Carter made a point of singling out The White House Office and staff as an aspect of the presidency to which he would devote priority attention and for which he would introduce much needed reforms. What was true for Candidate Carter remained true for President-Elect Carter during the transition. Another example of a President addressing the subject of the staff during the transition period occurred with President-Elect Nixon late in 1968, when he talked about the advantages of a young energetic staff who learn "awfully fast." These are words to weigh against subsequent experience.

Although Presidents have taken office in January since 1937, it can be argued that it takes a number of months before they come to feel comfortable and in full command. It is for this reason what we may set apart remarks made about the White House staff in this initial period from others rendered at a later stage. For there is a legitimate difference between a President's initial intentions and his more mature view derived from greater experience. One of the more well-known instances of this difference in operation concerns President Kennedy. For example, in an interview given in April 1961, only three months after assuming office, he remarked that "I think we sometimes overstate the ministerial difficulties of the Presidency." Before the month was out he had good reason
to reappraise that statement, together with his other thoughts on the management of the presidency, as a result of the Bay of Pigs adventure. Both Kennedy himself, and members of his staff around him, have testified to the impact made by that event and its effect in removing their comfortable illusions about the way things should be run, especially as regards the role of the staff in national security. To take other examples, there is evidence that President Nixon took even longer than four months to settle down. President Carter too, by the end of his first year, was also taking steps to re-fashion his staff organization.

Once Presidents are firmly in command of their job and The White House Office their comments on the latter are invested with a certainty that is usually free from self-justification of the kind occasionally found in memoirs. It is more straightforward. For example, when President Franklin Roosevelt was visited by Wendell Wilkie, whom he had defeated in the presidential election of 1940, he was asked by Wilkie why Roosevelt kept Harry Hopkins (who was a member of his staff) so close to him. Roosevelt replied quite openly that Hopkins was necessary in a classic reply that has maintained its relevance to subsequent Presidents and presidencies. In a similar open vein are the remarks made by President Johnson, quoted above, on the need for loyalty. President Truman also had some blunt things to say about his White House staff while in the presidency, as when he referred to the fact that "I have had some men round here with the itch for power or self-aggrandizement." If Presidents choose to they can be either revealingly candid or unerringly uninformative in what they say about the staff during this time period of their presidency. Even President Nixon was capable of the former, as in his statement of January 5th 1973 concerning Executive Reorganization where he revealed the functions that his staff of Assistants would
perform. But one would expect him also to have been capable of the latter, and a case in point was the non-answer he once gave to an inquiry about the 'proper role of staff members.'

Finally, what can we say about the kind of opinions a President expresses after he has ceased to be President? This subdivision is really very similar to that of presidential memoirs discussed above. But it can include other things besides. For example, Mr. Truman published a book in 1960 entitled *Mr. Citizen* in which he had certain criticisms to make of The White House Office which he would not have been capable of making while he himself had been in office. In particular he took exception to what he termed "this present trend toward a huge White House staff." His subsequent remarks about the insulation of the President undoubtedly derive from his opinion of the Eisenhower Presidency, which by then had nearly run its full course. Presidential opinions of other Presidents always shed light both ways and are useful for that reason. There is also a shift of emphasis at work affecting both the reason for, and form of, presidential memoirs among other writings. There is a much greater emphasis on self-justification and the re-correction of Press and media interpretations. Because these latter can be propagated so easily and so comprehensively the motive for memoir-writing has been given an added urgency.

We come now to consider presidential opinions and views in the context of the events that prompted them. This we have termed the event dimension.

Starting on the individual level, there have occasionally arisen special circumstances which concerned a single member of the White House staff and which have afforded Presidents the opportunity to make statements on
the way they organize their White House Office. Not that they always take
that opportunity. When Wally Jenkins, for example, who was a member of
President Johnson's staff, was arrested and charged early in 1964, Johnson
kept as silent as he could about the whole matter. By contrast, when
President Carter's adviser on drugs, Dr. Peter Bourne, was obliged to hand
in his resignation from the White House staff in July 1978, the President
spoke openly about the matter at a Press Conference. In the most well-
known example of this type of event, when Sherman Adams, who was President
Eisenhower's Chief of Staff in the White House, was charged with improper
conduct, Eisenhower could not avoid the need to make public statements
about the matter. Apart from defending Sherman Adams personally, Eisenhower
also addressed himself, during his Press Conferences, to the question of
the running of the White House staff.

On the general level, Presidents have usually been obliged to make a
reference to their staff whenever they have proposed some serious reorgani-
zation of government. This was certainly the case with President Franklin
Roosevelt, whose Executive Order setting up The White House Office has
already been described. So too has the statement on reorganization which
accompanied President Nixon's reorganization proposals issued on January
5th 1973. In President Nixon's case, given his tendency to resort to as
few Press Conferences and other forms of access as possible, any clues as
to his thinking on the way he wanted to organize his White House were
welcome. President Carter, currently engaged (as of this writing) in a
reorganization of the Executive Branch, has also been obliged to refer
to the position of the White House staff.

Prior to President Nixon's presidency one might have thought that the
kinds of event to precipitate Presidential views on the White House staff
would have been restricted to the two kinds just discussed. But a third level of event must be brought into existence to take account of Watergate. It might be termed the 'crisis level'. Other crises of one kind or another, such as the Cuban missile crisis, or Korea, or the events of the summer of 1968, were not as susceptible of triggering such widespread discussion of the White House staff. Watergate, however, provoked the widest and deepest public discussion of the President's White House Office that had ever been known. The relevant point here is that President Nixon was obliged to respond, however unwillingly, as the full scope of Watergate was unravelled, and was obliged to talk about his White House staff. For example, when he was obliged to accept the resignations of his two senior aides Haldeman and Ehrlichman President Nixon went out of his way to announce on prime time TV that they were "two of the finest public servants it has ever been my privilege to know." As an indication of the value President Nixon placed upon senior figures in his Administration it must count as primary evidence for this study.

The effect of Watergate has been to supercede the need for there to be any particular 'event' necessitating special presidential statements on The White House Office. This subject has now been elevated by the Press and media into a legitimate and necessary subject for regular inquiry. To give an example; due partly to President Ford's initiative and partly to Press demand, the White House Press Corps were given a full briefing on the organization of The White House Office by Ford's then Chief of Staff. This was the very first time that such a briefing had ever taken place and serves as an indication of the higher level of interest that such matters now have.

Implicit in the drawing of distinctions between the different categories
of presidential opinion on the staff are two additional factors with which we have not, so far, dealt. Firstly, that of motive; and secondly, that of prior experience. These latter two 'dimensions' are largely self-evident.

We have already noted that concerns of self-justification are at their strongest in presidential memoirs and other writings after the fact. These are more likely to be general statements, as are President Johnson's. During the Presidency, by contrast, they are more likely to be specific statements defending a particular action involving a member of the staff: for example, President Truman's defence of Harry Vaughn.48 Prior to the Presidency one encounters another motive - that of regular partisan attack. The 1970s have indeed provided many examples of leading presidential candidates expressing their opinion on the grave defects of the Nixon White House Office. These must, in part, be judged against the political background of the time. However, none were so serious in bringing this issue to the forefront than Candidate Carter and his running-mate.49 It will be especially interesting to ascertain to what extent his presidential actions will prove to have been influenced by his campaign rhetoric.

A President's previous political experience has, naturally, a pervading influence on what he says about his staff. From Truman to Ford the dominant prior political experience of Presidents was that gained in the Legislature (and the Vice Presidency) - Eisenhower being the sole exception. This common factor links their attitude to political staff, and puts them into one category. President Carter has now broken this 'tradition': his prior political experience, like Franklin Roosevelt's, being Executive, in the form of a Governorship. Yet Carter does share one other emerging common factor in the political backgrounds of recent Presidents: campaigning.
This is becoming more extensive than ever before. Both Nixon and Carter came to office after a period of prolonged campaigning as a private citizen. In Carter's case, this campaigning, together with his non-Washingtonian and Governorship background, amounts to a unique perspective which may well influence his attitude to his staff in a way which has not been seen in previous Presidencies. For example, Carter had firmer preset views on executive reorganization than Presidents with primarily legislative backgrounds.

CONCLUSION

We have raised some of the factors involved in assessing Presidential opinions on the White House staff. It remains to be said that the sum total of any President's recorded views on his White House Office and its organization is relatively meagre. The natural question is why? Apart from a possible genuine reluctance by Presidents to discuss their staff, the answer lies mostly in other people's neglect.

To a certain extent, for the earlier Presidencies of Roosevelt and Truman, this may be reasonable given that their staff were relatively small and the development of their functions still in its early stages. But it is also true that for a much longer time the White House staff were not considered a subject on which Presidents either habitually made, or were required to make, their views known. The Press, Congress, and the academic community must share the blame for that.

For the Press, the organization of The White House Office per se was not considered either a necessary or important enough topic to raise directly with Presidents. Although individual members of the Press naturally took
an interest in establishing and maintaining good contacts with individual members of the White House staff it was not a topic for regular or on-the-record Press inquiry. Thus, for example, few Presidential views were ever made known through the medium of Press Conferences.

In Congress, any interest in these matters was neutralised by the prevailing sentiment that they had no more right (or need) to know how the President chose to organize his staff than the President had the right to know how they organized their Congressional staffs. (This is discussed in detail elsewhere).

In the academic community the White House Office escaped serious scrutiny primarily because it was accepted as a logically necessary part of the post-war "strong" Presidency which that community, by and large, supported. Only when that conception of the Presidency finally came under attack in the late 1960s and 1970s was the extent to which the White House staff played a major role fully realised. Fortunately for this study, members of the White House staff have at least left us a better record of their opinions and experiences than have their respective former employers, which we shall now consider.

THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF

The proportion of members of the White House staff who have written about their work or experiences on the staff, or about the President they served, must by any reckoning be considered comparatively small. Over the years since 1939 several hundreds of people have served on the successive White House staffs of eight Presidents and yet only a relative handful have left behind them some record of their experience. Those that have provided an
account have done so in various ways, not always by writing a book — although many have — and not always seeking as their first priority to describe or analyse the particular White House staff of which they were members. As with Presidents, their motives for writing have varied widely; indeed, in some cases, their contribution has not been voluntarily given. The quality of the literature produced has also varied, and its relevance to the present study will be central to this analysis.

Two general points can be made at the outset. Firstly, the rate at which the literature has been produced has grown over the years since the 1930s. This simply parallels their growth in numbers and their growth in importance. Secondly, the quality of the literature has progressively become less descriptive and more analytical. This, too, is a natural consequence of there being more to be analytical about, coupled with a greater demand for such analysis.

To illustrate these two points we can make some rough and ready calculations of the numbers of staff of successive Presidents who have chosen to leave some record of their experiences, in whatever form. Starting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, we find that some seven members of his staff wrote about their service under him. Only four former staff members can be considered to have provided any serious thoughts on their time under President Truman. Relatively few can be discerned from the Eisenhower presidency as the number only amounts to five. The situation begins to change radically when one considers the Kennedy Presidency. There we find that nearly a dozen former members of his staff have committed themselves to print in one form or another to deal with their experiences during the years 1961-63. A similar figure can be counted for the period of the Johnson presidency. Another rise in the number comes
with the Nixon Administration: so far this amounts to about sixteen. The number is still rising (as of this writing) for the same obvious reason that also applies to the staff who served under President Ford: namely, that these presidencies are still recent.\textsuperscript{52}

The quality of the contributions over the years has greatly changed. As the staff have grown in size and power they have themselves come to realise what special contribution they can make to writings on politics at the White House level. For example, in the case of three former members of President Truman's staff, it is significant that it was not until 1973 that what they had to say was committed to print. Not only is this a consequence of the rising interest in the staff: the analyses of former presidencies are being revised from the perspective of the White House staffs which served under them.

Another reason for the improving quality is quite simply that the White House staffer's unique perspective has increasingly conferred greater and greater authority on the writer. For example, a Samuel Rosenman (in the Roosevelt 1930s) cannot match a Theodore C. Sorensen (in the Kennedy 1960s) for the amount and quality of information and analysis on their respective Presidents' Administrations. Perhaps they, in turn, cannot match the authority of an H.R. Haldeman or a Henry Kissinger (in the Nixon 1970s).

In analysing the body of literature produced over the last forty years by members of the White House staff we can identify several different categories. This parallels our treatment of the Presidents themselves, although these categories do not exactly match those of the former group. For example, one can distinguish political writings, primarily about a
particular President or presidency, from those written essentially as a personal account - perhaps in the form of an autobiography. Then there may be those who have written about a particular political issue as they saw or experienced it from their position on the staff. In addition, some have set out to write a work of general political analysis in which they seek to present their view of American politics or the political system in general. Naturally enough, these tend to revolve around the institution of the presidency.

Another important distinction that can and should be drawn between different contributions emerges from a general appreciation of the concept of staff seniority. There are no standard guidelines to distinguish senior members of the staff from middle-ranking members or junior members, but prima facie judgements can nevertheless be made. For example, one can distinguish between Theodore Sorensen and Mrs. Evelyn Lincoln in this respect, both of whom wrote books on the Kennedy presidency. Apropos the Johnson presidency, we can likewise distinguish between Joseph Califano, who was a senior staff member, and Harry McPherson, who counted as middle-rank. Such distinctions can even be observed in the career of an individual. To take but one example from the Nixon years we can distinguish between the earlier and later phases of the White House career of John W. Dean III: from being middle-rank to being, all but briefly, decidedly senior.

As with certain Presidents, some members of the staff have written at widely-spaced intervals on the same subject. This in turn has generally betrayed a change of motive. A good example is furnished by Theodore C. Sorensen, about whom more later. Members of the staff may also be impelled or prompted to write about a particular event. The outstanding example here is of course Watergate.
particular President or presidency, from those written essentially as a personal account - perhaps in the form of an autobiography. Then there may be those who have written about a particular political issue as they saw or experienced it from their position on the staff. In addition, some have set out to write a work of general political analysis in which they seek to present their view of American politics or the political system in general. Naturally enough, these tend to revolve around the institution of the presidency.

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That dispenses with the preliminary remarks. The best way to introduce the literature produced by members of the staff is to take the presidencies in turn and discuss what emanated from each. We begin with those assistants who wrote political memoirs of their time with President Roosevelt. Perhaps the best of these was by Samuel I. Rosenman, a jurist and long-time adviser to Roosevelt, who later served as Special Counsel, and who wrote *Working with Roosevelt.* There is much in the book which shed light on the working methods of Roosevelt and the way in which the advisers and staff around the President operated at the President's discretion. This was written in 1952, although twenty-one years later he offered revised judgements on these matters in *The Presidency as I have Seen It.* Another kind of tribute was that by William D. Hassett, one of the Secretaries to the President, who published what was essentially a diary record of his experiences entitled *Off The Record with F.D.R. 1942-1945,* with an Introduction by a former Administrative Assistant, Jonathan Daniels. On a more personal level comes *F.D.R., My Boss* by Grace Tully, who served as the President's personal Secretary.

Much more political are the books by Rexford G. Tugwell, who has been a prolific writer since the 1930s. The most relevant of his books are *The Brains Trust,* *The Enlargement of the Presidency,* and *The Presidency Reappraised* (with Thomas Cronin), although *Off Course: From Truman to Nixon* does not especially refer to his days under President Roosevelt. All these books are based more on analytical re-evaluation than actual experience - an important distinction. Another New Dealer, Benjamin V. Cohen, has written on his time with Roosevelt in *The Presidency As I Have Seen It.* Like Tugwell, Cohen was never an official member of the White House staff proper but he was part of the advisory group that preceded and foreshadowed the formal establishment of the White House Office in
1939. One or two glimpses of the work of an assistant under Roosevelt appear in various other writings on this period. Even the book by the President's physician Ross T. McIntire, entitled *White House Physician*, has something useful to say about the battle for the President's attention. The man who enjoyed the President's confidence in later years to the greatest extent, Harry L. Hopkins, died before there was any chance of his writing about his service to Roosevelt. However, there is much first hand evidence available in the study by Robert E. Sherwood, *The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins*, which is devoted to the relationship between the two men. Sherwood himself was a leading member of President Roosevelt's speech-writing team.

The most interesting feature of the record left by former members of the White House staff under President Truman is that not a single one of them wrote a single book. Furthermore the only 'literature' which was produced has been written years after the Truman presidency ended. Three former staff members, none of whom served the whole period 1945 – 1953, have written on the subject of the President and his staff under the heading *The Presidency as I Have Seen It*. These were Clark M. Clifford, Clayton Fritchey, and W. Averell Harriman. Two of these men served in advisory positions to more than one President but were no more disposed to write of that experience either. There was only one staff member to have served a significant time in the Truman White House who analysed his own experience in print. This was John R. Steelman, the Assistant to the President, whose reflections were given expression in an article he co-authored with H. Dewayne Kraeger entitled *"The Executive Office as Administrative Coordinator"*.  

As regards the Eisenhower Presidency the record is similarly bare. The
most prominent exception, and the most easily explained, was provided by Sherman Adams. He served President Eisenhower for six years, endowed with the title of "The Assistant to the President", and wrote a political record of those years called *First-hand Report*. Arthur Larson, who served as a Special Assistant and Special Consultant, wrote an account of the Eisenhower presidency which he titled *Eisenhower*. Another former member of the staff, Emmet John Hughes, who served as an Administrative Assistant and later as a Consultant, wrote *The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years*. Both were books primarily about the President rather than their own personal political lives. Further reminiscences and thoughts have come from Bryce Harlow and Nelson Rockefeller as published under the heading *The Presidency As I Have Seen It*. Rockefeller was a Special Assistant, while Harlow served first as a Special Assistant in the White House Office, then as an Administrative Assistant, and finally as a Deputy Assistant for Congressional Affairs. Emmet John Hughes himself, while not a leading staff member in the 1950s nevertheless later produced one of the most thoughtful books ever to appear on the Presidency and the White House staff. His book, *The Living Presidency* (which he subtitled "The Resources and Dilemmas of the American Presidential Office") was one of the first attempts at an analytical work by a former member of a White House staff. He summarized his views in *The Presidency After Watergate*.

The explosion of literature on the White House, including the White House staff, begins at the hands of those who served under President Kennedy. This great outpouring of books can partly be explained by the need to preserve and defend the reputation of a man who had not yet had sufficient time to achieve the fulfilment of his political hopes, promises and programme. Partly, too, it owed to the aura of martyrdom that surrounded the Kennedy years. Another factor was the greater Press and media
attention given to the White House staff who worked under Kennedy. This combined with a greater desire on their own part to write about their experience. However, the single most important spur to this increased volume of literature was political in nature. President Kennedy was the first President in the modern era to use his White House staff significantly, as a means to help him organize his Presidency. The Kennedy staff became very influential, and were known to be very influential. Consequently, much that was later written by his staff betrayed the need to mark their claim to that special influence.

The first category of literature by the Kennedy White House staff to appear was of the 'political record' kind. These were relatively straightforward accounts of the Kennedy years, although the angle of approach varied slightly depending on the writer. The acknowledged historian on the staff in the Kennedy White House was Arthur J. Schlesinger Jr. whose book *1000 Days* stands as one of the more authoritative accounts of the Kennedy presidency. Equally authoritative, if not more so in certain respects, but written from a more personal angle, is *Kennedy* by Theodore C. Sorensen. He was Kennedy's Special Counsel and enjoyed a much closer personal relationship with the President than did Schlesinger, who served as a Special Assistant during these years.

Other books by staff members did not so much purport to be complete records of a presidency as personal accounts of their relationship with the President. Opinions may vary, and did within the Kennedy staff, as to which staff were closest to the President, but it is generally acknowledged that a man like Pierre Salinger, for example, who wrote *With Kennedy* was not among the most senior policy advisers. He was Kennedy's Press Secretary. By contrast, General Maxwell D. Taylor's book *Swords and*
Ploughshares reveals that he was a trusted senior adviser but one who only operated in a limited sphere. Middle-ranking members of the staff were not to be outdone in reflections on the Kennedy years. The President’s former personal secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, wrote My Twelve Years With John F. Kennedy, which, as the title suggests, is very much a personal story. In the same vein, but with a more wide-ranging and substantial political content, is "Johnny, We Yardly Knew Ye". This was the joint product of two of Kennedy’s political staff. Kenneth P. O’Donnell and Dave Powers, both Special Assistants in the White House and both from his home state. One significant point about this book is its date of publication, 1973, which was decidedly much later than most of the works produced by the Kennedy staff. In that same year, however, were published the (in some cases further) reflections of former Kennedy staff members under the heading of The Presidency As I have Seen It. These included Ralph A. Dungan, who was a Special Assistant, and Theodore C. Sorensen, Special Counsel.

Sorensen’s output has proved an interesting case over the years since Kennedy’s assassination. Taken together his writings reveal a marked change of view in his judgement of the White House staff itself. His first book, Kennedy, was the most eulogistic piece of work on the former President. Some re-evaluation was evident in his later book entitled The Kennedy Legacy in which the attention he devotes to Kennedy’s style of government and working methods vis-a-vis his staff is notable. In 1973, during the Nixon Administration, his latest thoughts had appeared under the heading of The Presidency As I have Seen It. Although still in favour of a strong Presidency, as in The Case For A Strong Presidency, by this time he had certain reservations on the size of the White House staff and the way in which it was organized. These became much more
strongly stated in a book he wrote two years later in 1975 which was entitled *Watchmen In The Night*. More revealing was its subtitle, "Presidential Accountability After Watergate". Sorensen argued that the problems of accountability had grown considerably more acute since the Kennedy years when he had written his first and somewhat idealised analysis of presidential power entitled *Decision Making In The White House*. In his later book he singled out the White House staff for special criticism and had the honesty to admit that the faults lay deeper than the Nixon Administration alone.

The example of Sorensen illustrates an important general point in the analysis of the literature produced by the White House staff: the effect of the Watergate years on the judgement of earlier presidencies. Even a man like Sorensen, whose career as an adviser to Kennedy naturally led him to defend the concept of an influential staff, eventually recognised dangers independent of the particular staff serving a particular President. Admittedly, Sorensen never conceded that the Kennedy style and method of organization was anything but well suited to the Office of President, but the passage of time and force of events did demand some rethinking.

Sorensen also illustrates the progression from writing a particular political record of a particular presidency to more general works of political analysis. We have noted a similar progression with Emmet John Hughes, and we can point to others, such as Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. He wrote *The Imperial Presidency*, whose title has at least served as a telling epithet on the Nixon years if not on the last 40 years overall. Schlesinger was a trained historian before entering the Kennedy White House so it is less surprising that he should have produced analytical contributions in addition to his historical summary *1000 Days*. Neither should it be
surprising to find that McGeorge Bundy - the archetype 'best and brightest' - also contributed, in the shape of his unapologetic stand for a strong executive power: The Strength of Government. His argument ran more widely than the position and use of the White House staff, although like many books of the 1960s it argued for a balance of executive-legislative-administrative power that found itself under considerable attack during the Nixon years. Yet even Bundy was not immune to second thoughts, as Toward An Open Foreign Policy - The Opportunity And The Problem indicated.

The momentum established by the Kennedy staff was continued in the volume of literature produced by President Johnson’s White House staff. Many of those who worked closely with him have left us a record of some kind, whether in the form of books or interviews, of the Johnson presidency.

The nearest equivalent of a Schlesinger in the Johnson White House was Eric Goldman, an historian and academic by background, who left the staff in 1966, where he had been an Adviser, to write The Tragedy of LBJ. This was one of the more scholarly accounts of the early years of the Johnson Presidency but cannot rival others written by those with a much closer exposure to the style and working methods of the President. In contrast to Kennedy, there was no devoted staff person to labour over a complete record of the Johnson years, if only because no senior adviser really lasted the entire course under such a demanding man and President. One who was close to him in a personal rather than a political sense was Jack Valenti, a Special Assistant and Special Consultant handling his appointments and scheduling, who wrote A Very Human President, in which considerable attention was devoted to daily life in the West Wing where the White House staff are physically located.
A good example of the combined personal and political autobiography is furnished by Harry McPherson's book *A Political Education*. This too has an explanatory subtitle: "A Journal of Life with Senators, Generals, Cabinet Members and Presidents". At a later date he also had published *National Security versus Civil Liberties*. McPherson, who served as a Special Assistant and Special Counsel, was not the most senior of Johnson's aides. Indeed he well illustrates a distinction we should make between staff on the basis of their rank. Unfortunately, such distinctions - more necessary from the 1960s onwards - can never be susceptible of precise measurement. Sometimes the distinction between a top-level member of the staff and a middle-ranking or junior member could and did sometimes merge. This is not to deny the validity of the contribution that McPherson can make, merely to point out the perspective from which he wrote.

President Johnson had a number of journalists on his staff, and some of them have written interesting accounts of those years. George Christian, for example, wrote *The President Steps Down*. Douglass Cater, a distinguished journalist, has written several books. One written during the Johnson years was *Power In Washington* in which he devoted some attention to the styles of successive Presidents since Roosevelt. Perhaps the best of the journalistic contributions came from George E. Reedy, who, like George Christian, served as Johnson's Press Secretary for a time. His book, *The Twilight of the Presidency*, made its mark by approaching the presidency from a practical 'inside' viewpoint to which outsiders, of whatever kind, can rarely if ever aspire. Although he naturally took the Johnson years as the basis of his book, much of what he had to say was applicable to other presidencies, and he thereby helped provide criteria by which to judge them afresh. Although Reedy sought to produce a work of more general analysis in his later book *The Presidency in Flux*, and
wrote in more detail about his job as Press Secretary in Speaking For The President, it is The Twilight of the Presidency that will stand as his most lasting contribution.

Yet another former Press Secretary (they 'enjoyed' a high rate of turnover under Johnson) to have relayed his experiences on the White House staff is Bill Moyers. In an interview entitled The White House Staff vs. The Cabinet, which was published in a wide-ranging study of political life called Inside The System, Moyers identified many of the factors that determine the relationship between the two bodies and thereby the criteria with which Presidents judge the usefulness to him of each. Another important staff figure of the Johnson years was Joseph A. Califano Jr. In his book A Presidential Nation, published some years after the end of the Johnson era, we find another attempt at general political analysis by a member of the White House staff. He had already turned his mind to the subject in The White House Staff: How Many Speak For The President? While neither may be an academic work in the strict sense of the term, by drawing on his own considerable experience in being so close to the centre, they have a political validity of some force.

The Nixon presidency has only recently ended and under normal circumstances one might expect that writings by former members of the staff would only now just begin to emerge. However no circumstances for the end of any presidency could have been less normal. The result is that much that has been produced by staff members owes almost entirely to the effect of Watergate. This is by no means unfortunate. On the contrary, some absorbing and highly authoritative accounts of the Nixon presidency have been produced by those who were uniquely in a position to know how the staff was organized.

The forms in which the Nixon White House staff have expressed their views
and opinions on the staff itself have been varied - and not always volunteered. Some have written generalised accounts; others specifically about Watergate; and several more have provided valuable information through the medium of testimony before various committees. We can take these in turn.

One of the few books to be written by a member of Nixon's staff which was not designed to deal with the Watergate affair but with the general run of the Nixon presidency was that by William Safire, whose official title of Special Assistant does not immediately make clear that he served on the speech-writing staff. He wrote Before The Fall with an explanatory subtitle, "An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House". Despite the fact that Safire at no time counted among the most senior of the staff he provides an invaluable service in casting a dispassionately critical eye on the Nixon White House Office. He also provided interesting observations in writing the text for what was essentially a photographic publication entitled Eye On Nixon: A Photographic Study, but one which had much to offer on the routine and working methods of the President. One of his former speech-writing colleagues, Raymond Price, has also written about his experience and interpretation of the Nixon years. His book, entitled simply With Nixon (echoes of Salinger's book about Kennedy) was published in 1978, and was essentially a political and personal defence of his former chief. Another book dating from before the Watergate affair was Courage And Hesitation. Although authored by someone not actually himself a member of the staff, Allen Drury, it nevertheless mostly contained a series of interviews with the staff about their work and how they operated: among them, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Price and Haig. Yet another speech-writer, Patrick Buchanan, was responsible for another glimpse of the Nixon Presidency with the publication of The New Majority: President
Until the publication of Kissinger's memoirs, a "glimpse" is all we have so far received, as in Kissinger on Kissinger, of his work as Assistant for National Security Affairs.

The list of what might be termed 'Watergate' books is already extensive and not by any means complete. One of the more recently published has been that by one of the most important figures of the Nixon years - H.R. Haldeman. To the extent that his book The Ends of Power ranges more widely than Watergate alone it will retain its relevance and interest. Perhaps the most common type of 'Watergate' book has been the personal autobiography. For example, Jeb Stuart Magruder's An American Life: One Man's Road to Watergate, included a resume of his early life before devoting most of its attention to his work in the Nixon Administration, with particular emphasis on his role in Watergate. The tone was one of mea culpa as he sought to explain how the Nixon Administration came to behave as it did. This tone was also prominent in a discussion with his former professor at Williams College which was later published under the title Reflections on a Course in Ethics.

Where Magruder's book intended to account for his personal development, John W. Dean III, by contrast, sought to give only a political account of his years in the Nixon Administration, mostly spent as Counsel to the President. This he called Blind Ambition: The White House Years. Although orientated towards Watergate Dean nevertheless provided much valuable information about the operation of the Nixon White House staff. He was certainly in a position to view at close hand both the middle-ranking and top level as his career carried him 'upwards' from one to the other.

Unique among presidential administrations was the role played by testimony
in the Nixon years. This took various forms. Firstly, there was the regular run-of-the-mill testimony before congressional committees which is a standard feature of political life in any Administration. Of especial interest to the present study, for example were the congressional Hearings held on President Nixon's Reorganization Proposals which were submitted in 1971. These included testimony given by Roy Ash, who had supervised the preparation of the reorganization proposals, before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. Ash later became a senior Assistant to the President. Such testimony covered many of the problems a President faces in administering the Executive Branch and how he could best organize his White House staff. These Hearings constitute prime evidence of its own legitimate kind.

The distinctive aspect of testimony as a way of acquiring knowledge about the White House staff from the staff itself was most prominently displayed during Watergate. Two congressional committees in particular were responsible: firstly, the Ervin Committee (or Watergate Committee); and secondly the Judiciary Committee. They operated in 1973 and 1974 respectively and were both very fruitful in eliciting information. To give examples, both H.R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman appeared before Senator Sam Ervin's Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. In both cases they were questioned about their regular work in the White House as well as their part in the Watergate affair. These Hearings can be considered substitutes for the in-depth interviews which these two men never gave while they actually worked in the White House. Other members of the staff called to give evidence were John W. Dean III and Alexander P. Butterfield, together with a host of other figures involved in the Watergate affair.

One year after the Ervin Committee had conducted the most publicized part
of its investigations the House Judiciary Committee was preparing its case for impeachment. It held extensive Hearings\textsuperscript{119} preliminary to its final deliberations, which were devoted to collecting the testimony of certain witnesses. Among these were former members of the Nixon White House staff such as John Dean,\textsuperscript{120} Alexander Butterfield,\textsuperscript{121} and Charles Colson.\textsuperscript{122} Never before had Congress directed such detailed questions as to the organization and operation of the White House, and the information obtained was greatly illuminating.

There remain certain other modes of expression in which the Nixon White House staff have indulged. Firstly, some have occasionally given interviews to the Press; for example, Alexander M. Haig Jr.,\textsuperscript{123} Kenneth R. Cole Jr.,\textsuperscript{124} or William Timmons.\textsuperscript{125} Secondly, others have penned short critiques, such as Clark Mollenhoff's \textit{Reflections of a Muckraker}\textsuperscript{126} or Cole's \textit{Should Departments and Agencies Be More Independent?}\textsuperscript{127} Thirdly, the present writer has been able to conduct a number of interviews.\textsuperscript{128} Turning finally to the Ford White House staff, it would be unrealistic (at the time of writing) to expect much as yet in the way of reminiscence. But the record while in office was creditable. During Ford's early days as President, interviews held with his senior staff discussed how he planned to operate his White House staff. For example, three of Ford's most senior aides, Robert Hartmann, Philip Buchen and John Marsh, were interviewed on the subject in \textit{How Ford Runs The White House}.\textsuperscript{128a} An interesting statement was made by Ford's original Press Secretary, Jerry terHorst, in his article entitled \textit{Where Team Loyalty Stops}.\textsuperscript{129} Without doubt, however, the most significant development to emerge from the Ford White House in this connexion was the holding of a \textit{Press Conference}\textsuperscript{130} given by an Assistant to the President, Donald H. Rumsfeld, specifically
on the subject of "White House Organization". This was the first time anything like it had been attempted. It was certainly an authoritative briefing on the subject, as Rumsfeld was at that time serving as Ford's Chief of Staff. As such, it can be classified as prime evidence for our purposes, of presidential intentions.

CONCLUSIONS

This concludes our analysis of the body of literature that has been produced over the years by the members of the White House staff themselves. It remains merely to emphasize a few general points. Firstly, certain distinctions should always be borne in mind between the senior staff of a President and those who served at the middle-rank or junior-rank level. Although these distinctions cannot be appropriate for every President's staff, for the simple reason that The White House Office in its early days was too small a body to be susceptible to distinctions of this kind, they nevertheless began to emerge under Eisenhower. Subsiding somewhat under Kennedy, they came to the fore again by the end of the 1960s, whereupon they became one of the dominant characteristics of the Nixon and Ford White House staffs. Neither have they by any means disappeared under Carter.

Secondly, we should recognise that each staff contribution should primarily be judged according to the position he or she held and the President served under. This is only to state the obvious. Our judgement must be based not only on what he or she may have been expected to know (which would depend on his or her job) but also on what the President wanted him or her to do (which would depend on how he organized his staff).
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Thirdly, we must make due allowance for the length of time the staff member served on the staff. This, too, is a straightforward point. The most authoritative staff judgements are concomitant upon having gained sufficient experience. This generally means they have served a reasonable length of time. Turnover among staff members is often high and it can be difficult to assign a definitive meaning to the phrase 'reasonable length of time'. What is not in dispute is that any staff member who has worked closely with a President for many years, (and this may well predate his presidency), is in a superior position to judge the interaction between the President's ideas, his style, working methods, and organization of his staff.

Fourthly, another obvious point which should be spelt out is that any staff member's writing is bound to reflect his or her own background. These backgrounds have varied considerably. It is only natural, therefore, that Reedy's Twilight of the Presidency should betray his journalistic background and training, while Schlesinger's 1000 Days should reflect his academic and historical credentials. This is not necessarily to prejudge what they have to offer, for it is not their backgrounds alone that determine what they are likely to tell us about the nature of the White House staff. But it helps to explain the different approach each may take.

Before turning to the journalistic or academic approach we have yet to deal with two other groups which can be classified as participant, albeit obliquely: members of the Cabinet and members of Congress. Both groups are in a position to observe the staff in operation at first hand.
CABINET

The rise in volume of literature emanating from the White House staff has been in marked contrast to the dearth of such writings from Cabinet officers and other government officials. The question is: why? Cabinet memoirs have never, at the best of times, been as regular a feature of the corpus of American political literature as has been the case, for example, in Britain. But any explanation for this difference must go deeper than simple comparisons of this kind. The truth appears broadly to be that the rise in White House staff 'publishability' has been accompanied by a corresponding decline in the 'publishability' of Cabinet members. The sole exception here would appear to be the writings of former Secretaries of State. To this extent it reflects the rise of the White House staff and decline of the Cabinet as instruments of Presidential Government.

The Cabinet was still the dominant force in President Roosevelt's Administration, even if only considered as a collection of individuals rather than as a coherent group. Forty years on, in President Nixon's Administration, another collection of individuals had by and large supplanted the Cabinet officers in terms of influence, in terms of their place in the decision-making process, and in terms of their closeness to the President. Moreover, as the White House staff, they functioned far more as a coherent group than did the Cabinet. As Cabinet officers moved towards the outer orbit of Presidential decision-making their individual perspective inevitably became more compartmentalised, more bureaucratic; in short, more parochial. Many factors were responsible for this supplanting of the one group by the other, which we discuss elsewhere. For the moment we are concerned only with its effect on the literature.

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The instances of books by Cabinet officers or other government officials
on the workings of the Presidency are sparse. Such books as have appeared since the 1930s have progressively had less to offer on the organization of the White House and on presidential decision-making in proportion to the greater distance of their authors from the subject. In addition, much of the glamour of involvement in a Presidential Administration has been transferred from members of the Cabinet to members of the President's staff. The latter's closer proximity to the President has enormously enhanced their own 'publishability'. This should not of itself have diminished the appeal or relevance of writings by Cabinet officers. But it may well not be a coincidence that this dearth is a consequence of a declining ability to leaven the details of implementing presidential policy with a valid claim to the presidential perspective.

It should not be surprising, therefore, to discover that, for our purposes, such writing as does exist tends to date from the beginning of our period. For example, one of the best books written by a Cabinet officer is that by Frances Perkins entitled The Roosevelt I Knew. She served as President Roosevelt's Secretary of Labor for the entire duration of his presidency. What she can tell us about Roosevelt's personal life-style, his liking for people of all kinds, his political techniques, his methods of speech-writing, and even such personal facets as his memory, all have a bearing on Roosevelt's approach to his staff. In some ways she is unique in having enjoyed the confidence of the President for so long a period and having got to know him as a person as well as a political figure.

In a very different vein comes the book by Walter J. Hickel called Who Owns America? Until his much publicized "resignation" in the summer of 1970 he was President Nixon's Secretary of the Interior. It quickly became clear, and was confirmed in his book, that he certainly
did not enjoy the confidence of the President and that the feeling was mutual. For his part, Hickel has much to say on the way he feels government should be conducted at the centre and he argues strongly for a strengthened Cabinet and renewed influence of the Cabinet form of government. By so doing he naturally directed his most trenchant criticism against what he saw as a damaging system of White House staff dominance. Two things can be said of Hickel: namely, that his line of argument correctly identified the friction between his views and those of his President; and that in the ensuing confrontation the President won hands down.

If Hickel represented one extreme of the Nixon Cabinet then perhaps it could be argued that Elliot Richardson represented another - that of the Cabinet officer who did everything possible to work with, rather than against, the President's White House. Richardson was prepared to accept what this involved (until Watergate), as he made clear in an interview with the present writer. Yet his published book The Creative Balance did not deal with any of these questions in detail but was more a work of political philosophy.

Other writings by former Cabinet officers which are of use would include the Diaries of Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior, and Cordell Hull's Memoirs which recorded his service under the same President as Secretary of State. Even more stately were Dean Acheson's memoirs, ostentatiously titled Present At the Creation. It is noteworthy that these date from earlier Presidencies than from later ones. The presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson produced no outpouring of literary or political writing by Cabinet officials comparable to that of their staffs. Adam Yarmolinsky, a Deputy Secretary of Defense, had something
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to say about his experience of government, while his former chief Robert McNamara produced a rather dry 'memoir' called The Essence of Security which was really no more than a collection of some of his speeches and other public statements dating from the 1960s. A more substantial work was produced by George Ball, a former Under Secretary of State, entitled Democracy in a Crowded World. But neither dealt with the White House staff in any detail.

In conclusion, there is a paucity of information on the White House staff from Cabinet members. Despite the still influential aspects of certain Cabinet posts, and that they are often well placed to observe the operation of the staff, the fact is that very few members of any President's Cabinet have committed themselves to print. Moreover, contributions from this source have deteriorated as the staff have grown and developed.

**Congress**

Although very separate from the Cabinet, members of Congress should be included here in recognition of their importance. In the course of day-to-day affairs they generally do not come into contact with the White House staff - with the exception of the congressional relations staff. But Congress is the only body constitutionally capable of calling the White House staff to account. We should therefore consider what contribution members of Congress have made towards our understanding of the staff.

For very many years the only institutional point of contact between Congress and the staff lay in the former's responsibility for the
appropriations for The White House Office and other items of staff support to the President. To get any idea of recent congressional attitudes or opinions thus involves an examination of the subcommittee chairmanships of men like Congressman Tom Steed\(^\text{141}\) in the House or Senators Ralph Yarborough\(^\text{142}\) and Joseph Montoya\(^\text{143}\) in the Senate. The years of successive Hearings\(^\text{144}\) which these men and their predecessors conducted annually have produced a corpus of raw material which has progressively become indispensable as a guide to the outward form, structure and resources of the White House staff. This is not to say that such raw material has been exhaustive – certainly not – nor even that it has been regularly provided; only that it must be regarded as prime information for this study.

