The Emperor Frederick II's Crusade

1215 - c. 1231

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Submitted to fulfil the requirements of the University of Keele for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 1987.
Abstract

The aim of this thesis is not simply to reassess Frederick II's crusade and the treaty in which it resulted, but to flesh and clothe an episode of crusading history which, in the shadow of more colourful campaigns, has often suffered neglect.

The first half of the thesis (chapters one to four) covers the period from the time of Frederick's assumption of the cross in 1215 to the despatch of Thomas of Acerra to the East in 1227, although in its investigation of the possibility that Frederick may have inherited the unfulfilled vow of crusade sworn by his father, Henry VI, chapter one necessarily defies these parameters. Chapter two considers the influence of the Fifth Crusade on Frederick's crusading plans; chapter three discusses the preoccupations which compelled the emperor to delay the fulfilment of his vow until 1228, and chapter four looks at the military and financial preparations which were set in motion during this period.

The second half of the thesis can reasonably be divided into two. Chapters five to seven deal primarily with the crusade proper - the activities of the crusaders prior to Frederick's arrival in Syria, the role of two leading English bishops in the crusade, Frederick's strained relations with the nobility in Cyprus and the Latin Kingdom, his presence in the Holy Land and conclusion of peace with the Egyptian sultan al-Kāmil. The eighth and final chapter takes a brief glimpse at the observance of Frederick's treaty in the immediate aftermath of the crusade and subsequent diplomatic contacts between the Hohenstaufen and Ayyūbid dynasties.
Acknowledgements

I should like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Peter Jackson, for his unfailing encouragement, advice, patience and persistence, and for the benefit of his superior knowledge. I must also thank Dr. Colin Richmond and Dr. Christopher Harrison of the History Department at Keele, and my friends Wayne, Richard, Paul, and Ellen for many lengthy and highly necessary pep-talks. I must also acknowledge the justified impatience of my mother and father, which I hope will now be satisfied, and the financial assistance of the British Academy whose parsimony is masked neatly by its cinematic title.

Keith R. Giles
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Abbreviations

AM    - Annales Monastici
AOL   - Archives de l'Orient latin
DNB   - Dictionary of National Biography
EHR   - English Historical Review
HDFS  - Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi
HPEC  - History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church
MGH   - Monumenta Germaniae Historica
MGHS  - Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores
PL    - Patrologiae cursus completus..series Latina
RHC   - Recueil des Historiens des croisades
RHGF  - Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France
RIS   - Rerum Italicarum Scriptores
ROL   - Revue de l'Orient latin
RRH   - Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani
RTDA  - Report and Transactions of the Devonshire Association
SRG   - Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum
Introduction

The Emperor Frederick II's crusade spanned the years 1227 to 1229 but, to be specific, could justifiably be said to have lasted a mere eight months - the length of time from September 1228 to the beginning of May 1229 which the emperor spent in the Holy Land. To study such a narrow period of history is, of course, to ignore the preparations and the repercussions of the expedition, the precedents and experiences on which it drew.

In writing this thesis I have sought to avoid the calendaric constraints of the crusade itself, but nevertheless have consciously attempted to limit the scope of the work to the period defined by Frederick's assumption of the cross in 1215 and his reconciliation with the pope in 1230/1. This aim is reflected in the terminal dates included in the title of the thesis. Even so, in order to set the expedition more fully in context, it was considered useful to examine the extent to which Frederick's father, Henry VI, played a role in his son's decision to go on crusade, and to investigate, if briefly, Frederick's relations with the Ayyubid dynasty and nobility of the Latin Kingdom post-1229. These are aspects which are dealt with in chapters one and eight respectively. The bulk of the thesis, as has already been implied, looks initially at the choice of destination for the crusade, its financial and military organisation, and the delays to which the expedition was subject. In addition there is discussion of the crusade itself, Frederick's relations with the nobles of Syria and Cyprus during his stay in the East, and the provisions of the peace settlement agreed with the sultan of Egypt.
The principal sources of primary literature used in this study were Huillard-Bréholles' monumental compilation *Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, which has usefully brought together documents, letters and chronicle excerpts, the *Scriptores* volumes of the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, the *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France*, and the Rolls Series. For the Muslim histories of the period I have been largely in the hands of nineteenth century French compilers and translators whose work is collected in the *Recueil des Historiens des croisades*. A few relevant Muslim authors such as Maqrīzī and Juvaini have been translated into English by modern scholars and these translations have been used where possible. Dr. Peter Jackson has also very kindly provided me with translations of certain passages from a number of published Muslim chronicles which would otherwise have been inaccessible.

Although heavy reliance has been placed on printed primary sources, a number of unpublished thirteenth century English manuscripts have been consulted (see bibliography), and again I must thank Dr. Jackson for translating sections from the unpublished manuscript of the contemporary Muslim author Ibn Abī 'l-Dam.

I should point out that in referring in the text to the continuations of William of Tyre I have retained the very serviceable terms *Eracles*, 'Ernoul', and 'Rothelin' in preference to the more correct terminology devised by Dr. Morgan¹.

A further discussion of the sources appears in chapter six, and a full list appears in the bibliography at the end of this volume.
Notes to introduction

Chapter One

The legacy of Henry VI's crusade

Twenty years separated the crusader vows of the Western Emperor Henry VI and his son Frederick II. When Henry died at Messina in September 1197, his vow remained unfulfilled; and it appears that to many a vow of crusade, once taken, was held in such seriousness that if it were not discharged in a crusader's lifetime, his heirs were considered to be obligated by it. Was Frederick's vow linked directly to his father's failure to depart for the East?

Certainly a degree of papal pressure was brought to bear on the sons of the nobility, in particular, whose fathers had taken the cross but had died before they were able to set out. The decretal collection Compilatio tertia, compiled on the authorisation of the pope by the notary Pietro Collivaccino around the year 1209, included the decretal Licet which stated that the obligation incurred by an outstanding vow of crusade might be transmitted to an heir of the person assuming the cross, and the heir's obligation could be enforced, if necessary, by sequestration of the inherited estate. Innocent III had already threatened to disinherit Andrew II of Hungary if he did not discharge the vow sworn by his father, Bela III; and there are other precedents to indicate that the vow which Henry VI's son, Frederick, enunciated at Aachen in 1215 was the action of an obligated heir. For instance, Louis VII was said to have taken the cross in 1145 out of a desire to fulfil the vow his brother had sworn before his inopportune death; and Henry III of England, only nine years old, but apparently already bound by the vow
of his father, appears to have assumed the cross at the time of his coronation in October 12165.

It seems clear, therefore, that the imperial crusade of 1227-29 had its origins in the vow of Henry VI and the ensuing German crusade. Or did it? Although the principle of heritability of votive obligations appears to have been incorporated in Justinian's Digest and is found in Roman inscriptions, at the time of Frederick II's oath of crusade the idea of the inherited vow was new to canon law6 and had not yet been taken to the ultimate refinement of Innocent IV who was to interpret the vow not as having been uttered as a personal promise to God, but as a firm commitment to aid the Holy Land, carrying with it an obligation which bound the heirs of the author by the Roman law of succession7. In the early thirteenth century the vow was still essentially personal, but as the decretal Licet shows, it was becoming possible in certain circumstances for an individual who could not fulfil a vow, to entrust the obligation to his heir8. The canonist Damasus Hungarus writing around 1215, also touched on the question of heritability of vows as described in the same decretal. He contended that if a dying father commanded his son to fulfil the father's pilgrimage vow as a condition of the inheritance of the father's estate, there were two alternatives: first, the vow of pilgrimage might be satisfied by personal performance of the pilgrimage; or, second, the vow might be satisfied by redemption of the obligation. In his opinion, the former might not be imposed as a condition of inheritance, whereas the latter could be9. In other words, in the first decades of the thirteenth century, the transmission of the vow was not considered to be automatic nor necessarily enforceable, and although clerical opinion was moving towards this, it would not be properly expressed until the
pontificate of Innocent IV\textsuperscript{10}. Which leaves us with the apparently inherited vows of Louis VII, Andrew II, Henry III and Frederick II. If it was not possible at this time automatically to inherit an unfulfilled vow of crusade, why then should these monarchs have been obligated?

Otto of Freising, our source for Louis VII’s decision to go on crusade, reports the king’s reasons as follows:

'\textit{Lodewicus dum occultum Hierusalem eundi desiderium haberet, eo quod frater suus Philippus eodem voto astrictus morte preventus fuerat, diutius proteclare nolens propositum, quibusdam ex principibus suis vocatis, quid in mente volveret, aperuit}'\textsuperscript{11}.

Otto implies that Louis VII did not consider himself to be personally obligated by his brother’s vow, but was, nevertheless, anxious that his brother’s failure to depart on crusade should not blot his memory. His vow was, therefore, a voluntary and not a compulsory act. But it seems strange that Louis should have waited fourteen years after Philip’s demise in 1131 before making known his intentions, and indeed recent research has suggested that Louis’s vow owed more to the king’s reconciliation with the papacy in 1144-5 than to any moral obligation imposed on him by his brother’s death. The argument runs as follows: in return for permitting the entry of the archbishop-elect of Bourges, Peter of La Châtre, into his see, which Louis had opposed in 1241, Celestine II lifted the interdict which his predecessor, Innocent II, had imposed. Probably Louis also agreed to an expiatory pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and in order to avoid any suggestion that he was admitting guilt, promoted his dead brother’s unfulfilled vow of crusade as the motivation for his own
 Whereas, therefore, Otto of Freising's commentary might be taken *per se* as proof that Louis's vow was voluntary, circumstantial and chronological evidence would also appear to indicate that in no sense was Louis obligated by his brother's oath.

As for Andrew II of Hungary, although his vow *had been* inherited from his father, and despite the considerable papal pressure brought to bear in order to compel the fulfilment of this vow, the demise of King Bela had not automatically occasioned the transfer of the votive obligation. Rather, in anticipation of his death, and in line with the canonical thought of the time, Bela had personally entrusted the discharge of his crusader's vow to his son—a task which Andrew had solemnly sworn to execute.
The explanation of Henry III's first crusade vow is a little more difficult: there is no evidence that King John had placed on Henry the obligation of fulfilling his vow, and yet as soon as he was crowned, Henry appears to have taken the cross. A.J. Forey, without referring to the heritability of the obligation, suggests that Henry may have been persuaded by the papal legate, Guala, that it was his duty to fulfil his father's oath\(^\text{14}\), and Honorius III, acknowledging Henry as _crucesignatus_, in January 1217 urged him to carry out John's pledge\(^\text{15}\). In April 1223, Honorius again appealed to Henry to assist the Holy Land,

\[
'\text{cum in thronum regni crucesignato successeris, decet, ut et in crucis obsequium te votivum exhibes successorem, quia si patris debita legitimus heres exolves, expedit non minus celesti quam terreno satisfieri creditori}'\(^\text{16}\).
\]

But even the papal exhortations are insufficient evidence to prove that Henry was automatically bound by his father's oath, and the rapidity of Henry's assumption of the cross merely points to this possibility. A recent study by Simon Lloyd argues that Henry III's decision to take the cross in October 1216 was solely a political expedient which bore no relation to any obligation imposed on him by John Lackland's vow, itself a political manoeuvre. He concludes by suggesting that Henry's infant cross might legitimately be interpreted as a natural continuation of the 'political' cross of his father\(^\text{17}\). But here the idea of heritability must stop: Henry expressed concern that his father had died without discharging his pledge to go on crusade\(^\text{18}\), but was never obligated by the vow. This interpretation is supported by the apparent ease with which Honorius in the early 1220s absolved Henry, admittedly _ad tempus_, from his
crusader vow\textsuperscript{19}. It could also be argued that had there been an automatic moral obligation on King John's heirs to fulfil the outstanding vow, then by the time Honorius wrote to Henry in 1223 the vow had already been discharged by the king's illegitimate brother, Oliver, who had died at Damietta during the Fifth Crusade\textsuperscript{20}. Consequently there would have been little need for Honorius to invoke the memory of King John.

The answer to our problem, therefore, is that none of the vows of Louis VII, Andrew II, or Henry III was the result of inherited obligation: all were sworn through choice, and only Andrew of Hungary's vow was passed directly from father to son. This in turn supports the conclusion that a vow could not at this time be inherited without the acquiescence of an heir, and demonstrates as inadmissible the assumption, based on these precedents, that Frederick II's vow had been inherited from his father. Frederick himself, in a letter to Pope Gregory IX dated 6 December 1227, in which he refers to his coronation at Aachen and his taking of the cross, does not mention his father's unfulfilled vow, preferring to explain his actions as an expression of gratitude for the divine favour shown him\textsuperscript{21}. Nor do the two main sources for Frederick's coronation - the Reineri Annales and the Chronica Regia Coloniensis - allude to the new king of the Romans' reasons for assuming the cross\textsuperscript{22}. Frederick's independence of action is clinched by, of all people, Gregory IX, whose letter to the archbishop of Canterbury in October 1227 said of the emperor,

\begin{quote}
'Nam sponte, non monitus, Sede apostolica ignorante, crucem suis humeris affixit..\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}
Even so there are those who consider that, whatever Frederick's underlying reasons for taking the vow of crusade, he was encouraged to do so by papal agents active at his court\textsuperscript{23a}.

But the weight of evidence indicates that Frederick II's decision to assume the cross was a voluntary act which antedated the concept of the posthumous transfer of votive obligations as formulated by Innocent IV. The vow which Henry VI had sworn at Bari in 1195 was not binding on his heir, and played no part in the imperial crusade of 1227-1229. And yet it is possible to argue that both vows were to some extent linked in that they were sworn in a climate of political strife. In the case of Henry VI, it was likely that by vowing to go on crusade his position amongst the German nobility would be strengthened, the dignity of the empire in Europe would be enhanced, relations between the empire and papacy would be improved, and the pacification of the newly acquired kingdom of Sicily would be facilitated: well-prepared and well-managed, the crusade would contribute to the solidification of the German empire\textsuperscript{24}. Frederick, too, probably envisaged his assumption of the cross, at least in part, as a stabilising factor in the re-establishment of Hohenstaufen rule in Germany\textsuperscript{25}; and, as we have seen, Henry III's contemporaneous vow has also been interpreted as a political act designed to unify his realm\textsuperscript{26}.

But political expediency is not equatable with inherited obligation, and similarities of circumstance do not constitute a continuation; in which case, is there any other evidence which might support the view that Frederick's crusade was the heir to the German crusade of 1197-8?
One possibility would be that both ventures could be classed as 'leaderless'. Obviously, this statement has to be qualified, in particular since Frederick did finally set out on crusade in 1228, whereas the German crusade of 1197-8 was never blessed with the presence of the emperor. Of course, in the case of Henry VI, this was due in part to Henry's premature death in 1197, but the very fact that he did not assume the cross in public\textsuperscript{27} could be viewed as an indication that Henry never intended to spearhead the expedition, being content to follow on at a later date. Certainly whilst postponing any announcement of his own personal leadership, he nevertheless promised Aimery de Lusignan's envoy, Ranier of Gibelet, that he would cross to Syria\textsuperscript{28}. Such a judgement may in fact be harsh - Henry had yet to pacify the recently conquered kingdom of Sicily, and the situation in Germany was not at all satisfactory - but the departure of the imperial army in March 1197, minus the emperor, does not appear to have drawn any papal criticism.

At the time of the Fifth Crusade Frederick II's attitude may, therefore, have been encouraged by his father's experiences. Hampered by the turbulent situation in Sicily, Frederick repeatedly postponed his own departure, and in his place despatched groups of crusaders under the leadership of Louis of Bavaria and Walter of Palear\textsuperscript{29}. It may have been that the emperor envisaged the combined strength of the duke of Bavaria, the chancellor of Sicily, and Matthew of Apulia (who had arrived at Damietta in July 1220\textsuperscript{30}) as sufficient to render his own presence unnecessary\textsuperscript{31}; and indeed, although from late 1218 Honorius had made frequent appeals for Frederick to fulfil his vow\textsuperscript{32}, by April/June 1220 he was urging that if Frederick found it impossible to cross, he should not detain the other crusaders\textsuperscript{33}. The presence of the emperor was still desired,
but it was not impossible to conceive of the crusade without his personal participation.

In the wake of the Christian defeat, the pope summoned together the emperor and the crusade leaders in a bid to ensure Frederick's active involvement in any future expedition. Even so, neither the agreement sworn between the emperor and the errant count of Celano in April 1223, nor the 1225 treaty of San Germano, took for granted the emperor's own departure. And yet, when Frederick failed to depart on crusade in 1227 Gregory IX condemned him for deserting 'pars residua bellatorum exposita maris periculis et fluctibus tempestatum, absque duce et praeceptore vel principe.'

So, although the idea of a 'leaderless' crusade appears common to the expeditions of both Henry VI and Frederick II, it is a hasty classification; the concept of such an expedition came close to being accepted, even encouraged, by Honorius during the Fifth Crusade, but it was not recognised by the papacy as a long-term solution, and was one which was never actively pursued by either emperor. Both intended to fulfil their vows of crusade, but both found themselves constricted by domestic upheaval. Frederick's delays during the period 1218-1221/7 were not a conscious emulation of his father's failure to depart with the imperial army in 1197.

But if the 'leaderless crusade' is not in keeping with the concept of continuity between the two crusades, one area in which continuity might be traced is that of imperial expansion. Historians have emphasised Henry VI's grand plan of Mediterranean domination. René Grousset saw a vast programme of Germanic expansion which...
including the absorption of the Latin Orient and the conquest of Byzantium, leading to the re-establishment (in favour of the Hohenstaufen) of a united 'Roman' empire\textsuperscript{40}. More recently, J.M. Hussey has asserted that Henry planned to conquer Constantinople and the Byzantine empire en route to Syria and Palestine\textsuperscript{41}, whilst G. Ostrogorsky contended that Henry aimed at world domination, the first step to which was the conquest of the Eastern empire\textsuperscript{42}. It comes as little surprise, therefore, to find Frederick II portrayed as espousing his father's schemes, and seizing at the chance to marry John of Brienne's daughter, Isabella (sometimes called Yolande), heiress to the throne of Jerusalem\textsuperscript{43}, as a means of realising 'at a stroke Henry VI's eastern ambition, that of subordinating or rather annexing the Latin East to the German Empire\textsuperscript{44}.

Traditionally the German empire and Norman Sicily identified Byzantium as the natural enemy, and the experiences of Frederick Barbarossa's campaign had revealed the weaknesses of the Eastern empire and had provided more than adequate reason for attack. But although Henry VI demanded the Byzantines 'return' the Balkan territory from Durazzo to Thessalonika which William II of Sicily had formerly conquered\textsuperscript{45}, he had no immediate pretensions to the Byzantine throne. The marriage of his brother, Philip of Swabia, to Irene, daughter of the deposed emperor, Isaac II Angelus, serves to support this view\textsuperscript{46}, and it seems clear that Henry never planned to divert his crusade against Constantinople. Allegations of this made by Nicetas Choniates and later Western chroniclers (writing under the influence of the successes of the Fourth Crusade) cannot be supported\textsuperscript{47}. For one thing unrest in Germany and Sicily made such a war of conquest impossible; and to Henry it was sufficient that he
could exert his influence and exact tribute. (It is perhaps significant that the annual tribute of 5000 pounds of gold which he demanded from the Emperor Alexius III in 1196 was the exact equivalent to the sum required to maintain in Syria the 1500 knights and 1500 sergeants he had pledged in 1195). Instead Byzantium constituted just one part of a more general imperial policy for the Eastern Mediterranean which sought to exercise some influence in affairs but which did not subordinate its various concerns to pretensions in any one area. These concerns included interests in Cyprus and Cilician Armenia, whose rulers were granted royal crowns by Henry VI at their own request.

Henry's plans for crusade, therefore, did not encompass the conquest of Constantinople, but relied heavily on Byzantine gold. Frederick maintained his father's interest in the eastern Mediterranean, but the Fourth Crusade and the creation of the Latin Empire precluded any financial support of the magnitude envisaged by Henry VI, and Frederick's own association with the Greeks only really began with the marriage of his illegitimate daughter, Constance, to the Nicaean emperor, John III Doukas Vatatzes, around 1244. Byzantium apart, Frederick took full advantage of Henry VI's policies to extend the influence of the German empire: imperial suzerainty was reasserted in Cyprus, and contacts with Armenia, in the 1230s at least, were friendly enough. As regards the kingdom of Jerusalem, Frederick followed his father's example and sent the imperial crusade of 1227-9 to the Holy Land (although initially it was by no means certain that this would be Frederick's ultimate destination). In October 1197 Beirut had been recovered by the Germans, and in 1228 Frederick initiated a protracted campaign
against John of Ibelin, the Old Lord of Beirut who, it was claimed, did not hold the city by right. Frederick's demands may have been based on the view that since Beirut had been taken by the German crusade of 1197-8 it should have remained, by right of conquest, a possession of the empire. More likely, however, is the explanation that by converting Beirut into a port, John of Ibelin had infringed royal prerogatives. Consequently the joint focus of attention on Beirut was coincidental and cannot be regarded as a common factor in the two expeditions.

Frederick II does appear to have become imbued with his father's theories of state and empire, but the course of events had rendered redundant any plans for Byzantium, and it is not clear to what extent their intentions for the kingdom of Jerusalem would have co-incided, had not Henry's early death cut short his crusade. But whilst the similarities of territorial aspirations may be difficult to detect, important parallels can be drawn between the political manipulation of the crusade by both Henry VI and Frederick II. Both emperors were concerned to secure the inheritance of the imperial crown for their sons. Henry harnessed the zeal of the German nobility for the crusade in an attempt to secure their approval for his plan to make the Western empire hereditary instead of elective. Using the crusade as bait he also tried to inveigle the pope into accepting this constitutional change. In the same way Frederick prevailed upon the princes of the empire to accept his son as king, and wrote to Honorius III making known his desire to have Henry crowned king of the Romans before he himself departed for the Holy Land. Neither was successful, and the empire remained elective.
To sum up: Frederick did not inherit his father's vow; he was obligated solely by the oath which he swore at Aachen in 1215 on the occasion of his coronation as king of the Romans and which was renewed at his imperial coronation in Rome in November 1220 and at Ferentino in 1223. Although both Frederick and Henry appear to have favoured leaderless crusades this was never their intention, but was purely the result of circumstances. In Eastern policy Frederick had no grand designs, but sought to take advantage of his marriage to Isabella, and at the same time reassert lapsed rights in Cyprus. Undoubtedly Frederick drew inspiration from Henry VI, as in his attempts to secure the succession of his son to the imperial title, but to view Frederick's crusade as a direct continuation of the German crusade of 1197-8 is to read too much into the few similarities which exist between the two expeditions.

Notes to Chapter One

1 M. Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy, 1244-1291 (Leiden, 1975), p105.
6 Brundage, p78n.40.
7 Villey, p126; Forey, 'Crusading Vows', p230. See also Purcell, p105.
8 Villey, p126; Forey, 'Crusading Vows', p229; and supra.

9 Brundage, pp86-7.

10 Villey, p126; Forey, 'Crusading Vows', pp229-30.

11 Otto of Freising, p54.

11a A. Grabois, 'The Crusade of King Louis VII: a Reconsideration', in Crusade and Settlement, ed. P. W. Edbury (Cardiff, 1985), pp95-8, according to whom Louis VII's personal pilgrimage to Jerusalem was conflated by the papacy into a general crusade.

12 PL, ccxiv. col. 8, ep. 10. See also Johannes Thwrocz, 'Chronica Hungarorum', Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum, ed. J. G. Schwandtner (Vienna, 1746-8; 3 vols), i.149. Andrew's brother, Imre, also seems to have taken the cross, see PL ccxiv. col. 1100, ep. 103; ccxv. cols. 13, 16, 340 (nos. 6, 8, 57); R. Röhricht, 'Die Kreuzzugsbewegung im Jahre 1217', Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, xvi (1876), 142; J. M. Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221 (Philadelphia, 1986), p127.


17 Simon Lloyd, 'Political Crusades' in England, c.1215-17 and c.1263-5', in Crusade and Settlement, pp113-20. This view is given articulate support by Cheney, Pope Innocent III, pp262-3. Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, p77, argues that although King John's assumption of the cross strengthened Innocent III's hand in peace negotiations with the English barons, as a direct vassal of the pope John already enjoyed considerable papal backing, the implication being that politically his vow was largely superfluous and was therefore probably a genuine act. On this see also H. Roscher, Papst Innocenz III und die Kreuzzüge (Göttingen, 1969), pp156-8.

18 To John of Brienne in the autumn of 1223 - Matthew Paris, Historia Anglorum, ed. F. Madden (London, 1866-9; Rolls Series; 3 vols), ii.259.

20 'Iacobi de Vitriaco Acconensis Episcopi Historia Hierosolimitana', in Gesta Dei per Francos, ed. J. Bongars (Hanover, 1611; 2 vols), i.1134, 'Oliuerius filius Regis Angliae. '; 'Historia Damiatina' in O. Hoogeweg, 'Die Schriften des kolner Domscholasters, späteren Bischofs von Paderborn und Kardinalbischofs von S. Sabina, Oliverus', Bibliothek des litterarischen Vereins in Stuttgart, ccii (1894), 188. No bastard could legally inherit property (see The treatise on the laws and customs of the realm of England commonly called Glanville, ed. G. D. G. Hall (London, 1965), p87), but it is debatable whether or not this restriction on inheritance applied to vows. Both Jacques de Vitry and Oliver of Paderborn refer to Oliver as son of the king of England [John], but neither mention his illegitimacy.

21 MGH Legum sectio IV Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum, ed. L. Weiland et al. (Hanover/Leipzig, 1893-1927; 7 vols), ii.150 (no. 116), and infra, chapter 3, p34.

22 'Reineri Annales', MGH S[criptores], xvi.673; 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii (Hanover, 1880), 236.


25 Infra - chapter 3, pp34-5.

26 Lloyd, pp113-20; and supra, p4.


30 'Historia Damiatina', p249.

31 Matthew of Apulia was said to have arrived at Damietta with 8 galleys (two of which were corsairs captured en route), and much military hardware ('Historia Damiatina', p249; cf. 'Eracles', p354, which suggests 8 galleys was the number setting sail from Italy). See also Lettres de Jacques de Vitry, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Leiden, 1960),
pp135-6 (ep.7), which is evidence that Matthew retained many knights at his own expense. Louis of Bavaria 'in loco imperatoris cum multo exercitu...advenerat', Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum ed. J.Stevenson (London, 1875; Rolls Series), p189. Henry of Malta and Walter of Palear brought 40 galleys - 'Historia Damiatina', p277; cf. History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church [HPEC], ed. and trans. O.H.E.Khs-Burmester et al., iv/1, tr. p78, which puts the figure at 45. The Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier, ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), pp443-4 suggests 100, whereas the Muslim anthologist Maqrizi, A History of the Ayyubid Sultans of Egypt, trans. R.J.C.Broadhurst (Boston, Mass., 1980), p186, mentions a more unlikely fleet of 1000 vessels.


33 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.83,84 (nos.117,118).

34 'Eracles', p355, and see also chapter 4, n.4. At Ferentino in March 1223 Frederick agreed to depart on crusade in June 1225.


36 MGH Const., ii.130 (no.102), point 6.

37 Flores Historiarum, ii.340.

38 For Henry VI see 'Eracles', p209, Arnold of Lübeck, MGHS, xxii.202, and supra, p7. For Frederick passim chapter 3. J. L. La Monte, Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100-1291 (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), p58, is of a similar opinion as regards Frederick.

39 See for example, S.Runciman, A History of the Crusades (Cambridge, 1951-4; 3 vols), iii.91. T.Toeche, Kaiser Heinrich VI (Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte; Leipzig, 1867), pp366-7, believed that Henry's aspirations ultimately included the resurrection of Roger II's dreams of the submission of the whole North African coast.


41 J.M.Hussey, 'Byzantium and the crusades, 1081-1204', in Wolff and Hazard (eds), The Later Crusades, p149.


43 Frederick's marriage to Isabella was agreed at Ferentino in March 1223 - see Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.152,156 (nos.225,227), and chapter 2, n.52.

45 Johnson, p118. For William's expedition, see H. Wieruszowski, 'The Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Crusades', in Wolff and Hazard (eds), The Later Crusades, pp36-7.

46 There were subsequent rumours that Isaac had accepted the pair as heirs to the Byzantine Empire ('Annales Marbacenses', SRG in usum scholarum, ix. 64; Johnson, p119). But establishment of a client king in Constantinople would be essentially long term: Irene was not a direct heir and her father had already been deposed as emperor. Her presence in hostile hands, however, was a threat to the Byzantine government, creating an excuse for Western intervention in Byzantine affairs, and providing a focus for those who opposed Alexius III. Philip would be more readily received as a vassal-king by virtue of his wife's rights, and the claims of their children would be even stronger - see C. M. Brand, Byzantium confronts the West, 1180-1204 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp190-1, also K. Hampe, Germany under the Salian and Hohenstaufen Emperors, trans. R. Bennett (Oxford, 1973), p229.

47 Brand, pp193-4, and W. Leonhardt, Der Kreuzzugsplan Kaiser Heinrichs VI (variously cited as Leipzig/Giessen, 1913/1923) [unavailable to me].

48 Hampe, p229; Brand, p193.

49 Brand, p193. The money was never actually delivered.


52 Infra chapter 5, pp115-21.


54 Passim chapter 2.

55 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii. 161; R. C. Smail, 'The international status of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1150-1192', in The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the period of the crusades, ed. P. M. Holt (Warminster, 1977), pp23-43; J. S. C. Riley-Smith, The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277 (London, 1973), p113. As a parallel, Frederick's attitude towards Toron, which he acquired by treaty with the Egyptian sultan, does not seem to suggest that he regarded this fief as his by right

Beirut was therefore forfeit - 'Le Livre au Roit', RHC Lois, i.616-7. See also and cf. J.Prawer, Crusader Institutions (Oxford, 1980), p434; J.S.C.Riley-Smith, 'Further thoughts on Baldwin II's etablissement on the confiscation of fiefs', in Crusade and Settlement, pp176-80; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp76-8.

At my viva Dr. Peter Edbury expressed the view that Frederick's claims to Beirut turned on John of Ibelin's title. On consideration of this view I have to admit that there is a good case in its favour. The 'Gestes des Chiprois', p678, quote Frederick as demanding that John 'me rendes la cité de Baruth; car vous ne l'avés ni tenes raisonnablement', to which John responds: 'Je ay et tien Baruth come mon droit fié; et madame la rayne Yzabeau, qui fu ma suer de par ma mere et fille dou roy Amaury, et droit heyr dou reyaume de Jerusalem, et son seignor le roy Amaury ensemblement o ly me dounerent Baruth en charge de la constable, quant la crestiente l'ot recovree toute abatue...'. In other words Frederick challenges John's title to Beirut, and John counters that it was a legal exchange (for the constableship) soon after the Christians took Beirut (in 1197).

John, however, was still constable in October 1200 (RRH, no.776) and Walter of Montbéliard appears with the title only in March 1206 (RRH, no.811). John first appears as 'of Beirut' in May 1206 (RRH, no.812). I.e. the exchange must have taken place some time between 1200 and 1206. In addition despite the text implying that John had received the fief c.1197 his comment that it was 'toute abatue' when it came into his possession would suggest a much later date. Only the walls of Beirut had been dismantled in 1197 (Roger of Howden, iv.28; Ibn al-Athir, RHC Hist. Or., ii.86), whereas the destruction to which John refers could have been caused by the earthquake of 1202 (Ernoul, pp337-8; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p208). This might narrow the period of the grant to 1202-1206. John himself claims he received Beirut from Aimery and Isabella i.e. before Aimery's death in 1205, but the 'Lignages', RHC Lois, ii.448 (cf. ibid., p458), states simply that Beirut was given to John by Isabella. 'Eracles', p305, indicates that John was given the bailliage after Aimery died but whilst Isabella was still alive. (It also implies John was already lord of Beirut when given the regency, but the MS variants omit his title). Could it be, therefore, that the exchange dates from the period after Aimery's death, but before that of Isabella in 1205/6? and was John, like Raymond of Tripoli (supra, n.55) intended to hold Beirut only while regent? In which case was John's claim that he was granted Beirut by Isabella and Aimery (c.1197) an attempt to dissociate Beirut from the regency and give legitimacy to his continued possession of the fief? There is no sure proof of this, but
it seems clear that for various reasons John was anxious to give a false impression of the circumstances of his acquisition of Beirut.

I am, nevertheless, at this stage inclined to prefer the theory presented here that Frederick based his claims to Beirut on its conversion to a port without due reference to the crown. Although John's speech is only reported (probably by Philip of Novara) and we should not take it as necessarily a reliable presentation of his arguments, it seems to me that John and his supporters would have been keen to stress the legality of his possession if only to shift the emphasis if his title was being challenged for any other reason, such as its development as a port. Moreover I would argue that Beirut was not exploited as a port until the 1220s: Wilbrand of Oldenburg visiting Beirut in 1212 described the superb defences and sumptuous palace which John had built, but did not mention the port (J.C.M.Laurent, Peregrinatores Medii Aevi Quattuor (2nd. ed., Leipzig, 1873), pp166-7), and John himself says that reconstruction was financed by his estates in Cyprus ('Gestes', p679 [as opposed to coming from port dues]). Also grants of privilege by John of Ibelin to the Italian communes only appear to have been made after the Christian defeat at Damietta at a time when it was known John of Brienne intended to absent himself from the kingdom or, indeed, after he had actually departed (RRH, nos. 950, 951, 957, 963, 965 - November 1221 to September 1223; John of Brienne's intentions were known in September 1221 and he arrived in Europe in November 1222 - infra chapter 4, p69). Consequently, although there are problems with John of Ibelin's explanation of how, when, and from whom he acquired Beirut, there is also a deal of evidence to support the view that Frederick claimed Beirut principally because of its unauthorised development as a port.

57 Prawer, Histoire, ii.120.

58 Brand, p191; Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp20-3, 113-6; T.C.Van Cleve, Markward of Anweiler and the Sicilian Regency (Princeton, 1937), pp55-61. See also Donovan, pp75-8. Henry VI's attempts to secure the hereditary succession may have been connected with his alleged offer of homage to the papacy - E.Jordan, 'Henri VI a-t-il offert à Celestin III de lui faire hommage pour l'empire?', in Mélanges d'histoire du moyen Âge offerts à M. Ferdinand Lot par ses amis et ses élèves (Paris, 1925), pp285-306, with particular reference to p288.
Chapter Two

The precedent of the Fifth Crusade

Egypt might well have been the jewel in the crown, the strong, wealthy heart of Islam, and the most important partner in the military alliance which encircled the crusader states in the East, but as far as we know Frederick had no say in the translation of the Fifth Crusade from Palestine to the Nile delta\(^1\). It was a decision made without his connivance, yet regardless of Frederick's own intentions and, in spite of the running attacks made by al-Mu'azzam, the ruler of Damascus, in Christian Syria, particularly during 1220\(^2\), it was always assumed from the time of Honorius's first entreaty to Frederick in 1218 that the emperor would employ his troops to assist the crusader army already before Damietta. Frederick himself does not appear to have disputed Egypt as the focus of the crusade: he despatched contingents of troops under Louis of Bavaria (who arrived \textit{locum tenens imperatoris}\(^3\)) and the chancellor of Sicily, Walter of Palear; he sanctioned the involvement of his Master Justiciar for Apulia and the Terra Laboris, Matthew of Apulia, and on a number of occasions sent messengers to announce his own impending arrival at Damietta\(^4\).

But with the benefit of hindsight we know that Frederick was never to arrive in Egypt in person, and when he did finally depart for the East in 1228, it was for Syria, and not for the lush lands of the Nile. This begs several questions: if Frederick intended to go to Egypt in 1218-1221 (regardless of whatever his intentions might have been in 1215 when he first pledged to go on crusade), what
factors made him switch his immediate destination to the Holy Land, and when exactly was this decision made? Dependent on this is what the crusaders in Egypt expected of their endeavours, and whether they saw their conquests as a permanent extension to the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem through which would be engineered the final collapse of Islam, or as a pawn to be sacrificed in return for the immediate restoration of the lost Christian lands in Syria? This is perhaps the most important aspect of the problem, and one which underlies the whole of the Christian dilemma throughout the century following Hattin. In short, just where did the crusaders see the future of their eastern kingdom?

Without doubt, despite the extreme demands which the return of Jerusalem, Galilee, and the Trans-Jordan would exert on the post-1187 kingdom, it seems clear that this was the ultimate goal of the crusaders. Nevertheless, how this was to be achieved proved the cause of major discord, exacerbated in September/October 1219 by al-Kämil's timely offer of the entire kingdom of Jerusalem, and the Holy City together with funds to restore its walls, providing the Christians would agree to withdraw. Kerak and Montreal were not included in the proposal, but the sultan offered annual tribute for them as long as the truce would last. At this stage the army had been in Egypt for sixteen months and had gained few successes: the collapse of Damietta seemed as distant as ever. According to Oliver of Paderborn, King John, the French, Count Ranulf of Chester, and the German nobles were all in favour of acceptance, but Pelagius, the patriarch of Jerusalem, the various bishops, the Templars, the Hospitallers, the Italians, and Oliver himself, rejected the approach. A letter despatched to Honorius by certain French barons within days of the capture of Damietta reported that the sultan's
offer of truce had been rejected as totally inadequate ostensibly because, 'Nos autem petebamus totum regnum Hierosolymitanum.'\textsuperscript{10}: without Kerak and Montreal, as Oliver recognised, it was possible to guarantee neither the security of the Holy City nor of the rest of the lands which would be restored to the kingdom under the terms of the truce\textsuperscript{11}. For which reason, many prudent men had advised that 'Damietta ought to be taken before everything.'\textsuperscript{12}.

Once the city of Damietta had fallen to the crusaders, essentially two possible alternatives for the restoration of the kingdom's pre-1187 frontiers presented themselves. In the first option it was possible that the Christians might seek a direct exchange of Damietta for those alienated lands previously offered by the sultan, al-Kāmil. This time, however, any deal would have to include the Transjordanian fortresses; Damietta was after all, it was generally recognised, a highly important city, and without it the Ayyūbid hold on Egypt itself would be threatened. If al-Kāmil had been ready to buy off the crusaders so generously before their breakthrough, how much more might he be willing to offer now that Damietta was in Christian hands?\textsuperscript{13} But the sudden successes appear, predictably, to have had a hardening effect on views in the Christian camp\textsuperscript{14}. The French nobles, dismissed by Oliver of Paderborn as partisans of King John in support of accepting the sultan's peace overtures in October, in a letter dated at Damietta on 12 November 1219\textsuperscript{15}, claimed to have opposed any exchange which did not include the whole of the former kingdom. Even King John seems to have modified his attitude\textsuperscript{16}. Regardless of whether or not al-Kāmil would ever have been in a position to surrender Kerak and Montreal, the idea of a simple exchange appeared no longer reasonable\textsuperscript{17} and was universally discounted, although it was of course destined to be
resurrected in the fatal month of August 1221. Then John of Brienne again urged that the army avail itself of the repeated offers made by the Egyptian sultan. Again his advice was rejected, possibly because Honorius had requested that all peace proposals be referred to him\textsuperscript{18}, but primarily because, so we are told, the emperor had forbidden any peace or treaty to be concluded with the Saracens\textsuperscript{19}. This charge was repeated by Gregory IX in 1227\textsuperscript{20}, but Frederick countered by his assertion that there was no conceivable way he would have forbidden such an exchange since the whole object of his labours had been to secure the liberation of the Holy Land\textsuperscript{21}. J.P.Donovan prefers to believe the papal version\textsuperscript{22}, but the charge seems puerile, and it becomes apparent that Gregory's repetition of the accusation was an attempt to justify the excommunication of the emperor by denigrating his role in the Fifth Crusade whilst at the same time exonerating the Church and its representative at Damietta, the legate Pelagius. Oliver's view that in consideration 'of the critical point of our necessity, we made an excellent bargain [in August 1221]'\textsuperscript{23}, does not compensate for the fact that prior to July/August 1221 the crusaders could probably have negotiated the return of many of their initial objectives.

The second option open to the crusaders after the fall of Damietta envisaged the retention of the Christian conquests to force an Egyptian collapse which in turn would precipitate the release of the lost lands in Syria. Damietta was after all 'la clef, l'ent\'er\'ee de la terre d'Egypte'\textsuperscript{24}, and the leaders of the crusade had already summarised the importance of taking the city, 'Quatenus extincto forte divitiarum hostilium universi rivuli exsiccentur'\textsuperscript{25}. The so-called Chronique d'Ernoul believed that through Damietta would be conquered all the land of Jerusalem and Egypt\textsuperscript{26}, and in a letter to
Honorius dated 11 November 1219 various nobles urged that if only sufficient crusaders arrived it would be possible to take Cairo, the remainder of Egypt and, as a consequence, Jerusalem. The bishop of Acre, Jacques de Vitry, took this one stage further and saw in the conquest of Egypt the liberation of the Christian Church in that country and ultimately the return of all the isolated eastern Christians to the unity of the Faith. The occupation of Damietta was therefore to be on a permanent basis: Pelagius joined the city and its appurtenances to the kingdom of Jerusalem for ever, the Great Mosque was converted into a church, and a tower in the city was allocated for the use of the archbishop of Damietta; coins were even struck bearing the inscription + I.OhES : REX : on the obverse, and on the reverse + DAMIATA, again indicating the long-term nature of the Christian occupation.

Up to this point opinion was united, but on the question of timescale it diverged to form two further independent alternatives - whether the crusaders should stand their ground, or whether they should launch an immediate offensive. John of Brienne preferred to await the arrival of the emperor before moving against the Muslims, and the History of the Patriarchs portrays him as declaring that the Egyptians planned

'to besiege us for a month or two or three, but they will not obtain any advantage over us...and we shall grow stronger, and our enemy will become less and will be weakened, and if we get possession of Egypt in twenty years, we shall have made haste.'
This interpretation was rejected by Pelagius who wanted to move against al-Kāmil without delay. The difference of opinion may have been the chief reason behind King John’s departure for the Holy Land in the spring of 1220, ostensibly to press his claim to the throne of Armenia, but if John sought to enforce a delay in hostilities until the arrival of the emperor, he was successful. Despite the legate’s exhortations, a conference of knights refused to advance in the absence of King John. With the arrival of the emperor’s lieutenant, Louis of Bavaria, in May 1221, however, the knights’ protestations that there was no leader capable of uniting the crusader army were no longer valid. Pelagius therefore sent urgent summons to King John in Acre to return to Egypt for the imminent expedition, and prepared to march out against the Muslims.

However one cares to look at the strange and complex tale of the Fifth Crusade it is clear that the primary objective was Jerusalem and the Holy Land. Whatever arguments there might have been over booty, leadership, or the means by which the lost lands were to be regained, the crusaders and the rest of Christendom, despite the occasional blurring of aims, never actually lost sight of this objective. In letters the emperor or pope might talk of aid for Damietta, but actions were always for the business of the Holy Land ('ad negotium terre Sanctae') or for the liberation of the Holy Land ('ad liberandam Terram Sanctam'). If, in the meantime, it was possible to secure Egypt as well, then so much the better.

Despite the unhappy outcome of the Fifth Crusade, up until 1223/4 (and perhaps later) imperial plans do not seem to have precluded a return to Damietta. The Chronica Regia Coloniensis for 1224 note that under the auspices of the emperor fifty ships of such
magnitude were being prepared that together they would be able to carry not only two thousand knights, their horses, and all relevant arms, but also ten thousand footsoldiers complete with weapons. Each single ship was so constructed as to form or include a kind of bridge so that the knights, should it prove necessary, armed and astride their horses, might leisurely and without injury exit by means of these bridges and advance into battle exactly as if they had been on land. 'And if this were to be the task, having erected sails, they [the ships] would be able to enter the river of Damietta, or any other river,' Of equal importance is the letter of the Patriarch Nicholas of Alexandria sent to Pope Honorius in the summer of 1223 concerning the sufferings of the Christians in Egypt, in which the patriarch proceeded to urge on Frederick's preparations for crusade and to outline the necessary plan of campaign in order to take possession of the country. The timeliness of this unsolicited communication (agreement had been reached the previous March for the marriage of Frederick to Isabella of Brienne, which might have been viewed as a distraction from the goal of Egypt) and the shadowy identification of the Patriarch Nicholas would tend to suggest that the letter is a forgery intended to influence the destination of Frederick's projected expedition. If this should prove to be the case it is nevertheless an important document, being representative of an Egyptian lobby undaunted by the Christian defeat at Damietta, yet fearful that the emperor might pursue a more direct line in the liberation of the Holy Land. The Egyptians themselves did not discount a renewed crusade against their ports. Certainly when Louis IX arrived at Damietta in 1249 he found it packed with supplies enough to withstand even the most demanding siege, and it seems reasonable to assume that similar precautions would have been taken during the years intervening between the Fifth and Imperial...
crusades. Hans Gottschalk postulates that the reasoning behind al-Kāmil's approaches towards Frederick was principally to avoid a disaster similar to Damietta. The Venetian prohibition of trade with Egypt from 1224, and papal agreement in 1223 that future conquests in the East should accrue to King John, could both be interpreted as indicating that the forthcoming crusade was likely to strike at the Egyptian littoral. More likely however was that the Venetian measure was simply to deprive the enemy of the means of resistance, in Syria or in Egypt, whilst the ruling on the distribution of conquests was the natural solution to problems presented during the Fifth Crusade and during the Third Crusade when the vagueness of the agreement between Philip Augustus and Richard the Lionheart to split the profits and conquests made by their expeditions had led to major disagreements.

The post-1221 destination of the crusade may or may not have been one imposed on Frederick from outside - official letters again talk of the 'liberation of the Holy Land', whilst a letter to Honorius from Queen Russudan of Georgia in 1224 is under the impression that Frederick had been ordered by the pope to cross to Syria in pursuance of the release of the Holy Land from its captivity - but the great conference at Ferentino in March 1223 at which it was proposed that Frederick marry the king of Jerusalem's daughter, Isabella, must have prompted a serious examination of the primary objectives of his crusading vow. When the wedding took place in November 1225 Frederick immediately took the title, king of Jerusalem, and it is certainly possible that his acquisition of the crown of the Baldwins influenced the destination of his crusade. Any strategic considerations which may have dictated an attack on Egypt were finally overcome in 1226/7 by the arrival in Sicily of
al-Kāmil's emissary Fakhr al-Dīn who was authorised to offer the emperor the Holy City and 'some of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's conquests' in return for his presence in Syria⁵⁴.

The orientation of Frederick's thoughts towards the Latin Kingdom rather than Egypt is interesting. I have already discussed Gregory IX's charge that in 1221 Frederick was opposed to any simple exchange of Damietta for Jerusalem. It would appear, however, that Frederick had no undue attachment to Damietta despite his displeasure at its loss⁵⁵. Considered in isolation the Chronica Regia Coloniensis and the letter of the Patriarch Nicholas would indicate that despite the adverse effect which the collapse of the Christian offensive in Egypt must have had on established preconceptions, Damietta remained the prime motivating objective despite the traditional attraction of Jerusalem and the Holy Land itself⁵⁶. Indeed, Heyd points out that the fleeting Christian occupation of Damietta served as a demonstration that it was not impossible to occupy an Egyptian city and encouraged the belief that a vigorous attack could put the whole of the Egyptian coast in Christian hands⁵⁷. But in actual fact I would suggest that throughout the period 1217-1229 the ultimate objective which lay behind the crusading movement was the liberation of Jerusalem and the lost lands of its kingdom. Although the decision to invest Damietta was not made in consultation with the emperor, he was willing to support the expedition with arms and men, and with his own presence, had circumstances permitted. Nevertheless despite the possibility that the objectives of the imperial crusade might be achieved by way of Egypt, the various preoccupations and opportunities - problems with the Saracens in Sicily, the first tentative approaches concerning Frederick's marriage to Isabella, the
diplomatic contacts with al-Kāmil, all combined to convince Frederick that his crusade should be directed towards Syria. Such a destination would not only bring the kingdom of Jerusalem within the bounds of imperial policy⁵⁸, extending the imperial conception way beyond that of Charlemagne, but would also, by agreement with al-Kāmil, virtually guarantee the return of the Holy City to Christian control, and with minimal effort.

Palestine as the primary destination of Frederick's crusade was probably therefore under consideration at least as early as 1223 when the marriage to Isabella was first mooted, and certainly before 1225 when the marriage was celebrated. Any surviving lobby in favour of a first strike at Egypt was thwarted ultimately by the Egyptian sultan; by falling in with al-Kāmil's proposals Frederick would not only be able to fulfil his longstanding vow of crusade, but the campaign was likely to be both swift and successful, thus parting him from his European possessions for a minimal amount of time, a highly necessary requirement if he was to combat the aspirations of German princes, Sicilian nobles, and papacy alike. Jerusalem, and not Damietta, would therefore be the primary goal of the imperial crusade.

Notes to Chapter Two

1 Egypt as the objective of a crusade was mooted by the papacy at least as early as the Fourth Crusade (v. infra, chapter 4, n.1), and
by Richard I of England at the time of the Third Crusade (J. Gillingham, *Richard the Lionheart* (London, 1978), p194 and note). It may have been agreed at the Lateran Council in 1215 that this should be the ultimate destination of the Fifth Crusade: Donovan, p36 and n. 54 summarises the debate (but cf. ibid., p44), and see Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, pp137-8.

2 Röhricht, *Studien*, p49 (ep. 10), dated at Acre 20 September 1220, and p50 (ep. 11), dated at Acre 1 October 1220. The first letter appears in Roger of Wendover's, *Flores Historiarum*, ii. 260-2 under the year 1221. See also Donovan, p71, and 'Historia Damiatina', pp254-6.


4 'Historia Damiatina', p248; *Lettres de Jacques de Vitry*, p150 (ep. 7); *MGH Const.*, ii. 150 (no. 116). Louis of Bavaria also carried with him unspecified imperial letters, see *Chronicon Anglicanum*, p189.

5 See *MGH Const.*, ii. 150-1 (no. 116), where Frederick claims that by sending Louis of Bavaria, amongst others, to Damietta, he did not fail the Holy Land. See also Röhricht, *Studien*, pp46-7 (ep. 6).

6 See Donovan, p63.

7 'Historia Damiatina', p222; letter of Hermann von Salza in *Chronica de Mailros*, ed. J. Stevenson (Bannatyne Club; Edinburgh, 1835), p137; *Lettres de Jacques de Vitry*, p124 (ep. 6); and see also MaqrTzT, p184.

8 'Historia Damiatina', p223. Oliver comments caustically that this group would actually have settled for much less, already having been in favour of inferior proposals presumably put forward in September 1219 - ibid., p218. See also 'Eracles', p342.

9 'Historia Damiatina', pp223-4; *Eracles*, p342; *Flores Historiarum*, ii. 248 notes 'Legatus autem, concupiscentia retinendae civitatis ductus, et per eum patriarcha... huic compositioni se opponunt...'.

10 Röhricht, *Studien*, p46 (ep. 7), dated 12 November 1219. Perhaps Oliver was too general in his alignments, or perhaps the course of intervening events compelled the French to deny their previous support. Cf. Donovan, p63, following Oliver, and see MaqrTzT, p184.

11 'Historia Damiatina', pp222-3, and Oliver's *Epistola regi Babilonis* (September 1221) in Hoogeweg, *Schriften*, p305: 'pro Daminta reddere volebas eam totam, preter Montem regalem et Craccum cum suis pertinentiis et appenditiis. Nosti, Montem regalem potiore esse partem regni et provinciam nobilissimam ac metropolim ditiorem allis ad regnum Jerusalem pertinentibus, sine qua cum Cracco diu retineri non potest civitas sancta'.

12 'Historia Damiatina', p224, 'Legatus autem cum... multisque aliis prudentibus viris efficaciter se opposuit huic tractatu rationabiliter ostendens, ante omnia Damiatam fore capiendum'.

- 28 -
13 According to HPEC, iv/1. tr. p78, the Muslims "would have given Jerusalem, and the Littoral, and another fief [territory] in exchange for Damietta. ", but this is a mistranslation of the Arabic text p37:15f, and should read that these were territories which the Muslims had offered already. I am grateful to Dr. Jackson for pointing this out.

14 Ernoul, p435.

15 Röhricht, Studien, p47 (ep. 7) and supra, p19.

16 HPEC, iv/1. tr. pp69-80, and infra, p22.

17 According to the 'Burchardi et Cuonradi Urspergensium Chronicon: Continuatio Cuonradi praepositi Urspergensis', MGHS xxiii.380, the crusader army took Damietta 'ut eam possiderent in recompensationem civitatis Hierosolimitanae et Terrae Sanctae', but it is unclear from this whether the original intention of the crusade was to extend the frontiers of the kingdom of Jerusalem by exchanging Damietta for the lands lost in 1187, or by the permanent occupation of the Egyptian city. Likewise, see the letter of the French nobles in Röhricht, Studien, pp46-7 (ep. 7): 'Cum pro liberatione Terre Sancte et ampliatione regni Hierosolimitam crucisignatorum exercitum regnum Babilonie audivissem ad civitatem Damiate obsedisse, ad ejusdem Terre intendentes liberationem festinavimus illuc ire. '

18 'Historia Damiatina', p269; Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.112,123 (nos.159,176), and see Donovan, pp67-8, pp81-3,88-9.

19 'Historia Damiatina', p269.

20 Flores Historiarum, ii.340, letter of Gregory IX to the archbishop of Canterbury: 'Quam [Terra Sancta] olim, ut asseritur, recuperasset Christianus exercitus per concambium Damiatae nisi semel eis et iterum imperialibus fuisset litteris interdictum'.

21 MGH Const., ii.151 (no. 116). R. Röhricht, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge (Berlin, 1874-8; 2 vols in 1), i.66n.122 notes Frederick's response to the charges.

22 Donovan, p95. Nevertheless Frederick was said to have been very displeased at the conclusion of the peace (Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.341) and his fury led Walter of Palear to flee to Venice, whilst Henry of Malta was temporarily imprisoned and stripped of his lands - see D. Abulafia, 'Henry Count of Malta and his Mediterranean activities: 1203-1230', Medieval Malta: Studies on Malta before the Knights, ed. A. T. Luttrell (London, 1975), pp121-2. Perhaps anticipating the emperor's reaction Henry and Walter were themselves said to have been unhappy with the terms of the truce (letter of Peter de Montaigu in Flores Historiarum, ii.265).

23 'Historia Damiatina', p276: 'nos secundum articulum necessitatis communitationem optimum fecisse'.

25 Röhricht, Studien, pp39-40 summarises the letter to be found in Acta Imperii Selecta, ed. J.F. Böhmer (Innsbruck, 1870), ii.642-3 (no.934).

26 'Ernoul', p435, adding that Frederick had taken the cross and would be bringing a great multinational army. 'Et [que] se l'empereres estoit là, atout sen pooir, et li croisiet qui estoient encore à venir à l'aieue et al commencement qu'il avoient de Damiete, bien poroient, à l'aieue de Diu, ravoir toute le tiere d'Egypte et le tiere de Jherusalem, et qu'il le feroient savoir à l'apostle'. The Muslims themselves feared that Egypt and Syria were on the point of collapse - see Ibn al-AthTr, RHC Historiens Orientaux (Paris, 1872-1906; 5 vols), ii/1.120,163.

27 Röhricht, Studien, pp45-6 (ep.6). The writers also sought the presence of the emperor as a matter of urgency.

28 Lettres de Jacques de Vitry, p102 (ep.4).

29 'Historia Damiatina', p239; Lettres de Jacques de Vitry, p128 (ep.6). See also Iohannes de Tulbia, 'De domino Iohanne rege Ierusalem', Quinti Belli Sacri Scriptores Minores, p139 ('consiliati sunt et [John of Brienne] dare civitatem usque ad adventum passagij imperatoris et iussum Romae et libertatem Christianorum'), and Johannes de Columpna, 'Mare Istoriarum', MGHS, xxiv.281 ('legatus Romanae Ecclesiae dictam urbem Iohanni Ierosolimitano regi contulit'), but cf. 'Gesta Obsidionis Damiete', Quinti Belli Sacri Scriptores Minores, p115, 'Rex enim petebat dominationem civitatis et dominus legatus volebat, quod omnes Christiani haberent libertatem ibi, et exinde orut est discordia'. In 1223 John of Brienne obtained papal agreement that all future territorial acquisitions should appertain to him as king (Ernoul, p449; 'Eracles', p364, var. c), cf. Runciman, iii.174, who believed that all lands conquered would be given to the kingdom of Jerusalem.


31 G. Schlumberger, Numismatique de l'Orient latin (Société de l'Orient latin, Paris, 1878; rpr. Graz, 1954), p93 and pl.III.31; cf. Donovan, p66n.147. Prawer, Histoire, ii.161n.62 reads the legend as + : IOHES : RE + - + DAMIATA , adding that the coin was of almost pure silver, hence proving the existence of treasure at Damietta, cf. Richard, Latin Kingdom, p224, who states the coins were of a poorish silver alloy. For confirmation of treasure in the city see 'Historia Damiatina', pp227,239; 'Annales Januenses. Marchisii Scribae Annales', MGHS, xviii.143 (letter of the legate Pelagius dated 12 November 1219); Chronica de Mailros, p136 (letter of Hermann von Salza) which claims a large part of the money found was subsequently stolen.

32 HPEC, iv/1. tr. p79.

33 HPEC, iv/1. tr. p80. This could be said to indicate a lack of faith in Frederick II's protestations of personal assistance, but
might equally be interpreted as an extremely pragmatic approach: the strength of Damietta if it were to stand alone is emphasised by the History of the Patriarchs, iv/1. tr. p76, and the fact that despite the negotiated truce in August 1221 Peter de Montaigu considered the city defensible, had there been sufficient money and men - Flores Historiarum, ii.265; 'Historia Damiatina', p277; and cf. 'Ex Chronico Turonensi', RHGF, xviii.302, which notes that lack of food, the approach of winter, and the added danger of losing Acre made retention of the city unfeasible.

34 'Historia Damiatina', p248; HPEC, iv/1. tr. p80.

35 'Historia Damiatina', p248, specifies 'vertente anno, quando solent reges ad bella procedere..', a biblical phrase indicating spring i.e. March - April (Donovan, p69n.1). 'Eracles', p349, would suggest a date for John's departure c. 29 March 1220. On this see also G.F.Hill, A History of Cyprus (Cambridge, 1948-52; 4 vols), i.187 and note.

36 Ernoul, p427; cf. 'Historia Damiatina', pp248 ('multa causas pretendens'). According to Robert d'Auxerre, 'Chronicon', RHGF, xviii.290, 'Orta est dissensio pro eo quod legatus universi exercitus dominium usurpabat..et ob hoc rex a Damietta ad tempus discessit'.

37 'Historia Damiatina', pp248-9. Pelagius's exhortations were apparently encouraged by Matthew of Apulia's support for an offensive which itself ignored the disembarkation of imperial envoys c. July 1220 who announced the emperor's imminent arrival, ibid., p249.

38 Ernoul, pp441-3; 'Ex Chronico Turonensi', RHGF, xviii.301; Donovan, pp84-5. According to the HPEC, iv/1. tr. p81, had not John of Brienne fallen in with the legate's wishes the Franks 'would have destroyed him'. Frederick later claimed to have forbidden any advance before the arrival of the imperial fleet (MGH Const., ii.151 (no.116)). Regardless of this the 'Historia Damiatina', p257, notes that the duke of Bavaria was in favour of an advance (although as Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, p185, points out, merely against the sultan's camp), but the Chronicon Anglicanum, p189, records that the army set out only after having waited in vain five weeks for the promised ships.

39 MGH Const., ii.151 (no.116); Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.75, (no.106), dated 1 October 1219 - Honorius III complains that Frederick was proving lukewarm in the business of the Holy Land, and urged him to assist the Christian army; see also, for example, ibid., pp79,88,113,123,124 (nos.112,124,164,177,178).

40 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii.253, 'et si opus fuerit, erectis velis intrare possint flumen Damiate vel aliud aliquid flumen'. On these ships, see also Acta Imperii Inedita Saeculi XIII, ed. E.Winkelmann (Innsbruck, 1880-5; 2 vols), i.238 (no.261). Röhricht, Beiträge, i.60n.67 is wrong to say that the ships were ready in 1224 - see Frederick's letter in MGH Const., ii.152 (no.116).

41 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.162-3, (no.233). The patriarch of the Coptic Christians at Alexandria was Cyril III Ibn Laqlaq (1216-1243), and L. de Mas Latrie, 'Les patriarches latins d’Alexandrie', Revue de l'Orient latin [ROL], iv (1896), 1, identifies a certain Athanasius of Clermont as the Latin patriarch in 1219. Nicholas may have been
the Greek patriarch, see J.M. Neale, A History of the Holy Eastern Church (London, 1847-50; AMS repr. 1976, 5 vols), iv.278-80,293-4; Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, p27, and infra n.42. Cf. also Richard, Latin Kingdom, pp226,230,260. Röhrich, Beiträge, i.60n.67, suggests that the construction and design of the ships were perhaps a direct response to the patriarch’s letter.

42 Papal correspondence with the patriarch apparently dates from at least 1209 (PL, ccxvi. col.23, ep.12) and possibly as early as 1201 (Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, ed. A.Pothisast (Berlin, 1874; 2 vols), no.1430). Neale, iv.297, gives the date of the patriarch’s death as c.1230, but the HPEC, iv/2. 282 (and n.4) would imply a date of 1243. With the exception of this 1223 letter, however, the patriarch is not named (see PL, ccxvi. cols.506-7,507-8,509,828-30 (epp.146,147,158,32)); the name appears in the rubric of letters dated 1201 and 1209 (referred to above) but is supplied by the editors and is not included in the text. It cannot be said with any certainty therefore that this was the same patriarch who wrote to the pope in 1209, nor can the authenticity of this letter be confirmed.

43 Infra, p26.


45 During the occupation of the city by the Franks great improvements were made to the fortifications to the subsequent benefit of the Muslims - Maqrizî, p186; Ibn al-Athîr, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 125.


47 Supra, n.29.


49 Smail, 'The international status of the Latin Kingdom', pp35-7; Prawer, Histoire, ii.172 and supra, n.29.

50 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.137 (no.196); supra, n.39.

51 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.179 (no.251); see also ibid. i.180,181 (nos.255-7). On the Georgians and their promises of crusade see 'Historia Damiatina', pp232-3.

52 'Breve Chronicon de Rebus Siculis', in Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi [HDFS], ed. J.L.A.Huillard-Breholles (Paris, 1852-61; 6 vols in 12), i/2. 896; Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.343. On the initiative for this marriage see Donovan, p107 and n.52. The fact that Hermann von Salza was already in Europe soon after the collapse of the Fifth Crusade ('Eracles', p353) and that Frederick appears to have sent messengers to King John concerning the marriage in anticipation of John's departure for the West ('Gestes des Chiprois', p667) would suggest that Hermann was in fact the principal promoter of the match, although the possibility of Balian of Sidon's involvement, who was also in Italy in October 1221 ('Cronica Fratris Salimbene de Adam Ordinis Minorum', MGHS,
xxxii.34), not be discounted.

53 HDFS, i.1. 526; 'Eracles', p358. T.C.Van Cleve, 'The Crusade of Frederick II', in Wolff and Hazard (eds), The Later Crusades, p444, is perhaps following the 'Breve Chronicon, p897 (for Frederick's coronation as king of Jerusalem in 1225) when he notes that after Frederick's crowning Jerusalem became the immediate goal of the crusade. On the validity of Frederick's action see also chapter 4, pp81-2 and n.86, and chapter 5, pp106-7, and n.52.

54 MagrṬzṬ, p198; Abu 'l-Fidā, RHC Hist. Or., i.102, the ultimate source for both these references being Ibn Wāsil, Mufarrij al-kurūb fī akhbār banī Ayyūb, ed H.Rabie, G.Shayyāl, et al. (Cairo, 1953-in progress), iv.206-7. It has been suggested that Frederick may have been in touch with the Ayyūbids as early as 1217/18, perhaps with the restoration of Jerusalem in mind; see M.Amari, Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia (Florence, 1854-72; rpr. Rome, 1933-9; 3 vols), iii.647-8, and Röhrich, Beiträge, i.56n.25. N.Barbour, 'The Emperor Frederick II, King of Jerusalem and Sicily, and his relations with the Muslims', in Orientalia Hispanica sive studia F.M.Pareja octogenario dicata, ed. J.M.Barral (Leiden, 1974), p84, says 1215. The evidence is, however, somewhat tenuous.

55 Supra, n.22.


57 Heyd, i.405-6.

58 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp160,167.
Chapter Three

Frederick's preoccupations in advance of the imperial crusade

Frederick II's assumption of the cross at his coronation as king of the Romans on 25 July 1215 was, so we are encouraged to believe, a spontaneous and totally unanticipated act of devotion. In 1227 on the very eve of his departure on crusade, Frederick was to write

'...considering devoutly how we might repay God for the many gifts conferred upon us, as soon as we received the crown at Aachen, we took the cross, though this was not an equal payment to him, offering ourselves and our power not just in sacrifice but in the Holocaust to God, with pure and sincere spirit, that we might work for the recovery of the Holy Land with the efforts we had vowed and owed'\(^1\).

It was, according to one recent biographical work, 'a brilliant diplomatic stroke', simultaneously an expression of a 'deep sense of gratitude for the many blessings bestowed upon him by divine favour'\(^2\).

The political motivation of the act is incontrovertible, but the innate turbulence of western Europe as a whole was too great to be pacified by a single oath of crusade. Indeed, thirteen years were to elapse between Frederick's initial announcement of his intention to reclaim the Holy Land\(^3\) for Christendom and his actual departure from the shores of Italy, giving rise to much speculation in some quarters
that Frederick's vow had been purely and simply political, and that the perennial postponement of his expedition was clear proof that he had never seriously intended to undertake a crusade in any form whatsoever. Such criticism, however, failed to take account of the circumstances in which the young Frederick found himself - an insecure monarch of a semi-Christian island kingdom and the invited head of an 'anti-imperialist' faction in Germany. To say then that Frederick was making promises from a position of stability and power is totally misleading. The kingdom which he ruled, and the empire to which he aspired, were far from tranquil and presented innumerable problems which had to be surmounted before Frederick could even consider the fulfilment of his pledge. As a consequence it was impossible for Frederick not to force certain delays in his departure. That these delays totalled thirteen years is entirely circumstantial.

After Frederick's election as king of the Romans in 1212 his policies centred essentially on the kingdom of Sicily, Germany and the bridge between the two - northern and central Italy. Later he would be concerned with imperial rights and prerogatives in the kingdoms of Cyprus, Armenia and, more latterly, Jerusalem. But, before Frederick could exercise imperial authority in Europe or exert his influence in the eastern Mediterranean, he had first to pursue two basic objectives - the restoration of order, and the restoration of royal rights, in his European dominions. In this he was motivated by the lost rights of his ancestors, as he saw them. Frederick's hasty departure for Germany in 1212, against the better judgement of a number of his advisers and of his consort, Constance, suspended what little royal progress had been made against the semi-anarchic tendencies in the kingdom of Sicily in favour of an eight-year
absence in, and preoccupation with, Germany. This was not to say that Frederick ignored his maternal inheritance, but the simple fact of his presence elsewhere encouraged baronial presumption.

As for Germany, the death of Frederick's father, the Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI, had instigated a long period of struggle between the papal candidate Otto of Brunswick, elected emperor on 9 June 1198, and Henry's brother, Philip of Swabia, who had initially hoped to act on his infant nephew's behalf. The convenient death of Philip in 1208 was sufficiently belated to render the 'boy from Apulia' forgotten and leave Otto more or less unchallenged as emperor. Such a situation however, was evidently too much of a temptation for the Welf emperor who, secure in his office, rode roughshod over the accrued rights and privileges of the German nobility. His arrogant manner and injudicious acts alienated a good many of his former adherents. His increasingly apparent intention of depriving Frederick of the Sicilian crown, and his open defiance of promises made to the pope concerning the sanctity of the papal state, in particular the grant of privileges in the March of Ancona, the Duchy of Spoleto, and the 'Mathildine lands', prompted Innocent to withdraw his support from the discredited Otto and to incite the German princes to revolt against the legitimately elected sovereign. Otto's excommunication, and that of his supporters, first published 18 November 1210, was widely publicised on 31 March 1211 following the failure of negotiations.

As a result the Germany which Frederick was to encounter in 1212 was one racked by civil war, and the methods which he employed in Germany (essentially the concession of privilege to the firmly entrenched princes) during the 'initiation period' of 1212-1215 were
aimed to pacify the country and to secure and extend that support which already existed. The declaration at his coronation of Frederick's willingness to depart on crusade can be interpreted as a simple extension of this policy. Certainly it was patently obvious that Frederick's early departure on crusade was a sheer impossibility, and recognised as such by both Innocent and Honorius. In the first instance, despite waning opposition, and the decreasing amount of land under Welf control, Frederick's absence in the Holy Land was inconceivable as long as Otto IV remained alive to serve as a focal point for the rebel princes. Continued defiance was also made feasible by financial support for Otto from his uncle King John of England, who, irrespective of familial ties, no doubt viewed the conflict in Germany as beneficial to his own cause in France, since any unrest amongst the German princelings could not be dismissed by Philip Augustus as totally inconsequential. And although the crushing French victory at the battle of Bouvines (27 July 1214) had utterly shattered Otto's prestige, it had by no means removed him as an effective ally and opponent. This is emphasised by the fact that despite the continued depletion of Otto's territory and support throughout 1216 and 1217 (until in 1217 he had the support of the Margrave of Brandenburg alone) in July 1216, when Frederick summoned his wife Constance and son Henry to Germany, it was considered safer that each should travel by separate routes. Ironically it was impossible to strike a decisive blow against Otto and his supporters since the crusade of 1217 had deprived Frederick of much military support. Only with Otto's revolting, and apparently needless, death on 13 May 1218 was the chief difficulty in the path of Frederick's departure removed. Even this did not immediately release Frederick from his problems in Germany as unrest in many areas, often the result of trifling local disputes, was capable of developing into
widespread confusion, and so common that it proved a major temptation to the enemies of the Hohenstaufen and a major obstacle to the maintenance of central authority. Other threats to order were serious ecclesiastical quarrels in Regensburg, and a conflict between the king of Bohemia and the bishop of Prague, which threatened to upset relations between Frederick II and the pope. Border disputes between France and Germany, together with the longstanding feud between the counts William of Holland and Louis of Loos, and the death of Berthold V of Zähringen, rector of Burgundy, without a direct heir, were major preoccupations.

Germany was a huge conglomerate of disparate views and opinions, the total placation of which, it goes without saying, was both impractical and unfeasible. Frederick’s policy, however, as a means of facilitating the restoration of order and the consolidation of his support, was to surrender the rights of the feudal lord in return for sovereign rights; this was to result in increased sovereign authority by which royal officials (advocatus, Schultheiss, or Burggraf) could be instituted who exercised authority not as feudal vassals, but as direct agents of the king. Since this policy integrally involved an ever-increasing principality for Frederick himself (who was primarily regarded as a territorial prince amongst numerous other territorial princes) Frederick’s policy included not merely the concession of privilege and grants, but the sanction of existing privilege and the conferring of jurisdictional rights.

The various problems and political machinations in Germany occupied Frederick from 1212 to 1220 when he returned to Italy, and to Rome in particular, for his imperial coronation on 22 November 1220, before moving on to the kingdom of Sicily. Sicily had suffered
particularly badly during Frederick's absence in Germany. One reason
for this was that the long years of Frederick's minority had already
ensured a weakening of royal authority, which was inevitably to
continue during the precipitate departure of the king in 1212,
exposing the kingdom as it did to the depredations of a host of
self-seeking enemies determined to seize every opportunity which
these conditions might provide. The loss and usurpation of royal
rights and authority which characterised the whole period of
Frederick's minority was stemmed only momentarily by the king's
majority. Some semblance of continued royal authority was obtained,
despite his absenteeism, until 1216, but on Constance's departure for
Germany the kingdom was once again at the mercy of its
self-interested lords.

One major problem which faced Frederick was the fact that
despite the undisputed legitimacy of his claim to the Sicilian crown
his views concerning the status of the kingdom were in dramatic
conflict with those of the pope. Innocent III had considered the
rightful place of Sicily as a feudal principality subject to the
suzerain authority of the Holy See, and during the papal regency for
Frederick II the kingdom had been administered 'not as the
disinterested guardianship of a sovereign state, but as a
protectorate over Church property whilst awaiting an opportunity for
its restoration to papal control'. It was predictable, therefore,
that Frederick's all-encompassing policy of retrieving lost and
alienated rights would, sooner or later, bring pope and emperor into
direct conflict. Eight years of absence had obliterated any advances
which the crown had made against its 'competitors' in the kingdom,
and the restoration of order there was to prove a three year
struggle. Frederick's immediate tasks were to regain the dissipated
crown lands and to seize all castles and fortifications essential to royal interests, as a precursor to the subjugation of the powerful feudal barons whose undisguised independence threatened the unity and orderly government of the kingdom. Orderly administration also demanded the suppression of the Saracen community on the island of Sicily which had been in continuous revolt since the death of the Emperor Henry VI, aided and abetted by their fellow Muslims in North Africa. In addition the powerful commercial cities of northern Italy which had entrenched themselves in the Sicilian coastal areas, including her vital seaports, had to be combatted and their privileges cut back.

But whereas in Germany Frederick had sought to restore the power of the crown by yielding feudal rights as a means of securing sovereign rights from the firmly entrenched princes, in Sicily similar groups were restricted and forced into a subservient position under royal power. Again, however, the implemented policies encompassed quintessentially the aims of securing authority and 'restoring' royal rights, in particular those which Frederick believed to have been held by the Norman kings until the death of William II (1189), together with the recovery of all dues, rents, services and prerogatives adjudged to have been usurped from the crown during the period 1189-1209. It was in order to facilitate the restoration of the fabric of Norman government that new laws were promulgated at the Capuan assises in mid-December 1220. As J.M.Powell points out, this legislation was designed to restore the traditional framework of government, not initiate new administrative practice and, indeed, in many instances what was once custom now became written law with Frederick enjoining his subjects to observe strictly all good usages and customs current in the time of King
William. In effect Frederick was employing the indigenous resources of the kingdom to achieve his own ends, appealing to the ever-present conception of a 'Golden Age' in order to avoid the need to resort to military might. In line with this all privileges granted by Henry VI, Constance, and Frederick II himself prior to the Diet of Capua were to be submitted for inspection and verification, ostensibly to ward against unauthorised grants of privilege during the troubled period following William's death. By this method Frederick recovered much crown property, whilst other privileges were granted post curiam Capuae, although sometimes with clauses of reservation - salvo mandato et ordinatione nostra - thereby subordinating a grant's duration to a new examination of the pretensions of the holder. Such a qualification had particular significance since it meant that Frederick need not deal with the violaters of royal rights as a group, but could negotiate with them individually. Despite the obvious advantages for the crown, such a policy of fragmenting the opposition into individual dealings was inevitably long-term, if effective. In comparison, in order that the royal domain might be 'entire and complete', feudal estates were required to be surrendered pending a redistribution, the weaker barons being employed against the more powerful in the event of resistance. As a result Frederick achieved control of all the major fortifications, castles and cities within a few months of his return to Sicily. From now on the grant of Sicilian fiefs became based exclusively on services to the state, with the crown as supreme overlord. Other measures were taken to ensure the maintenance of peace, the honest administration of justice, and the implementation of a system of taxation; again all directed towards the re-establishment of the central administration and the prerogatives of the king.
Virtually of equal importance to the subjugation of the feudal group was Frederick’s recovery of the Sicilian cities from the powerful maritime communes of northern Italy. Foremost amongst the culprits was Genoa whose former privileges in the kingdom were revoked, a factory at Palermo seized, and those representatives who had overreached themselves deprived of office\textsuperscript{19}. As for Pisa, although in April 1219 Frederick had promised full freedom of trade in his kingdom, mentioning specifically Messina and Palermo as trading centres open to them, the phraseology of the privilege proffered to her in November 1221 read ‘throughout the whole empire’, with no mention of the Sicilian kingdom. To Venice and all other cities Frederick applied the formula which underlay his entire policy of rehabilitation i.e. a return to the norms and standards prevailing under his Norman predecessors. In general no favouritism was shown to any of the northern commercial communes, and the restrictive measures taken against them now made it possible to open the way for the future prosperity of the Sicilian cities through mercantile activities. In this way Frederick’s commercial policy could be classed as ‘enlightened’, depriving the communes of political influence whilst encouraging them to continue their maritime trade. But native merchants do not seem to have been rewarded with any advantage over their better organised competition, and the immediate effect of Frederick’s economic policies, although achieving their initial aim of securing adequate revenue for the crown\textsuperscript{20}, was injurious to the domestic agrarian economy and to Sicilian commercial interests\textsuperscript{21}. These restrictions did, however, facilitate the re-introduction of the old Norman official, Admiral of the Kingdom, an authorised ‘pirate-in-chief’ empowered to confiscate property of foreign communes resident in the kingdom who offended against its laws and persons, and who, in the person of Henry of Malta, built up
a royal navy which greatly surpassed that of its Norman predecessor. It is remarkable (as Van Cleve points out) that within a month of his arrival in the kingdom Frederick was able to despatch forty ships with reinforcements for the Holy Land\textsuperscript{22}.

The Capuan assises and Frederick's presence in the kingdom of Sicily were of prime importance to the establishment of peace and order on the Sicilian mainland, and the restoration of royal power there was to all intents and purposes achieved by mid 1221\textsuperscript{23}. This did not mean, however, that the crown had re-asserted an unassailable position; the towns, which had wrung from Tancred privileges to the point of semi-independence from royal authority and which Frederick had wooed during his protracted absence in Germany as a means of preventing the nobility from becoming all-powerful, were at last subordinated to the crown\textsuperscript{24}, but in spite of the measures taken against the Italian communes, Sicilian merchants held no advantage, and were compelled to trade on an equal, if not weaker, footing than the north Italian powers\textsuperscript{25}. The Sicilian nobility had been dislodged from their position of superiority but had been treated with extreme lenience - of the chief offenders Ranier, count of Sartiano, was compelled to surrender the landed estates held by his family in Sicily\textsuperscript{26}; Diepold of Acerra and count of Spoleto, the former henchman of Otto IV, was permitted to live out an exile with the Teutonic Knights in Germany, if only after his brother had surrendered the castles of Cajazzo and Alife in the valley of the Volterno\textsuperscript{27}. Only Thomas of Celano, count of Molise, was treated with any contrasting severity, being besieged in Celano for three months before a pardon was arranged for himself and his adherents in return for the surrender of the tower and castle of Celano, plus the strongholds of Orindole and San Potito. In addition Thomas was
obliged to depart on the next passage for the Holy Land where he was to remain for a period of three years, unless recalled by the emperor. The agreement did not, however, prevent the king’s justiciar, Henry of Morra, from expelling the citizens of Celano and destroying their city, with the exception of the church of St. John.28 As a consequence of the limited retribution which Frederick pursued the nobility remained powerful, as did the Church.

The Church was a potential rival to the monarchy in the kingdom of Sicily and the authority of the papacy had been greatly increased during Innocent III’s regency for the young Frederick (1198-1209). But whilst Frederick’s basic aim was to restore the prerogatives and authority of the crown, his attitude was motivated by practical considerations, not anti-ecclesiastical or anti-religious bias; on the other hand he was not swayed by religious sentiment. He apparently intended to apply the law of privileges equally against ecclesiastical and lay holders of privilege, but was prevented from doing so mainly because he needed the support of the Church, perhaps even the active assistance of bishops and abbots within the kingdom. From 1223 to 1239 Frederick was extremely generous in the distribution of privileges, and was on good terms with most of the bishops, retaining the support of the churchmen even during Gregory IX’s invasion of the kingdom in 1229. But this was only after the failure of the initially strict policy of attempting to impose the salvo mandato clause (1220-1223), when Frederick wished above all to restore relations between the monarchy and ecclesiastical holders of privileges to the situation as it had existed prior to the death of William II.29 Although, therefore, the Capuan assises appeared to have achieved the goal of restoring the position of the crown in Sicilian politics to that which it had held in 1189, all the evidence
points to the fact that all the turbulence of the previous years might just as easily be rekindled should the immediate and prolonged absence of the emperor on crusade prove unavoidable. Indeed there is evidence to suggest that the consolidation of authority which Frederick sought to achieve in his kingdom was seriously hampered by the preoccupation with a crusading expedition and by constant prodding from the Church and curia. What is more, although Powell considers that by 1224 the aims of the Capuan laws were fulfilled permitting Frederick to turn to the reorganisation of the Regnum Italicum and the recurring problem of the crusade, the island of Sicily remained far from pacified, an irritating and potentially dangerous distraction.

As has already been noted, the Saracens on the island had been in continual revolt since the death of Henry VI and had played an active part during the civil war by their provision of support for the German faction headed by Markward von Anweiler. By the time of Frederick’s return in 1221, the Muslims controlled much of the mountainous interior of Sicily including a number of important strongholds. It was not uncommon for Christians to be driven out, their lands seized and reapportioned amongst the Saracens. In 1221 the Muslim rebels were estimated at between twenty-five and thirty thousand. Documents dated 1220-1221 restoring to the archbishop of Monreale land seized by the rebels, and regranting rights to the church of Monreale previously enjoyed under William II, Henry VI and Constance, were a strong indication of Frederick’s intentions. In May 1222 he moved against the Muslim commander, Ibn-’Abbād of the Banū ’Abs at Giato. After a two month siege the emir was captured along with his Christian allies, William Porcus and Hughes de Fer, and executed. The rebellion, however, continued, and subsequent
expeditions of 1222-4 succeeded only in driving the rebels further into the mountains. An attempt was made in the autumn of 1223 to cut the Saracen routes of communication and aid with North Africa by the sacking of Jerba, but the rebellion continued well into 1225, and new taxes had to be levied 1224-5 in order to finance the continuation of the struggle before the Muslims could be compelled to surrender piecemeal.

Frederick’s solution was to undertake the forcible exile of some sixteen thousand Saracens (mainly able-bodied men and their families) to a military colony at Lucera, a few miles north of Foggia. Here they were permitted the maximum of freedom, with a degree of autonomy under their own officials, in return for the payment of a special tax (jizyah). Two other smaller Muslim colonies were organised on the Italian mainland at Girofalco and Nocera. Despite the effectiveness and enlightened nature of the move, and its importance for the progress of Frederick’s crusade, it was viewed with suspicion by the pope and curia, and the existence of the Saracen enclave was condemned by Gregory IX on more than one occasion, to whom it appeared the blatant fostering of the Islamic religion and its adherents. For its time it was indeed a drastic solution but one of the last steps necessary to overcome the chaotic conditions of the previous thirty years. At long last both Germany and the kingdom of Sicily were in as peaceful a condition as Frederick could possibly ever hope to achieve. Now he could turn his attention to northern and central Italy.

In Italy Frederick sought essentially two things: first, the establishment of peace between the perennially warring cities, and second, the formal recognition by each of them of his imperial
sovereignty. In general unrest in Italy during the period 1212-18 had been kept in check to some degree by Frederick’s agents Aldobrando of Este (d.1215) and Bishop Ludolf of Worms (d.1217). The implications of Frederick’s concept of the imperium for the communal independence of the northern Italian cities, however, threatened to upset not only the communes but also the pope. For this reason he was careful not to display any aggressive intentions to the Lombard communes or to the Duchy of Spoleto and March of Ancona during his passage from Germany to Sicily in 1220, and throughout the five years he spent engaged in the reorganisation of the kingdom. The Duchy of Ancona was of particular advantage to Frederick as a corridor between Sicily and the imperial possessions in northern Italy. His first move was to summon a diet for Easter 1226 at Cremona, traditionally loyal to the emperor and chief of the Lombard cities hostile to the Milanese group. The choice obviously aroused suspicions and in March 1226 the Lombard League was reconstituted. Van Cleve puts forward three reasons why this might have been: first, a consciousness of guilt in encroaching upon the imperial regions of Italy, second a marked growth in the sovereign pretensions during the preceding decades of imperial weakness, and third an awareness of the success of the Capuan legislation in Sicily. Frederick ordered the vassals of the kingdom to accompany him into Lombardy, and Spoleto and Ancona were apparently mobilised. This was an encroachment on the Papal State, and the pope’s remonstrations compelled the emperor to yield. Apparent from this episode is the fact that, despite his promises, Frederick did not regard the separation of central Italy from the empire as irrevocable, and this is exactly what Honorius feared. A letter of Frederick’s stated that he wished to reform the political status of the empire, and there is no reason to assume otherwise since indeed the next logical step would be to
establish imperial dominance in northern and central Italy as a natural bridge between Sicily and Germany.

Van Cleve claims that during his eight years in Germany, Frederick must have perceived that 'the goal of universal empire was to be attained only if first the Roman Church and the Lombard cities could be integrated within the fabric of the Empire in such a manner that temporal sovereignty would rest solely in the hands of the Emperor'. It was a partial aim of the Diet of Cremona to restore imperial rights, and inevitably the members of the Lombard League feared their subjugation comparable to that already achieved in Sicily. But the independence of the communes was already too far advanced to be effectively checked by the resources available to a thirteenth-century emperor. The League successfully blocked King Henry's march south to join his father in Lombardy, and after several months of virtual inactivity Henry returned to Germany and Frederick to Sicily.

As a result of the stalemate in Italy Frederick sought to reach agreement with the Lombard League, and in August 1226 a conciliatory letter was despatched to Honorius, agreeing in the interests of the crusade to submit the conflict between the Lombards and himself to the arbitration of the pope and his cardinals. Agreement was reached with surprising speed and guided by this accord the pope formulated his judgement which he submitted to the emperor and cities of the League on 5 January 1227. Amongst the stipulations of the agreement was one that the communes were to levy and maintain at their own expense 400 mounted troops for the use of the emperor in the Holy land for a period of not less than two years. Frederick formally accepted the judgement on 1 February 1227, but the Lombards
delayed, submitting their acceptance only on 26 March 1227 - a week after Honorius's death. The implementation of Frederick's policies in Italy had not yet been successful, but at least the accord with the Lombards, superficial as it was, yet apparently guaranteed by the pope, provided for an uneasy peace in Italy, the final prerequisite for Frederick's departure on crusade.

This then was the backdrop to the emperor's longrunning concern with and preparation for the crusade. The invitation to become king of the Romans had been too good an opportunity to pass up, despite the fact that Frederick's own kingdom of Sicily had still to be pacified. The task of reconstruction and restoration in both Germany and Sicily amply filled the years 1212-1225, and had not the Lombards proved so unreceptive to Frederick perhaps his active involvement there would have been extended beyond the summer of 1226, causing yet further delay in the fulfilment of the crusading plans nurtured by the pope. With the huge scale of the emperor's preoccupations in mind we can now turn, perhaps with some sympathy, to consider the individual delays and problems which prompted the series of infuriating postponements from 1219 to 1228.

Although Frederick took the crusader's vow at an early stage of the preparations for the Fifth Crusade the papacy apparently made no attempt to enforce the execution of his pledge until late 1218. One reason for this may have been that Innocent III conceived of the crusade originally as a purely papal enterprise. Recent scholarship, however, has argued that while Innocent did not regard Frederick as the probable leader of a new crusade, he nevertheless covertly encouraged Frederick's assumption of the cross, and it seems possible that his successor, Honorius III, was already working to
involve Frederick in the crusade as early as April 1217. Yet at the same time it was clearly recognised that in the current German political climate no crusading expedition could be expected of Frederick. Only with the arrival of the legate Pelagius in Egypt and his first-hand account of the stalemate at Damietta did Honorius see the need to force Frederick's hand.

The pope's appeal to Frederick II has not survived but it is obvious from Frederick's reply of 12 January 1219 that Honorius had urgently requested assistance and that both pope and emperor were fully aware of the situation in Egypt. It was now that Frederick first committed himself to a definite departure date, advising the pope that at the Diet of Fulda (December 1218) a second meeting had been summoned for Magdeburg the following March to arrange details of the crusading expedition and to make the choice for viceregent; all crusaders had been informed of the imperial schedule, and he urged the pope therefore to threaten with excommunication all those who had not set out by the feast of St. John the Baptist [24 June] 1219. At the same time, however, Frederick's letter clearly indicates the problems with which he was currently occupied. Although the Welf threat to Germany had been more or less removed by the death of Otto IV the previous May, his brother Henry of Brunswick still retained the imperial insignia which were essential to any monarch wishing to impress his subjects with his authority, and more importantly a necessary part of the regalia for imperial coronation. Frederick therefore requested the pope that Henry be compelled to give up the insignia, and in addition that the pope accept into his protection the empire and kingdom. The latter request was met immediately, but it was not until June 1219 - an interval of six months - that Henry was reconciled with Frederick and the insignia delivered up,
despite the early despatch of the Prior of Santa Maria Nova de Urbe who was commissioned with this task. The delay in the success of the papal mission may have been the reason behind the non-occurrence of the Magdeburg meeting arranged for March 1219, and Frederick's first request for a postponement of departure to the feast of St. Michael [29 September 1219], although it was soon to become apparent that he aimed to consolidate and secure his authority in Germany by having his son elected king of the Romans and himself crowned emperor before his departure on crusade. A further postponement was requested in early September 1219 when Frederick probably again took up the subject of his son's coronation. The start date was now to be 21 March 1220, later altered to 1 May, not without complaint from Honorius, who accused the emperor of being lukewarm in the business of the Holy Land.

In the meantime Frederick was working hard to secure his goals, and the abbot of Fulda was sent to Rome to negotiate on the imperial coronation. In Germany the princes were won over to the idea of Henry as king of the Romans by the Confoederatio or Privilegium in Favorem Principum Ecclesiasticorum of 26 April 1220 - an extensive grant of concessions to the spiritual princes, although in actual fact little was innovative, being in the most part a summation of previously existing customs and a universal application of privileges formerly granted to individual princes. The temporal princes feared the establishment of an hereditary succession, but yielded perhaps to the belief that their own position might be advanced during Frederick's absence on crusade. In order to allay papal suspicions, the princes had already written to the pope on 23 April asserting that the empire would never be united with, or have jurisdiction over, the kingdom of Sicily, and Frederick himself
wrote on 13 July that the election of his son had taken place in his absence and without his knowledge, and that even so Germany and Sicily would remain separate in every respect. But despite these assurances, the election was still greatly disturbing for the papacy since in the event of Frederick’s death there would be little obstacle to Henry becoming the personal sovereign of both Germany and Sicily, creating a dangerous precedent for the hereditary union of the two monarchies.

Having achieved the election of his son in Germany, Frederick delayed at Augsburg from the end of July 1220 to early September, sorting out numerous petty quarrels and arranging for his passage through Italy. In June he had written to the pope informing him that he would not be in Rome before the end of September and on July 13 he wrote explaining this delay as being due to an unresolved conflict between the Archbishop of Mainz and the Landgrave of Thuringia. Despite the uncertainty of the timescale Honorius wrote to Pelagius at Damietta that Frederick would be crowned around 29 September, and would thereafter cross to aid the Christian army.

In actual fact Frederick did not arrive in Rome until November 1220. Once crowned, however, he swore himself ready to cross to Damietta the following August, and to send reinforcements in March 1221. In December 1220 this news was faithfully reported to Pelagius, although less than a month later Honorius urged the papal legate to try to obtain a short truce with the sultan. The final decision on any truce, however, was to lie with the pope. J.P. Donovan suggests that this illustrates a continuing lack of confidence in Frederick, but it might equally be seen purely as an interim measure until the emperor could arrive in the East.
conformance with his undertaking to Honorius the previous year, Frederick supervised the despatch of a group of crusaders under Louis of Bavaria in April 1221 and later, following an urgent request from the pope, a fleet of forty ships under Henry of Malta and Walter of Palear. By this time, however, Frederick was totally embroiled in the re-organisation of the kingdom of Sicily, and a further letter from Honorius to Pelagius informed him that the emperor would not be crossing until March 1222. By then of course it was too late, and there was no Christian army for Frederick to assist; consequently the urgency for his departure was reduced, and although still committed to the crusade Frederick could, almost for the first time, concentrate exclusively on the problems of the empire. Nevertheless it is significant that the peace negotiated with the Muslims made provision for an eight-year truce which might be broken by the arrival in the East of a crowned head - clearly a reference to Frederick himself and the continued expectation of the fulfilment of his crusading vow.

Concerning the failure of Frederick to depart for the East during the time of the Fifth Crusade, Donovan remarks, 'It was one of the great misfortunes of the crusaders that they deceived themselves with false hopes centred on mysteries - especially Prester John and Frederick II'. He continues by saying that although Frederick was probably sincere in his early promises it was a mistake to continue to believe them even when they had been subordinated to his Hohenstaufen ambitions. The crusade was used by Frederick to barter promises for papal concessions, whereas 'Honorius probably hoped to distract Frederick from the imperial schemes by interesting him in the Holy War.' On the other hand the emperor 'shrewdly misled the pope by alternating earnest repetitions of his enthusiasm for the
crusade with humble delays in undertaking it.\textsuperscript{73}

The idea of a mysteriousness compatible with Prester John is completely fallacious; there is no mystery whatsoever surrounding Frederick's failure to depart on the Fifth Crusade. In the first instance it is quite obvious that Frederick approached his office in a highly realistic manner and was guided throughout by a realisation that it was essential to ensure royal authority and power and the means whereby these were maintained. The impetuous monarch who had been willing to risk the little he then had in a precipitous dash from Sicily to Germany in 1212 had developed into a highly astute king who realised that possessing a crown was meaningless if steps were not taken to secure that possession. Although Honorius recognised the necessity of Frederick's early delays in Germany\textsuperscript{74}, when it came to the rehabilitation of Sicily as a sovereign state the Apostolic See was much less sympathetic, viewing the kingdom as a feudal principality subject always to the overlordship of the Church\textsuperscript{75}. It is true however that the repeated pronouncement on the part of the emperor of totally unmeetable dates of departure proved a great disservice to the Damietta campaign in particular, encouraging overconfidence in some and idleness in others\textsuperscript{76}, but Frederick was only responding to the incessant papal pressure to announce the schedule of the crusade, and was by no means the first, or last, monarch to manipulate the dependence of the Church to his own ends. We must also keep in mind the lessons which the kingdom of Sicily had already furnished for an absentee king, and from this point of view the attention which Frederick lavished on each and every possible source of unrest and opposition, even to the detriment of wider interests (in the papal view) of Christendom, must come as no great surprise.
The years 1222-1227/8 saw renewed papal activity with regard to the crusade; and scarcely had Honorius upbraided the emperor for his failure to go to the aid of the Christian army than he sent to him the papal legate, Nicholas bishop of Tusculum, to urge the publication of yet another departure date. This was swiftly followed by a conference between Frederick and Honorius on the subject at Veroli in April 1222, where a second conference was arranged for November, when the crusade leaders John of Brienne and Pelagius would be present and a definite date for Frederick’s crusade would be set. But illness compelled Honorius to postpone the November meeting until March 1223 at Ferentino, after which it was ultimately announced that Frederick would undertake the long-awaited expedition on the feast of St. John the Baptist [24 June] 1225, and that he was to marry the daughter of King John of Jerusalem. It may have been that by this union Honorius hoped to secure at long last the fulfilment of Frederick’s vow (certainly after Ferentino the scope of Frederick’s plans was extended to include the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem), but the new papal initiative for the crusade had coincided with the commencement of Frederick’s operations against the Saracen rebels on the island of Sicily. Despite initial successes in 1222, the campaign continued well into 1225 - the year most recently designated for the despatch of the imperial crusade. An added complication for the emperor was the imprisonment in 1223 of Waldemar king of Denmark by Count Henry of Schwerin, an act which threatened to involve the German princes in a major conflict with the Danes. Inevitably Frederick was again compelled to appeal for a postponement of the crusade, and at San Germano on 25 July 1225 this was granted. The crusade would now depart on 15 August 1227 with one thousand knights to be maintained in the Holy Land for two years. Ships were to be provided for the
transport of two thousand men, each with three horses, squires and
valets. As a guarantee of good faith 100 thousand ounces of gold
were to be given up by Frederick into the custody of Hermann von
Salza, John of Brienne and Gerold of Lausanne, to be restored on the
emperor's arrival at Acre. For the first time Frederick could see
his way clear to meeting a deadline and authorised his lieutenant
Reginald of Spoleto to swear 'on the soul of the emperor' that the
terms of the agreement would be executed in good faith and without
reservations.

J.M.Powell, however, places a different interpretation on
events, arguing that whereas Honorius was initially willing to
countenance compromise and conciliation in a bid to secure
Frederick's co-operation with regard to the crusade, San Germano
signalled a tougher line, the threat of excommunication being a
penalty clause insisted upon by the pope himself. The theory is
very attractive but, although Frederick's extreme guarantee of good
faith may indeed have been one demanded by the papacy in response to
criticisms from within the ranks of the Church itself, the papal
correspondence of the previous six years incorporates at least one
threat of excommunication and expressions of disillusionment which
suggest exasperated, rather than cheerful, compromise.

At San Germano Frederick had gained two years to tidy up loose
ends in the empire, and in 1226 set out for Lombardy. As we have
seen, the expedition itself was from the imperial point of view a
failure, but it benefited the crusade in that the Lombards were sworn
by their agreement with the emperor to furnish four hundred knights
for the expedition. As an integral part of the crusading plans
Thomas of Acerra was despatched to Syria in July 1227, whilst

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during the summer crusaders from all over Europe began to assemble at the Apulian ports to await the ships which would take them to the Holy Land. Numerous contemporary writers attest that the weather, numbers and lack of fresh food combined to decimate those who had gathered, and although a great many crusaders did actually arrive at Acre, Frederick himself was taken ill and within days compelled to turn back. The response of the new pope, Gregory IX, in line with Frederick's own undertakings and the oath sworn by Reginald of
Spoleto, was immediately to excommunicate him.\textsuperscript{89}

The action of Pope Gregory was quite justifiable: Frederick had assumed the cross at his coronation in 1215 in complete independence of the pope, and in spite of numerous promises to depart on crusade had failed to do so. Anyone less patient than Honorius might with impunity have subjected Frederick to the papal anathema long ago. Indeed it was Frederick who had laid himself wide open to the ultimate spiritual sanction with which he had so often been threatened. In fact he had no grounds for complaint whatsoever. And yet there was every reason to believe that Frederick had intended to meet his obligations and fulfil his vow. Certainly the objectives which Frederick must have held at the time of his coronation as king of the Romans had been reached for the most part: royal authority had been restored in Germany and his son elected king; in Sicily the barons had been brought to heel, the Italian communes had been ejected from their position of power in the kingdom, and the problem of the Saracens had been virtually obliterated. Only northern and central Italy remained a thorn, but the agreement with the Lombards in early 1227 had at least lessened any immediate threat to imperial authority. Consequently the various areas of imperial interest were as stable as they were likely to be, with the result that there was no reason to delay any longer.

In setting out for the Holy Land in September 1227 Frederick met the deadline which had been set at San Germano two years previously, but did not cross on account of a 'sudden infirmity'. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines was unsure whether the illness was real or pretended\textsuperscript{90}, but the circumstantial evidence is that it was a genuine malady as not only do the chronicles speak of an epidemic which hit
the crusaders in the Italian ports, but we are told that whilst Frederick survived the Landgrave Louis of Thuringia, struck down at the same time, did not. In order that the expedition as a whole might not be delayed, fifty galleys were placed at the disposal of Hermann von Salza and the Patriarch Gerold, and Henry duke of Limburg designated the emperor's deputy pending his own arrival in Syria. In this Frederick was doing exactly as Pope Honorius had urged him to do in 1220 - if the emperor found it impossible to cross then he should not detain the other crusaders. It would seem therefore, that whereas Gregory IX was quite at liberty to promulgate the emperor's excommunication, it was nevertheless an injudicious and precipitate act. On the other hand, Gregory may have seen in the ban a move of equal advantage to the emperor's absence on crusade.

With the exception of Frederick's illness all the delays in his departure were essentially of political making. One other factor, however, did have a bearing on the emperor's plans, and this was a general apathy towards the crusade. Such an attitude might have been expected from England, France and Spain, whose diversions might respectively have been listed as feuding barons, heresy and Muslims, but views were changing and even the Germans who had provided so many crusaders in 1217 had to be threatened with excommunication in 1219 as a means of motivation. On 19 February 1220 Frederick reported to the pope that the crusade could not be launched because the German nobility had proved so apathetic, an excuse which Honorius accepted, suggesting that he must have been aware of some indifference in Germany and Europe. The changing attitude towards the crusade became more apparent with the collapse of the Fifth Crusade, and papal appeals for a renewed campaign met with resistance. At Ferentino in March 1223 although Honorius, Frederick, John of Brienne
and Hermann von Salza were present, together with other nobles and prelates, there were few princes of the empire. John of Brienne, soon afterwards visiting France, England, Germany and Spain, found little enthusiasm. In Germany John and Hermann reported that few, if any, were prepared to take the cross. The widespread apathy (if not hostility) was due in part also to the nature of the propagandists: preachers were said to be of lowly origin and lacking in ecclesiastical dignity and authority; but even the pious were unsuccessful and Oliver of Paderborn, whose preaching in 1214 had proved so fruitful, was met in 1224 with indifference. No doubt the reaction was in some degree pleasing to Frederick, whose continued preoccupations in Sicily prompted him to write to Honorius on 5 March 1224 that it was not yet wise for him to leave the kingdom. In the meantime the pope reluctantly began to recognise that the widespread apathy would seriously jeopardise the expedition timetabled for 1225. It is probable also that the pope's special representative in Germany, Conrad bishop of Porto, acquainted Honorius with the difficulties which had presented themselves. This led to the final official postponement of the crusade at San Germano in July 1225.

The apathy towards the crusade which the papal representatives discovered in 1224-5 was very convenient for Frederick, as the final thrust of imperial policy against the Saracens on the island of Sicily had met with stiffer resistance than had been anticipated. A more lasting solution had to be sought - the forcible exile of the vast majority of the Saracens to Lucera on the Italian mainland. In addition Frederick had still to turn his attention to north and central Italy. Such a programme required time, a requirement which was met at San Germano, and was facilitated by the failure of the
One question now remains to be answered: if Frederick knew that entanglements in Germany, Sicily and the Holy Roman Empire in general would probably keep him occupied for a good many years, why did he announce his intention to undertake an expedition to the East when he did, rather than wait until his immediate policies had achieved success? As has already been suggested, the oath of crusade was in part a political act which, although it failed to achieve its immediate objective\textsuperscript{101} - the unification of Germany behind a common monarch and a common ideal - emphasised Frederick's emergence from papal tutelage\textsuperscript{102} and must be construed as an unmistakable declaration of his accession to the political leadership of Europe\textsuperscript{103}. It was therefore a move essential to the dignity of the imperial office and one which was consciously intended to signal the renewal of the Holy Roman Empire. At the same time, however, as Frederick himself explained, it was an act of genuine devotion in thanksgiving for the success of the expedition to Germany and the gift of the crown at Aachen\textsuperscript{104}. This explains the timing of his vow and his commitment to the crusade, a commitment which is evidenced by the reiteration of his promise at the time of the imperial coronation at Rome in 1220. It is true that Frederick's departure suffered innumerable delays, but these were not of his own making. Troubles in Germany and Sicily, the need to establish peace and imperial sovereignty in northern and central Italy, and concerns over the hereditary succession to the empire combined to delay the fulfilment of his vow, whilst the depleted manpower available to Frederick caused by the Fifth Crusade, and the continual pressure imposed by the papacy (insensitive as ever to the demands of the empire\textsuperscript{105}) did nothing to alleviate the problems with which Frederick was
confronted.