In recent years Congress has taken more of an interest in the White House staff and this has led to greater congressional enquiry and activity on the subject. One result has been a widening range of available information. For example, Congressman Udall’s 1972 Report on The Growth of the Executive Office 1955-1973.\(^\text{145}\) Udall has also been closely involved with legislation to put the White House staff on a proper legal and authorized basis, and these congressional efforts have spawned a variety of congressional views on the staff. These include the views expressed by Congressmen Howard W. Robison,\(^\text{146}\) Tom Steed,\(^\text{147}\) Thaddeus J. Dulski,\(^\text{148}\) James R. Jones,\(^\text{149}\) Herbert E. Harris II,\(^\text{150}\) Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder,\(^\text{151}\) and Morris K. Udall himself.\(^\text{152}\)

Other forms in which congressional interest has been made manifest include the preparation by the Congressional Research Service of such volumes as How Can The Federal Political System Be Improved?\(^\text{153}\) And Resolved: That the Powers of the Presidency should be Curtailed.\(^\text{154}\) More specialised is Staffing in the White House Office\(^\text{155}\) prepared by Harold C. Relyea.
The GAO have also contributed in the form of a Report of the Comptroller General entitled Improvements Needed In Accounting System Operations regarding the White House Office. Examples of helpful background material would include Bernard Rosen's *The Merit System in the US Civil Service*. Occasionally there has been a perceptive contribution by a congressional staff assistant: for example from Howard Shuman - Administrative Assistant successively to two distinguished Senators, Douglas and Proxmire.

While some Congressmen but hinted at their contact with the staff, as in Senator Hubert Humphrey's *The Education of a Public Man*, others have consciously devoted more attention to it. Walter Mondale, for example, while still a Senator, published *The Accountability of Power* in which he specifically addressed himself to the unconstitutional transference of power from the Cabinet to the White House staff and what should be done to remedy the situation. His contribution stands as one of the most deeply felt statements ever to emanate from Congress.

In conclusion we can point to one development in recent years that has had its impact on the literature. The greater interest that Congress has taken in the White House staff has flushed into the open sharp divergences of opinion which have enriched our understanding of the staff as a flexible body not susceptible to precise accountability. On the other hand, writings on the staff by members of Congress tend to be closely tied to instances of noticeable abuse; or are governed by the prevailing attitude to the President. For both reasons the flow of literature from members of Congress is uneven.
The next most immediate group in our progression away from the White House must be the Press and media. Not only are both close to the scene of the action but they are themselves the means whereby the action is relayed to the wider public. Certainly it comes into more frequent contact with the White House staff than any other single political group.

Despite their close proximity to the White House the Press claim to maintain an objective perspective in their work. This claim is very much a matter for argument, nor can it be judged except in a relative way. For example, by the very nature of their work their criteria for objectivity must differ markedly from that of academic historians. But discussions about their degree of objectivity tend to bypass the single most important contribution that the Press and media have made to the study of the White House staff: they have publicized it. In some respects it was the Press which first recognized, sometimes intuitively, the growing importance of the staff. Partly this is explained by the simple fact that the Press came to realize how useful the staff were as political sources of information about a Presidential Administration. Knowledge is power - especially in Washington D.C. It should not be surprising that the Press should have come to regard the hand that fed them the more important knowledge as the more important power. Partly this came about because of the very emphasis that the Press naturally place on the short-term and the sense of immediacy - an emphasis which both explains the great contribution the Press have made to understanding the White House staff and simultaneously describes its limitations.

Press interest in the White House staff, which had always existed with respect to certain individuals, took on a new form with the advent of the...
Kennedy Administration. Attention began to be focused on how the staff operated as a collective entity and how this related to the President himself. From their position of privileged observer the Press searched for clues of all kinds which they thought might prove useful in constructing this picture. As a result they collected and recorded information about the way the White House was run under successive Presidents that no-one else was collecting. Much of this is highly useful and valid evidence. But there are difficulties. First, this process of collection tends to be unsystematic. Second, the Press and media tend to concentrate on the "immediate" rather than the "analytical" angle. They are dominated by the day to day march of events. But one major effect of this attitude is a decided emphasis on personalities, the small day-to-day conflicts between personalities, and the clash of situations. The Press are dominated by their desire to explain the political process in terms of the individual personalities that happen at any one time to occupy the political stage. Presidential choices and political conflicts, their resolution or escalation, are presented as the outcome of personality struggles, often between different members of the White House staff. Naturally the result can be sterile political comment. Fortunately this is not always the case.

This category of Press and media should rightfully be divided between the Press proper and the media. Although the transmitted image of the latter can be more powerful than the written word of the former, the Press have contributed the overwhelming majority share of the total output on the White House staff. Within that heading of 'the Press' we can distinguish further subdivisions. For example, the primary subdivision from our point of view consists of the White House Press Corps. This is the body of men and women whose lives are specifically devoted to a study of everything that moves in the White House. They are not geared to regard policy
decisions, administrative procedures, political options, personality clashes or presidential schedules as separate categories of political reporting. They see their job as discovering what links them all together. Their daily routine is completely circumscribed by the Press briefings given by the Press Secretary. It is principally through the White House Press Corps that information about the White House and its staff are channelled. This is also where the relationship between Press and staff can be at its most incestuous. The result is a stream of information and comment - some more trivial than the rest. The Press Corps are capable of paying the strictest attention to whose White House Office is where; how far it is from the Oval Office; who is in favour; who has the greatest access to the President; between whom on the staff does the tension really lie; what battles are waged for the President's ear; how the staff is organized; and which staffers are the most senior and influential.

The best example of a journalist in recent years who has both recognised that these matters can be important and yet has combined them with serious political analysis is John Osborne of The New Republic. His work took the form of a continuous series of reports which he entitled The Nixon Watch. They appeared almost weekly during the Nixon Presidency and have survived beyond it. During those years, despite the fact that the staff was at its most inaccessible, Osborne produced a steady stream of reports which sought to analyse the way in which President Nixon was organizing his White House staff. These reports included A Faithful Servant, Kicking Sand, Command Staff, Discipline and Order, Who's Who, Henry's Wonderful Machine, White House Staff, Daddy Dick, Games With Topsy, and Living With Henry. Osborne also dealt with the relationship between the staff and Cabinet officials, as in Secretary Richardson, and Kissinger and Rogers. Having amassed considerable skill in deciphering
the White House scene, Osborne continued his series of investigations under President Ford. Examples of his work in this period included *Settling In*, \(^{174}\) *Ford’s Image Machine*, \(^{175}\) and *And So To Bed*. \(^{176}\) It remains to be seen whether the special expertise which Osborne acquired during the years of Republican Administration is necessary in the new atmosphere of the Carter White House, although he (Osborne) made a start with such pieces as *Would-Be Transition*, \(^{177}\) and *Changing The Guard*. \(^{178}\)

At all events he has been invaluable as a guide to the Nixon White House as seen through journalistic eyes and was among the first to recognise the importance of the way Nixon organized his staff to an understanding of the way decisions were made. \(^{179}\)

Apart from those members of the Press that primarily concentrate on the White House come a special group of journalists that might be termed the Washington 'heavies': the major syndicated columnists. They deserve mention because in the world of the Press, where there is an undeniable herd instinct (well described in Drury's *Capable of Honour*, see below), the major columnists are allowed to become very influential leaders of general Press opinion. For example, James Reston is one that comes to mind although his book *The Artillery of the Press* \(^{180}\) only marginally refers to the staff. Reston was once described by another well-known Washington reporter, Joseph Kraft, in a chapter entitled *Washington's Most Powerful Reporter* from Kraft's book *Profiles in Power*. \(^{181}\) Kraft himself is another example. He has shown a sensibility to questions of White House organization in such articles as *Kennedy and the Intellectuals*, \(^{182}\) *The Two Worlds of McGeorge Bundy*, \(^{183}\) and *Presidential Politics In LBJ Style*. \(^{184}\) Kraft was one of the first journalists ever to write specifically about the way in which a President organized his White House staff, as in his article *Kennedy's Working Staff*. \(^{185}\) He continued to
place importance on this subject, and his treatment of the Ford staff system played a prominent part in his analysis of President Ford's first full year in office, entitled *The Rising of Lowered Expectations*. 186

Hugh Sidey has been another journalist who has made a particular living from a study of the Presidency. His two major books, *JFK: Portrait of a President* 187 and *A Very Personal Presidency: LBJ in the White House*, 188 both exhibit an awareness of the way in which each President sought to maintain their grip on the staff. Indeed Sidey asserted that Johnson's political decline could be mirrored in the decline of his staff. Press heavyweights do not always write singly, and Rowland Evans and Robert D. Novak must stand as an example of one of the most successful writing partnerships of recent years. In addition to their books on Johnson and Nixon, *LBJ: The Exercise of Power* 189 (subtitled "A Political Biography") and *Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of Power*, 190 Evans and Novak occasionally devoted their attention to the staff situation in the White House. This sometimes appeared to have an effect. For example, in their feature article entitled *Mr. Ford's Advisers: General Haig Must Go*, 191 they reflected a strand of thinking which was shortly to prevail.

Another figure in this group is Theodore H. White, who achieved his reputation on the basis of a series of books chronicling successive presidential campaigns. In *The Making of the President* 192 series there can be detected a growing emphasis on the way the staff, usually the campaign staff, worked with the candidate. With the tendency for any President's campaign staff to form the nucleus of his subsequent White House staff White's emphasis on this area assumed greater importance. But the breakthrough in White's awareness finally came with his book on President Nixon's demise, entitled *Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard
The organization of the White House played a crucial part in his unravelling of the Watergate story and his own ideas of how it all came about.

This does not complete the list of senior Press figures as the boundaries between 'regular' journalists and the 'heavyweights' are blurred. Up and coming political journalists in the latter category might include Anthony Lewis. He too devoted some attention to the staff, as in his 1976 'transition' articles, of which *Faces Old and New* was an example.

Another emerging contender in this group is Robert B. Semple Jr., a leading political writer for The New York Times. His credentials for inclusion here are a reflection of articles such as "Nixon 1: Major Reshuffle At White House".

Apart from the individual heavyweights another subdivision should be made to account for the collective heavyweights of the Press: namely, the political weekly magazines and other political periodicals of note. Such publications include *TIME*, *NEWSWEEK*, *US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT*, *CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY*, *the NATIONAL JOURNAL* and *WASHINGTON MONTHLY*.

Space does not permit a full listing of the articles printed in these political magazines on the White House staff. But some examples should be mentioned. At the outset it should be noted that coverage of White House affairs began to climb sharply during the Watergate period. Thus *US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT* ran articles entitled *Watergate Fallout - Government in Disarray*, *What's Ahead for the White House*, *New Battles Inside The White House*, *Inside The White House: How Nixon Runs things Now*, *How The White House Is Being Run After The Big Shake-Up*, and *Who's In Charge At The White House?* *US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT* did not
confine its coverage to the impact of Watergate. To its credit it was among the earliest of political magazines to print serious articles on the subject of the staff. For example, Nixon's Top Command: Expanding in Size, Power, was written well before the Watergate era had begun. So too did it devote attention to the Nixon second-term reorganization proposals, with articles such as Behind Nixon's Reorganization and Nixon Names His Take-Over Team.

The pattern is broadly repeated for TIME and NEWSWEEK. For example, during Watergate TIME ran stories entitled The White House: Who's In Charge There? while NEWSWEEK reciprocated with articles on the 'Berlin Wall' Inside The Nixon White House, and even on the staff's staff as in Henry's Little Kissingers. Once these magazines had developed their taste for political writing on the staff during the Nixon Presidency they continued to indulge it in their treatment of his successors. While US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT published How Ford Runs The White House, and After Six Months - The Team in Power at the White House, TIME and NEWSWEEK were also producing their own accounts.

It has been noted that the vast majority of such articles date from the Nixon Presidency but not prior to it. The only political journal to have devoted any real attention to the White House staff before Nixon's arrival in office was the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, and its sister (annually produced) publication the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC. As far back as 1961, under the heading President Kennedy's Major Appointments, the ALMANAC listed the top White House staff together with brief biographies and job descriptions. This process was repeated on an annual basis beginning with President Johnson. In 1964, for example, the senior staff were named, with special reference to the changeover between Kennedy's
and Johnson's men. In succeeding years the ALMANAC monitored the White House staff and its turnover, taking upon itself a responsibility to identify the senior staff. Information as to their job descriptions was often more elucidating than the official version.

By 1967, as evidenced in the article Turnover of White House Staff Aides is High, the staff was firmly on the agenda of the ALMANAC's political roundup. The following year's article, 43 Top Aides Served President Johnson Since 1963, was accompanied by the first 'post-mortem' analysis of a President's White House staff. Shortly after the Nixon Administration had got under way the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY Weekly Report produced an introductory article entitled White House Staff Covers Broad Range of Views, while the Almanac of that year was headlined Nixon Calls On Specialists To Help Make Up Staff. The attempt (not very successful in hindsight) to analyse the organization of the staff, not just to describe it, was carried on year by year. Nixon's resignation did not end this process.

There were also occasional articles in the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY GUIDE, a special publication on American Government. For example, during the Watergate period, the magazine made its first attempt at a serious analysis of the position and power of the White House staff. This was entitled Watergate Spurs Moves To Curb White House Powers. This was sometimes supplemented by in-depth articles on certain sections of the staff, most notably (and obviously) on the congressional liaison side: for example, The White House Persuaders: Timmons And His Team. However, this is not to say that it did not also produce articles of the more personalised TIME and NEWSWEEK variety, such as In The Wake of Watergate: A New White House Staff. But at least CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY usually made the attempt to treat the White House staff seriously, as in *Reorganization: A Super Cabinet and Super Assistants*, even if its analysis of what was going on was not always accurate.

Other serious political magazines have gradually begun to take an interest in the White House staff. For example, the *National Journal* produced an excellent analysis of Nixon's congressional relations policy in June 1970 entitled *Nixon Deals Cautiously With Hostile Congress*. It was also responsible for in-depth profiles, such as *Charles W. Colson: President's Liaison With The Outside World*, written in August of that same year. The magazine *Washington Monthly* is another example, with such articles as *Collecting Merit Badges: The White House Fellows* and *Tying The Imperial Purse Strings*. This latter reflected a growing Press awareness of the financial aspects and implications of staff growth. *Fortune* magazine's *The Management Problem In Ford's White House* was another serious study - in its own business-oriented manner.

There has been one particular kind of contribution that the Press have made to our understanding of the White House: the occasional record made of a President's working day. This is good raw material around which to build up our picture of a President's routine and working methods.

Examples of this kind of journalistic enterprise include John Hersey's *Forty-eight Hours*, which took two days in the life of President Truman. (Hersey was himself a Staff Assistant to Charles Murphy, Truman's Special Counsel on the White House staff.) Hersey made something of a speciality of this technique, for nearly a quarter of a century later he repeated the same idea in *President At Work: Sitting In With Ford*. Other examples of the genre include *Ten O'Clock Meeting*, (also about Truman); *The Presidential Day*, which took Eisenhower as its subject; *Working at
Night which formed part of a study of Nixon's working methods, as did Courage And Hesitation: The Working White House, A Day in the Life of the President: based around Ford; and A Day in the Life of President Carter. A similar approach, but arrived at in a very different manner, was provided by Alexander Butterfield's Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee in the summer of 1974. But surely the unbeatable record to end all records is that stored away in the endless reels of tape recording made in the Nixon White House.

Turning now to other Press contributions on the White House staff we will take first those journalistic books and articles that primarily concern a particular President or Presidency, and leave till later those that primarily concern a particular political issue. Comment on individual Presidents tends to date only from the Truman period. Comment on the staff as individuals tends to predominate over the staff as a collective unit.

In this connexion, two pieces on Truman should be mentioned. The first, by Elmer Davis entitled Harry S. Truman and the Verdict of History, was something of a general roundup on his presidential years. The second was more personal and somewhat more useful in assessing the nature of the man organizing those around him. Written by Eric Severeid, it was called The Man In The White House. From the Eisenhower years there was Charles J.V. Murphy's Eisenhower's White House, James Reston's interesting investigation entitled The Presidency: The Effect of Eisenhowers Illness on the Functioning of the Executive Branch, and William V. Shannon's Eisenhower As President: A Critical Appraisal of the Record. Some­thing can even be gleaned from Drew Pearson's Diaries 1949-1959. The upsurge of Press comment on the Presidency and the White House dated effectively from the accession to power of President Kennedy. A whole host
articles began to appear purporting to bear, in whole or in part, on the way Kennedy was thought to be running the White House. Great emphasis was laid, too, on the style of the man, and on the interaction of this style with the staff around him. For example, among the many early articles were those by Douglass Cater, A New Style, A New Tempo, How Mr. Kennedy Gets the Answers by Sidney Hyman, and The Men Around JFK by Karl E. Meyer. After Kennedy's assassination it was not long before the Kennedy Myth began to take hold. This prompted a steady flow of journalistic comment and analysis-by-hindsight, some complimentary and some rather less so. These included Benjamin C. Bradlee's Conversations With Kennedy, The Kennedy Promise by Henry Fairlie, Jack Newfield's Bread And Roses Too, and William Manchester's Portrait of a President.

When President Johnson succeeded Kennedy Press attention, naturally enough, turned towards the President's relationship with Congress and the methods he employed to keep their attitude favourable. For example, LBJ: The Exercise of Power by Evans and Novak, William Chapman's LBJ's Way: Tears, Not Arm-Twists, Alan L. Otten's By Courting Congress Assiduously Johnson Furthers His Program, or his later article Criticism of President's Style, Methods Mounts Among Small But Important Group. Attention was focused on Johnson's sometimes overbearing personality, as in James Reston's What's He Like? And How Will He Do? or Carrol Kilpatrick's Often Moody, Defensive. Not least, the Press exhibited their predatory interest in the way Johnson 'used' those staff around him. For example, Tom Wicker's Johnson's Men: "Valuable Hunks of Humanity", The "Inner, Inner Circle" Around Johnson by Ben H. Bagdikian; West Wing Story, Presidential Politics in LBJ Style, and The Two Worlds of McGeorge Bundy. The latter three were among Joseph Kraft's collected articles reproduced in Profiles in Power.
Whatever interest the Press had begun to develop in the White House staff per se since the Kennedy era now experienced, paradoxically, both a setback and a quantum leap forward with the arrival of President Nixon. The former was largely accounted for by the atmosphere—both real and apparent—of inaccessibility to the workings of the Nixon White House. The latter can be explained to a degree by the same reason when added to the challenge of realising that the President really did prefer to run the government from the White House and hide his policy-making processes from public view. This gradual realisation, although in time it might have prompted a wide and serious debate on the role of the White House staff, was overtaken by the explosion of Watergate. Watergate had the effect of propelling the White House staff to the forefront of public attention. The Press now treated the staff as the subject of legitimate and regular coverage, both as regards individuals but more importantly as regards its organization by the President.

To give some examples, early Press comment on the Nixon Administration quickly reflected the atmosphere of inaccessibility, although this was at first more politely referred to as privacy: thus Robert B. Semple’s A Passion For Order And Privacy, Don Oberdorfer’s The Presidency: Still Very Private After First Year, and John Pierson’s Presidential Isolation Is Part of the Job. The tone of such articles was generally respectful, as were books on the “new” Nixon such as Jules Witcover’s The Resurrection of Richard Nixon, or William Safire’s Eye on Nixon. Others were serious, such as Nixon Agonistes by Garry Wills, Nixon in the White House (subtitled “The Frustration of Power”) by Evans and Novak, or Nixon’s Head by Arthur Woodstone.
The latter two began to recognise the real importance of Nixon's staff to his Presidency.

Hand in hand went an appreciation that the new President wanted an orderly process of decision-making: for example, *The Nixon Style: President Seeks Order in his Decision-Making But Events Intrude.* His decided preference was first noticed on the foreign affairs side where the Kissinger machine adopted very orderly working methods. This was duly reflected in such articles as Robert B. Semple's *Nixon Staff Had Central Role in Missile Decision.* During the later part of the pre-Watergate Presidency it fell to the major political weekly magazines to develop this interest further, although they could not match the single-handed efforts of John Osborne.

With the experience of the Nixon years under their belt, Press treatment of the Ford Administration, after the initial euphoria had worn off with the Nixon Pardon, betrayed a greater maturity of judgement where White House staff matters were concerned. This derived from a much better understanding of the workings of the White House staff developed during Watergate. It also benefited from the fact that, while Ford strove to release himself from the harness of the Nixon White House staff system, vestiges of that system remained in place, virtually intact, for the remainder of the Ford Presidency. The Press were therefore familiar with the basic component parts of the Ford White House and did not have to go through the process of unlearning and rediscovery which usually accompanies a change of Presidency. This they have had to do since the arrival of President Carter.

This new-found maturity of judgement generally found expression in a
growing concentration on the problems of managing the White House. But the trivial personalised approach to the White House staff did not disappear. One need only glance, for example, at the "Washington Whispers" column in US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT to see that there was still a steady stream of political comment devoted to interpreting the President's political options merely in terms of a battle of personalities between staff members. But higher standards existed elsewhere. The regular White House specialists continued to write, such as John Osborne. Whether it was his regular column White House Watch, or particular pieces such as Ford's Image Machine, or the relationship between President and Vice President in More About Rocky, Osborne was consistently intelligent in his writing. The major weekly news and political magazines conducted periodic surveys into the Ford staff system, such as US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT'S After 6 Months - The Team in Power at the White House.

The influence of the Nixon Administration and its practices was perhaps nowhere more clearly felt than in the belief that at the heart of the Ford White House staff system must stand an all-important "Chief of Staff" who could be regarded as primus inter pares, if not primus alone. There was some substance to this notion as we shall see in later chapters. The first indication of Press treatment along these lines came nine months after Ford took office. This was in itself significant compared to the pattern of reassessment after the first nine months of other presidencies, including Kennedy's and Nixon's. A good example here was a series of articles written by Lou Cannon, a respected political writer and columnist for the Washington Post, the first of which appeared in May 1975 entitled Rumsfeld - 2nd Most Powerful Man In Capital. This was a reference to Donald Rumsfeld, the then Chief of Staff.
Provincial newspapers tended to take the more exotic angle, such as a piece by the Cincinnati Enquirer headed *CIA Infiltration of White House, Agencies Charge*, or the more homespun, as that by Jennifer Schwertman called *Cincy Woman Is Smoothing A Path For the President* in the same paper. By contrast, from the specialist fields, such as Science, emanated the occasional serious article on the staff from a specialist point of view, refreshingly devoid of personalities. For example, *Toward a Science Adviser: Round One*, which appeared in *Science News* in June 1975.

One other feature of Press comment on Ford's staff must be mentioned as it pervaded so much of what was written. It was generally acknowledged that President Ford personally was a decent straightforward human being who tried to make the Presidency and the White House staff somewhat more open and accessible. Opinions as to Ford's competence or clearness of thinking and objectives were another matter. These varied from commentator to commentator. But whether or not anyone could have done equally as well, given the "national nightmare" which Nixon had created, should not detract from the fact that Ford brought a much needed breath of fresh air to the White House for which he was given appropriate credit.

We turn now to particular issues that have prompted Press comment on the White House staff: primarily Vietnam and Watergate. In one respect they are complimentary. The former involved the organization of foreign affairs at the White House while the latter concentrated our minds primarily on the domestic scene. Among the most notable Press contributions to come out of the Vietnam period were *The Pentagon Papers* (as prepared by the New York Times) and *The Best and the Brightest* by David Halberstam. Their functions were mutually complementary in that the former provided raw material essential to the analysis of the latter.
Both shed light on the role played by the National Security Advisers on the White House staff, and this helped to put the emergence and eventual dominance of Dr. Henry Kissinger in its proper perspective. Kissinger himself captured the attention of the Press to a considerable degree and this made itself manifest in such books as Kissinger: The Uses of Power by David Landau, and Kissinger by that brotherly pair of journalists Marvin and Bernard Kalb. Another aspect of the Vietnam experience was dealt with in The Politics of Lying and The American Police State by David Wise. The former concentrated on the White House Press Office.

Watergate placed the spotlight on the White House staff as never before, and it did so with a great avalanche of Press comment, analysis and criticism which far outweighed anything that had gone before. Among the many investigative books were those by Lewis Chester and the Sunday Times Insight Team entitled Watergate: The Full Inside Story. Frank Mankiewicz's Nixon's Road to Watergate, Barry Sussman's The Great Cover-up: Nixon and the Scandal of Watergate, J. Anthony Lukas' Nightmare: The Underside of the Nixon Year, Cohen and Witcover's A Heartbeat Away, Theodore H. White's Breach of Faith, and the two books by Woodward and Berstein, All The President's Men and The Final Days. The thirst for instant books was satisfied by the competition between the New York Times's End of a Presidency and the Washington Post's The Fall of a President.

So far we have dealt with journalists from the Press. We now turn to Radio or Television journalists. The nature of their output makes discussion here difficult, but we can mention items that have been published in conventional form by those whose work has primarily been with Radio or TV.
Eric Sevareid is an example, although when he edited the book *Candidates 1960* he was not the 'heavyweight' anchorman and commentator that he later became. A possible anchorman of the 1980s, Dan Rather, co-authored one of the few books devoted to the White House staff. Entitled *The Palace Guard*, it concentrated mainly on the Nixon Administration. To a certain extent, Hugh Sidey and others like him have become TV journalists as much as print journalists. The many prime-time programs on TV such as "Issues and Answers", "Face the Nation", "Meet the Press", "60 Minutes", or "Agronsky & Co." together represent the major contribution that TV journalists make towards political debate. Although these programs may well refer, and often do, to individual members of the White House staff they do not discuss the staff as a unit.

TV is capable of some things beyond the ability of the conventional Press. In this connexion mention must be made of the TV drama "Washington Behind Closed Doors" which was produced by the ABC TV network and screened for the first time in the autumn of 1977. Its relevance here, besides being loosely based on John Erlichman's thinly-veiled book *The Company* lay in its representation of the attitudes, organization and working methods of the "Monckton" White House. Insofar as it captured some of the essential elements of the Nixon years, this TV dramatization will educate more people about the 1970s White House than a whole host of books can possibly hope to do.

Before concluding this section on the Press and media the impact of Jimmy Carter's election to the Presidency should be assessed in this context. Candidate Carter specifically made an election and campaign issue out of the size and power of the White House staff and the Press reciprocated by regularly monitoring and analysing the structure of the group operating
around Carter. This was made easier because Carter at first went out of his way to strip the White House of the restrictive and protective atmosphere which characterized the previous years of Republican rule.

Early examples of this greater Press monitoring included the following articles: *Carter Reviewing Memo on Selecting Top Aides* by Edward Walsh; *Carter Aide Chosen to Guide Transition* by James T. Wooten; *Henry Fairlie’s Trappings of Power*; *Ex-Aide To Nixon Advising Carter On Executive Reorganization* by Robert G. Kaiser, also the author of *Clash Shakes Carter Transition Team*; *Concerns About Carter – And His Chief Courtier*, by Charles Peters, (who had previously co-authored *Inside The System*); and a US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT feature article entitled *White House Insiders: How They’ll Run Things*. Magazines like CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY were to devote considerable attention to Carter’s White House set-up, as in *Carter’s Staff: Mondale Near The Hub*, and many other articles. TIME magazine ran cover stories like *The President’s Boys*; US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT conducted a survey entitled *Who’s Riding High At The White House* while the WASHINGTON POST investigated the activities of individuals, as in *Carter Image Being Remolded*. All this coverage suggested that the White House staff would never stray far from the attention of the Press, and that that coverage would reflect a more mature understanding of the extent to which the organizational structure of the staff reflected the processes of decision-making in the new Carter Administration.

Finally, to underscore the strength (and the limitations) of the Press and media’s contribution to the study of the White House staff, two publications deserve special mention: Patrick Anderson’s *The President’s Men* and *Has The President Too Much Power?* edited by Charles Roberts.
Anderson's book, although mainly descriptive, was the first to be devoted to the White House staff alone. The latter book was derived from a symposium on the subject organized by the Washington Journalism Center. At that stage it is fair to say the Press were taking the lead in subjecting the staff to serious scrutiny. For this pioneering work the Press deserve due credit. Certainly it was far ahead of most of the academic community in this respect. But this general advantage was matched by a corresponding disadvantage. By and large it lacked the capacity for sustained analysis. For this we must look elsewhere and turn our attention to the academic community's record.

THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY

The third major category of literature to consider is that emanating from the academic community. The amount of writing produced on the American political system over the last forty years has been mountainous. But relatively little has had any bearing on the White House staff. We will examine both those writers who have ignored the staff and those that have fully recognised its importance. Of the remaining literature, which forms a majority overall, much still tends towards the former attitude rather than the latter.

The academic study of politics is conducted at greater remove from that of the Press and media. It claims a more rigorous and objective basis. Its influence on the prevailing attitudes to politics is very strong indeed and for this reason we should consider very carefully what the academic community has had to say about the broad question of staff support for the President. In order to make this task more manageable
it is necessary to draw distinctions between students of political science, students of public administration and students of political history. These three groups represent different strains of modern political analysis. Their perspectives are also very different. Yet is is precisely because the White House unites questions of politics, of administration, and of history, that we should consider all these schools of academic writing.

**POLITICAL SCIENCE**

By and large political scientists did not take any real interest in the White House staff until the Nixon years. Only then, as Watergate unfolded, did political scientists rediscover critical faculties which had not yet been applied in this area of political life. With literally only a handful of exceptions their general attitude can be summarized in this way: recognition of the staff's existence but not of its significance.

Undoubtedly one reason for this relative lack of interest can be traced to the difficulties of obtaining consistent and reliable information on the subject. The systematic analysis that can be applied to most institutions of modern American government cannot so easily be applied to the often amorphous intangible inaccessible and ever-changing world of the White House staff. We have discussed the difficulties encountered in arriving at a workable definition of the staff. Confirmation of this dilemma is reflected in those few political scientists whose forebodings about the staff were buttressed by little more than a general hunch - prescient though that may have been. The general tendency among the political science community, with inadequate information at their
disposal, was to ignore the staff as unworthy of more than Press comment.

But beneath this excuse there lay a deeper and a broader explanation for this academic laissez-faire. From the time the Presidency was propelled to its modern ascendency by the Depression and World War II the majority among the academic community endorsed the need for the presidential establishment to grow in proportion to the new responsibilities placed upon it. This endorsement reflected their belief that a strong central government was good for the country and that a strong Presidency was good for a strong central government.

There were many factors that led to the formation of this view and its subsequent confirmation as conviction. One of these sprang from their liberal pessimism that no institution save the Presidency was capable of forging the social progress that was necessary. As students of Congress in the 1940s or 1950s they could readily see the obstacles, if not the dangers, of placing their faith in that quarter. Congress, with its conservative organizational hierarchy and its susceptibility to McCarthyite lapses, could not be trusted. Neither, for a considerable time, was the US Supreme Court (that liberal bete noire of the 1930s) the focus of their hopes. The answer lay elsewhere.

The impact of the Roosevelt Presidency cannot be over-emphasized. "Under Roosevelt, the White House became the focus of all government - the fountainhead of ideas, the initiator of action, the representative of the national interest", wrote the historian Leuchtenberg. The academic world was very much brought into government during this time and it had a profound impact on their future thinking. The Presidency was seen as the
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legitimate centre of action and the President as pre-eminent in his
capacity for moral and political leadership. This view was reinforced
by the Press and heavily influenced, especially in the 1960s, by the
power of the media in portraying the political process in terms of
personalities with the President as the biggest celebrity of all.

Lionizing the strong Presidency necessitated approval of the presidential
apparatus brought in its wake. By and large this was silently given. One
result was that, as the White House staff grew and became established as
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cal attention it deserved.

One of the clearest illustrations of this was to be found in the way the
staff were treated in standard political science textbooks. For example,
in William Bennett Munro's The Government of the United States there is
no mention whatsoever of the existence of The White House Office, although
by 1947 (the date of the 5th edition) that Office had seen eight years'
service and was on the point of the first significant increase in personnel
since its inception. Written in the same year was The American Problem of
Government by Chester C. Maxey. Although omitting to mention the
White House staff by name he nevertheless did refer to the need for it and
the necessity of setting up an organization along functional lines.
Scarcely more informative was the way in which Frederic A. Ogg and P. Orman
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Binkley and Malcolm C. Moos in *A Grammar of American Politics*. 
By 1951 there was some sign that The White House Office was at least granted recognition. In *The Theory and Practice of American National Government* Carl Brent Swisher was not only aware of the growth of the staff but also was prepared to entertain a mild doubt lest they became a hindrance rather than a help on account of this increasing size. But in general he endorsed its role and performance. Slightly more neutral was Edward S. Corwin's tome *The President: Office and Powers*, while Sidney Hyman, writing in 1954, somehow managed to say nothing at all about the staff in his book *The American Presidency*. Another textbook author, of high standard, was Clinton Rossiter, whose book *The American Presidency* was published in 1960. He recognised that the staff was taking on an air of permanence in certain functional areas, but could point to no serious drawbacks in that development.

By the 1960s raw material on the staff and its operation was beginning to grow, and references to the staff in textbooks accordingly took on a basic shape: for example, in Elmer E. Cornwell's *The American Presidency: Vital Center*. By 1964, the editors of *The Dynamics of the American Presidency*, Donald Bruce Johnson and Jack L. Walker, thought worthwhile the inclusion of contributions from Joseph Kraft and Louis Koenig on the subject of staff support to the President. Yet it was still possible for a major textbook, such as *The American Chief Executive* by Joseph E. Kallenbach, published in 1966, to virtually ignore the growing political importance of the staff. Four years later, references to the staff were still descriptive rather than analytical, as in *The National Executive Branch* by James W. Davis Jr., or *The Presidential Office* by Sidney Wise and Richard Schier.

By the end of the 1960s there were signs at last that standard textbooks
were taking greater note of the staff, to the extent that they provided a preliminary analysis of staff functions: for example, in *American Government Institutions* by Aaron Wildavsky and Nelson Polsby, and the volume *The Presidency* edited in 1969 by Wildavsky. By 1971, comparisons were beginning to be drawn between Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon in their use of staff, as in *Essentials of American Democracy* by Robert Kenneth Carr, and in *Contemporary American Government: Problems and Prospects* by Jay A. Sigler and Robert S. Getz. More wide-ranging were the comparisons drawn in *Laws and Men: The Challenge of American Politics* by Daniel M. Berman and Louis S. Loeb.

But however slow the textbooks were in devoting serious attention to the staff the position has recently been altered and rectified albeit more a result of Nixon and Watergate than any other single factor. One need look no further, for example, than the third edition of Louis W. Koenig’s well-known textbook *The American Chief Executive* (published in 1975) to see that the White House staff has now won for itself a significant and permanent place in any exposition of American national politics.

Turning now to the literature produced by academics who have had some form of political experience themselves, we find that this group has produced by far the best work on the staff that has emanated from the political science wing of the academic community. This in itself is an illustrative fact, for the forces at work in the atmosphere of the White House are often inadequately grasped by those who have not had such experience themselves.

Among the oldest of this group, and also one of the most prolific, stands Rexford G. Tugwell, who served President Roosevelt as one of the original
'Brains Trusters' of the 1930s. His acute perception of the modern Presidency was already evident from his book *The Enlargement of the Presidency*, published in 1960. Further books such as *The Brains Trust, Off Course: From Truman to Nixon*, and *The Presidency Reappraised* (edited with Thomas E. Cronin) have similarly helped to promote an awareness of staff developments since the Roosevelt era.

Another professor to combine academic writing with a measure of political experience was Richard Neustadt. He worked for a time as a junior aide in Truman's Administration. In 1954 he wrote an important article entitled *The Growth of Central Clearance* which bore partially on the White House staff, and he subsequently enlarged on the staff's function in *Approaches To Staffing The Presidency* in 1963. His knowledge of the Kennedy years was reflected in *The JFK Presidency: A Premature Appraisal* and in a later edition of his classic work *Presidential Power*. The most well-known professor from the Kennedy period was Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., the historian, who worked on Kennedy's staff as a Special Assistant. In his book *1000 Days* he included a short section on the staff. Although Schlesinger had previously written about White House life in the Roosevelt Presidency, in *The Evolution of the Presidency* he was able to write about the staff in his influentially titled book *The Imperial Presidency* with rather more personal experience.

While Schlesinger wrote a history of the Kennedy Presidency in 1965, two years earlier Emmet John Hughes had written *The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years*. Hughes had served on Eisenhower's White House staff, and this experience undoubtedly explains why Hughes was later able to produce his interesting book on the Presidency entitled *The Living Presidency* (subtitled: "The Resources and Dilemmas of the American Presidential Office"). He gave special emphasis to the
staff by including a lengthy appendix section devoted to the views of a
dozen or so eminent former staff members. Hughes continued his contribu-
tion to understanding the staff in *The Presidency After Watergate*.

In more recent years the conjunction between political experience in
government (whether on the White House staff or in close proximity to
it) and academic writing has been enriched by a select group. They in-
clude Richard Tanner Johnson, whose book *Managing The White House*
(1974) drew on his experience as a White House Fellow in the late 1960s
under both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations. Another White House
Fellow, Thomas E. Cronin, has produced a stream of useful writing on the
staff. This has included *Political Science and Executive Advisory
Systems*, *The Presidential Advisory System,* *The Textbook Presidency and Political Science*,
*The Swelling of the Presidency and its Impact on Congress*, and *The
State of the Presidency*. Yet another White House Fellow was Doris
Kearns, whose book *Lyndon Johnson and The American Dream*, while not
exclusively on the staff, nevertheless had much to say about the working
of the Johnson White House. Similarly, H.G. Nicholas, in "The Insulation
of the Presidency", (which was his contribution to a volume entitled
*American Political Institutions in the 1970s* edited by Max Beloff
and Vivian Vale), dealt largely with the situation in the White House.

Another source or patron of research besides the White House Fellows pro-
gram has been the Brookings Institution. In particular, it has helped
sponsor research into the Presidency's decision-making staff apparatus.
This has resulted in the publication of two highly important works on the
staff. The more specifically directed is that by John H. Kessel entitled
*The Domestic Presidency: Decision-Making in the White House*, while
Organizing the Presidency, by Stephen Hess, is the more general in scope. Hess served on the White House staffs of both Eisenhower and Nixon, and without this experience his book could not have been as influential as it has become.

On the foreign affairs side of the staff's activity, former members of the National Security Council staff, such as Richard M. Moose, have written on its development in *The President and the Management of National Security*. Finally, we should not forget the man responsible for the original report that led to the setting up of The White House Office. Louis Brownlow himself wrote several books, among them *The President and The Presidency*, and his autobiography *A Passion for Anonymity*. Nor should we overlook one other academic with political experience, though this time of British politics: Harold Laski. In his notable book *The American Presidency* he identified some of the major problems of the modern American Presidency and strongly advocated a staff system of some kind. Thus it was not only the American academic community that endorsed the continued growth of the White House staff.

The vast majority of those who have written on the subject of American politics at the Presidential level have not themselves had direct personal experience of the political environment which is the subject of their work. It is all the more interesting, therefore, to come across certain authors who have demonstrated a perceptive grasp of the role of the White House staff in the modern Presidency. Moreover those who did so without the benefit of the Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon years deserve greater credit for having pointed to the important potential of the staff, as in the case, for example, of Francis H. Heller's *The Presidency: A Modern Perspective*. Another important book published that same year, in 1960, *The Presidency: Crisis And Regeneration* by Herman Finer, explored aspects of the
Presidency and its staff the appositeness of which subsequent experience has confirmed.

There are other categories of writing, besides those already dealt with, into which the remaining contributions from political scientists can be placed. For example, such categories would include work on the Cabinet; the transition between one Administration and the next; individual Presidencies; particular aspects of the Presidency; Watergate; and works on the Presidency in general.

Writing on the Cabinet has declined in recent years in accordance with a generally perceived decline in its political importance as a cohesive political force. The standard work on the Cabinet is still *The President's Cabinet* by Richard F. Fenno Jr. Yet it was clear by the time he wrote *The Cabinet: Index to the Kennedy Way* that the very reasons why the Cabinet was in decline were those which in part accounted for the rise of the White House staff. By the time of the Nixon Administration, what little attention was devoted to the Cabinet, as in Alan L. Otten's *The Scorecard: President’s Cabinet Gets Mixed Reviews for Efforts To Date*, was meted out on an individual, rather than a collective, basis.