In consideration of all these factors it is perhaps surprising that Frederick ever found the opportunity to depart on crusade. But Frederick was determined to fulfil his vow; had he not been, there existed a wealth of legitimate excuses to justify his continued presence in Europe.

Notes to Chapter Three

1 MGH Const., ii.150 (no.116). The translation is Van Cleve's, Frederick II, p97.
2 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p97. 3 See infra, passim.
5 J.M.Powell, 'Honorius III and the Leadership of the Crusade', Catholic Historical Review, lxiii (1977), 522. Frederick's vow is not mentioned by either pope between 15 July 1215 and the end of 1218. Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp97,113, maintains that Innocent III conceived of the Fifth Crusade as an exclusively papal enterprise to be led by the pope. For this reason alone Frederick's pledge was ignored for three years. On this see also infra, n.52.
7 'Annales Pragenses', MGHS, iii.121; Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.78 (no.111).
8 Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp102-3.
9 'Undisputed' may be a little strong here - see Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp13-19.
10 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p135.
11 J.M.Powell, 'Medieval monarchy and trade: the economic policy of Frederick II in the kingdom of Sicily (a survey)', Studi Medievali, 3rd series, iii (1962), 453 suggests that the rise of Genoa was a direct result of the policies of Frederick Barbarossa, which contributed to the disintegration of political power in the kingdom of Sicily by (a) reducing royal revenue from taxes on trade, and (b) threatening to turn the kingdom into merely a Genoese colony. See also the comments by D.Abulafia, The Two Italies: Economic relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes (Cambridge, 1977), pp127-30.
12 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p138.
13 J.M.Powell, 'Frederick II and the Church in the Kingdom of Sicily, 1220-1221', Church History, xxx (1961), 28.
14 Ibid., pp29,33; see also Hampe, p251.
15 Powell, 'Medieval monarchy and trade', p455; Van Cleve, Frederick II, p139.
16 Powell, 'Frederick II and the Church', p31, in which the author suggests that this clause indicated an uneasy relationship between Frederick and some ecclesiastics, although (ibid., pp29-30,33) he maintains that careful reading of the Capuan Laws shows that they were not anti-ecclesiastical and that Frederick's letter to Honorius (March 1221 - HDFS, ii/1. 139) assuring the pope that he would not violate the rights of the Church and ecclesiastics, was not intended to deceive.
17 See, for example, Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.340.
18 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p142.
19 Ibid., pp135-6: Alaman da Costa after wresting Syracuse from the Pisans in 1204 had assumed the office Lord of Syracuse, styling himself 'by the Grace of God, of the king, and of the city of Genoa, Count of Syracuse and officer of the king'; ibid., p148, William Porcus, 'Admiral of the Kingdom', escaped imprisonment by precipitous flight.
20 Powell, 'Medieval monarchy and trade', p455.
21 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p149 and p150n.1 where the author asserts that Powell has greatly exaggerated the harmful nature of this policy; see 'Medieval monarchy and trade', with particular reference to pp469-71.
22 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p149-50: foreign merchants and clergy were taxed ostensibly for the equipment of galleys and hence for aid for Damietta; Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.341; Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.123, (no.127). For Henry of Malta see Abulafia, 'Henry Count of Malta', pp104-24, and W.Cohn, Die Geschichte der sizilischen Flotte unter der Regierung Friedrichs II (1197-1250) (Breslau, 1926), pp93-109.
23 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p144. Powell, 'Medieval monarchy and trade', p471, gives 1224 as the date for the pacification of the whole kingdom, but v. infra, p46. Legislation continued at Messina (spring 1221) this time dealing with social and criminal matters, see Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.341.
24 Powell, 'Medieval monarchy and trade', pp451,453,467. Although their political power was curtailed their privileged position within the kingdom was not destroyed.
25 Ibid., p471.
26 'Eraclcs', pp354-5.
27 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p137.
28 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.343; Powell, 'Medieval monarchy and trade', pp459-60; Van Cleve, Frederick II, p138.
29 Powell, 'Frederick II and the Church', pp28,33.
30 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p148.
31 Powell, 'Medieval monarchy and trade', p471.
32 Supra, p40.
33 Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp151-4.
34 A. Ahmad, A History of Islamic Sicily (Islamic Surveys, x, 1975), p83.
35 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.342; 'Annales Siculi', MGHS, xix.496; Ta'rīkh Mansūrī, in M. Amari, 'Estratti del Tarih Mansuri', Archivio Storico Siciliano, ix (1884), 108-9; F. Gabrieli, 'Federigo II e la cultura musulmana', Rivista Storica Italiana, lxiv (1952), 6-7.
36 Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp152-3; Ahmad, pp83-4.
37 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p153; Ahmad, pp84,105-6.
38 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p154.
39 Ibid., pp167-70.
40 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.345-6.
41 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p173. For Frederick's promises see Ibid., pp80,90,124.
42 Ibid., p172.
43 HDFS, ii/1. 548-9.
44 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p180.
45 HDFS, ii/1. 548 - 'jura imperii in statum optimum reformare'.
46 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.346; 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii.258; 'Breve Chronicon', p897.
47 HDFS, ii/2. 677.
48 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p188.
49 HDFS, ii/2. 705.
50 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p189.
51 Supra, n.5.
52 This is the view put forward by Van Cleve, *Frederick II*, pp97,113.


52b Powell, 'Honorius III', pp522,527, and supra n.5. Pelagius arrived in Damietta around September 1218.

53 *Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, i.65 (no.89).

54 Ibid., i.67 (no.93).

55 'Annales Stadenses', MGHS, xvi.357; Van Cleve, *Frederick II*, p112.

56 HDFS i.630; *Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, i.70 (no.97); Van Cleve, *Frederick II*, p113.

57 HDFS, i.629, O. Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici* (Lucca, 1738-56; 15 vols), a.1219 (no.7), intentions made clear in May and June 1219 respectively.

58 Röhricht, *Beiträge*, i.7; Van Cleve, *Frederick II*, p114.

59 *Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, i.75,78 (nos.106,110). The accusation was echoed by the troubadours of the day who criticised Frederick's vacillations 1218-27, see E. Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading, 1095-1274* (Oxford, 1985), pp65-7.

60 Van Cleve, *Frederick II*, p117.

61 HDFS, i/2. 762-4.

62 Ibid., p803.

63 Van Cleve, *Frederick II*, pp125-6,129.

64 Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. P. Pressuti (Rome, 1888-95; 2 vols), i.427 (no.2574).

65 HDFS, i/2. 802-5 and 822n.3. Donovan, p77, considers Frederick's excuses 'very unconvincing'.

66 *Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, i.88 (no.124).

67 Ibid., i.104 (no.146).

68 Ibid., i.110,112 (nos.157,159).

69 Donovan, p81; Powell, 'Honorius III', p532.

70 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.341; *Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, i.123 (no.177); Donovan, p83.

71 *Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, i.112 (no.176).

72 'Historia Damiatina', p276.
73 Donovan, p75.

74 Powell, 'Honorius III', p527; supra, p50 and n.5.

75 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p146.

76 Donovan, p76. Honorius must surely share some of the blame for falsely lifting the hopes of the crusaders, see Powell, 'Honorius III', p533, and supra, p52.

77 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.128,130 (nos.183,184).

78 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.342; Flores Historiarum, ii.337; Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.137 (no.196).

79 'Breve Chronicon', p896; Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.342-3; 'Annales Sancti Rudberti Salisburgenses', MGHS, ix.782; 'Annales Prioratus de Dunstaplia', Annales Monastici [AM], ed. H.R.Luard (London, 1864-9; Rolls Series; 5 vols), iii.80-1. See also chapter 4, n.7.

80 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.148,156 (nos.220,227). Frederick's wife, Constance, had died the previous year in Sicily - Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.342.

81 Chapter 2, passim. On his marriage to Isabella Frederick immediately assumed the title King of Jerusalem - 'Eracles', p358; 'Breve Chronicon', p897.

82 The dispute was only really solved in July 1227 when the German princes inflicted a crushing defeat on the Danish army - Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp352-4.

83 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.344; 'Breve Chronicon', p896; HDFS, ii/1.502. The postponement was due in part to apathy for the crusade, v. infra, pp58-9.

84 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.344; see also Powell, 'Medieval monarchy and trade', pp472-3.

84a Powell, 'Honorius III', pp525, 528, 531-6. See also Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, pp74-8,112.

85 HDFS, ii/2.705; MGH Const., ii.153-4 (no.116).

86 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.348, and see chapter 5, n.55, for discussion of this date.

87 See, for example, 'Annales Monasterii de Theokesberia', AM, ii.69; annals of Winchcombe, British Library MS Cotton Faustina B I, f.27v; 'Annales S. Rudberti Salisburgenses', MGHS, ix.784; 'Annales Scheftlarienses Maiores', MGHS, xvii.338; and infra chapter 7, n.29.

88 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.348; 'Breve Chronicon', p897; Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, MGHS, xxiii.920; Flores Historiarum, ii.327-8; MGH Const., ii.152 (no.116).

89 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.348; 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii.260. Honorius died on 18 March 1227.
90 Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, MGHS, xxiii.920.

91 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.348; Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, MGHS, xxiii.920. For contemporary sources not convinced of Frederick's illness, see H. Mann, Lives of the Popes in the Middle Ages (London, 1902-32; 18 vols), xiii.213n.2, and O. Lorenz, 'Kaiser Friedrich II', Historische Zeitschrift, xi (1864), rpr. in Lorenz, Drei Bücher Geschichte und Politik (Berlin, 1876), pp16-17. Frederick claimed in December 1227 that he still felt the effects of his illness (MGH Const., ii.153 (no.116)) and the journey East in 1228 was said to be leisurely 'propter debilitatem corporis' ('Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii.260).

92 'Breve Chronicon', p897; MGH Const., ii.153 (no.116).

93 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.83,84 (nos.117,118).

94 See Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp175,193. Powell, 'Honorius III', pp534-5, argues that the San Germano agreement of 1225 signalled a re-ordering along harsher lines of papal policy vis-à-vis Frederick, and greater stress on the defence of the Church's position in Italy. Excommunication not only removed Frederick's 'protected status' as a crusader but also freed the papacy from the obligation to defend the emperor's lands during his absence. It might therefore have been seen as the means to facilitate this re-orientation.

95 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.65,68 (nos.89,95).

96 HDFS, i/2.741; Van Cleve, 'The Crusade of Frederick II', p433.

97 Acta Imperii Inedita, i.238-9 (no.261): 'et sic pauci vel nulli sunt qui per omnes provincias illas quas dictus rex peragrasse, velint se ad crucis ministerium preparare'. But Philip Augustus did free a large sum of money before his death to aid in financing the war in Syria - see chapter 4, p74 and n.42.

98 Donovan, pp107-8; Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp160-1. See Prawer, Histoire, ii.173, and Acta Imperii Inedita, i.238 (no.261).

99 Acta Imperii Inedita, i.238 (no.261), and see 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii.253.

100 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p161.

101 Henry III of England assumed the cross with similar motives in 1216 - Lloyd, pp113-20, and supra chapter I, p4.

102 Van Cleve, 'The Crusade of Frederick II', p431; cf. Ahmad, p85, on Frederick's final decision to go on crusade 'motivated principally by the political objective of gaining respect and prestige in Christendom...', and see F2's own letter of 6 December 1227 (MGH Const., ii.150 (no.116)).

103 This was symbolised in 1215 by Frederick's rehousing of the body of Charlemagne in a gold and silver sarcophagus - 'Reineri Annales', MGHS, xvi.673.

104 HDFS iii.39.
105 Cf. the views of Powell, supra and n.84a.
Chapter Four

Finance and organisation of the imperial crusade

Part 1: John of Brienne in the West

The ignominious defeat of the Christian forces in Egypt and the return of Damietta to Muslim control was a bitter blow to papal plans which had first been mooted during the pontificate of Innocent III. The recriminations which ensued were inevitable, but not insurmountable: Honorius was determined that in spite of everything the Nile débâcle must not mean the termination of Christendom's military exertions for the recovery of the Holy Land. Before the close of 1221 papal letters had been despatched to all European prelates, exhorting them to rouse the faithful to renewed crusade against the infidel; whilst Frederick II, fearful that his personal neglect of the beleaguered army at Damietta might provoke damaging criticism, sent representatives to Honorius offering whatever aid might be considered expedient to obliterate the shame of defeat. The lessons of the Fifth Crusade seemed to point to the participation of the emperor as an essential prerequisite if a future expedition against the Muslims was to be successful; and so Honorius summoned the emperor to conference.

The talks which took place at Veroli in April 1222 failed to set any firm date for the departure of the proposed imperial crusade, but as a preliminary it was agreed to invite John of Brienne and the legate Pelagius, the former leaders of the Fifth Crusade, to a second
meeting planned for Verona in mid-November, when their explanations and advice might be sought. To that end a fleet of four imperial galleys was sent to the Holy Land, and in November 1222 the king of Jerusalem and his party stepped ashore at Brindisi, too late, according to John's biographer, to attend the conference, which was postponed until the following March.

But John of Brienne's arrival in the West was not prompted by any papal summons. In September 1221, soon after the surrender of Damietta, Philip d'Aubigny had written to Earl Ranulf of Chester that it was John's intention to visit England, and he urged Ranulf to make good the promises he had rendered the king, presumably whilst still in Egypt. In the meantime Hermann von Salza, Master of the Teutonic Knights, was sent to Europe to convey in person news of the Damiettan disaster. His shared captivity with King John must have made him aware of the king's intentions, and it is likely that in his audiences with both Frederick and Honorius he passed on details of the proposed royal peregrinations. It was the timing of the visit, therefore, not the visit itself, which was determined by the pontiff's summons.

There were two principal reasons why John of Brienne undertook to visit the West at this stage. The disaster of the recent crusade had depleted the kingdom of Jerusalem of virtually all its financial and military resources. It was of prime importance, therefore, firstly that these stocks be recouped, and secondly, that John ensure all future military efforts in the East, and consequently the continued replenishment of Western financial and military support, would not be undermined by divided leadership, nor by differing opinions of war aims. John's complaints concerning the prosecution
of the Fifth Crusade had their effect, and as a result it was agreed that all future conquests in the East should accrue without exception to the king of Jerusalem\textsuperscript{13}. In addition King John may have been motivated by the need to seek a solution to the quarrels which had erupted between Pisan and Genoese merchants in his kingdom, and to secure a husband for his daughter\textsuperscript{13a}.

For their part the pope and emperor saw in John’s visit not only a means of obtaining first-hand information and advice concerning the dismal display of the Christian army at Damietta, but also an effective propagandist who might be manipulated for the benefit of the crusade\textsuperscript{14}. And although Frederick’s vision of John’s role may not have encapsulated exactly the same tenets as that of Honorius - the emperor’s concern was less for an immediate resumption of the crusade than the suppression of rebellion in his troublesome Sicilian kingdom\textsuperscript{15} - he nevertheless authorised John of Brienne to recruit whomsoever he might wish for the projected crusade, and to offer on his behalf inducements of passage, sustenance and other necessities as he saw fit\textsuperscript{16}.

The tripartite talks which took place at Ferentino in March 1223, therefore, were, for the most part, profoundly satisfying for all sides. Not only did the meeting endorse King John’s propaganda mission in Europe and rule in his favour on the distribution of future crusader conquests, but more importantly, from Frederick’s point of view, it was agreed that the imperial crusade should not depart until 24 June 1225\textsuperscript{17}. The negotiations also marked a minor victory for Honorius who saw in Frederick’s agreement to marry Isabella a means of guaranteeing the emperor’s participation in the forthcoming venture\textsuperscript{18}. 

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When Frederick had joined the pope for negotiations at Veroli the previous April, two weeks had been spent in discussing a variety of subjects including the ways and means of assisting the Holy Land, and of financing the crusade. But these cannot have been the sole points of discussion on the agenda at Ferentino, and by way of confirmation the Eracles continuation of William of Tyre tells us that the date of departure and the proposed marriage union were amongst a number of items under consideration. Indeed it was of great concern to Honorius that whilst the Holy Land lay in Muslim captivity, Christian kingdoms bickered and fought amongst themselves, to the detriment of Christendom. That this was an item included on the draft agenda for the talks is made plain in a letter from Honorius to Philip Augustus, in which he appealed for the establishment of, if not a permanent peace between England and France, then at least an extension of the truce already in existence. As a means of achieving this it is probable that Honorius, knowing of John’s intention to visit both England and France, sought to recruit the king of Jerusalem as a mediator between the Angevin and Capetian courts. The choice could hardly have been less politic; as a Frenchman by birth, John’s motives would have been immediately suspect. It was apparently a role which he did not relish and, disregarding his avowed intention of travelling to England, John apparently decided to return home to the East.

But the king of Jerusalem was dissuaded from precipitate departure and in May/June 1223 began his journey to France. Even without his willing co-operation as a peacemaker, John would be an excellent propagandist for the crusade, a point which must have been uppermost in the minds of the pope and his cardinals. Indeed, it may have been Honorius who encouraged John to extend his itinerary to
incorporate not only France and England, but also Castile and southern Germany.

John of Brienne's arrival at the French court in June 1223 was greeted with great ceremony and rejoicing\(^{25}\), but despite the high esteem in which he was held neither Philip Augustus nor his magnates were prepared to commit themselves to participation in the crusade as long as the truce with the English remained unstable and without guarantee\(^{26}\). The untimely death of Philip Augustus and the succession of the inflexible Louis VIII did nothing to soften attitudes\(^{27}\).

In England the response was much the same. John, who appears to have arrived in late August\(^{27a}\), was received with all due honours, and royally entertained, by Philip d'Aubigny amongst others\(^{28}\), yet the 'difficult matters' which he sought to discuss\(^{29}\) failed to produce the results for which he had hoped. A letter of Frederick II to Honorius dated March 1224 reported that the king had found the English magnates, like their French counterparts, totally unwilling to set out on crusade\(^{30}\). But, despite the complete lack of enthusiasm displayed for the crusade by the English baronage, King Henry, whose youth militated against his own participation (even had not the French threat been sufficient deterrent), in memory of his father John Lackland, who had died leaving his vow of crusade unfulfilled, conferred numerous honours and gifts on the royal visitor. The barons and clergy were said to have more than matched Henry's munificence, but remained steadfast in their resolve\(^{31}\). The probable reasoning behind the English generosity was a desire to win an ally at the French court: an embassy consisting of the Archbishop Stephen Langton, and the bishops of London and Salisbury, had already
demanded that the new French king restore Normandy, Anjou and Aquitaine to Henry, but Louis VIII had deferred any decision until November. The claim of the annals of Dunstable, therefore, that the king of Jerusalem received smaller gifts than he might have done because he had advised Louis against the restoration of the rights of the king of England, seems premature. Prompted perhaps by a desire to ingratiate himself with the French crown (having incurred the wrath of Philip Augustus for arranging the marriage of Isabella without his knowledge or advice), it is evident that King John did support Louis in his refusal to concede any of the English demands, but he is unlikely to have committed himself until after his return from England. In the meantime John had no qualms about exploiting the situation, and took the opportunity to urge Henry III to grant protection to two merchants coming to England from Cahors in southern France. Before taking his leave, John made a pilgrimage to the shrine of St. Thomas à Becket at Canterbury, where he offered four enormous sapphires.

With the exception of his pilgrimage, the king of Jerusalem's mission to England had been particularly unrewarding. Although Louis's attitude towards the truce did not bode well for recruitment amongst the English barons, John was, nevertheless, distressed by their feeble excuses. The near complete failure of his efforts convinced him that he could not obtain anything for his kingdom in the West, and he resolved to return home. Only the urgent appeals of the emperor dissuaded him. Even so, the itinerant king was unwilling to remain long in France, and again sought consolation in pilgrimage, this time to the shrine of Santiago de Compostela. Ludwig Böhm maintains that, putting behind him the wreck of his diplomatic overtures in England and France, John nurtured the hope of
assistance for the crusade emanating from Spain\textsuperscript{38}, but this seems unlikely. Although John’s marriage to King Ferdinand’s sister, Berengaria, linked him closely to the royal families of both France and Castile (and England), the marriage was unlikely to influence Louis favourably, and the situation of Castile on Christendom’s frontline precluded all but the most symbolic aid\textsuperscript{39}.

The response was much the same when King John arrived in Cologne during August 1224: beyond the customary gifts there lurked no offers of tangible aid\textsuperscript{40}, and disillusioned he slowly made his way back to Rome, where he arrived in December 1224\textsuperscript{41}.

* * *

In terms of promoting the necessity of renewed crusade and thereby encouraging the commitment of the European nobility to active involvement, John of Brienne’s mission was notably ineffective. In terms of securing pledges of financial aid, the king fared only slightly better. Philip Augustus, on his deathbed, bequeathed 50,000 marks to King John, a second 50,000 to the Hospital, the same sum to the Temple, two thousand marks to the Teutonic Order, and two thousand to the Order of St. Lazarus, in acceptance of which each organisation or individual swore that this money would be expended for no other purpose than the assistance of the Holy Land\textsuperscript{42}. But if Cono, the prévôt of Lausanne, is correct, this represented a disaster for the Latin Kingdom since his account indicates that all the bequests which the king of France made were to be met from money already assembled for the succour of the Holy Land, and whilst around 167,000 marks were allotted to the defence of the kingdom of Jerusalem, a further 700,000 were reserved to protect the interests
of the kingdom of France\textsuperscript{43}. This was the most substantial financial aid which John was to receive, however, for although throughout his peregrinations he was invariably received with the honour due to a king, the frequent gifts which he acquired from both the clergy and secular rulers can only have been sufficient to underwrite the expenses of his mission\textsuperscript{44}.

In apparent conflict with this view, Ralph de Coggeshall records that following the arrival of John of Brienne in England, King Henry was moved to publish a general edict defining the contributions which each subject should make for the assistance of the Holy Land\textsuperscript{45}. Unfortunately the chronology of Ralph’s account is here in error; the subsidy to which he refers was decreed in June 1222 and could not have been a direct consequence of King John’s personal presence in England\textsuperscript{46}. Instead the decision to implement a levy may have been connected with an earlier appeal from the king of Jerusalem, whose messengers were at Westminster in May 1221\textsuperscript{47}, or more likely a direct response to the defeat of the Christian army at Damietta. However, the fact that the decree of the Great Council in June 1222 indicated that the subsidy was to be conceded to the lord king of Jerusalem as opposed to the kingdom of Jerusalem itself, suggests that some one may have been agitating on the king’s behalf\textsuperscript{48}. This person, or persons, could well have been Ranulf of Chester, and his associates, since, as we have already seen, Ranulf appears to have made several promises of aid to King John whilst still on crusade in Egypt\textsuperscript{49}, although the annals of Dunstable assert that the levy was voted at the request of the papal legate Pandulf\textsuperscript{50}, whilst the annals of Waverley report that the royal concession was made on the advice of Stephen Langton, archbishop of Canterbury, and other unnamed magnates of the realm\textsuperscript{51}.
The form of the subsidy was such that each earl should contribute to the aid of the Holy Land three marks, each baron one mark, each knight one shilling, each free tenant one penny, and anyone who held no land but owned chattels to the value of half a mark, likewise one penny. Should any individual wish to give more, they might do so in the name of the Lord. Tenants of churchmen, inhabitants of cities, boroughs, and the rest of the king's demesne were included, but the Templars were exempt. In each vill the chaplain, the sergeants of lords in the vill, and two legal men were to assess and collect the tax, whilst in the cities and boroughs this work was to be carried out by two legal men of the corporation. Receipts were to be deposited in each county with the Templars, or with the Hospitallers, or at religious houses should there be no Temple or Hospital in the area. From there the money was to be conveyed in sacks bearing the name of each vill, together with a note of the amount collected, to London to be lodged at the New Temple, each sheriff being required to ensure the security of its transportation.

But despite the obvious merit of the levy, it met with strenuous resistance: the annals of Waverley note that 'the grant did little or no good, because soon afterwards it was opposed, and hardly came to fruition'. The date set for the collection of all the monies at the New Temple - 1 November 1222 - came and went, and on 3 November King Henry was compelled to issue a fresh writ declaring that payment was to be made voluntarily. Towards the end of the same month the Great Council decision of the previous June concerning the imposition of the Holy Land levy, was reiterated, but with subtle changes as to the classes subject to the tax. All receipts should now arrive in London by 28 January 1223. Not surprisingly the
supposed voluntary nature of the contributions militated against the smooth exaction of the tax, and royal letters were still being despatched urging its collection as late as April 1224\textsuperscript{63}.

But this was not to say that none of the tax was ever collected\textsuperscript{64}; in March 1225 Stephan le Gras and Gerard Bat are recorded as having delivered 300 marks to the royal treasurer from the money collected for the Holy Land, and in the following May they paid a further 500 marks from the same source into the hands of Henry of St. Albans, a citizen and merchant of London, specifically for the business [opus] of the kingdom of Jerusalem\textsuperscript{65}. But at the same time as the money was being gathered in London, it was already being mobilised for the king's own use. In March 1225, £124 and 10 shillings of the money collected ostensibly for John of Brienne were released from the Exchequer to Walter of Brackley, keeper of the king's wardrobe, in apparent payment of royal expenses\textsuperscript{66}. Once again, just as in France, it appears as if money intended for use in the Holy Land was diverted to the benefit of the crown.

Even so there seems no reason to suggest that when originally proposed it was not intended that the money should go to the king of Jerusalem; the circumstances of the decree indicate its integrity. Nevertheless it is difficult not to construe the first ever graduated poll tax as simultaneously an intentional experiment in taxation for the future guidance of the crown and its treasury\textsuperscript{67}. Indeed it was one of the declared aims of the tax to discover exactly what, and how much, might be collected\textsuperscript{68}. Hence the specification that the receipts from each vill be labelled in respect of origin and total amount realised\textsuperscript{69}. 

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The tax levied in the king of Jerusalem's name benefited neither him nor his kingdom\textsuperscript{70}. It was not imposed at his personal insistence, but predated his arrival in England. Although it was collected, the sum total, even had the exaction been deemed compulsory, was never likely to amount to a figure of immense significance and could not have matched those disbursements made by the testament of Philip Augustus. Indeed it may have been John's visit to England in the autumn of 1223 which convinced him that not only was military aid unlikely to be forthcoming, but also the promised financial aid was likely to be insubstantial. Hence there would be nothing to lose by not supporting Henry's demands for the return of lands now held by the king of France. In turn it is probable that the failure of John to represent effectively English interests at the French court released Henry from any sense of guilt he might have felt for diverting the money raised.

Part 2: Money and Manpower

The elaborate provisions of the decree \textit{Ad liberandam} published by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 signified the final stage in the development of a system of public finance for the crusades. Until then, with the exception of the ecclesiastical fortieth levied in aid of the Holy Land by Innocent III in 1199, monetary support had been derived largely in isolation of the Holy See\textsuperscript{71}. Although even in the thirteenth century a great deal of financial organisation was carried out by the \textit{crucesignati} themselves - visible for instance in the crusade of Louis IX and the records of his brother, the count of
Poitiers - and was therefore only indirectly related to papal policy\textsuperscript{72}, the disbursements from the papal camera nevertheless formed an essential aid to the crusade movement. Nor were such disbursements insubstantial: the decree of 1215 declared a triennial twentieth on all ecclesiastical revenues but, lacking the administrative sophistication of later decrees, failed to detail the manner of collection or mode of distribution. Local collectors therefore improvised by disbursing the proceeds of their collections direct to local crusaders, or by forwarding their contributions straight to the Holy Land, with the pope receiving merely statements of account. Such independence of action was soon curtailed and by 1220 Honorius III was overseeing the transmission of monies. By mid-century it was accepted practice to hand over the money raised to kings or lords who had taken the cross\textsuperscript{73}.

Throughout the thirteenth century therefore the role played by the ecclesiastical arm in the support of crusades and crusaders became increasingly important. And yet, despite the gradual establishment of the idea of public finance spearheaded by the Church, Frederick II did not benefit, and between the years 1221 and 1228 there was no ecclesiastical impost directed towards the assistance of the proposed imperial crusade\textsuperscript{74}. Instead, in 1223, immediately after the talks held at Ferentino, Honorius wrote to various prelates of Europe requesting that they decree in aid of the Holy Land a payment of one denier Tournois to be made each month by each household for a period of three years\textsuperscript{75}.

This subtle deviation which transferred the main burden of taxation and the onus of collection from the Church to the laity may have had its origins in the same smouldering resentment which later
in the century compelled Clement IV to promise a general exemption from crusading tithes for ten years after the expiry of the current imposition\textsuperscript{76}; clerical dissatisfaction with the scale and frequency of papal demands during the course of the Fifth Crusade - the last expression of which is recorded to have been shipped to Damietta with Walter of Palear and Henry of Malta\textsuperscript{77} - may have convinced Honorius that a general crusade levy at this stage would have been far from welcome. Even so a non-mandatory papal request was an extremely poor substitute and unlikely to realise anything but minimal co-operation, from France and England in particular\textsuperscript{78}; indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that any collection was ever made\textsuperscript{79}. Consequently the problem of raising money to finance the imperial crusade was one with which Frederick, like his twelfth century predecessors, had to contend virtually alone. The problem was compounded by continued rebellion in his Sicilian kingdom which proved a severe drain on the kingdom's financial resources\textsuperscript{80}, whilst the protracted nature of the revolt compelled Frederick to urge a postponement of the crusade for a further two years\textsuperscript{81}. In order to secure this delay Frederick had to agree, at San Germano in July 1225, to numerous papal demands. Not only was the emperor obligated to maintain one thousand knights in the Holy Land for a period of two years and reaffirm his commitment to provide ships and transport for two thousand knights, but he also had to swear to deliver one hundred thousand ounces of gold in the next five passages\textsuperscript{82}.

In this sense Van Cleve was right to pay tribute to the strength of the Sicilian economy in that it was able to meet promptly the instalment payments required of Frederick\textsuperscript{83}, but the strain of the imposition was nevertheless tremendous, since whilst money was being syphoned off for the Holy Land, yet more had to be raised to
support the continuing efforts of the Sicilian kingdom towards the crusade, and in 1226 to finance the campaign in Lombardy. Money, therefore, became imperative, and the quest for money began to dictate the course of many of the emperor's actions.

The concern for an adequate crusade income was not a new phenomenon. Any crusade demanded resources far in excess of normal royal revenues, and letters written by both Louis VII and Conrad III whilst en route to the East show that they were chronically short of cash⁸⁴ - a situation which Frederick was anxious to avoid. In order to escape this it would be necessary to exploit effectively all available monies, even those voted in aid of the Holy Land but not directly linked to Frederick's crusade. Such a policy would have important consequences for John of Brienne as, although both John and the emperor were theoretically united in their aim to raise an army for the East, what little money the king of Jerusalem had been able to secure on his travels in Europe had been granted in his name and not in the name of the imperial crusade. In addition, if the expedition was not to conflict with Frederick's own plans and the restrictions placed upon him by the empire, then the organisation and finance of the crusade must ultimately be under his sole direction. It was with this in mind that Frederick, immediately after his marriage to John's daughter, Isabella, and in violation of undertakings given by Hermann von Salza, declared himself king of Jerusalem⁸⁵.

The legal thinking behind the coup was sound enough: John himself had held the throne purely by right of marriage, and it was on this basis that the emperor displaced him⁸⁶. To give weight to his declaration Frederick sought, and obtained, the homage of the
Syrian nobility. It was only sensible, therefore, that all monies rendered the former king of Jerusalem for the benefit of the Holy Land should now accrue to Frederick who personified the interests of both kingdom and crusade. John, however, obviously thought otherwise, and Frederick's demand for the fifty thousand marks bequeathed the ex-king by Philip Augustus, specifically for the assistance of his kingdom, was refused outright.

It was this preoccupation with money which in many ways characterised the imperial crusade. Although Frederick claimed to have despatched the full 100,000 ounces of gold to which he was obligated under the terms of the San Germano agreement, the postponement of his departure for the East until 1228 probably meant that, in accordance with this agreement, by the time of his arrival much of the money had already been expended in works of refortification and maintaining the army for a year. Consequently, whilst the arbitrary impositions in Sicily mainly on the great monastic foundations during 1227-8 were sufficient to finance the emperor's own crossing, what should have been a relatively restrained policy in Cyprus aimed primarily at re-establishing imperial rights of suzerainty was converted into an aggressive demand for money. Three thousand armed serjeants, crossbowmen and sailors were said to have pressed home Frederick's claim for the royal revenues of Cyprus which, he argued, should legally have accrued to him during the minority of the Cypriot king, and before leaving the island imperial officers were appointed to collect the rents and send them to Syria. In Syria the story was much the same: alms and customs dues were requisitioned to meet short-term needs, and ultimately Frederick arranged to farm the bailliage of Cyprus for ten thousand
The financial organisation of Frederick's crusade was poor, ill thought out, belated, sometimes piratical. In theory Frederick's position as Holy Roman Emperor, king of Sicily and of Jerusalem, should have guaranteed vast resources, but in practice his rank disproportionately dissipated his revenues. Campaigns in Sicily and in Lombardy served to deplete resources already strained by the demands of the San Germano agreement. In addition Frederick had to contend with resentment of renewed impositions so soon after the Fifth Crusade, together with changing attitudes towards the crusade itself. Moreover the failure of the papacy to adequately provide financial backing, Frederick's own failure to depart in 1227 (when he could have exploited the 100,000 ounces of gold), and his debilitating sentence of excommunication, sorely restricted his options. It is not surprising that Frederick complained to the Syrian feudatories of his poverty, but although his impoverished status was recognised by the patriarch of Jerusalem, it was predictably blamed not on any papal shortcoming, but on Frederick's own deliberate intent.

Frederick's departure for the East with only minimal resources was a calculated decision which anticipated the acquisition of unclaimed rents accumulated during the minority of King Henry, an intention which had presumably already been communicated to the Ibelins by Frederick's marshal, Richard Filangieri. The unreadiness of the Ibelins to produce this money provoked the emperor to violence which in turn alienated many potential allies and further restricted his scope for manoeuvre. Unlike those of St. Louis, Frederick's plans had not been meticulously laid, and despite aiming
to avoid the cash shortages which had beset leaders like Louis VII and Conrad III, Frederick found himself in much the same straits.

In terms of manpower the emperor also had problems. It is difficult to assess just how many crucesignati Frederick had under his command (although many historians have tried to do this101), if only because, like every crusade, the numbers were often exaggerated and in almost constant flux. In England, for instance, as many as sixty thousand men were said to have taken the cross102, whilst of the huge numbers of crusaders reported to have set out from all over Europe in 1227103, forty thousand were rumoured to have been struck down by hunger and disease104. Of those who actually reached the Holy Land in the autumn of that year it was claimed that a further forty thousand, on hearing that the emperor had not yet crossed, returned by the same ships in which they had arrived105.

The figures are unconvincing, yet behind the exaggeration it seems clear that the ultimate magnitude of the crusade, depleted by epidemic and desertion, fell short of what had been originally planned. Indeed, Frederick himself asserted that so many crusaders were affected by the 'corruption of the air' that many of the ships provided for them were rendered superfluous and remained in port106. The fleet itself had been in preparation since at least 1224 when Frederick had advised Pope Honorius of the inauguration of a programme of shipbuilding. One hundred galleys and fifty large barges capable of carrying two thousand knights, their equipment and horses, were being prepared in Sicily under the direction of two brothers of the Teutonic Order, and would be available for the crusade together with limitless other ships and vessels of the kingdom107. Consequently Frederick's agreement at San Germano to
supply one hundred chellanders and fifty galleys for the transportation of the same number of knights to Syria was no great inconvenience, although the scale of the marine operation may possibly have been extended as in 1227 Frederick reported that eight hundred chellanders under construction had been delayed by bad weather and disease (and consequently not all of them would be completed in time). Eventually just fifty galleys set sail under the captaincy of Henry of Limburg.

In addition to the supply of transports, the San Germano agreement had obligated the emperor to maintain one thousand knights at his own expense in the Holy Land for two years. Pope Gregory claimed this he had not done, but according to Frederick's own estimates seven hundred knights had been recruited in Germany by Hermann von Salza, whilst two hundred and fifty knights, formerly in the pay of the pope, had been hired in Sicily. One hundred knights were also said to have been drawn from the imperial retinue and Sicilian baronage, in addition to which four hundred knights had been promised to the expedition, at the pope's own mediation, by the Lombards. But the Lombard knights were not forthcoming, and the inauspicious beginnings of the crusade dissuaded many from undertaking the crossing. Some, as has been noted, on reaching the Holy Land, refused to stay, so that in November 1227 barely eight hundred knights remained. Others still, stayed on only until the arrival of the emperor.

The composition of the army was thus never really static and its size cannot be estimated with any degree of certainty. When Frederick disembarked at Acre in September 1228 with a force of between forty and a hundred knights, he was said to have been
greeted by eight hundred knights and ten thousand footsoldiers. As there is no indication whether or not this figure took into account immediate departures, or included knights furnished by the military orders and kingdom of Jerusalem itself, or even the five hundred knights sent out with Filangieri the previous April\textsuperscript{116}, it becomes obvious that estimates of the size of the army for the period 1228-9 could vary dramatically. Indeed it is probable that the figure of eight hundred knights and ten thousand infantry, so often quoted by historians, is in itself unreliable, being computed by Roger of Wendover from the patriarch of Jerusalem's letter of November 1227, which is also included in his chronicle and which quotes only the number of knights\textsuperscript{117}.

The logistics of the imperial crusade had been well in hand for several years. As early as 1224 Frederick had authorised the construction of special ships for the transportation and rapid deployment of his army\textsuperscript{118}. Following the treaty of San Germano he had contrived to meet the demands for ships and men placed upon him, but his plans lacked depth and dealt solely with the letter of the agreement. The failure to provide adequate food supplies for the crusaders massing at Brindisi contributed to the wildfire spread of disease which in turn seriously disrupted the crusade's organisation and departure. Gregory IX argued that Frederick should have been responsible for the feeding and transportation of all crusaders, but Frederick's reading of the agreement was that this should apply solely to those capable of bearing arms or otherwise performing essential duties\textsuperscript{119}. Whatever the case, the result was that as many as 200 to 250 of the one thousand promised knights failed to depart or returned immediately after their arrival in Syria. And although Frederick may have intended to make good this deficiency\textsuperscript{120}, his
excommunication and the increasingly aggressive tone of the papacy combined to alter this policy, and severely restrict the size of the force which was to accompany him in 1228 by rendering it necessary to retain a major defensive force within the Sicilian kingdom\textsuperscript{121}. The Patriarch Gerold did not appreciate this subtlety and, disregarding Frederick's earlier protests that the pope was conspiring with Italian rebels against him, found it perfectly reasonable to criticise the meagre troops arriving with the emperor in Syria in September 1228\textsuperscript{122}.

Like the financial aspects of the crusade, the organisation of its manpower and shipping was characterised by a lack of detailed planning which indirectly resulted in forces less than those anticipated by the pope. The actual size of the army during the period of Frederick's personal leadership is difficult to estimate, but was probably small by the standards of earlier crusades\textsuperscript{122a}. Even so the imperial forces were not insubstantial and despite the apparent Muslim superiority of numbers\textsuperscript{123} were sufficient to convince the Egyptian sultan they could not safely be ignored. But the willingness of the Muslims to negotiate and the satisfactory conclusion of the crusade (as far as the emperor was concerned) must not be permitted to obscure the fact that Frederick's attempts to ensure the financial and organisational viability of his expedition had on the whole been a dismal failure, or that in the process Frederick had destroyed all prospect of what could have been a most useful alliance with the king of Jerusalem, John of Brienne. In the end the military effectiveness of the crusade had been severely undermined long before the crusade set sail.
Notes to Chapter Four


2 Reg. Hon. III, ii.19 (no.3637) = ['Epistolae Romanorum Pontificum'], RHGF, xix.717. On 10 December Honorius had charged the bishop of Tusculum with the task of urging Frederick to announce a fixed date for his departure on crusade - Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.130 (no.184).

3 The pope himself was swift to condemn Frederick's inactivity, and claimed to be not alone in such criticism (Epistolae Saeculi XIII i.128 (no.103)), as is evidenced, for example, by Siberry, pp65-6.

4 Acta Imperii Inedita, i.213 (no.231); MGH Const., ii.151 (no.116). Donovan, p105, claims Frederick used the opportunity to suggest a meeting, but all the indications are that the summit arranged between the pope and emperor was on Honorius's insistence - see 'Eracles', p355; Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.342; 'Breve Chronicon', p896; but cf. 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.80, which claims the conference was called by King John.

5 Epistolae Saeculi XIII i.137-8 (no.196); 'Eracles', p355; Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.342.

6 'Eracles', pp355-6; 'Breve Chronicon', p896; 'Historia Damiatina', p280. The question of whether or not Pelagius arrived in Italy at the same time as the rest of the party is discussed by Donovan, pp104,106 n.47,48.

7 Ludwig Böhm, Johann von Brienne, König von Jerusalem, Kaiser von Konstantinopel (um 1170-1237) (Heidelberg, 1938), p67. A more likely explanation for the postponement would be Honorius's ill health - see Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.342, and supra chapter 3, p55, but cf. 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.81 ('qua nec Papa nec imperator interiit'), and 'Annales Sancti Rudberti Salisburgenses', MGHS, ix.782 ('[imperator] alii negotiis prepeditus in Sicilia remansit'). In 1239 the emperor himself was to write that the postponement was due to 'et volubilitate consiliii et motu rerum continuo praesentium' (Chronica Majora, iii.564).

8 Flores Historiarum, ii.263; Chronica Majora iii.68. Ranulf had departed for Egypt in late spring 1218 ('Annales Monasterii de Waverleia', AM, ii.289; 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.54) and returned to Chester in August 1220 (Annales Cestrienses, ed. R. C. Christie (Record Society for the publication of Original Documents Relating to Lancashire and Cheshire, xiv, 1886), p50; and infra chapter 7, n.10). John of Brienne left Damietta in the spring of 1220 ('Historia Damiatina', p248). Philip d'Aubigny's arrival at Damietta coincided with the Christian defeat. As he did not stay to witness the surrender, Philip must have met with King John in the kingdom of Jerusalem. The earl of Chester's offers of assistance could explain the presence at Westminster in May 1221 of two messengers sent by the king of Jerusalem (Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum in Turri Londinensi asservati, ed. T. D. Hardy (London, 1833-44; 2 vols) i.458b), but see also chapter 7, n.11.
9 'Eracles', pp352,355; Marino Sanuto, 'Liber Secretorum super Terrae Sanctae', in Gesta Dei per Francos, ii.210. Balian of Sidon was also in Italy in October 1221, see 'Cronica Fratris Salimbene', MGHS, xxxii.34,39, and supra chapter 2, n.52.

10 'Historia Damiatina', pp276,277.

12 'Li rois Johan establi la terre le meauz que il pot, selonc la povreté en quoi ele estoit, et mist en son lue le conestable Odo de Montbeliart' - 'Eracles', p355. In general, however, the crusader states may have been richer in the first half of the thirteenth century than was previously thought, see J.S.C.Riley-Smith, 'Government in Latin Syria and the Commercial Privileges of Foreign Merchants', in Relations between East and West in the Middle Ages, ed. D. Baker (Edinburgh, 1973), p109. Böhm, p65, suggests John may also have hoped to obtain sufficient finances to restore the kingly lifestyle demanded by tradition. On John's personal poverty, see Richard, Latin Kingdom, pp224-5,227, according to whom (pp244-5) John had first to obtain substantial sums from the pope and Philip Augustus actually to finance his trip. Most sources indicate that the expedition was essentially a quest for European aid, e.g. Ann. Cestrienses, p53; 'Les Gestes de Phillippe-Auguste', RHGF, xvii.416; Chronicon Anglicanum, p193; Chronica Majora, iii.82; Historia Anglorum, ii.259; annals of Winchcombe, f.26v.

13 Ernoul, p449; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p137. See also supra chapter 2, p25 and n.29.

13a Böhm, p65; 'Annales Januenses. Marchisii Scribae Annales', MGHS, xviii.150; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p279. Frederick's letter to the citzens of Acre, 28 March 1224 (Acta Imperii Inedita, 1.241 (no.263)), may have been connected to John's pleas for intervention between the warring communes. The 'Gestes des Chiprois', p667 (hence La Monte, Feudal Monarchy, p56) suggest the principal purpose of John's visit was to secure a husband for his daughter.

14 Supra, n.5. John's role as a propagandist can be inferred from Frederick's letter to Honorius III (5 March, 1224), Acta Imperii Inedita, i.238-9 (no.261).

15 Supra chapter 3, pp40,45-6.

16 Acta Imperii Inedita, i.239 (no.261).


18 Flores Historiarum, ii.337; Acta Imperii Inedita, i.237 (no.261). The initiative for this marriage probably came from Honorius, see MGH Const., ii.151 (no.116); 'Burchardi et Cuonradi Urspergensium Chronicon', MGHS, xxiii.382; Böhm, p68n.25. Donovan, p107, suggests John of Brienne as proposer, but Hermann von Salza was also heavily involved in the promotion of the match - v. supra chapter 2, n.52.

19 'Eracles', p355; Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.342. Honorius's letter to Philip Augustus (c. 27 April 1223), Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.155 (no.226), urged the imposition of a special tax, infra p79.

20 'Eracles', p356.

21 Royal and other Historical Letters Illustrative of the Reign of Henry III, ed. W.W. Shirley (London, 1862-6; Rolls Series; 2 vols), i.538,542 (nos.13,18); Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.148 (no.220). The promotion of peace between England and France was also of concern to Frederick, who in March 1224 urged the despatch of a special legate for this purpose: Acta Imperii Inedita, i.239 (no.261).
22 Böhm, p71, certainly thought this was a possibility.

23 Böhm, p71; A. Cartellieri, Philipp II August, König von Frankreich (Leipzig, 1899-1922; 4 vols), iv. 562; E. Winkelmann, Kaiser Friedrich II (Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte, Leipzig, 1889-97; 2 vols), i. 218. This may explain the English attitude towards John's mission: although his reception befitted his status, John 'Anglis Anglos vulpinos reperiens ad natale solum festine se transponit' ('Willelmi Chronica Andrensis', MGHS, xxiv. 763). See also infra, p72.

24 MGH Const., ii. 549 (no. 418); Regesta Imperii, v. Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs... 1198-1272, comp. J. F. Böhmer, new ed. J. Ficker (Innsbruck, 1881-1901), no. 1485; Böhm, p70.


26 Acta Imperii Inedita, ii. 238 (no. 261); Böhm, p70. In addition the French were preoccupied with the Albigensian problem - see 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, ii. 100.

27 Böhm, p71, asserts that all hopes of French assistance were destroyed by Philip's death, whilst Ch. Petit-Dutaillis, Etude sur la vie et le regne de Louis VIII (1187-1226) (Paris, 1894), p334, suggests John probably tried to induce Louis to depart for the East. Honorius had already written to Philip Augustus (and other monarchs) around April 1223 urging them to take up arms for the sake of the Holy Land - Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i. 152-5 (no. 225); Reg. Mon. III, ii. 126 (no. 4304).

27a According to Matthew Paris, John of Brienne arrived in England around 7 July 1223 (Chronica Majora, iii. 82; Historia Anglorum, ii. 259). Ernoul, p450, agrees that John journeyed to England before the death of Philip Augustus on 14 July, but this date is much too early: John was definitely in France for Philip's funeral on 26 July, and for the coronation of Louis VIII on 6 August, see 'Ann. S. Benigni Divionenses', MGHS, v. 49, and 'Annales S. Nicasii Remenses', MGHS, xiii. 85. Two knights sent by John to King Henry III to announce his imminent arrival were at Winchester on 16 August (Rot. Lit. Claus., i. 559). Walter of Coventry, ii. 252, dates the visit around 8 September, and the Close Rolls (Rot. Lit. Claus., i. 526b) show that John was in London on this date; see also Patent Rolls of the Reign of Henry III, 1216-1225 (HMSO, 1901), p384. The annals of Dunstable ('Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii. 85) record John's reception at Canterbury and at London by Henry III, whose itinerary can be traced from Westminster (23-29 August), to Rochester (30-31 August), Canterbury (1-2 September) and back to Westminster (6-13 September) (Rot. Lit. Claus., i. 560-3). John probably left for France at the end of October or early November, if not before: see Rot. Lit. Claus., i. 574a, 584a. He was in Tours on 14 December - 'Ex Chronico Turonensi', RHGE, xviii. 304. On these dates cf. also Böhm, p71, and Röhricht, Beiträge, i. 61n. 70. John was accompanied to England by the Master of the Hospital, Garin de Montaigu (Historia Anglorum, ii. 259), and other Eastern magnates (Annales Cestrienses, p53) - on whom see 'Eracles', p355, and 'Historia Damiatina', p280. For the sojourn of Garin de Montaigu in Europe see J. Delaville Le Roulx, Les Hospitaliers en Terre Sainte et à Chypre (Paris, 1904), pp146-8.
28 Rot. Lit. Claus., i. 562b - Philip d'Aubigny was reimbursed £30 for expenses incurred at London on the king of Jerusalem's behalf, and a further £5 the following month (ibid., 566b). Böhm, p71, claims that John was received coolly.

29 Chronica de Mailros, p140. These ardua negotia may have included the question of the truce with France (supra), but cf. The Historical Collections of Walter of Coventry, ed. W. Stubbs (London, 1872-3; Rolls Series; 2 vols), ii. 252, Chronicon Anglicanum, p194, and 'Willelmi Chronica Andrensis', MGHS, xxiv. 763, none of which specify the truce as being amongst John's pre-occupations.

30 Acta Imperii Inedita, i. 238 (no. 261); and supra chapter 3, n. 97. One John Forrester, knight, did however join the king of Jerusalem's service - Rot. Lit. Claus., i. 574a.

31 Walter of Coventry, ii. 252; Chronica Majora, iii. 148; Historia Anglorum, ii. 259-60. Rot. Lit. Claus., i. 582a records the purchase of a goshawk for the king of Jerusalem's use. It is possible to argue that John Lackland's illegitimate son, Oliver, may in fact already have fulfilled his father's vow; on this v. supra, chapter 1, p5, and n. 20.

32 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii. 81; Chronicon Anglicanum, p197.

33 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii. 85.

33a 'Eracles', p356.

34 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii. 82, 100. This, together with Louis's indicated intention of pursuing his own territorial demands in England (ibid., p82; Rot. Lit. Claus., i. 565), is probably the source of Matthew Paris's charges of treachery levelled against John of Brienne - Chronica Majora, iii. 148.


36 Historia Anglorum, ii. 259. According to the 'Willelmi Chronica Andrensis', MGHS, xxiv. 763, the prime purpose of John's visit to England was to make the pilgrimage to the shrine. With regard to this see also the Dover Chronicle, British Library MS Cotton Julius D V, f. 25v.

37 Acta Imperii Inedita, i. 238-9 (no. 261); Bohm, p72.

38 Böhm, p72. John left Tours for Santiago in March 1224 ('Ex Chronico Turonensi', RHGF, xviii. 304), travelling via Toledo where he was received on 5 April by Ferdinand III of Castile ('Indices rerum ab Aragoniae regibus gestarum Libri III', Hispaniae Illustratae seu Rerum in Hispaniae et praesertim in Aragonia gestarum Scriptores varii, ed. A. Schottus (Frankfurt, 1603-8; 4 vols), iii. 73). It is unclear why John should have made such a major detour from the established pilgrim route, but it may have been connected with negotiations for John's marriage to Ferdinand's sister, Berengaria. On his return from the shrine John again met Ferdinand, this time at Burgos (Ernoul, p450).
39 'Eracles', p356; Ernoul, p450: John received many gifts, but no offers of tangible military aid. For Ferdinand III’s, and therefore Berengaria’s, relation to the French royal house see the genealogical table printed in the frontispiece of R. Pernoud, Blanche of Castile, trans. H. Noel (London, 1975).

40 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii.254. The 'Caesari Heisterbacensis Vita Sancti Engelberti Archiepiscopi Coloniensis', in Fontes Rerum Germanicarum, ed. J.F. Böhmer (Stuttgart, 1843-68; 4 vols) ii.301, suggests that John also received gifts from the kings of Denmark, Bohemia and Hungary. At the time Waldemar II of Denmark was still a prisoner of Henry of Schwerin (see Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp352-4). Provisional terms for the king’s release involved participation in the forthcoming crusade with a penalty of 25,000 silver marks to be paid to John of Brienne’s agents in the event of delay, but the final form of the agreement appears to have omitted the conditions relating to the Holy Land: Diplomatarium Arna-Magnaeum, ed. G.J. Thorkelin (Copenhagen, 1786; 2 vols), t.289-93, and see P.Riant, Expéditions et pèlerinages des Scandinaves en Terre Sainte au temps des croisades (Paris, 1865-9; 2 vols), t.333. Cf. also Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp353-4, who gives the penalty as 20,000 marks and implies that the obligation to go on crusade was not withdrawn. For the Danish contribution to the crusade, see also chapter 7, nn.28,37.

41 Royal Letters, i.241 (no.209).

42 'Cononis Lausannensis Notae', MGHS, xxiv.782. Cono was actually present at the burial and claims to have acquired the information from familiars of the king and ‘public utterance [publica fama]’; 13,000 marks were apparently earmarked for the transport of all the monies to the Holy Land. The sums involved in Philip’s testament vary greatly; for a comparison see Cartellieri, iv.566, who fails to include ‘Les Gestes de Phillipe-Auguste’, RHGF xvii.416. Donovan, p109n.60, notes that John of Brienne and the Masters of the Hospital and Temple each received a personal gift of 3000 marks of silver, but this appears to be part of a previous testament drafted in 1222 and superseded by the final version of 1223 - see Guillelmus Amoricus, 'De Gestis Philippi Augusti', RHGF xvii.115, and Cartellieri, iv.558-65. Röhricht, Beiträge, i.60n.69, makes the same error.

43 'Cononis Lausannensis Notae', MGHS, xxiv.782. Röhricht, Beiträge, i.61n.69, comments that the apparent financial zeal of the French crown for the affairs of the Holy Land did not benefit the crusade.

44 Had the various gifts donated by the kings of Castile (Ernoul, p450) and of England been of a similar magnitude to the bequest of Philip Augustus they would no doubt have been recorded. Walter of Coventry, ii.252, together with Matthew Paris (Chronica Majora, iii.148; Historia Anglorum, ii.259-60), challenges this interpretation, suggesting that the donations which John received in England from king, nobles and clergy were indeed substantial. But cf. 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.85 and supra, p73. Whilst in the Bailliwick of Canterbury, John of Brienne incurred expenses totalling £33/7/11, which were met by Henry III - Rot. Lit. Claus., i.584a, and v. supra n.28.

45 Chronicon Anglicanum, p194.

47 Rot. Lit. Claus., i.458b. See also supra n.8, and chapter 7, n.11.

48 Rot. Lit. Claus., i.516b.

49 Supra, p69 and n.8.

50 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.67 which assigns the levy to 1221. Lunt, Financial Relations, p420, notes that Pandulf resigned the office of legate on 19 July 1221 and therefore could not have proposed the tax, by which he ignores the possibility that the bishop-elect of Norwich could have pressured for the levy before, or even after, his resignation.

51 'Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.296. Papal involvement in this subsidy seems unlikely; nevertheless Lunt, Financial Relations, p420, considered it a possibility, and A.Gottlob, Die päpstlichen Kreuzzugssteuern des 13. Jahrhunderts (Heiligenstadt, 1892), p27, was convinced that the subsidy was exacted under the direct mandate of the pope.

52 Rot. Lit. Claus., i.516b, 567a. See also 'Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.296; Walter of Coventry, ii.252; Chronicon Anglicanum, p194.

The 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.67, assert that each knight was to pay 6d.

53 Rot. Lit. Claus., i.593a, 630a.

54 Ibid., i.594b.

55 Ibid., i.516b, 567a.


57 Rot. Lit. Claus., i.516b, 567b.

58 Ibid., i.516b, 567b.

59 'Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.296, 'Sed concessio ista parum aut nihil profuit, quia cito postea contradictum est, et ad effectum minime perductum'.

60 Rot. Lit. Claus., i.516b.

61 Ibid., i.518b, but cf. the tone of Ibid., i.630a. See also Mitchell, Studies in Taxation, p141.


62 Rot. Lit. Claus., i.567b.
63 Ibid., i. 593a, 594b, 630a.


65 Patent Rolls, 1216-1225, pp512, 527. On Henry of St. Albans see ibid., pp359, 466, 467, and Rot. Lit. Claus., i. 526b, 636b, ii. 21a, 29a, where he is styled joint custodian of the cambium. It seems unlikely that the levy would have realised much more than the two sums noted, not simply because of its voluntary nature, but also because of the relatively low contributions required. Cf. J.H. Ramsay, A History of the Revenues of the Kings of England, 1066-1399 (Oxford, 1925; 2 vols), i. 275, whose calculations of royal revenue show a marked increase for the year 6 Henry III (1221-2) which he attributes in part to the exaction of the poll tax.

66 Rot. Lit. Claus., ii. 21b. Walter of Brackley was (joint-) keeper of the wardrobe from December 1222 to June 1232, see T. F. Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History of Medieval England (Manchester, 1920-33; 6 vols), i. 190-200.

67 See also Mitchell, Studies in Taxation, p142.

68 Rot. Lit. Claus., i. 516b, 'ut possint scire quid et quantum de terra cujuslibet exierit et summam auxilii tocius regni nostri'.

69 Ibidem.

70 The money granted to Henry of St. Albans does not resurface, and it is unclear exactly why he should have received it, although v. supra n. 65.


72 Purcell, p138.

73 Purcell, pp137, 139; Lunt, Papal Revenues, i. 72, 76; J. S. C. Riley-Smith, What were the Crusades? (London, 1977), p49.

74 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix. 341-5. The levies to which he refers for the period 1221-7 were inspired by Frederick either to counter the Saracen revolt in Sicily or to finance the crossing to Syria. But cf. 'Ex Chronico Turonensi', RHGF, xviii. 312: 'Mense autem Martio [1226] Honorius papa per universas provintias predicatores cum litteris destinavit, qui ob Terre Sancte subsidium populis predicarent in remissionem omnium peccatorum sicut superius continetur in Lateranensi consilio generali', and see Gottlob, p27, and Böhm, p69. Mayer, The Crusades, p224, comments that the Treaty of San Germano made no provision for financial assistance in the shape of a crusading tax, and a cryptic entry in the pages of Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix. 349, appears to indicate that in April 1228 Gregory IX forbade the clergy to give any money whatsoever to Frederick. In 1239 Frederick complained to Richard of Cornwall that a promise made by Honorius III to make available all ecclesiastical tithes allocated for the use of the Holy Land (providing he submit
his dispute with the Lombards to papal arbitration) had not been honoured. Pope Gregory denied that such an offer had ever been made (Chronica Majora, iii.588,605).

75 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.151,156 (nos.224,226); T.Rymer and R.Sanderson, Foedera, conventiones, litterae et cujuscumque generis acta publica inter reges Angliae et alios quosvis imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes, vel communitates ed. A.Clarke and F.Holbrooke (London, 1816-69; 4 vols; Record Commission), i/1. 173; Honorius III to Philip Augustus, 'Epistolae Romanorum Pontificum', RHGF, xix.733. See also Lunt, Financial Relations, p191.

76 Purcell, p150. Powell, 'Honorius III', p533, suggests that in fact the papacy had exhausted all ecclesiastical resources in support of the army at Damietta.

77 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.341.


79 Lunt, Financial Relations, p420, cites Gottlob, pp26-7, as proof that various contemporaneous aids were granted by individual rulers in response to appeals by Honorius, but the ultimate authority [Acta Imperii Inedita, i.237 (no.261)] is no evidence.

80 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.343,344.


82 MGH Const., i.152 (no.116); Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.344; 'Ex Chronico Turonensis', RHGF, xviii.312-3.

83 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p195.

84 Constable, 'Financing of the Crusades', p68.

85 'Eracles', p358; 'Breve Chronicon', p897.

86 'Eracles', pp305-8; 'Ex Chronico Turonensi', RHGF, xviii.311; Mayer, The Crusades, p224. See also chapter 5, pp106-7.


88 'Ex Chronico Turononisri', RHGF, xviii.311; Ernoul, p452. In 1226/7 John of Brienne, apparently in response to the birth of a daughter to Isabella, attempted a reconciliation and expressed himself willing to release the money ('Ex Chronico Turonensi', RHGF, xviii.318; Van Cleve, Frederick II, p189 has the wrong date for the birth - see P.Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule in Syria', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, lix (1986), 26n.40). Runciman, iii.176, is patently incorrect when he asserts that the money was seized by Frederick in 1225. The alms donated by Philip Augustus and referred to by the Patriarch Gerold as being present in the Holy Land in 1229 (HDFS, iii.137) must surely be those donated to the military orders. The death of John of Brienne's daughter noted in 'Matthaei de Griffonibus Memoriale Historicum de Rebus Bononiensium', Rerum Italicarum Scriptores [RIS], ed. L.A.Muratori (Milan, 1723-51; 25 vols; new ed. Città di Castello and
Bologna, 1900ff; 34 vols), xviii/2. 8, under the year 1226, refers to the child of his marriage to Berengaria (born April 1225 - see Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.344) and should not be confused with either Isabella or this first child born to Isabella and Frederick.

89 MGH Const., ii.154 (no.116): 20,000 ounces of gold were to be sent to the Holy Land in the five passages following July 1225 (HDFS, ii/1. 502). Gregory accused Frederick of not having made the payments (MGH Const., ii.153 (no.116)), and by Frederick's own admission the sum which should have been sent in the fourth crossing was assigned to Hermann von Salza (admittedly one of the agreed trustees for the money) who did not cross until September 1227, at the time of the fifth crossing. The final 20,000 ounces also appear to have gone to Syria at this time (ibid., p154), but we have only Frederick's word on this.

90 HDFS ii/1. 502; 'Ex Chronico Turonensi', RHGF, xviii.313.

91 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.347-9. The Lombards were said to have promised 60,000 pounds in aid of the Holy Land in 1227 ('Ex Chronico Turonensi', RHGF, xviii.318), but this is not confirmed elsewhere.

92 Of course, this was not the sole reason behind the apparently hardline attitude adopted by Frederick in Cyprus - v. infra chapter 5, pp115-21.

93 'Gestes des Chiprois', p677. Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p164, suggests that these men were mercenaries hired with a loan of 30,000 Saracen besants exacted from the lord of Gibelet (see 'Eracles', p366), but the composition of the force would indicate mariners from the imperial fleet. Their numbers may have been exaggerated: Philip of Novara claims they filed into Philip of Ibelin's house and surrounded Frederick's banqueting guests ('Gestes', p677), but the venue and Gerold's criticisms of the fleet (HDFS, iii.135-6) would imply much lesser numbers.

94 'Gestes des Chiprois', p678; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p164.

95 'Eracles', p369; cf. 'Gestes des Chiprois', pp681-2. In 1229 Frederick sent Count Stephen to forcibly take possession of the fortresses and revenues of Cyprus - ibid., pp682-3 and note; HDFS, iii.139.

96 Flores Historiarum, ii.374; HDFS, iii.109; infra chapter 6, p180, and see also chapter 5, p139.

97 'Eracles', p375; 'Gestes des Chiprois', p684. It is possible that this money may have formed part of Frederick's plan to enlist German crusaders to fight against the papal armies in Italy. Their presence is noted, for example, by Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.354-5; 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii.261. But the Germans were unamenable to the plan because of the threat of excommunication (HDFS iii.110), and ultimately Frederick arranged for the money to be paid to Balian of Sidon and Garnier l'Aleman ('Eracles', p375). Ironically, in the event, bad weather blew the German fleet to Brindisi and brought about their participation in the crushing of the papal forces ('Breve Chronicon',...
98 HDFS, iii.105.

99 HDFS, iii.136. The sultan, al-Kâmîl, was also said to be aware of the emperor’s impoverished status - 'Eracles', p371.

100 Filangieri had left Italy soon after Easter [26 March] 1228 (‘in prima septimana mensis aprilis’, according to Frederick, HDFS, iii.58), and met the emperor at Limassol in late July - 'Eracles', p367; Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.349.


102 Chronica Majora, iii.126; cf. Flores Historiarum, ii.323, and Historia Anglorum, ii.297, which say forty thousand.

103 'Annales Placentini Guelfi', MGHS, xviii.443; 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.107. The 'Annales Wormatienses', MGHS, xvii.38, record the departure of more than four hundred citizens on crusade in March 1227. See also HDFS, ii/2. 933n.1.

104 'Annales de Theokesberia', AM, i.69; 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.107,111.

105 'Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.303; Chronica Majora, iii.128; Flores Historiarum, ii.325.

106 MGH Const., ii.152 (no.116) (6 December 1227), 'corruptela vero aeris', cf. Gregory's letter of excommunication, HDFS, iii.27, which claims the opposite - that Frederick did not provide sufficient ships.

107 Acta Imperii Inedita, i.238 (no.261). See also 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii.253.

108 MGH Const., ii.152 (no.116). The alternative reading for octingenti is contingentis.

109 MGH Const., ii.153 (no.116), and v.infra n.112.

110 MGH Const., ii.153-4 (no.116); HDFS, ii/2. 705. The San Germano agreement made provision for not meeting the stipulated number of men by providing a financial alternative - 50 marks per absent knight (HDFS, ii/1. 501), hence Gregory's accusation is flawed. Frederick himself fails to include in his calculations the 300 knights who had been sent out in 1225/6 ('Eracles', p359), which may be the 'certum numerum militum dirigit ultra mare' referred to by Richard of San Germano (MGHS, xix.346), or any knights who might have accompanied Thomas of Acerra in July 1227 (ibid., p348). Runciman, iii.177, believed the promised 1000 knights were sent to Syria in the same ships despatched in 1225 to bring back John of Brienne's daughter.
111 'Annales Cremonenses', MGHS, xviii. 807; Van Cleve, Frederick II, p193; Röhrich, Beiträge, i. 53n. 91. But cf. the apparent exemption clause in Honorius's letter to the Lombard League, 5 January 1227 (Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i. 251 (no. 331), 'auctoritate presentium declaramus, ut si forte ipse, quod absit, non transierit imperator, transire non teneantur milites supradicti, nisi forsan ipsum imperatorem propter necessitatem evidentem et manifestum et a sede apostolica approbatam continget non transire...'), which is seemingly overlooked by both Rohricht and Van Cleve. Later Frederick accused the pope of sending these knights into Apulia against him - Chronica Majora, iii. 560, 564-5.

112 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii. 107. Of the fleet of 50 galleys which Frederick now intended to send to Syria, various magnates considered that just 20 were required - MGH Const., ii. 153 (no. 116); see also Cohn, Geschichte der Sizilischen Flotte, p31, and chapter 5, n. 2.

113 Chronica Majora, iii. 128; Flores Historiarum, ii. 325: even these were discontented and threatened to depart if they were not permitted to break the truce.

114 'Eracles', p369. Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp161, 163, believed the main body of Frederick's crusade had left Palestine before he ever reached it.

115 HDFS i. 135-6; 'Eracles', p367. See also 'Iohannis Longi Chronica S. Bertini', MGHS, xxv. 836; 'Notae Sancti Emmerammi', MGHS, xvii. 574; 'Annales Gotvicenses', MGHS, ix. 603; 'Gotifredi Viterbiensis Continuatio Funiaeensis et Erbacensis', MGHS, xxii. 347. For the number of galleys in the imperial fleet, see 'Eracles', p366; 'Annales Placentini Gibellini', MGHS, xvii. 469; 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii. 114; 'Breve Chronicon', p898; 'Gestes des Chiprois', p676; Marino Sanuto, p211. Frederick had told Gregory IX that he intended to cross in greater strength than the previous year (MGH Const., ii. 153 (no. 116)), but despite ordering every eight Sicilian fiefs to provide one knight together with sufficient wages for one year, and demanding from the abbot of Monte Cassino one hundred servants for the crusade (Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix. 348, 349; P. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. M. Jones (Oxford, 1984), p91), this was not reflected in the force which accompanied him in June 1228.

116 Flores Historiarum, ii. 351-2; Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix. 349.

117 Flores Historiarum, ii. 325, 'octingenti fere milites remainserunt'. As a comparison Jordan, Louis IX, p66, employs a multiplier (for St. Louis's crusade) of four foot for every knight, which in this instance would give 3200 footsoldiers (and perhaps a similar number of bowmen, etc.). Wendover may also have assumed the members of the reception committee from the same source since he does not mention Filangieri (cf. 'Eracles', p367), although he does include the duke of Limburg (Flores Historiarum, ii. 351).

118 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii. 253; Acta Imperii Inedita, i. 238 (no. 261).

119 HDFS, iii. 27; Van Cleve, Frederick II, p198. In 1224 Frederick wrote that he had authorised John of Brienne to offer whatever inducements of passage, sustenance and other necessities he thought fit (Acta Imperii Inedita, i. 239 (no. 261), and supra, p70), but this
was probably intended to apply strictly to crusaders and not to the hordes of common pilgrims. On this see also Böhm, p72. In December 1227, perhaps as a result of Gregory's criticisms, Frederick promised 'in passagio et aliis liberaliter providebimus transituris' (MGH Const., ii.155 (no.116), but his account of horses and supplies provided for crusaders arriving in Apulia from Germany in April 1228 again gives the impression that assistance was not forthcoming for ordinary pilgrims - HDFS, iii.58.

120 MGH Const., ii.153 (no.116).

121 Gregory's letter of 5 August 1228 complained that the emperor 'cum paucis militibus mare dicitur intrasse, contra patrimonium ecclesiae magnum exercitum Christianorum et Saracenorum multitutinem destinavit' (Chronica Majora, iii.155). Cf. Boulle, p138, who believed the intentionally small force departing for Syria in June 1228 constituted 'une mission culturelle, scientifique, artistique, technique...'. Frederick's excommunication was renewed in March 1228 (Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.238-9 (no.371), despite all the indications that he intended to cross to the Holy Land in May (MGH Const., ii.153 (no.116); HDFS, iii.57-60.

122 HDFS, iii.58-9,135-6. Rumours of the conspiracy were circulating even in N. Germany - see 'Ann. Scheftlarienses Maiores', MGHS, xvii.339, and 'Ann. S. Rudberti Salisburgenses', MGHS, ix.784.


123 'Eracles', pp369-70; Flores Historiarum, ii.366.
The Emperor Frederick and the nobility of the Latin East

The Emperor Frederick arrived in Syria in September 1228 and departed eight months later at the beginning of May 1229. His relatively brief sojourn in Syria was dominated largely by a series of diplomatic exchanges with the Egyptian sultan, al-Kāmil, culminating ultimately in the cession of the Holy City of Jerusalem to the Franks. But the negotiations pursued by Frederick with the Muslims by no means constituted the sole activity of the emperor in Palestine, nor was his presence co-incident with the whole period covered by the imperial crusade.

For a whole year prior to Frederick's own arrival in Syria his army was active in rebuilding a number of ruined fortifications. Arriving in the early autumn of 1227 under the leadership of the duke of Limburg, the crusaders initially assembled at Acre. On 28 October a great gathering was held outside the walls of the city, and in the presence of Gerold, Henry of Limburg (who was here confirmed in his role as leader of the army by the crusaders) and the heads of the three main military orders, it was agreed that the army should reconstruct Jaffa and Caesarea as a preliminary to an attack on Jerusalem; the army would set out for Caesarea on 2 November. Obviously the departure date was over-optimistic: before the plan could be put into operation news reached Acre of the death of al-Mu'azzam, the prince of Damascus, which had occurred on 11 November 1227/30 Dhū'l-Qa'da 624 H. It was therefore decided to take advantage of the Muslim disarray and seize the city of Sidon.
which had been under joint Muslim and Christian administration since the Franks' treaty with al-\textsuperscript{5}\textsuperscript{Adil in 1204}. The subsequent work of reconstruction lasted until the spring of 1228 and not only guaranteed the crusader possession of the city but also improved the security of the coastal road. At the same time as the English and French were working on the new fortifications at Sidon, another group of crusaders may have begun the refortification of Montfort. On completion of the work at Sidon the army returned to Acre, briefly pasturing their horses at Haifa before moving on to Caesarea around the end of April or early May. Here the crusaders probably engaged themselves in the reconstruction of the citadel on the south quay of the port which al-Mu\textsuperscript{6}azzam had destroyed. The work lasted about five months and was probably completed by the time of the emperor's arrival in late summer. The former Château-du-Roi in the mountains of Acre was also rebuilt about this time.

The engagement of the crusader army in the restoration of the kingdom's embattled defences was probably a deliberate decision on the part of the crusade leaders. Although it was possible to claim that the death of al-Mu\textsuperscript{7}azzam had invalidated the existing truce with the Muslims in Syria, negotiations had already been initiated between Frederick and the Egyptian sultan, al-Kämîl. Any display of aggression on the part of the crusaders might possibly have been misinterpreted by the Egyptians, negate completely what progress had been made, and consequently threaten the success of the whole campaign. Hence the severity with which Thomas of Acerra suppressed an unauthorised chevauchée against the Muslims in early November. A strong programme of refortification would usefully channel enthusiasms until the arrival of the emperor, whilst simultaneously benefitting the security of the kingdom. It was obvious that such a
programme would not necessarily satisfy the majority of crusaders, who were anxious to get to grips with the enemy, but by defining the planned reconstruction as a necessary preliminary to an advance on Jerusalem it was possible at least to gain their acquiescence and to prevent an eruption of uncontrollable fervour.

Frederick’s plans to depart for the Holy Land in May 1228 were interrupted by the death of the Empress Isabella on the sixth of that month, and as a consequence the imperial fleet did not leave port until 28 June. It arrived at Limassol in Cyprus on 21 July. On 17 August the emperor moved overland to Nicosia before rejoining the fleet at Famagusta on 2 September. The following day the fleet sailed for Syria, moving down the coast from Botron via Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre, before finally putting in at Acre on 7 September. Frederick seems to have installed himself initially in the citadel, at the boundary of the old town and the new quarter of Montmusard, but very soon quit the city for the nearby village of Tell-Kurdana (Ricordane) which lay between Acre and Haifa. It was here that Frederick learnt of the arrival at Acre of two Franciscan brothers sent by the pope with letters denouncing the emperor as an excommunicate and forbidding the military orders from rendering any assistance whatsoever.

In the meantime Frederick’s negotiations with the sultan of Egypt continued unabated through the medium of Balian of Sidon and Thomas of Acerra; but al-Kāmil’s sudden departure from Nablus threatened to cut short the intercourse. Frederick’s response was to march to Jaffa, a reaction which has been portrayed as a military gesture designed to bring pressure to bear on the sultan, who now appeared to be reneging on a previous offer to return a large wedge
of the Holy Land to Frankish rule. But although the emperor does seem to have announced his intention to march on Jaffa with this in mind, we have seen that the plan to rebuild the port's ruined defences had already been agreed by the crusaders at Acre the previous autumn. Jaffa may, therefore, have been Frederick's trump card which al-Kāmil's withdrawal compelled him to play. In contrast Gerold of Lausanne cynically attributed the emperor's decision to a desire to be close to the Egyptian sultan in order to continue his parleys with the enemy and secure a truce. Despite the malice displayed by the patriarch it is clear that this did nevertheless play a part in the emperor's thinking.

The expedition arrived at Jaffa around 15 November 1228, and almost immediately ran into trouble: ships carrying supplies were delayed by storms at sea, and the army was compelled to consider a return to Acre. This was forestalled by a propitious improvement in the weather, but in the intervening period the crusaders had ravaged the neighbouring Muslim villages for food, and only after the damage had been made good did al-Kāmil permit the recommencement of negotiations. Even then he warned against the fortification of Jaffa, but the work went ahead. Towards the end of December, whilst Frederick was still at Jaffa, an armed galleon arrived from Apulia carrying disconcerting news: hostilities had broken out in Italy. To forestall any initial advantage to the papal army Frederick's regent, Reginald of Spoleto, had invaded the March of Ancona and the Duchy of Spoleto in the autumn of 1228. The news prompted Frederick to order ship's biscuit to be prepared and his ships and baggage made ready. Only the unfavourable time of year appears to have prevented his departure.
But Frederick's patience was rewarded. On 11 February 1229, whilst the crusaders were still at Jaffa, the emperor was able to disclose the draft clauses of an agreement by which Jerusalem was to be handed back to the Franks. The following Sunday, 18 February, the treaty was signed. As a result the emperor may have hoped to celebrate Easter [15 April 1229] in the Holy City, but intelligence which arrived at Jaffa on 7 March (probably concerning events in Italy) could have served to alter such plans. Frederick swiftly sought al-Kāmil's permission to visit the Holy City, and on 17 March, leaving the Cypriot knights behind at Jaffa, the crusaders entered Jerusalem. The following day the emperor wore the crown in the Holy Sepulchre, and on 19 March the army returned to Jaffa. After a brief stop-over, the crusaders made their way back to Acre, arriving around 25 March 1229.

From now on the poor relations between Frederick, the Patriarch Gerold, and the Templars, which had grown steadily worse since February, deteriorated even further, to the point of open conflict. On Palm Sunday [8 April] 1229, Franciscan and Dominican friars were reportedly dragged from the pulpits in Acre, and around the same time Frederick is said to have laid siege to the houses of the Temple and patriarch for a period of five days. Immediately prior to this episode Frederick may also have tried to seize the new Templar fortress at Chastel Pèlerin ('Athlit). The tale is absent from the main text of the Estoire de Eracles but is related by the Chronique d'Ernoul. According to this version the attempt was made during the emperor's stay at Acre, soon after his arrival in the Holy Land. It was only after his failure to take the stronghold, and after his subsequent return to Acre, that Frederick set out for Jaffa. Professor Prawer manages to reconcile the account by suggesting that
the absence of any other major Frankish fortress between Haifa and Caesarea may have provided Frederick with the excuse that imperial control of Chastel Pèlerin was necessary in order to provide adequate security for the march to Jerusalem\textsuperscript{38}. But if the assault on Chastel Pèlerin is not to be dismissed as pure invention\textsuperscript{39}, it seems more likely that it would have taken place in March 1229, en route from Jaffa to Acre. Despite his dislike for the Templars, and their Master in particular, Frederick is unlikely to have risked alienating a potential source of assistance so early in the crusade, whereas after his crown-wearing in Jerusalem it is clear from Gerold’s letters to the pope that the emperor’s relations with the order were at an extremely low ebb\textsuperscript{40}. This episode must therefore be attributed to the period 20-25 March\textsuperscript{41}, although by following, in isolation, the description of events put forward by William of Tyre’s continuator, it is possible to argue that Frederick first returned to Acre from Jaffa, and only then set out for Chastel Pèlerin, returning immediately afterwards to attack the house of the Temple\textsuperscript{42}. This would limit the assault to early April 1229.

On 1 May Frederick embarked at Acre\textsuperscript{43} and sailed to Tyre, where he issued a charter in the city to John de Bagnolo in acknowledgement of services rendered the emperor in Jerusalem\textsuperscript{44}. From there the fleet crossed to Cyprus where the emperor married the young King Henry by proxy to Alice of Montferrat\textsuperscript{45}, before continuing his journey to Brindisi, which was reached on 10 June 1229, one year after Frederick’s departure for the East\textsuperscript{46}.

Apart from letters written by Frederick himself, Hermann von Salza and Gerold, and the partisan accounts of the baronial histories, the documentary evidence for the crusade as a whole is
scanty. Nevertheless the movements of the crusader army 1227-8 and of the emperor himself in Syria can be followed with relative ease, but the minutiae of the expedition must remain sketchy, and even the application of the Muslim chronology fails to permit the dating of certain episodes of the crusade with any greater certainty. One thing is, however, clear, namely that although Frederick was preoccupied with negotiating a peaceful settlement in Syria, his activities were not strictly limited to discussions with the Muslims: he used his presence to enforce his own authority in Cyprus and the kingdom of Jerusalem, issuing charters, granting privileges and appointing officers. But whereas Frederick, as German Emperor, was the recognised suzerain of Cyprus, his status in the kingdom of Jerusalem was not so easily defined.

When Frederick II married John of Brienne’s daughter, the heiress to the kingdom of Jerusalem, in November 1225, his position was essentially one of king-consort to the young queen, but he immediately took the title ‘king of Jerusalem’ and laid claim to all his queen’s prerogatives in spite of protests from her father who claimed that his retention of the title for the remainder of his lifetime had been guaranteed by Hermann von Salza. The distinction between king and king-consort would not have been obvious to the thirteenth century nobility, and Frederick’s actions would not have been out of place or unexpected. Indeed the nobles who had accompanied Isabella to the West willingly paid homage to the emperor, and the imperial envoy, the bishop of Melfi, sent to Syria to receive the homage of the nobles of the kingdom, successfully carried out his commission. The homage which Frederick received from his vassals in Jerusalem was, therefore, rendered to him as king and husband of Isabella. But although Frederick’s assumption of
the title king of Jerusalem may have been justified on legal grounds—after all, John of Brienne's sole claim was that of regent to his daughter in a kingdom which she had inherited from her mother—this did not guarantee his recognition as such. Both Honorius III and Gregory IX (until after the treaty of San Germano) refused to address Frederick as king of Jerusalem and continued to reserve the title for John of Brienne.

Together with his wife, Frederick issued charters for the kingdom and appointed baillis to rule on his behalf. The term bailli was very broad and might be used, as in this case, to indicate a lieutenant established by a king or regent who was, or intended to be, absent temporarily from the kingdom, but equally might be applied to a regent chosen in a time of minority or when the heir to the throne had not yet come to be crowned. Frederick designated as his lieutenants Odo of Montbéliard in 1225 and Thomas of Acerra in 1226/7, but in practice although it was possible, through his wife, to appoint such lieutenants, theoretically no regent could exercise authority in the kingdom until he came in person to receive it. The designation of Odo of Montbéliard as bailli in 1225 was perhaps intended as an assurance of continuity. Odo, who was a kinsman of John of Brienne and whose uncle had been in the entourage of John's brother, Walter, during the years 1202-4, had been left in charge of the kingdom by John when he departed for the West in 1222. The confirmation of Odo's position by Frederick and Isabella must have reassured many of those who feared dramatic change as a result of the marriage. The appointment of Thomas of Acerra as Odo's successor in 1226/7 was far more radical. Acerra had created a name for himself as a captain of the imperial forces during Frederick's campaign to bring the Sicilian nobility to heel and re-establish
royal rights as they had been under the Norman kings. His promotion to the rank of Frederick's representative in the Holy Land is unlikely to have been co-incidental\textsuperscript{59}, and the population of Syria was said to have been greatly troubled as to what the appointment presaged of Frederick's intentions\textsuperscript{60}. Certainly it would seem not unreasonable to interpret the move as evidence that Frederick hoped to pursue in Palestine the same policy as he had in Sicily\textsuperscript{61}.

Thomas of Acerra's position in the kingdom of Jerusalem was officially one of representative of both Frederick and Isabella, but de facto as representative of imperial interests in the kingdom. When Isabella died in May 1228 leaving a ten-day-old son, Conrad\textsuperscript{62}, it might be inferred from our sources that Frederick's status, and consequently the count's role, were radically altered: Frederick was not now 'king', but merely regent for the infant Conrad\textsuperscript{63}. As such, according to John of Jaffa\textsuperscript{64}, he was powerless to appoint his own representatives in the kingdom until he came in person and presented himself before the High Court for acceptance as regent. Hence, Thomas of Acerra's position as Frederick's lieutenant also lapsed, and John of Jaffa wrote in his treatise on the bailliage that, after John of Beirut and John of Caesarea had declined to take up the office, the High Court chose Balian of Sidon and Odo of Montbéliard as regents for Conrad until such time as the emperor might arrive in Syria\textsuperscript{65}. This must have occurred in June or early July 1228.

But despite Thomas of Acerra's apparent replacement and the appointment of Balian of Sidon and Odo of Montbéliard sur le fait de la seignorie ['in charge of the affairs of the lordship',\textsuperscript{65a}], at the time of the emperor's arrival in Cyprus in July 1228 he is referred to by the Estoire de Eracles as bailli of the kingdom of Jerusalem\textsuperscript{66},
and witnessed two charters in the same capacity in April 1229\textsuperscript{67}. The Patriarch Gerold also tells us that Frederick intended Thomas should remain as \textit{ballivus} in the kingdom after the emperor's own departure\textsuperscript{68}.

The implication would appear to be that, despite the death of Isabella in May 1228 which deprived him of any legal authority, Thomas of Acerra retained his position as imperial lieutenant in the kingdom from the time of his appointment to the office by Frederick and Isabella in 1226/7 right through to the time of the emperor's departure from the Holy Land in May 1229. Such an interpretation, however, fails to take account of a number of problems. For instance, how was it possible for Thomas to hold on to the title of \textit{bailli} after the election of Balian of Sidon and Odo of Montbéliard as regents for Conrad, and why should Frederick have found it necessary to persist with a \textit{bailli} during his own presence in the kingdom? One solution might be that since the appointment of Frederick as regent for Conrad was likely to be a mere formality, Thomas of Acerra was able to remain as Frederick's representative in Syria complete with the title of \textit{bailli} until formally reappointed; in the meantime, however, the law required that regents be chosen to exercise authority until Frederick himself came and was accepted as regent. On the emperor's arrival in Syria it would be feasible for him to replace both Balian of Sidon and Odo of Montbéliard, and reinvest Thomas with the powers which accompanied his title.

But this explanation is unsatisfactory: although the count of Acerra appears in charters of April 1229 as \textit{bailli} of the kingdom, John of Jaffa makes no mention of a transfer of authority from Balian of Sidon and Odo of Montbéliard to Thomas of Acerra during the
emperor's stay in the Holy Land and, indeed, clearly identifies Frederick as holding the bailliage of the kingdom at this time. In addition Balian of Sidon is referred to as the emperor's bailli at a juncture soon after the completion of negotiations with the Muslims. The obvious solution would appear be that not long after news of the empress's death reached the Holy Land in 1228 Thomas of Acerra was removed from his position as imperial lieutenant in the kingdom and, as Professor Riley-Smith asserts, the description of Acerra as bailli at the time of the emperor's disembarkation at Limassol in July 1228 is an error of fact by William of Tyre's continuator. In April 1229, in anticipation of the emperor's departure, Acerra was reappointed to the office; hence his title on the various charters issued by Frederick in that month. During the intervening period Balian of Sidon and Odo of Montbéliard initially held the title of baillis (in the sense of being regents), but the emperor's arrival in the kingdom rendered their continuation in office unnecessary. John of Jaffa's account in which he ascribes the bailliage of the kingdom to Frederick during his stay and yet also identifies Balian of Sidon as bailli can be reconciled. Although, as we have seen, the term bailli was often used in Old French sources to signify a regent who was related to the monarch by blood, or a vassal chosen as regent by the High Court, or indeed a lieutenant appointed by a regent (or monarch) to govern in his or her absence, it was also applied indiscriminately to minor officials operating in the royal domain and lordships. John of Jaffa significantly refers to Balian in this instance not as bailli dou roiaume, but as baill de l'empereor. In other words the reference may not be taken as indicating that Balian continued uninterrupted as regent, then imperial lieutenant, in the kingdom right up until the reappointment of Thomas of Acerra, but that during Frederick's presence in the Holy
Land he was on at least one occasion acting as a direct representative of the emperor. As for Frederick holding the bailliage during this period, the assertion is not inconsistent since both Frederick's status and his recognition as regent for Conrad by the High Court demand that the term be interpreted not as 'lieutenancy', but as 'regency'.

There is, however, another twist to the final solution. According to the jurist, Philip of Novara, when an absentee monarch had come of age the law which then operated was substantially different from that which applied in the case of a minor. In fact there existed no precedent for such an assertion, but nevertheless John of Jaffa was to write that as soon as Conrad came of age Frederick's regency was automatically terminated and, as in 1228, the office of his lieutenant in the Holy Land, allegedly held by Odo of Montbéliard at this time, also lapsed. The Livre au Roi, however, although it makes no allowance for such an eventuality as an absentee monarch, stipulates that where a king had come of age but had not yet been crowned, further acts of a parent-bailli were still valid provided they were countersealed by the young king. In other words, even after 26 April 1243, the date of Conrad's majority, Frederick, and consequently his lieutenant, could continue legitimately to exercise authority, backed by the sanction of Conrad's seal, until the young king himself came East to be crowned. That this was the prevailing view - at least until the early 1240s - is evidenced by a petition of June 1241 in which the barons John of Ibelin (later count of Jaffa), Balian of Beirut, John of Arsur, Philip of Montfort and Geoffrey of Estrein requested the emperor that he appoint as his lieutenant in the kingdom the earl of Leicester, Simon de Montfort (who was then on crusade in the Holy Land), stating
explicitly that de Montfort would hold the lieutenancy first of all for Frederick, as regent, and then, once Conrad reached his majority, for the absentee king, without interruption. If such a proposition was acceptable to the baronage in 1241, then it is inconceivable that in 1228 it would not have been possible for Thomas of Acerra to retain the lieutenancy of the kingdom until the arrival of the emperor despite the natural hiatus created by the death of Frederick's wife. The appointment of substitute baillis would, therefore, have been completely unnecessary, and the description of the count of Acerra by William of Tyre's continuator as bailli of the kingdom in July 1228 would not have been incongruous. In addition, this would tie in with the homage Frederick had received from the Syrian nobility in 1225 and which may arguably have given Thomas of Acerra the right to remain bailli even after the death of Isabella.

Such an interpretation, however, directly contradicts John of Jaffa's treatise on the bailliage which clearly states that on Isabella's death the count of Acerra was replaced by Odo of Montbéliard and Balian of Sidon, and that when Conrad came of age Odo (theoretically imperial lieutenant since 1229) had formally to be re-elected before the regency was passed to Queen Alice. What is interesting, however, is that this brief survey of the bailliage was written by the same John of Jaffa who in 1241 along with other nobles advocated the appointment of Simon de Montfort as lieutenant for both Frederick and, subsequently, Conrad.

So why should John have considered in 1241 such a continuation in office feasible, but not when he came to write his treatise in c.1265? The answer lies in the fact that John was not an historian, but rather sought to establish retrospectively a justification for
baronial actions primarily with regard to the termination of Frederick's bailliage in the kingdom in 1242. It is for this reason that John totally ignores the appointment of the imperial marshal Richard Filangieri as Frederick's lieutenant, although the nomination had been accepted without question by the High Court in 1231. To have acknowledged Filangieri's tenure of the office would not only have seriously undermined the baronial claim that a lieutenant could not be appointed simply on the say-so of letters from an absentee monarch or regent, but would also have severely damaged the carefully constructed argument that a change in ruler, be it due to the majority of a minor or the death of the rightful queen, brought with it major constitutional implications which had to be dealt with in person by the new absentee king or regent. The temporary re-election of Odo of Montbéliard, said to be the imperial lieutenant in Syria, and the supposed precedent for this action - the replacement in 1228 of Thomas of Acerra by Balian of Sidon and the ubiquitous Odo - formed a part of this argument. Only by tailoring the pattern of events with regard to Conrad's majority, and by endowing the death of Isabella with greater constitutional significance than it ever possessed, could the barons, at the instigation of the Ibelins, create an umbrella of respectability for their challenge to Hohenstaufen rule.

In 1241 the baronial leaders had sought to resolve their differences with the emperor by means of a compromise appointment to the lieutenancy; in c.1265 when John of Jaffa came to write his account of the bailliage he was concerned to establish a credible explanation of what had been achieved in the intervening period by unconstitutional means. The baronial petition of 1241 and the Livre au Roi both show that it was accepted practice in the kingdom that
appointments made by a parent-baili were valid even after an heir came of age, and consequently that Frederick's continued regency for his son would have been legitimate. It seems clear that to overcome this John manufactured evidence to support the transfer of the bailiage from Frederick to Alice, and that this evidence included the replacement of Thomas of Acerra in 1228. It is probable, therefore, that Thomas was not superseded as baili of the kingdom by Balian of Sidon and Odo of Montbéliard, but continued in office until the emperor's arrival in Syria in September 1228. He was then re-appointed to the office in April 1229.

But Frederick's decision to leave Thomas of Acerra as lieutenant in the kingdom with full powers was reversed by the time of the emperor's departure for Italy. Already on board ship Frederick named Balian of Sidon and Garnier l'Aleman as his representatives, an appointment which was apparently confirmed by the fact that they joined Frederick at Tyre a day or two later. The belief that Thomas of Acerra had already returned to Sicily, based presumably on his letter to the emperor of February or March 1229 detailing the advances made in Italy by the papal army under the command of John of Brienne would adequately explain the switch in appointments, but the count of Acerra's presence in the kingdom of Jerusalem in April 1229 is attested by the two charters which he witnessed at Acre, and by Gerold's letter to all the Christian faithful which was probably written in May 1229. An alternative argument favours the view that although in general a regent's choice of lieutenant (providing the regent had himself already been received in the Holy Land) could not be challenged, pressure brought to bear by the vassals and High Court had some indirect influence resulting in Thomas of Acerra's replacement. This may well have been the
case, but the worsening news from Italy might equally have prompted Frederick to reverse his earlier decision, thereby permitting the return home of Thomas of Acerra who had, after all, already proved himself on the battlefields of Apulia.

In summation then, Thomas of Acerra held authority as imperial lieutenant in the kingdom of Jerusalem from the time of his arrival in the summer of 1227 until the appearance of the emperor at Acre in September 1228. Although Isabella's death radically altered Frederick's perceived status in the kingdom, we must discount John of Jaffa's claim that it necessitated the replacement of Thomas of Acerra as bailiff by Odo of Montbéliard and Balian of Sidon. The count was then briefly re-appointed in April 1229. As for the emperor's legal position in the kingdom of Jerusalem, until the death of his wife Frederick was owed homage as king and husband to Isabella. After Isabella's death his status was transformed to become that of regent for Conrad, but in theory until he came in person to Syria this regency would not be recognised in law. Frederick himself continued to use the title king of Jerusalem - an accepted practice, since John of Brienne had done the same during his regency for Isabella.

The question of Frederick's legal status in the East was an important one on which depended his attitude towards, and his relationship with, the baronage of both Syria and the island of Cyprus. As regards Cyprus, Frederick contended that the regency belonged to him by right: the Emperor Henry VI had granted the island in fief to Aimery of Lusignan in 1197, and whilst a developing European custom held that a king or lord should have wardship of a vassal's lands during a minority, since the death of King Hugh in
1218 the office of regent and guardian for the minor Henry I had been held by his mother, Alice of Champagne. This was in perfect accord with practice in the Latin East, which said that a regency belonged first to a child's surviving parent; but since Cyprus was a vassal-state of the empire it was not unreasonable for Frederick to press that it should follow imperial custom. In a number of letters he reminded Alice that she held the regency solely at his pleasure, and when Henry was crowned in 1225 without his permission (an action which may have been prompted by the prospect of baronial disenchantment with their de facto rule had the Ibelins delayed the coronation) he complained bitterly, and with justification, that the crown should have been received from him alone. Not only did such an action totally ignore Frederick's claims to the bailliage, blatantly flouting his rights as suzerain, but it also laid the foundations for the antagonism which was to follow. Frederick's relations with a section of the Cypriot nobility were therefore from the beginning likely to be little less than stormy.

On the eve of his arrival in Cyprus Frederick appears to have had two main objectives; the first to re-establish what he believed to be his rights as suzerain of the kingdom, the second to finance his crusade from the revenues of the kingdom, which according to imperial tradition should have accrued to him. In opposition to these aims Frederick faced John of Ibelin, the 'Old Lord' of Beirut, who together with his brother Philip, then Queen Alice's lieutenant in Cyprus, had pushed through Henry's coronation in defiance of imperial rights. John was not unknown in the West and Frederick himself stated that he had long ago heard of his adversary's skill as an orator. At a banquet in Limassol within days of his arrival in Cyprus the emperor demanded the surrender of Beirut, which he
claimed John of Ibelin did not hold by right, and the profits of the
revenues of the bailliage and regalia of Cyprus for the ten years
since the death of King Hugh, 'for this is my right according to the
usage of Germany'.

Although none of the authorities state explicitly that John had
been elected to the bailliage following Philip's death earlier in the
year, it is unlikely that Frederick would have addressed his demands
for the revenues of the kingdom to anyone other than the person he
considered responsible for them. There is also evidence to suggest
that Frederick may have suspected the Ibelins of corrupt
administration. But although John made a bold response claiming
that Beirut had been granted him by Isabella and Aimery (i.e.
pre-1205), and asserting that the Cypriot rents had been enjoyed by
Alice alone, it is clear that John did not necessarily carry the
majority support of the Cypriot baronage. Alice herself had had a
major disagreement with Philip of Ibelin, and the activities of the
Ibelins, during the later stages of the minority in particular, had
antagonised a good many nobles, with the result that in anticipation
of Frederick's arrival in the kingdom certain of their leaders had
set out to meet him en route to lay out their complaints and explain
the usefulness of Cyprus for the crusade. The rumours of the
Ibelins' corruption which appear to have circulated in Frederick's
entourage, and doubts as to the legitimacy of John's possession of
Beirut may have had their origins in the information communicated to
the emperor by these knights.

But in actual fact it may have been that Frederick had no right
to demand that John of Ibelin surrender his fief of Beirut since he
had not yet been received in Syria as regent and therefore in law
could be said to have held no powers in the kingdom. Whether or not this was true, it was certainly arguable that the matter of Beirut was one which could be dealt with only by the High Court of Jerusalem. It was therefore agreed that twenty of John's followers, including two of his sons, should join the emperor's party as a guarantee for John's appearance before the High Court, and that John himself would serve the emperor on the mainland.

The dispute was an unnecessary complication to Frederick's position in Cyprus, and may indeed have weakened that position. It certainly cannot have failed to heighten suspicions among the Ibelin partisans and on 26 or 27 July they withdrew to Nicosia in line with predictions by Frederick's collaborators who had warned that a careful watch should be kept on the movements of John and his followers. But the emperor does not seem to have been at all worried by the course of events and remained at Limassol a full three weeks after John's departure. Perhaps his sense of security was encouraged by his continued possession of the lord of Beirut's two sons, and indeed, despite wariness on John's part - as the emperor approached Nicosia he withdrew to the castle of Dieu d'Amour - a compromise solution appears to have been reached relatively quickly. Under the mediation of some of the more moderate Syrian leaders, the lord of Beirut and his followers promised fealty to Frederick as liege-lord of King Henry, and agreed to serve him in the Holy Land. They recognised him as suzerain of Cyprus, but refused him the bailliage which they claimed belonged by right to Alice. Frederick, however, was permitted the functions of the office and would receive the rents together with the custody of the king. The kingdom was to be received in person by Henry, but until his majority the castles would be guarded by Cypriot liegemen appointed by
Frederick. In addition Frederick was to free the hostages who had been delivered to him at Limassol. In other words, Frederick received the bailliage of the kingdom as was his right as imperial suzerain, but the title of bailli was retained by Alice in accordance with the laws of Cyprus. The agreement, however, only postponed the quarrel as Frederick does not appear to have obtained satisfaction concerning the outstanding rents which should have accrued to him during the previous ten years, and the question of Beirut had yet to be settled.

Throughout Frederick's stay in Cyprus both parties appear to have maintained a sense of legality. Frederick may have used bullying tactics to impress on John of Ibelin the rights which he claimed as suzerain, but with the one exception of intimidating his banqueting guests, he cannot be said to have behaved arbitrarily: he had not seized John's person, the hostages which he requested had been surrendered to him voluntarily, and he had agreed to take the case of Beirut to the High Court of Jerusalem. In fact Frederick had acted in a very restrained manner. For John's part, he had rejected a suggestion made by John of Caesarea and Anceau of Brie that they assassinate the emperor, and had emphasised that as vassals his followers must not raise arms against Frederick's person. But by withdrawing from the emperor's presence and commencing fortification of three strongholds in the north of the island, the Ibelins had severely compromised themselves in the eyes of those who accused them of maladministration and corruption. Whilst they had acted in accordance with their own ideas of the laws of Cyprus, Frederick could have been forgiven had he chosen to impose his own interpretation of a suzerain's rights with even greater firmness. Instead he held back and, assisted by John of Ibelin's refusal
actively to oppose him, was able to conclude the highly favourable agreement of August 1228.

It has been suggested that Frederick may have intended to employ against the Cypriot nobles the same methods used so successfully in southern Italy\textsuperscript{115}, and that the agreement reached between John of Ibelin and the emperor was prompted by fears that delay in Cyprus would permit the pope to seize the initiative in Italy\textsuperscript{116}. But Frederick’s impatience with the situation in Cyprus is not over-evident and the bias of the agreement would tend to indicate that Frederick (and his collaborators) held the advantage and were clearly recognised as doing so by the Ibelins. Hence the emperor had no need to make concessions, but all the same he may have found it expedient to drop demands for a refund of rents in Cyprus and an account of the bailliage. It was sufficient that he had effective control of the kingdom and had been able to secure use of the rents there to help finance his crusade in Syria\textsuperscript{117}. When in April 1229 Frederick sent Count Stephen and a force of Italians from Botron to Cyprus to impose his regency and take control of the fortresses and revenues, his action was entirely consistent with his views of his status in the kingdom, that of regent for the king, but contrary to the compromise of the previous autumn which had formally recognised Alice as bailli\textsuperscript{1} and which had entrusted the fortresses not to Frederick’s own officers but to the liegemen of the king. By the same argument Frederick was perfectly within his rights to appoint his own baillis, which he now did, however unethical the farming of the bailliage might seem. It was his decision to disinherit the lord of Beirut and his followers [in Cyprus] and to prevent their return to the island, without having obtained the sanction of the High Court, however, which overstepped his authority and was to seriously affect
his relations with the feudatories on the mainland, leading ultimately to civil war\textsuperscript{118}. Only then did the strained relations finally reach breaking point.

Frederick had come to Cyprus claiming the bailliage as imperial practice demanded; this he had received in all but name, but with certain limitations of power in line with the laws of Cyprus. This was adequate for his immediate requirements, but once he had achieved his aims in the kingdom of Jerusalem he chose to renege on his agreement with the lord of Beirut and assert the imperial rights he had claimed all along. Consequently, after the emperor’s stop-over in Cyprus in May 1229 he departed the kingdom as acknowledged suzerain and \textit{de facto} regent, but left behind him a veritable powder keg.