Writing on the transition between Administrations only got underway with the changeover from Eisenhower to Kennedy in 1961. A Brookings study in that year, edited by Paul T. David, entitled *Presidential Election and Transition*, included an article by Laurin L. Henry on *The Transition: The New Administration* in which the role of the staff was central. As regards the transition from Ford to Carter, a series of articles appeared in the *CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY*, such as *Carter's Guidelines: New Stringent Rules* and *Delay On Top Jobs: Good Or Bad?* Once again the position of the staff was uppermost in these articles.
Any political science writing on individual presidencies since FDR is now bound to say something about the White House staff, even if it is confined to treatment of the staff as individuals rather than as members of an identifiable and operational unit. The former approach is most evident in such books as *The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practice* edited by Louis W. Koeing, *The Politics of JFK* edited by Edmund Ions, *Eisenhower - The Inside Story* by Robert J. Donovan, and Arthur M. Schlesinger's trilogy on the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The latter approach - treating the staff as an entity in itself - has yet to find full expression in any work on an individual Presidency.

There has been a great variety of writing that has dealt with particular aspects of the Presidency. Many, in their own way, have cast some light on the way the White House Office operates. For example, one of those tasks that every incoming President faces - filling appointments - was the subject of *Outlawing The Spoils* by Ari Hoogenboom. Relations with the Press have been dealt with in *The Presidents and the Press* by J.E. Pollard, *The President and Public Opinion* by M. Landecker, *Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion* by Elmer E. Cornwall Jr., *Public Opinion and the President* by John E. Mueller, and *The Presidents and The Press* by Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Congressional relations has been covered in *Legislative Liaison: Executive Leadership in Congress* by Abraham Holtzman. The important question of executive privilege has been exclusively treated in *Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth* by Raoul Berger. Another key area concerns the work of the President's National Security Adviser in the conduct of foreign affairs. This has been dealt with in *The Executive and Foreign Policy* by Francis O. Wilcox, and extremely well by I.M. Destler in *Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy*. General relations with Congress were the subject of Kenneth Schlossberg's *The Ablest Men in Congress* (which had something interesting to say about
Johnson's treatment of his staff), and a book edited by Ronald C. Moe entitled Congress and the President - Allies and Adversaries. Considering that several Presidents have had a congressional background the study Recent Trends in Congressional Staffing by Harrison Fox and Susan Hammond has much to say on the way congressional staffs have been handled in the last two decades. Finally, as to the question of presidential systems of advice in general, a collection of articles were published in The Institutionalised Presidency edited by Norman C. Thomas and Hans W. Baade, which included Presidential Advice and Information by Norman C. Thomas. Further light was shed on the staff as a by-product of John Hart's Executive Reorganization in the USA and the Growth of Presidential Power.

Since 1973 Watergate has pervaded everything written on the Presidency. Some academics have written expressly on Watergate, as for example in The Unlearned Lesson of Watergate by Philip B. Kurland. Others have not. But among general works on the Presidency published in recent years the attention devoted to the White House staff has undoubtedly been prompted by Watergate in some measure. Examples have included The Contemporary Presidency by Dorothy Buckton James, Presidential Power and Accountability by Charles M. Hardin, The Modern Presidency edited by Nelson Polsby, The Presidency in Contemporary Context edited by Norman C. Thomas, The Power of the Modern Presidency by Erwin C. Hargrove, (together with several of his book reviews, and Is Presidential Power Poison? by Richard M. Pious.

This analysis would not be complete without reference to those works on the Presidency not so far mentioned, which, although not always dealing with the White House staff to any great degree, nevertheless have remained important guides to the Presidency. Among these would be included The

This concludes the analysis of literature produced by political scientists which bear upon the subject of the White House staff. However it does not exhaust that produced by the academic community. We now turn to consider the contribution made by students of public administration.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The literature produced by students of public administration has run in parallel to that from other sources. Rarely has it achieved wide publicity in its own right. It has always appeared to be less applicable to the operation of the Presidency. But we have elsewhere noted that at the highest level of the Executive Branch - the Presidency - what may appear to be separate matters of politics and administration are actually two sides of the same coin. The President is constantly called upon to take political and managerial decisions. What is political affects the way things are managed and what is managed affects the way things are politically decided. In terms of the literature on public administration we should bear in mind that what may seem a dry subject has in fact considerable political meaning.
Before detailing the literature we should make clear the meaning of the very word "staff" in the context of public administration. Especially in the years before the 1960s, the term "staff" tended to be used in a somewhat ubiquitous sense and was intended to include anyone working within the Executive Office of the President. The explanation for this can be readily found in the traditional distinction drawn between "staff" and "line" functions in theories of management. This is in turn derived from the classic division of the function of government into "politics" and "administration" — a dividing line dear to the hearts of all students of public administration. Indeed it has almost the dimensions of an article of faith. One reflection of this attitude, and its entrenchment, has been the progressive anxiety that the growth of the White House staff has threatened these distinctions.

Among the early works to identify the new place of management in the American political system was James Burnham's *The Managerial Revolution*, published in 1941. A year earlier, Herman Finer had addressed himself to the questions raised for public administration by the notion of responsibility in *Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government*. In 1944 appeared an article by Norman M. Pearson entitled *A General Administrative Staff to Aid The President* which explored the area of executive management. Louis Brownlow's *The President and the Presidency* provided early confirmation that public administration was an inherently political process at the presidential level. More came (also in 1947) with an article by Avery Leiserson entitled *Political Limitations on Executive Reorganization*. Two years later Norton E. Long followed up the same point in *Power and Administration* and was one of the first to compare the Presidency to the operation of a medieval court. Some twenty years later still, in his *Reflections On Presidential Power*, published...
in the Public Administration Review in 1969, Long was even more firmly convinced that the real struggle lay between the President and the Bureaucracy. Here was a student of public administration with a keen political sense.

Perhaps the first writing ever to concentrate on a particular President's Administration came with an article by Edward H. Hobbs in the Public Administration Review in the autumn of 1958 entitled The President and Administration: Eisenhower. Hobbs had already authored Behind The President in 1954 which detailed the additions to the White House staff since 1939. Also published in 1958 was a short article by the Public Administration Review entitled simply Staff Work For The President. Less specific was The Bureaucracy In Pressure Politics by J. Leiper Freeman.

Certain studies in the 1950s were directed at the types of people involved in public administration, and among the most useful from the point of view of the White House staff were Executives For Government by Paul T. David and Ross Pollock (1957), The Growth Of The Federal Personnel System by Herbert Kaufman (1954) and Who Are The Career Executives? by Earl H. DeLong (1959.)

Although the growth of the staff was acknowledged in writing on public administration, the emphasis on the Cabinet and orthodox Cabinet departments as the proper focus of attention was still strong in the 1960s, as in Peter Woll's book American Bureaucracy. Less sanguine on the Cabinet's future was Avery Leiserson in the article he contributed to a symposium on "Present Trends in American National Government" entitled American National Administration. Other books of note in the 1960s included Administrative Reform by Gerald E. Caiden, Administrative Frontiers by James M.
Landis, (which was originally a task force report for President Kennedy in 1961), *Bureaucratic Power In National Politics*[^30] by Francis E. Rourke (again, a certain emphasis on the Cabinet), and *Bureaucratic Behaviour in the Executive Branch*[^31] by Louis C. Gawthrop. More recent comment dated from the beginning of the Nixon Administration, by which time the cumulative experience of different Administrations since the war provided better clues to the nature of the challenge public administration faced on the political front. In 1969, for example, William D. Carey wrote an article in *The Public Administration Review* entitled *Presidential Staffing in the 60s & 70s*[^32], which explored the difficulties of a Presidency which was losing its ability to stay on top of its many responsibilities. Hard on its heels came two classic works. Firstly, in 1970, came *Politics, Position and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization*[^33] by Harold Seidman. Secondly, a year later, came *Federal Organization and Administrative Management*[^34] by Herbert Emmerich. Both authors entertained serious doubts about the use to which the White House staff was being put by Presidents since Kennedy.

Further material on the historical background to the growth of the staff and the bureaucracy came with *Reorganizing The Federal Executive Branch: The Limits of Institutionalisation*[^35] by Harvey C. Mansfield. By contrast, a light-hearted touch was offered by Robert N. Kharasch in *The Institutional Imperative*[^36]. By the 1970s it was clear that the Cabinet was suffering a decline that was more permanent than temporary[^37], and this trend was chronicled vis-à-vis the old Bureau of the Budget by Allen Schick in *The Budget Bureau That Was*[^38] (subtitled "Thoughts on the Rise, Decline, and Future of a Presidential Agency"). After it had been resurrected as the Office of Management and Budget it was soon subject to close scrutiny by students of public administration, such as Louis Fisher in his book...
Presidential Spending Power, or the focus of symposia such as the one held in 1971 called The Federal Management Improvement Conference.

The Nixon Administration, for a number of reasons, spurred much writing on its methods of administration. The direct influence of Watergate was felt in a specially convened panel of public administrators which produced a report entitled Watergate: Implications For Responsible Government. Apart from that, the managerial tendency of the Nixon years was analysed in a perceptive study by Richard P. Nathan entitled The Plot That Failed. More generally the experience of the Nixon Administration was reflected in such books as Presidential Advisory Commissions: Truman to Nixon by Thomas R. Wolanin. This experience also prompted a reinterpretation of the post-war Presidency, one such example being the article by Peri E. Arnold called The First Hoover Commission and the Managerial Presidency.

Finally, as a testament to the widespread recognition of the importance of administration and management to the modern Presidency, mention should be made of Managing Presidential Objectives and The President: A Chief But Not An Executive, both by Richard Rose. Although a political scientist, he had nonetheless accepted the crucial nature of the management function. Students of political history, however, have yet to incorporate this line of argument into their work.

**POLITICAL HISTORY**

In terms of our progression of immediacy the last group from the academic community with which we must deal are the students of political history. They write at the greatest distance from the subject. The White House staff have never been the sole subject of any historical work. No such study
exists. Indeed, even in the context of a particular Presidency, there has never been a separate treatment of its White House staff. The work of historians in dealing with Presidents or their presidencies is inevitably concerned with the content of policy and the making of events rather than with the intricacies of style or of day-to-day working methods.

Rightly, when writing from an historical perspective, (if such a thing is truly possible with all the Presidents since Franklin Roosevelt), the primary purpose is to place the President or Presidency into a context of wider significance. In this perspective the place of the White House staff has hitherto been considered largely inappropriate. While there is some justification for this attitude as regards Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower, there is much less with Kennedy and Johnson. It is indefensible when you reach the Nixon Presidency. It will not be possible to write the history of the Nixon Administration without serious and extensive discussion of his White House staff.

In historical writing references to the staff occur in three contexts. These are concomitant upon the following divisions. Firstly, writing on a particular President; secondly, writing on a particular Presidency; and thirdly, writing on a particular issue, or era, or matter of policy. We will take these in turn.

Personal biographies of recent Presidents have occasionally been hard to distinguish from what one might call political biographies or biographical accounts of their presidencies. Examples of biographies of the more traditional kind have included Joseph P. Lash's *Eleanor and Franklin* 446 and even Booth Mooney's *The Lyndon Johnson Story*. Conventional in concept but not in form was Merle Miller's *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman*. 447 Another attempt was furnished by Alfred Steinberg's *Sam Johnson's Roy* 448 even though it was a little folksy in style.
The more common form has become the political biography or historical record of a Presidency. The examples are more numerous. Among the best known are Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.'s 1000 Days and his trilogy on the New Deal. Also on the Roosevelt Presidency was Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal by William E. Leuchtenburg, James McGregor Burns' The Lion and The Fox, and Charles Hurd's When The New Deal Was Young And Gay. A chronological listing would include The Truman Presidency by Cabell Phillips, Eisenhower - Captive Hero by Marquis Childs, Eisenhower by Arthur Larson, the collected articles entitled The Eisenhower Era, edited by Paul S. Holbo and Robert W. Sellen, another edited collection entitled Eisenhower As President by Dean Albertson, The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years by Emmet John Hughes, William Manchester's Portrait of a President, William S. White's The Professional: LBJ, and The Tragedy of LBJ by Eric Goldman.

Historical writing primarily directed towards a single issue or matter of policy can often involve more than one Presidency, such as Jim F. Heath's Decade of Disillusionment. On the other hand, it can stay within the bounds of a single Presidency, such as The Politics of Loyalty by Alan D. Harper, or The Missile Crisis by Elie Abel. More comprehensive are such classics as James Bryce's The American Commonwealth, general surveys such as Marcus Cunliffe's American Presidents and the Presidency, or grand critiques such as Arthur M. Schlesinger's The Imperial Presidency. Most of these refer to the White House staff or to close advisers of the President, but whatever information they have to offer comes in passing - in the form of asides or sketches. In 1943, historian Fred W. Shipman, Director of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, did prepare a short paper entitled The White House Executive Office: Its Functions and Records. However, by that time the Office had hardly been in official existence four years. In any event - as the title itself made clear - this
amounted to no more than a study of the deposition of records and was not a work of political, much less historical, analysis. Shipman was less an historian than an archivist. But even archivists of the White House staff have been non-existent since then.

OTHER LITERATURE
Apart from the major categories of literature so far discussed, which are relatively straightforward to identify, there are other kinds of literature of relevance to the subject in hand. They may not all deal directly with the White House staff per se, but in their varying degrees have much to contribute indirectly towards a fuller understanding of the nature of the staff.

We will take five groups of writings in this section, arranged in no particular order. Firstly, the political writing not so far touched upon, dealing with a President's prior political career. Secondly, non-political writings or particularly personal writings, often by members of a President's family. Thirdly, sociological and psychological literature, taking questions of leadership in groups, the work situation, and the various factors that play a significant part in such activity. Fourthly, literature on the Medieval period of European history, describing the nature and operation of the feudal system of kingship and the relationship between the medieval monarch and his advisers at court. Fifthly, political novels and other works of fiction which, although not dealing with precise historical fact, nevertheless explore, highlight, and help define the often delicate relationship between the adviser and the advised.
POLITICAL WRITING

We can divide this group into two principal divisions. The first deals with the political life of Presidents prior to their assumption of office. In recent times, most Presidents have had some experience in Congress, as have the majority of presidential aspirants. Others, notably Presidents Roosevelt, Eisenhower and Carter have enjoyed different backgrounds. But in all cases, whatever has been written about a man who later became President has importance for what it tells us about his character and his political style and working methods.

Of the last eight Presidents there have been few who merited serious study independent of their presidential aspirations. There was little reason to write about the political careers of Presidents Truman, Kennedy, Ford and Carter before they became potential Presidents. With others, however, there were specific reasons for doing so. President Eisenhower, for example, had a full and distinguished military career behind him before coming to the Presidency, and much has been written on the career of General Eisenhower. President Johnson enjoyed a most distinguished career in the Senate, which fact formed the basis of political biographies such as Booth Mooney's The Lyndon Johnson Story, published shortly after Johnson assumed the Presidency. President Nixon presents a unique case. He wrote a political autobiography of sorts entitled Six Crises which certainly revealed a great deal about the formation of his political character and shed light on his political style. His years as Vice President were referred to in many books on the Eisenhower years. Among them, Eisenhower: The President Nobody Knew by Arthur Larson. Besides Nixon, only Jimmy Carter wrote a personal account of his life before reaching the Presidency.

The second division concerns what we might term 'campaign literature'. Presidential campaigns have increasingly become divorced from the national
Party campaign. Presidential candidates have come to rely on that group of men and women around them who are personally loyal and campaigning mostly on that basis. A political campaign for the Presidency is a transitional phase in any politician's life. In recent years it has afforded valuable insights into the future President's organization of the staff around him. As a result, the White House staffs of recent times, certainly from the Kennedy Presidency onwards, have been built around a central core of staff campaigners. It is clear, therefore, that political writing about presidential campaigns has much to tell us about the relationships formed between candidate and staff and the way in which the future President establishes a style and working methods which he is likely to continue inside the White House. This relationship is emphasized as the length of presidential campaigns gets longer and longer.

In this connexion Martin Schram's *Running For President* (subtitled "A Journal of the Carter Campaign") said much about a presidential candidate with whom in any case many people were very unfamiliar. An opposite case was the 1968 presidential election where Richard Nixon was anything but the unknown candidate. Out of that came Joe McGinniss's best-selling book *The Selling of the President*, which confirmed many people in their opinion of Nixon's campaign. Another Nixon campaigner, Richard J. Whalen, wrote *Catch The Falling Flag* (subtitled "A Republican's Challenge To His Party"). Four years later came a new style of campaign reporting exemplified by Hunter Thompson's *Fear And Loathing On The Campaign Trail* and Timothy Crouse's *The Boys On The Bus*. A more conventional attempt to discuss the experience was published as *Campaign 1972* which took the form of a series of discussions between the leading participants on both sides. Campaign literature will continue to grow and develop in the foreseeable future.
The most obvious group of people who could contribute such material are the members of a President's family. However, as with Presidents themselves, their families have written relatively little. President Roosevelt's son James Roosevelt wrote *Affectionately FDR* (in cooperation with Sidney Shalett) in which he had something to say about working at the White House as one of the Presidential Secretaries. Another family book from the Roosevelt years was Eleanor Roosevelt's *The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt* which commented on the relationship between President Roosevelt and several of his closest aides, among them Louis Howe and Harry Hopkins. Turning to his successor, *Harry S. Truman* was written by his daughter Margaret, which dealt with his political as well as personal life. A more personal story was told by Lady Bird Johnson in her book *A White House Diary*. Although it did not discuss political issues, it said something about the routine of life at the White House and the working schedule.

In the same vein, J. Bernard West, who served as Chief Usher at the White House for many years, wrote *Upstairs At The White House*, describing the working methods and routines of the Presidents he knew. Similar information was provided in Ruth Montgomery's *Hail To The Chief* (sub-titled: "My Life and Times with Six Presidents"). It has been said that a President's life is a process of constant decision-making. Literature of this kind helps to round out what we know of this process.

**SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE**

Although the Presidency of the United States is a unique position in world politics and therefore without direct comparison, there is a body of literature deriving principally from the discipline of sociology which seeks to analyse any situation involving the leadership of a group and the behaviour of groups in that position. The President has virtually complete control over the White House staff, who are in turn completely dependent upon him.
for their work and advancement. Given these circumstances there is 
something of value to be gleaned from the appropriate sociological and 
psychological literature.

For example, in the late 1940s J.K. Hemphill, in The Leader and His 
*Group* reached some tentative conclusions about the characteristics of 
groups and their view of what constituted successful leadership. Many 
of the characteristics which he identified — such as Size, Viscidity, 
Homogeneity, Flexibility, Polarization — have definite political meaning 
in the White House context, though they appear to be couched in academic 
jargon. Other academic terms, such as the concept of turnover, used by 
E.A. Fleishman and E.F. Harris in their paper *Patterns of Leadership* 
*Behaviour Related To Employee Grievances and Turnover* are more readily 
understandable in political terms. Turnover is certainly pertinent to the 
White House staff. On a more general level, the work of Victor H. Vroom, 
as exemplified in his book *Work and Motivation*, has dealt with such con­
cepts as the motivational bases of work, the determinants of job satis­
faction, and such matters as supervision and supervisory behaviour. Again, 
much of this can be related to the White House staff. *Men Who Manage*, 
by Melville Dalton, has discussed the relations between 'staff' and 'line' 
management, a division which is of the essence of presidential organization 
of the Executive Branch and White House. One of the founding fathers of 
the study of organizational behaviour was Max Weber. His major works, 
such as *Economy and Society* and *Essays in Sociology*, brought to the 
fore models of organization and their historical roots. His identification 
of what he called 'Patrimonial' versus 'Bureaucratic' officialdom, for 
example, made clear that although outward political institutions may change 
there were certain continuing forms of human organization which tended to 
transcend any particular historical period.
MEDIEVAL LITERATURE

One historical period will, however, retain its special relevance. Perhaps the best way to introduce this body of literature is to refer to one of its most famous works, *The Prince* by Niccolo Machiavelli. In a work that has proved a milestone in the development of political analysis, it should also be recognised as having much of relevance to the contemporary Presidency. For example, insights that Machiavelli pinpointed into the human character and the role played by advisers remain insights today in the context of the President and his staff.

Apart from other such writings to come directly out of the Medieval period of history there is a wealth of analytical historical writing which should be considered part of this group. For example, J.E.A. Jolliffe's *Angevin Kingship*. Jolliffe provides us with a picture of life at court which resembles the White House not only in terms of the complete dependency on the king of his courtiers but also in matters of administration. Then again, in the more specialised study by Sir Fredericke Maurice Powicke, *Henry III and The Lord Edward*. we find an analysis of the motives of kings toward their courtiers that compares with those of modern Presidents towards their staff. This relevance has been heightened by the experience of presidential Administrations in the 1970s. Whether or not there exists an absolute obligation on the staff to follow a presidential order is but one more example of a question that first emerged in the medieval era, according to Ewart Lewis in *Medieval Political Ideas*. A further similarity is to be found in the principle of 'Theocratic Royal Grace' dealt with by Walter Ullmann in his book *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages*. This concept adequately describes the behaviour of President Johnson toward his staff.

To conclude, there is perhaps no body of historical literature more pre-
closely applicable to a discussion of the White House staff than that emanating from the Medieval Age. The difference of hundreds of years does not detract from the essential similarity of position between a medieval king and his advisers and a modern President and his White House staff.

POLITICAL FICTION

When discussing or appraising the political structure of a state in terms of its tangible outward form the use of political fiction in helping to further understand this definite political structure is almost non-existent. However, when one comes to consider the intangible factors that convert the outward structure into a living organism, works of political fiction immediately assume a greater importance. For example, when trying to analyse the relationship between a President and his closest senior staff, the dry academic description may well not have as much to offer as the sharp insight offered by a political writer. This is especially the case when the writers of political fiction have themselves had at least some acquaintance with the political system.

One who had a great deal was John D. Ehrlichman, a former Assistant to President Nixon for Domestic Affairs and one of the men closest to President Nixon in the 1970s. Ehrlichman's fictional book The Company (although its fictional aspects were thinly-veiled) is important in this context not for its plot but for the way he described relationships between the President and the staff around him. Obviously this was shaped in large measure by the experiences Ehrlichman encountered while himself working in the White House. Also guided by his own experience, but to less effect, was The Canfield Decision by former Vice President Spiro Agnew.
Various journalists have written novels of political fiction. In many respects these are the most valuable fictional works of their kind, especially so as some had their journalistic sense enriched by actual experience in the White House itself. Good examples would include the books by Douglass Cater, especially Dana: The Irrelevant Man, which was built around the relationship between the President and a very influential adviser and all-round Washington figure. Cater spent many years in the White House as a Special Assistant to President Johnson. Allen Drury's Capable of Honour explored similar themes. Another journalist, Patrick Anderson, went to work as a speech-writer in the Carter White House. His first novel published in 1970 was The Approach to Kings which traced the progress of a bright young speech-writer on a President's staff. Anderson freely admitted that this book grew out of his experience in the Kennedy-Johnson years and his subsequent study of White House assistants. It grasped the essential fact that you cannot be "your own man" for very long inside the White House "pressure cooker" (as George Reedy once characterized it). His second novel The President's Mistress was especially interesting for its recognition of a "layered" White House staff. William Safire, who served as a Special Assistant under Nixon and was one of his senior speechwriters, incorporated a great deal of his White House experience in Full Disclosure including characterizations of senior staff "types", and many interesting incidental details about the working White House.

Professional writers, as distinct from journalists who also write fiction, have tended not to be so successful. For example, although Gore Vidal's political novel Washington DC is undoubtedly well written it suffers, in this context, from the distance it deliberately keeps from its subject. Not that Vidal has been the least political of authors, having written A New Power in the White House to celebrate the arrival in office of President Kennedy in 1961. Others, such as Upton Sinclair, who produced
The novel *Presidential Agent,* have also drawn on the political mood of their times.

The world of the White House staff is not one that is susceptible to precise measurement in tangible terms. Fiction can therefore play an important role by stepping in where conventional research cannot tread. While the American political system continues to provide for a Presidency that can organize its immediate staff at will then the contribution of political fiction to our understanding of the way that White House works will always be of some value.

**CONCLUSION**

We have now examined the body of literature on the White House staff and found it useful to distinguish between various categories of writing according to the relationship of the writer to the 'scene of the action', i.e. the White House staff. Some of the points made would not suffer from further emphasis.

First, the volume of writing. This analysis of literature has not been compiled from a chronological viewpoint but the reader will have noticed that the more recent the year the greater the amount that has been written on our subject. Indeed, were the numbers of books and articles on the staff that have appeared over the last forty years to be plotted on a graph, the curve upwards in the 1970s has been almost exponential. It may not continue upwards at this rate but it will nevertheless remain at a much higher level than that which obtained in any previous period.

Among the various categories we have identified this growth in the volume of writing has been unevenly distributed. Presidents, for example have
not noticeably had more to say about their White House staffs than their predecessors a decade or two ago. On the other hand, the contribution of the Press, taken as a whole, to understanding the nature and work of the staff has grown enormously and has often been of a valuable kind. By contrast, the academic community, and especially its political science branch, has been slow in treating the White House staff as a serious and legitimate subject of study. As for the staff themselves, there has been an increasing output, whether sponsored by financial considerations (as in the case of many of the Nixon staff) or otherwise. This is both reflected in, and bolstered by, their collective sense of self-confidence, born of their privileged position at the centre of the Presidency and their "White House perspective". Their passion for anonymity has been overtaken by their passion for publication. It remains to be seen what approach historians for the 1970s will take, but they will certainly have to take great account of the staff system of the Presidents about whom they write. As regards political fiction, for which we do not need to wait so long, we can already discern that the experience of the last few years has proved fruitful for writers of fiction as well as those who seek to veil their memoirs with fictional veneer.

Second, the quality of writing. There is no doubt that this has improved over the years, especially in the 1970s. This is partly a function of having more to write about on the subject. The effect of a large White House staff has been to force examination of the system under which the staff operates and the various factors involved in its management. The general trend has been towards a better and more mature understanding. But parallel to this trend has been the continuance of the trivial superficial personalised 'analysis'. It would be naive to think that this will ever disappear.
Apportioning the quality of writing to the different categories is a difficult exercise because it can depend more on the individual than the category in question. The quality of writing by certain of the Press deserves special mention, especially during the Nixon years when they operated with the disadvantages of Administration secrecy. Writers on public administration also deserve recognition. They have fostered much discussion on issues and problems relevant to the ways in which the staff can (and should) be organized. The one disadvantage for the general reader is the terminology employed. The dry impersonal approach which (albeit refreshingly) characterizes their discussion needs to be translated into 'political language' to readily appreciate the impact of what is being said.

Third, there is a definite relationship between the kind of writing produced and the position of the writer in relation to the 'scene of the action'. Those who are direct participants, the Presidents and White House staff, provide us with source material which is indispensable. Yet this is rarely accompanied by an analysis to match the description. The Press stand outside this inner circle, but are in constant contact with it. The Press produce writing that is often highly personalised and directional, and lacks the ability to take the wider view. This is natural given the high-pressured and fast-moving world in which political commentators are attuned to the daily rush of events. In the absence of a more open policy by successive Administrations the Press have performed a considerable service by their constant search for information pertinent to the President's relationship to his staff.

The academic establishment has not had a very satisfactory record in this respect but its analytical discipline offers the prospect of worthwhile contributions, some of which are already apparent. Its main drawback is a
lack of practical experience of the unique situation of the White House. Historians, writing from great distance, have not yet comprehensively re-interpreted contemporary presidencies in the light of the importance now accorded to White House management, but it is perhaps too soon to make a final judgement. Certainly they are in a better position to examine the importance of personal relationships (one thinks here of Robert E. Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins). Finally, as regards that motley assortment of literature - including political fiction, sociological and psychological writing, and Medieval literature - their contribution lies in the insights they give into the human relationships involved and an understanding of the unchanging aspects of human behaviour.

One caveat must be entered at this point. Namely, that proper account must be taken of the various hierarchical divisions that exist within each category. This subtlety somewhat complicates matters. For example, there can be a considerable difference of perspective between senior and junior-ranking members of the White House staff. Neither can the Press be lumped together entirely in one bundle. Journalists that specialise in White House affairs (such as John Osborne of The New Republic) have something different to offer from nationally-syndicated columnists or departmentalised political reporters. It can be argued that these categories occasionally overlap. A journalist may be in a position to know more than a member of staff. The more hierarchically the staff is organized the more likely this is to occur. One is mindful that John Dean wrote in Blind Ambition that his best policy was "to keep my mouth shut", and not to ask questions about what went on. "The loyal soldier is silent, and he does not pry." For a while, therefore, some journalists knew more about the Nixon staff system than did John Dean, although eventually Dean was in a position to know things which no amount of 'digging' by any journalist could reveal.
Fourth, the motive of the writer. This is another subtle consideration when assessing the overall value of any contribution on the White House staff. As a general rule one’s motive for writing is dependent upon one’s situation (i.e. into which category one falls). The journalist writing next day’s newspaper has a different motive from the political scientist writing next year’s treatise. The motive of a President answering questions about his staff in a Press Conference can be different from his referring to them in his memoirs. Sometimes these varying motives affect what each say; almost always it affects the way that they say it. Five brief examples will suffice.

Consider firstly the case of an off-the-record press interview with a staff member. Academic writers like Thomas E. Cronin and John H. Kessel have made good use of the background interview. Here, in the safety of non-attributable quotations, the staff have greater freedom to say what they really think without too much regard for the consequences - even if (or especially if) it reflects on another staff member in which case the consequences may be the point of the exercise. Infighting among the staff is often conducted in this way.

Secondly, take the case of the on-the-record Press interview. These have traditionally only been granted for the simple purpose of presenting an Administration or a President in the best possible light, including the very fact of its being accessible to the Press. The motive for what is said is thus governed by the motive in holding the interview at all. A good example here was *Courage and Hesitation* by Allen Drury. He was considered friendly enough to the Nixon Administration to be given carte blanche to roam around interviewing staff members. They, in turn, used Drury to talk about their work in a way that reflected best on them and the President.
Thirdly, there is the matter of appearing before Congress in the course of the regular round of appropriations hearings. Such staff as have appeared before either the House or the Senate subcommittees concerned have shared one particular motive: to do their best to ensure that Congress appropriated whatever money the Administration has claimed it needed for its staff. This objective has necessarily coloured every aspect of their testimony. It has involved, for example, their presenting a distorted picture of the activity of the Domestic Council and the Vice Presidential role in government. Certainly they have at all times sought to reveal as little as possible about the true structure and operation of the staff.

Fourthly, there is the different world of the televised congressional inquiry. The two obvious examples here are the Ervin Committee hearings in 1973 and the House Judiciary Committee hearings on Impeachment in 1974. Members, past and present, of the Nixon White House staff were summoned before both of these congressional committees. The purpose of their appearances was vastly different from that of a routine congressional hearing. "I do not need to stress again the importance of our undertaking", said Chairman Rodino in the summer of 1974 to his Committee, with unusual understatement for a member of Congress. Whether or not it was for their personal good, the White House staff were on oath to tell the truth. In this case their motive was further encouraged by a sense of history and high drama.

Fifthly, there is the question of memoirs. Here again can be discerned a different shade of motive. The passing of time tends to have a sobering effect on a former member of staff for the simple reason that a period of adjustment is necessary after such a high-powered existence. Rarely can anything else in life match the heady days of life in the White House. Staff reminiscences convey, almost by definition, a more mature approach
to their staff experience. For example, the books by George E. Reedy, Theodore C. Sorensen and Emmet John Hughes, were all the richer for the backward look at their former employment. Particularly valuable in this context was the Appendix of Hughes' book, in which were contained a dozen or so concise reminiscences of former members of the staff. This reassessment of their experience occasionally reflected a motive not present in any other situation. For example, Sorensen argued against the growth and organization of the staff in the 1970s in a way which he did not in the 1960s. What may be harder to separate is how far it was intended to create a favourable comparison between the Kennedy and Nixon years (in Kennedy’s favour) and how far it reflected a genuine change of heart. In such cases the motive may be the message.

It should be clear enough by now that the motive of the staff member writer has to be carefully taken into account when considering their writing. This is no less true in any other of our delineated categories. For instance, part of the reason that much Press writing tends to the sensational and personalised is because their motive for writing (or their editor’s motive for editing and presenting) is determined by such an approach. Similar motives predominate in the writing of political fiction. Writers on public administration may be motivated more by the need to appeal to fellow members of their discipline than to the lay reader. By contrast, Machiavelli intended that his work should be readily understood by the general reader, in which task he manifestly succeeded.

How then are we to judge the most valuable writing on the White House staff? The short answer is that those who have produced the best writing have been those with experience in two or more of the categories that we have identified. Paramount must be some experience on the White House staff itself for the author. Without direct personal experience of what
the White House is actually like in practice no writer can place the staff in its proper context. The position of an adviser to a President on whom that adviser is dependent is not susceptible to dry mathematical analysis alone. With such a subject there is no substitute for experience. The best appreciation can come from those who have both seen it from the inside and are capable of subsequently subjecting it to critical analysis.

Few have combined personal experience on the staff with such writing at a later stage. Among these have been Stephen Hess, John H. Kessel, Thomas E. Cronin, Richard P. Nathan, Richard Tanner Johnson, and Patrick Anderson. All have had experience as a participant (the first category) and all except Anderson have been academics (the third category). Anderson's background was journalism (the second category). Hess served on the Nixon staff, as did Tanner Johnson and Kessel; Cronin worked on Johnson's domestic policy staff; and Nathan was on the Nixon OMB staff as Assistant Director. Anderson served in staff capacities under both Kennedy and Johnson and joined the White House staff of President Carter as a speech-writer. By taking their experience and reflecting widely upon it, always cognizant of the real forces at work inside the White House, they have made a valuable contribution to our understanding.

This analysis would not be complete without a definite indication of the gaps that yet need to be filled. These can be summarised simply enough under two headings: firstly, hard facts; secondly, the attitude of Congress.

As to the first, the dearth of hard fact on which to base any study of the staff is apparent in almost everything written. Writers may have had greater or lesser access to past or present White House staff in the course of their work, but none has ever compiled (or attempted to compile) a
reasonably accurate and comprehensive array of basic evidence on the subject. Elementary statistics — such as the names of all those serving on the staff of a particular President; between which dates; with what title and/or job description; with what salary; with what staff of their own; funded with what resources; from which Budget item; whether detailed and if so from where — have not been comprehensively researched. Neither has there been constructed a clear record as to the organization of a staff; e.g. who reported to whom; which staff covered which areas; and other such relevant information. Discussion has continued in the absence of firm knowledge of the basis of the White House staff in law and in ignorance of many other facets of its existence, whether de jure or de facto. On all these matters no comprehensive attempt was made in forty years to rectify these elementary omissions.

Secondly, extraordinarily little attention has been focused on the attitude of Congress despite its being entrusted with the constitutional responsibility to provide funds for the White House staff. As Watergate unfolded people questioned how it was possible that the abuse of power which then appeared to characterize the White House could have remained hidden for so long. How and why had the staff been allowed to develop in such a way without Congress taking an effective interest in their growth or exerting effective checks where necessary? But even by the end of Ford's Presidency no research whatever had been published on these crucial aspects of the congressional role.

This analysis of the literature leaves us better able to understand and evaluate the two most obvious and serious omissions in the corpus of literature on the White House staff. The original research conducted for this thesis will rectify both such omissions (particularly in Chapters IV and VII respectively). This chapter has brought us to the threshold of the major part of our study of the White House staff. Our first task is to place them in their historical context.
CHAPTER III

THE ORIGINS AND ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF
INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the origins and establishment of the White House staff. Staff assistance for the President, of one kind or another, was available long before the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. To this extent, some of the features of the White House staff system that we know today are not new. An historical perspective is necessary for a proper understanding of this fact. It is therefore important to examine the origins of staff assistance in order to appreciate what has been new and distinctive about the growth of the White House staff since 1939.

This chapter divides into two parts. In the first part the origins of staff assistance are traced from their roots in American political history to the accession to power of President Franklin Roosevelt. In the second part we examine the years 1933 to 1939, which formed a transition period, at the end of which The White House Office was created by Roosevelt and the White House staff were officially established.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Two approaches are taken in this discussion of the origins of the White House staff. The first part of this section is primarily descriptive. It briefly demonstrates the level of staff assistance made available to the President in the period to 1933. The second approach is more analytic. Of primary concern here is the nature of the relationship between President and advisers. The mere existence of a single executive in itself engendered a relationship which embodied certain recurring features. They are still present today. Such nascent features of the White House staff are considered in the second part of this section.
It was not until 1857 that Congress first appropriated any money whatsoever for any kind of assistance to the President. By its action in that year the President was finally allowed one Private Secretary, one White House Steward, and one Messenger. Until then some Presidents had had to hire relatives or friends to perform some of the necessary clerical duties, often having to pay them out of their personal presidential salary. This practice began with George Washington himself, who employed his nephew as an assistant. President Jefferson was another whose messenger-cum-secretary had to be paid for out of his own pocket. President Monroe at different times retained his brother and two sons-in-law in a similar capacity. He was also the first President to openly state the need for paid assistance from public funds. Shortly before leaving office he sent Congress "a few remarks...founded on my own experience, in this office" in which he complained that petty household details were forced upon the Chief Executive at the cost of his ability to attend to matters of higher importance. Thus Presidents Adams and John Quincy Adams (of necessity) made a point of handling their correspondence themselves. But Quincy Adams suffered so many idle visitors, mostly total strangers, that he became "an object of attention like the exhibits in the Patent Office", about which his Private Secretary (his son) could do nothing. President Jackson continued this family tradition by employing his son, and before that, his wife's nephew. President Tyler's son worked as his Private Secretary and Presidents Polk and Buchanan both employed their nephews.

For those early Presidents who maintained a high work rate, such as President Polk, there was little official help available, and none of a personal nature. Polk's diary records the existence of a "porter" who vainly tried to keep visitors out of his office; a solitary clerk provided by Congress to sign land patents on behalf of the President; and the occasional services of other
clerks to make their fair copies in duplicate of the President's annual messages. Polk functioned both as President and at the same time managed two or three of the executive departments during the summer months when the members of his Cabinet felt they had to leave Washington because of the heat. President Taylor, on the other hand, who was known neither for his work rate nor his workload, was said to have managed with the aid of two assistants (one of whom was his son-in-law employed to improve Taylor's grammar) and a couple of clerks. His successor, Millard Fillmore, also made extensive use of an amanuensis, while at the same time complaining about the volume of mail he received.

But even the congressional contribution in 1857 of a Private Secretary and two others (at a combined cost of $5,350) was no guarantee that the Presidency would thereafter function in a more orderly administrative fashion. President Lincoln provides us with a good example here. He operated in such a personal manner, and with so little direct help, that he bequeathed only a small executive staff organization to his successor. This can be partly explained by the fact that he himself was in the habit of writing most of his correspondence in longhand. Moreover, his particular idiosyncratic approach to the administrative problems of the Presidency apparently entailed the use of his famous stovepipe hat as a portable filing cabinet for important papers. This may or may not be the origin of that brand of political analysis which differentiates between the various political 'hats' that the President wears.

The first hard evidence of staff assistance for the President in the postbellum years (if one discounts the "rubber-stamp signature machine" invented for President Johnson, who had hurt his arm) came with the Grant Presidency. Grant was appropriated the sum of $13,800 p.a. to pay for six assistants. These were: one Private Secretary, one Stenographer, two Executive Clerks,
one Steward, and one Messenger. Curiously, despite this official assistance, he seems to have handled most of his correspondence himself. Yet, in other respects, even this doubling of assistants within a space of twelve years was not enough for Grant felt bound to borrow three Generals from the War Department to help him. This stands as an early example of the practice which has come to be known in modern government as 'detailing'.

Although this level of assistance was maintained for all the succeeding Presidents in the nineteenth century, some of them complained that it was not enough. President Hayes, for example, felt that he was so overburdened that he didn't get enough exercise. President Garfield was dissatisfied that his time was frittered away, which in part may be explained by his lack of adequate staff assistance. His successor, President Arthur, sought to modernize the staff and was responsible for having introduced the typewriter to the White House. By the time of the presidencies of Garfield and Arthur, the complement of presidential clerks had been increased to include one Executive Agent and Disbursing Clerk, two Private Secretaries, and one Assistant Private Secretary. Garfield had tried at first to write by hand all his own correspondence (as President Carter similarly was to attempt to sign all of his by hand nearly 100 years later) but was obliged to turn this burden over to his staff.