The policy pursued by Frederick in Cyprus, and the manner of its implementation were important since many feudatories held fiefs in both Cyprus and in the kingdom of Jerusalem. It was likely, therefore, that Frederick’s actions in Cyprus and the attitude he assumed towards the nobility there would have a direct bearing on his relations with the baronage of Syria. This goes some way to explain his willingness to compromise and his refusal to countenance any rash moves against the Ibelins and their supporters during their presence at Nicosia and Dieu d’Amour. The subsequent agreement reached between the two parties in the late summer of 1228 improved the strained relations and ensured that John of Ibelin and the rest of the Cypriot nobles would render their co-operation to the emperor on the mainland. At the same time it probably also encouraged support from those Syrian barons who did not hold fiefs in Cyprus. Indeed there is evidence to suggest that during the period
September/November 1228 to February/March 1229, Frederick's relations with the Syrian nobility as a whole (including the Cypriot feudatories) were relatively amicable. Although Frederick had departed on crusade whilst still under sentence of excommunication, and despite the arrival of Franciscan friars carrying letters from the pope which forbade all contact with the emperor or obedience to his orders, the vast majority of the nobility and crusaders affirmed their willingness to follow the emperor to Jaffa. Only the Masters of the Temple and Hospital demurred, declaring that they considered themselves obedient to the pope alone, but even so announced that under the circumstances, for the 'need and benefit' of Christendom they would be prepared to accompany the emperor. No doubt it was this episode which led Frederick in a letter dated March 1229, to comment favourably on the help and assistance he had received from the patriarch and military orders. As for the nobles themselves, though John of Ibelin might not be considered as being representative of the Syrian baronage as a whole, then at least he can be put forward as an example that even those who were not entirely well-disposed towards the emperor appear to have sunk their differences and co-operated.

Frederick's relationship with the Syrian nobility was therefore a working relationship. It was not without friction, but both parties realised the necessity of co-operation. In law Frederick was regent for his son Conrad; in practice he claimed the title king of Jerusalem. But despite his crownwearing in the Holy Sepulchre he does not seem to have demanded that homage be paid to him as king. Nor does he appear to have raised the question of Beirut at any time during his stay in the Holy Land. Whilst in Cyprus he had received the homage of the Cypriot nobility as liege-lord of King Henry, and
had requested the fealty of Bohemond IV of Antioch-Tripoli and all his vassals. Bohemond refused to comply with the emperor's wishes, but nevertheless appears to have remained on reasonable terms with the emperor and is found in his presence at Acre in April 1229.\textsuperscript{127}

Frederick took what was essentially a pragmatic attitude towards Cyprus and Syria. By agreeing to minimal compromises in Cyprus he was able to avoid a major confrontation with the Ibelins which might have hampered the progress of the crusade. The same priority dictated that the question of Beirut should be left unanswered until the objectives of the crusade had first been achieved. In the same way Frederick was unwilling to press his claims to suzerainty over the principality and county of Antioch-Tripoli. Although he was anxious to re-establish his rights in the East as he saw them, his claims to Bohemond IV's fealty are nevertheless dubious. It has been suggested that he may have based his demands on his position as regent-to-be of Jerusalem,\textsuperscript{128} but without having been received in Syria Frederick may not have had authority to make such demands, and moreover it is arguable whether or not Antioch-Tripoli was a vassal of the neighbouring kingdom.\textsuperscript{129}

Although Bohemond refused to pay the emperor the homage which he demanded, Frederick declined to exact it by force. Relations between the empire and Antioch-Tripoli had on the whole been good, and Tripoli was already a centre for opposition to the Ibelins.\textsuperscript{130} Frederick would not therefore have wished to forfeit Bohemond's sympathy and aid at this stage.\textsuperscript{131} Indeed, the only evidence for a major schism between Frederick and Bohemond is given by the jurist, Philip of Novara, a celebrated Ibelin partisan, who describes how the prince feigned illness and slipped away from Cyprus under cover of darkness before his oath of fealty could be exacted.\textsuperscript{132} But reading
between the lines there is nothing strange in Bohemond’s departure; he left Cyprus at the same time as Frederick, as did John of Ibelin, but whereas the emperor sailed to Botron and moved down the coast via Beirut, Sidon and Tyre to Acre, John of Ibelin crossed to Beirut, and Bohemond, as might be expected, sailed to Nefin, the nearest port in the county of Tripoli and only slightly up the coast from Botron. Although there is no evidence to show that Bohemond was ever with the emperor in the kingdom of Jerusalem before his appearance at Acre in April 1229, this should not be taken as proof that the two were on bad terms: not only do William of Tyre’s continuators omit reference to the rupture, but in recent years much doubt has been cast on the reliability of Philip of Novara’s portrayal of events. With one flourish of the pen Novara is able to accuse the emperor of ill-treating John of Ibelin’s sons when he held them hostage in Cyprus, and with another he finds it not inconsistent to recount how Balian of Ibelin was subsequently taken into the imperial household (and served the emperor well), whilst his brother, John, was offered the city of Foggia. And there are other contradictions of fact, such as the two different dates for Bohemond IV’s arrival in Cyprus and the uncertainty as to which of John of Ibelin’s sons were given as hostages, over and above Novara’s very obvious bias towards the Ibelin household. Professor Riley-Smith points out that Philip of Novara may well have embellished his reports of speeches made by John of Ibelin, and it seems certain that Novara was by no means averse to exaggerating his own role in the Ibelin s’ struggle with the emperor. In other words the jurist’s description of Bohemond’s flight from Cyprus is in all probability a highly distorted account of events, and whilst there may have been some disagreement between the prince and emperor relating to Bohemond’s refusal to recognise Frederick’s suzerainty it was not of sufficient
magnitude to permanently upset their relations\textsuperscript{140} - hence Bohemond's presence at Acre in April 1229. The view that Frederick deliberately excluded Antioch-Tripoli from the scope of his treaty with al-Kāmil in retaliation for Bohemond's rejection of the emperor's pretensions must be dismissed since, as will be been pointed out elsewhere, it was not uncommon for the county of Tripoli and principality of Antioch to be outside any agreements made between the kingdom of Jerusalem and its Muslim neighbours\textsuperscript{141}. The fact, however, that the truce agreed between al-Kāmil and Frederick prohibited the kingdom of Jerusalem from giving its neighbour direct military assistance, clearly angered Bohemond\textsuperscript{142}, and he seems to have considered meeting John of Ibelin's request for military aid against Frederick's baillis in Cyprus. After the defeat of the baronial forces at Casal Imbert in May 1232, however, and friendly overtures from the emperor, Bohemond reverted to a policy of non-interference which, if not entirely favourable to Frederick, rendered the imperial forces passive support through his neutrality\textsuperscript{143}. Frederick had attempted to impose some form of suzerainty over Antioch-Tripoli, but this had no firm basis in law. Bohemond was therefore able to reject Frederick's pretensions and maintain his independence of action.

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Frederick's stay in Palestine can be divided neatly into two distinct periods: the time of the crusade proper, culminating in the acquisition of the Holy City by treaty in February 1229, and the following few months during which the emperor set about reorganising the kingdom of Jerusalem.
As we shall see, during the initial period Frederick was concerned chiefly with the negotiations conducted between himself and the Egyptian sultan, al-Kāmil; problems of administration and the establishment of the emperor's rights in the kingdom were left until the primary objectives of the crusade had been achieved. This is reflected in the number of charters which survive from the period of Frederick's presence in the Holy Land. Of the fifteen which are extant twelve date from April 1229 and only two from the previous October. One was issued in May 1229. Of the feudatories of Jerusalem Balian of Sidon and Garnier l'Aleman witnessed every charter and Odo of Montbéliard and John of Ibelin fourteen of the fifteen; but beyond attesting to John's fulfilment of his pledge to serve the emperor in Syria, there seems to be little significance in this. The grouping of the charters is, however, indicative of Frederick's pre-occupations: having secured financial aid in Cyprus and the co-operation of the Cypriot nobility he was concerned to maximise their use in the prosecution of his crusade, and hence any decisions or assertion of royal rights which might antagonise the nobility had to be delayed until the objectives of the crusade had been realised. Even so, a number of charters issued in April 1229 relate primarily to problems raised by the treaty agreed between Frederick and al-Kāmil, but in the same month Frederick also accorded privileges (perhaps tax remissions) to the burgesses of Acre and lent his support to the Syrian Christians against the Latin clergy, actions which had they occurred the previous October would undoubtedly have strained the loyalties of the nobility and military orders. Hence it would seem as if Frederick purposely postponed all actions likely to provoke serious opposition until after the completion of the truce with al-Kāmil. An apparent anomaly would seem to be the attempts made by imperial officers in 1226-8 to restore
what were believed to be royal rights over the chaine at Acre. But since such actions affected the Italian merchants rather than the Syrian nobility, even though they took place before the emperor's arrival in the East, they should not therefore be viewed as being inconsistent with Frederick's policies during the early part of the crusade.

Of the problems which were raised by the treaty of Jaffa and which Frederick sought to resolve by his charters of April 1229, one of the most serious concerned the inheritance of the fief of Toron and Chastel Neuf. In general nobles continued to maintain their titles to fiefs even when they had been lost to Muslim rule, and it was the practice that such fiefs when recovered should be returned to the person closest in degrees of relationship to the last actually in seisin (plus dreit heir aparan)\textsuperscript{147}. The lordship of Toron had fallen to Şalāḥ al-Dīn in 1187; under the terms of the agreement concluded between the Emperor Frederick and al-Ḵāmil in 1229 it was returned to Christian administration and consequently was due to revert to its rightful owner. But establishing just who was the rightful possessor of the fief proved to be a much more difficult task than Frederick can originally have anticipated.

When Humphrey IV of Toron had been betrothed to King Baldwin IV's sister, Isabella of Jerusalem, he had surrendered (before November 1181) Toron, Chastel Neuf, and his rights over Banyas to the king\textsuperscript{148}. In 1186 Guy of Lusignan granted the lordship of Toron and Chastel Neuf to Joscelin of Courtenay\textsuperscript{149}, who in turn transmitted the fief to William of Valence, brother of Guy, on the marriage of William to Joscelin's elder daughter, Beatrice. Following William’s disappearance and presumed death around 1187, in total disregard of
King Aimery's right to arrange such marriages, Beatrice married Count Otto of Henneberg (who had probably arrived in Syria with the German Crusade of 1197-8), and returned with him to Saxony. In the meantime Joscelin of Courtenay had died and his lands had been divided between his two daughters, Beatrice and Agnes, but despite Beatrice's violation of her service de mariage, which it might have been expected would affect her rights to dispose of her inheritance, Beatrice and Otto proceeded to grant their half of the 'lordship of Count Joscelin' piecemeal to the Teutonic Knights. Admittedly this disposal of their lands took place after Aimery's death, but nevertheless it was not opposed even then. It was by virtue of these donations that after Toron's return to the Christians by the treaty of Jaffa in February 1229, Frederick considered it within his rights to restore Toron to the Teutonic Knights, on the grounds that after the disappearance of William of Valence Toron had returned to Joscelin, becoming part of the inheritance which was subsequently acquired by the Teutonic Order. If James of La Mandelée, to whom the rights of Beatrice's younger sister had passed, had any claims to Toron, he does not seem to have asserted them.

But there was an alternative solution to the problem of the inheritance of Toron and Chastel Neuf. The marriage of Humphrey IV of Toron and Isabella of Jerusalem had been dissolved in 1190 and Isabella married to Conrad of Montferrat. According to the Eracles, one of Isabella's first actions after her marriage to Conrad was to restore to her ex-husband the lordship of Toron, to which Humphrey had reasserted his claims as early as 1186. Humphrey died without direct heirs, and Toron passed through his sister, Isabella, widow of Rupen III of Armenia, to their daughter, Alice. It was on these grounds that Alice challenged the grant of Toron and Chastel Neuf to
the Teutonic Knights.

But although Frederick's charter of April 1229 is clear evidence that he had first granted Toron to the Teutonic Knights before the grant was disputed by Alice of Armenia, a Muslim chronicler, Ibn al-"Amīd, wrote that Toron did not form any part of Frederick's original treaty with al-Kāmil, and that its cession was arranged only after the lady of Toron had come before the emperor and requested it. On the other hand the Christian sources would seem to indicate that Toron was included in Frederick's agreement from the outset. Perhaps it is the case that Toron did not form part of the draft treaty which the emperor revealed to selected barons on 11 February 1229, yet was written into the final form made public the following Sunday. This would explain the Muslim intimation that Toron was restored to the Franks as a personal favour to Frederick only after the outline of the treaty had been agreed, and at the same time would satisfy the Frankish belief that it formed part of the treaty of Jaffa \textit{ab initio}. Ibn al-"Amīd's claim, however, that the emperor was prompted in his request by Alice of Armenia must be incorrect, since, as has been noted, the charter of April 1229 compensating the Teutonic Knights for the return of Toron to Alice is clear proof that the lordship had already been assigned to the order when Alice claimed it. It seems nevertheless improbable that Hermann would have neglected to assert the claims of the Teutonic Order to Toron and Chastel Neuf before February 1229, and consequently that Frederick would have excluded the territories from his negotiations with the Muslims prior to that date. Indeed Frederick's charter relating to Toron states explicitly that Hermann had secured the grant of the lordship in advance of the crusade, whilst Frederick was still in Italy and whilst Isabella was still alive. Probably,
therefore, Frederick had already requested Toron during the course of his negotiations with al-Kāmil, but only in February did the Egyptian sultan have a change of heart and agree to its cession. In stark contrast to this discussion, another Muslim chronicler does not appear to have recognised the existence of such a clause whatsoever and asserts that Toron and Chastel Neuf remained in the hands of the Muslims until after the death of al-Ashraf [28 August 1237/4 Muhurram 635 H.], when they passed to al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ ʿImād al-Dīn Ismāʾīl, who included them amongst other fortresses which he gave to the Franks. This account by Ibn al-Furāt should not, however, be dismissed as incorrect, as a continuator of William of Tyre notes that certain of al-Kāmil’s officers refused to surrender three northern fortresses in the territory of Tyre and Sidon which, although apparently included in the treaty, as a result were never delivered to Frankish control. Toron may have been one of these three, which would explain the assertion that it remained in Muslim hands until well after the death of al-Ashraf.

As we have seen Frederick appears to have considered the Teutonic Knights as the rightful heirs of the inheritance of Joscelin of Courtenay and consequently to the lordship of Toron and Chastel Neuf. But this was disputed by Alice of Armenia who, in accordance with the requirements of the law, appeared before the High Court and was able to prove that she had an hereditary right through her mother, Isabella of Toron. The jurist John of Jaffa relates how the High Court ruled in Alice’s favour, but Balian of Sidon, acting as Frederick’s bailli, produced imperial letters specifically forbidding her to be put in seisin. John goes on to say that the Syrian barons responded by withdrawing their service from the emperor, stating that they would serve him again only when he agreed to abide by the ruling
Professor Riley-Smith applies his interpretation of the Assise sur la Ligece to the episode, believing that Alice of Armenia, having proved the justice of her claim, was excluded from her inheritance on Frederick's sole authority and without esgart of court, and that by withdrawing their service the barons were acting in line with a precedent set in 1198 when Ralph of Tiberias, accused of instigating an attempt on the life of King Aimery, was disinherited and banished from the kingdom also without esgart. But whereas John of Jaffa's legal treatise asserts that the emperor was working unconstitutionally, Frederick's charter of April 1229 referring to these events makes the transfer of Toron to Alice and the compensation of the Teutonic Knights appear a purely normal procedure with no hint of animosity. And indeed a second contemporary jurist and Ibelin partisan, Philip of Novara, fails to mention Toron or any problem with its inheritance - from which it might be possible to infer that the dispute was speedily and amicably resolved.

Recent studies have cast some doubt on John of Jaffa's reliability, particularly with regard to the supposedly comparable situation of 1198. Although John was in Acre during the events of March/April 1229 and had close connection with those directly involved, he was too young to be in the High Court and his account of the dispute dates from a period after the defeat of the pro-Hohenstaufen element in Syria, and is in itself the product of the victorious anti-imperialist party. Moreover, by studying John's legal writings we can see that in the same way that the relatively simple Livre au Roi tried to present the image of a (non-existent) strong monarchy comparable with that of the early twelfth century as a means to re-establish its authority, so the Livre de Jean d'Ibelin
was a sophisticated analysis of the laws of Jerusalem which was keen to stress baronial rights and their precedents in law\textsuperscript{164}. This is not to say that John of Jaffa's lawbook is totally unreliable as an historical source, but it must be used with extreme caution since John's aim was not to record history but to create a legal treatise from the point of view of baronial interests.

But the details of John of Jaffa's account concerning Toron to some extent parallel Frederick's own version of events in which, following Alice's initial approach to the emperor, a date was set for her to prove her case in court\textsuperscript{164a}. Frederick's charter indicates that he had made a genuine mistake as to the ownership of Toron and Chastel Neuf; Alice was able satisfactorily to prove her hereditary right, and Frederick restored the lands 'according to the esgart of our court',\textsuperscript{165} John of Jaffa is the only source to affirm that the vassals withdrew their service in support of Alice; nevertheless, in comparison to his version of similar events in 1198 which, it has recently been argued, should be interpreted as a purely rhetorical view of not what did happen, but what should have happened\textsuperscript{166}, it seems likely that the withdrawal of service in 1229 did take place. The withdrawal, however, was ineffectual, and John's 'Livre', in characteristically vague terms, implies that the vassals had returned their service to the emperor before the restoration of Toron to Alice was agreed. [When certain Syrian barons were disinherited in Acre probably soon after, an alternative solution was adopted and they were restored to their fiefs by force\textsuperscript{167}.] According to John, the baronial action was a direct result of the imperial command which forbade Balian of Sidon to execute the judgement of the High Court and put Alice in seisin. But is this a true representation of Frederick's intentions? I would suggest not. True, the withdrawal of
service was an expression of displeasure at Frederick's refusal to implement the esgart of the court, but the delivery by Balian of Sidon of imperial letters to the baronage would in this case have taken the form of an injunction effective until Alice had met the conditions of Frederick's ruling and, whilst in the narrowest sense it might have forbidden Alice's entry into the fief of Toron, would not have denied the justice of her claim.\textsuperscript{167a}

Although Frederick was probably unaware of Alice's claims to Toron when he first granted the lordship to the Teutonic Knights, his decision to go ahead and comply with their request that the territory be assigned to them as a former possession of the late Joscelin of Courtenay, much of whose domains they had acquired, must have been guided to some extent by the staunch support which they had shown him during his crusade. When it was realised that Alice had a stronger claim to the fief the Teutonic Order was compensated with Maron, plus a rent of 7000 besants on the revenues of Acre, by virtue of Humphrey IV's cession of Toron to Baldwin, by the terms of which these properties, ceded to Humphrey, were to revert to Count Joscelin if Toron were returned to Humphrey\textsuperscript{168}.

But Frederick had begun to shower benefits on the Teutonic Order even before his arrival in Syria: he completed the donation of Otto of Henneberg by obtaining for the order the cession of the mountainous region of Trefile, seven miles northeast of Acre, in which the old fortress of Montfort was situated, together with a number of other fiefs, but large sums had to be paid to James of La
Mandelée, Joscelin of Courtenay's other heir, to persuade him to renounce his claims to this domain. These payments were facilitated by Frederick's concession to the Teutonic Knights in April 1229 of 6400 crusader besants annually from the tolls in the harbour of Acre\textsuperscript{169}. In 1226 the knights had been exempted from taxation, in particular from the market tolls known as the plateaticum, and in April 1229 they were granted \textit{le Manoir le Roi} in Jerusalem, in the street of the Armenians near the church of St. Thomas, which was said to have once belonged to King Baldwin, together with the former house of the Germans in Jerusalem, plus a garden and six acres of land\textsuperscript{170}.

As has been suggested, the favour which Frederick rendered the Teutonic Order stemmed probably from the unwavering support which the order had shown him throughout his crusade; but their Master, Hermann von Salza, had also played an invaluable role not only during the preparations for the expedition, but also in the arrangement of the emperor's marriage to Isabella of Brienne on which Frederick based his claim to the crown of Jerusalem. All of this may have been a factor in Frederick's donations, but Professor Jean Richard has put forward a broader theory which suggests that Frederick aimed to transform the order into 'the chief instrument of the defence of the Holy Land', and perhaps even create a German Kingdom of Jerusalem\textsuperscript{171}. It is certainly true that Frederick favoured the Teutonic Knights above the other military orders, and sought to promote the German nobility - Garnier l'Aleman was appointed Frederick's lieutenant (jointly with Balian of Sidon) on his departure from the Holy Land, and in 1229 Conrad of Hohenlohe was granted an annual payment of 6000 besants on the customs of Acre in return for the feudal service of Conrad and nine knights\textsuperscript{172}. Yet it seems likely that the chief aim of Frederick's policy was to ensure his support in the kingdom, and

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by making grants to the Teutonic Order and those nobles of German extraction he was merely pursuing a policy that any other leader would have adopted in similar circumstances.

But by openly promoting the Teutonic Knights Frederick was likely to further alienate the other military orders, in particular the Templars. Frederick had shown the Temple and Hospital some favour in the early years of his reign, but between November 1226 (when he had concluded an agreement with the Hospital as part of the preparations for his crusade) and March 1228 he began to confiscate Hospitaller and Templar possessions in Sicily\textsuperscript{173}. On his return from Syria to Sicily he again seized Templar property apparently in retaliation for his treatment in Syria, but one of the conditions of his reconciliation with the pope in 1230 was that these possessions be returned. In August 1230 Frederick ordered this to be done, but later in the same year lands belonging to both the Temple and Hospital were again confiscated\textsuperscript{174}.

The emperor's actions may have been prompted by a desire to curtail the powers and independence of the two main military orders within his kingdom of Sicily and ultimately in Jerusalem, but there also seems to have existed an element of personal emnity between himself and the master of the Temple. Frederick's failure to take an active role in the Fifth Crusade and the siege of Damietta had caused resentment amongst many of those who had taken part, and when John of Brienne departed for the West in 1222 together with the patriarch of Jerusalem and the master of the Hospital, Garin de Montaigu, the master of the Temple, Peter de Montaigu, refused to accompany them and was instead represented at Rome by one William Cadel\textsuperscript{175}. It was the same Peter de Montaigu who in 1228 infuriated Frederick by a
speech which openly opposed the leadership of the crusader army by an excommunicate[^176], and after the signing of the treaty of Jaffa was noticeable by his absence from the Holy City despite the presence of his counterpart, the master of the Hospital, in the emperor's entourage[^177]. For his part, after returning to Acre in March/April 1229, Frederick publicly harangued the Temple and Peter de Montaigu in particular, and it was rumoured that he planned to kidnap Peter, take him to Apulia, and perhaps even kill him[^178]. Whatever the truth of the matter Frederick and the master of the Temple were certainly not on the best of terms.

Both the Temple and the Hospital strongly objected to the treaty which had been concluded between the Emperor Frederick and the Egyptian sultan. The Templars were enraged by the fact that the Temple at Jerusalem remained in Muslim hands depriving them of their traditional headquarters[^179], whilst the most important estates of the Temple and Hospital - Krak des Chevaliers, Margat, Tortosa, and Baghras - were outside the kingdom of Jerusalem and therefore excluded from the scope of the treaty. This in itself would not ordinarily have angered the military orders who were at the time following an aggressive policy towards the Syrian Muslims and would not have welcomed an interruption in their activities, but Frederick's treaty specifically stipulated that no military assistance whatsoever should be given to Antioch-Tripoli by the kingdom of Jerusalem, a clause which thereby effectively isolated the possessions of the military orders in the north and deprived them of all military reinforcements and aid[^180]. The Templars' response therefore was to refuse to ratify the treaty, and with the connivance of the Patriarch Gerold they began to raise troops to break the agreement. Frederick reacted by besieging the houses of the Temple
and patriarch at Acre, in an attempt to enforce the observation of the treaty, and a truce was hastily cobbled together. Nevertheless, despite the assurances which the Templars must have given to Frederick, the Temple continued to give direct military support to their houses in Antioch-Tripoli and in February 1231, under pressure from the emperor, Gregory IX wrote to the master of the order commanding them to desist from their violations of the treaty.

The reaction of the Templars to the treaty was not unexpected. Although both the Templars and the Hospitallers had accompanied Frederick to Jerusalem, they did not take part in the ceremony at the Holy Sepulchre, and the master of the Temple, Peter de Montaigu, had refused even to come to the Holy City. The military orders did attend a council to decide on Jerusalem’s defence, but after a heated exchange the meeting produced no results. Perhaps anticipating a military expression of their dislike of the treaty, on his return to Acre Frederick sought to seize control of the Templar stronghold of Chastel Pèlerin as a means of impressing upon the order his determination to ensure the faithful observance of the agreement, but was foiled by its garrison, and Frederick was therefore compelled to make his point more forcibly by means of direct action against the houses of the Temple and patriarch at Acre.

Although the military orders had followed Frederick to Jaffa and had promised their assistance in the refortification of Jerusalem if it were required, relations with the Templars were on the whole far from cordial. Frederick’s seizure of the order’s property in Sicily and the clash of personalities between the emperor and the master of the Temple from the beginning did not portend successful
co-operation, and in addition Frederick had neglected to consult the military orders in his negotiations with al-Kāmil. The result was an agreement which was both openly opposed and deeply resented by the Templars. Indeed Matthew Paris relates with great relish the rumour of a Templar-led plot, presumably prompted by their dislike of the treaty, which sought to betray the emperor into Muslim hands during a secret pilgrimage to the Holy Places on the Jordan. Had these rumours of treachery and dislike of Peter de Montaigu been the sole reasons for Frederick's assault on the houses of the Temple and patriarch then it might have been possible to argue that the emperor's actions were unjustified, but in the light of the evidence to do so is to misconstrue the purpose of the siege. The emperor was not motivated by a desire for revenge but by the need to ensure the acquiescence of the military orders in his treaty with the Muslims. This he obtained (with arguably minimal use of force), and although the Templars did not strictly abide by the contents of the treaty they did not immediately break it as had been originally planned.

The other main military order, the Hospital, appears to have remained essentially neutral during the few days of civil strife in Acre, and indeed seems to have taken a less extreme view of the agreement with the Muslims. Although they opposed the treaty in principle, the Master of the order accompanied Frederick to Jerusalem, and may even have given the emperor refuge in Acre after Frederick had raised his siege of the Templars and patriarch in April 1229. By the mid-1230s the Hospitallers had assumed a stand in support of the emperor and of the Egyptian alliance, possibly in the hope that they would recover their possessions which the emperor had confiscated in Sicily.
Consequently although Frederick could count on the backing of the Teutonic Knights, he drew only limited support from the Temple and the Hospital, and sometimes not even that. To broaden his support, therefore, just as he had patronised the nobility of German extraction, Frederick sought to regrant privileges to Pisan merchants in the kingdom of Jerusalem which had been withdrawn in 1228. Relations between Pisa and the Hohenstaufen in Italy were on the whole good, and had been since at least the time of Frederick Barbarossa who, in 1162, had made generous promises of estates, quarters in cities, and complete tax exemptions in the Norman kingdom of Sicily, should the Pisans assist him in conquering the kingdom which had been established in imperial lands against imperial interests. These promises were renewed by Henry VI in 1191, and in general the Pisans retained strong Hohenstaufen sympathies. But attempts in 1226-8 by Frederick II's officers apparently to restore what were believed to be royal rights over the chaine at Acre, and to impose a tax on all horses brought into Acre by the Pisans before 1229, had elicited strong opposition from the Pisan merchants. As a result Thomas of Acerra had deprived them of all their judicial rights in Syria - despite the pro-imperialist policy they followed in the West. It was these rights and privileges which were restored by Frederick in April 1229.

Thomas of Acerra's activities may have stemmed from Frederick's policy towards trade in his kingdom of Sicily, in which the main motivation appears to have been control as a direct means to provide for the fiscal needs of the kingdom: as we have seen, Frederick apparently intended to employ the rents due to him in Cyprus as a means of financing his crusade and may have harboured similar intentions for the revenues on the chaine at Acre. Certainly such
moves were unlikely to have been a preliminary to the replacement of the Pisans in Syria by Sicilian merchants. Although Frederick was not unaware of the advantages of commercial exchange for his empire, his overall policy on trade cannot be described as encouraging, and there appears to have been no attempt by the monarchy to improve trade between the kingdom of Sicily and the East. In Sicily the native merchants were compelled to trade on an often inferior footing to the north Italian powers, and as a result were chiefly limited to Italian coastal trade. Consequently they lacked the capital for the lengthy voyages to Syria and Egypt, which anyway could not be reached by their light coastal shipping. Hence there was little incentive for Frederick to grant privileges to his Sicilian merchants, and the long-haul routes were likely to stay in the hands of the established merchant powers such as Pisa. The Pisans must have realised that their maritime trade with the kingdom was not being threatened, and although the actions of the emperor's lieutenant squeezed their profits and cut Frederick's support, these would have been fully recouped by the restoration of privileges in April 1229.

But it might also be argued that the actions of the emperor's baili in Syria were indicative of the policy which the emperor intended to pursue in Palestine - a kind of quo warranto approach to rights and privileges as had been followed in Sicily, by which all privileges granted by Frederick's immediate predecessors had to be submitted for inspection and verification as a means of recovering royal rights and property. Indeed such a policy may have been behind Frederick's demand that John of Ibelin surrender his fief of Beirut which, according to Philip of Novara, he considered to have been illegally alienated from the royal domain. But this does not
seem to have been the case. Although the Pisan privileges in the kingdom were suspended by Thomas of Acerra and later regranted, as has been suggested, the more likely reason for the count of Acerra's activities on the chaine at Acre was probably the need to secure funds for Frederick's impending crusade. In the same way the demand that John of Ibelin return his fief of Beirut derived probably not from the fact that he possessed no right to it, but rather that by converting it into a port without permission he had infringed upon royal prerogative. Frederick was obviously keen to ensure royal rights in the kingdom of Jerusalem - after all, not only had John of Brienne's rule lacked strength, but since 1222 he had been absent in the West and the rights of the monarchy cannot have failed to be eroded as a result; but to have consciously pursued a programme of examining all privileges and rights held in the kingdom would have taken more time than the emperor was prepared to give. The actions which Frederick took against the Italians, the Templars and John of Ibelin were not therefore quo warranto proceedings, nor did they form part of a broader policy based on that which had been implemented in Sicily. Instead Frederick sought to preserve the established prerogatives of the crown, as he saw them, by demanding the return of Beirut and by favouring the Teutonic Order in preference to the Temple and Hospital whose independence of action undermined royal authority. Donations to the German nobility and the regranting of privileges to Pisan merchants within the kingdom were similarly designed to bolster support for Frederick and thereby counterbalance the forces which threatened further to erode the position of the monarchy. In this limited sense Frederick's policies can be said to have been a conscious imitation of those he pursued in Sicily in that they were intended to strengthen the authority of the crown based on royal rights as they had existed at an earlier time, but they did not
encompass the same techniques nor were they carried to the same extremes.

The position of the monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem had been visibly weakened since the end of the twelfth century, but it was evident to Frederick that a thorough scrutiny of privileges and grants such as had been followed in Sicily was not only inappropriate, but would severely hamper the progress of the crusade, and his attempts to secure his recognition as king. But at the same time he was tempered in his actions by the need to come to an agreement with al-Kämil, a need which in turn inhibited all acts which might antagonise the Syrian nobility. Although the emperor's restrained attitude did promote co-operation in Syria and facilitate the eventual assertion of his rights in Cyprus, such an attitude was unlikely to make him more congenial to those nobles whose power and rank had been greatly enhanced by the minority in Cyprus and by the absentee monarchy in Syria. They saw in his marriage to Isabella and his claims to the throne of Jerusalem a major threat to their own position and, despite their willingness to support Frederick in the prosecution of his crusade, did not wish to encourage his personal advancement in the kingdom.

The view of the jurists John of Jaffa and Philip of Novara that friction between Frederick and the majority of the nobles in the Latin Kingdom was brought about by the inflexibility of the emperor is in stark contrast to the apparent evidence of maladministration by the Ibelins in Cyprus and John of Ibelin's infringement of royal rights concerning Beirut - both of which could be cited as alternative reasons for the tension between the two parties. Indeed Frederick's policies and actions were much less extreme than the
works of these two jurists have suggested, and their intimations that the vast majority of nobles in Syria and Cyprus were opposed to imperial rule are patently incorrect. Frederick’s relations with the Ibelins were poor mainly because they had most to lose by the assertion of his rights in the two kingdoms, whereas his relations with a not insignificant section of the nobility, who had been angered by the promotion of the Ibelin family and their partisans, were on the whole good. These nobles came from some of the most illustrious families in the East and included such men as Balian of Sidon, Bertrand Porcellet, Amaury de Bethsan and Hugh of Gibelet²⁰².

Nevertheless, despite differences, Frederick was able to ensure support from all sections during the period of his crusade proper by compromise and a refusal to assert his rights until the primary aim of agreement with the Muslims had been achieved. Once this was secured he set about asserting his position by issuing charters and dispensing justice. Donations and grants of privilege to Pisan merchants and German nobles in the kingdom added to the support he already attracted from a variety of nobles. Only when the Patriarch Gerold in alliance with the Templars threatened to overturn the treaty which he had negotiated did Frederick resort to military action. Relations with the Templars had been strained, but until then Frederick had been content to counterbalance the order’s independence by patronising the Teutonic Knights. Some of Frederick’s later actions, such as the sale of the bailliage of Cyprus and the appointment of his own officers to control the island’s fortresses (although this was his right as bailli) together with the disinheretance of John of Ibelin, might be interpreted as provocative, but Frederick cannot be accused of being wholly
responsible for the situations which ensued. His attitude towards Cyprus and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was essentially pragmatic, and therefore flexible. Under pressure he was willing to alter his appointment of Thomas of Acerra as bailli for the kingdom after his departure, to that of Balian of Sidon and Garnier l'Aleman. He was also able to recognise the error of his judgement in assigning Toron to the Teutonic Knights and arrange for its transfer to Alice of Armenia. In the circumstances Frederick’s actions were reasonable and restrained; they may not have been popular with everyone, but they certainly lacked the anti-baronial hue with which the jurists insist they were coloured. The arrival of the emperor in the East polarised opinion, but this was a polarisation which had already begun; Frederick’s presence merely exacerbated existing tensions.

Notes to Chapter Five

1 Frederick had succumbed to illness and in his place had appointed the duke of Limburg - HDFS, iii.44; Chronica Majora, iii.128; cf. 'Eracles', p364, which suggests Frederick fell ill only after Henry's departure.

2 According to 'Eracles', pp363-4, the army set sail in two distinct groups; the latter, under the Patriarch Gerold, called at Limassol en route to Acre and consisted of only two galleys.

3 Until now it may not have been clear just who was in overall command of the crusade: Ernoul, p458, notes that the meeting was called because the crusaders had no leader, whereas Roger of Wendover (Flores Historiarum, ii.351) identifies the bishops of Winchester and Exeter as being amongst the leaders of the army. See also the Dover Chronicle, f.26v, and infra chapter 7, n.2. Since Frederick had already appointed Henry as leader (supra, n.1), the account of the meeting given by 'Eracles', p365, could indicate that Henry was chosen as supreme commander.

4 Chronica Majora, iii.128-9. According to Gerold the meeting merely announced the decision reached beforehand. Cf. 'Eracles', p365, and Ernoul, p458.

5 According to 'Eracles', p365, the prince of Damascus died after the crusaders had arrived at Sidon, but a letter from the patriarch of Jerusalem (Chronica Majora, iii.129) specifically states that Caesarea was the primary goal, and only an event of the order of magnitude of al-Mu'azzam's death is likely to have prompted such a
dramatic change in plan. Cf. 'Eracles', p365, and Ernoul, p459, which assert that Sidon was the original agreed objective of the crusaders.

6 Ernoul, p459; Prawer, Histoire, ii.181. The 'Gestes des Chiprois', p674 and 'Annales de Terre Sainte', ed. R.Röhrich and G.Raynaud, in Archives de l'Orient latin [AOL], ii (1884), 438, date the commencement of work at Montfort as 1226 before the arrival of the imperial crusade, but Hermann von Salza's letter dated March 1229 (HDFS, iii.92) suggests work had only begun in that year. The letter of exchange transferring the fortress to the Teutonic Order was dated 20 April 1229 - Tabulae Ordinis Teutonicici, ed. E.Strehlke (Berlin, 1869), no.63, and might indicate that reconstruction was undertaken only after the crusaders left Sidon. On this see W.Hubatsch, 'Montfort und die Bildung des Deutschenordenstaates im Heiligen Lande', Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen (1966), p187, and K.Forstreuter, Der deutsche Orden am Mittelmeer (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Ordens, 1967, ii), pp41-3.

7 'Eracles', p365.

8 Prawer, Histoire, ii.183. Ernoul, p461, suggests work was still being carried out at Caesarea when Frederick arrived in Syria.


10 Ernoul, p458, and v. infra chapter 6, p178.

11 An overture had apparently been made by al-Kämil in 1226-7, see Maqrizi, pp198-9, which was reciprocated by Frederick - Ernoul, p458; Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.349, and v. infra chapter 6 [11.345-8]. These contacts were condemned by Gregory IX in a letter to the papal legate in France (5 August 1228) - Chronica Majora, iii.154.

12 Chronica Majora, iii.154. Prawer, Histoire, ii.177, dates the mêlée soon after the crusaders' arrival in Syria, but the Patriarch Gerold, writing at the very end of October (Chronica Majora, iii.128-9) did not mention the event, although he hints that feelings were running high at the time of the council at Acre. The most logical dating would seem to be immediately after al-Mu'azzam's death, but before the departure for Sidon. The imperial marshal, Richard Filangieri, appears to have been involved in a similar incident when Frederick was in Cyprus (Ernoul, pp460-1), and Frederick reacted with equal vigour when his army ran amok en route to Jaffa in November 1228 - HDFS, iii.103.

13 Chronica Majora, iii.128. By the time of Frederick's arrival many crusaders were no longer willing to remain - 'Eracles', p369.

14 'Breve Chronicon', p898.

15 'Breve Chronicon', pp898-901; Flores Historiarum, ii.351.
16 'Eracles', p369; Philip of Novara, 'The Wars of Frederick II against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus', ed. and trans. J.L. La Monte (Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies, xxv, New York, 1936), p88; Prawer, Histoire, ii.192-3.

17 'Eracles', p370; Ernoul, p462. 18 'Eracles', pp370,372.

19 Prawer, Histoire, ii.194; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p234.

20 For al-Kämîl's offer see Badr al-Dîn al-Aînî, 'Le collier de perles', RHC Historiens Orientaux, ii/l. 184; Maqrîzî, p198; and chapter 6, n.123.

21 Chronica Majora, iii.129 and supra, p100.

22 HDFS, iii.136.

23 Hermann von Salza (HDFS, iii.90) and Frederick (HDFS, iii.95) indicate they arrived at Jaffa on 15 November; the 'Breve Chronicon', p901, says 16 November. Gerold (HDFS, iii.102) dates Frederick's departure from Acre as 'circa festum beati Clementis [23 November].

24 HDFS, iii.91,95.

25 HDFS, iii.103; Prawer, Histoire, ii.196.

26 HDFS, iii.103. Reconstruction work at Jaffa was completed by 18 February - HDFS, iii.91.

27 'Eracles', p373; HDFS, iii.104; and see Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp209-12. According to the 'Eracles' the news from Apulia was that San Germano had fallen. The city did not in fact defect to the papal party until mid-January 1229. Frederick may also have been influenced by fears that his departure would damage his prestige - see his comments, made after the conclusion of the Treaty of Jaffa, as reported by Ibn Wâsîl (in F.Gabrieli, Arab Historians of the Crusades, trans. E.J.Costello (London, 1969), p270).

28 HDFS, iii.97,104. It is perhaps significant that the two brothers al-Kâmîl and al-Ashraf had agreed to dispossess their nephew al-Nâşîr Dâ'ûd only shortly beforehand - Maqrîzî, pp204-5. For the political background see chapter 6, pp188-9, and R.S.Humphreys, From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260 (New York, 1977), pp197-200.

29 Frederick had, however, already arranged for Henry of Malta to bring ships to Acre at Easter apparently for the journey home - 'Eracles', p374, and infra chapter 6, n.128.

30 HDFS, iii.92: 'Frater..Leonardus venit ad nos Joppen..referens nobis rumores de partibus cismarinis..'

31 'rumores de partibus cismarinis' [supra, n.30] could be construed as indicating that the bad tidings referred to Syria - possibly attempts by the Patriarch Gerold and the Master of the Temple, Peter de Montaigu, to raise troops in opposition to the treaty with al-Kâmîl (HDFS, iii.137), or even al-Ashraf's advance towards Damascus which took place in March (Humphreys, pp201-2).
is the explanation that Brother Leonard brought news (possibly in the form of a letter - see HDFS, iii.110-2) from Sicily which had been received at Acre and which was then transmitted by Thomas of Acerra to the emperor at Jaffa.

32 Maqrizī, p207.

33 'Eracles', p374; nor did the master of the Temple, Peter de Montaigu, accompany Frederick to Jerusalem (HDFS, iii.109).

34 HDFS, iii.98,99,101,109,136,137; 'Eracles', p374; Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, MGHS, xxiii.925; Ernoul, p465; 'Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.306. The original crown of the Baldwins had been captured by Salah al-Dîn along with the other royal insignia in 1187 - Richard, Latin Kingdom, p235. A number of sources erroneously attribute these events to Easter 1229, see for example 'Annales de Margam', AM, i.37; 'Ann. Theokesberia', AM, i.72; 'Annales Scheflarienses Maiores', MGHS, xvi.339; 'Annales Stadenses', MGHS, xvi.680.

35 Gerold gives two dates for the emperor's arrival in Acre - HDFS, iii.110, 'in media quadragesima [22 March]'; ibid., p137, 'die dominica, scilicet qua cantatur Letare Jerusalem [25 March]'. If Frederick contemplated a pilgrimage to the Holy Places on the Jordan, such as Matthew Paris suggests (Chronica Majora, iii.177-9), it would have been before his return to Acre: see J.S.C.Riley-Smith, The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus c.1050-1310 (London, 1967), p168, and especially H.L.Bulst-Thiele, Sacrae Domus militiae Templi Hierosolymitani magistri: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Templerordens 1118/19-1314 (Göttingen, 1974), pp182-3.

36 HDFS, iii.138-9, 149-50; Flores Historiarum, ii.373-4.

37 Ernoul, p462; 'Eracles', pp373-4, main text and variants. Reconstruction work at Chastel Pelerin had been begun by the Templars and Teutonic Knights in 1217 with money and other assistance provided by Walter of Avesnes - 'Historia Damiatina', p169; 'Eracles', pp325-6.


39 Bulst-Thiele, Sacrae Domus, p183, seems unsure whether the event did, or did not, take place.

40 HDFS, iii.109, 137.

41 Bulst-Thiele, Sacrae Domus, p183; see also Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p168.

42 Ernoul, pp462-3; this might explain the belief of the 'Breve Chronicon', p902, that Frederick did not arrive back in Acre until April 1229.

43 'Breve Chronicon', p902; 'Gestes des Chiprois', p683.

44 Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani, MXCVII-MCCCXI [RRH], ed. R.Röhricht (Innsbruck, 1893-1904; 2 vols), no.1016. Riley-Smith, Feudal

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Nobility, p173, suggests a date of c3 May for this charter. see also 'Gestes des Chiprois', p684, which could be taken as indicating Frederick's presence at Tyre, the castle of which he left in the care of Balian of Sidon. The Chronica Majora, i11.192, says Frederick II embarked 3 May 1229.

45 'Gestes des Chiprois', p684; 'Eracles', p375.
46 'Breve Chronicon', p902; 'Gestes des Chiprois', p684.
47 Henry VI had given a crown to Aimery in 1197 - 'Eracles', pp209,212, and supra chapter 1, p10.
48 This is Riley-Smith's terminology, Feudal Nobility, p166.
49 'Eracles', p358; HDFS, ii/2. 922-3. The 'Breve Chronicon', p902, says Frederick was crowned king of Jerusalem.
50 'Eracles', pp358-9. The bishop of Melfi had also been amongst the party which had fetched Isabella from the East - 'Breve Chronicon', pp895-7.
51 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp166,167; J.L. La Monte, 'John d'Ibelin, the Old Lord of Beirut, 1177-1236', Byzantion, xii (1937), 433.
52 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p167; Mayer, The Crusades, p224. See also chapter 4, n.86. John of Brienne had in fact been crowned and anointed king in 1210, but his title nevertheless had been challenged as early as 1212 (PL, ccxvi, col.738 (ep.210)).
53 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p167. Honorius appears to have accepted the inevitability of the situation when in January 1227 he appointed John of Brienne governor of the patrimonium between Radificone and Rome, with the exception of the March of Ancona, the duchy of Spoleto, Reati and Sabina (Epistolae Saeculi XIIII, i.257-8 (no.339); Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.347), but continued to deny Frederick John's title. Gregory IX applied the title only after the reconciliation at Ceprano in 1230, the first recorded use being 12 August 1231 (Epistolae Saeculi XIIII, i.363 (no.450)). After Conrad's majority in 1243 Frederick continued to style himself king whereas Conrad remained simply 'heir to the kingdom' - see Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p209.
54 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p185.
55 HDFS, ii. 531-8, 671-2; 'Eracles', pp359,364; 'Gestes des Chiprois', p674; 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p438; 'Documents relatifs à la successibilité au trône et à la régence', RHC Lois, ii.339. Although it is possible that Thomas of Acerra may have been appointed Frederick's lieutenant as early as 1226 (Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p166, certainly seems to have thought this was the case), it seems unlikely that he crossed to Syria before 1227. Both the Annales de Terre Sainte, p438, and the 'Gestes des Chiprois', p674 (cf. also Ernou, p448) claim that Thomas crossed to Syria in 1226 to take up his appointment, but neither source is completely reliable for its dating of events: both place the count of Acerra's arrival around the same time as the commencement of rebuilding at Montfort, which we have seen probably did not take place before 1227/8 (supra, p101 and n.6), whilst the Annales de Terre Sainte date...
the arrival of the bishop of Patti in Syria to escort Isabella to
Italy a year before the actual event ('Annales de Terre Sainte',
pp437,438; cf. 'Breve Chronicon', pp896-7). In the same manner the
Gestes des Chiprois attribute the deaths of the Master of the
Hospital, Garin de Montaigu, and the baili of Cyprus, Philip of
Ibelin, to the same year - ostensibly 1227, whereas the Estoire de
Eracles notes that the death of the Master occurred whilst the army
was at Sidon, i.e. November 1227 to spring 1228, a date which would
accord well with Philip of Novara's account which describes the
Ibelin family as still in mourning when Frederick arrived in Cyprus
in July 1228 ('Gestes des Chiprois', p676; 'Eracles', p365. For an
alternative discussion of the date of Philip's death, see Hill,
ii.91n). A date of 1226 for Thomas of Acerra's arrival in Syria
would seem therefore highly suspect, and is in fact refuted by the
chronicle of Richard of San Germano (although itself not always
chronologically reliable - see Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen
Rule', p24), which explicitly states that the count of Acerra crossed
to Syria in July 1227 (Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.348), and by
the Eracles, p364, which dates the event au main devant the emperor's
proposed passage of August 1227. (On this see also La Monte's
introduction to Novara, Wars of Frederick II, p25n.5.) Marino
Sanuto, p211, also dates the crossing 1227.

56 See Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, Appendix E, p321n.
57 'Documents relatifs', p398. See also 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin',
p267; 'Livre au Roi', p610; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility,
pp167,186.
58 Richard, Latin Kingdom, p23ln.5, and P.W. Edbury, 'The 'Cartulaire
de Manosque": a grant to the Templars in Latin Syria and a charter of
King Hugh I of Cyprus', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical
XIIIe et XIVe siècles: Genèalogie compilée principalement selon les
registres du Vatican', in Epeteris tou Kentrou Epistemonikon Ereunon,
ix (1977-9), rpr. in Familles de l'Orient latin XIIe-XIVe siècles
(London, 1983; Variorum reprints), no.IV, p131, and Riley-Smith,
Feudal Nobility, p23, are wrong in identifying Odo as being Walter's
son, see 'Lignages', RHC Lois, ii.455n.3.
59 E. Kantorowicz, Frederick the Second, trans. E.O. Lorimer (London,
60 'Eracles', p364.
61 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p167, but v. infra, pp140-2.
62 'Breve Chronicon', p898.
63 'Documents relatifs', p399; 'Gestes des Chiprois', p682;
'Eracles', p380.
64 Supra, n.57. 65 'Documents relatifs', p399.
65a The phrase is translated by D. Jacoby, 'The Kingdom of Jerusalem
and the Collapse of Hohenstaufen Power in the Levant', Dumbarton Oaks
Papers, 40 (1986), 95.
66 'Eracles', p367.
67 HDFS, iii.120; RRH, nos.1013,1014.

68 HDFS, iii.138. A third charter of April 1229 regranting privileges to the Pisans in the kingdom of Jerusalem appears to describe Thomas as a former bailli of the kingdom, but the rubric is misleading and consultation of the text shows that this is not the case: HDFS, iii.134.

69 'Documents relatifs', p399; 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', p325.

70 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p167n.

71 Ibid., p185.


73 Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', p26 and n.41.

74 'Documents relatifs', p400; 'Gestes des Chiprois', pp731,732; Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', p27.

75 'Livre au Rol', p610; Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', p26; Jacoby, 'Kingdom of Jerusalem', p89.

76 'Acte de soumission des barons du royaume de Jérusalem à Frédéric II', ed. R.Röhricht, AOL, i (1881), Documents, 403. The earl of Leicester would hold the lieutenancy 'jusque à l'age de nostre seignor le rei Conrard, et oncore jusque à tant que nostre seignor le rei vengne en la terre, ou qu'il i enueit aucun autre de par lui qui seit au louc del deuandit Simon..' On the importance of this document see P.Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule in Syria', passim.

77 'Eracles', pp358-9.

78 'Documents relatifs', pp399-400.

79 Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', pp22,36; Jacoby, 'Kingdom of Jerusalem', p101. Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp137-43,147, also questions John's reliability, and see Prawer, Crusader Institutions, p57.


81 On this see Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', pp26-9, and Jacoby, 'Kingdom of Jerusalem', pp86-9. It would also have left Alice's position indefensible after the High Court had sanctioned her as regent, since it would have been a simple matter for Conrad to nominate an alternative bailli. In 1242 the High Court rejected the appointment of Thomas of Acerra as bailli on the grounds that Conrad was now king but had not yet been received in the kingdom (Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p191; Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', p25, for the date).

82 Conrad, of course, did not reach his majority until 1243, see Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', p23.
According to Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p173, but neither Garnier l'Alleman nor Ballan of Sidon are identified as baillis in the charter they witnessed: RRH no.1016; 'Documents Relatifs', p399; 'Gestes des Chiprois', pp683-4.

HDFS, iii.110-2; Van Cleve, Frederick II, p212. Acerra's letter may have been one which was written at Acre and sent from there to Frederick at Jaffa - supra n.29.

HDFS, iii.135-40; RRH, nos.1013,1014.

Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp172,191. The choice of lieutenant was, of course, challenged in 1232/3 when the vassals objected to the appointment of Philip of Maugastel - Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp201-3; Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', p25 and n.48.

V. supra, n.52.

In practice Philip of Ibelin ruled as Alice's lieutenant in Cyprus: 'Gestes des Chiprois', p670; 'Eracles', pp360-1; La Monte, 'John d'Ibelin', p426.

'R'Gestes des Chiprois', p672; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp161-2. Philip of Novara, p124 (see also 'Gestes des Chiprois', p702), quoting John of Ibelin, indicates that at the time of the Fifth Crusade Duke Leopold of Austria had attempted to disinherit the young King Henry, and thereby deprive Alice of the regency. It is possible to infer that the duke was acting on Frederick's instructions, but the claim lacks confirmation and any plans for such a coup would have to have been communicated to Leopold who had arrived in the East in September 1217, i.e. before the death of Hugh I in January 1218. It is unlikely therefore that he was acting on Frederick II's behalf, but may have had his own designs on the kingdom.

'R'Gestes des Chiprois', p672. Henry's coronation may have been prompted by fears that Frederick planned to seize the regency and take advantage of his suzerainty to the detriment of the kingdom (see La Monte, 'John of Ibelin', pp428-9; Hill, ii.90, and supra, n.89). But although the coronation was an affront to Frederick's dignity, it did not affect his right to the wardship, and was therefore more likely to have been brought about by criticism nearer home. The ceremony probably took place soon after Isabella's coronation as queen of Jerusalem at Tyre in August 1225 ('Gestes', p667).

'R'Gestes des Chiprois', p672.

'R'Gestes des Chiprois', p678; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp161,164.

'R'Gestes des Chiprois', p672, and supra nn.88,90.

The 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii.264, introduces John of Ibelin as if well-known, but Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, MGHS, xxiii.933 finds it necessary to explain John's background. Both chronicles refer to John in connection with events after the imperial crusade; cf. also Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix. 368-9. Wilbrand of Oldenburg visited Beirut in 1212 and makes passing comment on its lord (J.C.M. Laurent, Peregrinatores Medii Aevi Quattuor (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1873), p66), and the 'Annales Ianuenses.
Marchisii Scribae Annales’, MGHS, xviii.150, under the year 1222 apparently knew sufficient of John to label him vir strenuus.

95 'Gestes des Chiprois’, p679.

96 Frederick arrived at Limassol on 21 July. A messenger was sent to John of Ibelin at Nicosia, and King Henry (in the company of the Ibelins) joined the emperor on 23 or 24 July ('Breve Chronicon', p900; 'Gestes des Chiprois', p677; but cf. 'Eracles', p367, which says John and Henry were already at Limassol when the emperor put in). On 26 or 27 of that month John withdrew to Nicosia - 'Breve Chronicon', p900. The banquet was held at Philip of Ibelin’s house ('Gestes des Chiprois', p677).

97 'Gestes des Chiprois’, p678: 'car ce est mon dreit, selon l'usage d'Alemaigne’. According to 'Eracles', p367, Frederick appears to have made his demands before the festivities, with the exception of Beirut which was requested at the banquet.

98 Hill, ii.91-2; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p162; cf. La Monte, 'John d'Ibelin', p430.

99 'Breve Chronicon’, p900; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p162. The advice offered John of Ibelin by his knights, and his hasty withdrawal from Limassol might also suggest that the lord of Beirut had a guilty conscience - see 'Gestes des Chiprois', pp677,680.

100 'Gestes des Chiprois’, pp678-9.

101 See 'Eracles', p368. Philip of Novara portrays John of Ibelin as carrying the majority of the nobles, but careful reading of the text indicates that many opposed him - see for example 'Gestes des Chiprois’, pp676, 677, 680, 681, and Richard, Latin Kingdom, p307. A knight who implied that Philip had usurped Alice’s authority was set upon and killed by Ibelin partisans ('Eracles’, pp361-2; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp192-3).

102 'Gestes des Chiprois’, p676. Marino Sanuto, pp211-2, says the nobles met with Frederick in Romania (a blanket term for Frankish Greece). Alice’s attempts c.1225-6 to replace Philip of Ibelin by Aimery Barlais failed - Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp192-3; Hill, ii.87-91.

103 'Gestes des Chiprois’, p678. 103a Ibid., pp679-80.

104 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p164.


106 'Breve Chronicon’, p900; but Philip of Novara ('Gestes des Chiprois’, p681) implies that the delay was due to Frederick awaiting men and supplies from Syria. Cf. 'Eracles’, p367, which indicates that the nobles supposedly summoned by Frederick were already in Cyprus together with all the knights of Cyprus and the kingdom of Jerusalem.

107 The agreement was reached after Frederick left Limassol on 17 August but before he embarked at Famagusta for Syria on 2 September - 'Breve Chronicon’, p900.
Henry was in Frederick's company when he arrived in Syria in September 1228 and when he departed in May 1229 - 'Gestes des Chiprois', pp682,684; 'Eracles', p369.

'Cf. Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p164, who suggests that Frederick may now have realised that such demands could not reasonably be made of John of Ibelin, but only of Alice.

The celebrated scene in which mercenaries hired by the emperor filed into the hall ('Gestes des Chiprois', p678) may have been exaggerated by Philip of Novara - v. infra, p124.

The charge that Frederick ill-treated them is probably untrue - v. infra, p124.


'Breve Chronicon', p900.

Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p163; and v. supra chapter 3, pp40-4.

'Gestes des Chiprois', p681; La Monte, 'John d'Ibelin', p433; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p165; Hill, ii.98.

'Eracles', p369 notes that Frederick arranged for the rents to be assembled and sent to Syria.

'Eracles', p375; 'Gestes des Chiprois', pp682-4; letter of the Patriarch Gerold, HDFS, iii.138-9; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p166. It is unclear from the 'Gestes', p684, whether the feudatories were to be disinherit in Cyprus, or Syria, or both. The 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', RHC Lois, i.325, would tend to indicate Syria and date the disseisin before Frederick's departure from the Holy Land. The 'Gestes', p684, however, record John of Ibelin's disinheritance as if a stipulation of the farming of the bailliage which Frederick was said to have completed in Cyprus en route for Italy. 'Eracles', p375, places the sale at Acre in April 1229. La Monte (in Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, p92n.4) suggests the sale was contracted in Acre and renewed at Limassol. Perversely the 'Gestes', p686, indicate that Philip of Novara was cajoled into siding with the baillis, implying that he, at least, was not dispossessed. The grant to the Teutonic Knights by the baillis in June 1229, however, appears to be the estate of an Ibelin follower (RRH, no.1017). Despite his promises to John, Frederick may have been within his rights to dispossess the lord of Beirut without esgard of court, v. infra, p141, and n.199. Hill, ii.97-8, however, argues that Frederick had no right to substitute his own officers for Henry's liegemen, claiming that during a regency the barons, not the regent, held the castles, whereas in the kingdom of Jerusalem it seems to have been established practice for the bailli to have had overall charge of the royal fortresses when the monarch was incapacitated or under age-see Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', pp29-31.
119 Supra, and n.17.

120 'Eracles', p372. Philip of Novara ('Gestes des Chiprois', p682) says Frederick, his men, and all the men of Syria went to Jaffa (although, of course, his evidence must be treated with caution). It is possible that despite the antipathy between John of Brienne and Frederick II, the old Brienne followers (who had little love for the Ibelins) may have given their support more readily to Frederick.

121 'Eracles', p372. The solution involved the Templars and Hospitallers following behind the imperial vanguard (comprising only the emperor's own men and the Teutonic Knights) at a distance of one day's journey; it was also stipulated that orders issued to the army were to be given not in the name of the emperor, but in the name of God and Christendom.

122 HDFS, iii.97; this is absent from Matthew Paris's version of Frederick's letter in Chronica Majora, iii.175.

123 John left Famagusta around the same time as Frederick and after a day's delay in Beirut caught up with the emperor at Tyre ('Gestes des Chiprois', p682). 'Eracles', p369, implies that John left Cyprus in Frederick's company, but this would presumably not have permitted John's visit to Beirut. [For Frederick's itinerary, see 'Breve Chronicon', pp900-1, and supra, p102]. John was with the emperor at Acre in October 1228 and again in April 1229 (RRH, nos. 994,995,1003-14; 'Gestes des Chiprois', p684). He probably travelled with the army to Jaffa ('Eracles', p374; La Monte, 'John d'Ibelin', p434), but in compliance with Gerold's ban (HDFS, iii.108) did not go to Jerusalem. Cf. 'Gestes des Chiprois', p683, which assert that the lord of Beirut never left Frederick's side despite frequent advice to do so.

124 See, for example, John of Beirut's speech, 'Gestes des Chiprois', p677.

125 See the various accounts of Frederick, Hermann and Gerold in HDFS, iii.98,99-100,109,136, and 'Eracles', p374; 'Breve Chronicon', p901. At Acre Frederick reprimanded the patriarch 'dicens quod [sine] ejus consilio et licentia qui jam rex fuit Hierosolymitanus, non deebant milites guerrini retineri in regno suo' (HDFS, iii.137).

126 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p170. Despite Frederick's promises it may not have been necessary to take the case of Beirut before the High Court (v. infra n.199, and chapter 1, pp10-11, and nn.55,56). The question of Beirut may have been resurrected in Cyprus on Frederick's return journey home, supra n.118.

127 'Gestes des Chiprois', p682; HDFS, iii.125.

128 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p165.

129 Tripoli was originally held as a fief from the king of Jerusalem, but Antioch appears to have accepted the kingdom's suzerainty as and when it suited its prince. Antioch also owed allegiance to Byzantium. In the thirteenth century Antioch-Tripoli was as important and as strong as the Latin Kingdom and the lords of the two states were acknowledged as equals - La Monte, Feudal Monarchy, pp187-202. Hill, ii.99, states Antioch definitely owed no allegiance to the Latin Kingdom, and Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, p641, insists
Bohemond came to Frederick in Cyprus as an ally, not as a vassal. See also Prawer, Latin Kingdom, pp40-1. Also of interest are J. L. La Monte, 'To what extent was the Byzantine Empire the suzerain of the Latin Crusading States?', Byzantion, vii (1932), pp253-64, and J. Richard, 'Les comtes de Tripoli et leurs vassaux sous la dynastie antiochénienne', in Crusade and Settlement, p215.
130 Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, p640; J. Richard, 'Les comtes de Tripoli', p215. One of the reasons for this may have been the Cypriot High Court's refusal to accept Queen Alice's plans to impose her husband, the future Bohemond V of Antioch-Tripoli, as bailli in place of Philip of Ibelin, c.1225. It was to Tripoli that Aimery Barlais fled in c.1226 after the rejection of his appointment as bailli by Alice and his humiliating defeat in a duel with a prominent Ibelin supporter, Anseau of Brie ('Gestes des Chiprois', p673).

131 'Eracles', p368. Bohemond had with him 60 knights.

132 'Gestes des Chiprois', p682.

133 'Gestes des Chiprois', p682; 'Breve Chronicon', pp900-1; 'Eracles', p369; and supra n.123. Bohemond had met the emperor at Piroghi ('Eracles', p368; cf. 'Gestes des Chiprois', p681, and 'Breve Chronicon', p900 which says Nicosia) and appears to have accompanied him to Nicosia without incident.


135 'Gestes des Chiprois', pp680,682, where the two hostages are initially identified as Balian and Baldwin. 'Eracles', p367 names the hostages as Balian and Hugh, and reports that they were put under guard, but does not refer to ill-treatment, indeed they were said to have been given rings by the emperor.

136 'Gestes des Chiprois', p681 says Bohemond came to Frederick at Limassol, but p682 suggests he did not arrive in Cyprus until late August 1228; v. supra n.133.

137 Supra n.135. Novara also mistakenly identifies al-Kämil as sultan of both Egypt and Damascus ('Gestes des Chiprois', p682).

138 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p163.

139 This is highlighted by Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', pp21,23.

140 By casting doubt on this particular episode the finer points of other scenes, such as the banquet at Limassol ('Gestes des Chiprois', p678) and Frederick's departure from Acre under a hail of offal (ibid., pp683-4) must also be questioned.


142 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.118; cf. 'Annales Scheftlarienses Majores', MGHS, xvii.338, which assert Bohemond was instrumental in making the truce.

143 Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, p643; and see Richard, 'Les comtes de Tripoli', p215.

144 RRH, nos.994,995,1003-14,1016; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p168. See also above, n.123.
145 Prawer, Crusader Institutions, p55; HDFS, iii.137,140n.1.

146 HDFS, iii.131-5; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p166; Riley-Smith, 'Government in Latin Syria', p114. See also 'Annales Januenses. Bartholomaei Scribae Annales', MGHS, xviii,176-7, for an apparently similar attempt in 1231.

147 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp14-6.


149 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp105,279n.35 suggests the fief passed to Joscelin on the death of Agnes of Courtenay (Baldwin IV's mother and Joscelin's sister) c.1185. Agnes had earlier been given the fief by her son, Baldwin, see The travels of Ibn Jubayr, trans. R.J.C.Broadhurst (London, 1952), p316, and B.Hamilton, 'Women in the Crusader States: the Queens of Jerusalem (1100-1190)', in Medieval Women: Studies in Church History, subsidia i (1978), 167.

150 Richard, Latin Kingdom, pp251,265,308. Edbury, 'The 'Cartulaire de Manosque'', pl77, suggests that William's marriage to Beatrice in fact never took place.

151 'Eracles', p154; Tabulae Ordinis Theutonici, no.21; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p116; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p191. It may have been a condition of Humphrey's marriage to Isabella that if they were separated Toron was to be returned to Humphrey (see Richard, Latin Kingdom, p86), since according to William of Tyre, ii.452, Isabella's betrothal was arranged (in 1180) as part of an agreement which gave Baldwin IV the patrimony of Toron, Chastel Neuf, and Banyas, the terms of which were set down and deposited in the royal archives. The text, however, has not survived, but Frederick II's grant of Maron to the Teutonic Knights in 1229 (HDFS, iii.124) indicates that the contract involved the return of the Tordship of Maron (with which Humphrey had been compensated in 1180/1) to Joscelin of Courtenay should Toron revert to its original lord.

152 C.Cahen, 'La Chronique des Ayyoubides d'al-Makin b. al-'AmTd', Bulletin d'Études de l'Institut Francais de Damas, xv (1955-7), 138; HDFS, iii.123-5. The anthologist Maqrīzī, p207, agrees that Toron was not originally included in the treaty but does not mention Alice as having come to Frederick with this request.

153 See, for example, the letter of an English crusader in 'Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.306, and letters of Frederick, Gerold, and Hermann (HDFS, iii.92,97,105).

154 HDFS, iii.105.

155 Cf. Maqrīzī, p207, where Frederick's request appears to have been made much later.

156 HDFS, iii.124.


159 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', RHC Lois, i.112-3,325-6; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p171; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p309.

160 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp171-3. 'Eracles', pp230-1, gives a radically different version of events declaring that Ralph was accused in open court of acting disloyally against King Aimery - see Loud, pp207-8.

161 HDFS, iii.123-5.

162 See, for example, Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp137-44; Riley-Smith, 'Assise', p188; Jacoby, 'Kingdom of Jerusalem', pp94,101; Prawer, Crusader Institutions, pp56-7. See also Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', pp21-2.

163 Loud, pp204-12.

164 M. Greilsammer, 'Structure and aims of the Livre au Roi', in Outremer, p226; Loud, p209.

164a HDFS, iii.124.


166 HDFS, iii.124.

167 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', RHC Lois, i.325; 'Livre de Philippe de Navarre', RHC Lois, i.517,528; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp170-1.

167a At my viva Dr. Peter Edbury pointed out that the 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', RHC Lois, i.325n.27 ('[les] homes doudit reiaume...gagier dou service qu'il devoient a l'empereor, por ce que il ne teneit ni ne faiseit tenir et parfaire a la princesse Aalis...ce que la Haute Cour doudit reiaume aveit esgarde..') is a better reading of the main text. i.e. it was insufficient for the court to give esgart in Alice's favour, it also had to put her in seisin. Hence the ease with which Frederick was able to block the ruling. Dr. Edbury has also suggested an alternative explanation for Frederick's instructions to Balian of Sidon not to try to put Alice in seisin, this being that Toron was at the time under the control of recalcitrant Muslims and so al-Kämil could not deliver it (supra, n.158).

168 HDFS, ii/1. 531-8, ii/2. 671-2, iii.123-5; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p436n.5. This caused further problems with James of la Mandelée, ended only in 1244.

169 HDFS, iii.117-20,120-1,122-3; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p308; Sterns, 'The Teutonic Knights', pp350-4.

170 Ernoul, p465; HDFS, iii.126-7; Sterns, 'The Teutonic Knights', p350. Which King Baldwin is not specified.

171 Richard, Latin Kingdom, p286.
172 ‘Gestes des Chiprois’, p684; ‘Eracles’, p375; RRH, no.1008;

173 The papal bull excommunicating Frederick at the end of March 1228
mentioned that goods of the Temple and Hospital had already been
despoiled (HDFS, iii.54); see also Gregory IX’s letter of 5 August
1228 (Chronica Majora, iii.154), and Riley-Smith, Knights of St.
John, p164.

174 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.368; Riley-Smith, Knights of
St. John, pp163-4,172; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p267.

175 ‘Eracles’, p355: ‘Frere Pierre de Mont Agu, qui estoit maistre
dou Temple, n’i vost aler, mais il y envoia un prodome de ses freres
en son lue, qui avoit nom frere Guillaume Cadel’. In contrast the
‘Historia Damiatina’, p280, reports that ‘Magister Templi cum militia
domus eiusdem remansit in Terra promissionis ad custodiam
Christianitatis ex consilio baronum communi transmissis nunciis
discretis et honestis ad idem concilium’.

176 ‘Eracles’, p372.

177 HDFS, iii.109.

178 ‘Gestes des Chiprois’, p683; HDFS, iii.138; Riley-Smith, Knights
of St. John, p168.

179 Ernoul, pp465,466; HDFS, iii.101.

180 HDFS, iii.89-90. See also Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John,
p167.

181 Cf. Gerold’s version of events (HDFS, iii. 138-9), and
Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p169, who follows Gerold’s lead, in
suggesting that though outnumbered, cut off, and deprived of
sustenance, he and the Templars were able to compel Frederick to
raise the siege.

182 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.345 (no.427), and v. infra chapter 6,
p182. See also chapter 8, p237, for possible reasons.

183 HDFS, iii.109,137.

184 On the dating of this episode v. supra, pp104-5.

185 HDFS, iii.109,137, and infra chapter 6, p170.

186 Gerold’s letter to the pope (HDFS, iii.104-5) indicates that
negotiations were essentially complete before the Military Orders
were advised of the contents of the agreement reached between the
emperor and sultan.

187 Historia Anglorum, ii.312-4. For this episode see also
Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p168, and cf. R. Röhricht,
Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem (1100-1291) (Innsbruck, 1898),
p793n.5. The accusations of Templar treachery made by Matthew Paris
are unlikely to have any basis in fact, particularly since there
would have been no advantage whatsoever to be gained in betraying
the emperor to the Muslims, with whom he was then on good terms.
Bulst-Thiele, Sacrae Domus, pp182-3, says Paris later withdrew his
charges against the Templars, and cites Historia Anglorum, iii.259.

188 See Bulst-Thiele, Sacrae Domus, p184.

188a According to Riley-Smith, Knights of St: John, p169.

189 Riley-Smith, ibid., pp169-75, who suggests that such a hope might also have guided the attitude of the Templars after Frederick's reconciliation with the pope in 1230.

190 HDFS, iii.131-5.

192 HDFS, iii. 131-5. The Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig, ed. G. L. F. Tafel and G. M. Thomas (Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, pt. ii, Diplomataria et Acta, xii-xiv, 1856-7), ii.398 (no. 300) refers to a tax on horses brought into the kingdom by the Venetians, but it may also have applied to those imported by the Pisans - this is the interpretation placed on the document by Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p166. See also Richard, Latin Kingdom, p246, and supra, n.146. The independence of action of commercial colonies is commented upon by Abulafia, 'Pisan commercial colonies', p68.

193 Cf. Van Cleve, Frederick II, p149, and Richard, Latin Kingdom, p287.

194 Powell, 'Medieval monarchy and trade', 470-1, 493, 518, 523-4.

195 This is not to say that trade did not exist; in particular Messina took advantage of the friendly relations between Frederick II and the sultan of Egypt, with the result that the Messinesi were granted a privilege in Egypt in 1252 - Powell, 'Medieval monarchy and trade', p496.

196 MagrTzT, pp204-5 records that Frederick requested of al-Kāmil the concession of rights in Alexandria. Heyd, i.407, citing MagrTzT, writes that Frederick sought complete exemption [from tolls] for his subjects both at Alexandria and Rosetta. (Cf. Powell, 'Medieval monarchy and trade', pp470-1, 495-6, in which he maintains that the treaty between Frederick and al-Kāmil cannot be said to have contained any commercial clauses). This may simply have been an attempt to re-obtain privileges for Christian merchants in Egypt whose treatment had worsened markedly since the Fifth Crusade - see Heyd, i.405. In contrast Jackson, 'The Crusades of 1239-1241', p36, maintains that one of Frederick's primary concerns in 1229 was to secure commercial advantages for Sicily.

197 V. supra chapter 3, p41, and Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p167.

198 'Gestes des Chiprois', p678; La Monte, 'John d'Ibelin', p431.

199 V. supra chapter 1, pp10-11 and n.56. Although Frederick had initially agreed to hear John's case in the High Court ('Gestes des Chiprois', p679), Baldwin II's Établissement on the confiscation of fiefs ('Livre au Roi', RHC Lois, i.616-7) lists the construction of a port and a road from it into the Muslim hinterland as an infringement of regalian rights warranting the confiscation of the fief without esgart of court. Cf. Riley-Smith, 'Further thoughts on Baldwin II's Établissement on the confiscation of fiefs', Crusade and Settlement, pp176-80, who interprets this as meaning that once convicted of treason (which John of Ibelin clearly was not) a vassal might be disseised without further esgart of court. Whether this was the case or not, if Frederick based his action on this établissement he would no doubt have considered it within his rights to dispossess John of Ibelin.
Royal rights had already been whittled away by the early thirteenth century (Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp147-8; Prawer, Crusader Institutions, pp27-45).

A possible argument that Frederick's attack on the Templar fortress of Chastel Pèlerin was a quo warranto act is also invalid: the site of the fortress, formerly known as Pierre Encise (Petra Incisa), or Destroit (Districtum), was a notorious dangerspot (see William of Tyre, ii.453) which had been fortified by the Templars early in their career when the protection of pilgrim routes was a primary objective (T.S.R. Boase, Castles and Churches of the Crusading Kingdom (London, 1967), p61; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p220). In 1217 consultations between John of Brienne, Duke Leopold of Austria, the military orders and Walter of Avesnes resulted in agreement to refortify Caesarea and Chastel Pelerin ('Eracles', pp325-6; 'Historia Damiatina', p168-9). The Templars' title to the land was therefore not in dispute, nor could it be said that refortification had been undertaken without due reference to the crown.

Chapter Six

The Treaty of Jaffa: a reassessment

The treaty concluded between Frederick II and al-Malik al-Kämil remains a shadowy piece of diplomacy of uncertain substance. Its terms must be pieced together from the testimony and letters of the Patriarch Gerold, Pope Gregory IX, the Emperor Frederick and Hermann von Salza, supplemented and bolstered by the evidence provided by Muslim and Christian observers and anthologists. No comprehensive text of the treaty has survived and this presents the largest single obstacle to an adequate assessment of the true nature and extent of the agreement. Such a document does, however, seem to have existed: Gerold remarked to the pope that he had demanded and received from Hermann a full transcript of the conditions of the agreement. He related also how Frederick had refrained from making known the articles contained in the document, each of which he intimated were poorly defined for fear that the sultan might not agree to them\(^1\). But the patriarch, when he wrote to the pope, preferred not to send a full copy of the terms agreed by the two leaders, merely the most surprising elements of which he considered it necessary to inform Gregory\(^2\). These were written in Old French - the predominant language amongst the Franks in the kingdom - with Gerold's appended comments in Latin. The version as printed by Raynaldus and presented by Huillard-Bréholles is a translation into Latin of the original Old French extract; hence, although translated with close reference to the patriarch's accompanying letter, it must be handled with some care as it differs marginally yet significantly from the clauses quoted by Gerold\(^3\). Raynaldus himself was under the impression that
the original text of the treaty was written in Arabic and then translated into the vulgar French tongue⁴.

The discrepancies between the Muslim and Christian accounts of the treaty and its stipulations are more blatant, a circumstance made certain not by the paucity of the Muslim sources but by their brevity. Most are totally preoccupied with the cession of Jerusalem to the Franks and fail to give any greater substance to the treaty than this; of those that do, however, the majority (of which Maqrīzī’s Kitāb al-sulūk fi ma’rifat duwal al-mulūk is a good example) are derived from Ibn Wāsīl’s Mufarrij al-Kurūb. This provides the fullest Muslim version of the agreement. Ibn Abī ’l-Dam must be the only writer to comment in some detail on the stipulations of the agreement, albeit with reference to Jerusalem alone, and yet remain independent of Ibn Wāsīl⁵. Other chronicles, such as the Ṣiqd al-Jumān fi ta’rīkh ahl al-zamān (Collar of Pearls) by Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAinī, are compilations from older authorities⁶. Thus, although the Muslim accounts would superficially appear to be many and quite extensive, they provide a very limited description of the treaty, whilst their apparent scope is further restricted by their close interdependence.

The treaty which was agreed between Frederick II and al-Kāmil was sworn on 18 February 1229. Under the terms of the agreement Jerusalem was to be surrendered to the Christians, with the proviso that the Temple area and its precincts - the Dome of the Rock (Qubbat al-Sakhra, or Templum Domini) and the al-Aqṣā mosque (Masjid al-Aqṣā, or Temple of Solomon), collectively known to the Muslims as the Haram al-Sharīf (sacred enclosure)⁷ - were to remain in Muslim possession. Muslim worship and practices were to continue there. The Franks for
their part were strictly forbidden to enter the area except as visitors. Thus the Sibt Ibn al-Jauzī was able to report that during Frederick's visit to the Holy City in March 1229 in the company of the gādi of Nablus, Shams al-Dīn, the muezzins continued their customary call to prayer, and that before leaving the city the emperor distributed money amongst the custodians and muezzins and pious men of the sanctuary. It was even reported that actually within the confines of Solomon's Temple Frederick rebuked a cleric for abusing the right of pilgrimage so graciously accorded the Franks by the sultan.

The arrangement is not lacking in confirmation: al-ʿAinī quotes the Chronicle of Baybars to the effect that the rights of Islam were to be observed in the sacred enclosure. Maqrīzī repeats the claim, as does the contemporary Ibn Abī 'l-Dam, adding that no Muslims should be excluded from repeatedly visiting the Islamic shrines of the city, nor should any dues be exacted from them for the privilege of that admission.

All these stipulations are confirmed by the Patriarch Gerold in his letter to the pope, even to the point of passing on Frederick's specification that the Templum Domini was to be manned by Saracens so that those Saracens who wished to come there on pilgrimage could enter freely and without paying dues. As a means of ensuring this the keys to the gates of the Haram al-Sharīf were to be in the sole charge of its Muslim administrators, and the al-Aqṣā mosque and Templum Domini which it comprised were to be places of Muslim worship and prayer free from hindrance or oppression. A semi-fictional account of the events by the fourteenth century writer Qīrṭāy represents Frederick as saying that he had obtained agreement that
there should no longer be a Muslim force in the city\textsuperscript{12}. The Eracles, however, whilst agreeing that the Muslims retained possession of the Templum Domini and its appurtenances, suggests that in order to guarantee the situation and ensure their right of pilgrimage they were permitted to guard the area with a force of three men. Since the Temple area had four entrances and twenty-two gates, the concession cannot be said to have amounted to much\textsuperscript{13}.

Neither Frederick nor Hermann von Salza denied that they had not obtained full rights for Christians within the Holy City - indeed, as Gerold was quick to point out, it would have been impossible to hide such a fact\textsuperscript{14} - but they attempted to cushion the blow by emphasising that the Templum Domini, although remaining under Muslim control ("because they have long been in the habit of praying there") was still freely accessible to those Christians who wished to worship within its walls\textsuperscript{15}. Moreover, as the emperor wrote in a letter to King Henry III of England, only as many Saracens as the Franks might choose to allow would be permitted to visit the Haram al-Sharif, and without arms. Nor were they to be permitted to dwell in the city, but outside its walls, and as soon as they had paid their devotions they were to depart\textsuperscript{16}. In the opinion of the Master of the Teutonic Order, such an arrangement represented no threat since the Saracens held the Temple only in so far as a few of their functionaries who were old and unarmed were guarding it, whilst the emperor's men guarded and fortified the outer gates with the result that there was no way in nor out for these Saracens, or any others, except with the approval of the emperor's men\textsuperscript{17}. Nevertheless Hermann was anxious to make it known that the Muslims possessed a long established right to worship in Jerusalem, just as Christians had once been permitted to worship in Muslim cities. Indeed whilst
the Muslims retained the al-Aqṣā mosque and the Rock, in which the Prophet's footprint had been miraculously preserved, the Christians for their part had been restored the right to come and go freely to the Holy Sepulchre. Under the circumstances it appeared that the treaty was a just compromise since, as the emir Fakhr al-Dīn recognised, the Saracens held the Templum Domini in as great a reverence as the Christians did the Sepulchre of Jesus Christ.

However, it seems probable that Hermann was more mindful of plausible excuses to justify the existence of this anomalous Muslim enclave than any concern for equitable settlement. Certainly Gerold remained unconvinced, and in his commentary on the treaty he complained bitterly that a Frank might worship neither in the Templum Domini nor in the Temple of Solomon if he did not believe as the Saracens did. But such a stipulation is not specified by Ibn Wāsīl nor does Maqrīẓi include this as a condition in his presentation of the material. It seems unlikely that had this been the case the Muslim custodians would have permitted the offerings made at the Rock to go to the Christians as Hermann maintains that they did.

The sole other right attributed by the sources to Muslim pilgrims within the city, subsequent to al-Kāmil's expulsion of the resident Muslim population, was that of independent administration of justice, although only when the injury or mischief committed involved Saracens alone. Gerold condemned this out of hand as allowing the Muslims the same jurisdiction in the city as the Christians. Despite the obvious importance of this provision for the Islamic population, the Muslim chroniclers apparently neglect to list it amongst the concessions which they held in the Holy City, although they may have felt that such an itemisation was unnecessary, considering it a self-evident responsibility of the new Muslim
governor who was now to be resident at the town of al-Bīrā, actually within the province of Jerusalem

In essence Frankish and Muslim sources are not at variance as regards the division of authority within Jerusalem: the Muslims were to retain the Templum Domini and the Temple of Solomon, to which the Franks had access but purely for worship. The problem of legal jurisdiction and the number of custodians permitted to guard the Templum Domini is less clear, since Frankish claims lack the confirmation of their Muslim counterparts. But it is over the question of the reconstruction of Jerusalem’s ruined defences that the greatest divergence occurs.

From the point of view of the Latin chroniclers Frederick had obtained from al-Kāmil complete freedom to refortify the Holy City. But it is a claim which those Muslim authors who refer to the problem utterly refute. Nor has the predicament entirely escaped the notice of historians, although few have attempted to explain the incongruity: the much-cited Hans Gottschalk alludes to the difficulty, but disappointingly skirts round it asserting that since Jerusalem remained an open city until 1239 the Muslim tradition must be the correct one. Joshua Prawer in his Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jérusalem lends only a footnote to the discussion, whilst Jean Richard is content to label it 'an unsolved problem'.

The walls of Jerusalem had been destroyed in 1219, during the time of the Fifth Crusade, by al-Muʿazzam of Damascus, within whose domain the city lay. Matthew Paris was convinced that the action was one of revenge for the siege of Damietta. It could also have been in anticipation of negotiations whereby al-Kāmil might offer the
crusaders Palestine in return for an end to the siege of the Egyptian port. But more likely is the suggestion that, denuded of troops by the duel in Egypt, Jerusalem would be wide open to attack from any new Frankish expedition arriving at Acre. Should it be taken, it would provide a ready-made stronghold for consolidation and further expansion. The remaining defences were razed a second time in 1220, and approaches made by al-Kämil towards Frederick II in 1227 persuaded al-Mu'azzam of a renewed threat to the city. Before his death on 11 November 1227/30 Dhū'l-Qa'da 624 H., he ordered the destruction of those fortifications which survived.

Both Hermann von Salza and Frederick stressed the concession which they claimed to have obtained from al-Kämil. In a letter to Henry III, Frederick wrote that he was permitted to rebuild the city of Jerusalem in as good a state as it ever had been, in addition to the castles of Jaffa, Caesarea, and Sidon and the new castle at Montfort. As for the sultan he was forbidden, until the end of the truce, to repair or rebuild any of his fortresses or castles. Hermann was in complete agreement, informing the pope that both the walls and towers of Jerusalem might be rebuilt just as the Christians wished; the Muslims, however, could construct no new fortresses or buildings, nor undertake any reconstruction until the truce had terminated.

The Old French extract from the treaty also states clearly that Jerusalem was to be given to the emperor, or his baillis, that he might do with it whatever he wished, whether fortify it or anything else. Gerold emphasised these concessions in his accompanying letter to the pope, although he made no reference to al-Kämil's oath not to undertake the refortification of Muslim possessions until after the
expiry of the truce\textsuperscript{32}. It is also plain from the patriarch’s letter that he considered defences might be constructed at Bethlehem, whilst Toron, however, was to remain in its present state. A number of other places are listed in the same vein, but Gerold’s Latin is confusing and it is unclear which others could or could not be rebuilt\textsuperscript{33}. In contrast the Annales S. Medardi Suessionensis identify only two cities which might be refortified: Jerusalem and Jaffa. The new castle at Montfort could also be strengthened, but Bethlehem was not to be rebuilt, nor was Nazareth\textsuperscript{34}.

But the Frankish sources seem to have been too ready to accept what for the Muslims was an enormous concession to make. Jerusalem had not been in Christian hands since the defeat of their forces by Salāh al-Dīn in 1187; by permitting its refortification al-Kāmil would in effect be returning the long-contested city to Christendom in perpetuity - clearly a situation which would not be tolerated in the Islamic world. Not surprisingly the Muslim writers were unanimous in their belief that the Franks had been granted no authorisation whatsoever to begin reconstruction of Jerusalem’s defences. Ibn Abī ‘l-Dam states quite expressly that the city was made over to Frederick II on the condition that the Franks should rebuild nothing whatsoever within its confines\textsuperscript{35}. Likewise Ibn Wāṣil asserts that the truce stipulated explicitly that Frederick was in no way to attempt to rebuild the city defences. It is an opinion disputed by none of the later anthologies compiled by Maqrīzī, al-ʿAinī and Abu ‘l-Fīda\textsuperscript{36}.

Gerold implied that the right of refortification was granted to the emperor as a personal concession by al-Kāmil which he communicated neither to his brother nor to his subjects\textsuperscript{37}. Instead
the sultan was content in public to claim that he had conceded only churches and ruins, since the sacred precincts, the venerated Rock and all other sanctuaries to which the Muslims made their pilgrimages remained in Muslim control. He justified his action in a letter to the Muslim princes by pointing to the military helplessness of the city: Jerusalem's flattened walls and defences could afford little opportunity for resistance should the Franks seek to take the city by a sudden coup, yet by its surrender the Frankish forces would be stretched to their limit and thereby considerably weakened, thus facilitating its recovery at a later date when the situation was more favourable. According to Gottschalk, it was a sufficiently good explanation to be accepted by all the Muslim sources - even the Damascene propaganda hostile to al-Kämì. But criticism was severe, and a recent work (by J.M.Powell) has suggested that contemporary Muslim accounts which present Frederick in a very favourable light may in fact have been part of a concerted effort by the sultan to make the treaty much more palatable to its detractors. Likewise Fakhr al-Dīn's declaration that the emperor had no real ambition to hold Jerusalem nor anything else, but simply wished to safeguard his reputation amongst the Christians, may also have been designed to provide additional comfort, by implying that Frankish possession of the city would pose no threat, and that Frederick might have no intention of undertaking a restoration of its defences.

But the contradiction remains: the Christian sources maintain the treaty permitted refortification, the Muslim sources flatly deny it. Until now discussion has been limited to the treatment of the terms by representatives of the two opposing opinions. It might be profitable at this stage, therefore, to investigate the reaction of
the new masters of Jerusalem to the constraints which the agreement imposed upon them.

As a result of the spectacular claims enunciated by both Frederick II and Hermann von Salza many people advised the emperor to hasten to Jerusalem and to carefully set about the rebuilding of the city. Frederick himself declared boastfully to Henry III that before leaving the Holy City he intended to restore its magnificence by rebuilding its walls and towers and to arrange matters so that the work would be continued in his absence with no less care and diligence than if he had been there in person. Thus, following Frederick's wearing of the crown in the Holy Sepulchre on 18 March 1229, Hermann delivered a long speech first in German and then in Latin to the people and nobles gathered there, at the end of which he invited the nobles to give their assistance in the work of fortifying the city. According to the Eracles, having given out that he wanted to fortify the city, the emperor set about uncovering and ascertaining the position of the foundations, presumably in preparation for the imminent work of reconstruction.

But in spite of the fact that the gathered nobility had agreed to give an answer the following day concerning the emperor's request for assistance, and although he had on many previous occasions promised to fortify Jerusalem, Frederick departed the city, in great secrecy at dawn on the Monday. He had told no one of his intention, with the exception of the constable of the kingdom, Odo of Montbéliard, whom he commanded to remain and guard the city. According to Gerold, the brothers of both the Temple and the Hospital had agreed to aid him with all their forces and their advice, if he still wanted to undertake a programme of refortification, and he was
informed of their decision by a delegation which set off after him. His reply, however, was noncommittal\textsuperscript{46}.

But that the emperor was concerned with the problem of restoration does not answer the question of whether or not reconstruction work was actually begun. In his description of the events in Jerusalem during the emperor's stay, Gerold admits that some attempt was apparently made by Frederick to organise a renewal of the city's defences\textsuperscript{47}. Hermann says that before leaving for Jaffa Frederick had on the same day made careful arrangements for the rebuilding of the city, whilst 'Ernoul' claims that Frederick went as far as to order his \textit{baillis} to refortify the city\textsuperscript{48}.

Certainly there are a number of sources which assert with great confidence that the process of rebuilding was indeed begun. The annals of Margam describe how the emperor and other great men entered the city of Jerusalem in the forty-second year after it had been seized, and afterwards 'they manfully began to restore the walls of the city, and to build churches'. The annals of Dore, which closely follow the Margam annals in the details of Frederick's crusade, likewise maintain that the demolished walls were once more built up from the rubble\textsuperscript{49}. Roger of Wendover, for his part, wrote that after divine services had been performed in the suburban churches, the prelates and all the religious men set to work in conjunction with the rest of the pilgrims, at great expense and trouble, to rebuild the city, to surround the walls with ditches, and to repair the ramparts of the towers\textsuperscript{50}. German chroniclers note that Frederick also restored buildings in the city and rebuilt Jaffa, Capharnaum, and Nazareth, along with a great many other places\textsuperscript{51}.
The view that construction work did take place is shared by the *Willelmi Chronica Andrensis*, although here Frederick is credited with a somewhat less ambitious programme: the writer describes how, having conducted negotiations with the sultan of Babylon, Frederick regained Jerusalem, and applied himself to the restoration of its demolished walls. 'He rebuilt the Tower of David and built up St. Stephen's Gate', with the assistance and guidance of Peter des Roches, bishop of Winchester. But whereas St. Stephen's Gate as the principal entrance to the city for pilgrims and travellers coming from Acre was a likely contender for repair, the credibility of the information is undermined by the mis-identification of the Egyptian sultan as Salāh al-Dīn rather than al-Kāmil.

Whatever may be the truth in these reports, it seems unlikely that construction work would have been begun whilst Frederick was actually in the city - for one thing there was not sufficient time: Christian sources agree with the Sibt that the Emperor spent only two nights in Jerusalem. T.C. Van Cleve asserts, however, that a body of knights, probably of the Teutonic Order, was left behind in the city with the purpose of aiding the process of rebuilding. This seems to be pure speculation; the letter which he cites is evidence only that Frederick left some knights in the kingdom and those not necessarily at Jerusalem. The *Annales S. Medardi Suessionensis*, however, state that Frederick stationed a garrison in the Tower of David, and at other cities elsewhere, just as he saw fit; but our information is scanty and it cannot be said with any certainty that the imperial troops noted by the *Annales Sancti Rudberti Salisburgenses* as protecting the Holy City in 1239 were the selfsame relic of Frederick's crusade, or that they had played the role of masons or civil engineers.
In spite of the continued presence of at least some imperial forces, Gregory IX, in his encyclical to St. Louis and all the bishops of France, found sufficient grounds to complain that the emperor had left the Holy Land destitute of troops and men, of arms and other protections, thus exposing it to occupation by enemies of the faith. The 'Rothelin' continuation of William of Tyre agrees, declaring that Frederick left the Christians in the Holy Land of Jerusalem in great peril, 'as it all remained unenclosed and without fortification'. Indeed, if we are to believe its author, none of the churches was rebuilt, the Holy City was not refortified, and neither Frederick nor his bailli gave any advice by which Jerusalem was to be refortified in the future. This, of course, is in direct conflict with 'Ernoul's version of events, and it seems likely that 'Ernoul' must have assumed, solely on the basis of the survey of the city's foundations, that Frederick's instructions to his representatives must have included a command to commence the work of rebuilding. The emperor's hurried departure from the city and return to Acre, despite being acquainted with the amenability of the military orders to the work of reconstruction, lends weight to this interpretation. Certainly there survives no record of Frederick accepting their offer of assistance.

But this does not prove conclusively that no rebuilding was undertaken in Jerusalem during the period of the truce: indeed demolition of various parts of the city had been effected on three separate occasions during the previous ten years, and the scale of destruction must have been extensive. The Eracles attributes to al-Mu'azzam the dismantling of all the walls of the city of Jerusalem in addition to the two castles of Toron and Safed. However, both the 'Rothelin' continuation and Maqrizi's account of events assert
that the Tower of David was not destroyed\textsuperscript{59}.

The vandalism wrought by the prince of Damascus was described by the scholasticus Oliver of Paderborn in his \textit{Historia Damiatina}, in which he told how in 1219 Jerusalem, although impregnably fortified, was destroyed within and without by al-Mu'azzam. Its walls and towers were reduced to heaps of stone but, we are told, the Templum Domini, the Tower of David and the Holy Sepulchre all survived\textsuperscript{60}. Thus Oliver's account indicates that the demolition included not merely the city's outer defences but also other buildings within the city walls. The 'Rothelin' continuation, in a later passage describing the condition of Jerusalem, also assesses the extent to which the city was affected, suggesting that during the period of Muslim occupation everything was razed with the exception of the Church of the Sepulchre and certain other buildings which are not identified\textsuperscript{61}.

But between March 1219 and repossession of the city by the Franks in 1229, Jerusalem was subject a further twice to destructive onslaughts by its Muslim ruler. The \textit{Historia Damiatina} indicates that in the late summer-autumn of 1220 the city was more completely destroyed; and the destruction of Jerusalem is again recorded in 1227\textsuperscript{62}. Thus, even if the Templum Domini, the Church of the Sepulchre and the Tower of David survived 1219, or for that matter 1220, it cannot be confidently asserted from the evidence available that in 1229 they remained unscathed. Certainly the \textit{Willelmi Chronica Andrensis} would tend to indicate that the Tower of David had not escaped al-Mu'azzam's wrath\textsuperscript{63}. The \textit{Eracles} hints at the same thing when it informs us that a little after the departure of the emperor from the Holy Land an attack was made on Jerusalem by, according to the report, more than fifteen thousand Muslim peasants
from the surrounding countryside. The attack was beaten off and five hundred of the raiders killed; but during the incursion the inhabitants took refuge in the Tower of David, 'in a fortification which had been made there out of the strongest houses which were close by',\(^{64}\). The *Annales Wormatienses* agree that the Muslims attacked the city, but add that the Tower of David was destroyed\(^ {65}\). This is not confirmed elsewhere.

Whether the Frankish stronghold had been destroyed or not in 1229 or before, it appears to have presented a major problem to al-Nāṣir Dā'ūd when he arrived at Jerusalem on 15 December 1239, where, according to Ibn al-Furāt, 'the Franks had built up and fortified a tower... known as the Tower of David'. It was sufficiently well defended to hold out until 5 January 1240. After its surrender it was reduced to a pile of rubble\(^ {66}\).

'Rothelin' gives us a fuller impression of the work which had been accomplished in the intervening years since the return of Jerusalem to the Christians. We are told that on the appearance of Theobald's crusade in the Holy Land there were no fortifications in Jerusalem apart from the Tower of David, although the Christians had made good use of alms to begin to fortify the city near St. Stephen's gate, and had constructed '.I. pou del mur et ne sai quantes tornelles'\(^ {67}\). The extent of this refortification seems to be confirmed by the *Chronique rimée* of Philippe Mouskès which, with reference to Dā'ūd's attack in 1239, affirms that the Tower of David was thrown down along with the gate of St. Stephen\(^ {68}\).

Thus it would appear that at some time between Frederick's departure from the Latin Kingdom and Dā'ūd's assault on the city of
Jerusalem at the very end of 1239, work of refortification had been undertaken in the Holy City. The problem is at what stage this was begun, its full extent, and whether or not it contravened the terms of the agreement.

Perhaps, surprisingly, the most conclusive proof of a violation by the Franks of the conditions of Jerusalem's cession would seem to come from a Muslim source. An historical study written by Ibn Shaddād (1217/613H.-1285/684H.) claims that reconstruction was indeed embarked upon and completed during the agreed period of the truce. We are told that after the treaty expired, around the time of Theobald's expedition, Jerusalem was evacuated of its inhabitants and a celebrated knight remained in command.

"He had rebuilt the citadel of Jerusalem during the time of the truce and had fortified it and had filled it with equipment....and he had joined it to the tower, which is known as the Tower of David." 69

But it is difficult not to be sceptical of this claim. Although it seems unreasonable to dispute the form which the fortification took - Ibn Wāṣil writes that the Franks had constructed on the western side of Jerusalem a fortress which comprised the Tower of David as part of its walls - the date of construction remains open to dispute. Ibn Wāṣil clearly fixes the rebuilding as occurring sometime after al-Kāmil's death (9 March 1238/ 21 Rajab 635 H.), adding that when al-Nāṣir Dā'ūd learned that the Franks had constructed a citadel at Jerusalem, he marched against the city 70. Thus the implication of Ibn Wāṣil's account is that, had there been any major work on the city's defences prior to 1238-1239, it would have provoked a similar
reaction. How then is it possible to explain the apparent reconstruction which took place during the ten years following the loss of Jerusalem to the Franks?

In the first place it seems clear that the Tower of David escaped destruction on all three occasions when the wrath of al-Mu'azzam was unleashed on the Holy City: both Maqrīzī and Ibn Wāṣil, writing about the events of 1239-1240, reaffirm that al-Mu'azzam had left the Tower of David intact, and 'Rothelin'’s description of the city circa 1239 differentiates between the Tower of David and fortifications which had been begun only recently. The reason for its survival is given in a letter of al-Nāṣir to the Caliph: it seems that it was revered by the Muslims as an edifice personally constructed by the Prophet for use as a mosque. Dā'ūd, although like al-Mu'azzam a very religious man, was able to overcome his father’s qualms, writing that he planned

'to overturn it...and make it into a mosque for worship instead of a refuge for mobs and a musterground.'

In other words the Tower of David did not suffer destruction at the hands of the Muslims until 1240, and consequently it was not in need of reconstruction work during the period of the truce.

However, between 1229 and December 1239 there were two occasions when building work was carried out in Jerusalem. The first was probably in the May or June of 1229 (although possibly as late as October of that year) when some sort of temporary refuge was hastily constructed from a number of sturdy dwellings within the former citadel area and neighbouring on the Tower of David. The picture
conjured up by the Eracles is one of a few houses knocked together as an emergency measure in the face of increasing Muslim hostility in the locality, which had been excited by the harangues delivered from the mosques, probably at the instigation of al-Nāṣir Dāʾūd who represented the loss of Jerusalem as a betrayal of Islam. Thus it was a minor defence measure, and as such provided no threat to Jerusalem's status of a 'free-city'. It is quite conceivable that it even passed unnoticed by Muslim observers. Indeed it is unlikely that any more extensive defences would have been necessary at this stage: the Christian community living in Jerusalem was small; few of the pilgrims had wanted to stay behind when Frederick had left\textsuperscript{74}, and all the indications are that immigration did not really begin again until 1243. Even when the city was sacked by the Khwarizmians in 1244, the population seems to have been only about seven thousand\textsuperscript{75}. Nor was there any real incentive to contravene the treaty and refortify - the seat of government, the court and patriarch all remained at Acre. Even the Teutonic Order to whom Frederick had given possessions in Jerusalem (including \textit{le Manoir le Roi}) preferred the comforts of the thirteenth century capital\textsuperscript{76}.

The second and by far the more important occasion was in the period March 1238 to December 1239. According to Ibn al-ʿAmTd the duration of the truce was set at ten years, five months and forty days, and would, therefore, expire some time in mid-to-late 1239; but with the death of al-Malik al-Kāmil on 9 March 1238 / 21 Rajab 635 H. the treaty lapsed before its allotted time and the binding obligations on the two parties were lifted\textsuperscript{77}. This sort of unwritten contingency clause seems to have been commonly recognised by the Franks, and it is found in connection with the death of al-Muʿazzam in 1227 and of the ruler of Aleppo nine years later\textsuperscript{78}. Thus in March
In 1238 the Franks considered themselves at liberty to begin work on the refortification of Jerusalem's crippled defences. This resulted in the fortifications noted by the 'Rothelin' continuation and by Philip Mouskès as having been begun near St. Stephen's gate, and the building up of the citadel to incorporate the Tower of David which the Muslim writers report. Ibn Shaddād's assertion that this construction work took place during the time of the truce reflects the unwillingness of the Muslims to recognise this particular agreement as having expired with the sultan's death, an understandable attitude which was directly attributable to the inevitable upheaval within the Ayyūbid house on al-Kāmil's demise. Indeed it was this unrest which prevented the Ayyūbid princes from taking punitive measures against the Christians. Only with his cousin Ayyūb safely incarcerated in Kerak, and the demoralising defeat of a Frankish force near Gaza in November 1239 by Egyptian troops, did Dā'ūd find it opportune and advantageous to move against Jerusalem and to espouse the cause of the Jihād as he had done in 1229.

It is obvious that the construction work undertaken in the Holy City belongs in essence to the period intervening between al-Kāmil's death and al-Nāṣir's assault, a period which the Franks considered to be outside the jurisdiction of the truce. Roger of Wendover's claim that the refortification was begun almost immediately after the emperor's visit to Jerusalem appears to be poetic licence based on the boastful intentions portrayed by Frederick in his letter to Henry III. The suggestion by the Burchardi et Cuonradi Urspergensium Chronicon that the buildings within the city walls were restored may again have been an action which was contemplated, but one which was never carried out. As for the affirmation by the annals of

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Margam that the walls were repaired and churches built, this must surely be pure supposition - or at least wishful thinking. The whole episode of the emperor's visit to Jerusalem as described by the Margam chronicler is one of misinformation: mass is said to have been celebrated despite the city having been under interdict since 1187 and the emperor being an excommunicate, the patriarch is mistakenly included amongst Frederick's entourage, and the event is misdated as Palm Sunday [8 April] 1229. In the face of such neglect it is difficult to class talk of refortification as anything other than just one more error.