But if there were Presidents who seemed to need more staff assistance there were others who did not appear either to wish or require it. President Cleveland, for example, seems to have managed most of the time without even a Secretary. He answered most of his mail in longhand, and refused to use the newly-invented typewriter. He is also said to have answered all White House telephone calls in person, although that perhaps tells us more
about the numbers of telephones in those days than anything else. At
all events, such administrative self-reliance proved in his case, however
quaint, to be misdirected. It was said that Grover Cleveland "fell prey
to the tyranny of the trivial". Had he wished to delegate some of
these trivial matters, President Cleveland would have had to hand a modest
group of nine clerical assistants: one Secretary, two Assistant Secretaries,
two Executive Clerks, and four other Clerks. As Bryce remarked, at about
this time, the President had not the means "to maintain a Court".
The new century brought not only the first signs of the modern Presidency
but also the first signs of the accelerating growth of presidential staff.
There is a difference of opinion over the exact size of President McKinley's
staff support. It has been recorded that McKinley had to manage with the
aid of only eight or ten persons, and that a small secretarial staff took
care of all his personal and official correspondence. Another source,
however, records that McKinley was appropriated no less than $44,240 to
cover the cost of a staff of twenty-seven employees. While these two
accounts need not necessarily be incompatible (for example, the latter
figure may have included household as well as clerical staff) the latter
does nevertheless indicate the emergence of a more significant level of
staff support for the President. Either way, working arrangements for
the President were by this time becoming disorganized. Six rooms in the
dilapidated East Wing of the White House comprised the executive offices.
Here a handful of clerks, aided by a telephone and several typewriters,
assisted the President and his Private Secretary. McKinley encountered
difficulties in trying to find someone who would serve as his Secretary,
which indicates that the post was hardly considered very desirable.
President Theodore Roosevelt, who succeeded to the Presidency upon the assassination of McKinley, was reported to have had a staff of forty. Nevertheless, James Bryce, that important and respected British commentator on the American commonwealth, observed that the President "had no military guard, chamberlain, or grooms-in-waiting". Teddy Roosevelt's daughter, Alice Roosevelt Longworth, has confirmed this in private conversation with the present writer. Apparently there were no secret service guards, and entry into the White House itself presented no problems for even the casual caller. Residents at the White House were left to fend for themselves and there was none of the atmosphere of reverence about the place, or the office, that has grown up in more recent times. Indeed, on one occasion, it is related that a junior reporter from the Washington Post once wandered into the White House and walked around for some time looking for someone at home until he finally bumped into Roosevelt himself.

Bryce's observation proved to be a misleading indication of the new demand that the twentieth century was to place upon Presidents. One was the need to travel, and the first funds for presidential travel were appropriated in 1906. But the pressure of work was also beginning to tell. For example, Roosevelt's arrival in the White House created a dramatic increase in the volume of mail. The popular Teddy began to get as many as 1,500 letters a day. A special department had to be created of the Washington post office just to handle White House mail. In 1905 the Postmaster General authorized the detail of a registry clerk to the White House to help with the workload. This was the first properly recorded instance of detailing staff to the White House, despite the fact that the Attorney General subsequently ruled against this action. Any reference to the workload at the White House during this period should not pass over its more bizarre aspects. For example, one activity that took up a good deal of time in the early years
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of the century was the procurement and preparation of an adequate supply of sheepskins. In those days all Commissions had by tradition to be written on sheepskin, and with the steadily increasing number of Commissions being issued visitors were sometimes greeted with the sight of the White House bedecked with numerous sheepskins being dried out before use. 41

A more serious sign of the times, and portent for the future, is afforded by the transfer during these years of the President's working quarters from the second floor of the White House to the newly-built office wing added to the west. 42 This new West Wing was certainly needed just to handle the growing volume of mail received at the White House, which by the Taft Presidency was already considerable. 43 A contemporary observer stated that a large slice of the annual appropriation for the upkeep of the White House (for which Congress in 1909 voted funds to pay for servants), some $86,000, went towards dealing with the mail. 44

Turning to other staff positions we find that with the advent of President Wilson there was an official White House Physician on the payroll. Indeed he and Wilson often played golf together on Sunday afternoons and other days when the going was slow. 45 Wilson, whatever his other duties, certainly made enough time for himself to draft personally some of the important state papers. 46 If he may not always have appeared busy, his Private Secretary (at a salary of $7,500 p.a. 47) certainly was, although Wilson's dependence on him did not preclude at least one attempt to do without him altogether. 49 By the time of President Harding we find that there had been added to the presidential entourage a Military Aide, which in Harding's case was considered a post to reward his friends, 50 and Congress at last helped defray the cost of official presidential entertaining. 51 But this additional help was not of much comfort. "I knew that this job
would be too much for me", 52 wailed President Harding. It is doubtful whether any amount of assistants would have made Harding any happier. He did enjoy one labour-saving advantage, however, for he was the first President to use the secretarial proxy signature for his correspondence. 53

Of all the Presidents this century, the one least noted for succumbing to the strains of presidential office was surely President Coolidge. Yet he maintained a larger staff than his predecessors. By this time a Social Secretary had been added to the staff complement, and a Naval Aide, although this latter was a routine placement rather than a personal presidential appointment. 54 Altogether his staff assistance amounted to some forty-six employees (of which twenty-seven were domestic staff), with an annual operating budget in the region of $93,500. 55 President Coolidge represented the last of an administrative tradition that began in earnest after the Civil War with the succession of relatively passive Presidents. Despite such feats of social activity as shaking hands with nineteen hundred people in the space of thirty-four minutes, 56 Coolidge was not noted for any corresponding amount of political activity. Indeed his particular contribution to that post-Civil War administrative tradition was best summed up in a remark he once made to his secret serviceman (at that time detailed to the White House). "I don't work at night", said President Coolidge. "If a man can't finish his job in the daytime, he's not smart." 58 Later Presidents were not to be afforded the luxury of the uninterrupted twelve or fourteen-hour nights to which Coolidge was accustomed.

Finally we come to the Presidency of Herbert Hoover, the last before the White House staff emerged as an organized body in the 1930s. It was not until President Hoover came to office that Congress in 1929 grudgingly agreed to give the President three Private Secretaries instead of one. 59
Thus, on the eve of President Roosevelt's arrival, the following staff positions were in existence: three Private Secretaries, at least one Executive Clerk and two Assistant Clerks, a Military Aide, a Naval Aide, a Physician, a Social Secretary, several Stenographers, and other secretarial assistance and mail-handlers. In terms of its institutional resources the Presidency in 1933 was still in the stone age by comparison to its needs.

These assistants really played no direct political or partisan role: they were managers of files, appointments, and correspondence. Although privy to the President's thinking and decisions their advice on policy and direct involvement in the business of government was only sought in the case of a very few exceptional personalities.

EMERGING CONCEPTS IN STAFF ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT

The second kind of historical evidence relates to emerging patterns or concepts which have since come to characterize the White House staff. We can identify several whose historical origins can be traced back beyond 1933. Each can be seen to have laid part of the groundwork for the quickened pace of development of staff assistance that began under Roosevelt in the 1930s. These concepts may be summarized here as follows: the development of routine; the emergence of staff functions; the structural organization of staff; the staff-President relationship; the job qualifications of staff; and the Kitchen Cabinet, or unofficial advisory group.
The first element concerns the development of presidential routine and the organization of the presidential day. The problems of such organization are to a degree independent of the level of technology at the disposal of the President to help him in this task. Nearly one hundred years ago, for example, President Garfield articulated a feeling that has never been far from any President since: "I am feeling greatly dissatisfied with my lack of opportunity of study", he wrote. "My day is frittered away...What ought not a vigorous thinker to do, if he could be allowed to use the opportunities of a Presidential term in vital useful activity?" President Nixon, for one, was later to feel so strongly on this subject that he began his own Presidency with the firm intention of keeping Wednesdays free of all appointments in order to have the time to think about the major issues with which he wanted to deal.

The burden of routine work fell on the staff as well as the President. During President Arthur's term one commentator observed of the presidential clerks that "the routine office work of the White House constantly increases...often they are busy until late at night bringing up the day's work". Routine was also becoming evident at the other end of the day. By the time of President Hayes it was normal practice for the President to set aside the hour between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. to write and arrange business prepared for him by his Private Secretary. From Cleveland's Presidency we have a similar account: "From 9 a.m. to 10 a.m. he devoted himself to his able and accomplished private secretary, Dan Lamont....who understood, far better than did his Chief, the art of disposing of the piles of letters important enough to require the President's personal attention".
President Cleveland remains the classic example of a President incapable of coming to terms with a proper routine and a proper use of his presidential time. For example, Cleveland spent hours and hours of his time personally supervising literally hundreds and hundreds of private pension bills, often staying up late into the night writing individual veto messages detailing his objections. His biographer related another example of this total inability to delegate: "When the first of each month came, the President insisted upon performing in person the unnecessary labour of making out checks for personal and household expenses, and going over the accounts....'I guess I have to take time to pay my bills' he would remark". Attention to detail can be very important to a President, or can occasionally play a very important part in a particular presidential process, but equally it can be destructive. Cleveland's sense of priorities may be compared with President Johnson's immersion in the preparation of bombing targets during the Vietnam War as an example of a misdirected use of presidential time.

One aspect of the presidential routine that had become standard well before the arrival of Franklin Roosevelt concerned the handling of the mail. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century the volume of mail entering the White House had reached such a level that a solidly organized mail system was required under the direction of a clerk working full-time on its classification. A contemporary account from the Taft Presidency set out the procedures that had by then been adopted to deal with the daily arrival of 500 to 2,000 letters, of which "less than a hundred" required the personal attention of the President:
"A card-index system of all correspondence is maintained with a complete filing system in connection. Probably a hundred letters of a day's mail may be answered by a single form letter, without even engaging the attention of the Secretary to the President. Several hundred of the remainder will be distributed to the various departments and perhaps less than half will reach the Secretary to the President. Of those which do, the Secretary makes a digest and when the President has a moment of leisure his Secretary gives him their substance and receives instructions as to the replies to be made".  

Since then little in essence has changed except the scale of the mail handling operation. Today's daily total on an average day is more like 12,500 (although at special times it can be hugely increased); instead of a solitary clerk there are now about one hundred staff involved, including highly experienced mail analysts; and letters are stored on computers rather than on a card index. What has not changed is that most of the replies take the form of standard coded replies printed and signed automatically; that mail is still forwarded to the departments where applicable; and that the President, or his staff, see but a tiny fraction of the gross total.

Other aspects of the modern apparatus of the Presidency for which predecessors can be found before FDR's time include the daily preparation of a news summary for the President. During Woodrow Wilson's Presidency his Private Secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, was charged with this task. "Without public opinion polls to guide him", wrote Wilson's distinguished political biographer Arthur S. Link, "(Tumulty) pored over newspapers, kept the President informed of the drift of press sentiment on leading issues" and provided a wide-ranging news briefing. Under Wilson's predecessor, President Taft, the practice had developed that whenever the President
vented out of the White House a stenographer always went with him to take down his speeches exactly as they were delivered. This has carried down to the present day as an essential element of the presidential routine, to which has been added the extra dimension of a photographer to record every possible presidential moment together with the ubiquitous tape recorder. Finally, there are precedents for today's natural concern with the state of a President's health and fitness. Long before the turn of the century some Presidents, for example President Hayes, complained that there wasn't enough time or opportunity for exercise.

THE EMERGENCE OF STAFF FUNCTIONS

The second principal element of historical perspective concerns the evolving political functions of the personal staff around the President. Functional divisions of responsibility among the staff developed in a haphazard way: appearing, disappearing, merging and re-emerging under different Presidents over a period of many years. But each development laid part of the groundwork for the more established functional divisions that have characterized the White House staff since 1939.

One of the first of these to appear, unsurprisingly, was the scheduling and appointments function. By the time of President Arthur an Assistant Private Secretary kept "with the aid of two clerks, the record of appointments...in formidable leather-bound volumes like the ledgers in a counting house". One observer commented that "what is practically a Bureau of Appointments has grown up. Including the private secretary there are now seven persons attached to this bureau and their places are no sinecures". This function was allied to the overseeing of patronage matters, which today goes under the title of Personnel Affairs. Well before Lawrence O'Brien performed the role of chief patronage overseer on the White House staff for
both Kennedy and Johnson, Joseph Tumulty was doing essentially the same job for President Wilson. That was not all. He not only "worked closely with the professionals in the Democratic National Committee and had a decisive voice in patronage matters", but also worked as Press Secretary, and served Wilson in the embryonic role of congressional liaison. This latter job had still not established itself in its own right by the time of President Hoover. In his Administration congressional liaison and responsibility for Cabinet business were combined with the work of the Appointments Secretary.

Another major staff function eventually to emerge in its own right was that of Press Secretary. It was not always known by that title, nor of course did it have anything to do with radio or TV in the early days, but it was discernible as early as President Theodore Roosevelt's time. His Private Secretary, William Loeb, enjoyed a formidable reputation. Dealing with newspapermen and their editors was one of his functions. By contrast one of his more light-hearted duties was his self-appointed responsibility to ensure that Roosevelt's spelling was correct. This was necessitated by several incidents consequent upon Roosevelt's professed intention, subsequently discarded in the face of ridicule and protest, to update the spelling of the English language in a manner he thought more appropriate to the modern age. During the Wilson Presidency Tumulty took on board the job of "chief liaison" with newspapermen, a function which was considered important at the time. Being in actual charge of the Administration's Press relations, Tumulty was often in a position to repair the damage created by Wilson's aloofness. Tumulty was affectionate and generous in his dealings with the Press and they in turn "responded with favourable accounts of Wilson, his program, and his purpose". (In some respects a similar challenge fell to President Nixon's Press spokesmen after 1969.)
Calvin Coolidge, too, considered that the overall responsibility for newspaper relations was "considerable". Finally, we find that President Hoover had firmly delineated the Press as an area of jurisdiction for one of his Assistant Secretaries.

Another functional division identified by Hoover was dealt with by a second Assistant Secretary: correspondence. In the nineteenth century this had been the principal duty of each Private Secretary, but by the twentieth century it had become merely one part of an ever-increasing array of functional divisions. We have referred already to the role that President Taft's Secretary had in the arrangement and disposal of correspondence, and this was continued in subsequent Administrations including, for example, the Coolidge Presidency.

The combination of several functions by one man reveals one of the more interesting features of the pre-1933 age. Precisely because the level of help given to Presidents was so small it was possible, and sometimes necessary, for the Private Secretary to coordinate the President's work on his behalf. In this sense they were early prototypes of the role within the White House staff that has since come to be played by the Chief of Staff. William Loeb appeared to fit this category while working for President Theodore Roosevelt. To the extent that this role implies a mastery of the administrative organization of the White House then Joseph Tumulty must also be considered an important prototype. It was said of him that in his position as Secretary Tumulty "was burdened with more numerous tasks than any other man near Wilson". Of all those around the President Tumulty was "the one totally political functionary in the Wilson group". His political importance was more than adequately underlined by his control over the President's time and his access to the President at
all times. This was a political advantage of the first order, and the key component of every Chief of Staff's position since. The corollary applied with equal force: he was intensely jealous of anyone else who was close to the President. 97

The terms in which Tumulty's position were described show a marked similarity to later descriptions of senior White House staff. "No man, not even a Cabinet member", it was said, "got the President's ear except by an appointment approved by Tumulty". 98 His control was so strict that even Congressmen and Senators who arrived late were sent away without an audience with the President. 99 Tumulty's biographer wrote that "Tumulty alone enjoyed free access to his chief... All callers had to reach him through Tumulty. The red rug in Tumulty's office was worn thin by the thousands who carried their hopes and their troubles to the highest authority in the land... Only when he could not solve their problems himself did he refer them to his chief". 100 In many respects the same function was in turn performed by Sherman Adams for President Eisenhower; by H.R. Haldeman and Alexander Haig for President Nixon; and by Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Cheney for President Ford.

In common with these others came attacks from one quarter or another to the effect that they were usurping power. One of President Taft's Private Secretaries (he went through no less than four in four years but "unfortunately for Taft he found no one who could even approximate the technical or political skills of Roosevelt's Private Secretary William Loeb Jr."

101) was a former Chicago journalist named Charles Dyer Norton. From descriptions of his behaviour he clearly exemplified the potential for abuse of power always inherent in the Chief of Staff position, as this passage from Taft's biography makes clear:
"(Norton) was young, enthusiastic, and eager - especially to build an empire for himself. Taft spoke more freely to him than he did to some of his Cabinet members, but Norton was as out of place as a raw oyster in a cup of tea. He did not understand his job or the people he dealt with and knew less about politics and politicians than Taft did. Calling himself assistant to the President, he wanted to build his office into a permanent group of career officials, and even tried to change Taft's personal work habits and to reorganize the Republican Party... (but came under heavy criticism) Taft first cautioned him to stop acting like an 'under-president' and finally let him go. 102

Tumulty was criticized in even stronger terms as "this monstrous and fiendish political plunderbund, and enemy of mankind". 103 At one point President Wilson felt compelled to intervene and state publicly "that the impression that any part of my correspondence is withheld from me by my Secretary....is absurdly and utterly false". 104 (Wilson usually conferred with his Cabinet by correspondence. 105) Such charges directly anticipate those later levelled at the Nixon White House staff and H.R. Haldeman in particular. 106 Sometimes the charges were weathered, sometimes not. Calvin Coolidge was another President who had to come to terms with the ambitions of his Private Secretary, a man with the distinctly Dickensian name of C. Bascom Slemp. Although Coolidge praised his "wide acquaintance with public men and the workings of the legislative machinery" 107 his ambition to achieve Cabinet office eventually became so blatant that Coolidge was obliged to freeze him out of the staff and replace him with a more diplomatic Secretary. 108

Another interesting early example of the Chief of Staff function was furnished about one hundred years earlier. President Andrew Jackson's Administration was famous for its 'Kitchen Cabinet' of which his Private
Secretary, Amos Kendall, was a key figure. The following extract from a contemporary view of the role that Kendall undertook provides an interesting parallel with contemporary circumstances. Kendall was described as "one of the most remarkable men in America. He is supposed to be the moving spirit of the whole Administration; the thinker, planner, and doer; but it is all done in the dark. Documents are issued of an excellence which prevents their being attributed to persons who take the responsibility of them; a correspondence is kept up all over the country for which no-one seems to be answerable; work is done, of a goblin extent and with goblin speed, which makes men look about them with a superstitious wonder; and the invisible Amos Kendall has the credit of it all". 109

Here we can detect the suspicions which are quickly aroused by a presidential adviser acting with "a passion for anonymity"; whether he be in charge of Documents, an early form of the modern-day practice of speechwriting; or whether he be in overall administrative charge of operations at the White House, which is a key part of today's Chief of Staff function.

THE STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF STAFF

A third element which is coupled with the development of functional divisions, relates to early prototypes of staff organization. The earliest of significance again relates to the Jackson Presidency. For example, the Jackson Kitchen Cabinet was described in terms that closely match the staff organization of some recent Presidents, in that "the character of the organization chief (Jackson) was more important than any other. In the absence of bureaucratic rules, the chief's personality and imagination gave his enterprise form and direction". 110
Lyndon Johnson, Jackson's subordinates were tied to their President by particular demands on their personal loyalty. By conscious choice, not natural chance, Jackson's White House establishment was "an adjunct of Jackson's personality, intended to compensate for his personal deficiencies and to extend his personal influence". George Reedy said much the same of the Johnson staff, although this is a feature to some extent true of every modern presidential staff.

The absence of a proper staff has not historically prevented certain Presidents from gathering around them a loose group of unofficial advisers in whom the President may place great reliance and trust. Jackson's 'Kitchen Cabinet' is a good example here. Echoes of that practice still exist, despite the modern apparatus of the White House staff. Franklin Roosevelt's 'Brain Trust' in its original form was one modern example. Similarly, Presidents Johnson, Ford and Carter were known to confer with a 'group' of 'unofficial' advisers. Their hallmark has usually been that they held no Cabinet or official government appointment in the Administration. Such advisers render their advice from a standpoint unencumbered by the intricacies of day-to-day affairs.

At no time in the pre-1933 age did the group of advisers around the President ever grow to a large enough size to be described as either loosely structured or formally hierarchical. Some Presidents appeared to be against such growth. President Coolidge, for example, expressed a firm preference in his autobiography for 'official' advice. "It has been my policy", he wrote, "to seek information and advice wherever I could find it. I have never relied on any particular person to be my unofficial adviser. I have let the merits of each case and the soundness of all advice speak for themselves. My counsellors have been those provided by the Constitution and the law".
By the 1920s some Presidents were prepared to try out new ways. Indeed, despite his apparent sentiments to the contrary, Coolidge was one of them. But in widening his circle of advisers Coolidge still opted for a deliberate organized format, as this contemporary extract describing the Coolidge White House at work in 1924 shows:

"An innovation in the day's work is just now being introduced. The President wishes not merely to dispose of business as it arises. He wishes in addition to make an organized study of all the great national problems. For this purpose he has made out a list of the subjects he wishes to investigate, and Mr. Slemp (the Secretary to the President) has allotted certain days to each, upon which the best informed men in these subjects are summoned to Washington from all parts of the country, arriving at scheduled hours at the White House for intensive discussion, at the request of the President. In a few months this system will put him in possession of the best information and opinion of the country on current problems that organized effort can provide". 114

We can detect here early precedents, in intention if not in form, of the task forces that were set to work by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in the 1960s to deal with a wide variety of domestic problems. Coolidge's innovation also presaged the more organized approach of the Domestic Council fifty years later, if not more precisely the celebrated Camp David "Summits" of President Jimmy Carter. 115

One further feature of staff organization deserves special mention, for historical precedents clearly exist for it: the need to delegate work to others. To a certain extent, this ability (or inability) - crucial to all Presidents - is independent of the exact workload that a President carries.
For example, both Presidents Cleveland and Carter, despite vast differences in the scope of their responsibilities, have been criticized for concentrating on the trivial tasks of their time. Cleveland, in particular, mistakenly preferred to do something poorly himself rather than delegate it to someone else to do well. By contrast, 'Silent Cal', whose burdens of office were not noted for their weight, acted on his own simple words of wisdom. He once wrote that "in the discharge of the duties of the office there is one rule of action more important than all others. It consists in never doing anything that someone else can do for you". In retrospect this advice almost matched Truman's blunt commonsense approach, with the proviso that in Coolidge's case he extended this philosophy to his conception of the role of the federal government and the Presidency itself. Yet in the narrow sense it remains good advice today more than ever. Moreover presidential decisions about the organization of the White House staff have been in no small measure decisions about the delegation of work - and power.

THE STAFF-PRESIDENT RELATIONSHIP

A fourth element to arise out of this historical examination concerns the personal relationship forged between President and staff, as distinct from the political relationship. Central to an understanding of the personal relationship is the concept of dependency - whether mutual or one-way. The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson provides the most illustrative precedent. It does so, firstly, in respect of mutual dependency. What one might term the alter ego relationship is an apt characterization of the relations between President Wilson and Colonel Edward House. The most forceful evidence of this extraordinary bond comes from the President
himself who once wrote: "Mr. House is my second personality. He is my independent self. His thoughts and mine are one. If I were in his place I would do just as he suggested". That is a remarkable statement by any standards. This sense of rapport was reciprocated in House's own observation that "nine times out of ten we reached the same conclusions".

House did not appear to go quite as far as the President in claiming a fusion of their personalities but was equally forthright. "I did not", wrote House at a later date, "in the long course of our friendship, attempt to superimpose my personality upon his. Somehow our two souls merged, yet I always remained what I was, and he always remained Woodrow Wilson".

This was a personal relationship marked by total trust on both sides, and of a kind which was obviously impossible with any member of his Cabinet or others around him. Wilson's biographer has explained that the President "needed a friend above the struggle for place and power, to whom he could turn for advice and spiritual support. Indeed, without such friendship the President was emotionally bereft". The key phrase here is "above the struggle". It was an essential part of House's relationship as alter ego that he had no political ambitions of his own and could thus put himself totally at the disposal of the President. It is clear that from the outset he preferred to operate in an advisory capacity to those seeking office. When asked why he himself never wanted to hold political office House replied: "Because I prefer the intellectual pleasure without the responsibility". This is a straight answer, although he was also apt to use his physical handicaps as an excuse, saying that "I was like a disembodied spirit seeking a corporeal form. I found my opportunity in Woodrow Wilson".
Thus 'equipped' House could put at his patron's disposal a genius for political strategy, and a rare ability to detach himself from the heat of any particular political battle. His self-discipline prevented his aspiring to any more influential role than that of adviser - which in itself was influential enough. Wilson once wrote in an academic work that "argument and an unobstructed interchange of views upon a ground of absolute equality are essential parts of the substance of genuine consultation". In one obvious sense this is an impossible ideal for any President to put into practice. But the alter ego relationship between Wilson and House, as in other such cases since, rested on the generation and maintenance of an artificial atmosphere of equality between President and adviser. It was maintained on the one hand by the subtle judgement of the adviser and on the other by the continuing confidence of the President that the adviser had only the President's best interests at heart. Thus Wilson could say of House: "What I like about House is that he is the most self-effacing man that ever lived. All he wants to do is serve the common cause and to help me and others". Franklin Roosevelt was later to say much the same thing about Harry Hopkins, a member of his White House staff.

The concept of 'the man behind the throne' was resurrected - in the context of the American Presidency - by the role of Colonel House. What did House's role involve in practice? To give some substance to his status as confident, House was Wilson's acknowledged "spokesman and liaison with the outside world. He talked with practically everyone prominent in the Democratic party in state and nation. Most of the Wilson entourage turned to him, as the man closest to the throne, for support in the unending struggle for preferment. Furthermore, House was Wilson's chief link with the leaders of the business and banking communities". This was a strategic role in comparison to Tumulty's tactical involvement in daily administration.
House's main practical contribution involved a constant stream of good judgement. As Wilson's biographer has noted: "It would be more accurate, perhaps, to evaluate him (House) as an exceedingly keen judge of what types of behaviour on his part were required to keep him in good standing with Wilson".129 This is one brand of loyalty. But House supplemented this with help of another kind. He recounted his technique with Wilson thus: "I nearly always praise at first", wrote House, referring to proposals put forward by the President, "in order to strengthen the President's confidence in himself which, strangely enough, is often lacking".130 It was said that Wilson especially needed House on emotional issues.131 This is a second brand of loyalty: emotional loyalty. Generally speaking it is only manifested in the alter ego relationship, although it has been an undercurrent in more recent Administrations.

The second precedent of the Wilson years highlights the relationship of complete one-way dependence that can exist on the part of the adviser upon his President. It did so in the case of Joseph Tumulty and President Wilson. Tumulty clearly exhibited a third brand of loyalty to Wilson - best expressed in practical terms - but was far more dependent on him than was House. The real foundation on which Tumulty's relationship with Wilson rested was nowhere more clearly expressed than in a letter he wrote to the President when it appeared that Wilson was attempting to relinquish his services. His letter was a study in anguish and sense of rejection: "I had hoped with all my heart that I might remain in close association with you," wrote Tumulty, "that I might be permitted to continue as your Secretary, a position which gave me the fullest opportunity to serve you and the country. To think of leaving you at this time...wounds me more deeply than I can tell you....I am grateful for having been associated with so great a man. I am heart-sick that the end should be like this".132 This more than adequately conveys the
one-way dependency that has since characterized the position of many a member of the White House staff.

THE JOB QUALIFICATIONS OF STAFF

There is one respect in which an historical feature of several presidencies did not develop, indeed has all but died out in the contemporary Presidency. This relates to what one might term the job qualifications of staff assistants to the President. It was not uncommon for a number of Presidents’ Private Secretaries either to have had personal experience of political office prior to undertaking the job of Secretary or to seriously aspire to political office afterwards. Several examples come to mind. President Cleveland’s Private Secretary, Mr. Lamont, later became Secretary for War in the Cabinet. President Lincoln’s Secretary John Hay, later became Secretary of State under President Theodore Roosevelt. President Wilson at one stage asked Newton Baker to be his Private Secretary, but Baker, who was at that time Mayor of Cleveland, refused. Coolidge’s Private Secretary, C. Bascom Slemp had once served in the House. The fact that Slemp aspired to Cabinet office was itself less a crime (or considered an improper ambition) than the blatant way in which he tried to promote his chances. His replacement as Secretary, Mr. Sanders, was also a former member of the House. Other secretaries, such as Theodore Roosevelt’s William Loeb, were judged in terms appropriate for a man with personal political experience and concomitant political skills. Their abilities were only emphasized by those Presidents, like Taft, who felt that they were lacking in those about them. Not all those about them, however, needed necessarily to have any such job qualifications at all. There was another route to the President’s confidence.
A continuing theme of American political history has been the occasional existence during a Presidency of a so-called "Kitchen Cabinet". The historical roots of such an informal advisory group can be traced back to the earliest days of the Republic: to the development of the relationship between the President and his proper Cabinet. This relationship has not always been fruitful. For this reason, presidential experience of the Cabinet — whose existence is nowhere officially acknowledged in the United States Constitution — has proved to have a significant historical bearing on the origins of the White House staff.

The idea of providing the President with formal advisers first arose in the Constitutional Convention and was championed in various forms by those who opposed a strong executive power. The purpose of creating an advisory council of some kind was to impose consultation upon presidential decision-making. But there were others, notably Alexander Hamilton, who saw in such advisers and assistants for the President the means to better administer the government. In the Federalist Paper No. 72 Hamilton accurately predicted, and George Washington's subsequent behaviour confirmed, that the departmental secretaries would comprise a Cabinet whose advice was regularly sought — both individually and collectively; orally and in writing.

Washington's belief that "advice should be competitive" led him at first to consult directly with both Congress and the Judiciary. However, both avenues were soon to be foreclosed by the decisions of each body. Thus rebuffed Washington was obliged to rely more on his Cabinet (although the precedent was gradually set that it took no collective decision). But
The nineteenth century dawned the real weakness of the Cabinet as an instrument of advice soon manifested itself. Forming a Cabinet, in the new era of party politics, became dominated by the process of building successful political coalitions - both to gain office and to maintain power. The criteria of Cabinet membership - politics, geography, ability - militated against a relationship of confidence and trust with the President. Presidents soon began to turn away from the Cabinet in search of the political advice they desired. President Jackson's cultivation of a clique of personal advisers led to the coining of that celebrated phrase the "Kitchen Cabinet". At the time, this clique was widely thought to have displaced its legitimate namesake.

The notion of a Kitchen Cabinet has survived to the present day, although it is now most applied to a more organized group. Despite vast differences in the job of President between the early nineteenth century and the later twentieth, a Rip Van Winkle President awakened today would understand and appreciate the value of the White House staff far more easily than he would other features of the modern Presidency. Successive Presidents' wish for an informal grouping of political advisers was the continuing sign of a presidential need unmet by the existing scale of assistance provided. It was said of Jackson's Presidency that "probably the Kitchen Cabinet's strongest underlying characteristic was the closeness of all its members to Jackson". His innovation spawned countless imitations which all served to demonstrate the same point. President John Tyler had his "Virginia Schoolmasters"; Grover Cleveland maintained a "Fishing Cabinet"; Warren Harding encouraged a "Poker Cabinet"; and Herbert Hoover instituted a "Medicine Ball Cabinet". It is instructive that such nicknames have, since Franklin Roosevelt, ceased to be applied to Cabinets but are reserved instead for the characterization of a President's White House staff. This was most certainly true in the case of Franklin Roosevelt's Presidency.
PERIOD OF TRANSITION 1933 - 1939

The period between Franklin D. Roosevelt's assumption of power in 1933 and the creation of The White House Office in 1939 marked a transitional phase in the development of adequate staff assistance for the President of the United States. Roosevelt's Presidency spanned two eras. When he arrived in the White House he was at once aware that the physical arrangements necessary for his work as President were inadequate and that he had insufficient staff assistance. He could do little about this initially, but the experience of these years provided Roosevelt not only with the occasion for experimenting with an embryonic White House staff but also the excuse for finally establishing them.

OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT

During this period President Roosevelt continued, like his predecessors, to enjoy a certain, but limited, amount of officially recognized help (i.e. from persons whose salaries were paid from public funds for precisely that purpose). At its most senior level, as listed in the biannual editions of the CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, this comprised six persons whose names and titles were regularly published under the simple (budgetary) heading of "The White House". Louis Howe, a longstanding confidant of Roosevelt's, was accorded the sole post of Secretary, to which title he held tenaciously, thus depriving Marvin H. McIntyre and Stephen Early of equal status. They were technically only assistant secretaries until Howe's death in 1936, after which they were each upgraded to that of full Secretary to the President. From January 1937 to November 1938 they were joined by a third Secretary, the President's son James Roosevelt.
Also officially listed was the President's Personal Secretary, Missy LeHand (who continued to hold this position until serious illness in December 1942 forced her departure, to be replaced by her deputy Grace G. Tully). Two other persons officially listed were both non-political staff: Maurice Latta held the title of Executive Clerk, and his senior colleague, Rudolph Forster, was named Executive Clerk in charge of the White House Executive Offices. Between them they were responsible for the supervision and coordination of the clerical and administrative functions of the White House. For example, Forster would remind the President that a bill must be acted upon in a certain amount of time, or that by law he must fill a vacancy within a definite period. In his service under no less than eight Presidents he had acquired such a notable reputation for impartiality that when, in October 1944 prior to a campaign foray, he quietly took Roosevelt's hand to wish him luck the President was completely taken aback. "That's practically the first time in all these years that Rudolph has ever stepped out of character and spoken to me as if I were a human being instead of just another President."149

UNOFFICIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT

This meagre amount of official assistance was endowed, however, with a greater number of clerical and staff personnel. Most were acquired unofficially by means of the device known as detailing, and their growing numbers were an important factor in the physical need for an expanded West Wing at the White House. An interesting glimpse of this growth was provided by a specially commissioned Wall Chart in 1937. Under the heading of the "White House Executive Offices" this chart took the form of the traditional pyramid-shaped structure. The Executive Clerk was renamed the Director of White House office staff, and beneath him were ranged the
various functional offices: the Telegraph, Telephone and Travel Service; the Office of Chief of Records; the Office of Chief of Files; the Office of Chief of Mails; the Office of Chief of Correspondence; the Office of Chief of Messenger and Miscellaneous Services; the Office of Chief of Accounts; Purchases and Personnel; and two offices primarily concerned with the First Lady. This listing alone betrayed the existence of a considerable number of support staff working in the White House.

The Wall Chart also revealed the extent to which the political staff were developing their own small staff offices. The three Secretaries to the President - the Press Secretary, the appointments Secretary, the congressional liaison Secretary - had staffs of four, five, and seven. Each was listed as having a Private Secretary; one enjoyed the services of an Assistant; and another that of a Special Assistant. Their names were nowhere officially acknowledged. For example, William D. Hassett, whose name only surfaced officially in 1944 (when promoted to Secretary to the President) had in fact been working at the Roosevelt White House continuously since September 1935 when, on Marvin McIntyre's recommendation, he went to work as an assistant to Press Secretary Early.

What was more significant was the extent of the detailing of many of these personnel from elsewhere in government. The 1937 Wall Chart contained 126 names in all, of which no fewer than 107 were detailed personnel: a percentage figure of 85%. Even in respect of the political staff alone (e.g. the Secretaries and their small staffs) the pattern was the same. Of 24 political staff, 17 (or 71%) were on detail. This additional staff help, surreptitiously acquired, was undoubtedly of great value. But, by the beginning of his second term, Roosevelt's need for more White House help had evidently far outstripped any official capacity to provide it. This was nowhere more apparent than in his need for political advice.
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What President Roosevelt found deficient in his official resources he endeavoured to make up for in other ways, the most notable of which was made manifest in the celebrated "Brain Trust" which he gathered about him. In point of fact the origin of the Brain Trust lay in Roosevelt's campaign for the Presidency in 1932. Initially they were a small group of (mostly) university professors, gathered together by Sam Rosenman on Roosevelt's behalf, to brief the Democratic candidate on a variety of issues and help him "get away from all the old fuzzy thinking on many subjects". It included men like Raymond Moley (who acted as unofficial leader of the group), Guy Tugwell, Adolf Berle, Jr., and several others. Roosevelt referred privately to this group as his "privy council", but they were later dubbed the "Brains Trust" by *New York Times* journalist James Kieran, and it was this name (subsequently shortened when the 's' was dropped) that caught on in the public imagination.

Apart from their professional qualities, other qualities were envisaged which were distinct precursors of those that would later be applied to the White House staff. In the words of Sam Rosenman, "the people we use must be strongly for Roosevelt. They must be discreet, and not talk to people about what they are doing." Moreover, being advisory only, Roosevelt made sure they did not pre-empt any of the crucial decisions necessary during the campaign (although they wrangled endlessly over drafts of campaign speeches). The experiment proved a notable success. As one colleague commented: "Out of it his own (Roosevelt's) thinking was brought into sharper focus. Sometimes it knocked down newly formed ideas of his own; sometimes it opened up entirely new avenues which would later broaden into action."
With the election over and the transition begun Roosevelt was faced with
the question of what to do with the Brain Trust members. He canvassed
several of his associates and advisers for their opinion. Rosenman's
own advice was to keep the group intact for the purpose for which it had
been organized: namely "as a staff to gather materials for study and for
speeches, as a group with whom the President could, as formerly, 'bat
around' ideas from time to time, and who could 'bat around' ideas among
themselves".\footnote{158} We do not know exactly what factors counted with Roose­
velt as he weighed this option but in the end he rejected it. One factor
which must have played a vital part was the absence of any official frame­
work within which these advisers could be located and allowed to continue
their work. During the campaign it had been frankly conceded by Rosenman,
in his discussions with Raymond Moley, that their work for Roosevelt would
have to be on a voluntary basis only. There was no money to pay them with
and it had to be undertaken on the basis of a willingness to promote the
progressive policies of the candidate. But what had been accepted during
a political campaign was no longer acceptable with the launch of the new
Administration. Money was a problem.

It was this problem which Roosevelt solved when he decided to give members
of the Brain Trust administrative jobs in Washington. Thus, for example,
Moley was appointed Assistant Secretary of State; Tugwell became an
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture; Berle worked with the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, and later became an Assistant Secretary of State;
and Hugh Johnson became the NRA administrator. This decision, though it
solved one problem, created others. Roosevelt had their services at his
disposal but each had a major job to which they had to devote the major
part of their time and attention. This, in turn, raised the possibility -
justifiably as it turned out - that they would be diverted into worrying
about the trees at the expense of their ability to help the President in his wider concerns for the forest.

The original Brain Trust was thus gradually broken up as the Roosevelt Administration got underway. But the descriptive term proved more durable than its original membership. It was given a new lease of life. It was retained by the Press and applied to many of the New Dealers that came to Washington in the 1930s to join the crusade: men like Harry Hopkins, Dean Acheson, Bernard Baruch, Tom Corcoran, Ben Cohen, William Woodin, Joseph P. Kennedy, Felix Frankfurter (before he was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court), and many others. Soon anyone not in government service upon whom the President relied for advice or assistance, or those who were in government and enjoyed frequent access to the President, came to be labelled a member of the Brain Trust.

ORGANIZING THE STAFF ASSISTANCE

Roosevelt's handling and organization of these Mark II brain trusters clearly presaged his subsequent treatment of his White House staff. The years 1933-1939 firmly established his personal political style and working methods. Much has been written about his administrative ability, however unorthodox that was considered to be. His success was more than mere triumph of technique, although there is no question that Roosevelt was a very skilful political operator. No-one could ever be sure where he stood. He kept his cards close to his chest. "You won't talk frankly even with people who are loyal to you and of whose loyalty you are fully convinced", complained Harold Ickes, his Secretary of the Interior, in a remark that surely held true of Roosevelt's relations with all his advisers. But his leadership depended to a great extent on an incomparable ability to absorb
information, handle people, and inspire. His Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, once commented: "His capacity to inspire and encourage those who had to do tough, confused, and practically impossible jobs was beyond dispute. I, and everyone else, came away from an interview with the President feeling better."  

Although the White House staff did not officially exist during these years of the 1930s Roosevelt regarded his advisers as later Presidents were to do their staff. He organized them in the manner best suited to his own needs. For example, in his determination to protect himself from White House insulation, Roosevelt encouraged a diversity of information sources and channels deliberately designed to orientate the administrative machinery away from routine and towards innovation. In delegating his authority he was at pains to adopt the same technique. He kept grants of authority to his advisers incomplete. He let them get on with the job but its jurisdictions remained uncertain. He was careful to ensure that their areas overlapped one with another. Roosevelt's methods were similarly evident in the preparation of his speeches. He made extensive use of a variety of Brain Trusters and other advisers. Speechwriting proved to be one of the most fought-over areas between them, precisely because it represented an important means of access to, and influence with, the President.  

One notable Brain Truster, Rexford G. Tugwell, observed that "Franklin allowed no-one to discover the governing principle." Whether true or not, the competitive atmosphere thereby engendered was Roosevelt's administrative insurance policy that "in a large bureaucracy filled with ambitious men eager for power the decisions, and the power to make them, would remain with the President."  

It was clear that Roosevelt wanted, in the words of the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, "an inventive government rather than an orderly government."
But that is not to say that Roosevelt did not keenly appreciate the need for some more organized element of coordination amid the burgeoning departments and agencies of the New Deal. Indeed from an early stage he searched for the person(s) or structure(s) that could best satisfy this need. Without a proper White House staff to hand he was obliged to conduct this search in a rather haphazard fashion. His first attempt at a structural instrument of coordination was a body known as the Executive Council, established in July 1933, and composed of the heads of departments and agencies. Its weekly meetings supposedly superceded those of the Cabinet, indeed it functioned more or less as an enlarged Cabinet, but its combined lack of an agenda and aggressive leadership led Roosevelt no further forward. In November 1933 he tried again with the establishment of the National Emergency Council, a less inclusive body designed to coordinate the recovery agencies. But its growing size precluded its potential use.

One conclusion that Roosevelt reached from this experience was the need for such bodies to be firmly guided, on his behalf, by someone personally accountable to him. By themselves, without an efficient secretariat, these bodies were unwieldy and unworkable. Roosevelt's experience in tackling this problem clearly influenced his later determination to create an institutional staff apparatus to help the Presidency. First, he decided in favour of a vigorous executive secretary to manage the business of both bodies. In mid-1934 he therefore entrusted both jobs to Donald Richberg. Second, he decided to consolidate the Executive Council and the National Emergency Council. In October 1934 Richberg was duly appointed executive secretary of this new body. Third, under Richberg's direction the newly reconstituted National Emergency Council was allowed gradually to build up a considerable structure of its own, developing a set of divisions
Fourth, Roosevelt deliberately used it to gain administrative control over the legislative programme. In pursuing what has become known as "the growth of central clearance" Roosevelt directed that all requests for appropriations should be channelled through the Bureau of the Budget, and all requests for legislation through the National Emergency Council. "If you are going to ask for any legislative action", he said in 1934, "it has got to come through Donald Richberg and up to me if necessary."

Richberg's position thus clearly foreshadowed that of later White House staff assistants for domestic affairs - and in more ways than one. For example, he personally was soon subject to the kind of publicity since attendant upon prominent White House aides. Newspaper stories spoke of Richberg as "Assistant President" or "Now No. 1 Man". Indeed, according to Richberg himself, Roosevelt at one time even contemplated appointing him to a newly-titled position of Assistant to the President. But such treatment of Richberg by the Press undoubtedly influenced Roosevelt against such a step, and the continuing Press comment made a lasting impression on him. After the emergence of the new National Emergency Council in 1934, newspaper headlines were as quick to claim that Richberg was formally established as senior to the Cabinet as Roosevelt was at pains to reassure his alarmed Cabinet colleagues that Richberg was merely "an exalted messenger boy". In the event, Roosevelt's Cabinet need not have worried. Richberg departed from government in 1935, and the National Emergency Council (with Frank Walter recalled to his old job) gradually withered away as a serious presidential instrument of structural coordination.

But it had left its mark. First and foremost it demonstrated the growing dependence of the President on a special staff other than Cabinet members.
whose departmental duties were already sufficient to fully occupy their
time and attention) working exceedingly close to the President's own
sphere of daily operation. One problem was exactly how this staff should
work. "Ideally speaking they executed the President's will without poss­
essing direct authority of their own; but it was difficult to say where
the line was to be drawn", was one comment made.

Roosevelt absorbed the lessons of this experience, and others which forced
themselves upon him. By the end of his first term Roosevelt discerned
that he was in danger of being snowed under by the sprawling executive
establishment that the outpourings of the New Deal had very largely created.

How was he to maintain adequate presidential control over the new agencies
that were springing up on every side? It was "humanly impossible", as
he himself admitted, to handle personally the numerous contacts and mass
of detail that daily confronted him. Over one hundred agencies, in theory,
now reported directly to the President. The sphere of the federal govern­
ment had been vastly increased, not only to regulate the economy but also
to forge its recovery and future development.

On a personal level, too, Roosevelt was swamped. A revealing glimpse of
what this meant in practice was the fact, incredible to the modern reader,
that almost a hundred persons could get through to him by telephone with­
out first stating their business to a secretary. Government officials
encountered little difficulty in procuring appointments on the same basis.

The flow of official memoranda (rarely the one-page memos he tried to
encourage), State Department cables, government reports, congressional
reports, hearings, and debates, and correspondence of all kinds was over­
whelming. "The oldsters around here tell me", he reported, "that I am
now forced to handle...approximately a hundred times as many papers as
any of my predecessors". Under such pressure, the presidential working day was transformed into a pattern that—in its essentials—has lasted ever since. For example, tightly scheduled appointments replaced leisurely chats; news summaries and samples of correspondence were prepared for the President to skim through; lunch was usually taken at his desk; and dinner was often followed by more late-night paper work.

In the continued absence of official help to deal with this massive workload President Roosevelt turned to individuals to provide the degree of coordination necessary. As early as November 1933 he had voiced his opinion that the time had come "when I have got to have somebody to act as sort of alter ego for me during the congressional session, going round and acting as my legs and ears and eyes". In truth his need for an alter ego relationship extended well beyond the sphere of his relations with Congress. From the time that Louis Howe, arguably the adviser closest to Roosevelt when he arrived in office, faded from the scene through ill health and a failing grasp of New Deal issues, Roosevelt seemed to many, not least his wife, to be in search of an adequate replacement. "For one reason or another", commented Eleanor Roosevelt, "no-one quite filled the void which unconsciously he was seeking to fill; and each one in turn disappeared from the scene, occasionally with a bitterness which I understood but always regretted." Among those to which she was referring (with the exception of Harry Hopkins) were Raymond Moley, whose heyday as a Roosevelt confidant was in 1933-1934; and Rexford G. Tugwell, whose spell as Moley's successor in 1934-1935 brought an end to any attempt at a coherent philosophy of coordination.
THE CREATION OF THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939

We have seen that during the 1930s President Roosevelt managed to circumvent the official restrictions placed on the direct employment of staff under which the Presidency laboured. He recruited such persons as he wanted to advise him by a variety of means. He either borrowed people from other departments and agencies of government; or, by the manner in which he conducted his Presidency, and his use of patronage in government appointments, he managed to acquire the stream of advice that he wanted. Throughout this period he was able to call on the services of a growing number of political advisers. But he also recognised that a more systematic system had to be devised to replace the ad hoc brain truster methods that characterized his early years in office. Clearly something had to be done.

THE BROWNLOW COMMITTEE 1936-1937

Roosevelt signalled his intention to tackle this serious problem when he announced, on 22nd March 1936, the appointment of "The President's Committee on Administrative Management" under the direction of Louis Brownlow.

Brownlow had first joined the New Deal effort in 1933 working under Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, and had himself recruited Charles Merriam, an academic, whose previous work on political planning [entitled "A Plan for Planning" (1934)] had caught Roosevelt's attention. The third member of the Committee was Luther Gulick. The spirit in which the
three-man Committee undertook its task was reflected in the broad view that they adopted of their mission. It was also in keeping with their uneasy awareness of the historical context of the 1930s. To their Hamiltonian view of the Presidency, which they regarded as "one of the very greatest contributions made by our Nation to the development of modern democracy," they attached this warning: "Those who waiver at the sight of needed power are false friends of modern democracy. Strong executive leadership is essential to democratic government today. Our choice is not between power and no power, but between responsible but capable popular government and irresponsible autocracy." 

In spotlighting this particular aspect of the Presidency they betrayed a concern that democratic government itself was on trial. For them the American Executive was an institution which "stands across the path of those who mistakenly assert that democracy must fail because it can neither decide promptly nor act vigorously." 

Across the sea, Hitler defiantly taunted the democracies as impotent. Nearer home there was even a certain amount of guarded praise in some quarters for the "efficiency" of the fascist dictatorships. In the United States there was a degree of self-doubt as to the ability of the presidential system to supply the bold dynamic leadership required for the solution of the problems of modern government. The question was even raised as to whether efficiency and democracy were compatible. President Roosevelt reflected such concern when he asked, albeit with a rather over-dramatic rhetorical flourish: "Will it be said, 'Democracy was a great dream, but it could not do the job?'" 

It was, therefore, the President's capacity to act that was specifically uppermost in the Committee's mind. The American Chief Executive, the
Committee claimed, was foremost among other democratic executives precisely because it combined "the elements of popular control and the means for vigorous action and leadership." In its political expression this question was thought to revolve around "administrative management", which the Committee defined as "the organization for the performance of the duties imposed upon the President in exercising the executive power vested in him." In more detail, this required the Committee to concern itself with "the executive and his duties, with managerial and staff aides, with organization, with personnel, and with the fiscal system.

The problem, as the Committee saw it, was simply one of management - of correcting 'bad' management and replacing it with 'good'. In short, "a modernising of our managerial equipment." Viewed in this mechanistic light, the problem of good administrative management would thus go hand in hand with the concept of 'efficiency'. The two were seen to be intimately connected. For efficiency was what made democracy work. In the Committee's Report this concept was translated as 'effectiveness'. The situation thus necessitated "the establishment of a responsible and effective chief executive as the centre of energy, direction, and administrative management."

Politics was seen in essentially business terms, and the survival of political institutions depended upon the successful incorporation of business practices into government: "The forward march of American democracy at this point in our history depends more upon effective management than upon any other single factor". It was precisely this effectiveness that the Committee felt was impaired by the existing framework, "in spite of the clear intent of the Constitution to the contrary". Like any piece of productive machinery, the equipment for proper administrative management needed updating and modernizing to be "abreast of the trend of our American times".
The Committee's introductory remarks were full of language of this kind. It is self-evident that their whole approach was business-like and managerial in the sense that these terms are understood in the private sector. Even as experts in their field they were more familiar with the operation of cities and states than with the Federal Government. Rexford G. Tugwell, a member of the Roosevelt Brain Trust, has written of the Committee members that "it is impossible to escape the impression that they saw the Presidency as an enlarged Mayoralty....they had in mind the picture of a big businessman, master of his organization, served by an efficient staff, running a taut organization, and getting well-defined jobs done in good time". 191

However, this approach was not without its political attractions. Indeed it very much appealed to President Roosevelt. There is no doubt that he was well aware of the real political significance of the changes the Committee advocated. He instinctively appreciated that when the Committee spoke of "the systematic organization of all activities in the hands of a qualified personnel under the direction of the chief executive" and "the establishment of appropriate managerial and staff agencies" 192 this represented a fundamental shift of power. Precisely for this reason Roosevelt was happy to acquiesce in any approach that masked its true intent or lessened its potential to arouse opposition. If the phrase "administrative management" had not already existed it would have been necessary to invent it.

Throughout this period he maintained a close eye on the way in which the Committee's deliberations were proceeding. A revealing glimpse of his mind at work is available from a diary reconstruction of a meeting between the President, the Committee, and the Majority Leaders of the House and
Senate. The President was quoted as having remarked: "I like that word 'management'. It is popular and this thing is going to be popular. People talk of a good housewife as a 'good manager' and when the father of a big family runs things well he is called a 'good manager'".193

Louis Brownlow himself, in his memoirs, also records Roosevelt's satisfaction at this approach. For example, Roosevelt approved the very title of the Brownlow Committee precisely because it did not include the word "reorganization".194 He felt that if it was included it might worry a lot of people unnecessarily; including his own White House advisers, who themselves were nervous at the prospect of being reorganized.195 In this way President Roosevelt sought to defuse potential opposition. The more it could all be presented as a politically neutral administrative change the better.

Nothing was in fact further from the truth. The creation of the White House staff was a definite political act. With the implementation of the Brownlow Committee Report and its advocacy of staff assistance the Presidency was well and truly brought into the twentieth century and given modern means commensurate with its modern responsibilities. The Report, issued on 12th January, 1937, has been described as "a classic paper on American Administration".196 But it was more. It came to dominate political thinking on the Presidency for a generation.

THE BROWNLOW REPORT 1937

"The President needs help" was the Brownlow Committee Report's most celebrated single sentence.197 It recommended the creation of The White House Office to provide the President with the staff assistance that he
needed. These White House staff would have direct access to the President. From this acorn grew a considerable tree.

In describing the characteristics of the proposed new White House staff thereby created, the Report laid down that the staff were to be subject to three specific limitations. These can best be expressed in practical, personal, and political terms. (Appendix 3.2 provides the full text.)

First, in practical terms the staff were to be small in number:

"(The President) should be given a small number of executive assistants.... probably not exceeding six in number". 198

They were to be in addition to the President's existing aides, of which at that time there were three Secretaries to the President.

Second, in personal terms the staff were enjoined to abide by the following:

"They should be possessed of high competence, great physical vigour, and a passion for anonymity". 199

Third, in political terms their limitations were clearly set out:

"These aides would have no power to make decisions or issue instructions in their own right. They would not be interposed between the President and the heads of the departments. They would not be assistant Presidents in any sense". 200

The above three extracts concisely convey the intention of the Brownlow Committee in recommending the creation of the White House staff. But in each area some further commentary is required.
There was no magic in the precise number of six assistants that it was proposed the President should have. President Roosevelt initially chose only to appoint three Administrative Assistants to the President in September 1939. Between then and his death there was only one relatively short period, between 1943 and early 1944, when the White House Office contained the full complement to which he was entitled. Nor did the Report forbid a President the benefit of other forms of additional help. For example, it specifically called for "a contingent fund" to enable the President "to bring in from time to time particular persons possessed of particular competency for a particular purpose" whose services he might usefully employ "for short periods of time". Moreover, the Report was equally cognizant of the President's need for "a greater number of regular office staff" to provide the back-up services essential to the Presidency. Mindful of the experience of the 1930s, with FDR's recourse to detailing personnel to the White House on an ever-increasing scale, the Report encouraged this larger official office staff precisely in order to curtail what it considered an unsavoury practice. Some freedom of manoeuvre was retained. The President was "free to call on departments from time to time for the assignment of persons who, after a tour of duty as his aides, might be restored to their old positions". But this aside, it was quite clear that there was meant to be a definite limitation on the number of staff. The size and the purpose of the White House staff were held to be two sides of the same coin.

The personal characteristics of the staff were similarly thought to be not without relation to their political purpose. That they should be highly competent was not in dispute. That they should be endowed with "great physical vigour" merely reflected the physical incapacities of the President they were to serve. In a very real sense they were to be the "eyes and ears" of a President unable to get out and about as easily as others. Where
their personal and political characteristics merged was in the statement that "they should be men in whom the President has personal confidence".\textsuperscript{204} It was this which vitally distinguished the White House staff from a high-powered civil service. Women, incidentally, went quite unmentioned.

The Brownlow Report described in some detail the extent to which the political role of the White House staff was to be circumscribed. Their job was only to simplify executive contacts, clearance, and guidance. They were to assist the President in obtaining "quickly and without delay all pertinent information"; and when the decisions had been made they were to "assist him in seeing to it that every administrative department and agency affected" was properly informed. To this end it was thought that their effectiveness would be "directly proportional to their ability to discharge their functions with restraint".\textsuperscript{205} The White House staff were specifically enjoined to "remain in the background, issue no orders, make no decisions, emit no public statements".\textsuperscript{206} Such were the limitations.

The Brownlow Committee had in mind the establishment in the American Executive Branch of a piece of machinery akin to the British Civil Service Cabinet Office; a buckle that would join the President to his government. It is instructive to recall that the Committee specially asked for a report on the organization and procedures of the British Cabinet Secretariat during its deliberations between 1936-37.\textsuperscript{207} Indeed Louis Brownlow himself later recorded (what in retrospect should come as no undue surprise) that the very phrase, "a man of high competence, great physical vigour, and a passion for anonymity", had in fact been suggested to him by a British civil servant friend as portraying the very qualities required.\textsuperscript{208} The staff were not to play a political role, but only insure that "all matters coming to the President have been examined from the over-all managerial point of
The Committee thought that, with the right blueprint, 'efficiency' could be built in to the machinery like some precision part.

This intention is equally evident from some of the Committee's original proposals which never saw the light of day, because they were vetoed by Roosevelt. For example, in a memorandum to the Committee (which Roosevelt had requested be written to give him an advance look at the likely content of the final report), Louis Brownlow proposed that the White House secretariat should operate under "an executive secretary (who would) establish direct lines of communication with all the staff agencies except the Budget". Roosevelt immediately put a stop to any such idea. He did not want any organization under the control of "one man". "You can't have just one Executive Secretary", said Roosevelt. "The damn columnists would never let him alone". Brownlow argued that there would be some confusion, a lack of coordination, and much wasted time if the President did not appoint someone as "primus inter pares" to deal with planning and personnel. Roosevelt was less adamant about appointing such a liaison man as long as "that's the fellow who never goes out". But Roosevelt firmly vetoed any suggestion that only one staff member would report directly to the President.

President Roosevelt understood far better than the Brownlow Committee the extent to which the President would rely on personal confidence in his staff, as distinct from confidence accruing merely on the basis of expertise in a particular field. For this reason another Committee proposal, about detailing, came not to be implemented in precisely the way that the Report had intended. Louis Brownlow related that Roosevelt's attention had been drawn "to the fact that career men might well be brought into the Secretariat
from the various departments. He agreed and said that they could be tried out and sent back if necessary. The Report thus suggested that the President "should be free to call on departments from time to time for the assignments of persons who, after a tour of duty as his aides, might be restored to their old positions." But it never happened in this way. On the contrary, Presidents wished to have their 'own' advisers around them (at the senior level); none ever were prepared to work closely with seconded career personnel from elsewhere in government.

Paradoxically, the practice of detailing personnel from the departments and agencies to work in the White House was given a legitimacy that opened the door to later abuse. Similarly, the suggestion of a contingent fund to secure the advice of experts for a limited time was not sufficiently restrictive in language to forestall later abuse by the hiring of "temporary" experts for unlimited periods of time.

In 1939, however, this was far in the future. The fact that there were sizable areas where the supposed restrictions on this staff activity proved later to be virtually non-existent had no effect on its initial establishment. What mattered was that President Roosevelt had succeeded in bringing about a report that accorded with his own views. He immediately set about translating its recommendations into action. The joint efforts of Brownlow and Roosevelt came finally to fruition in September 1939 when the President brought The White House Office formally into existence.
"There shall be within the Executive Office of the President the following principal divisions, namely: (1) The White House Office". With these words the White House staff were thereby officially created when President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 8248 on 8th September 1939. (It was to come into force three days later on 11th September 1939). This document set out the functions and duties of The White House Office, and its major constituent parts, and thus provided an outline of its intended internal organization. (Extracts from this Executive Order appear as Appendix 3.1).

The general purpose of The White House Office was to serve the President "in an intimate capacity on the performance of the many detailed activities incident to his immediate office". Reflecting a mixture of old practice and new there were to be three principal subdivisions accorded their own particular functions and duties. The first consisted of the Secretaries to the President, whose task it was to liaise with Congress, Cabinet, Press, Radio and the general public. The second embraced the purely administrative functions of the Executive Clerk whose job it was to organize and supervise all clerical back-up to the political staff, including the orderly handling of documents. The third subdivision was that reserved for the newly-created Administrative Assistants to the President. They were to "assist the President in such matters as he may direct", as his "personal aides", mainly to "get information and to condense and summarize it for his use". Specific reference was made to their not being "interposed" between the President and anyone else.

Of the other sections of the Executive Order, only that designating one of the Administrative Assistants to be in charge of the Liaison Office for
Personnel Management (a vestige of Brownlow's original notion of a "primus inter pares") related exclusively to the White House staff as distinct from other parts of the EOP. Reference was made to the intention to house the White House Office entirely in The White House, but for the time being the Administrative Assistants had to make do with offices in the State, War and Navy Building next door (later to be renamed the Executive Office Building or EOB).

One vital point was briefly touched upon. The President alone was to "prescribe regulations governing the conduct of the business of the division of The White House Office". To this end, Roosevelt later appended a "Note" to the Executive Order. It was meant to amplify the preceding dry official language with a more personal commentary on what he hoped he was achieving. Formally re-emphasizing that his staff had "no power to formulate decisions" he nevertheless revealed the extent of their influence in several ways. Firstly, he admitted that their relationship was "a very close one". Secondly, he found "one of the greatest benefits" to be that they shared his presidential "standpoint". Thirdly, he clearly appreciated their flexibility as a group, freed from "any definite functional patterns" or "hard-and-fast allocations" of particular functions. Despite proclaiming that they were not interposed between himself and his government, Roosevelt's remarks simultaneously revealed the degree to which the infant staff dealt with Congress, Cabinet, financial, political or personal interests on his behalf. President Roosevelt knew full well the value and purpose for which he had created the White House staff. But even he would have been taken aback by its subsequent growth and development.
CONCLUSION

This review of the origins and establishment of the White House leads us to summarize several general conclusions. Firstly, the historical level of staff assistance to the President was always small, if it existed at all. By 1933 it did not amount officially to more than a dozen, of which but a tiny handful were there to offer political advice, while the rest provided merely clerical support. Secondly, there appeared at various times in embryonic form several features later to play a prominent part in the development of the White House staff. The underlying nature of the relationship between President and adviser can be as well demonstrated historically as it can in the modern day. Thirdly, the White House staff unofficially began to take shape, as a practical fact of life, during the early years of the Roosevelt Presidency in the 1930s. Franklin Roosevelt was the first of the modern Presidents to recognise the real need for, and devise the organization of, staff assistance of an enlarged kind. Fourthly, Roosevelt created The White House Office, and its staff, as a deliberate political act. Although he did his best to camouflage this fact with neutral administrative language, Roosevelt firmly intended that the staff serve a definite political purpose. Finally, upon their official establishment in 1939, the White House staff were originally made subject to three specific limitations regarding their physical, personal, and political characteristics. They were to be small in number, remain anonymous, and not to be interposed between the President and anyone else.

The true significance of these specific limitations, to which the origins and establishment of the staff had by 1939 led, is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in that staff's subsequent growth and development.
The White House staff are now recognised as an institutional part of the Presidency and an integral feature of presidential government at the highest level. But the facts underlying their collective rise to this position have yet to be historically examined in depth.

This chapter therefore traces in detail the growth of the White House staff - primarily under the six presidencies from Roosevelt in the 1930's to Nixon in the 1970's. Spanning five decades this growth can essentially be reduced to two broad categories: growth in the numbers of staff; and growth in their cost. Varieties within both categories are discernible and these several subsidiary areas are reflected in the major sub-headings of this chapter: Numbers; Job Titles; Turnover; Cost; Salaries; and Support Services.

A comprehensive examination of the growth of the White House staff has been a notable omission in writings on the staff during this period. This deficiency has owed much to the considerable difficulties of obtaining even the most elementary information, a fact which was established in Chapter I. To the extent that this chapter builds upon the definition of the inner core White House staff discussed in Chapter I we now add flesh to the bones revealed in that earlier chapter.

The importance of this chapter is that it provides the factual basis upon which the argument is advanced that the White House staff have become a formidable part of the machinery of presidential government.
The White House Office: Commissioned Staff

The White House Office commissioned staff are the tip of the White House staff iceberg. They are those whose names and staff titles have been recorded in the regular annual listings of WHO staff by the United States Government Organization Manual, and the Congressional Directory (and in other public documents and private publications; see Chapter I). Precisely because of this visibility the task of tracing their growth since 1939 is the easiest. Table 4.1 provides the bare outline of this growth over a 35-year period. (Appendix 4.1 fills in this outline with detailed figures for each year between 1939 and 1976.) There are two figures given for each Presidency, taken from the first and last years in office of each President.

TABLE 4.1

NUMBERS OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1974

The Growth of WHO Commissioned Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>USGOM</th>
<th>CD(^a)</th>
<th>CSD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>43(^c)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Figures include Military Aides [1945(11) to 1964].

\(^b\) 1940 figure (no figure for 1939 published).

\(^c\) 1973 figure (no figure for 1974 published).

Sources: United States Government Organization Manual
Congressional Directory
Congressional Staff Directory
As Table 4.1 shows, the overall picture has been one of undoubted growth. Equally clear have been the variations. Both Republican Presidents, Eisenhower and Nixon, had markedly higher number of WHO commissioned staff than any of the four Democratic Presidents.

The first WHO commissioned staff numbered only a handful. After the formal establishment of The White House Office in 1939 President Roosevelt at first only availed himself of three of the six newly-created Administrative Assistants to which he was entitled. These three, together with the three Secretaries to the President, his Personal Secretary, and the non-political Executive Clerk, made up the total of eight listed staff. By the time of his death Roosevelt had nearly doubled this number. He added several new staff posts including the first Special Assistant, Harry Hopkins, and the first Special Counsel, Sam Rosenman.

As was to be expected, President Truman gradually brought his own staff into the White House to replace those inherited from Roosevelt (only a few of whom stayed on, like Bill Hassett, Sam Rosenman, and David Niles). The first listings of the Truman WHO staff, in the latter part of 1945, gave the totals variously as 14 (the Government Organization Manual) and 10 (the Congressional Directory). By the end of his Presidency Truman's WHO staff had risen by about half as much again (according to each source) to 19 and 14 respectively. This modest increase owed partly to Truman's full use of the complement of six Administrative Assistants, partly to his creation of new staff positions for aides like John Steelman, and partly to the addition to WHO staff lists of military aides and non-political personnel (such as the President's Physician, the Chief Usher, and the Secretary to the Wife of the President).
The Eisenhower Presidency brought the first dramatic change. In 1953 the numbers of WHO commissioned staff jumped immediately into the 20's; by 1954 had reached the 30's; by 1955 were firmly entrenched in the 40's; and by 1960 were approaching the 50's. A whole new range of staff titles were invented (as we shall later see). Other changes were equally noticeable. Among the most important was the fact that for the first time the President could no longer deal with all the members of his WHO commissioned staff on a one-to-one basis. There were too many of them to allow such personal direction, even had the President wished to provide it (which Eisenhower didn't). Managing the White House staff was delegated to Sherman Adams, The Assistant to the President.

The Kennedy and Johnson years marked a step back from this growth of WHO commissioned staff. Throughout the Democratic years of the 1960s, this level remained stable and hovered around the middle or later 20's. This was a size that enabled both Presidents to maintain - if need be - a personal relationship with each of their staff members, given that about half-a-dozen of the listed WHO commissioned staff were non-political, military, or residential personnel. On the face of it, the Kennedy-Johnson years gave little sign that the renewed growth of the White House staff was in fact well under way, (as we shall shortly discover).

The arrival of President Nixon produced another dramatic change, akin to that of Eisenhower's two decades earlier. The numbers of WHO commissioned staff took another leap upwards. Figures from all three regular sources show that Nixon's incoming staff was almost double the size of that of his two immediate predecessors. The Nixon WHO staff remained over the 50 mark more often than not. It was partly this size that fuelled criticism of the Nixon Presidency's expansion of White House power, although at this level
Nixon's staff were only slightly more numerous than Eisenhower's had been — and considerably less than Ford's or Carter's were to be.2

Despite this increase the number of senior staff (e.g. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Kissinger, Timmons, Colson, Zeigler, Harlow and others — those whose names were generally well known in political circles) did not significantly outnumber their equivalents in the Kennedy-Johnson years (such as Sorensen, O'Donnell, Salinger, Bundy, O'Brien, Moyers, Califano, and Valenti). Rather it was the ranks of middle-level commissioned White House Office staff (featuring the likes of Chapin, Higby, Cole, Dent, Morgan, Clawson, Fielding, Butterfield and Kehrli) that were noticeably expanded during the Nixon Presidency.

The White House Office: Budgeted Staff

The task of charting the growth of the staff as defined by the budgetary heading of "The White House Office - Salaries and Expenses" is less easy than it appears. We have already noted (in Chapter I) that figures obtained from United States Budgets must be treated with considerable caution. The figures themselves are given in Table 4.2.

* It is interesting that, despite the adverse criticism of the size of President Nixon's White House staff, his successors should all have enjoyed significantly greater numbers of commissioned WHO staff support. President Ford had over 50% more commissioned WHO staff in 1975 (total: 66) than Nixon had had in 1973 (total: 43), according to the U.S. Government Organization Manual. President Carter's staff was almost 25% up in 1977 (total: 80) on Ford's last year (total: 65). Thus Carter, who campaigned in 1976 specifically against the role of the White House staff, had almost double the number that Nixon had at this level. In 1981 President Reagan made further increases. Figures from the Congressional Staff Directory show that the numbers of commissioned WHO staff had reached 90. Reagan's staff exhibited a wider range of job titles and staff functions than any White House staff had ever known before. The Reagan WHO staff are listed in Appendix 5.17 as an illustration of the continuing increases in size and scope of the modern White House staff.
### TABLE 4.2

**NUMBERS OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1974**

The Growth of WHO Budgeted Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>USBA&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>CSC&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>CR-H&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Figures given are the "Total Number of Permanent Positions" for the years 1939-1950, after which they are a combination of "Total Number of Permanent Positions" and the "Full-time Equivalent of Other Positions" for the years 1951-1974. All figures are actual figures, i.e. the 1974 figure is taken from the FY 1976 U.S. Budget.

<sup>b</sup> Figures given are the "Total Number of Permanent Positions" throughout the period 1939-1974.

<sup>c</sup> Figures given are the "Average Number" of employees for the years 1939-1962, and those "Full-time" employees 1963-1974.

Sources: United States Budget Appendices (FY 1949 - FY 1976)
House Appropriations Subcommittee Hearing (1959)
U.S. Civil Service Commission (1978)
Congressional Record - House (1978)

The caution that has been previously urged is reflected here in two obvious ways. Firstly, the figures available from each of the three sources listed by no means always tally with one another for any given year. These differences (which are relatively slight and mostly accounted for by different
definitions of whom is being counted) do not themselves matter greatly because they only represent the starting point. We must dig deeper than this surface layer to understand what staff growth was really taking place.

The second obvious feature of Table 4.2 is that the growth of WHO budgeted staff appears to have proceeded in three distinct stages, marked by two sudden and dramatic shifts from one plateau to the next. These two quantum leaps upwards appeared to occur under Truman in 1947 and under Nixon in 1971. (Appendix 4.1 gives figures for each year.) Between 1946 and 1947 the official budgetary size of the White House staff rose from 52 to 210 employees; between 1970 and 1971 it rose from 250 to 533 employees.

The suddenness and size of the apparent increases on both occasions were entirely misleading. The new higher figures merely represented, on both occasions, an attempt more honestly to present the real size of the budgetary WHO staff. It is fair to say that on both occasions the result was undoubtedly a more accurate picture of that size. To this extent, therefore, the apparent jump in size should be completely ignored in favour of what the resulting figure proved to be. This new honest approach can best be appreciated from a breakdown of the 1970 and 1971 figures as published in the FY 1971 Budget which is given in Table 4.3.

**Table 4.3**

**NUMBERS OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1974**

The White House Office: The Extent of Detailing 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White House Office</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Projects</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed Personnel</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>576</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United States Budget 1971
This Table shows the extent to which, by 1970, the official size of The White House Office staff had shrunk to little more than a third the size of the total White House staff (according to the Nixon Administration's definition at that time). The other near two-thirds were accounted for by Special Projects staff (paid from the Special Projects appropriation) and the numbers of detailed personnel (who themselves accounted for nearly half the total). Table 4.3 shows how the Nixon Administration merged these three groups together in 1971 with the result that the numbers of staff paid from The White House Office appropriation jumped upwards.

Given that any analysis of the Table 4.2 figures must take its distortions into account, what emerges is that the White House staff grew steadily over a period of years. There were no sudden and dramatic leaps upwards that were not accounted for by a redefinition of whom were being included under the budgetary heading of The White House Office. One by-product of this conclusion is that it demolishes the legitimacy of the charges popularly laid (by Press and academics alike) against the Nixon Presidency that Nixon alone was responsible for the huge growth in the White House staff. It is the crudity of such charges that is undermined by the facts - although the Nixon White House was entitled to be sensitive to them. Indeed, at the time, it was quick to claim credit for having actually reduced the total numbers of staff, from 576 to 548, which it was hoped would take the edge off any criticism that this new honest budgetary approach might bring in its wake. In this respect it obviously failed. It only fuelled the criticism. But it also failed in a less obvious way to achieve its stated objective.
Giving credit to the Nixon White House (and to the Truman White House for a comparable display of honest budgeting in 1947) should not obscure the continuing deficiencies that characterized official figures. As Chapter I again made clear the new 'honest' figures cannot be accepted as the true size of the White House staff. The detailing of personnel continued unabated and, as we shall see, there is evidence from other sources that not inconsiderable extra numbers need to be added each year to obtain a truer picture of the overall size and the growth from year to year.

The White House Office: Detailed Staff

Reliable and regular information on the numbers of personnel detailed to work for The White House Office has never been available for the presidencies between Roosevelt and Nixon. Such information as it is possible to obtain can vary, sometimes considerably, depending on the source. Table 4.1 illustrates the predicament facing the researcher in this field who tries to reconcile the different figures obtained by the four sources utilised here. Figures available from hearings conducted by the relevant House and Senate appropriations subcommittees have been intermittent. Figures covering the years 1939–1959 were produced at one hearing; \(^3\) while those for the years 1970–1974 were made available at the hearings of successive years.\(^4\) Figures for the years 1961–1969 were taken from a speech on the House floor during a debate on an appropriation bill in July, 1975.\(^5\) Such figures were obviously derived from the same source as those which were subsequently presented in the Congressional Record (covering the period 1939–1974) during debate on a White House staff authorization bill in April, 1978.\(^6\)
### TABLE 4.4

**NUMBERS OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1974**

The Growth of WHO Detailed Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>HAS/SAS(^a)</th>
<th>LoC(^b)</th>
<th>CSC(^c)</th>
<th>CR-H(^d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Figures obtained from House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Hearings are intermittent. Figures for 1961-1969 obtained from a speech in the House in 1975 (see below).

\(^b\) Figures obtained by deducting "permanent position totals" in The White House Office from Civil Service Commission "employee totals for The White House Office" as of June of each year. This deduction gives, "in the difference, a quantity of detailed employees".

\(^c\) Figures for 1939-1949 are taken from a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Hearing (1949). Figures for 1950-1969 are said by the Civil Service Commission to be Not Available. Figures for 1970-1974 are taken from House and Senate Appropriation Subcommittee Hearings.

\(^d\) Figures given are the numbers of detailed employees as of 30th June of each year.

NA Figures not available.

**Sources:**
- House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Hearings
- House Debate on Appropriation Bill (1975)
- Library of Congress (1973)
- U.S. Civil Service Commission (1978)
- Congressional Record - House (1978)
But the authority of these figures has never been substantiated. They must remain, as do all other purported figures, no more than a guide to the level of detailing in the years before 1970. The U.S. Civil Service Commission acknowledged as much in its admission that figures for the period 1950-1969 were simply not available. A Library of Congress study in 1973 agreed that "it is virtually impossible to obtain information regarding the number of government employees detailed to the White House Office". Its own listing of figures for the years 1954-1971, it admitted, were "a very poor substitute for such information".

Turning to the figures themselves we can see that to a large extent they complement those given earlier for the budgeted totals of WHO staff. For example, in the years 1939-1946, when the official budgeted totals were low (only a few dozen), the numbers of detailees were correspondingly high (well over one hundred). After 1947, when WHO budgeted totals were readjusted upwards to include detailees hitherto omitted from official figures, the numbers of personnel on detail to the White House consequently dropped back sharply. (Appendix 4.1 gives figures for each year.)

By the 1960s the numbers of detailees had begun to grow upwards to a significant level once again. Detailed personnel in no small part powered the White House staffs of both Kennedy and Johnson. Of the many examples that could be given, the experience of Special Assistant George McGovern was typical. Kennedy had grandly talked him into the job on his WHO staff, and made him Director of Food-For-Peace, but McGovern arrived to find that he had no offices, staff or budget. His solution was to borrow people from elsewhere in government. McGovern's own Special Assistant was paid for from Department of Agriculture funds. His deputy, James Symington (like McGovern, later elected to Congress), was paid for by the State Department. By
establishing "squatter's rights" in a suite of offices on the second floor of the Old Executive Office Building McGovern ensured that his HQ was paid for from EOP funds. Thus it went on throughout the 1960s, the same pattern repeated in other White House staff offices.

By the end of the 1960s eight years of Democratic rule had greatly increased the size of the White House staff while at the same time the official budgetary figures showed the staff to be of static size. Table 4.4 also demonstrates that this level of detailing was decidedly higher than that of the later 1940s. After 1971, when most detailees were again re-incorporated into official budgetary totals, the level of detailing dropped greatly. The early 1970s also witnessed a greater congressional interest in the numbers of detailees, which had the beneficial effect of eliciting the first reliable figures for many years. Even these showed that a not inconsiderable number of detailed personnel still worked for the White House: from two to about four dozen annually, depending on the source consulted. Sometimes it was higher. In 1974, for example, the White House revealed that there had been 52 detailees to The White House Office over the previous ten months (and a further 12 on top of that who worked at the White House either for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board or as part of the White House Fellows Program).

There will always be detailees to the White House staff. They help provide the White House with valuable additional expertise or back-up servicing. They constitute a resource that can greatly add to the ability of the White House staff to fulfil the expectations upon them of the President. On this basis their influence will continue to be felt and their numbers legitimately added to the total figure for the overall size of the White House staff in any given year. The experience of the 1960s, when detailing reached large
proportions, was sufficient proof. But it proved no less relevant in the 1970s. It was more than ironic, in view of the criticism levelled at President Nixon for his large staff, that Nixon's successors should have presided over even greater levels of detailees. By the end of the Carter Presidency, for example, over 200 personnel were detailed to work for The White House Office, and several dozens more for other parts of the White House staff. Clearly, detailing has continued to be an important part of staffing the White House. By contrast the contribution made by Special Projects faded and then disappeared with its formal abolition as a separate entity in 1974. But its impact between 1956 and 1974 was not inconsiderable.

The Special Projects Staff

"Special Projects" was graced with the appearance of separateness during its existence between 1956 and 1974. But the truth was different. Special Projects was in fact a wholly owned subsidiary of The White House Office. Special Projects staff were thus de facto members of the White House staff. (This synonymity has been established in Chapter I.) This was more openly acknowledged during the first half of its existence, between 1956 and 1965, when the U.S. Budget provided figures of the numbers of staff employed under the Special Projects heading. Subsequently such figures mysteriously disappeared from U.S. Budgets. In 1974 Special Projects itself was technically abolished, and subsumed within The White House Office.

Special Projects is a good example of the effects of the secrecy surrounding the White House staff. With a restricted range of official figures to go on, for a restricted numbers of years, it is only possible to gauge the outline of the growth of Special Projects staff. Table 4.5 provides the available figures, and they are quite sufficient.
### Table 4.5

#### NUMBERS OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1974

**The Growth of Special Projects Staff**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>Numbers of Staff</th>
<th>The White House Office combined with Special Projects Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Projects</td>
<td>USBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Figures** are the "Average Number" of employees.
- **Figures** obtained by subtracting the "Average Number" of WHO employees from the "Total" numbers of WHO and Special Projects employees (combined), as given by the Congressional Record, for the years 1939-1962. Figures for the years 1963-1974 are obtained by subtracting the "Permanent Positions" from the combined total for WHO and Special Projects.
- **Figures** for the years 1939-1946 are of WHO "Permanent Positions".
- **Figures** for the years 1947-1955 are of WHO "Average Number" of employees. Figures for the years 1956-1963 are numbers "At The End of Each Year" for both WHO and Special Projects (combined). Figures for the years 1964-1974 are of WHO "Average Numbers".
- **Figures** are the number of "Permanent Positions" plus the numbers of "detailed personnel" in The White House Office.
- **Figures** are for WHO "Actual Manpower" (as recorded by the Bureau of Personnel Management Information Systems) and are all "end of calendar year totals" as of 31st December" of each year.
- **Figures** are for "White House Staff: Total" which includes both WHO "full-time" employees with Special Projects employees.
- **NA** Figures not available.