Indeed we have only the word of Frederick and Hermann that there ever existed any intention to refortify the city. Certainly the emperor did not personally undertake the rebuilding of the Tower of David and St. Stephen's gate as the Willelmi Chronica Andrensis asserts; Gerold accuses Frederick of arriving in the Holy Land with 'scarcely forty knights and without money', and his departure from Jerusalem was far too hasty for him to have initiated the actual process of rebuilding. Frederick himself complained of the poverty which beset him, in spite of having borrowed thirty thousand besants from Guy of Gibelet before his departure for Syria. As it was there was little enough money for day to day expenses, to say nothing of refortification, and he found it necessary to confiscate the offerings made at the Holy Sepulchre, and to deprive the canons at Acre of certain of their customs dues in order to meet the short-term needs of his expedition. Even if we were to suppose that the Tower of David had not survived the destruction caused by al-Mu'azzam, and that the refortification specified by the Willelmi Chronica Andrensis did take place in Jerusalem in 1229, we would have to accept the dubious assertion that it was supervised by Peter des Roches, bishop
of Winchester. He may indeed have remained behind for a short time in the kingdom of Jerusalem after Frederick's departure\textsuperscript{86}, but a review of the bishop's life by the xenophobic Matthew Paris, whilst hailing the Englishman as the principal architect of the crusade's successes, attributes to him little more than the strengthening of Jaffa in 1228 and the transformation of the church of St. Thomas the Martyr in Acre from a secular to a military establishment\textsuperscript{87}. It is more than doubtful that, had Peter des Roches masterminded a refortification of Jerusalem, it would have escaped Paris's able pen.

If Frederick II set out with the intention of refortifying Jerusalem it was an intention which the pressing circumstances of the final months of his stay in the Holy Land compelled him to abandon. Under the pressure of events he was forced to accept al-Kāmil's terms. Although he went through the motions of preparing for a programme of reconstruction - he had the foundations of the city walls surveyed, and requested assistance from the Syrian baronage and military orders - it seems probable that this was an attempt to dupe the opposition and to make a pretence of goodwill. His sudden departure from Jerusalem and evasive reply to the Templars' offer of help frustrated the anticipated rebuilding. Thus it would appear that the Muslim sources were correct in their assertion that there was to be no refortification of the city. Certainly it seems unlikely that, whilst permitting the Franks to rebuild, al-Kāmil would have accepted a clause which barred him from renewing those fortresses in his own possession. Indeed the terms on which the sultan was prepared to declare a truce remained secret until 11 February 1229 and even then we cannot be certain that all the points were relayed in full, or remained without embellishment by the emperor\textsuperscript{88}. Frederick claimed that he possessed the right to rebuild
Jerusalem's city walls and defences, but his actions would tend to suggest otherwise. It is a right which the Muslims would not have conceded lightly, and a concession which al-Kāmil's own justification for the conclusion of the truce precludes. But Frederick's prestige and position as the temporal head of Christendom had been seriously undermined by his excommunication, and the very fact that the imperial crusade had been based not on success in battle, but on negotiation, had only added to his critics. By claiming that the Egyptian sultan had conceded the right to refortify Jerusalem, Frederick may have hoped to silence these critics and in particular to persuade the Patriarch Gerold and the Templars to withdraw their opposition to the treaty. This did not mean that he planned to commence refortification; events at home demanded his attention and ruled out prolonged personal involvement in Syria. He therefore never intended to break the truce, nor had he any intention of permitting the inhabitants of the kingdom to break it. But Frederick's claims failed to placate Gerold, and when the patriarch attempted to raise troops on the pretext of protecting the kingdom from attack by the prince of Damascus, and in apparent contravention of the terms of the treaty, Frederick reacted violently, besieging the patriarch in his palace, setting soldiers at strategic points about the city of Acre, and removing engines of war useful for both defence and attack. In February 1231, after his reconciliation with the emperor, Gregory passed on a 'serious complaint' from Frederick to the Master of the Templars which accused the order of seeking to violate the truce contrary to the terms of peace and in face of prohibition by his bailli,

'by frequently drawing off knights from the Kingdom of Jerusalem for the purposes of campaign...'.

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Frederick used his concern that the Muslims were not properly keeping the truce as an excuse to send out his marshal, Richard Filangieri, in the autumn of 1231, not only to police the kingdom and protect it from Muslim unrest, but also to keep the Syrian baronage in line and at the same time prevent any premeditated attempts to break the truce\textsuperscript{93}. That Frederick was not anxious to violate the treaty is reflected in the continued friendly relations with al-Kämil, and the Ayyūbid dynasty in particular, which Ibn Wāṣil attests were maintained right up to the emperor's death in 1250\textsuperscript{94}.

But in his quest for a swift and universally acceptable conclusion to the imperial crusade, it seems unlikely that Frederick would have limited himself to exaggerating the concessions which he had obtained in the Holy City; and indeed the problem of reconciling the Muslim and Christian accounts of the treaty in general as regards the territory returned outside the city is equal in its complexity to that of refortification. Again this is due largely to the brevity of the Muslim accounts. Ibn Abī 'l-Dam was convinced that the cession was limited to Jerusalem alone\textsuperscript{95}, but most of the contemporary Muslim sources concede that more than just the Holy City was returned to Frankish control, although they are reluctant to enlarge upon this further.

The most expansive Muslim text is again supplied by Ibn Wāṣil, who wrote that outside the city all the villages within the province of Jerusalem were to remain in Muslim hands and were to be administered by a Muslim governor resident at al-Bira. Excepted from this agreement were ten hamlets on the road from Acre to Jerusalem, which were to belong to the Franks\textsuperscript{96}. Ibn al-AthTr attributed to the treaty the cession of Jerusalem and the cities appertaining to its
district, whilst Abū Shāma, a contemporary writing in Damascus, complained of the scandalous agreement which had abandoned the city of Jerusalem to the Franks, along with 'several villages'.

In contrast the gains which Frederick claimed to have obtained were far more extensive. They included Bethlehem and all the country between Jerusalem and that city; the city of Nazareth and all the country between Acre and that city; the whole of the district of Toron, and the city of Sidon with the whole of its plain and appurtenances. Hermann, the emperor’s trusty aide, agreed with the emperor’s itemisation, although he considered it necessary in his letter to the pope to spell out that the agreement included the tenements and dependent villages of each city. In addition he listed 'the town known as St. George' and the villages lying on either side of the road as far as Jerusalem.

Gerold was scathing of the emperor’s claims and whilst he does not appear to have disputed the return of Bethlehem, Nazareth, Toron, and Sidon, along with a handful of villages, he complained that outside Jerusalem not a single square foot of land was being restored to the Latin Church in Syria, nor to the Hospital; only the Templars received back any of their property, and even then, as he remarked with great bitterness, the villages which this entailed were few in number and of little worth.

Christian sources generally agree that the Franks received possession of Bethlehem, Nazareth and Sidon, but with the exception of Bethlehem, which is mentioned by Kamāl al-Dīn, none of these is confirmed by the available Muslim sources. The reason for Bethlehem’s absence from most Muslim versions of the treaty could be
explained by the suggestion that the Muslim writers probably understood the city as being included in with Jerusalem, presumably owing to its proximity and close religious ties, hence its usual omission. Of the three places thus far mentioned, the Annales de Terre Sainte confirm only Nazareth but do add Lydda to the inventory, as do the Gestes des Chiprois. This, remarkably enough, is verified by the Coptic Christian, Ibn al-'Amid, writing around 1273, who lists the cessions as Jerusalem, the city of Ludd [Lydda], and the localities situated on the road. Maqriz also mentions Lydda, but does not specify it as reverting to Christian tenure, preferring to reserve this fate for the villages which lay between Jaffa and Lydda, and Lydda and Jerusalem, rather than the city itself. He also reaffirms that those villages dependent on Jerusalem were to continue under Muslim control. Since Lydda lay on the direct route between Jerusalem and Jaffa, it seems unlikely that under the provisions of the truce the Franks would not be permitted to hold it. Hermann von Salza had already specified in his report to the pope that the city of St. George was returned, and in general this referred to both Lydda and the neighbouring township of Ramla, a situation which had existed since the time of the First Crusade when Robert of Rouen had been appointed to the bishopric of Lydda, at that time comprising both Lydda and Ramla and the surrounding territory. Together they formed the important Lydda-Ramla cult centre of St. George, a strategic point on the Jerusalem-Jaffa roads. The inseparability of the two townships is emphasised by the History of the Patriarchs, which lists 'Ludd al-Ramla' amongst the Christian gains. Ramla was also included, along with part of its plain, in a description of the truce provided by the letter of an English crusader, and was specifically mentioned by the Annales S. Medardi Suessionensis as being amongst the five cities handed over to Frederick II.
Another impressive gain specified by Hermann was that of the castle of Toron, a strong point on the road from Tyre to Banyas and then Damascus. It was an important foothold (when fortified) for possible future reconquest of Galilee to the south. Ibn al-Amīd informs us that the fortress did not originally feature amongst the terms of the treaty, but was granted at Frederick's own personal request.\textsuperscript{109}

But what appeared to be sweeping gains seem in large measure to have been simply an exercise in self-aggrandisement on the part of the emperor since much of what had been gained constituted merely a recognition of established facts. Even Frederick's assertion that the Christians had permission to refortify Jaffa, Caesarea, Sidon and Montfort neglected to point out that work had already begun or been completed at all these places before or immediately following the emperor's arrival.\textsuperscript{110} Both Frederick and Hermann claimed that Sidon had been wrested from the Muslims by the terms of the agreement, and yet in reality the joint Frankish-Muslim condominium had reverted to solely Frankish control when a detachment of troops drawn from Acre, Tyre and Beirut had occupied it during the winter of 1227-8/625 H., following the death of al-Mu'azzam.\textsuperscript{111} Lydda and Ramla had also been shared between the Muslims and Franks since 1192-3, but a truce agreed by al-'Aḍil in September 1204 had altered previous agreements to give up the Muslim share of the revenues of both, and perhaps even of Sidon as well. The Franks also received full control of Nazareth and Jaffa.\textsuperscript{112}

Thus in 1229 the Franks appear already to have been in effective control of Sidon, Nazareth, Lydda and Ramla, and the treaty of Jaffa must have served merely to confirm the Franks in these
possessions. Even so, the fourteenth century anthologist Ibn al-Furat maintains that the Muslim-Christian condominium over Lydda and Ramla survived through the reigns of al-’Aziz, al-Afdal, al-’Adil and al-Kamil, until al-Kamil’s son, al-Malik al-’Adil, came to the throne. Then, presumably at the time of Theobald’s crusade, the Franks broke the agreement to share the towns and seized control of them both. As for Toron, he claims it remained in Muslim hands until the death of al-Ashraf (28 August 1237/4 Muḥarram 635 H.), after which time it passed to al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ Ismā’īl, who included it with some other fortresses which he gave to the Franks. The conflict of opinion seems irreconcilable, but Ibn al-’Amid appears to be proof that Toron was added to the treaty only after a provisional draft had been drawn up, and Muslim opposition to its inclusion may well have prevented its actual transfer to Frankish control at that time. In addition the surrender of rights to revenues in a township, as is proved by the example of Sidon, did not necessarily recognise the suspension of Muslim rights to a say in the administration of that township. Hence the treaty of Jaffa may have confirmed the transfer of the Muslim share of the revenues of Sidon, Nazareth, Lydda, and Ramla, as had originally been agreed in 1204, without actually recognising their return to the Franks which, in the case of Sidon at least, was an established fact. Nazareth, Sidon and St. George do not feature in the Muslim accounts of the treaty, and indeed for June 1229/Sha’bān 626 H., Maqrizī notes that an agreement reached between the warring Ayyābid princes resulted in the Egyptian sultan now possessing Shawbak, Hebron, Tiberias, Gaza, Ascalon, Ramla, Lydda, and all the Muslim possessions in the Ṣāhil, in spite of the terms apparently agreed with Frederick. In other words, from the point of view of the Muslims, the form of the treaty was nowhere near as substantial as the emperor claimed it to be. It is
perhaps significant that the only commentators in Arabic to affirm
the return of Lydda to the Franks, Ibn al-'Amid and the anonymous
author of the History of the Patriarchs, were themselves Christians.

Much of the territory which al-Kāmil was supposed to have
signed away by his treaty with Frederick II was at the time of the
truce within the domain of al-Nāṣir Dāʿūd of Damascus, al-Muʿazzam's
son. He was an inexperienced, impetuous youth, not quite twenty, and had inherited his father's stubbornness and strength of purpose;
his refusal to cede the Transjordanian fortress of Shawbak to
al-Kāmil convinced the Egyptian sultan of the prospect of yet another
unruly neighbour in the north. On the pretext of protecting Syria
from the imminent Frankish invasion, al-Kāmil moved into Palestine in
early August 1228, and took al-Nāṣir's possessions there. Jerusalem,
Nablus, and Hebron were all seized. Some time before February 1229,
al-Kāmil reached agreement with al-Ashraf to deprive their nephew of
all his territories and compensate him with less significant lands in
Diyār Mudar. Despite using the surrender of Jerusalem to identify
his cause with that of Islam, Dāʿūd was forced to concede Damascus to
al-Kāmil and al-Ashraf on 25 June 1229/ 2 Shaʿbān 626 H., and the
ensuing territorial exchanges gave the Egyptian sultan a position of
supremacy within the Ayyūbid confederation.

Thus, only with the fall of Damascus nearly two months after
Frederick's departure from the Holy Land, did much of the land ceded
according to Frederick and Hermann officially become al-Kāmil's by
right to cede. The fact that al-Kāmil had not been in a position to
surrender much of what Frederick suggested he had done was not
mentioned by the emperor; it was left to Gerold to point this out
and that the prince of Damascus was unwilling to swear to the truce

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or to any concessions\textsuperscript{121}. Indeed, 'Ernoul' reports that under the terms of the truce al-Kämil was to return all the land of Jerusalem that had been conquered by the Muslims in 1187, except for Kerak and three castles in the territory of Tyre and Sidon, which their occupants refused to surrender, suggesting that al-Kämil's control over the northern territories around Toron remained extremely limited\textsuperscript{122}.

The treaty represented a considerable reduction in what might have been obtained. Some time in 1226-7/624H., al-Kämil, fearing an alliance between al-Mu'azzam and the Khwarizmshah Jalâl al-Dîn, had sent the emir Fakhr al-Dîn to Frederick to request his assistance against the ruler of Damascus. In return the emperor would receive all of those conquests made by Salâh al-Dîn, including Jerusalem, which had been offered to the Franks at the time of the Damietta campaign\textsuperscript{123}. Gottschalk argues convincingly that al-Kämil did not seek an alliance, merely a deterrent which would also forestall another calamity like Damietta\textsuperscript{124}. This seems to be borne out by the Chronicle of Baybars, as quoted by al-'Aini, which claims that the step had the object of persuading al-Mu'azzam to abandon his opposition to al-Kamil and to make common cause with him as a subject prince\textsuperscript{125}. But when Frederick eventually arrived at Acre in September 1228, the situation had changed considerably: al-Mu'azzam was dead, and Jalâl al-Dîn found himself too fully occupied with the Georgians to be concerned with affairs in Syria. Nevertheless, despite the drastic reduction in bargaining power, Frederick still felt it within the interest of al-Kämil to surrender all that which had been previously agreed. In his opinion the sultan could offer him nothing less than had been promised to the Fifth Crusade; this included all the Sâhil plus rights in Alexandria\textsuperscript{126}.
But if Frederick thought that al-Kāmil would respect his previous offer in the modified circumstances he was being unrealistic. Pressed hard by increasingly grave news from home that papal armies had invaded his Sicilian kingdom, Frederick was anxious to leave but could not because of the time of year. His discomfiture led him to set a tight schedule for the completion of negotiations and he arranged for Henry of Malta to bring the necessary transports for a return to Italy at Easter. Meanwhile al-Kāmil hedged and negotiations dragged on. According to Richard of San Germano, the sultan knew of the animosity between the Church and the emperor, and it was this which persuaded him of the advantage he possessed. Gerold would have preferred the explanation that Frederick's representations rendered him despicable in the eyes of the sultan and his subjects, 'especially after they had discovered that he was not at the head of a numerous army...

al-Kāmil's situation was also increasingly difficult; he had committed himself to the surrender of Jerusalem, and to refuse could mean war. Whilst Frederick's army was nowhere near as large as it might have been, the turmoil of such an event would rob him of the unusual opportunity with which he had been provided to assert his authority throughout the Ayyūbid empire. Nor was a defeat for the crusaders likely to ensure a very long peace in Palestine. What he needed, therefore, was a peace involving no strategic liabilities, marginally acceptable to his subjects, and which would remove the crusading army from Syria as quickly as possible, leaving him free to strike at Damascus.

Thus as the Muslim year progressed both leaders found it more and more expedient to compromise, and what two years earlier might
for Frederick have been the cession of the whole of the former kingdom was stripped to its barest minimum. The reality of the agreement was in stark contrast to the belief of a number of Christian sources that if not the whole of Palestine, then at least the bulk of it, had been regained for Christendom. Of Salâh al-Dîn's conquests there remained in Muslim possession by far the greater part of the Holy Land - Hebron, Nablus, the Jordan Valley, not to mention the fortresses of Transjordan. For al-Kâmîl the agreement with Frederick and the subsequent juggling of territories amongst the Ayyûbid princes presented him with Tiberias, Hebron, Gaza and Ascalon. Dâ'ûd received the lordship of the Jordan valley, Kerak and Shawbak, whilst al-Ashraf, wooed by its beauty, was only too happy to become the new ruler of Damascus. A strange intermingling of possessions, but it would provide al-Kâmîl with a more far-reaching and more imposing power-base allowing him to ensure the allegiance of his brother and nephew and exert greater influence in the affairs of Damascus and Kerak.

The settlement must ultimately have been profoundly satisfying for the Egyptian sultan, for whom the possibility of an alliance between the Franks and al-Nâşir Dâ'ûd, master of the Transjordanian fortresses, may well have raised serious fears. But although Frederick cannot have been unaware of the tensions within the Ayyûbid house - Gerold had reported them as early as 1227 - it was essential for him to achieve a swift settlement. Backing al-Nâşir - had not al-Mu'âzzam's response to Frederick's approaches in 1227 and Dâ'ûd's reaction to the loss of Jerusalem in 1229 rendered such an alliance unthinkable - would probably have meant prolonged involvement. Besides which, when the situation was considered objectively, it was al-Kâmîl who was in effective control of
Jerusalem and the surrounding areas, and not Dā'ūd\textsuperscript{141}. Consequently despite the obvious weakness of his claim to the lands which he occupied, it was the Egyptian sultan, rather than his nephew, with whom the emperor had to conduct his dealings. Frederick, however, did not ignore Dā'ūd, and when the treaty had been sworn he sent Balian of Sidon to the prince of Damascus to receive similarly an oath from him. The annals of Margam claim that the bishop of Exeter, William Brewer, was sent to Damascus, presumably with the same aim, but the context would suggest merely that he was a party to the discussions between Frederick and al-Kāmil\textsuperscript{142}.

Continually aware of the approach of the spring passage Frederick had launched into the negotiations with renewed anxiety\textsuperscript{143}. In his haste he had been inattentive to the security requirements of those cities already under effective Frankish control which he nevertheless claimed to have obtained by means of the agreement; and although in theory the Frankish domains had been vastly enlarged, and fortifications were officially permitted in a region which had hitherto remained open, Nazareth, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and also for that matter Toron, all remained isolated from the main body of the kingdom. After the collapse of Damascus, Jerusalem's isolation was made even more effective by the agreement handing Beit-Jibrīn to al-Nāṣir Dā'ūd thereby dissecting the link road from Ramla to the Holy City\textsuperscript{144}.

In retrospect the gains which al-Kāmil made as a result of the treaty seem far more extensive than those which Frederick made. The impressive territorial concessions when studied in a little depth become far less substantial. The promise of Jerusalem and Bethlehem when initially made emanated from al-Kāmil and not from al-Nāṣir, to
whom they belonged; and when by right of Dā'ūd's surrender in June 1229 they finally accrued to the Egyptian sultan, the right to Jerusalem and its surrounding district was immediately returned to al-Nāṣir, with whom the Franks had no agreement. Although officially content to respect the treaty it did not prevent him from agitating against the loss of what was rightfully his. As for Toron and Nazareth, the latter was already more or less a Frankish possession, whilst al-Kāmil's influence barely stretched as far as Upper Galilee, and could not necessarily guarantee the truce there.

Nazareth, Bethlehem and Jerusalem were connected to the kingdom by roads running through hostile Muslim territory. The realm possessed neither the capability of guarding the roads nor the strength to build a new network of fortifications - even if this had been permitted by the agreement. Thus the application of the treaty would depend heavily on the goodwill of the Muslims.

The sparkling achievements of the treaty of Jaffa in reality lacked all but the faintest lustre, and Frederick knew it. It could be suggested that his grasp of the situation was far less well-informed than many historians would have us believe, or that he just misunderstood the magnitude of the concessions, preferring to believe that he had obtained various rights and confirmations of rights where none had been offered. But Frederick was an intelligent man: he was fluent in six languages, including Arabic, and was well versed in the sciences, medicine, philosophy and natural history. Maqrīzī even tells us how he sent many very difficult problems of geometry, number theory and mathematics to the Sultan al-Kāmil. He was also very shrewd; having been approached by al-Kāmil in 1226-7, he sent to Damascus to find out what al-Mu'azzam had to
offer, and in his reconciliation with the pope in 1230, his submissive approach appeared to cast all blame for the dispute on to the shoulders of Gregory IX. Such a man could hardly fail to be aware of the subtle intricacies of the predicament in which he found himself. al-Kāmil, however, was no longer under any compulsion to grant him anything. As a result Frederick's gamble was unlikely to bring him the windfall on which he had pinned his hopes. Jerusalem might have satiated his adversaries in Europe and in the Latin Kingdom had it been granted outright, but it continued to be shared with the Muslims. Frederick therefore found it necessary to exaggerate his achievement. Only in this way could he hope to save his face and pacify his opponents.

In addition to the major points of the treaty already outlined, there remained a number of clauses attributed to it by Gerold, and by Pope Gregory, who based his objections on Gerold's information.

According to the patriarch the emperor swore not to induce any Frank to contravene the treaty, and to restrain all those who might contemplate to do so. He would also deny aid to anyone attacking the sultan, and was even bound to defend the sultan and take up arms against an aggressor. These are clauses which remain unconfirmed by both Frederick's and Hermann von Salza's versions of the agreement, although they could quite conceivably have formed a necessary part of the treaty which, for obvious reasons, the emperor was unwilling to divulge publicly.

The treaty had particular significance for the northern Frankish principalities, since Tripoli, Crac des Chevaliers, Chastel Blanc, Tortosa, Margat, Antioch, and their territories were to remain
as they were, and the emperor was to forbid his troops and men, regardless of whether or not they were native Franks, from assisting the lords of these places. This, claimed Gerold, had never occurred before, since always when there had been a truce in the kingdom of Jerusalem, the knights of the kingdom and other Christians had assisted and defended these regions in their predicament. Gerold was not complaining at the exclusion of Tripoli and Antioch from the treaty, as this was quite a usual occurrence; rather that they were to be given no military assistance. This did not, however, prevent both the Templars and Hospitallers from taking part in conflicts on the borders of Tripoli before a separate peace was signed in June 1231.

One very commendable point of the treaty in the eyes of the Franks must have been the clause permitting the exchange of prisoners. As Frederick assured Henry III, the sultan was to return all those captives not released after the loss of Damietta and all those who had been taken since that time. This, explained Hermann, was to apply to both sides. Needless to say, it was not confirmed by the Muslim sources, nor is there any evidence that the restitution ever took place. Certainly when Louis IX entered Damietta in June 1249, Franks were discovered in its dungeons who had been there since at least 1227.

Christian sources generally agree that the treaty was to last for a period of ten years. Ibn al-`Amīd, however, specifies ten years, five months and forty days. It has been proposed that the difference is due to the discrepancy between the length of the Muslim and Christian years; but such an explanation is inadequate and still leaves several months unaccounted for. Another exception is the
annals of Margam which claim that the peace was agreed for a period of 'ten years and the same number of days'\textsuperscript{156}. However, since the peace was automatically terminated by al-Kämil's death in March 1238, computations as to the exact date of its expiry become irrelevant since its effective duration was limited to only nine years.

As regards the commencement of the truce, since the emperor was in Jerusalem in mid-March, it must have come into effect some time before this. Maqrîzī dates the commencement of the treaty as 28 Rabî' I 626 H./24 February 1229\textsuperscript{157}. The annals of Margam date the proposed transfer of the city to the Franks as the day of St. Peter in cathedra, or 22 February 1229 - the same date as is given for the handover by the annals of Southwark\textsuperscript{158}. Either way, the few days following the signing would have been necessary to evacuate the city of its Muslim inhabitants. Certainly by the first day of Rabi' II/27 February, Abū Shāma in Damascus had heard of the abandonment of Jerusalem to the Franks. Since Damascus was three days distant from the Holy City, it is a date which accords well with that proposed by Maqrîzī\textsuperscript{159}. But perhaps the coincidence of dates is a little too convenient: Ibn al-ĆAmīd, from whom Maqrîzī appears to have taken his information in this instance, apparently believed the truce to have come into immediate effect on 22 Rabî' I 626 H./18 February 1229, a date he specifically identifies as being a Sunday. Maqrîzī's date, when converted, is found to be a Saturday. Thus it would seem that Maqrîzī misread Ibn al-ĆAmīd's chronicle, and that there was no distinction between the conclusion of the agreement and the commencement of the truce\textsuperscript{160}. Abu Shāma was probably right about when the news of Jerusalem's betrayal actually reached Damascus, but it was the expulsion of the Muslim population which the rumours referred to and not the date the treaty had come into operation. It
must be assumed that the annals of Margam (and of Southwark) are once again in error, as is Ibn al-Furāṭ who claims that the Holy City was handed over to the Franks on 11 Rabi‘ I 626 H./7 February 1229\textsuperscript{161}. al-Nuwayrī must be referring to Frederick’s visit to Jerusalem when he writes that the emperor took possession of the city in the month of Rabi‘ II [27 February - 27 March]\textsuperscript{162}.

The treaty is further credited with certain provisions which are mentioned by neither Frederick and Hermann, nor by Gerold, the principal of these being that free access was gained for Christian pilgrims to the Holy Places on the Jordan. A letter incorporated in the annals of Waverley claims that the way lay open for all pilgrims to come and go as far as the river Jordan, along the ancient pilgrim route, just as had been proclaimed by King Richard and the sultan Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn\textsuperscript{163}. But it seems unlikely that the Latins would have been able to provide adequate protection for pilgrims should this have been the case.

A letter from Henry, Duke of Lorraine, to Henry III, repeats a report that the emperor had gained permission for the Roman Church to send legates and preachers in complete safety throughout the sultan’s territory, with the specific aim of converting the Muslims. As a concession which would only have provoked widespread violent opposition in the Islamic world this claim can only have been based on hearsay; the duke himself writes that the news was heard from the messenger of the King of Bohemia, mistakenly described as the emperor’s son\textsuperscript{164}. The currency of such wild rumours is testimony, however, to the obscure nature of Frederick’s peace, and to the aspirations of many Christians in the West.
It is also possible that the treaty may have included a number of commercial clauses. Roger II of Sicily had been keen to improve trading links with Egypt almost a century before, and Frederick was not unaware of the advantages of commercial exchange. According to Maqrīzī he had been concerned to reacquire rights in the port of Alexandria, and during his stay in Acre in April 1229 various privileges and rights were restored and renewed for the Pisans in the kingdom’s capital.

Such then may well have been the final few points of the agreement, an agreement which, taken piecemeal, possessed some promising elements but as a whole portended disappointment and discord.

The treaty agreed between Frederick II and al-Kāmil met with a mixed reception. Hermann von Salza was scarcely able to describe the joy in Jaffa at the restitution of the Holy City, whilst Alberic of Trois-Fontaines was more reserved, writing that the few Christians and pilgrims permitted by the peace to go freely to the Sepulchre welcomed the truce joyfully and greatly esteemed the emperor. His account is qualified, however, by the information that Gerold, the Templars and the Hospitallers all objected to the agreement. Indeed the patriarch was so angered by the treaty that he refused the crusaders licence to enter the Holy City and renewed the papal interdiction which had been proclaimed in 1187. He even went as far as to despatch the archbishop of Caesarea to Jerusalem in an apparent attempt to prevent Frederick’s triumphal wearing of the crown. According to Hermann the reason for Gerold’s anger was that the Templum Domini and the Temple of Solomon remained under Muslim control, and that the Muslims continued to practice their religion.
there. Gerold himself ascribed his actions to the fact that the treaty was totally opposed to the interests of the Church, and that if after the emperor's departure Jerusalem should be retaken by the Muslims it would be the Church that was blamed. But a principal point of contention was that Frederick had formulated the truce with little or no reference to the patriarch or to the military orders. Van Cleve suggests that this, and the constraints imposed upon the orders by the treaty, may have been a form of revenge for the 'long opposition' they had presented to Frederick. A more likely explanation would be that Frederick sought to restrict their independence as part of an attempt to restore the authority of the crown and its representatives, which had been gradually eroded since before the beginning of the thirteenth century. For this reason only limited consultation was made of the Templars, whilst Frederick preferred to rely on the support of Hermann von Salza and the Teutonic Knights. But to the Templars Frederick appeared to have ignored their rights completely, and to have deprived them of all manoeuvrability. What enraged them even more was the fact that the Temple had not been recovered - a deliberate oversight we are told by 'Ernoul', so that the order might have no headquarters in the city.

At the same time the agreement had imposed on the kingdom a new burden of defence which went against the ideas and policies of many of those permanently resident in Syria. The Latins preferred a geographically restricted kingdom which they would still be able to protect once the crusaders had departed. Extended frontiers would stretch resources to the limit thus vastly reducing defence capabilities. An additional complaint was that Jerusalem belonged
by right to Damascus, with whom the Franks until recently had been bound by treaty, and it was the good will of the Damascenes which permitted the passage of trade to Acre, Tyre and Beirut. Thus the treaty threatened the commercial interests of the kingdom, and consequently the revenues of its lords. At the same time, by denying the military orders the right to render assistance to their houses in Antioch-Tripoli, it removed all obstacles on al-Kāmil’s road to Damascus, and cleared the way for an encirclement of the Latin states by a 'unified' Muslim power, an event which the military orders had sought to avoid. Now with their hands tied by Frederick’s truce they were powerless to prevent it. One solution, therefore, was to sabotage the treaty. Claiming that the kingdom was under threat from the young ruler of Damascus with whom there existed no agreement (although at the time Damascus was already under siege by troops despatched by al-Kāmil and al-Ashraf), and using money bequeathed the Holy Land by Philip Augustus, Gerold and the Templars began to assemble troops. Van Cleve alleges that Gerold, with the support of the Templars, was determined to claim Frederick’s achievements for the papal faction and, after the emperor’s departure, take Jerusalem in the name of the pope. Considering Gerold’s reasoning behind his lack of support for the emperor this seems unlikely. Nevertheless the activities of the patriarch and his supporters did threaten to wreck the peace treaty and consequently would have seriously jeopardised the emperor’s schedule for departure. Frederick’s response, therefore, was to besiege the patriarch and his allies in their houses at Acre in order to compel their acquiescence.

In the Muslim world discontent at the surrender of Jerusalem to the Franks was so great that the Egyptian sultan found it necessary to issue a circular letter in an attempt to calm scandalized opinion.
Nowhere was the loss more vehemently condemned than in Damascus, where al-Nāṣir Dāʾūd commanded the Sibṭ Ibn al-Jauzī to preach against al-Ḵāmil's treachery. But none of the Muslim princes was in a position actively to oppose the cession; al-Ḵāmil was well established in southern Syria, and a rebellion by his brother and ally, al-Aṣ̲ḥāf, would deprive the ageing prince of Diyār Mūdar of the promised prize of Damascus. To the minor princes the mood of events was obvious and consequently al-Nāṣir remained in isolation.

The treaty of Jaffa was a miraculous achievement of diplomacy, but one which does not stand up to scrutiny. Both al-Ḵāmil and Frederick were anxious to reach a swift agreement: al-Ḵāmil to take advantage of the weakness of Damascus, caused by the death of al-Muʿazzam, Frederick to extricate himself from what threatened to be prolonged personal involvement in Syria. Had negotiations failed, no longer able to invoke the spectre of al-Muʿazzam (or for that matter Jalāl al-Dīn), the emperor's sole recourse would have been direct military action - an alternative which he could ill afford. Frederick claimed to have obtained remarkable gains for the kingdom of Jerusalem, but for the Egyptian sultan to have made massive concessions to the Franks would have been counterproductive and would have gravely jeopardised the success of his own plans.

The result was a truncated treaty, the provisions of which Frederick felt it necessary to exaggerate in order to vindicate his preference for negotiations over all-out war. Instead of the whole of the former kingdom with which he had been tantalised by Fakhr al-Dīn, Frederick had to be content to accept Jerusalem, Bethlehem, a few villages on the road from Jerusalem to Jaffa, and later, Toron (although the Franks were apparently never able to make
good their claim to the lordship). In exchange he had to agree not to undertake any work of reconstruction, nor to give any military assistance to Antioch-Tripoli. The Muslims grudgingly permitted the Franks to hold Lydda and Ramla, but failed to recognise Frankish sovereignty of these townships, or of Nazareth and Sidon.

Thus the brief Muslim versions of the treaty were far nearer its true form than the exaggerated claims put forward by Frederick and repeated by Hermann. Yet even though some of these claims, such as the right to refortify Jerusalem, were accepted, the critics were not stifled. Frederick had earned the enmity of many Syrian nobles whilst still in Cyprus, and his refusal to engage the Muslims, or permit others to do so, only added to their dissatisfaction. It must have appeared to them that in his negotiations Frederick had paid little attention to the restoration of the possessions of the Holy Sepulchre, or those of the military orders. In concluding a truce without due reference to the full Syrian baronage and without the authority of the patriarch he had violated their prerogatives. As a regent he had offended the nobility by wearing the crown, and as an excommunicate he had insulted the Church by effecting his crown-wearing in the Holy Sepulchre. Worst of all the Holy City remained shared with the votaries of a false religion, and the muezzins there continued to call the faithful to prayer.

The treaty of Jaffa cannot be said to have been in the best interests of the kingdom of Jerusalem: it ran counter to established commercial relations, and it overstretched the kingdom's military commitments. In addition it effectively permitted the Egyptian sultan a free hand in Muslim Syria, but was not subscribed to by the prince of Damascus, the legal ruler of the territories ceded to
Frederick. And when al-Kāmil gained control of Damascus, he immediately recognised al-Nāṣir’s authority in the adjoining areas that had been ceded, thereby relinquishing his responsibility for the observance of the treaty.

Despite popular opposition, al-Kāmil emerged from the agreement strengthened. For Frederick it seemed the complete opposite: his treaty lacked substance, and what stability it offered the kingdom was negated by the climate of resentment and rebellion it provoked. In letters addressed to Gregory IX Hermann von Salza gave expression to Frederick’s misgivings, commenting

'I am not writing to you about this [the terms of the agreement] to the effect that the emperor is satisfied or that he would not gladly have arranged it otherwise had he been able. But, God knows, he was not able to bring about a peace and truce in any other fashion',\textsuperscript{180}

and opined

'It seems likely that if the lord emperor had crossed in the grace and harmony of the Roman Church the business of the Holy Land would have fared far more effectively and profitably'.\textsuperscript{181}

Hermann was, of course, irredeemably biased, but one cannot help feeling that had not Frederick’s excommunication, the domestic turmoil of Germany and Sicily, and the death of al-Mu‘azzam all combined to obstruct Frederick’s crusade, the resulting treaty would have been something quite spectacular.
Notes to Chapter Six

1 HDFS, iii.106,107-8. Gregory’s complaints of Frederick (Flores Historiarum, ii.374) also mention a written agreement, and Ibn al-’Amdt, p138, similarly refers to the existence of an actual text. The precedent of the Third Crusade would appear to confirm that the treaty would have been written down, see the ‘Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta regis Ricardi’, in Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I, ed. W.Stubbs (London, 1864-5; Rolls Series; 2 vols), i.429, and The Crusade of Richard Lion-Heart by Ambroise, trans. J.L. La Monte and M.J.Hubert (New York, 1941), p432; and when peace was established after the Fifth Crusade, 'Conditionibus itaque pro arbitrio soldani compositis solempniter iuramenta, obsides hinc inde nominati. Ponens ergo manum dextram soldanus super cartam, cui subscripsisset, iuravit..'Ego Kemel..me bona fide omnia firmiter observaturum, que subjecta manui mee carta continet scripta..” ('Historia Damiatina', p275). M. Amari, Bibliotheca Arabo-Sicula. Versione Italiana (Turin and Rome, 1880-9; 2 vols), 1.549n.2, believed that Aragonese ambassadors negotiating a truce with Egypt in 1290 were given access to a written copy of Frederick’s treaty held at Cairo. Perversely, Gerold’s comments, HDFS, iii.104-6,136, could be construed as indicating that there was no written agreement in 1229.

2 HDFS, iii.108; see also ibid., p86n.1.

3 HDFS, iii. 86-90, and Gerold’s letter to the pope, ibid., pp102-110. The best edition is Epistolae Saeculi XII, 1.297-8 (no.380).

4 Raynaldus, a. 1229 (no.15); Richard, Latin Kingdom, p269n.10. The Arabic text may have been deposited in the Egyptian chancellery, see Heyd, i.407; Amari, Bibliotheca Arabo-Sicula, 1.549n.2, and supra n.1.

5 Translated extracts of Ibn Wäsil appear in Arab Historians of the Crusades, pp267-73. The substance of Ibn AbT 7-T-Dam’s account is given by Gottschalk, p158n.1, and H.A.R.Gibb, 'The Aiyûbids', in Wolff and Hazard (eds), The Later Crusades, p702, the manuscript source being Kitâb al-Shamarîkh fi’l-tawarîkh, Bodleian MS Marsh 60, f.172v; I am grateful to Dr. Jackson for his translation of various extracts.

6 The relevant passages of al-‘AinT are to be found in RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 185-93.


9 al-‘Ainî, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 189.

10 Ibn AbT 7-T-Dam, f.172v; MaqrTzT, p206.

11 HDFS, iii.86,105,108.

12 Qirtây al-‘Izzi al-Khazânârî, Ta‘rikh majmûC al-nawâdir (c.1330) MS Gotha Forschungsbibliothek Or.1655, fol.39-40, trans. in C.Cahen,

13 'Eracles', p375 variants C, D and G; 'Ernoul', p464 substitutes 'M' for 'III'; H. Michelant and G. Raynaud, Itinéraires à Jérusalem et descriptions de la Terre Sainte (Geneva, 1882), pp104(5), 183, 193, supplies the number of gates (sometimes said to be xii).

14 HDFS, iii.107.

15 HDFS, iii.92, 'Quia orare diu consueverunt...'

16 Flores Historiarum, ii.367.

17 HDFS, iii.101-2.

18 HDFS, iii.102.

19 'Eracles', p371.

20 HDFS, iii.88.

21 HDFS, iii.102.

22 HDFS, iii.87,89.

23 Ibn Wāsil in Arab Historians, p269.

24 Gottschalk, p158.

25 Prawer, Histoire, ii.210n.56; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p235; see also Grousset, iii.318, 'Les côtés obscurs de la paix frédéricienne'.

26 'Eracles', p339; 'Rothelin', pp489, 525; 'Historia Damiatina', p203. The HPEC, iv/1, tr. p61, dates the destruction as March/April 1219.

27 Chronica Majora, iii.39.

28 Maqrīzī, p181; Humphreys, p164.

29 The 'Historia Damiatina', p254, implies a date of October 1220. The context of Ibn al-Athīr, RHC Hist. Or., i/1. 119, would indicate that he is also referring to the destruction of 1220, but the month (Dhū‘l-Qa‘da/January-February) would suggest the original dismantling of 1219, supra n.26.

30 Maqrīzī, p200; Gottschalk, pp144-5; Gibb, p701.

31 Flores Historiarum, ii.367; HDFS, iii.92. Ernoul, p465, notes 'l'imperes pooit fermer totes les citez et tous les chastiaus, qui onques avolent esté fermé, mes fermete nouuelle no pooit faire et li Sarrazin ne pooit rien fermer', a detail repeated by the 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.118: '..infra treugas licebit nobis inforciare civitates et castra nostra, pagonis vero nequaquam'.

32 HDFS, iii.86,108.
Although in general the majority of Franks lived in fortified cities and castles, and even villages, Prawer, Latin Kingdom, pp288,291, (cf. p318) appears to indicate that fortifications at Bethlehem and Nazareth had previously been limited to the churches of the Nativity and of the Annunciation respectively.


Ibn AbT '1-Dam, f.172v.

Ibn Wāsīl in Arab Historians, p269; Maqrīzī, p206; al-‘AīnT, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1.188,189; Abu ’1-Fidā, RHC Hist. Or., i.104.

HDFS, iii.87,106,108.


Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, p200n.12. For hostile reaction to the treaty see Sivan, pp140,148.

Ibn Wāsīl in Arab Historians, p270.

HDFS, iii.92. Flores Historiarum, ii.368.

HDFS, iii.100. According to Hermann he was translating a speech made by Frederick (presumably in French). Gerold (ibid., p109) indicates that Hermann himself made the speech, in French and German, but Roger of Wendover's itemisation of Pope Gregory IX's complaints against the emperor contradicts this (Flores Historiarum, ii.373). Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp321-2, attempts to resolve the confusion by suggesting that Frederick is likely to have followed the oriental custom of allowing a trusted aide to make his speeches for him.

'Eracles', p374.

HDFS, iii.136-7; 'Eracles', p374. Hermann's account (HDFS, iii.101) of this episode is less mysterious, with Frederick apparently departing much later in the day. Frederick's conduct may have been related to the activities of the Templars and patriarch at Acre, see chapter 5, n.31.


Ibid., iii.101; Ernoul, p466; also 'Eracles', p376 variant C. This is not confirmed by either variants D or G.

'Annales de Margam', AM, i.37, 'viriliter muros civitatis... incipient reparare, ecclesias aedificare...'; 'Annales Dorenses', MGHS, xxvii.528.

Flores Historiarum, ii.372.

52 'Willelmi Chronica Andrensis', MGHS, xxiv.769, 'turrim David renovavit et portam Sancti Stephani erigens construxit...'. On the importance of St. Stephen's gate see Michelant and Raynaud, Itinéraires, p41.

53 Sibt, p275; and, for example, Hermann's letter, HDFS, iii.99-101.

54 Van Cleve, Frederick II, p226; Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.345 (no.427); cf. Van Cleve, 'The Crusade of Frederick II', p459, in which he claims that the Teutonic Knights actually made a start on refortification, citing HDFS, iii.98 - an apparent reference to the phrase 'et ad ejus reedificationem dedimus statim operam'. It implies merely that preliminary arrangements were made for future refortification. Van Cleve appears to have confused the writer of the letter [Frederick] with Hermann von Salza whose letter follows this in HDFS, iii.

55 'Ann. S. Medardi Suessionensis', MGHS, xxvi.521-2; 'Ann. S. Rudberti Salisburgenses', MGHS, ix.787. Those troops stationed in the Holy City in 1239 must have been Richard Filangieri's men, under whose supervision the city then was (see Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p207), and 'Eracles', p421 (hence 'Gestes des Chiprois', p728), names a certain Walter Pennedepie as imperialist castellan of Jerusalem at the time of Richard of Cornwall's crusade. Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', p32, citing RRH, no.1107, corrects this to Peter Pennedepie. On the knights left behind in the kingdom after Frederick's departure, see also infra, n.128 and chapter 7, p221 and n.37.

56 HDFS, iii.150.

57 'Rothelin', p489: 'ele estoit tout desclouse senz fermé..'; ibid., p526. See also 'Reineri Annales', MGHS, xvi.680: 'terram transmarinam in maximo reliquit periculo'.

58 'Eracles', p339.

59 'Rothelin', p489; MaqrTzT, p181.

60 'Historia Damiatina', p209.

61 'Rothelin', p525. See also HPEC, iv/1. 61. MaqrTzT, p200, notes that al-Mu'azzam destroyed the towers and cisterns of the city. The Muslims held both the Templum Domini and Holy Sepulchre in great respect, see Frederick's letter to Henry III, Flores Historiarum, ii.366, and Chronica Majora, iii.39-40.


63 'Willelmi Chronica Andrensis', MGHS, xxiv.768-9.

64 'Eracles', p378 variants D and G, p384, '...en une fermeté que l'en avoit faite iqui de lez es plus forz maisons, qui pres de la estoient'; Ernoul, p468; 'Rothelin', p489. For the date of this incident and a discussion of those killed v. infra chapter 8, pp234-6 and nn.6,8.

65 'Annales Wormatienses', MGHS, xvii.38.
66 Ibn al-Furat, ii.62. It should be noted that Ibn al-Furat draws heavily on Ibn Shaddad. See also Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, MGHS, xxiii.948; 'Annales Mellicenses', MGHS, ix.559. The attack referred to by the 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.150, may have been an earlier penetration of the city by Ayyub in mid-1239, see Jackson, 'The Crusades of 1239-1241', p38 and n.31.

67 'Rothelin', p529.


69 Ibn Shaddad, al-A`läq al-khatTra fT dhikr umarä2 al-Shäö wa'l-JazTra, ed. S.Dahhdn: Liban, Jordanie, Palestine: Topographie Historique d'Ibn Saddäd (Damascus, 1963) pp226-232, letter of al-Näöir Däööd to the Caliph al-Mustansir after the conquest of Jerusalem in early 1240. I am indebted to Dr. Peter Jackson for allowing me to make use of his translation of this letter; for a partial translation see M. Van Berchem, Matéraux pour un Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum, ii. Syrie du Sud, tom i. 'Jérusalem ville' (Mémoires de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, xliii, 1922), pp137n.5,139n.2. 'Rothelin', p530, notes that the Tower of David had been filled with all manner of supplies, arms, and men by the emperor's baillis.

70 Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij al-Kurub, v.245. See also al-'AinT, RHC Hist. Or., ii/l. 196. MaqrızT, p229, gives the date of al-Kämîl's death. I am grateful to Dr. Jackson for the translation of various passages of Ibn Wasil's Mufarrij.


72 Ibn Shaddad, pp227,232; see also Van Berchem, p139n.2.

73 'Eracles', p384; Prawer, Histoire, ii.227, and see chapter 8, p234.

74 HDFS, iii.109,137.

75 Chronica Majora, iv.309. A similar letter in the Chronica de Mailros, p160, mentions a figure of 6000 inhabitants. See also 'Annales Monasterii de Burton', AM, i.259, and 'Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.334.


77 Ibn al-'AmTd, p138. I am grateful to Dr. Jackson for his translation of the relevant pages of Ibn al-'Amid's chronicle. For varying views on the agreed duration of the truce, v. infra, pp195-6. Humphreys, p261, believes that only after the truce had run its full course did the Christians frantically begin to refortify Jerusalem. It is plausible that work begun in 1238 may have been intensified at this stage.

78 'Eracles', p371 variants C, D and G; Chronica Majora, iii.404.
79 Maqrīzī, pp250-1; Humphreys, pp239-61; Sivan, p140. al-Naṣir Dā'ūd was at the time acting as an Egyptian lieutenant - see Jackson, 'The Crusades of 1239-1241', p39.

79a R.C. Smail, The Crusaders in Syria and the Holy Land (London, 1973), p132, claims that much of the construction of the Cenacle of Mount Sion (revered as the scene of the Last Supper) belongs to the second crusader occupation of Jerusalem. His assertion, however, does not necessarily conflict with my own view that building work in Jerusalem did not really begin until after al-Kāmil’s death.

H. Plommer, 'The Cenacle on Mount Sion', in Crusader Art in the Twelfth Century, ed. J. Folda (British Archaeological Reports, International Series, 152; Oxford, 1982), pp139-66, on the basis of architectural styles, argues the Cenacle belongs to 'the last days of the crusader kings in Jerusalem' (i.e. pre-1187). Prawer, Histoire, ii.210n.56, suggests that a wall built by Salāh al-Dīn to encompass Mount Sion and destroyed on the orders of al-Mūazzam may have been restored by Frederick, but there is no firm evidence for this.

Flores Historiarum, ii.372.

80 'Burchardi et Cuonradi Urspergensium Chronicon', MGHS, xxiii.383.

81 'Ann. Margam', AM, i.37. For Gerold's version of events see HDFS, iii.108-9.

82 HDFS, iii.135-6, 'venit secum ducens milites quadraginta et sine pecunia'.

83 HDFS, iii.105; 'Eracles', p366.

84 HDFS, iii.109. See also chapter 5, p139, for Frederick's money-raising activities on the chaine at Acre. Prawer, Histoire, ii.209, claims that these exactions were made specifically to finance the projected reconstruction, but there is no evidence to support this view.

85 But see chapter 7, pp225-6, for the likely date of Peter's return to Europe.

86 Historia Anglorum, i.304,410; Chronica Majora, iii.490; and v. infra chapter 7, pp223-4.

87 HDFS, iii.104-5, 'in dominica septuagesima [11 February 1229] pacis volens publicare tractatum qui usque tunc admodum fuerat occultatus...'; ibid., p136, 'formam pacis vel treuge nullus vidit quando de servandis conditionibus idem imperator prestitit sacramentum'.

88 Flores Historiarum, ii.373-4; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p235, takes the opposite view that Frederick was permitted to rebuild all or part of the walls, but that the sultan let it be known that no such permission had been given. Grousset, iii.318, suggests that Frederick had not decided on what course of action to take, but was driven into abandoning all thoughts of refortification by the reimposition of the interdict on the Holy City.

89 Such criticism is articulated by, for example, 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.114; Johannes de Columpna, 'Mare Historiarum', MGHS, xxiv.282.
91 HDFS, iii.137-9; and cf. 'Gestes des Chiprois', p683.

92 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.345 (no.427), 'ad movendam guerram de regno Ierosolimitano milites pluries abstrahendo...'

93 'Breve Chronicon', p904; 'Eracles', pp383-4.