**Sources:**
- United States Budget Appendices
- Congressional Record - House (1978)
- Library of Congress (1973)
- U.S. Civil Service Commission (1978)
### TABLE 4.5

#### NUMBERS OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1974

The Growth of Special Projects Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>Numbers of Staff Special Projects</th>
<th>The White House Office combined with Special Projects Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USBA(^a)</td>
<td>CR-H(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Figures are the "Average Number" of employees.

\(^b\) Figures obtained by subtracting the "Average Number" of WHO employees from the "Total" numbers of WHO and Special Projects employees (combined), as given by the Congressional Record, for the years 1939-1962. Figures for the years 1963-1974 are obtained by subtracting the "Permanent Positions" from the combined total for WHO and Special Projects.

\(^c\) Figures for the years 1939-1946 are of WHO "Permanent Positions".

\(^d\) Figures for the years 1947-1955 are of WHO "Average Number" of employees. Figures for the years 1956-1963 are numbers "At The End of Each Year" for both WHO and Special Projects (combined). Figures for the years 1964-1974 are of WHO "Average Numbers".

\(^e\) Figures are the number of "Permanent Positions" plus the numbers of "detailed personnel" in The White House Office.

\(^f\) Figures are for WHO "Actual Manpower" (as recorded by the Bureau of Personnel Management Information Systems) and are all "end of calendar year totals as of 31st December" of each year.

NA: Figures not available.

**Sources:**
- United States Budget Appendices
- Congressional Record - House (1978)
- Library of Congress (1973)
- U.S. Civil Service Commission (1978)
The disparity between the two columns on the left-hand side is marked. Those taken from the U.S. Budgets take precedence over those drawn from the Congressional Record for the period 1956-1964, in terms of their legitimacy, but speculation is inevitable for the years until 1974.

Special Projects did not grow in size from 'infancy' to 'adulthood'. It was born almost full-sized. By the end of 1956, in the year of its creation, there were already an average 98 staff on the payroll. (See Appendix 4.1 for detailed figures.) Thereafter the staff grew to well over 100, at which level it remained until 1965 (the last year in which figures were published) with the noted exception of 1962 when the average number increased almost half as much again to 150 staff. It is immediately obvious that this level of staff was quite considerable. Moreover "average" figures give an understated picture. Under the budgetary classification of "numbers at the end of each year" Special Projects staff grew to 166 by the end of Eisenhower’s Presidency, subsided in Kennedy’s first year to 143, only to rise to their highest recorded peak of 206 staff by the end of 1962.

Although figures for the numbers of Special Projects staff disappeared from U.S. Budgets after FY 1966 there is evidence to suggest that the average number of over 100 staff continued unabated throughout the 1960s. We have already seen, in Table 4.3, that the Nixon White House in 1970 stated that 95 staff were being paid for by the Special Projects appropriation. With the disparity that has already been shown to exist between "average" figures and "end of year" totals the real number of Special Projects staff by the end of 1970 could well have been higher.
Thus far the evidence clearly shows that a significant proportion of the
White House staff was provided under the Special Projects heading during
the second half of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s. The official WHO
staff were swelled by at least another hundred persons each year (and
often considerably more). The next stage is therefore to consider the
combined size of WHO and Special Projects staff. The four columns on the
right-hand side of Table 4.5 provide the available figures for such a
combination.

The discrepancies between the figures obtained from varying sources may
present a somewhat confusing picture. (As before, these are partly ex-
plained by varying definitions of what is being measured by each source;
partly by the incomplete nature of any official records. See: Appendix 4.1.
But the fact that no overall trend can easily be discerned is simply
explained by the unavailability of complete figures for large periods of
time. The real significance of the figures in the four columns lies
rather in what they reveal about the real size of combined WHO and Special
Projects staff between 1956 and 1964 (when official records were at their
most complete). Allowing for the (relatively minor) discrepancies between
figures from the U.S. Budgets, the Library of Congress, and the U.S. Civil
Service Commission, Table 4.5 shows that by the end of Eisenhower's
Presidency there was a combined total of well over 400, if not nearer 450,
staff. The Kennedy Presidency saw a small increase, although by his
death the combined total had dropped, and it subsided slightly in Johnson's
first year. For the rest of the decade the combined total appears to have
fallen sharply down, but this is quite misleading and therefore somewhat
meaningless. The staff were still there, supporting the President, but a
large proportion were no longer officially counted.
If we compare what we now know about the size of the White House staff in the Eisenhower-Kennedy-Johnson years with the official totals for The White House Office alone, then it is clear that all three Presidents enjoyed a much larger level of staff support than has previously been acknowledged. Insofar as the 'responsibility' for this can be usefully apportioned, it was President Eisenhower who first created this extra arm of staff support. But it is equally clear that, it having been created, neither Presidents Kennedy nor Johnson took steps either to abolish or drastically reduce it. Indeed the highest total of combined WHO and Special Projects staff recorded between 1956 and 1964 was that in 1962 under President Kennedy. In 1962 the 'official' size of the White House staff was defined as being the 270 full-time permanent positions provided for in the appropriation for The White House Office. But if we add the numbers of Special Projects staff we get a much larger figure. Different sources may vary but the most authoritative put the combined total at over 450 staff in 1962.13

What is the real political meaning behind these figures for combined totals? Firstly, they support the analysis of a White House staff whose overall size was greater than it apparently appeared or was officially admitted. Secondly, precisely because of this, the appearance of sudden growth in the early 1970s can be put into its proper perspective. Over a number of years the White House staff actually grew fairly steadily. Thirdly, the consequent impression current in the early 1970s that President Nixon was single-handedly responsible for the huge size of the White House staff can, once again, be shown to be founded on a serious misinterpretation of the size of the staff throughout the 1960s (under two Democratic Presidents) and even in the late 1950s (under the benign Eisenhower).
Any criticism of President Nixon for enjoying a high level of White House staff support, on the basis of combined WHO and Special Projects staff totals, should be equally directed at his three immediate predecessors. The proliferation of staff support for the President was just as much a feature of the Eisenhower-Kennedy-Johnson years. That is not to say that Nixon is immune from all responsibility for the growth of the White House staff. On the contrary, if critics of Nixon were to concentrate their fire on those areas where he is most vulnerable they need only have considered the more persuasive prima facie evidence of the proliferation of the National Security and Domestic Affairs staff.

The NSC and Domestic Council Staff

We have argued in Chapter I for a definition of the White House staff that includes two of the more important - and obvious - offshoots of The White House Office: the foreign affairs staff and the domestic affairs staff. The former are known as the National Security Council (NSC) staff. The latter have been known by many different names, formal and informal. In 1970 they were formally established by President Nixon as a separate and identifiable part of the White House staff: the Domestic Council. The domestic affairs staff continued under that heading for the duration of the Nixon and Ford presidencies. President Jimmy Carter renamed them the Domestic Policy Staff (DPS), while President Reagan established an Office of Policy Development (OPD) as the title of his domestic affairs staff.

From the dates of their respective establishment - the NSC in 1947, the Domestic Council in 1970 - the senior figures of the staff working under each heading have been listed as senior White House staff, paid for by
The White House Office appropriation. The staffs over which they presided were accorded separate budgetary status within the EOF. This provides us with the starting point from which to consider how and in what way the NSC and Domestic Council staffs grew over time. Table 4.6 provides the available figures.

### Table 4.6

**Numbers of White House Staff 1939-1974**

The Growth of NSC and Domestic Council Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NSC Staff</th>
<th>DC Staff</th>
<th>Combined NSC &amp; DC Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budgeted</td>
<td>Detailed</td>
<td>Budgeted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>1970d</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Figures are "Total Number of Permanent Positions" combined with "Full-time Equivalent of Other Positions" from U.S. Budget Appendices.

b Figures obtained from House and Senate Appropriations Sub-committee Hearings.

c Figures are the combination of a and b above.

d Figures are given for 1970 to include the Domestic Council.

e Estimated figure.

NA Figures Not Available.

Sources: United States Budget Appendices

House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Hearings
The NSC was established by President Truman who from the first envisaged it as the President's Council. He thus insisted that its (initially rather small) staff were to be housed near the White House under the direction of a National Security Adviser who would serve as a senior member of the White House Office staff. From 1947 to 1957, under both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, the strength of the NSC staff was maintained at just over two dozen. In 1958, however, its complement of personnel was substantially increased. (Appendix 4.1 provides full details.) The NSC staff grew to about 75, the level that was bequeathed to the incoming President Kennedy in 1961. Kennedy's reorganization of national security policy machinery, which itself represented a reaction against what was thought to have been the excessively bureaucratic and cumbersome system of the Eisenhower years, was reflected in the reduced size of the NSC staff. President Johnson thus inherited an NSC staff of about four dozen. This budgetary staff level was maintained for the rest of the decade.

Table 4.6 shows that the arrival of President Nixon brought an unmistakable increase in the size of the NSC staff. It rose to a level not seen since the Eisenhower days, and soon exceeded it. By 1970 the budgeted size of the NSC staff was 77 persons; by 1974 it had formally reached 87. Neither President Nixon, nor his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, made any secret of their determination to exert control over the foreign policy decision-making process from inside the White House in preference to sub-contracting it out to the State Department and the normal bureaucracy. To achieve this objective required that the staff resources available to the President through Kissinger be equal in size and calibre to that surrounding the Secretary of State. (Table 4.6 shows how this was made possible insofar as the official NSC budget was concerned.)

*The proportion of professional NSC staff to clerical back-up in Kissinger's team is estimated in Note 17a.*
Just as significant, therefore, as the numbers of staff formally on the NSC payroll were the numbers of other personnel detailed to work on the NSC staff. On entering office in 1969 Kissinger hired a greatly increased number of consultants: 38 in that first year alone.\(^{16}\) (These figures were later obtained by congressional appropriation subcommittees and are included in Appendix 4.1.) In the following year no less than 58 personnel were on detail. This in itself represented another 75% of the official staff total. For the remainder of the Nixon Presidency the level of detailers ranged between the middle 40s and 50s. In any evaluation of the real size of the NSC staff working under Kissinger it is clear that he was consistently able to call upon the resources of more than 120 NSC staff.

A similar pattern, though on a smaller scale, characterized the Domestic Council and its staff. The Council's first regular appropriation in 1970 provided for 61 staff. The following year this had dipped to 52 but in 1972-73, when the Domestic Council was at its height, under Assistant to the President John Ehrlichman, its official payroll numbered 80 persons. To these yearly totals must be added those additional personnel on detail from other departments and agencies. Information gleaned by congressional appropriation subcommittees during the Watergate period showed that there were usually about 10 persons on detail at any one time to the Domestic Council staff (of which some were part-time or temporary consultants).\(^{17}\)

Table 4.6, in its right-hand column, combines the available figures for both NSC and (from 1970) Domestic Council staff, both budgeted and detailed. From this column it is clear that the Nixon Presidency did represent a clean break from its predecessors. This was not a break in the pattern of presidential staffing in previous presidencies; more a break in terms of the sheer size of the staffs concerned. It is entirely likely that both Kennedy and Johnson, for example, enjoyed the services of persons detailed
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to work on their NSC staffs. Indeed, in Johnson's case, there is already evidence that its size was swelling beyond its official budgetary levels.\textsuperscript{18} But precise figures of the numbers of detailees were never revealed, most likely never kept, and certainly never asked for. In terms of staff numbers the Nixon White House made apparently substantial and unprecedented increases. They can legitimately be said to be the responsibility of President Nixon. They could also be expected to have a noticeable effect on any cumulative total of the overall size of the Nixon White House staff. This expectation is not misplaced, as we shall see in turning now to consider the cumulative growth of the White House staff.

The White House Staff

We have hitherto dealt separately with the major constituent parts of the White House staff. We must now turn to consider the whole. The task of constructing a clear and accurate and comprehensive picture of the growth of the White House staff is more difficult than piecing together a jigsaw puzzle. Unlike the latter where, no matter how intricate, there is only one piece for each slot, this task is greatly complicated by all the overlapping pieces of information. These often give conflicting evidence of the size of the staff at any one time. Sometimes these are hard to finally reconcile one with another.

But the argument advanced in this chapter does not rest on the assumption of the cut-and-dried precision of figures that in many respects have never been properly kept. The evidence is already sufficient to dismantle the misconceptions widely held about the manner in which the White House staff have grown in size in the last forty years. Seen in this context the variations between different sets of figures can for the most part be taken as of secondary concern. The broad outline, revealed by the accumulated
weight of the figures, shines through most of the discrepancies. It is in
this frame of mind that Table 4.7, which brings together what has previously
been considered in separate doses, should be approached.

TABLE 4.7
NUMBERS OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1974

The Growth of The White House Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>CSC^a</th>
<th>CR-b^b</th>
<th>USB(1)^c</th>
<th>USBA(2)^d</th>
<th>Combination Total of WHS^e</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>1970^f</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Figures are for WHO "Actual Manpower" (as recorded by the Bureau of Personnel Management Information Systems) and are all "end of calendar year totals as of 31st December" of each year.

b Figures are for "White House Staff: Real Total" which includes both WHO and Special Projects "full-time employees", and also all detailed employees "as of 30th June of each year".


d Figures are the "Total Number of Permanent Positions" plus the "Full-time Equivalent of Other Positions" for a combination of The White House Office (1947-1974), the NSC (1948-1974), and the Domestic Council (1970-1974). Figures for Special Projects (1956-1963) are "Numbers At The End of the Year", and "Average Number" (1964-1966). WHO figures for the years 1939-1946 obtained from a House Appropriations Subcommittee Hearing.

e Figures are the combination of d above with the highest figures recorded in each year for detailed WHO, NSC, and DC personnel.

f Figures are given for 1970 to include the Domestic Council.

g Alternate figure for 1964 is 453 if Special Projects total is omitted.
(See Appendix 4.1).

Sources: U.S. Civil Service Commission (1978)
Congressional Record - House (1978)
United States Budget Appendices
Note: Some comment must be made on the different sources from which these figures have been drawn. The first four columns are not a direct straightforward comparison between like and like. The U.S. Civil Service Commission figures are those for "Actual Manpower", a concept which is nowhere defined. It includes WHO budgetary totals but what else is unclear. Judging from the rise recorded in the latter part of Eisenhower's Presidency and the subsequent dip in the figures after 1964 the CSC totals may well include Special Projects between 1956 and 1964. (Curiously, however, the increase in CSC figures comes in 1955 which is one year before Special Projects was formally established.)

Figures drawn from those published in the Congressional Record claim simply to be the "Real Total" of White House staff. This is defined to be a combination of WHO and Special Projects staff together with all detailed employees. But there is reason to believe (e.g. the 1973 figures) that there are errors in the basis on which these alleged "Real Total" figures have been constructed. While figures derived from the Congressional Record undoubtedly convey a more graduated picture of staff growth than those derived from the CSC the authority for them is not established.

The two columns of figures derived from the United States Budget Appendices enjoy unquestioned authority; but only as far as they go. Both columns include figures for the NSC and Domestic Council staff. USBA(1) is based on the "Average Number" of employees for each part of the White House staff. This is not the only unit of measurement recorded in the USBA; nor necessarily the best guide to real size. USBA(2) is based on other units. For the majority of years the figures are based on a combination of the "Total Number of Permanent Positions" and the "Full-time Equivalent of Other Positions". But these are not available for every year in respect of each part of the staff. No such combination totals were ever available from USBA for Special Projects, for which the unit of measurement is instead "Numbers At the End of Each Year". The principal effect of utilizing the alternative units of measurement is USBA(2) is to present a larger, and somewhat more realistic, picture of the size of the White House staff.

The "Combination Total" of White House staff is based on USBA(2) to which have been added the highest recorded figures for the number of detailers in each year (as given in Table 4-5). It thus presents the most accurate picture of the size of the staff - based upon the information made publicly available.

Table 4.7 presents four columns of figures for the overall growth in the size of the White House staff. Those taken from the U.S. Civil Service Commission and the Congressional Record are included here primarily for purposes of comparison with those derived from the United States Budget Appendices (USBA). As a yardstick by which to judge USBA figures they are both useful although, for the reasons given in the Note to Table 4.7, neither the CSC or Record figures can be accepted as pre-eminent. Both the columns headed USBA(1) and USBA(2) are founded on the most authoritative
basis of ascertainable fact. The differences arise because USBA figures provide different units of measurement. USBA(1) is based on the most constant unit. USBA(2) is based on a combination of other units. USBA(2) may be considered the principal of the two because it errs on the side of caution, which in this context suggests that the real size of the White House staff has always been minimized in official figures.

The "Combination Total" on the right-hand side is based upon the figures from USBA(2) to which have been added the highest recorded figures of the number of detailees in each year (as given in Table 4.5). This final cumulative column represents the most comprehensive picture of the size of the White House staff based upon the information made publicly available.

The first - and most significant - conclusion to be drawn from the cumulative figures of Table 4.7 is that they portray the irresistible trend of broad upward growth. Nearly every President from Roosevelt to Nixon has bequeathed to his successor an obviously expanded White House staff. Certainly not one President took any action seriously to reduce its size.

Secondly, within this broad upward pattern of growth can be discerned periods of uneven growth. These primarily owe to the further establishment of a new part of the White House staff. For example, Truman bequeathed to Eisenhower a staff strengthened by the addition of the NSC staff. Eisenhower, in turn, established the Special Projects staff whose numbers greatly increased the total complement of White House staff. While neither Kennedy nor Johnson generated any formal restructuring or enlargement of the staff, Johnson relinquished the Presidency with the White House more overrun with detailees than at any previous time. Nixon built upon the existing trend of staff growth, to which he added both the Domestic Council as a newly separate component and a greatly increased NSC staff. Only the
Kennedy Presidency gives the impression that the steady growth was halted, but a closer examination reveals that if some parts (e.g. the NSC staff) were reduced others (e.g. the Special Projects staff) were increased. While the rate of increase in overall size may have been temporarily halted it was certainly not put into reverse.

Thirdly, the figures indicate the considerable size of the White House support staff who provide the clerical and administrative back-up to the political White House staff. Even in 1939 the support staff formed a sizable pyramid at the top of which were placed Roosevelt's original Administrative Assistants. Even thirty-five years later under Nixon, when the political staff had grown so much that it had expanded to form a layered nose cone, the base of this pyramid still consisted of some hundreds of non-political support staff.

A fourth conclusion concerns the meaning that these figures have for the modern Presidency. By the close of the Nixon Presidency there were well over 700 members of the White House staff. That was by any standards a considerable size for a President's personal (as distinct from institutional) staff. Since the Truman years the sheer numbers of White House staff have been so large (irrespective of the pattern of their continued growth) that every President has had the problem of how best to manage them. But before we reach that stage (which is discussed in Chapter V) there are other facets of the growth of the staff that merit attention. These go beyond the mere numbers involved. We know how many senior WHO staff there have been. We need now to ask what they did. To answer such a question we must first consider what we have been told they did.
THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF: JOB TITLES

An examination of the job titles given to the White House staff over a period of forty years reflects both the increase in their numbers, the expansion of their role, and the method of their organization.

Job titles for the senior commissioned White House Office staff are bestowed by the President personally. What began as a straightforward and rather colourless exercise in 1939 has long since ceased to be so. It has now blossomed into an important symbolic statement by the President. It has provided the President, and successive Presidents have come to realise this ever more strongly, with an opportunity to establish in the public mind the kind of Presidency that he wishes to project. It has become a much publicized exercise in image-building: an opportunity to signal the manner in which he would like it thought he hopes to run both his White House and his Administration. But there is now enough accumulated evidence that at the very least a President's original intentions conceal the forces that are later brought to bear upon him in the White House. Job titles are an important ingredient both in projecting those original intentions, and as a reflection of subsequent experience. Not unlike the celebrated Kremlinologists we can derive from White House staff job titles (and, more minutely, from their ranking in published listings) a useful means of prying loose the real meaning beneath the symbolism.

The principal sources of information on which the research is based are, as Chapter I identified, those regularly published listings of WHO staff. By virtue of the fact that their basis for inclusion of names and job titles has remained consistent (from 1939 to date), their listings afford a valid comparison between presidencies. This is reflected by the inclusion of
Tables 4.9 to 4.14 in the text. Further information, of specific relevance only to a particular Presidency, appears in Appendices 4.2 to 4.8.

The Increase in Number

The growing size of WHO commissioned staff is clearly evident from the generally increasing number of different job titles that were in use during each Presidency. Table 4.8 gives the number in use at the beginning and end of each Presidency from Roosevelt to Nixon.

When the White House staff were first established in 1939 there were only two titles in use: Secretary to the President (which had been in use for many decades), and Administrative Assistant to the President (the new title given to the extra staff help that Brownlow had proposed). By the time of Roosevelt's death, seven titles were in use (according to one source), reflecting the small but noticeable increase in the complement of senior staff.

Thereafter the trend was upwards; markedly so on occasion. The pattern of increases, according to the various special sources available, was similar to that obtained from regular listings. But in most presidencies the numbers of staff titles recorded were generally higher. This is accounted for by the greater precision, and thus variety, of White House staff job titles provided by the special sources. A great number of different job titles have never necessarily indicated greater numbers of staff per se; neither have a few titles necessarily meant few staff. But as a rule of thumb, the more titles in use during a Presidency the more staff there have been to whom those titles were applied.
**TABLE 4.8**

**THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-1974**

**Number of Job Titles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USGOM</th>
<th>CD</th>
<th>CSD</th>
<th>Special Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1933-1943: 12&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(USGOM/CD Total: 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1939-1945</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>1945-1953: 10&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; (List A)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; (List B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(USGOM/CD Total: 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1945-1952</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>1953-1961: 48&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1961: 16&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(USGOM/CD Total: 41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1953-1960</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>1964-1968: 16&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt; (List A)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>1964-1968: 16&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt; (List B)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(USGOM/CD Total: 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1961-1963</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(USGOM/CD/CSD Total: 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1971: 45&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(USGOM/CD/CSD Total: 42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1964-1968</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>1971: 45&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1971: 45&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>16&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>(USGOM/CD/CSD Total: 42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1969-1974</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td>(USGOM/CD/CSD Total: 42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> 1973 figure (No WHO Staff listing for Nixon Presidency was issued in 1974).

<sup>NB</sup> All figures exclude the number of job titles applying only to residential and non-political staff.

**Sources:**

- Congressional Directory (1939-1974)
- Congressional Staff Directory (1939-1943)
- b Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (1945-1953)
- c Harry S. Truman Library (1953-1961)
- d Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (1961-1968)
- e Congressional Quarterly (1971)
The number of different job titles in use under President Truman was less important than the steady rise in the numbers of staff endowed with them. Eisenhower, in marked contrast, deliberately assigned to a bigger staff a wider variety of different job titles. He was succeeded by a President who dismantled such variety in favour of a simpler and less specific array of job titles. Johnson, in turn, affected the same approach. But, as the special sources make clear, both the Kennedy and Johnson staff were ascribed more specific job titles than officially was admitted. Nixon restored a more strictly defined approach, in that his senior staff were obviously differentiated by job title. When the Nixon White House itself issued a list of staff in 1971 its size was openly reflected in the large number of job titles in use, many of which had not been published before.

But staff job titles did not merely point to the increasing quantity of staff. They also registered significant developments that grew out of this increasing number. Among the most important for the future of the staff was the appearance of different staff 'layers'. For example, by the Truman Presidency several of the senior WHO staff had developed their own small staffs. Assistant to the President John R. Steelman utilized the services of no less than 25 persons altogether; Special Assistant Averell Harriman could call on a dozen; Personal Representatives Donald M. Nelson and Edwin A. Locke, Jr., shared their own small office of 15 people; while Special Assistant Gordon Gray supervised two staffs of 14 and 17 people respectively. 19

The Eisenhower WHO staff listings are proof enough that the staff had already grown to the point of dividing into very clearly marked layers. Thus The Assistant to the President was pre-eminent, and was himself serviced by an Assistant to The Assistant, a Special Assistant to The Assistant, a Deputy Assistant, Assistant to The Deputy Assistant, and a team of Special
Assistants in The White House Office. (See Table 4.11.) The differentiation between the most senior staff and their deputies was clear; as was that between both groups and the general run of administrative aides.

Despite Kennedy's egalitarianism even he could not avoid official distinctions between the posts of Special Counsel, Assistant to the Special Counsel, and Deputy Special Counsel. Johnson's staff lists contained the occasional Associate position, and he introduced the formal post of Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs which was an oblique reflection of the growing size of the NSC staff apparatus.

Nixon White House staff listings, including the one list released by his White House Press Office, were reminiscent of the Eisenhower years. (See Appendix 4.7.) For almost every staff position named one can discover the position of Deputy. The dominant staff title for lower-ranking political staff was merely Staff Assistant (whether applied to the NSC, DC, or WHO). By Nixon's time, therefore, the size of the commissioned WHO staff had grown so large that a degree of hierarchical listing was inevitably made public. What was true for Nixon remained true for Presidents Ford and Carter, both of whose official WHO staff listings were littered with evidence of a layered White House staff.

The Expansion of Role

The expansion of role with which this study is primarily concerned is an expansion of the political role of the White House staff. They so dominate the daily working life and schedule of the President that they have become the medium through which nearly every contact that he has with the world
outside the Oval Office is effected. To achieve this dominance within so relatively short a period as four decades necessitated a considerable expansion in their political role.

This expansion is probably nowhere more immediately visible than in the job titles that Presidents have bestowed upon their senior WHO staff. While it would not be correct precisely to equate 'job title' with 'job description' - for many job titles have in fact proved to be anything but informative as to the real work performed - this expansion has been impossible to hide from view. Evidence from many sources powerfully reinforces the broad outline already discernible from official staff listings.

Taken together, Tables 4.9 to 4.14 and Appendices 4.2 to 4.8 present a myriad mixture of prosaic colourful misleading and pertinent staff job titles. We need at the start to identify two major elements in the pattern of such titles. Firstly, certain core areas, or functional areas, of staff responsibility readily emerge in most presidencies. Individual job titles may vary in minor ways between one Presidency and another, often reflecting no more than stylistic differences, or the urge to seem innovative, or the perceived need to appear to break with the nomenclature of a predecessor. But these functional areas, once developed, have been a remarkably constant feature of every WHO staff. Secondly, we can trace the way that Presidents gradually began to use their (expanding) White House staff as vehicles for conveying a message to special interest groups. In this context staff job titles were intended to become proof of presidential concern that their views would be represented in the White House decision-making process.

Little attention was given to the job titles of the Roosevelt White House staff in 1939. The Brownlow Committee had spoken of the need for what they termed "executive assistants" but President Roosevelt preferred the more neutral title of Administrative Assistant.
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### TABLE 4.9

**ROOSEVELT PRESIDENCY 1939-1945**

**WHO Staff Job Titles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Titles</th>
<th>USGOM</th>
<th>CD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Assistant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Executive Assistant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Counsel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Representative</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Representative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aide</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL Number of Job Titles b**

2  7

2  6

### TABLE 4.10

**TRUMAN PRESIDENCY 1945-1952**

**WHO Staff Job Titles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Titles</th>
<th>USGOM</th>
<th>CD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Assistant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Counsel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Executive Assistant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Assistant c</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Assistant</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Aides</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other a</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL Number of Job Titles b**

5  5

4  6

---

a  Includes residential and non-political staff.
b  Excludes the 'Other' category.
c  Includes one Administrative Assistant in the President's Office
NL  Job Title is not listed in this source.

**Sources:** United States Government Organization Manual 
Congressional Directory
Table 4.9 shows that by 1945 Roosevelt had discarded these previous inhibitions by appointing staff members whose job titles were already beginning, however faintly, to reflect a widening range of staff work for the President. The positions of Special Counsel and Special Assistant, for example, were created for Sam Rosenman and Harry Hopkins respectively. Both were early examples of the wide-ranging political adviser that subsequent Presidents have rarely done without. Appendix 4.2 more clearly illustrates the emerging division of staff functions, with specific responsibility for appointments, for congressional liaison, and for personnel, vested in specific staff members.

Table 4.10 by itself only partially confirms this emerging trend with the appearance for the first time of a Legislative Assistant in official listings. More substantial confirmation is provided by Appendix 4.3, based on listings of staff prepared by the Harry S. Truman Library. These identified a growing range of functional staff areas: an appointments function, a Press function, a legislative function, a nascent national security function (in the Executive Secretary of the NSC), and an early form of White House operations function (in the Assistant to the President, with the Administrative Assistants as back-up). Certain areas began to develop subsidiary offshoots. For example, Appendix 4.8 demonstrates the existence of an Information and Editorial Specialist, working in the Press office. One new feature was the appearance of specialist subject White House staff. For example, President Truman appointed a Telecommunications Adviser, and entrusted more than one Personal Representative with a specific task, such as the Liquidation of War Agencies. One other feature was consolidated. The inclusion of military aides to the President now became a regular feature of staff lists.
President Eisenhower was the first President openly to confirm the expansion in the role of the staff. He more closely approximated their job titles with their job descriptions. Table 4.11 shows the result. The core of staff functions was more clearly visible than before: for example, the President's foreign policy adviser, (the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) was endowed with the title that has since more or less remained unchanged. The co-ordinative function of White House operations was incorporated in a whole range of obviously graded job titles: (The Assistant, Assistant to The Assistant, The Deputy Assistant, and the Special Assistants in The White House Office). One subsidiary offshoot, relating to the flow of paperwork, surfaced for the first time (Staff Secretary, Assistant to the Staff Secretary, and Assistant Staff Secretary). Among the more noticeable new staff functions, peculiar to Eisenhower's Presidency, were those of servicing the Cabinet (Secretary to the Cabinet, Cabinet Operations Officer and Associate Counsel, and other aides), and liaison within government (Deputy Assistant for Interdepartmental Affairs).*

* These were peculiar to Eisenhower's Presidency only in the sense that they had not been known hitherto and were subsequently dropped by the incoming Kennedy Administration. Yet we can see in retrospect that Eisenhower's more formalized approach to staff structure proved to be of greater long-term influence than the informal style of his two immediate successors. This was nowhere more evident than in respect of White House staff titles for the central core of staff functions. The first President to resurrect some of them was Nixon. This was no accident because his experience of the Eisenhower years as Vice President undoubtedly influenced his own approach as President. For example, in 1969, he appointed a Secretary to the Cabinet. Although this post subsequently sank without trace under the regime of Haldeman and Ehrlichman it resurfaced under President Ford, in 1975, and was further upgraded in status by President Carter, in 1977, when it was combined with the position of Assistant for Intergovernmental Affairs. President Reagan, in 1981, re-titled broadly similar staff functions but re-divided them into two posts: Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Cabinet Administration; and Assistant for Intergovernmental Affairs. Several other examples could be given of the same process including that involving the post of Staff Secretary, a key political position in the White House Office operations machinery.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Job Titles</th>
<th>USGOM 1953</th>
<th>USGOM 1960</th>
<th>CD 1953</th>
<th>CD 1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Assistant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant to The Assistant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant to The Assistant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Deputy Assistant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant to The Deputy Assistant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Special Assistant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant in the White House Office</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant for National Security Affairs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant for Personnel Management</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Advisor for Personnel Management</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counsel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Counsel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant to the Special Counsel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting Special Counsel</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Special Counsel</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Secretary</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Consultant</td>
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<td>Special Consultant</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary to the Cabinet</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Secretary</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Secretary</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Advisor</td>
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<td>Deputy Assistant for Interdepartmental Affairs</td>
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<td>Cabinet Operations Officer and Associate Counsel</td>
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<td>Staff Assistant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Aides</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL Number of Job Titles&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Includes a Military Liaison Officer.<nub>
<sup>b</sup> Includes one Special Assistant (Food-for-Peace Coordinator).
<sup>c</sup> Includes the 'Other' category.
<sup>d</sup> Includes a Military Liaison Officer.
<sup>e</sup> Excludes the 'Other' category.
<sup>f</sup> Excludes the 'Other' category.

Sources: United States Government Organization Manual
Congressional Directory
Yet the full scope of Eisenhower's specialist subject staff was not visible from official lists. Appendix 4.4 reveals the extent of the omissions. What the official lists most concealed were the more precise titles for the Special Assistants. Specialist subjects assigned to Eisenhower staff members included Public Works Planning, Aviation, Security Operations Coordination, Science and Technology, Atomic Energy, Agricultural Surplus Disposal, and Personnel Management. Another functional area began to develop in the economic field (Special Assistants for Economic Affairs, and for Foreign Economic Policy). Highlighting the formal linkage between The White House Office and Special Projects was the position of Administrative Officer for the Special Projects Group.

President Kennedy consciously reverted to a more anonymous collection of job titles for his senior White House staff in official lists. Table 4.12 shows the result. For reasons of apparent equality and flexibility the majority of his WHO staff were given the allegedly equal ranking job title of Special Assistant to the President. The Press function alone retained an obvious identity (Press Secretary, and Associate Press Secretary). Another developing functional area - domestic affairs - fell mainly within the province of a special series of staff titles (the Special Counsel, Deputy Special Counsel, and Assistant Special Counsel). Such job titles were thus freed from any residual connexion with legal matters (as had long been implied). One exception to the general rule concerned Kennedy's naming of George McGovern as a Special Assistant and Director of the Food-For-Peace Program. This was done deliberately "to lend the office more prestige" - a good example of the use of staff job titles to emphasize presidential concern.
**TABLE 4.12**

KENNEDY PRESIDENCY 1961-1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHO Staff Job Titles</th>
<th>Numbers of WHO Staff Holding Each Job Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USGOM 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Counsel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Special Counsel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Special Counsel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Press Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Special Assistant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Assistant</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Aides</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other a</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Number of Job Titles</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4.13**

JOHNSON PRESIDENCY 1964-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHO Staff Job Titles</th>
<th>Numbers of WHO Staff Holding Each Job Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USGOM 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counsel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Counsel</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Special Counsel</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Special Counsel</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Special Counsel</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Counsel</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Counsel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Press Secretary c</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Special Assistant</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative Assistant</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Consultant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counsellor</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary to the Cabinet</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisor for National Capital Affairs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aide d</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Aides</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other a</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Number of Job Titles</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Includes residential and non-political staff.
b Excludes the 'Other' category.
c Various titles included: Assistant Press Secretary or Associate Press Secretary.
d Various titles included: Armed Forces Aide.
NL Job Title not listed in this source.

Sources: United States Government Organization Manual
Congressional Directory
Congressional Staff Directory
That Kennedy's general emphasis on bland job titles did not seriously imply any dilution of the expansion of the role of the staff is shown by Appendix 4.5. Job titles that the official listings did not allude to in print nevertheless still existed in a very real sense. Most notable were the functional staff responsibilities relating to Congress (Special Assistant for Personnel and Congressional Relations, and the Administrative Assistants for liaison with both the House and Senate). The domestic affairs function was broadened (Deputy Special Counsel for Budget and Programming), and certain specialisms survived (Special Assistants for Science and Technology, and for Regulatory Agencies).

The discrepancies between job titles published in official lists and those published elsewhere continued during the Johnson years. Table 4.13 shows that job titles in official use barely identified the Press function. After George Reedy's departure from the White House Johnson formally discontinued the title of Press Secretary in the belief that it restricted his freedom of manoeuvre. Neither did official listings overtly refer to congressional relations (Legislative Counsel being the only obvious job title) which was another area that Johnson thought too important to be left to his staff alone. The one specialist subject area consciously added was liaison with the District of Columbia (Advisor for National Capital Affairs).

Appendix 4.6 again confirms that behind the official job titles other, more accurate, descriptions of the work of the Johnson White House staff were to be found. Specialist subject areas were covered in the Johnson White House by a wide range of Special Assistants (for Science and Technology, the Arts, Consumer Affairs, Health, Education and International Affairs, Reconstruction in Vietnam, and Urban Affairs and Conservation). Johnson also established a post of Consultant (for liaison with the academic community), and other Special Consultants (for Military Affairs, Regulatory Agencies, and even for
Physical Fitness). Among the regular functional areas, the job of congressional relations was clearly performed by the Administrative Assistants under the overall leadership of the Legislative Counsel or the Special Assistant for Congressional Relations. In the area of foreign policy there emerged for the first time a Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. A further development in the domestic policy area was the appearance of a Special Assistant for Legislative Programs.

We have seen that the arrival of President Nixon brought a noticeable increase in the numbers of senior White House staff listed in official WHO lists. It also brought a noticeable increase in the numbers of different job titles and an upgrading of staff status. Table 4.14 makes this clear. Nixon created several new job titles, hitherto unknown, such as the senior position of Counsellor to the President, which unprecedentedly carried with it Cabinet rank. The domestic affairs function underwent changes in job title. It started as Urban Affairs and was subsequently overhauled to become Domestic Affairs. The congressional liaison function broadened over time (from Congressional Relations to Legislative Affairs). The Press function was split (between the Press Secretary and his deputy, and the Director of Communications for the Executive Branch and his deputy). The crucial task of White House operations was hidden behind bland titles (H.R. Haldeman occupied the position of Assistant to the President, and his own staff went largely unnamed). Specialist subject staff introduced by Nixon served under the headings of Special Consultant (on Aging (sic), Systems Analysis, and Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs), and Special Assistant (for Consumer Affairs, and Liaison with Former Presidents). Assorted others included the Science Advisor, and the Advisor on Manpower Mobilization.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Aide</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Other                      [a]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Job Titles</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[a] Includes residential and non-political staff.
[b] Excludes the 'Other' category.
[d] Includes one Executive Assistant and Personal Secretary.
[e] Retitled Assistant and Press Secretary.
[f] NL Job Title is not listed in this source.

Sources: United States Government Organization Manual
Congressional Directory
Congressional Staff Directory
The range of job titles in official use for the Nixon staff was slightly extended by the list issued by the Nixon White House itself in April, 1971. Appendix 4.7 is based on that Press release. It illustrates that the majority of the junior-level staff, whether working in the domestic or foreign affairs area, or in White House operations, were collectively labelled Staff Assistants. By and large all the principal functional areas were immediately recognisable from job titles alone. Other staff positions whose job titles were nowhere else revealed included the Official White House Photographer (which itself was a newly-established part of the White House scene).

The pattern of past presidencies was carried well beyond the Nixon years and into the 1980s by both Presidents Ford and Carter. Firstly, reflected in the job titles accorded their respective WHO senior staffs were the essential functional areas of staff responsibility: domestic affairs, national security affairs, economic affairs, congressional relations, and Press and media relations. Secondly, both Presidents sought to send a signal to certain outside constituencies that their Presidency would be sensitive to particular problems or groups. Thus, for example, President Ford introduced a new series of Special Assistants (for Women, Hispanic Affairs, Minority Affairs, and Labor-Management Negotiations), while Carter sought to safeguard his own credentials in appointing both Special Assistants (for Health Issues, and for Media and Public Affairs) and full Assistants (for Reorganization, and for Public Liaison). Each President has his own list of priorities and, in an age where the impact of single-issue political groups is thought to be increasing, Presidents have come to appreciate the value that their WHO staff job titles can have — not least in White House dealings with special-interest lobbyists. The role of the White House staff has expanded over the past four decades to the point where their job titles
alone are now considered to embody sufficient evidence that certain
issues are permanently on the President's agenda. Reagan now carries
this tradition forwards.

The Method of Organization

An examination of the job titles bestowed by successive Presidents on their
White House Office staff yields corroborative evidence of its method of
organization. As the number of staff increased over time the need for
some method of organization also increased.

Over the years there was a steady development of certain functional areas
with which any President - and therefore every White House staff - had to
be concerned. But we have also seen noticeable differences of approach
between Presidents. Some have deliberately identified which staff were
entrusted with which area. Others have deliberately left these matters
vague or undefined. Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon, for example, as
Table 4.11 and Table 4.14 make clear, generally itemized by job title the
work done by particular members of their staff. President Kennedy, on the
other hand, as Table 4.12 shows, chose officially to withhold the impression
that his staff were permanently or primarily engaged in any one area. (The
exception common to all three was the Press Secretary.) The conclusion
that Kennedy regarded his White House staff as more flexible in their use
to him, by comparison with the approach of those two Republican Presidents,
seems a fair one.

The greater precision of job titles used by Eisenhower and Nixon for their
White House staffs implied both a greater certainty of staff role and a
greater emphasis upon the formal structure within which the staff operated.
Table 4.11 clearly shows that the hierarchical nature of staff organization was reflected in the hierarchical character of the job titles employed. Eisenhower presided over a staff led by The Assistant to the President, the Assistant to The Assistant, the Special Assistant to The Assistant, followed by The Deputy Assistant, and the Assistant to The Deputy Assistant. No more obviously hierarchical pattern of job titles could exist. Table 4.14 similarly makes clear that Nixon routinely allotted deputies to those of his senior staff working in the domestic affairs, foreign affairs, and congressional relations functional areas.

Official listings of job titles from the Truman and Johnson years suggest a method of staff organization somewhere between the two kinds. Neither President can be said to betray a preference for a markedly formal method of staff organization, to judge from job titles alone. But, as Appendix 4.3 and Appendix 4.6 also suggest, neither President went so far as to leave entirely undeclared certain important areas of staff work. President Roosevelt's staff numbered too few for us to reach firm conclusions from the evidence supplied by job titles alone. But the discussion in Chapter III of the Roosevelt Presidency in the 1930s gives adequate grounds to suppose that like Kennedy his presidential working methods were unaffected by, and thus not reflected in, the job titles that he chose for his White House staff.

The Changes in Job Title

An important sidelight is thrown on this discussion by considering the changes in job titles bestowed on the staff by the President. Research shows that such changes have been a marked feature of certain presidencies. Table 4.15 gives full details of the number of changes in job titles recorded for each White House Office staff from Roosevelt to Nixon.
### TABLE 4.15

**THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-1974**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of Job Titles a</th>
<th>Number of Changes in WHO Job Titles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USGOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>1939-1945</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>1945-1952</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>1953-1960</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>1961-1963</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1964-1968</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>1969-1974</td>
<td>66 c</td>
<td>31 b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a The figures given are each an aggregate number of the different WHO Staff Job Titles used in each Presidency, compiled from all the published sources listed in Tables 4.9 to 4.14. They exclude residential and non-political Job Titles (which are listed as the 'Other' category).

b Covers the period 1969-1973 only.

c Includes many Job Titles listed by the Nixon White House in April 1971 which did not appear in USGOM CD or CSD sources.

**Sources:**
- United States Government Organization Manual
- Congressional Directory
- Congressional Staff Directory

Table 4.15 shows the unmistakable fact that Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon were each responsible for a large and significant number of changes in job titles for their respective White House staff. Together they were responsible for about 85% of all staff job title changes recorded on official listings between 1939 and 1974. That is not to say that other Presidents did not from time to time allocate changing duties to their staff, but the nature of the evidence available both suggests and allows a concentration on Eisenhower and Nixon. Closer examination of these changes, and the reasons for them, reveals two principal preoccupations common to each President. The first concerns staff personnel; the second concerns staff structure.
The preoccupation with staff personnel was mainly expressed in terms of staff promotion, or demotion, or shuffling sideways. A not inconsiderable number of the changes in job titles recorded during the Eisenhower and Nixon presidencies can be put down to this process. Examples are not difficult to find. During the Eisenhower Presidency Maxwell Rabb changed job titles in three successive years, 1953-55, from Assistant to The Assistant, to Cabinet Operations Officer and Associate Counsel, and finally Secretary to the Cabinet. Wilton B. Persons joined the staff in 1953 as a Special Assistant, becoming The Deputy Assistant in the following year, and The Assistant by 1959. The individual record for job title changes was held by Gerald Morgan who, again in successive years 1953-55, started as a Special Assistant in The White House Office, became an Administrative Assistant, and then Special Counsel, before finally replacing Persons as The Deputy Assistant.

Examples from the Nixon Presidency tend to show a mixture of actual staff promotion with a penchant for tinkering with job titles per se. A good example, taken from the Directory listings, was that of William Timmons whose successive job titles in the years 1969-71 were Deputy Assistant for Congressional Relations, Deputy Assistant for House Relations, and Assistant for Congressional Relations, and finally Assistant for Legislative Affairs (in 1973). The first three job titles reflected his steady promotion. The fourth reflected less a substantial change in the job he was actually doing than a general re-titling of the senior staff instigated at the start of Nixon's second term. Similarly, both John Ehrlichman and Henry Kissinger, who in 1970 were Assistants for Domestic Affairs and National Security Affairs respectively, were each re-titled in 1973. Each became simply an Assistant to the President.
The outward signs of staff promotion were sometimes more apparent than real. An example was President Nixon's invention of Counsellors to the President, who were deliberately endowed with the hitherto unprecedented and prestigious equivalent of Cabinet rank. The earliest such appointment was that of Arthur Burns in 1969, followed the next year by those of Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Bryce Harlow (who had begun as Assistants to the President). Donald Rumsfeld, who also began as an Assistant in 1969, was promoted to the rank of Counsellor in 1971. However, the degree of promotion actually involved (or even intended) is a matter for debate. The change in job title to Counsellor in reality signalled the removal of that staff member from the operational command chain of the White House staff 'upwards' into the rarefied atmosphere of advisory status alone. Some thought it the equivalent of being "booted upstairs". Examples of straightforward promotion were furnished by Nixon's long-standing speechwriter Ray Price, whose initial staff title was merely Special Assistant before Nixon upgraded him to a Special Consultant in 1973; Ron Ziegler, promoted from Special Assistant in 1969 to Press Secretary in 1970 to Assistant and Press Secretary (combined) in 1973; and Kenneth Clawson, who joined the staff as Deputy Director of Communications for the Executive Branch in 1972, becoming Deputy Press Secretary in 1973, and Director of Communications in 1974.

A President's preoccupation with the structure and organization of his White House staff is now accepted as foremost among the concerns of managing the Presidency. Decisions by a President to change the structure of their WHO staff can be reflected in various ways. In certain presidencies this is most readily apparent from the consequential changes in job titles for staff members. The Eisenhower and Nixon (and, to a lesser extent, Ford) presidencies, by their very hierarchical nature, best betray such structural changes in job title changes.
In both the Eisenhower and Nixon presidencies there is definite evidence of some structural change in their WHO staff organization after their first year in office. A large number of job title changes were recorded after that first year. (Appendix 4.9 gives the figures year by year.) For the Eisenhower Presidency, figures from the Government Organization Manual show 8 job title changes in 1954 (over the previous year), out of a total of 27 changes during the whole period 1953-1961; the Directory figures were 12 out of 34. Thus one third of all the job title changes that Eisenhower made during his Presidency were made after his first year. This proportion was similar in respect of President Nixon’s first year. The Staff Directory figures show 10 job title changes in 1970 out of an overall total of 35 between 1969 and 1974. The experience of running the White House for a year either invited, or compelled, each President to reconsider the structure of his staff.*

Both Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon had one common motivation for such reorganization. Both initiated, early in their presidencies, studies of the Executive Branch whose recommendations prompted certain staff changes. For example, partly as a result of the second Hoover Commission, President Eisenhower established certain new White House staff posts such as that of Secretary to the Cabinet, Staff Secretary, an Administrative Assistant serving as a Deputy Assistant for Intergovernmental Relations, and a Presidential Advisor for Personnel Management. President Nixon, in following both the advice of the Ash Advisory Council on Executive Organization and his own experience of life under Eisenhower, established a new Domestic Affairs office in the White House, with new staff job titles to match the newly-defined areas of staff responsibility.

* Machiavelli’s celebrated aphorism about judging a Prince from seeing the brains he has about him can be paraphrased in this context to the effect that you can judge a President’s changing approach to the organization of his staff from the changing job titles he chooses to bestow upon them.
Other changes in job titles were occasioned by the expansion of the role of the White House staff. The formal designation of one Special Assistant to the President as being responsible for National Security Affairs came in 1954 under President Eisenhower. This title remains to this day.

Similarly, after Special Projects had been established in 1956, Eisenhower created a supervisory staff post entitled Administrative Officer (Special Projects). President Nixon, as we have noted, created a number of new consultancy staff posts, such as the Special Consultants on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, on Systems Analysis, and on Aging.

For both Presidents the start of their second term acted as a catalyst for any rethinking and brought in its wake another round of staff job title changes. Yet those in the Eisenhower White House were more the result of staff turnover than any structural alteration of staff duties. Staff members were moved to other jobs to fill vacancies that had arisen. By contrast, President Nixon intended his second term to be marked by a radical restructuring of his White House organization (and its relationship with the rest of government). Before Watergate had seriously invaded his second term President Nixon was able to put many of these changes formally into effect—at least, as they affected the White House. About one third of all the job title changes during his Presidency occurred in the 1973 staff listings. (Appendix 4.9 gives the figures from the Government Organization Manual, Directory, and Staff Directory listings as 12, 9, and 11, out of 31, 28, and 35, respectively.) One of the most interesting features of these changes was that Nixon endowed his senior staff with job titles that tended to belie their greatly increased scope of operational responsibilities.

One other general feature of changes in staff job titles is the extent to which they reflect turnover of staff. Once again, this is most clearly manifested in the Eisenhower and Nixon presidencies. The Eisenhower Presidency
demonstrated a noticeable cyclical pattern of changes in job title. Apart from changes occurring after the first year, more changes were recorded after the first mid-term, the beginning of the second term, and the second mid-term of his Presidency than in other years. The Government Organization Manual figures are 4, 4, and 7 job titles changes at those times compared to the 1, 1, and 2 changes in the intervening years. As we have noted, Nixon's second term began with a significant number of job title changes. Moreover, both presidencies experienced political upheavals that precipitated staff turnover and consequently more such changes. In 1958, the enforced resignation of The Assistant to the President Sherman Adams triggered off a small chain reaction of reshuffled staff. By mid-1973, Watergate had made such a noticeable impact on Nixon's staff, and enforced so many resignations, that there was a similar necessity to re-shuffle staff and job titles.

Of the other presidencies under review none exhibited a high level of White House Office staff job titles changes. This was partly a reflection of a lower turnover among staff. Equally, it reflected a fundamentally different approach to staff organization. Compared to the Republican Presidents, the Democratic Presidents gave their WHO staff general job titles. Being less specific there was less need for them to be changed purely on grounds of reshuffled overlapping or reallocated responsibilities. Staff promotion, or reorganization, would not necessarily be evident from job title changes alone.

The Kennedy Presidency provides a good illustration of the one political advantage that a flexible organization has had over an hierarchical one. The job title of Special Assistant on the Kennedy WHO staff bespoke of no fixed political abode. The President could and did employ such assistants on a wide variety of different and overlapping assignments. Kennedy staff
job titles were merely a convenient mask behind which they operated freely at the President's direction. When staff reorganization proved necessary, as was the case in the national security area after the Bay of Pigs, it was achieved without any obvious reflection in official WHO staff listings. Although McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, was thereafter entrusted with a greatly increased role this was accorded the minimum of official recognition. Thus the emerging influence of the White House staff was well shielded from public and congressional view. This helped to protect both Kennedy - and the Presidency.

The Johnson White House followed the same pattern. Job title changes were few and far between. There was the occasional promotion caused by a vacancy (as when Lee White moved up from Associate Counsel in 1964 to Special Counsel in 1965, while Harry McPherson was similarly upgraded to the same post in 1967 from his former status as Special Assistant); or the need to bestow an apparently higher status (as when George Reedy returned to the Johnson staff in 1968 as a Special Consultant); but little else.

In conclusion, we have seen that the job titles conferred by Presidents on their White House staff have not only highlighted their increasing numbers and, with varying degrees of specificity, their expansion of role, but also embody the broad outline of staff organization in each Presidency. Job titles, even if they have not been as informative as job descriptions would be, still reflect quite accurately a President's underlying approach to his Presidency - if you know what to look for. This is not always easy. For example, few at first realised that behind the short and mundane job title of Assistant to the President held by H.R. Haldeman under Nixon lay the enormous scope of White House operations and the development of the modern-day model of Chief of Staff.
More prominent have been examples of the reverse. Presidents have deliberately manipulated staff job titles for political ends. The opportunity has been too good to miss. The EOP (not to mention the whole vast Executive Branch beyond) has grown far too big for special interest groups to be assuaged merely by an appointment here, or the establishment of an office there. They seek a more credible reassurance that their constituency has a voice - where it counts - in the councils of the Administration. Proximity to the President is the only currency that some of the more important special interest groups will trade and do business in. Presidents can most easily manufacture that currency by promising (while still a presidential candidate) or establishing (while in office or running for re-election) positions on their White House staff whose job titles give both clear notice that certain issues have a built-in feed to the White House policy machine, and give reassurance of access to presidential thinking.

Job titles are a most flexible presidential tool. As a result their use more directly indicates the President's philosophy towards his managerial White House role than a whole host of other governmental appointments, over the descriptive content of which his hands are tied by comparison. In the continued absence of any requirement for a standard, regular, full and public listing of all members of the White House staff the President will continue to enjoy a considerable degree of discretion. He may choose to be specific where it suits him; and similarly disingenuous if he considers it necessary. But to the well-trained eye his freedom of manoeuvre can be made more apparent than real. Experience shows that White House staff job titles are revealing; not least as a barometer of the development of the staff. This is no less true, as we shall now discover, in respect of staff turnover.
As a by-product of the annual publication of official listings of senior commissioned White House Office staff it is possible to gauge the turnover of staff from one year to the next. To do so is to do more than a mere exercise. Behind the figures of its computation lie an insight into the atmosphere of each White House - and into the possible connexion between staff organization and staff turnover. In many areas of life, loyalty and commitment are key factors that affect the level of staff turnover in any organization. Working at the White House is no exception. Among the senior staff there is an especially strong sense of loyalty to the job they do simply because of the obviously strong sense of loyalty to the President they serve. This loyalty is one of the important reasons of their being there at all. Countless numbers have testified that their period of service on the White House staff was the high point of their lives. Very few have deliberately relinquished their moment on centre stage unless they had very special reasons. The interpretation of staff turnover must therefore be seen against this background and judged accordingly.

So too must the limitations inherent in this examination of staff turnover. Firstly, our analysis can only be applied to the senior commissioned White House staff. Only they have their names published (the vast majority of the White House staff are unnamed), and without a regular publication of names it is impossible to know what turnover occurs. Secondly, in the absence of any one authoritative definition of staff turnover we must rely on a combination of definitions.

No standard definition of turnover exists by which to measure the proportion of persons arriving or leaving an office whose size itself varies from year to year - which The White House Office certainly does. In mathematical
terms one can distinguish between three different versions of turnover in The White House Office, each of which is calculated on a different basis. First: the numbers of incoming WHO staff can be expressed as a proportion of the total WHO staff in that year. Second: the numbers of outgoing WHO staff can be expressed as a proportion of the total WHO staff in the previous year. Third: the numbers of WHO staff who remain from one year to the next can be expressed as a proportion of the total WHO staff in both the present and the previous year. These three different bases for calculating turnover and expressing it as a percentage can be termed respectively the "arrival turnover", the "departure turnover", and the "constant ratio". Each definition contributes towards an understanding of the overall picture of WHO staff turnover during each Presidency.

TABLE 4.16

TURNOVER IN THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>USGOM Dep-Arr</th>
<th>Totalb</th>
<th>CD Dep-Arr</th>
<th>Totalb</th>
<th>CSD Dep-Arr</th>
<th>Totalb</th>
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<td>Roosevelt</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>6-12</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>16-21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>44-64</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>41-64</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>10-9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7-4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>Johnson</td>
<td>30-28</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>33-27</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>69-66a</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>74-84</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>78-88</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Covers the period 1969-1973 only.
b The figures given are the combined total of those listed as having departed (Dep) and arrived (Arr) during each Presidency.
c Figures include Armed Forces Aides (between 1945(ii) and 1964).

Dep Numbers of staff who departed from The WHO during each Presidency.
Arr Numbers of staff who arrived to join The WHO during each Presidency.

NB: Figures refer only to senior commissioned WHO staff.

Sources: United States Government Organization Manual
Congressional Directory
Congressional Staff Directory
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TABLE 4.16

TURNOVER IN THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total WHO Staff Turnover</th>
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</tr>
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</table>

<table>
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<th>Presidency</th>
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<th>Total b</th>
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<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>8-14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6-12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>16-21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16-20</td>
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a Covers the period 1969-1973 only.
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c Figures include Armed Forces Aides (between 1945(11) and 1964).

Dep Numbers of staff who departed from The WHO during each Presidency.
Arr Numbers of staff who arrived to join The WHO during each Presidency.

NB: Figures refer only to senior commissioned WHO staff.

Sources: United States Government Organization Manual
Congressional Directory
Congressional Staff Directory
Before turning to any detailed analysis we should first consider the broad outline. Table 4.16 provides the aggregate totals for WHO staff turnover arranged Presidency by Presidency. (Appendix 4.10 gives annual figures for the period 1939-1974.) As Table 4.16 shows, the crude extent of aggregate turnover broadly corresponded with the size of the senior WHO staff that served each President. For example, President Nixon's WHO staff, which was the largest yet seen, also produced the largest overall turnover figures. President Eisenhower's WHO staff, second in size only to Nixon's was similarly second in recorded turnover figures.

But the patterns of staff size and staff turnover have not completely coincided. Where they have not adds significance to the meaning of that turnover. For example, despite the fact that President Roosevelt had the smallest WHO senior staff of any President he did not achieve the lowest staff turnover. Kennedy's Presidency enjoyed that distinction, and yet the size of the Kennedy WHO senior staff was at least double that of Roosevelt's. This can partly be accounted for by the fact that Kennedy was in the White House less than three years, which did not give so great an opportunity for turnover to occur. But it also reflected the relative stability of the senior team around Kennedy. Johnson's Presidency provided a contrasting example. Although at any one time his senior WHO staff numbered no more than had Kennedy's, Johnson experienced a much higher turnover of staff throughout his time in office. Indeed, measurements of departure turnover for Johnson's staff almost reached the level of the Eisenhower years. In general, however, taking into account minor deviations, the broad outline still holds. What of the patterns within each individual Presidency?

The figures for actual turnover during the Roosevelt Presidency, as Table 4.16 clearly shows, point to the increasing size of the WHO senior staff. According to the United States Government Organization Manual
14 persons joined the Roosevelt staff between 1939 and 1945, while only 8 left. A closer inspection shows that only three persons both joined and left during that time. All three held the position of Administrative Assistant and none were among the most senior aides to Roosevelt. For the rest, several departures were occasioned by deaths; while those that joined all stayed until the end. The prevailing picture, suggested by the figures both for departure and arrival turnover, was of a settled staff, slowly growing.

Noticeably higher figures for actual turnover were produced by the Truman Presidency. Both the Organization Manual and the Congressional Directory showed that departure turnover at least doubled over the years 1945-1952. The two years of most change were 1946 and 1948. Departure and arrival turnover figures for those two years were higher than for any others. Of the approximately 20 staff who joined the White House during Truman's Presidency, only one third subsequently left before his term of office finished. With only one notable exception (Special Counsel Clark Clifford) the turnover among Truman's staff was generally restricted to those that did not count among the President's known closest advisers. In summary, Truman's Presidency demonstrated that the turnover of WHO staff would henceforth be a regular feature of the modern Presidency.

The subsequent Eisenhower Presidency amply confirmed this fact. Staff turnover in real terms was higher than ever before. According to the Organization Manual, 44 persons left the senior WHO staff between 1953 and 1960, while 64 joined. Well over two-fifths of those 64 had left the Eisenhower staff before his second term ended. Only three of those who left later returned to serve another spell: Thomas Stephens (Secretary to the President); Robert Cutler (Special Assistant for National Security Affairs); and Kevin McCann (Special Assistant). The ramifications of the
Sherman Adams affair were reflected in the fact that Eisenhower suffered a greater proportion of staff turnover among his closest aides than any previous President. Of the top 21 staff listed by the Organization Manual in 1953 (excluding the President's Physician, but including his Personal Secretary) only 9 were left by 1960.

The Eisenhower years also brought one feature of staff turnover into more prominence. There was a distinctly cyclical pattern of staff turnover between 1953 and 1961. It rose every two years: after the first mid-term; after the beginning of the second term; and after the second mid-term. In the intervening years it noticeably fell. Figures for departure turnover from the Congressional Directory show the following progression during the years 1954–1960: 4%, 17%, 8%, 21%, 15%, 27%, and 6%. Government Organization Manual figures for arrival turnover during the same period similarly exhibit this cyclical pattern: 24%, 34%, 18%, 26%, 17%, 22%, and 6%. Factors that contribute to such a pattern are varied. Those staff members for whom government service represented too great a financial sacrifice found the occasion of Eisenhower's second term a natural moment to leave. Similarly those who benefited from their connexion with the White House in terms of increased job opportunities outside saw the mid-term as the appropriate point to move on. The political pattern of biennial sessions of Congress also provided opportunities to release and recruit staff, although this applied less to Eisenhower's senior staff than to those lower down the pecking order.

President Kennedy's term may have been too short to enable a definitive judgement on whether such trends also applied in his case. They do not seem to do so. Unlike any previous Presidency, the numbers of senior WHO staff remained almost constant and their turnover was small in real terms.
During Kennedy's 1000 days only 10 persons left, and 9 joined, the senior WHO staff, according to the Government Organization Manual (although the Congressional Directory put the numbers even lower, at 7 and 4 respectively.)

The impression gained is of a stable senior WHO staff. Such turnover as did take place was not among the most senior of Kennedy's advisers, but affected those of decidedly middle rank. There were also some special factors at work. The Special Assistant James Landis had been brought on board mainly for the transition and the early months only. Special Assistant for civil rights, Harris Wofford, left to join the Peace Corps; while George McGovern, Special Assistant and Director of the Food-for-Peace program, left the White House to run for the Senate. Of the other departures recorded three were occasioned by Kennedy's reorganization of the State Department. Walt Rostow moved from his position as a Deputy Special Assistant to become Counsellor and chief of the Policy Planning Council; Fred Dutton relinquished his post of Special Assistant to become Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations; and Richard Goodwin went from being an Assistant Special Counsel to Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. These changes apart there were few departures. Figures for arrival turnover from the Government Organization Manual show an increase from 12% to 21% between 1962 and 1963, indicating that there was a slight change after the first mid-term elections. While Kennedy didn't remain long enough for his staff to have exhibited a cyclical pattern, the Kennedy years were certainly ones of stability.

The very opposite conclusion can be drawn from the White House of his successor. Johnson's senior WHO staff, like Kennedy's, numbered in the later twenties. But Table 4.16 shows that, in aggregate total, the turnover of staff was decisively higher: three times as many staff members
left and joined the Johnson WHO staff as had been the case under Kennedy.

The *Government Organization Manual* listings showed that 30 staff left Johnson's service in the years 1964-1968, while 28 joined. The *Congressional Directory* figures were 33 and 27 respectively; while the newly-published *Congressional Staff Directory* listed 26 and 29 respectively.

The year-by-year figures of staff turnover (see Appendix 4.10) reflect the exceptional nature of the circumstances of the early Johnson Presidency. The listings of staff compiled by the *Congressional Directory* in January, 1964, recorded the names of many Kennedy 'holdovers' still on the payroll. Some were about to leave the White House. This was entirely natural for they were Kennedy's - not Johnson's - men. Many if not most of those who left for this reason alone had done so before the first listing of the Johnson staff was compiled by the *Government Organization Manual* in June, 1964. Yet subsequent turnover was still high, and this cannot be ascribed to the transition after Kennedy's assassination. Other factors soon came into play.

The single most striking feature of the Johnson staff turnover was that it applied to his most senior advisers as much as, if not more so, to those of middle-level rank. Of the 27 WHO staff listed by the *Directory* in January, 1964, only 7 were listed by the same publication four years later. Of those 7 only one was a political staff appointment, the rest being non-political and residential staff. Thus only one man - Administrative Assistant Mike Manatos - had served Johnson throughout his Presidency; and of him, having been originally a Kennedy appointee, it could not be claimed that he was primarily a Johnson staffer. This is the most dramatic illustration of the decimation of Johnson's staff by turnover. The evidence is just as clear from other sources. Of the 29 staff listed by the *Manual* in June, 1964, only 10 were listed four years later. Of those, only 4 were
left and joined the Johnson WHO staff as had been the case under Kennedy. The Government Organization Manual listings showed that 30 staff left Johnson's service in the years 1964-1968, while 28 joined. The Congressional Directory figures were 33 and 27 respectively; while the newly-published Congressional Staff Directory listed 26 and 29 respectively.

The year-by-year figures of staff turnover (see Appendix 4.10) reflect the exceptional nature of the circumstances of the early Johnson Presidency. The listings of staff compiled by the Congressional Directory in January, 1964, recorded the names of many Kennedy 'holdovers' still on the payroll. Some were about to leave the White House. This was entirely natural for they were Kennedy's - not Johnson's - men. Many if not most of those who left for this reason alone had done so before the first listing of the Johnson staff was compiled by the Government Organization Manual in June, 1964. Yet subsequent turnover was still high, and this cannot be ascribed to the transition after Kennedy's assassination. Other factors soon came into play.

The single most striking feature of the Johnson staff turnover was that it applied to his most senior advisers as much as, if not more so, to those of middle-level rank. Of the 27 WHO staff listed by the Directory in January, 1964, only 7 were listed by the same publication four years later. Of those 7 only one was a political staff appointment, the rest being non-political and residential staff. Thus only one man - Administrative Assistant Mike Manatos - had served Johnson throughout his Presidency; and of him, having been originally a Kennedy appointee, it could not be claimed that he was primarily a Johnson staffer. This is the most dramatic illustration of the decimation of Johnson's staff by turnover. The evidence is just as clear from other sources. Of the 29 staff listed by the Manual in June, 1964, only 10 were listed four years later. Of those, only 4 were
political staff members, and one of them, (Special Consultant George Reedy, who had rejoined the staff near the end of Johnson's Presidency having left the White House at mid-term) had not served continuously.

The figures are quite conclusive. Johnson suffered a greater degree of turnover among his most senior WHO staff than any previous President. That highly well-informed observer of congressional affairs, Congressional Quarterly, felt obliged to point to the high turnover.28 By the end of 1967, eight of the nine Special Assistants with whom Johnson had begun his presidential term on 20th January, 1965, had left the White House. By the end of his Presidency it was calculated that 43 "top aides" had served Johnson altogether,29 at an average (and noticeably short) tenure of 28 months. (The same average - applied to Kennedy would mean that all his initial WHO staff would have left the White House before his death.) At least half-a-dozen senior staff resigned from the Johnson White House each year. This steady flow seems to have overlaid any obvious repetition of the cyclical patterns of turnover previously identified, although figures for arrival turnover from the Congressional Directory for the years 1965-68 (33%, 25%, 31%, and 21%) do exhibit cyclical trends.

President Nixon enjoyed a large senior commissioned WHO staff; normally over 50 in each year. Over 110 persons served during his 5½ years in office. The aggregate totals of turnover, as Table 4.16 shows, were similarly large. The Government Organization Manual listings show that 69 persons left, and 66 joined, the staff in the years 1969-1973. (No list of Nixon's staff was published by the Government Organization Manual in 1974.) The Congressional Directory, for the years 1969-1974, put the totals at 74 and 84 respectively; while the Congressional Staff Directory put them slightly higher at 78 and 88 respectively.
In analysing the distribution of this staff turnover allowance must of course be made for the impact that Watergate had on Nixon's White House Office staff. Without Watergate, more of Nixon's most senior advisers might well have remained throughout his Presidency. But in the event Nixon suffered a significant degree of turnover among his most senior aides. For example, of the 46 staff listed by the Government Organization Manual in 1969, only 14 appeared on the last Government Organization Manual listing in 1973. Of those, three were non-political staff and one other, Counsellor Bryce Harlow, had temporarily re-joined the White House staff after a long period away. Only ten, less than a quarter of the original staff, had served Nixon throughout. The Congressional Directory figures show that only 10 remained in 1974, of which only 8 were political staff and only 7 had served continuously: Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, Press Secretary Ron Ziegler and his deputy Gerald Warren, Assistant for Legislative Affairs William Timmons, the speechwriters Patrick Buchanan and Ray Price, and Personal Secretary Rose Mary Woods.

Beneath the staff turnover occasioned by Watergate, the cyclical nature of staff turnover decidedly reasserted itself during the Nixon Presidency. For example, the Government Organization Manual recorded the following real totals of staff who left the Nixon White House in the years 1970-1974: 4, 25, 7, and 33. Once again, the peak periods of turnover were in the aftermath of the mid-term elections of 1970, and the presidential re-election of 1972. After each the Nixon WHC staff underwent considerable changes, especially among middle-level commissioned staff.

White House staff turnover may also be considered from another angle. We have considered the overall pattern. We now turn to the individual pattern. Table 4.17 provides figures for the average length of service by WHC staff for the years 1939-1974.
TABLE 4.17

TURNOVER IN THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-1974

Average Length of Service of WHO Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>USGOM</th>
<th>CD</th>
<th>CSD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Figures given in years and months

Sources: United States Government Organization Manual
Congressional Directory
Congressional Staff Directory

The most obvious feature of Table 4.17 is that the average length of service has shortened over the years: from more than 3½ years (under Roosevelt) to less than 2½ years (under Nixon). Yet this progression has not been gradual. The six presidencies fall into two groups. The average figures recorded during the Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower presidencies were definitely higher than those for the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon presidencies (which themselves were much the same as each other). Generally speaking these figures are all closer either to 4-year or 2-year periods of service. This tends to correlate with, and confirm, the cyclical pattern of turnover (especially in later presidencies). As measurements of staff turnover these average length of service figures must be weighed in the light of the length of each Presidency. In this context figures for the
Kennedy Presidency represent much less staff turnover than do the (superficially comparable) figures for a Nixon Presidency that in fact lasted over twice as long.

What general conclusions can be drawn from this analysis? It is clear that turnover comprises several elements. Firstly, there is a broad relationship between the size of a staff and the rate of staff turnover: the smaller the staff the lower has been the turnover. Secondly, the larger staff normally entails a differentiated rate of turnover between two parts: the President's most senior aides, and the bulk of the middle- and junior-level staff. Turnover among the latter groups tends to be greater. This is tantamount to saying that the closer staff members are to the President the less they are subject to turnover. No rule would be complete without its partial exceptions. Both the Nixon staff (because of Watergate) and the Johnson staff (for different reasons) suffered a higher level of turnover among the most senior aides than did the staff of any other President. Thirdly, one other (submerged) relationship exists between a large staff and the tendency towards a cyclical pattern of turnover: rising and falling in successive years. The most notable examples have been the Eisenhower and Nixon presidencies. It was a submerged feature of the Johnson Presidency, a nascent feature of Roosevelt's and Truman's, while those of Kennedy (and Ford) were too short to allow it to surface.

With this variety of elements it is plain that no single measurement of staff turnover can adequately encompass - in a single figure - such turnover as there was in each Presidency nor convey its full meaning. But equally there is a need for a guide to the relative susceptibility of each Presidency to WHO staff turnover. Table 4.18 provides such a guide.
TABLE 4.18

TURNOVER IN THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-1974

Departure Turnover for WHO Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>USGOM</th>
<th>CD</th>
<th>CSD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Least Turnover

Most Turnover

a Covers the period 1969-1973 only.
b Figures exclude Armed Forces Aides (between 1945(ii) and 1964).
c Figures expressed as a percentage of x/y where:
x is the number of WHO staff who left the staff during each Presidency.
y is the total number of WHO staff who served during each Presidency.

Sources: United States Government Organization Manual
Congressional Directory
Congressional Staff Directory

On the basis of figures for departure turnover, Table 4.18 places the six presidencies in an order from top to bottom that reflects their degree of WHO staff turnover from least to most. This order - from Kennedy to Nixon - represents the synthesis derived from other measurements available. (Appendix 4.11 provides three other such measurements which collectively confirm the validity of the order given in Table 4.18.) Even more pronounced is the general division of the six presidencies into three groups. These are given here as Groups A, B, and C. Kennedy and Roosevelt, in Group A, enjoyed the lowest senior WHO staff turnover. Johnson and Nixon, in Group C, recorded the highest. Truman and Eisenhower, in Group B, ranged between the other two groups.
The first official budget for President Roosevelt's newly-created White House Office staff in 1939 provided $213,000. Forty years later in 1979 the budget for the entire White House staff of President Carter was $31,694,000 - no less than 150 times greater. The nature and definition of the White House staff changed and expanded during those forty years, as Chapter I has shown, and it may seem unjustified to claim direct comparisons. Even so, the budget in 1979 for The White House Office alone was $17,163,000 - about 80 times larger than for Roosevelt's WHO in 1939. This is one measure of the increase in the cost of the staff. This section examines how the cost increased over time, and considers in more detail the constituent parts of the overall picture.

The pattern of increase in the cost of the White House staff can be said broadly to correspond with that of the increase in its size in three major respects. First, the cost must be considered in the light of the expanding definition of the staff. In 1939, the cost of the staff could validly be measured only in the budget for The White House Office alone. By 1969, the cost could only be computed by adding together the budgets for The White House Office, Special Projects, the Emergency Fund, and the National Security Council. By 1979, reflecting once again the changed components of the staff, the total cost comprised The White House Office, the Office of Administration, the Domestic Policy Staff, the National Security Council, and the fund for Unanticipated Needs. The second respect in which the pattern has corresponded is that the appearance of significant increases in
cost has been as misleading as the apparent sudden increases in size.

Finally, the third parallel lies in the caveat that must be entered on the extent to which the published official figures convey the complete picture of the true cost.

This examination is circumscribed by the degree of information available from public sources. However, while figures for the size of parts of the White House staff, such as those Special Projects employees, have not always been available a figure for cost has always been given. What is impossible to obtain have been the various kinds of hidden 'subsidies': for example, the addition to the true cost of the staff of the persons detailed to work in the White House from elsewhere. What is often equally impossible to ascertain have been the financial breakdowns of some White House staff budget items. Special Projects again provides a good example. Budget breakdowns disappeared from the FY 1967 Budget onwards, a development which marked a move towards greater secrecy.

The basic measure for the cost of the White House staff is that given in the annual United States Budgets for various White House staff items. The amount appropriated for each such item is known as its "Budget Authority". This measure can be used as the basis for comparison, whether year by year, or Presidency by Presidency (with the reservation discussed in Chapter I).

Table 4.19 gives figures for the Budget Authority of the five budgetary items that at various times and in various combinations have made up the core of the cost of the White House staff between 1939 and 1976. (See also Appendices 4.12 and 4.13 for detailed annual figures of Budget Authority and Outlay.)
### TABLE 4.19

**COST OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1976**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>WHO (in $ '000s)</th>
<th>SP (in $ '000s)</th>
<th>EF/UN (in $ '000s)</th>
<th>NSC (in $ '000s)</th>
<th>DC (in $ '000s)</th>
<th>TOTAL (in $ '000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1,884</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,958</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2,221</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2,498</td>
<td>1,258</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2,545</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2,730</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3,009</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3,229</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>6,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>11,260</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,802</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>16,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>16,367</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>21,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>16,766</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,052</td>
<td>1,646</td>
<td>22,464</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a 1970 figure (because the Domestic Council was not established until 1970).
b Total excludes figures for Domestic Council in 1970.

NB: All figures are actual figures: i.e. the 1975 figures are taken from the FY 1977 Budget.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>The White House Office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Special Projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF/UN</td>
<td>Emergency Fund/Unanticipated Needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Domestic Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: United States Budgets
During the whole period 1939-1976 these items were coterminous only for a few years (in the 1970s). None except for The White House Office itself has spanned the entire period. Figures are given for the first and last years of each Presidency. (Complete figures for each year are given in Appendix 4.12.)

The cost of The White House Office mirrored its size in one obvious respect: the pattern of apparent increase was the same. For example, twice in the course of this period - in 1947 and in 1971 - there appeared to be a sudden and dramatic increase in the cost of The White House Office. In 1947 the cost rose to $884,000 from $343,000 the year before; an increase of over 150%. In 1971 the cost rose to $8,359,000 from $3,940,000 the year before; an increase of over 110%. However, as Chapter I made clear, both such increases were more apparent than real. Both represented attempts to reveal more accurately the real cost of The White House Office. The 1971 case is worth examining in more detail. In its FY 1971 Budget the Nixon Administration presented to Congress breakdown figures for the cost of the White House staff in 1970, designed to illustrate that the 1971 increase in cost was actually not what it seemed. Table 4.20 is based on these figures for 1970 (and should be taken in conjunction with Table 4.329b).

**TABLE 4.20**

**COST OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1976**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The White House Staff: Breakdown of Cost in 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary Item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The White House Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel detailed to the White House b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUB-TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Figures in $'000s.

b Figure calculated by the Nixon Administration

Source: United States Budget FY 1971
From this breakdown it is clear that the estimated cost of the detailees from elsewhere in government to the White House amounted to 71% of the official cost of The White House Office. Moreover, the total cost of $13,360,000 for the White House staff in 1970 does put the 1971 figure of $14,541,000 into better perspective.

The rise in cost in cash terms was under 9%. At the time the Nixon White House even claimed a reduction in WHO costs. In 1970 its estimate for the combined cost in 1971 of WHO and Special Projects was $8,550,000; but the FY 1973 Budget later revealed that the actual combined cost was $9,859,000. A small degree of error in making budgetary predictions is natural. But in this case the claim, however unrealistic, was deliberately made for presentational reasons, to off-set unfavourable publicity resulting from the large apparent increase of 1971 costs over 1970.

For different reasons the interpretation of cost increases in the years 1974-1975 should also be treated with caution. The cost of The White House Office did rise substantially in each of those years. But the appearance of casual connexion between size and cost of staff is misleading. In 1974, as Watergate neared its climax, it is true that the Nixon Administration requested a definite increase in WHO staff. OMB Director Roy Ash stated at a Senate appropriations subcommittee hearing on 4th June, 1974, that another 30 staff were needed "to handle the greater workload that is imposed upon the White House" as a result of Watergate. By itself, this increase accounted for but a fraction of the total increase in estimated costs between 1973 and 1974. $667,700 of that increase was due to pay increases. Another $414,000 was provided by a continuing resolution. This latter was the equivalent of what had been Special Projects (abolished in 1974). In 1975, the normal Special Projects sum of $1,500,000 was "restored" and
re-appropriated to, or subsumed by, The White House Office. The conse-
quently swollen WHO budget thus largely reflected no more than the combined
WHO and Special Projects cost, where before they had been separated budget-
ary items. The other main component of the 1975 cost increase was
really no more than a bookkeeping alteration which did not itself signify
any increase in the size of the White House staff.

An analysis of the cost of Special Projects is a much easier task. With
few exceptions, the annual appropriation for Special Projects was $1,500,000.
On only one occasion was it higher, when another $1m was added to cover extra
costs occasioned by the incoming Nixon Presidency. Obviously the real
value of this $1m appropriation fell gradually downwards from 1956, and
somewhat faster in its last ten years, as a result of inflation. Nevertheless,
no attempt was ever made to inflation-proof the appropriation. Upon its
abolition as a separate fund in 1974, an amount was transferred to The White
House Office, after which in 1975 the $1m was subsumed within WHO costs.

An even more striking case of the erosion by inflation of the real value of
funds for staff purposes has been provided by the Unanticipated Needs
appropriation (whose name was changed in 1975 from the Emergency Fund). Its
regular annual appropriation is $1m. By 1980 this was worth in real terms
a great deal less than the same cash amount 40 years earlier. To this
extent successive Presidents have seen their financial freedom of action
greatly reduced by the eroded purchasing power of this $1m. President
Ford was the only President to suffer a cash reduction, when in 1975, as
a result of moves aimed primarily at the Nixon White House in the aftermath
of Watergate, Congress cut the appropriation by half. But the full $1m
was restored in 1976. President Roosevelt's $1m in 1940, however, was by
1980 only worth $171,000 to President Carter.
Compared to The White House Office budgetary appropriation, those for the National Security Council have more accurately reflected the official size of the staff serving on the NSC. For example, the cost increase between 1957 ($248,000) and 1958 ($711,000) was directly attributable to an increase in the size of the NSC staff from 28 to 77 permanent positions. When President Kennedy came to power in 1961 he deliberately dismantled the NSC machine that Eisenhower had built up. The reduction in NSC staff between 1961 and 1962 (from 75 to 47) was therefore directly mirrored in the reduced cost of the NSC staff, from $817,000 to $554,000.

When President Nixon arrived in the White House in January, 1969, he set about re-establishing the NSC staff as the foreign-policy arm of his White House staff. The cost jumped from $811,000 in 1969 (itself a noticeable increase over 1968) to $1,860,000 in 1970. This 130% increase needs closer examination, as the size of staff rose (from 47 to 75) only by 60%. The FY 1971 Budget gave the difference between actual expenditure in 1969 and that estimated for 1970. This showed that the salary bill was to rise by 100% (from $610,000 to $1,246,000); the printing bill was also to double (from $2,000 to $4,000); travel costs were to rise by nearly 450% (from $11,000 to $60,000); and the cost of other services was to increase by well over 500% (from $23,000 to $144,000). Subsequently, the official cost of the NSC staff rose gently throughout the 1970s, as Appendix 4.12 indicates. But what was not revealed, at any stage, was the extra cost of the large numbers of personnel detailed to the NSC staff. One can only estimate the additional costs thus incurred. In 1970, for example, 58 persons were on detail to the NSC whose official size was then 75 permanent positions. Those 58 detailees thus represented 44% of the total real size of Kissinger's staff. Adding a proportionate extra amount for their salaries to the official NSC budget means possibly adding up to another $800,000 to get the total real cost of Kissinger's staff in 1970 - which would then be $2,660,000.
The cost of the Domestic Council, during its relatively short existence, varied - as did the NSC - according to its size. The increase in 1972 to $2,209,000 reflected an increased number of staff, from 52 to 79 permanent positions. Similarly, the reduction in 1974 to $1,100,000 owed to a reduction in staff (from 75 to 30). The increase in 1976 (over 1975) of a third in the cost of the Domestic Council matched a rise of a third in its personnel. Further rises in the Carter Presidency, to $2,711,000 in 1980 (in its new guise as the Domestic Policy Staff), were accompanied by a one quarter increase in staff levels. None of these figures encompass the cost of any detailees, of which there were always more than a handful in any one year.

Appendix 4.12 demonstrates conclusively that the White House staff have not incurred a negligible cost when considered in aggregate total. Cumulative totals for various staff items show that between 1939 and 1976 about $127 million had been allocated to The White House Office; $27½ million to Special Projects; $36½ million to Unanticipated Needs; $28 million to the NSC; and over $11 million to the Domestic Council. This yields a combined cumulative total of over $230 million. Moreover, by 1979 the annual level of expenditure for White House staff budgetary items was running at about $30 million p.a. If the cumulative total for these latter years 1976-1979 is added to that for 1939-1976 (already calculated at $230 million) the combined cumulative cost of the staff for the forty years between 1939 and 1979 has been well over $300 million. Even when set against the mammoth budgets of the United States this aggregate cost cannot possibly be discounted as marginal.

From the macroview we now turn to examine in more detail the major components of these large budgetary costs. Two major components stand out. Firstly, the staff salary bill; and secondly, the cost of back-up services.
Top members of the White House staff today enjoy the same salary level as members of Congress (Executive Level II). That is not an inconsiderable pay packet. Only members of the Cabinet, the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the President himself are on a higher government salary grade. (Technically, the President doesn't count; he does not receive a 'salary' as such but 'compensation' for each year in office.) At the beginning of the Carter Presidency in 1977 the salaries of the top dozen White House staff were set at $57,500 p.a. At a time when the new President was allegedly fulfilling his campaign promise to cut back on the size and importance of the White House staff this salary level, and others for middle- and junior-level staff, prompted an embarrassing wave of criticism.

"It's an abuse of taxpayers' money", was one charge made.

A proper assessment of such a comment can only be made in the historical light of past experience. What were the principal trends in staff salary levels from the Roosevelt years onwards? Interesting though these may be in themselves the primary purpose here is to ask the question: what light have these trends shed on presidential treatment of his most senior staff? As was the case with staff job titles, so too in respect of staff salaries: they may be clues to the structure and organization of a President's staff.

It is almost an axiom of the conventional world of business and industry that the most important employees can usually be identified by the salaries they receive. Has the same been true of the White House staff?

Our prime focus of attention is the salaries of senior WHO staff. Although the steadily increasing size of the staff has brought with it onto the payroll at quite high salary levels many middle- and junior-level staff, it is at the senior staff level that the personal influence of the President has
most directly been felt. In addition, any discussion of staff salaries is limited by the range of evidence available. United States Budgets have provided, in varying degrees over time, information on the salaries paid to staff members in The White House Office. But no such information was ever provided in respect of Special Projects; or ungraded personnel; or detailees from other departments and agencies. Moreover, between 1947 and 1977, the extent of the information given on salaries in U.S. Budget Appendices was progressively curtailed. In 1947 precise figures were published for the individual salaries of each staff member (arranged according to his or her job title). By 1977 spartan figures were printed merely of the aggregate numbers of unnamed staff at various salary levels whose dollar amounts were not given. Since 1977 the curtailment has been even greater.

Salary Levels From Roosevelt to Carter

Table 4.21 provides a summary of the main outlines of White House staff salaries for the years 1942-1977.* Appendix 4.14 amplifies this summary and chronicles in greater detail the annual growth in senior WHO salary levels during the same period.

* Table 4.21 gives actual salary figures for the quinquennia between 1942 and 1977. See Note 45a for inflation-adjusted figures. These show that since 1967 the most senior WHO staff, whether measured by the Top Salary Paid (TSP) or the Top Salary Grade (TSG), have enjoyed a significantly higher standard of salary than those in the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy years. At 1977 prices, however, the Nixon staff emerge at the top of the salary league with an inflation-adjusted salary for the senior WHO staff of $61,500 p.a. (compared to the Carter staff's $57,500 p.a. and the Johnson staff's $54,500 p.a.).
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**NA** Not Available

a From 1947-1966 the senior WHO salary grade was expressed as a minimum figure. Actual salaries were usually higher. From 1967-1977 all 14 senior WHO staff were paid salaries at the level shown.

b Figures given to the nearest $100.

c Crude Figures obtained by dividing total WHO salary costs by the number of "Permanent Positions" and "Full-time Equivalent of Other Positions" on the WHO payroll.

d Figures given in $000s.

e This salary (budgeted for the first time in 1947) was not paid from WHO funds but from the Emergency Fund appropriation.

NB: All figures are actual figures, i.e. the 1972 figures are obtained from the FY 1974 Budget.

Source: United States Budgets
In 1939 the average salary of employees of The White House Office was $3,100 p.a. It is likely that the salaries of the nascent WHO staff members, the three Secretaries to the President (Stephen Early, Marvin McIntyre and 'Pa' Watson) and the three Administrative Assistants (Lauchlin Currie, William McReynolds and James Lowe), were above that average. The evidence suggests that the newly-established Administrative Assistants were all to be paid exactly the same salary, although they ranked behind the three Secretaries in seniority. By 1945 that average had increased by over 25% to stand at $4,800 p.a., and there is evidence that the senior staff were earning almost double that figure. But the salaries of two of the most important persons on Roosevelt's staff - Special Assistant Harry Hopkins and Special Counsel Judge Sam Rosenman - were paid not by The White House Office appropriation but by that of the Emergency Fund. Roosevelt was forbidden to pay them from WHO funds by the wording of the formal authorization that then existed for The White House Office appropriation. This referred only to "the Secretary to the President, and the six administrative assistants to the President as authorized by law, and the two additional secretaries to the President".  

It was not Roosevelt but Truman who was first freed from this restriction on the nature of the staff that could be employed - and paid - from White House Office funds. It took two stages. Firstly, on 2nd August, 1946, an act was passed which granted the President the flexibility he wanted. The new wording, which has been enshrined in every appropriation act until FY 1980, authorized expenditure "for expenses necessary...as the President may specify and (for) other personal services". By this time the minimum salary level of the senior staff was $10,000 p.a. The senior White House Office salary grade was listed as General Schedule 16 (GS-16). In 1947 nine Truman staff members were included in that grade. But this still did
not enable President Truman to pay all his senior staff from White House
Office funds. Assistant to the President John Steelman and Special Counsel
Clark Clifford, for example, continued to be paid from the Emergency Fund
appropriation.\textsuperscript{50} An act passed on 15th October, 1949, "to provide in-
creased compensation of secretaries, and executive, administrative, and
staff assistants"\textsuperscript{51} boosted salaries all round but left untouched the
essential problem.

The second stage in its solution came in 1950 with the formal establishment
for the first time of a new salary level, set above the General Schedule
grades.\textsuperscript{52} The new level, expressed as a minimum, was $14,800 p.a.\textsuperscript{53}
The immediate effect was that President Truman could now include eleven
of his staff in the new senior WHO salary grade. John Steelman and Clark
Clifford, therefore, were listed in 1950 as being formally on the payroll
of The White House Office.\textsuperscript{54}

At first the new salary grade was merely labelled "Positions at rates in
excess of...", being changed in 1953 to "Special Positions at rates equal
to or in excess of...". The dollar level was increased in 1956 to
$16,000 p.a. but the number of staff qualifying at that top level was
still limited to eleven. Notice of a change, however, was given in the
FY 1958 Budget and the following year, 1958, saw the addition of three
more staff members to the senior group eligible for the highest salary
rates. Thus Secretary to the Cabinet Robert Gray and Associate Special
Counsel Edward McCabe, for example, qualified for inclusion at the same
salary grade as Eisenhower's top staff such as The Assistant to the
President Sherman Adams, Special Counsel Gerald Morgan, and Secretary to
the President Thomas Stephens.\textsuperscript{55}
Despite an apparent equality of treatment of these 14 senior staff the actual salaries paid to each varied. A strictly graded system was introduced to distinguish between the amounts that could be earned - even within this senior salary grade. A formula was instituted whereby not more than two were to be paid the top salary; not more than three to be paid at the next level down; not more than six at the level below that; and not more than three below that. This formula was tailor-made for an hierarchical organization of senior White House staff. That President Eisenhower adopted such a system says much about his attitude to his staff. Though he could have chosen to pay $22,500 to two top staff members, only one - The Assistant to the President - qualified in his view for that salary. The Deputy Assistant to the President was paid $21,000 The rest came lower down, graded like flour. Despite the fact that the minimum salary level for the senior WHO salary grade was increased, in 1960, to $17,500 p.a. this left the actual salaries of the senior Eisenhower staff unaffected.

The $17,500 p.a. was in fact reduced to $16,530 p.a. in 1961 when President Kennedy entered office, but this far from presaged a decline in the treatment of senior staff. On the contrary, Kennedy did what he could to equalize the position of his top 14 WHO staff, within the graded system laid down by his predecessor. Five were paid at $21,000 p.a., such as Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen, Press Secretary Pierre Salinger, and Special Assistants Kenny O’Donnell and McGeorge Bundy; while six were paid at the slightly lower level of $20,000 p.a., such as Deputy Special Counsel Myer Feldman, and Administrative Assistants Mike Manatos and Henry Hall Wilson. Kennedy was so concerned to minimize pay distinctions between his top staff that he changed the law "to increase the compensation of three assistants to the President from $17,500 to $18,500" p.a. This helped to make Associated Press Secretary Andrew Hatcher, and Assistant Special Counsel Lee White, for example, feel less discriminated against.
Meanwhile the minimum level for the senior WHO salary grade was raised in 1962 to $18,000 p.a.

While Kennedy strived for equality Johnson managed to realise it - at least on paper. The single most important act in respect of the equalization of top White House staff salaries came in 1964 with President Johnson's promotion of legislation to repeal the pay distinctions that had up till then existed among them. His sponsorship of this measure owed something to his regard for staff assistance. On 14th August, 1964, the old graded system was replaced by provision of a single salary rate for the 14 senior staff. They were still labelled "Special Positions". The minimum salary level was increased to $21,445 p.a. (later to $22,217 p.a. and $22,750 p.a. in 1965 and 1966 respectively), and the maximum level to $30,000 p.a., although the average salary actually paid to the top staff was $27,500 p.a. in 1965 and $29,700 in 1967.

It was a noteworthy feature of Johnson's attitude to his staff that he deliberately chose not to award the maximum salary to all of them. For two years, in 1965-1966, he maintained a slightly lower salary level for all but one member: Lawrence O'Brien. ("It is the consensus of his colleagues and myself that no public servant in Washington is more deserving", said Johnson. In 1965 those in the Special Assistant category received $28,500 p.a. On 16th January, 1965, at a News Conference, President Johnson briefly referred to staff salaries in the course of remarks he made about the turnover of staff in his White House. After singling out O'Brien, he elucidated his general approach: he did not believe in starting his staff at the highest permitted salary level. "I will feel at liberty", said Johnson, "and will no doubt do so as the weeks
move on, (to) promote some of these men to various salaries in keeping
with their experience, their duties, and their requirements." Much
better, in his own mind, to retain that small leeway with which to reward,
or punish, his staff as he felt necessary.

Johnson was also responsible for one other important change. On 23rd
December, 1967, the senior WHO salary grade underwent both a change in
its very nature and also another change of name. Created and placed
above the General Schedules were now established the Federal Executive
Salary Schedules. Henceforth these were to be tied to congressional
salary levels. They were themselves to be graded from Executive Level I
down to Executive Level V. Each Executive Level was to have a fixed salary
level. In 1967, for Johnson's top staff, this was fixed at $30,000 p.a.
(which represented only a slight increase over the previous average salary
for 1966). This was the salary enjoyed by such top Johnson staffers as
Special Assistants Jo Califano, Douglass Cater, Walt Rostow, James Jones,
Mike Manatos, and Harry McPherson. President Johnson, who as Majority
Leader in the Senate had known full well how much he relied upon congres-
sional administrative assistants, amply repaid his sense of debt by up-
grading both the status and security of salaries for the senior White House
staff.

President Nixon made no major alteration in the new system he inherited
from his predecessor. He continued the practice, for example, of having
the salary of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry
Kissinger, paid from WHO funds. Kissinger served as de facto director of
the National Security Council staff, while for the years 1969-70 his
deputy, Alexander Haig, was paid from the NSC salaries account. This
changed in 1971 with Haig's formal appointment to The White House Office
as the Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs. By contrast, the Assistant for Urban Affairs, Patrick Moynihan, and his deputy, were both paid from WHO funds right from the start in 1969. When John Ehrlichman replaced Moynihan in the autumn of 1969, and became Assistant for Domestic Affairs in 1970 with the additional operational job as Director of the newly-formed Domestic Council, both Ehrlichman and his six principal Deputy Assistants continued to be listed as WHO staff and paid as such. Ehrlichman himself, together with H.R. Haldeman, Kissinger, the Counsellors to the President, and certain others, enjoyed the Executive Level II salary.

Under President Nixon salaries were distinctly improved, although allowance for inflation was a factor to some extent. This improvement came in two stages. Firstly, the Executive Level II salary level was raised in 1970 to a substantial $42,500 p.a., a rise of over 40%; and secondly, the staff qualified for certain overtime pay increases, thus prompting one Senator to ask the light-hearted rhetorical question "Do you think the President is going to be able to get more overtime out of his staff than President Johnson did?"

In 1971 certain lower salary grades were raised, (leaving unaffected the most senior staff). But this, together with the increases in the numbers of staff at those lower grades, began to cause some concern. Indeed as early as 1969 the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury, Post Office, and Executive Office had drawn attention to the doubling of the number of middle-level staff requested at salary levels that were clearly "not in the secretarial level". The numbers of ungraded personnel, too, began to rise (although no information on the salaries paid was ever printed in the U.S. Budgets). This was a feature that attracted the attention of congressman Morris K. Udall in 1972, when
he undertook a study of the EOP, and many other members of Congress between 1974 and 1978 when White House authorization legislation was under discussion. (See Chapter VII.) In 1974, the Acting Comptroller General, Mr. R.F. Keller, estimated that "one quarter of the ungraded positions...are paid at rates in excess of $36,000 p.a." When one considers the number of ungraded staff employed in 1972-1974 (76, 96, and 94 respectively), and the projected total for 1975 (126), one can appreciate that large numbers of staff below the top level were earning considerable salaries.

This can perhaps best be judged by some comparisons made in 1975 between certain White House staff salaries and those of other government officials. Kenneth Lazarus, Associated Counsel to the President, was paid a salary of $38,000 p.a. which compared with the Level V salaries of only $36,000 p.a. paid to the Administrator of the Farmers Home Administration, the Commissioner of Fish and Wildlife at the Department of the Interior, and the Executive Director of the U.S. Civil Service Commission. Richard Cheney, the Deputy Assistant to the President, was paid $40,000 p.a., which was more than the Level IV appointments of members of the Federal Trade Commission, the Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, and the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, all of whom were paid $38,000 p.a. Similarly, Robert Goldwin, the Special Consultant to the President, and Gerald Warren, one of the Deputy Press Secretaries, both earned more (at $39,000 p.a. each) than the Under Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Chairman of the U.S. Tariff Commission, and members of the Civil Aeronautics Board (at $38,000 p.a. each).
The range of comparisons at the most senior staff level truly indicated the rarefied atmosphere in which their salaries were located. For example, the Assistant to the President for Public Liaison, William Baroody, hardly top of the staff pecking order, was nevertheless paid more than the Deputy Attorney General of the United States and the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, both of whom received the Level III salary of $40,000 p.a. Similarly, the Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, Max Friedersdorf, outearned the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission by the same margin.

Finally, the most senior of President Ford's White House staff, such as John Marsh and Robert Hartmann, Counsellors to the President, Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President, Philip Bunken, Counsel to the President, and Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President, were each paid at the Level II rate of $42,500 p.a. (raised later in 1975 to $44,600 p.a.). This was a salary equal to that of the most important sub-Cabinet posts of Under Secretary of State, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and other senior government jobs such as the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. In addition, this salary level was shared by every member of Congress.

Unlike most of the government positions here referred to, the precise nature of the pay scale for White House staff is not formally set by law. It is more tradition that has linked its top salary level to the pay of congressmen and senators, a linkage which was firmly entrenched by the establishment of the Executive Level grades in 1967. Early in the new Carter Presidency, therefore, when Congress approved itself a 29% pay raise to $57,500 p.a., Robert Lipschutz, Counsel to the President, presented a similar plan of salary rises for the White House staff to Jimmy Carter. By all accounts
the President "baulked at the generosity". \(75\) This was less for its effect on his very top staff - such as Assistant to the President Hamilton Jordan, Press Secretary Jody Powell, domestic affairs adviser Stuart Eisenstadt, or Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski - but what it meant for the middle-level White House staff.

Middle-level staff had received the benefit of a government-wide pay increase signed into law by President Ford on 1st October, 1976, which was estimated to add $632,000 to the salary bill for The White House Office in 1977.\(76\) The impact of further increases, especially for those staff below top level, not unnaturally brought some critical publicity. This was fuelled by two additional factors: firstly, the comparisons that were easily made between the jobs, and salaries, that the new Carter staff were now to enjoy as compared with the Ford staff of only a few months previously; and secondly, their age.

A few examples amply illustrate the point. In 1976 Richard Hutcheson had a job at the Democratic National Committee worth $6,000 p.a. In April, 1977, while still only 25 years old, he now earned $42,500 p.a. as Staff Secretary to President Carter in charge of managing the White House paper flow. Only a few years earlier dozens of men and women of enormous political experience (and twice his age), like Senate Budget Committee Chairman Edmund Muskie, and every other member of Congress, had earned the same. Another staff aide, Rex Granum, aged 26, had deserted a $14,000 p.a. reporter's job for the Carter presidential campaign in 1976, to be rewarded in 1977 with the title of Deputy Press Secretary and a salary of $48,500 p.a. to match. Yet another example was Elizabeth Rainwater, who at 30 was appointed to a Level V staff position as a deputy assistant for research under Hamilton Jordan at $42,500 p.a. Undeniably there are few
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routes to so large a salary at such young an age in any field.

It was the media spotlight falling on such staff members as these which sparked the comment about an abuse of taxpayers' money. The President himself was reportedly not immune from a similar feeling. "'Look, people are being overpaid', he said, running his finger down the list of staff salaries. 'What is this business?'" White House Counsel Lipschutz responded by trimming all salaries at all levels, except those for the very top Level II. In turn, Level II Carter staff voted themselves a voluntary cut of $1,500 to $56,000 p.a., allegedly to "set an example". This enabled Lipschutz to claim that the additional cost to The White House Office salary bill ($400,000 p.a.) actually represented a $166,000 p.a. "saving" since the full increases had not been granted. One news magazine reported that "after all the controversy over the latest raise, one aide predicts it will be another eight years before White House employees get another pay boost". But no-one needed to wait that long. In the FY 1982 Budget the Executive Level II salaries were raised to $60,662 p.a. Incoming senior WHO staff in the Reagan White House, like Counsellor Ed Meese, Chief of Staff James Baker, and his deputy Michael Deaver, all received this increased salary - four years ahead of schedule.

The Hierarchy of Staff Salary Levels

Turning now to an analysis of the principal trends in White House staff salaries over four decades there is a clear distinction between those Presidents who have enjoyed a large measure of discretionary control over the top staff salaries and those Presidents who have not. The Johnson Presidency stands as the turning point. Our analysis must be considered within this framework.
Of those Presidents enjoying such control all employed an hierarchical pattern of staff salaries to some degree. Appendix 4.14 clearly illustrates the point. Those White House staff paid at the top salary rate numbered between one and only five under Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy. After Johnson's reform the top fourteen were paid at an equal level. President Eisenhower undoubtedly differentiated his senior staff in the most obvious manner. In 1957, for example, one man - The Assistant to the President Sherman Adams - stood out as receiving the highest salary ($22,500 p.a.)81 while his deputy, Major General Wilton B. Persons, received the next highest ($21,750). Special Counsel Gerald D. Morgan, and two Secretaries to the President occupied the next level while six other staff members the next below that. The pattern of staff salaries resembled a pyramid, with the numbers of staff on each lower salary level increasing.

President Truman's apparently equal treatment of his top WHO staff (in 1947, the top nine were each paid $10,000 p.a.) is undermined by the fact that he rewarded two others with measurably higher salaries ($15,000 p.a. and $12,00 p.a.), paid for from a separate fund. Moreover, while by 1952 he equalised the position at the very top, having allowed both John Steelman and Clark Clifford to share the top salary level, he had by contrast differentiated the other senior WHO staff into two groups of three (at $18,000 p.a. and $15,000 p.a. respectively).

Within the restrictions laid down by Eisenhower (in 1957) of a formula for the grading of senior WHO salaries, President Kennedy sought the most equal treatment for his senior staff. Broadly speaking, as many as possible were paid the same salary, even if this meant - as it did - reducing the amount of top salary paid. Appendix 4.14 shows that five were paid at $21,000 p.a.;
the next six 'down' were paid $20,000 p.a. Thus eleven senior staff were accommodated on the top two salary rungs, by comparison with his predecessor's total of only two. Kennedy also successfully jacked up the salary level of the three staff at the next level down.

One trend links the presidencies from Roosevelt to Kennedy. This is borne out in Table 4.21. The gap between the top salary paid and that at the sixth salary level below the top consistently narrowed. Expressed as a percentage the 6th salary level as a proportion of the top salary level moved from 47% in 1947 (under Truman) to 58% in 1952 (also under Truman) to 71% in 1957 (under Eisenhower) and finally to 79% in 1962 (under Kennedy). This progressive narrowing of the most senior WHO salary bands suggests a trend towards equalization for the senior staff. It is one of the apparent paradoxes that this trend reversed itself after the Kennedy Presidency and in the wake of the Johnson reform of 1964 which guaranteed a future equality of treatment for the top 14 WHO staff. Evidence for the widening gap (between the top and the sixth salary level) were the percentage figures of 69% in 1967 (under Johnson) and 57% in 1972 (under Nixon). Salaries for the senior WHO staff (i.e. those on Executive Level II) thus went up faster than those of middle-level staff. Overall, the WHO seemed subject to less equal treatment. However, as Table 4.21 makes clear, the average WHO salary level (a figure which includes that for political and support staff combined) gradually increased during 1947-1977 as a proportion of the top salary level: from 18% in 1947 (under Truman) to 42% in 1977 (under Carter). Therefore, as a rough and ready guide, WHO staff as a whole could be said to have been better paid in 1977 than ever before.

More precise an analysis is rendered impossible by the non-publication of essential information but three points can usefully be emphasized. Firstly, the treatment by successive Presidents from Roosevelt to Kennedy of their
most senior (dozen or so) WHO staff was unequal (although Kennedy best minimized the inequality); but since the Johnson Presidency these top staff have been both equally treated and highly paid (in government terms). Secondly, the reverse appears to have been the case immediately below the senior level. The salary band separating the senior from the middle-level WHO staff, having progressively narrowed from Roosevelt to Kennedy, has since widened (although the average WHO salary level has steadily continued to increase as a proportion of the top salary level). Thirdly, WHO staff salaries undoubtedly provide useful additional evidence by which to judge a President's staff organization and structure.

The most important White House staff are certainly paid the most. Yet the inducement to serve on a President's senior staff has never been primarily financial. Service in the White House places them beyond the reach of 'normal' concerns over pay. In some cases persons have taken a considerable cut in salary by joining the staff: for example, Bryce Harlow in joining the Nixon staff in 1969, and re-joining it in 1973. To have been a member of the White House staff has undeniably (especially since Kennedy's day) added to one's earning potential upon leaving; even in the case of the 'Watergate' staff. As to the view that the staff are overpaid, few outsiders have ever begrudged the most senior staff their salaries. When it was announced in 1977 that staff salaries were being raised President Carter was asked to justify such increases at a News Conference on 12th May. "These men and women on my staff", said Jimmy Carter, "are not overpaid... Their increase in salary, I think, was one that was justified, and I don't have any apology to make for it. They work extraordinarily long hours, as do some of you, and I think the people of our country are getting a good return on their salary investment in my staff." This reply could well have been made by any President of any staff.
THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF: SUPPORT SERVICES

The salary costs of the White House staff do not by themselves account for the total overall cost of the staff. Over the years the amount appropriated for support services, for administrative and secretarial back-up, has increased to a significant level.* In 1939 they accounted for over one quarter of the White House Office budget. This proportion declined (to between one tenth and about two fifths) during the years between the Truman and Nixon presidencies. But by 1976, under Ford, it had risen sharply. Under Carter it rose again and by 1979 support services accounted for a full third of the total White House budget.

Table 4.22 gives Budget Authority figures for a selection of the more important support services that have been provided for the White House Office staff over the years: "Printing and Reproduction", "Equipment", "Supplies and Materials", and "Travel and Transportation". Figures are given for 1939, and for the last year in each succeeding Presidency. As Table 4.22 shows, expenditures on these categories have neither been steady in themselves nor in relation to one another. However, allowing for fairly large fluctuations from year to year, the broad trend has been upwards.

* Any assessment of support services for the White House staff based only on the resources of the White House Office must convey understated conclusions because this section does not include additional support services paid for from the Special Projects appropriation (detailed estimates for which disappeared from U.S. Budgets in the mid-1960s). The level of such support between 1956 and 1964 was much higher as a proportion of the total budget than that for the White House Office. While for the latter the figure ranged between one seventh and one fifth, Special Projects recorded an average figure of one half for the cost of support services as a percentage of staff salary costs. Thus the highest salary bill, $880,000 in 1962, was matched by the high figure of $480,000 in support services (and throughout the period this figure remained near $400,000). Under President Kennedy certain items grew markedly. The budget for "Travel and Transportation" (always over $100,000 except in 1956) reached $206,000 in 1962. The "Equipment" budget trebled between 1962 and 1963; the "Supplies and Materials" and "Communications" budgets both increased two-and-a-half times between 1961 and 1962. (See: USBA FY 1958 – 1966.)
### TABLE 4.22

**THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-1979**

Cost of WHO Support Services

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<th>TOTAL SUPPORT SERVICES&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>As a % of Total WHO Budget</th>
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<td>10</td>
<td>25 (25)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30 (30)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50 (40)</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53 (40)</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>64 (40)</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58 (36)</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>226 (56)</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>255 (100)</td>
<td>5,094</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>327 (100)</td>
<td>5,817</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> All figures in $000s.

<sup>b</sup> Figures given in brackets show the amount of each sum nominally allocated for the President's travel (see Chapter 1 note 106). From 1972 onwards figures include "Transportation of Things".

<sup>c</sup> Figures include several other categories of expenditure (not listed in this Table), including "Rent, Communications, and Utilities" (which underwent a 10-fold increase in 1975).

Sources: House Committee on Appropriations 1939-1946

United States Budgets 1947-1979

Budget allocations for equipment, as might be expected, have varied the most. At certain times, as in business offices everywhere, the West Wing has been refitted with up-to-date office equipment. In the 1970s, for example, more and more self-correctible IBM Selectric typewriters were introduced. Even so, the demand outstripped supply. Staff Secretary Jerry Jones explained to a House appropriations subcommittee in 1975 that "we have
a running battle going on in our place whether to use the executive-type typewriters or the Selectric-type typewriters... Everyone who comes to the White House wants a Selectric". He also admitted that "we are under great pressure to replace, but we just have too big an inventory to do wholesale replacing". As it was, the Ford White House would have to replace their collators and offset printing equipment.

As the 1980s got underway more and more computer equipment began to appear at the White House. For example, the congressional liaison office had a computerized file installed containing basic information about every representative and senator together with their voting records in current and past Congresses. Information on party affiliation, committee assignments, seniority, margin of victory in his/her last election, and ratings by various interest groups became available at the touch of a VDU button, saving the time of White House staff who would otherwise have compiled the information painstakingly by hand or in their heads.

The White House also arranged to be plugged in to two other Washington computerized information products: the LEGIS system, which tracks legislation and gives the full legislative background of a given proposal; and the Library of Congress SCORPIO system, which produces issue briefs on a multitude of specific topics. Such information quickly proved its worth to the domestic affairs White House staff. One other facet of the new computerized age was the "Congressional Correspondence Summary and Retrieval System" which logged incoming mail in a computer, printing out a daily summary of letters received, reporting on the status of the follow-up, and providing an analysis of congressional sentiment. The costs involved in procuring such equipment have been far from negligible. The budgetary allocation in 1979 for equipment was $484,000.
The cost of supplies and materials for the staff increased more steadily, although still subject to occasional fluctuation. There were noticeable percentage increases during the Eisenhower Presidency, the Nixon Presidency and even the Ford Presidency. This was not entirely coincidental. The effort made by those three Republican Presidents to ensure that they were properly briefed by their staff, a process that incurred much organized staff work and consequent paper flow, was reflected in the amount spent on supplies and materials for The White House Office.

But perhaps the true measure of the degree of paperwork is now better reflected in the "Printing and Reproduction" item in The White House Office budget. Table 4.22 records steady increases under Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower - roughly doubling from one to the next. The unmistakable increase in cost under Johnson was followed by a remarkable three-fold increase in the Nixon Presidency. In 1974 alone the Nixon WHO staff were responsible for $483,000 in reproduction costs. This fact amply corroborates a remark by one of Nixon's most politically astute WHO advisers, Bryce Harlow. In conversation with this writer Harlow related, apropos the relentlessly organized staff system presided over by Haldeman, that even the most "innocuous paper" that was submitted to the President ended up, by the time it had been circulated among the staff for comments to be made and appendices to be added, "weighing a pound by the time it was ready". The xerox corporations undoubtedly did well out of the Nixon Presidency, and the evidence is that they did even better out of both Ford and Carter. By 1979 the Carter WHO staff did nearly $650 thousand dollars worth of xeroxing and printing.
The item entitled "Travel and Transportation" has a curious history - and a no less curious application. Table 4.22 gives figures for the combined total of travel costs for the President and for his staff (with the figures for the President alone in brackets). From the Roosevelt Presidency until 1950 these were synonymous. After 1950 separate funds were appropriated for the President's travel and for other travel costs. From 1972 onwards a third item was separately budgeted for the travel and transportation of "things". Table 4.22 shows a clear division in scale between the costs of travel incurred during the presidencies of Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson on the one hand, and those of Nixon, Ford and Carter on the other. Throughout the 1970s the average annual travel cost for The White House office was running at over $250,000 - at least four times the level of a decade earlier.

The curious nature of this item derives from the fact that it is in no way supposed to cover the actual travel costs of the President. Its title is therefore completely misleading. The "travel" referred to has meant that undertaken by the White House staff. In a statement submitted for the record in 1974 to the House appropriations subcommittee the Nixon Administration said that all "travel" funds were used "primarily to pay expenses of the President's staff which accompany him on trips," adding that the staff "must always stay in close proximity to the President". However, this has by no means always been the case. Two years earlier, the equivalent Senate subcommittee had inquired about the costs of Henry Kissinger's travels as an Assistant to the President. "How are Mr. Kissinger's trips to China, Moscow, and Paris financed?" asked Senator Montoya. The Administration witness, Mr. Caspar Weinberger, did not in fact himself know. He ventured the opinion (which was not subsequently challenged) that the NSC, Defense Department, and State Department budgets were all contributors.
But he was sure the costs were not financed from WHO travel funds because their use was limited to travel "within the United States". 90

The increased level of travel costs in the 1970s did not pass unnoticed, nor without critical comment. The particular criticisms were that Presidents continually travelled in their capacity as Commander-in-Chief, thereby evading any restriction on travel expenses (i.e. for his accompanying staff), and that such trips seemed magically to increase during election periods. The subject provoked no little discussion in 1975, 91 and no little argument in 1976. 92

In the autumn of 1975, during the run-up to the primary season of early 1976, Counsel to the President Philip W. Buchen was obliged to respond to a request from the Federal Election Commission to comment on presidential travel to a special senatorial election in New Hampshire. 93 Buchen stated that the Ford White House would adopt a policy in future that, when the President was travelling on a trip which entailed "only political stops ... we will identify those individuals who could be considered to be present for a political purpose". 94 He cited some examples, whom, he said, would be paid for by "the appropriate political committee". 95 But the fact remained, as Buchen himself acknowledged, that "in most cases it is not possible to schedule the President's travel in a manner that will allow trips to be solely official or solely political". 96 In such cases the Department of Defense would calculate the "political" component of such a trip and charge it to the appropriate political committee. In regard to the White House staff he simply stated that "no precise dividing line now exists, nor is one likely to be drawn, which clearly indicates when such employees are performing official duties and when those duties are political." 97
The arguments would no doubt have re-surfaced in 1980 had President Carter not observed a self-denying (and, in the short term, beneficial) ordinance by not campaigning in person outside the White House during the primaries while the Iranian hostages remained captive.

The figures given in Table 4.22 for the total cost of WHO support services show that these totals dramatically increased under both Nixon and Ford. This, in turn, had a marked effect on the total WHO budget. Such increases wrongly give the impression that back-up services for the White House staff went through the roof during this time. The explanation for a large slice of the increases actually lay less in the roof space than in the floor space of the White House. Beginning in 1975 a new law came into force which instituted "standard level user charges" for government buildings and office space (including the White House offices), in place of the previous system where the GSA took care of such matters from its own funding. Essentially this was a non-political change in accounting procedures. In the words of OMB Director James Lynn in 1975, "the idea is that each budget of each organization will show, on a fair basis hopefully, what it costs for space". For the White House this meant that between 1974 and 1976 the amount charged for "Rent, Communications, and Utilities" leapt into prominence as by far the biggest single item in the total WHO support services budget, going up ten-fold from $400,000 to $4,300,000 p.a.

This increase has resulted in a decisive shift in the proportion of The White House Office budget devoted to support services. But to some extent this increased proportion already existed in previous years. We have here only examined WHO support services, but between 1956 and 1974 Special Projects provided additional back-up, and the NSC and Domestic Council budgets similarly contributed their share. Detailed breakdowns of the Special Projects budgetary totals were stopped in the middle 1960s, but on
average the proportion devoted to support services during 1956-1964 was about half its total annual cost. Moreover, the extent of detailing of staff to the White House during the 1960s (which in 1968 culminated in Johnson having more White House staff on detail than officially on the WHO payroll), also played its part in giving a false idea of the real cost of support services. Figures for the Johnson Presidency should on this account be treated with great circumspection.

Indirect Support for The White House

It would be naive to suppose that even these considerable costs incurred on White House staff support services truly account for the actual 'back-up' costs either of the staff or of the President. Both benefit from the daily presence of a level of indirect support and assistance whose precise extent and cost can never be measured. But it is huge. The expense of this indirect support is borne by cabinet departments and agencies; not least, by the Defense Department.

The Defense Department provides indirect support in four main areas. Firstly, it maintains the presidential retreat at Camp David in Maryland. In 1975 there were 150 Naval personnel assigned to this retreat and its annual budget exceeded $1.4m. Secondly, it provides the means of transportation for the President and his staff. Gone are the days when this included a presidential train. In the mid-1970s the White House was accorded five Boeing 707s (including the presidential plane Air Force One, later renamed "The Spirit of '76"), and eleven smaller executive jets and helicopters. The cost of operating such aircraft cannot be separated out from budget figures, but it is also fair to point out that they were at the disposal of cabinet officers and diplomatic personnel as well as the White House staff.
Thirdly, the Pentagon budget includes items for the comfort of the presidential yacht (until its disposal by President Carter\textsuperscript{103}); the cars and chauffeurs of the thirty White House limousines (which, contrary to initial expectation, were not all removed from service during the Carter years and were subsequently fully reinstated by President Reagan); and the celebrated White House Mess, which has long been famed as an exclusive luncheon venue.\textsuperscript{103} Fourthly, the White House Communications Agency provides the sophisticated array of communications equipment that services not only the Presidency but its national security appurtenances. Its cost is hidden but was believed in the mid-1970s to be running at over $35 million p.a.\textsuperscript{104}

The Treasury Department contributes indirect support for the Presidency by virtue of its traditional jurisdiction over the Secret Service and the offshoot Executive Protective Service.\textsuperscript{105} The National Park Service takes responsibility for the domestic upkeep of the White House as a building. Funds for the Executive Residence are presented to Congress by the Director of the National Capital Parks. In 1975 the budget was $1.8m, double the amount only nine years previously.\textsuperscript{106} This provides for the dozens of engineers, housemen, butlers, carpenters, plumbers, painters, maids, florists and cooks that service the White House. There were about seventy-five such people on average during the 1970s. The Parks Service also provides for the facilities at Camp Hoover for the use of White House aides. The General Services Administration has some $2m or $3m appropriated to furnish, remodel, and maintain the East and West wings of the White House.

The State Department foots the bill for most of the costs incurred in entertaining the accommodating visiting dignitaries. For example, it reimburses the White House from its own funds for the costs of State dinners and any accompanying entertainment. Similarly it helps to underwrite the
the costs of foreign travel by the President or his staff. Taken together, these various extra items better illustrate the scale of indirect support made available, of which the President and his staff are undoubted beneficiaries.

Finally there are the costs of running the White House as a building. These have traditionally been accorded a separate budgetary heading, whether the "Executive Mansion" or (as a result of de-imperializing the Nixon legacy) the "Executive Residence at the White House". The personnel employed by this appropriation have included the gardners, cooks, butlers, and general handypersons who maintain the White House and grounds. As was noted in Chapter I internal alterations to White House staff officers are so continual as almost to compare with painting the Firth of Forth bridge - it's never not being done. For many years there have been dozens of staff employed, at a budget that by 1980 had reached over $3 million.

What is the real significance of support services for the White House staff? In themselves they are of passing interest, but the sheer scale that they have now reached has brought one factor into prominent relief. The staff that serve a President, who provide him with political advice, information, day-to-day assistance of all kinds, and facilities better to manage the Presidency, do not exist in isolation. They are the beneficiaries of, and can themselves direct on behalf of the President, a formidable machine. This provides them with a level of sophisticated technological, administrative, and secretarial back-up that is unequalled anywhere in the world. No other elected political leader has such personal access to resources on the scale of those at the disposal of his White House staff. When the President chooses to entrust these resources to a Chief of Staff it is not difficult to see why that staff member is so universally accorded pre-eminent status
by Washington's extensive political community. Decades ago, the staff were merely a collection of individuals acting as the eyes and ears of the President. They have since been transformed into a body capable of taking comprehensive and sustained action on behalf of their President. Whether direct or indirect, support services for the White House staff provided the engine for such a transformation.

CONCLUSION

It is clear from this chapter that the growth of the White House staff has been broadly and steadily upwards throughout five decades. Across the board between 1939 and 1974 the numbers of staff dramatically increased, as did the variety of their job titles, their turnover, their collective cost, their individual salaries, and the range of support services at their disposal. Although there have been localised areas of faster (or lesser) growth within the overall pattern, the cumulative growth of the various entities that make up the inner White House staff has been truly impressive. From being merely a handful of 'eyes and ears' for the President they have grown to become his political life support machine.

The essential political message conveyed by this chapter is reflected in the fact that every President added to the growth of the White House staff in at least one major respect during this period. Despite the occasional (and, upon detailed examination, wholly misleading) impression to the contrary, this growth has been sponsored, encouraged, nurtured, and sustained by a succession of Presidents - whatever their political party or political views. The underlying theme of this chapter has been their shared responsibility - convincingly confirmed by the evidence - for the rise of a new American political institution. To what extent its development and organization has been determined by common factors or individual circumstances is a matter to which we now turn.