94 Ibn Wāṣil in Arab Historians, pp276-7; al-C Ainī, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 192; Ta'rikh Mansūrī, pp119-23; Johannes de Columpna, 'Mare Historiarum', MGHS, xxiv. 282. See also E. Blochet, 'Les relations diplomatiques des Hohenstaufen avec les sultans d'Egypte', Revue Historique, lxxx (1902), 61-4, and infra, chapter 8, pp237-40.
95 Ibn Abī ' l-Dam, f.172v.
96 Ibn Wāṣil in Arab Historians, pp.269-70; Mufarrij, v.246.
97 Ibn al-Athīr, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 176; Abū Shāma, RHC Hist. Or., v.186.
98 Flores Historiarum, ii.367. See also 'Gotifredi Viterbiensis Continuatio Funiacensis et Erbacensis', MGHS, xxii.347, which appears to be based on Frederick's letter.
99 HDFS, iii.92, 'villam etiam que dicitur ad Sanctam Georgium...'.
100 HDFS, iii.105.
101 Kamāl al-Dīn, 'Histoire d'Alep de Kamāladdīn', tr. E. Blochet, ROL, v (1897), 76.
102 Humphreys, p448n.19.
103 'Annales de Terre Sainte', AOL, ii.438, variants A and B; 'Gestes des Chiprois', p682.
104 Ibn al-Qamīd, p137.
105 Maqrīzī, p206.
106 Hamilton, pp11,137.
109 Ibn al-Qamīd, p138. See also Maqrīzī, p207, and Humphreys, pp107,266. Hermann actually refers to the castle as 'Tyron' (HDFS, iii.92), to Gerold it is 'Toron' (ibid., p105), whilst Frederick names it variously as 'Toron' and 'Turon' (ibid., p97; Flores Historiarum, ii.367). All three forms could be applied to a number of places. Prawer (Histoire, ii.200n.40) prefers to associate the stronghold in Gerold's account with Toron des Chevaliers (Latrun), but in his description of the Christian gains Gerold appears to be working systematically north from Jerusalem to Sidon which would rule out such an assumption. The identification of the fortress as Toron is put beyond doubt by the letter of an English crusader ('Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.306), which describes the cession as 'Turon Winfredi', and by Frederick's charter granting Toron to Alice of Armenia (HDFS, iii.123-5). On the cession of Toron and the problems which it caused v. supra, chapter 5, pp127-33.
110 Flores Historiarum, ii.367; 'Eracles', p365; 'Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.305; HDFS, iii.91,92 for Hermann's comments. See also chapter 5, pp100-102, for the activities of the crusaders prior to Frederick's arrival.
111 Ibn al-Athīr, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 170; Humphreys, p194.
112 Ibn al-Athīr, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 96; Humphreys, p134; Prawer, Histoire, ii.123.
113 Ibn al-Furat, ii.97-8 (his source is probably Ibn Shaddad); see also Maqrizî, p210.
114 Ibn al-Furat, ii.97.
115 Ibn al-'Amid, p138, and see the discussion in chapter 5, pp129-30.
116 Ernoul, p464, notes that the Muslim garrisons of three northern fortresses in the territory of Tyre and Sidon refused to comply with the treaty and hand over the strongholds to the Franks - see Jackson, 'The Crusades of 1239-1241', p42n.64. The fortresses owed allegiance to Damascus and probably the garrisons based their action on Da'ud's condemnation of the treaty.
117 The Muslim revenues in Sidon were conceded in 1204, v. supra n.112, but the Franks only took full possession of the city in 1227 (see chapter 5, pp100-101).
117a See Edbury, 'John of Ibelin's title', pp119,123 for the extent of Christian occupation of territory nominally in their hands.
118 Maqrizî, p210.
119 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil fi'l-tä'rikh, ed. C.J.Tornberg (Leiden, 1851-76; rpr. Beirut, 1966 with new typeface and pagination; 13 vols), xii.472. (I am indebted to Dr. Jackson for this reference). Estimates of al-Nasir's age vary, see 'Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.306 ('infans est'); 'Eracles', p365 ('estoit de xii. anz de eage'); Maqrizî, p201 ('twenty-one years of age').
120 'Eracles', p383; Maqrizî, pp201-11; Humphreys, pp193-207.
121 HDFS, iii.87,106. The problem is also noted by the 'Breve ChronicOn', p901. The 'Gestes des Chiprois', p683, mistakenly identifies al-Kämil as sultan of both Egypt and Damascus at the time the treaty was agreed.
122 'Ernoul', p464; supra n.116.
123 Gottschalk, al-Malik al-Kämil, p141. For the form of the peace offered at the time of the Fifth Crusade, v. supra chapter 2, p19. This interpretation is supported by al-'Ainî, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1.184, and by Frederick's demands first to al-Mu'azzam and then, on his arrival in Syria, to al-Kämil, as reported by Abu Shâma, RHC Hist. Or., v.185 and Ibn al-Furat, ii.61. Abu 'l-Fidâ, RHC Hist. Or., i.102, mentions only that al-Kämil's offer included Jerusalem; Ibn Wâsil, Mufarrij, iv.206, restricts the promised concessions to 'some of the conquests of Salah al-Dîn', and Maqrizî, p198, to 'certain coastal cities'. The negotiations inaugurated between the emperor and sultan by Fakhr al-Dîn's embassy were condemned by the pope in 1228 - see chapter 5, n.11.
124 Gottschalk, al-Malik al-Kämil, p142.
125 al-'Ainî, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1.187.
126 Maqrizî, pp204-5. According to Ibn al-Furat, ii.61, Frederick threatened a meeting in battle if agreement was not forthcoming, and al-'Ainî, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1.188, suggests the Franks considered
their position strengthened by the death of al-Mu‘azzam.

127 'Eracles', pp373-4, but v. supra chapter 5, n.27, for the accuracy of this report. Frederick’s anxiety to leave is emphasised by HDFS, iii.104,110, and 'Gestes des Chiprois', pp681,683.
128 'Eracles', p374. Frederick had ordered Henry to bring 20 ships, but when he arrived he brought only 7 (‘Breve Chronicon’, p902), an indication that at least some troops must have been left in the kingdom by Frederick, if only temporarily - v. supra, p172. Cohn, Die Geschichte der sizilischen Flotte, p34, interprets this as meaning that all 20 requested galleys arrived, but of them just 7 (the fastest) formed the fleet which carried the emperor back to Brindisi.

129 'Eracles', p372; HDFS, iii.103.

130 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.354. See also 'Eracles', p371, and 'Ernoul', p463.

131 HDFS, iii.136, 'precipue cum ipsum intellexerent secum non tantam armatorum multitudinem adduxisse."

132 Ibn Wäsil in Arab Historians, pp269,270.

133 For a discussion of the size of Frederick's army v. supra chapter 4, pp84-6.

134 Humphreys, p198; Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, pp199-200. According to Ibn al-Furât, ii.61, al-Kämil was driven into the treaty with Frederick by his overwhelming desire to take Damascus; cf. Flores Historiarum, ii.364, which attributes the agreement to the pressure of internal wars.

135 See, for example, 'Ann. Margam', AM, i.37; 'Ernoul', p464; Flores Historiarum, ii.364; Royal Letters, i.343 (no.282); 'Annales Sancti Rubberti Salisburgenses', MGHS, ix.784; 'Ann. Mellicenses', MGHS, ix.507; 'Continuatio Lambacensis', MGHS, ix.558; 'Ann. Gotwicenses', MGHS, ix.603; 'Continuatio Scotorum', MGHS, ix.624; 'Continuatio Clastroneoburgensis tertia', MGHS, ix.636; 'Ann. Neresheimenses', MGHS, x.23.


137 MaqrTzT, pp203,210; Humphreys, p206.

138 See Prawer, Histoire, ii.196.

139 Chronica Majora, iii.129. Information concerning the strained relations between the Muslim princes was continually reaching the West, see 'Ann. Waverlea', AM, ii.306, and HDFS, iii.92.

140 al-CAinT, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 186,191; Abü Shäma, RHC Hist. Or., i.185; the Sibt, pp273-4.

141 The History of the Patriarchs (HPEC, iv/1. text p52, tr. p108) claims that after al-Kämil's withdrawal to Tell al-CAjül towards the end of 625 H./November 1228 (v. chapter 5, pp101-2 and n.23 for the date), al-Näšir seized the opportunity to retake all his lands from the Jordan valley as far as Gaza, leaving al-Kämil with only Gaza and Darum. [This is the obvious sense of the Arabic text, as communicated to me by Dr. Jackson]. Had this been the case, Frederick would, perhaps, have been better directing his overtures to al-Näšir in preference to his uncle. The supposed reconquest, however, finds no place in the other sources, and it must be concluded that it is the departure of al-Ashraf and al-Näšir from Damascus to parley with al-Kämil which the author has endowed with a
more serious intent and result. On this episode see Maqrīzī, p203; Ibn al-Athīr, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 177, and Abū 'l-Fidā, RHC Hist. Or., i.103.

142 HDFS, iii.106; 'Ann. Margam', AM, i.37. Cf. Prawer, Histoire, ii.194, for an alternative interpretation of William Brewer's activities, and see infra chapter 7, p222. The Chronica Majora, iii.192, is incorrect in attributing to Frederick a ten-year truce with al-Nāṣir.

143 'Eracles', p374.

144 Maqrīzī, p210. Prawer, Histoire, ii.259n.1, prefers to believe that Beit-Jibrīn went to al-Kāmil.

145 The vulnerability of travellers on these roads soon after the conclusion of the truce is indicated by HDFS, iii.110,150; 'Ernoul', p468; 'Eracles', pp383-4; 'Rothelin', p489; and v. infra chapter 8, p234.


147 Maqrīzī, p208.

148 al-'Ainī, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 186; Abū Shāma, RHC Hist. Or., v.185.

149 Kantorowicz, pp208-9; Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp230-3; Hampe, pp266-7.

150 HDFS, iii.86-90,147-50; Flores Historiarum, ii.374.

151 HDFS, iii.87,90; Stevenson, p314. On this, and Frederick's relations with Antioch-Tripoli, see also chapter 5, pp123-5.

152 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, 1.345 (no.427); Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, MGHS, xxiii.928; Stevenson, p314n.4. Notwithstanding the agreement Peter II of Avallon, John of Ibelin, and Walter of Brienne took part in an Hospitaller campaign against Hamah in 1233, notably at a time when the imperial marshal, Richard Filangieri, was effectively confined to Tyre (Richard, Latin Kingdom, pp238,315).

153 Flores Historiarum, ii.369.

154 The letter of John Sarrasin to Nicholas Arrode (1249) in 'Rothelin', p592 (trans. in Joinville, p245), gives 'xxxij. anz' as the length of their incarceration, with an alternative reading of 'xxij. anz'.

155 Ibn al-Ṣamtd, p138; Stevenson, p312n.2.

156 'Ann. Margam', AM, i.37, 'decem annis totidemque diebus..' The 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.142, add a curious note under the year 1235 to the effect that the truce was extended by the emperor for a
further four years, suggesting that the initial form of the peace had been set at only six years, despite an earlier entry for 1229 contradicting such a suggestion (ibid, p118). Gregory IX in a letter dated May 1239 (HDFS, v/1. 329) also indicates that the truce was originally set at only 6 years, but the duration of the truce is missing from the same letter reproduced in the Chronica Majora, iii.593. The confusion may have been due to a papal letter of 1234 which laid emphasis on the rapidly approaching end of Frederick's truce - see Chronica Majora, iii.281,309.

157 MaqrTzi, p207.

158 'Ann. Margam', AM, i.37; annals of Southwark, f.144v.

159 Abū Shāma, RHC Hist. Or., v.186. The translator wrongly gives 1 RabT' I 626 H./28 January 1229. I am grateful to Dr. Jackson for furnishing the correct date. 'Rothelin', p490, gives the distance. For the Muslim exodus from Jerusalem see Ibn al-Athīr, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 176; Ibn Wāṣil in Arab Historians, pp270-1; al-CAini, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 188,190.

160 Ibn al-CAini, p138. Dr. Jackson tells me that the Arabic thānī ('second') closely resembles thāmin ('eight').

161 Ibn al-Furāt, ii.62.

162 al-CAini, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 188. On this date see Stevenson, p312n.1.

163 'Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.306, and see also the annals of Winchcombe, f.28r. For the equivalent in Richard's treaty with Šalāḥ al-Dīn, see the 'Itinerarium peregrinorum', p429.

164 Royal Letters, i.343 (no.282); cf. Saunders, pp33-4, who suggests Franciscan and Dominican friars were permitted to preach in Egypt. The letter also claimed that Frederick had married a daughter of the sultan of Babylon; cf. 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.112, where Frederick was said to have taken to wife the sultan's sister.

165 HDFS, iii.131-5; MaqrTzi, pp204-5; Heyd, i.391-2,407-9. See also Richard, Latin Kingdom, pp287-8. Röhrich, Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem, p785, and Amari, Storia dei Musulmani, iii.664-5, agree that the treaty included commercial clauses, but Powell, 'Medieval monarchy and trade', pp470-1,495, claims that the treaty cannot be said to have contained such clauses. On this see also chapter 5, n.196.

166 HDFS, iii.92,101; Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, MGHS, xxiii.925. The 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.118, note that 'His treugis non consenserunt Templarii, nec comes Tripolitanus'.

167 HDFS, iii.101,108. On the interdict, see Prawer, Histoire, ii.205n.49.

168 Van Cleve, 'The Crusade of Frederick II', p456. Perhaps Van Cleve is here referring to what may have been a longstanding personal enmity between Frederick II and Peter de Montaigu - see chapter 5, pp135-6.
169 'Ann. Marbacenses', SRG in usum scholarum, ix.93: 'Et sequenti
die reversus est [Frederick], factis treugis per decennium, egre
ferentibus Hospitalariis et Templariis, quod non eorum consilio, sed
magis Alemannorum consiliis et auxiliis in omnibus uteretur'. For
Frederick's policies and his preference of the Teutonic Order to the
Templars, see chapter 5, pp133-5,141.

170 Ernoul, p465; HDFS, iii.87-8, 105,107.
171 Gerold, HDFS, iii.107-8, for example, gives expression to some of
the complaints.
172 It was a problem also recognised by al-Kämil who believed
Jerusalem would be easy to retake at a future date, see al-'AinT, RHC
Hist. Or., ii/1. 189, and v. supra, p169.
173 Flores Historiarum, ii.367; Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John,
p166.
174 MaqrTzT, pp206,209; Prawer, Histoire, ii.211. The letter of an
English crusader dated 20 April 1229 ('Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.306-7)
notes the siege of Damascus by al-Ashraf and al-Kämil, but does not
refer to Frederick's dispute with the patriarch and Templars.
175 HDFS, iii.108,137. On the alms of Philip Augustus see chapter 4,
p74 and n.89.
176 HDFS, iii.107; Van Cleve, Frederick II, p226. Matthew Paris,
Historia Anglorum, ii.314-5, claims it was the Templars who induced
Gerold to join them against Frederick.
177 HDFS, iii.138-9,149-50; 'Gestes des Chiprois', p683; Flores
Historiarum, ii.374. See also 'Ann. Dunstableia', AM, iii.118 ('orta
fuit dissentio inter imperatorem et Templarios, unde graviter
persecutus est'), and cf. Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.355
('Preterea qualiter contra ipsum imperatorem aput Accon postmodum
redeuntem predicti patriarcha, magistri domuum Hospitalis et Templi
se gesserunt, utpote qui contra ipsum intestina bella moverunt in
civitate predicta, hiis, qui interfuerunt, luce clarius extitit
manifestum').
178 Sibt, pp273-4; Sivan, pp137,140,147-8.
179 On the extent of Fakhr al-DTN's offer v. supra n.123.
180 HDFS, iii.102: 'Hec vero non scribimus quod idem placeat domino
imperatoris; et quod non libenter si potuisset aliter ordinasset.
Sed, sicut Deus novit, pacem et treugam non potuit aliter stabilire'.
181 HDFS, iii.92: 'Verisimile enim videtur quod si dominus in gratia
et concordia Ecclesie Romane transivisset, longe efficaciens et
utilius prosperatum fuisset negotium terre sancte'.

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Chapter Seven

The English contribution to the imperial crusade

Frederick II's crusade was by no means a specifically German crusade, nor was it 'Sicilian'; but in the same way that the crusade movement as a whole from its inception in the late eleventh century drew widespread active support throughout Europe, so too the imperial crusade of 1227-1229 attracted its share of combatants whose origins lay outside the bounds of the German Empire.

Richard the Lionheart is probably the most famous English knight to have taken the cross, but 'English' involvement in the crusades began with Pope Urban's summons to the East in 1095; then William the Conqueror's son Robert Curthose mortgaged the entire Duchy of Normandy in order to finance his participation in the First Crusade, a venture in which he was joined by Ralf de Gael, the exiled earl of Norfolk. Englishmen, including Ranulf of Chester and Saer de Quincy, fought at Damietta in 1218-1221, and William Longuespée, earl of Salisbury, accompanied St. Louis to Egypt in 1249. It was Henry III's brother Richard of Cornwall who negotiated the return of Ascalon to the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1240/1, and Henry's son Edward I was one of the very last western princes to visit the kingdom before its final collapse in 1291. Even Henry II, who never once set foot in the Holy Land, heaped up an enormous treasure at Jerusalem which was to prove invaluable to the city's defence in 1187\(^1\). It is therefore perhaps inevitable that Englishmen should be found with the emperor's crusade in Syria in 1227-1229.
At the head of the English contingent which departed Apulia with the vanguard of the imperial army in September 1227 were two of King Henry III’s foremost bishops, Peter des Roches of Winchester and William Brewer of Exeter. Peter des Roches was a powerful man, a Poitevin who had served as chamberlain in Richard’s household, and who in 1205, through the influence of King John, had been rewarded with the prestigious see of Winchester. Throughout the turbulent years of John’s reign Peter remained loyal to the king and progressively advanced his position. When John died in 1216, it was Peter, not the archbishop of Canterbury, who crowned the young King Henry and who emerged as guardian of the royal person. It was as such, and in conjunction with his immense ecclesiastical stature, that the bishop of Winchester achieved international repute and respect - a major figure in the government of England. Yet for the English nobility he remained an outsider at the fore of a foreign faction which had usurped their traditional rights and privileges. The latent antagonism which this situation provoked finally led Henry III in February 1227, apparently at the instigation of the then justiciar, Hubert de Burgh, to declare himself of age, renounce the bishop’s guardianship, and dismiss the bishop’s followers from the court. But the timeliness of the royal coup would suggest it to have been a calculated decision designed to make easy capital out of Peter’s own plans: it was already clear that the bishop was contemplating his imminent departure on crusade and, by relieving Peter of his position, Henry could check court rivalries whilst simultaneously freeing the bishop of Winchester from any commitments which might hamper his pilgrimage to the East. Indeed Peter himself may already have realised that his position at court was rapidly becoming untenable and hoped by his absence to defuse the situation.
Peter's desire to depart on crusade was well-known. A warrior bishop, he had played a decisive role at the 'Fair' of Lincoln in 1217, and in later life was to command the troops of Gregory IX against the rebellious citizens of the Patrimony. His ability as a soldier was recognised even amongst his fiercest critics\(^8\); but during the Fifth Crusade Peter had deferred his assumption of the cross, and contented himself with the custody of the lands and men of William de Ferrers, earl of Derby, who had left for Palestine in mid-1218\(^9\). It was only the news of his election as the first archbishop of Damietta which apparently prompted him in September 1221 to take up the cross\(^10\), by which time the fate of the Christian enterprise in Egypt had already been decided. With the benefit of hindsight, Ralph de Coggeshall was to comment cynically that the shortlived appointment had been 'for nothing'\(^11\). Peter himself was unaware of Damietta's fall, and in early November 1221 was still agitating for recruits to accompany him on his proposed expedition\(^12\). It was only when he and the Norman adventurer Falkes de Breauté were actually in the midst of their preparations for crusade that news of the catastrophe reached them. As a result the two men agreed to postpone the fulfilment of their vow until such a time as the pope might command\(^13\).

In the event Pope Honorius did not waste time in his attempts to organise a new crusade. In December 1221 he wrote to all the prelates of Europe exhorting them to rouse the people in its support\(^14\), and at the conference of crusade leaders at Ferentino in March 1223 it was agreed that the Emperor Frederick II should undertake his long-awaited expedition to the East in June 1225\(^15\). As we have seen, however, continued unrest in Sicily compelled the German emperor to urge a postponement, and a second conference
convened at San Germano in July 1225 announced that the crusade would now depart on 15 August 1227. Peter des Roches resumed his preparations, and in November 1226 Henry III despatched a letter to Frederick recommending to him the bishop of Winchester's envoys so that they might arrange for Peter's passage through the Italian dominions of the empire. Two months later a papal encyclical reminded the bishop himself not to neglect to preach the forthcoming crusade, and soon after, in February 1227, a letter from Honorius confirmed papal protection of the bishop of Winchester's person and goods. This same letter granted the bishop licence to receive and pledge rents belonging to his episcopal income for the whole of the period covered by the general indulgence. Concurrent with this was an order to the bishops of Salisbury and Coventry to ensure that this protection be observed, on condition that Peter appoint a fit representative to serve the see in his absence. A similar letter dated 5 April 1227 granted papal protection to a second English bishop, William Brewer of Exeter.

William Brewer was a lesser known figure than his compatriot, having succeeded to the diocese of Devon and Cornwall as recently as April 1224, on the death of Simon of Apulia. Prior to his elevation he had been precentor at the cathedral in Exeter. His uncle, of the same name, was the benefactor of Torre Abbey and other religious foundations, - a great magnate influential in both ecclesiastical and secular government affairs. It was to do penance for his own sins and for those of his uncle that William assumed the cross in late 1226 and prepared to depart for the East in the company of the bishop of Winchester. As a means of financing the trip, and to provide funds for his nephew's use in the Holy Land, the elder Brewer had deposited the remarkable sum of four thousand marks of silver with
the Temple at Acre. But the aged baron did not live to see the outcome of the crusade and died before his nephew set sail.

From the evidence of the annals of Tewkesbury it would appear that the two bishops set out on their journey some time after Easter [11 April] 1227, but an entry in the Liberate Rolls dated 8 June 1227, gives no indication that they had as yet left. The annals of Southwark prefer a departure date of around the feast of St. John the Baptist [24 June], and indeed a note in the Close Rolls dated 18 June describes Peter des Roches as being absent on pilgrimage. Thus it would seem likely that the bishops of Winchester and Exeter and the crusaders who accompanied them probably departed in early June with the intention of taking the August passage to Syria, the crossing by which, as Honorius had already informed Peter, the emperor himself would be travelling.

The actual size of the English contingent remains uncertain. Roger of Wendover claimed that upwards of forty thousand had taken the cross in England in 1227, but such a figure is out of all proportion, and in the event probably only a few thousand at most made the journey to the continent. Even so this was by no means an insignificant force and sufficient to be singled out by the Annales Placentini Guelfi amongst the multinational host converging on the ports in Apulia. Here the intemperate weather and poor food supplies took their toll. Even the emperor succumbed, and retiring to Pozzuoli to recuperate, nominated in his place Henry, duke of Limburg, until such time as he himself might be fit to cross. The crusade thus departed for Syria without its principal general, but taking with it the two English bishops, together with the new patriarch of Jerusalem, Gerold of Lausanne.
Regardless of the enormous losses which the imperial army suffered whilst inactive at the Italian ports, the *Chronique d'Ernoul* nevertheless remarked on the impressive numbers of Englishmen amongst the crusaders arriving in Syria. One Italian chronicler described the bishop of Winchester as a man endowed with an abundance of warriors, and it is obvious that the vast majority of the English contingent must have remained steadfast in their resolve to fulfil their vow of crusade rather than re-embark as a good many other crusaders were to do in the light of the emperor's decision to remain in Italy. Amongst the English soldiers a small section probably came from the area around Farnham in Surrey, or were at least closely associated with the abbey at Waverley, the annals of which incorporate the letter of an English crusader dated at Acre in April 1229. One or two actual names of crusaders can be gleaned from the Curia Regis Rolls and from the Papal Registers, and from Matthew Paris who identifies a certain Master Walter, a member of the Dominican Order charged by the pope with the duty of attending to the religious needs of the army, as being of English origin. But other than these few hints there are no indications as to the composition of the army, nor of its intended strength. Several of those who made the journey to the Holy Land in all probability stayed on in the Latin Kingdom after the departure of the English bishops and the emperor, as during a Muslim attack on the city of Jerusalem in mid-to-late 1229, although casualties were light, the Franks suffered a single fatality which, we are told (as if it were of little consequence), was that of an Englishman.

Both Peter des Roches and William Brewer appear to have been on the whole worthy ambassadors of the English crown: 'Ernoul' affirms that their presence was extremely beneficial, a comment
echoed, as might be expected of an English source, by the annals of Winchcombe. The annals compiled at the abbey of Margam claim that William Brewer was sent with certain others to the sultan in Damascus to arrange a peace between the Christians and Saracens. But the Margam annalist is largely an impassioned and untrustworthy source for the crusade, and the context of his claim would indicate merely that the bishop was party to the negotiations conducted between the Emperor Frederick and the sultan of Egypt, who was never once during this period resident in Damascus. An article by Kate M. Clarke goes as far as to suggest that William even went to Baghdad where he obtained costly embroideries decorated with birds, elephants and other animals, which on his return to Exeter he presented to the cathedral. Since the inventories of the cathedral do not specify the source of the cloths, Ms. Clarke's claim appears to be without foundation. It is, nevertheless, interesting to speculate, and the various relics which William bequeathed to his cathedral might well have been the profits of his visit to Syria.

Whatever else the bishop of Exeter may have undertaken in the Holy Land is not known - the annalists tend to neglect him and, of the handful of documents which do exist relating to his episcopate, none sheds any light on his pilgrimage. In contrast Peter des Roches was of great interest to his contemporaries, and he appears to have been extremely active during his stay, travelling with the army to Sidon, Caesarea, Jaffa and Jerusalem. The bishop played a major role in the rebuilding of Jaffa, using his vast wealth to promote the refortification work both here, and at Sidon. The annals of Dunstable also claim that it was through his outstanding help that the city of Ascalon was restored. This latter event is extremely unlikely. The fortifications of the city had lain in ruins since
1192 and remained in the same condition at the time of Theobald of Champagne's crusade in 1239. Nowhere is there any mention that during, or as a result of, Frederick's crusade Ascalon reverted to Frankish control, and the agreement concluded between the Egyptian sultan, al-Kämil, and his nephew al-Näsir Dä'ūd in June 1229 specifically mentions Ascalon as being transferred from the authority of Dä'ūd to that of al-Kämi144. It is possible, therefore, that the Dunstable annalist mistakenly inserted Ascalon, where in actual fact Caesarea was meant. Confusions such as this were not uncommon: one chronicler attributed the rebuilding of the Tower of David and St. Stephen's gate in Jerusalem to the Emperor Frederick, in which work, so the writer asserts, he was nobly aided and supported by Bishop Peter45. But whereas Peter did prove a useful counsellor and ally - indeed Matthew Paris writes of him in his obituary that all honours and benefits gained for the Church in the Holy Land during Frederick's crusade were brought about solely by the bishop's wise counsels and assistance46 - one thing he did not do was to mastermind the refortification of the Holy City. Such a programme of reconstruction was strictly forbidden under the terms of the truce agreed by the emperor and sultan, and Frederick was not sufficiently reckless as to risk an act which would separate him from his Italian dominions, already subject to active papal interference, for any longer than was absolutely necessary47. Instead the bishop of Winchester's single greatest achievement of the crusade lay elsewhere in the kingdom - at Acre, where he transformed the Hospital of St. Thomas the Martyr, reputed to have been founded by Richard I, into a military establishment subject to the rule of the Teutonic Order. The transformation was probably undertaken in consultation with the patriarch and magnates of the kingdom, who would have been keen to stress the vulnerability of the Holy Land, but the reform was equally
consistent with the military background and outlook of the bishop himself. The situation of the house at Acre was also changed, from a site near the German hospital on the eastern side of the city, to a more suitable location in the northern quarter of Montmusard. And so that the fortunes of the foundation might be restored the bishop donated to the Order some of his own wealth, augmented on his death in 1238 by a further bequest of some five hundred marks. Confirmation of these reforms was not issued by the papacy until 1236, but they were effected certainly before the autumn of 1228, probably in late 1227 or early the next year⁴⁸.

But in spite of the beneficial works which the two English bishops performed, they were unable to remain aloof from the troubles which engulfed the imperial expedition. Frederick had departed for the East without papal sanction and whilst still under sentence of excommunication. This in itself was guaranteed to provoke hostility, but his treatment of the Syrian nobles and his apparent disregard for what they saw as their inalienable rights and privileges, not simply in his conclusion of a truce with the sultan of Egypt, generated an atmosphere of permanent resentment and rebellion⁴⁹. In order to ensure the acceptance of the negotiated agreement both William Brewer and Peter des Roches urged the emperor to consult with the patriarch, who was after all the highest representative of the ecclesiastical establishment in Syria. But Gerold refused out of hand to swear to the treaty, and in frequent letters to the pope he complained bitterly that once the emperor had departed not only might al-Kāmil be able to repossess Jerusalem, but the Latin Kingdom itself would be under serious threat from the prince of Damascus, with whom there existed no agreement⁵⁰. For this reason (so he claimed), and in complete contravention of the truce, he began to assemble troops with
which to protect the kingdom. In response, fearing that such action would disrupt the peace and with it his plans for departure, Frederick, secure in the support of the Teutonic Order, laid siege to the houses of both the patriarch and Temple at Acre\textsuperscript{51}. Roger of Wendover claims that the bishops of Winchester and Exeter were also besieged in their quarters, but none of the letters of Pope Gregory nor of Gerold, from which he indicates he obtained this information, confirm this belief\textsuperscript{52}. Indeed the two bishops had been amongst the emperor’s retinue at Jerusalem in March 1229 in breach of the interdict covering the city which Gerold had refused to lift\textsuperscript{53}. Moreover the annals of Winchcombe assert that both William and Peter were subsequently suspended from their duties by the pope - a course of action which would have been totally incomprehensible had they shared the lot of Gerold and the Templars\textsuperscript{54}. Richard of San Germano notes that on Frederick’s return to Europe in 1229 he specifically called upon Peter des Roches, amongst others, to witness before Gregory IX as to his good behaviour in the Holy Land \textsuperscript{55}. Peter responded favourably, and was instrumental in the reconciliation of pope and emperor at Ceprano on 28 August 1230\textsuperscript{56}. Such co-operation could hardly be expected of some one who had suffered violence at Frederick’s hands.

Before arriving back in Winchester on 1 August 1231\textsuperscript{57}, Peter des Roches undertook a second diplomatic sortie, collaborating with Earl Ranulf of Chester to successfully arrange a three year truce between England and France\textsuperscript{58}. William Brewer, meanwhile, had already returned home. The annals of Tewkesbury record his joyful arrival in Exeter at Easter 1229\textsuperscript{59}. Unfortunately, we know from Gerold that both William and Peter were still in Jerusalem only four weeks beforehand\textsuperscript{60}, and to have reached England in such a short space of
time would have been a virtual impossibility. On this occasion the Tewkesbury annalist must have been mistaken. The bishop of Exeter's presence in England in 1229 is, however, confirmed by the annals of Winchcombe, and by the Patent Rolls which limit his return to some time before October of that year. The Liberate Rolls are conclusive proof that in January 1230, whilst the bishop of Winchester continued to be absent, William Brewer was being dealt with in person in his business with the king. Thus it would seem reasonable to assume that William, probably in the company of his fellow bishop, departed the Holy Land around the same time as Frederick in May 1229, having spent approximately two years on crusade. The erroneous belief that the bishops of Winchester and Exeter were together absent in the Holy Land for almost five years, and which has in the past misled a number of historians, must be attributed to an unfortunate generalisation by Matthew Paris. In actual fact, although Peter des Roches was absent for just over four years, much of which time was spent in Europe reconciling the pope and emperor, it seems unlikely that either of the two bishops ever intended being away for any more than three years, as this was the period of validity (dating from the early autumn 1227) of the royal letter of protection issued by Henry III to the bishop of Winchester. But for William Brewer even his relatively short absence of two years was two years too long: on his return to Exeter he discovered the goods of his diocese had been disgracefully squandered, and as late as 1238 the papacy was still appealing to creditors to be patient lest the church of Exeter 'be swallowed up in the abyss of usury'. Winchester fared much better, and on his death in 1238 Peter des Roches left his successor a richly stocked bishopric with 'no diminution of its plough cattle.'
As for the lesser Englishmen who had accompanied William Brewer and Peter des Roches to Syria, neither those who returned, nor those who failed to do so, find any mention in the various English annals. Hugh Watkin, however, proposes a strange and unsubstantiated theory that the widows of those who died on crusade were granted a special dispensation to mark their own last resting places with a large and floriated cross, perhaps as a gesture of thanks to the dead crusaders.

Frederick II may have lacked papal approval for his actions in Palestine, but the two English bishops who accompanied him to Jerusalem embodied all the ecclesiastical sanction he required. Regardless of deteriorating relations with the papacy, he could invariably rely on their support, and in spite of the bitter confrontation between the emperor and the patriarch in April 1229 the loyalty of his English allies remained steadfast. For Peter des Roches defiance of papal authority was nothing new: he had stood by King John in the bitter dispute with Innocent III; in his association with Frederick he defied Pope Gregory. The apparent suspension of the bishops of Winchester and Exeter from their episcopal duties was perhaps a predictable response, but Peter at least was not one to be underestimated: just as in 1205 he had been able by personal representation to prevail upon Innocent III in his disputed election to the see of Winchester, so at San Germano in 1230 he was able to win over Gregory IX. It was a shrewd emperor who appealed to Peter to help mediate his disagreement with the Apostolic See, and a talented and calculating man who accepted. It was not the first time that Englishmen had played a major role in the leadership and politics of a crusade, and it would not be the last.
Notes to Chapter Seven


2 On the status of the two bishops see the Dover Chronicle, f. 26v, according to which Peter des Roches, on the pope's authority, had been appointed head of the English detachment ('dux petrus de la roche episcopus Winton... auctoritate apostolica est constitutus'), and supra chapter 5, n.3.

3 On Peter's election see 'Ann. Wintonia', AM, ii.79; 'Annales Monasterii de Oseneia', AM, iv.51; Flores Historiarum, ii.9; and Cheney, Pope Innocent III, pp144-7.


6 Flores Historiarum, ii.318

7 If this was his aim it was achieved with considerable success: on his return Peter was able to oust his discredited rival, Hubert de Burgh, and reassert his position at court. See D. Carpenter, 'The Fall of Hubert de Burgh', Journal of British Studies, xix/2 (1980), 6, and cf. W. E. Rhodes, 'Peter des Roches', Dictionary of National Biography [DNB], ed. L. Stephen et al. (London, 1885-1900; 63 vols), xiv.52a-56b.

8 During his youth in Poitou Peter was most probably a mercenary knight; Roger of Wendover describes him as 'vir equestris ordinis et in rebus bellicis eruditus', Flores Historiarum, ii.9, and a derogatory satire of the time refers to the bishop as follows: 'Wintoniensis armiger/ Praesidet ad scaccarium, / Ad computandum impiger, / Piger ad Evangelium', The Political Songs of England, ed. and trans. T. Wright (Camden Society, Old Series, vi, 1839), p10.

9 Royal Letters, i.24-5 (no.19). William had taken the cross with King John in 1215: Gervase of Canterbury, ii.109. For the date of his departure see 'Ann. Burtonensis', AM, i.225; 'Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.289; 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.54; Ann. Cestrienses, p50.

10 'Ann. Waverleia', AM, ii.295; annals of Southwark, f.142v; Walter of Coventry, ii.250. The return of William de Ferrers, probably in 1220 along with Ranulf of Chester (Ann. Cestrienses, p50, and Walter of Coventry, ii.246, but cf. Röhrich, Studien, p40n.11 which dates William's return 1222) and the departure on crusade of Philip d'Aubigny in April 1221 (Patent Rolls, 1216-1225, p287) may have been other factors in Peter's decision to assume the cross.

11 Chronicon Anglicanum, p190, 'frustra electus est...' Jacques de Vitry wrote that Pelagius established the archiepiscopal chair in the basilica of the Great Mosque at Damietta (Lettres de Jacques de
Vitry, p127 (ep.6)), and the Historia Damiatina, pp239-40, notes that a tower in the city was reserved for the use of the archbishop, but neither identifies the proposed incumbent. Cf. the spurious letter in Röhricht, Studien, pp48-9 (ep.9), which implies that an archbishop had been enthroned immediately following the fall of the city to the Franks. Peter’s election may explain the presence at Westminster in May 1221 of two messengers from the king of Jerusalem (Rot. Lit. Claus., i.458b), but on this see also chapter 4, n.8. Peter was then at Compostella, infra n.13.

12 Patent Rolls, 1216-1225, pp318-19. News of the collapse of Damietta had reached Frederick in Sicily by 25 October 1221 (Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.127 (no.181)), so Peter must have heard soon after this entry in the Patent Rolls.

13 ‘Ann. Dunstaplia’, AM, iii.75. The bishop of Winchester’s intention of going to the East must be distinguished from his pilgrimage to Compostella the previous spring, see ‘Ann. Wintonia’, AM, i.84; ‘Ann. Dunstaplia’, iii.68; Patent Rolls, 1216-1225, p286; also Powicke, i.76n.1, after G.J.Turner, ‘The Minority of Henry III - Part ii’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Third Series, 1 (1907), 259. Kate Norgate, op.cit, pp179-80, discusses an interesting ‘plot’ said to be linked to the bishop’s absence abroad.

14 Reg. Hon. III, ii.18 (no.3637).

15 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.148-57 (nos.220,225,227); Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.342-3.

16 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.344; ‘Breve Chronicon’, p896. The postponement was due in part to apathy for the crusade, see Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.171 (no.243); Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp160-1, and supra chapter 3, pp58-9.

17 Rot. Lit. Claus., ii.204a.

18 Reg. Hon. III, ii.463, (no.6157).

19 Calendar of entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland, ed. W.H.Bliss et al., (HMSO, 1894-1961; 14 vols), i.116,117; also Reg. Hon. III., ii.476 (no.6222), and Royal Letters, i.218 (no.194). The ‘Ann. Waverleia’, AM, ii.309, record the name of Peter’s vicar as John, as do O.Manning and W.Bray, The History and Antiquities of the County of Surrey (London, 1804-14; 3 vols), iii.144. His bailis, according to the Curia Regis Rolls of the Reign of Henry III, 11 to 14 Henry III (1227-1230) (HMSO, 1959), p276 (no.1235), were Roger Wascelin and Robert Basset.


dispensations for all magnates who had taken vows of crusade before 1200, on the grounds that their services were indispensable to the crown, but Innocent III was unimpressed by the king's arguments and the oaths remained binding (The Letters of Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) concerning England and Wales, ed. C.R. and M.G.Cheney (Oxford, 1967), pp60,71 (nos.364,439)). It seems probable, therefore, that William Brewer entrusted the discharge of his unfulfilled vow to his nephew, the bishop of Exeter. On the heritability of crusade vows v.supra chapter 1, ppl-6.

22 'Ann. Theokesberia', AM, i.69-70. See also 'Ann. Wigornia', AM, iv.419, and the annals of Winchcombe, f.27v.


24 Annals of Southwark, f.144v.

25 Rot. Lit. Claus., ii.189b,211b, and see also ibid., 190b [28 June 1227].

26 Reg. Hon. III, ii.463 (no.6157).

27 Flores Historiarum, ii.323. See also chapter 4, p84.

28 'Annales Placentini Guelfi', MGHS, xviii.443: 'innumerabilis multitudo virorum prudentium et bellicorum omnium regionum et provintiarum, scilicet Theutonicorum, Bierorum, Brienorum, Saxorum et aliorum in septemtrionali plaga habitantium, Anglicorum, Fryrorum, Francorum, Provintialium, Yspaniorum et aliarum regionum in extremis partibus orbis... The 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.107, mention only 'Angli et Franci et aliae multarum gentium nationes'; but Riant, i.333-8 discusses the Norwegians, Danes and Icelanders said to have taken part in the crusade, and see also the appeal sent by Honorius III to the king of Sweden in 1223 (Reg. Hon. III, ii.126 (no.4304)). L.Thorndike, Michael Scot (London, 1965), p35, suggests that the Scottish philosopher and translator of that name accompanied Frederick to the Holy Land, but A.Macquarrie, Scotland and the Crusades, 1095-1560 (Edinburgh, 1985), pp39-40, questions both this and the philosopher's Scottish birth (although he goes on to assume both). R.Röhricht, Die Deutschen im Heiligen Lande (Innsbruck, 1894), pp120-5, provides a list of Germans who travelled to Syria in 1227-9.

29 'Breve Chronicon', p897; Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.348; HDFS, iii.44; Flores Historiarum, ii.325.

30 'Gestes des Chiprois', p675; Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, MGHS, xxii.920; 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.112.

31 Ernoul, p459.

32 'Willelmi Chronica Andrensis', MGHS, xxiv.769.

33 Flores Historiarum, ii.325.


35 Curia Regis Rolls (1227-1230), pp64,260,298,314,347,370,380,444; Papal Registers, p113. See also A.W.Searley, 'Haccombe. Part 1',

36 Chronica Majora, iii.177. See also HDFS, iii.107-8. Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, ii.372, on which Paris bases his report, makes no mention of the friar's nationality. Paris could, however, have had the information from Peter des Roches in person, whom he met on at least one occasion and from whom he was able to obtain, not without difficulty, a copy of William of Tyre's Historia Orientalium Principum (see R. H. C. Davis, 'William of Tyre', in Relations Between East and West, p71), which the bishop had brought back from the Holy Land: Historia Anglorum, i.163n.4.

37 Ernoul, p468; 'Rothelin', p489. A number of Danes must also have remained in the Holy Land after the emperor's departure as Waldemar II's marshal Johan Ebasson is reported to have died at Acre in 1232 - see Riant, i.335,337. For the Muslim attack on Jerusalem v. supra chapter 6, pp174-5,177-8, and infra chapter 8, pp234-6.

38 Ernoul, p459; see also 'Willelmi Chronica Andreensis', MGHS, xxiv.769.

39 Annals of Winchcombe, f.28v.

40 'Ann. Margam', AM, i.37; cf. Prawer, Histoire, ii.194. William could have been a member of the imperial delegation sent to Nablus in February 1229 to gain Damascene approval for the treaty between Frederick and al-Kämil (HDFS, iii.106); the only cleric known to have visited Damascus about this time was archbishop Berard of Palermo despatched by Frederick in 1227, Prawer, Histoire, ii.176-7.

41 G. Oliver, Lives of the Bishops of Exeter and a history of the Cathedral (Exeter, 1861), p298; K. M. Clarke, 'The Misereres of Exeter Cathedral', RTDA, xxxix (1907), 232. Peter des Roches was said to have returned from the East with one of the feet of St. Philip: 'Ann. Wintonia', AM, ii.86.

42 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.112,126; Historia Anglorum, ii.304; Chronica Majora, iii.490. C. F. Meekings, Studies in Thirteenth Century Justice and Administration (London, 1981), ch.xvii, p18, asserts that the bishop also refounded the Pilgrims' Hospice at Jaffa. This claim is based on a misreading of Matthew Paris and is not found elsewhere. Peter des Roches's wealth is commented upon by the 'Willelmi Chronica Andreensis', MGHS, xxiv.769; see also Political Songs, pp10,11, and Chronica Majora, iii.243,490.

43 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.126.

44 MagrTzT, p210; 'Eracles', p365; 'Rothelin', p532; Stevenson, pp286,317.

45 'Willelmi Chronica Andreensis', MGHS, xxiv.769.

46 Chronica Majora, iii.490.

47 Supra chapter 6, pp181-2, for Frederick's attitude towards reconstruction of the Holy City.

49 Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, MGHS, xxiii.925; HDFS, iii.105,108,135-40; see also R. Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp163-73.

50 HDFS, iii.105,107-8,137.

51 HDFS, iii.137-9,149-50. See also 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.118, and 'Gestes des Chiprois', p683. For Frederick's comments on the support of the Teutonic Order, see HDFS, iii.97-8.

52 Flores Historiarum, ii.374, and supra n.51.

53 HDFS, iii.108-9. The interdict was proclaimed by Clement III in 1187, and was repeated by Innocent III in 1215 and Honorius III in 1217: Praewer, ii.205n49.

54 Ann. Winchcombe, f.28v. William Brewer was still on good terms with the emperor in 1235, when he accompanied the king's sister, Isabella, to the imperial court, 'Ann. Theokesberia', AM, i.95.

55 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.357. Richard claims that the bishop of Chichester was requested to do the same, but Cisestrensis must be an error for Exoniensis, as Ralph Neville, bishop of Chichester, had never been on crusade and was unknown abroad at the time of the crusade's departure: Royal Letters, i.339 (no.280). The stormy debate over Neville's election as archbishop of Canterbury in 1231 (Chronica Majora, iii.206) would have made his name current and could have been the source of Richard's mistake. The favour shown the bishop of Winchester by Frederick subsequently prompted rumours that Peter had agreed to make England subject to the empire: Flores Historiarum, iii.66; Chronica Majora, iii.243.

56 HDFS, iii.218; 'Ann. Theokesberia', AM, i.76; 'Ann. Dunstaplia', AM, iii.126.


58 'Ann. Theokesberia', AM, i.76; 'Ann. Wigornia', AM, iv.422. Also Epistolae Saeculi XIII, 1.353 (no.438).

59 'Ann. Theokesberia', AM, i.73. See also the annals of Winchcombe, f.28v.

60 HDFS, iii.109.

61 Annals of Winchcombe, f.28r; the Patent Rolls, 1225-1232, p309, record Henry III's order that a legal dispute involving the bishop, and presumably postponed due to his absence on crusade, be resolved.

62 Liberate Rolls, 1226-1240, p162.

63 Chronica Majora, iii.127,204. Amongst those misled were Richard Izacke, Remarkable Antiquities of the City of Exeter (London, 1681), pp7-8; Oliver, pp34-6; and H.R. Watkin whose views are reported in RTDA, lxiv (1932), 58, and Notes and Queries, 12th series, v.293.
64 Patent Rolls, 1225-1232, pp130,135.

65 Papal Registers, p176.

66 Chronica Majora, iii.490, 'ita ut aratrorum armentorum nulla fieret diminutio'.

67 RTDA, lxiv (1932), 58; also Devon and Cornwall Notes and Queries, ix (1916-17), 103; x (1918-19), 69. E.W.Tristram, English Medieval Wall Painting: The Thirteenth Century (Oxford, 1950), p166, suggests that the paintings in the Chapel of the Holy Sepulchre at Winchester cathedral may have been executed on the orders of Peter des Roches to provide a suitable place of devotion for the returning crusaders.
Chapter Eight

The aftermath of the crusade; diplomatic relations
between Frederick II and the Ayyübids

The sense of dismay which the treaty of Jaffa provoked amongst sections of the Christian community also found expression amongst the ordinary Muslims of Palestine. Dissatisfaction with the agreement was immediately expressed in frequent attacks on Christian pilgrims making their way to the holy city and the repeated cutting of the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem\(^1\). Much more serious was an event not long after the emperor's departure from the kingdom: probably in late May or June, but possibly as late as October 1229\(^2\), the Muslim population of the areas around Hebron, Nablus and Jerusalem, excited by the Damascene condemnation of the cession of Jerusalem by al-Kämil and urged on by the harangues of the religious classes, rose against the tiny Christian presence in the Holy City\(^3\). According to the Fracles, more than 15,000 Muslim peasants took part in the attack, declaring that they would not tolerate the possession of Jerusalem by the Christians, nor the practice of Christian worship in the Templum Domini, and that al-Kämil had not even sanctioned the city's return to the Franks\(^4\). In anticipation of the Muslim incursion, the Christians withdrew with their families and possessions to the Tower of David and to a number of small houses nearby which had been hastily converted into a makeshift stronghold\(^5\). Renaud of Haifa, the castellan of Jerusalem, despatched an urgent appeal to Acre for assistance, and two days after the Muslims had entered Jerusalem, a Christian squadron under Baldwin of Picquigny arrived at Bethlehem. In the meantime the Muslim raiders had been in total control of the
holy city, plundering and looting, and killing the few who had not found refuge. But when the Franks trapped in the Tower of David caught sight of the approaching Christian troops, they took new heart, emerged from their confinement, and expelled the Muslims, killing 500 or more of them in the process⁶.

Technically the Muslim attack on Jerusalem was a direct breach of the truce negotiated between al-Kāmil and Frederick; but in fact the Egyptian sultan took no part in the attempted repossession of the city, nor did he condone the raid which, from the account of events given by the Eracles, appears to have been an unorchestrated ebullition of popular feeling. Consequently al-Kāmil could not be accused of instigating the incident, despite his comments on the future of Jerusalem to his fellow Muslims at the time of signing the treaty⁷. It is conceivable, however, that veiled encouragement of the attack may have been given either by al-Nāṣir Dā'ūd or by al-Ashraf, both of whom at different times would have benefited from such an uprising. From the evidence available we cannot be certain of the exact date of the assault, only that it took place some time after Frederick had left the Holy Land and probably before the end of October when news of the event must have been sent to the pope⁸; but in late May and June 1229 al-Nāṣir may consciously have sought by his very vocal condemnation of the concession of the holy city to the Franks to incite popular emotions which would divert the attentions of al-Kāmil and al-Ashraf and thereby relieve the pressure on Damascus, then under siege from their troops⁹. Equally, after al-Nāṣir's surrender on 1 Shaʿbān 626 H./25 June 1229¹⁰ and his replacement by al-Ashraf as ruler in Damascus, al-Ashraf would have been concerned not only to defuse discontent at the loss of Jerusalem but also to still opposition to his new régime, objectives which
might conceivably have been achieved by cautious promotion of an attack on Jerusalem. This is, of course, pure speculation, and indeed whether or not passive encouragement was forthcoming from either Ayyūbid ruler is here irrelevant; what does matter is the fact that no Muslim prince actively supported the raid, and that the treaty of Jaffa remained intact.

But the treaty was not challenged by the Muslim populace alone. It has already been noted how discontent of the patriarch and Templars with the way in which Frederick terminated his crusade led to civil strife in Acre¹¹, and in the immediate aftermath of the crusade non-observance of the treaty, particularly by the Templars, reflected this discontent. In frequent skirmishes on the borders of Tripoli during 1229-1231 the military orders provided active support and reinforcement from the kingdom of Jerusalem for their houses in Antioch-Tripoli. Although these operations took place in areas which were named specifically as being outside the scope of the treaty, they were a clear violation of its terms which also strictly forbade any such direct aid¹². There appears, however, to have been no direct military response by the Muslims to these infringements of the truce. One reason for this may have been that al-Kāmil considered it to his advantage to respect the traditional absence of the northern principalities from the treaties concluded between the kingdom of Jerusalem and Egypt¹³ on the premise that, by implicitly allowing limited hostilities to continue, this might serve periodically to preoccupy those elements in northern Syria whose loyalty was open to question¹⁴. Since the same purpose would be served by tolerating the minor violations of the treaty by the military orders, he may have been unwilling to compel their observance of its stipulations. The validity of such a policy would have been emphasised by the
reluctance of the citizens of Hamāh in July 1229 to surrender their city to al-Kāmil’s representatives. But another reason for al-Kāmil’s inactivity may have been that he was not in a position to enforce the treaty; Jalāl al-Dīn had reappeared in Greater Armenia in August 1229, and rather than militarily oppose the activities of the Temple and Hospital, which might be construed as a contravention of the peace and, indeed, tie up a portion of the military resources of both Egypt and Damascus, al-Kāmil may have presumed upon his friendship with the emperor to request Frederick’s intercession. Although it should be noted that there exists no record of an Egyptian embassy to Apulia about this time, in 1231, under pressure from Frederick, Gregory IX wrote to the master of the Temple at Acre commanding that all violations of the treaty by the military orders should cease. Even so, despite the intervention of the pope, these transgressions can hardly be said to have been of sufficient magnitude to threaten the survival of the treaty, which remained in force until the death of al-Kāmil.

The violations of the treaty on the borders of the northern territories during the period 1229-1231 clearly did not constitute a major campaign against the Muslims, and the very cordial relations between Frederick II and al-Malik al-Kāmil were undamaged by the activities of the military orders. Indeed, the amicable relationship which had been built up between the two dynasties before, and during, the imperial crusade, was to be maintained up to and beyond the deaths of its two inaugurators. These contacts, it has been suggested, were initiated between Frederick II and the Ayyūbids possibly as early as 1215/17, and at Frederick’s instigation. In consideration of the state of Germany at the time, however, this seems doubtful, but embassies were certainly exchanged as early as
1226/7 when the emir Fakhr al-Dīn was sent to Frederick in Sicily. Frederick’s friendship with Fakhr al-Dīn in particular was exceptionally close and, according to Joinville, he appears at some stage to have conferred the honour of knighthood upon the emir; later, in 1230, imperial letters were sent jointly to Fakhr al-Dīn and to al-Kāmil detailing Frederick’s progress against the papal armies which had attacked his Italian dominions during his absence in the Holy Land. In 1232 emissaries from both the sultan of Egypt and the prince of Damascus were to be found in Apulia, those of al-Kāmil bringing with them the gift of a skilfully constructed planetarium valued in excess of 20,000 marks. The Damascene embassy was reciprocated in 631 H./1233-4, when an imperial messenger is recorded as having visited al-Ashraf, the then ruler in Damascus; but it was relations with Egypt which took precedence, and in 1238 these were apparently so cordial that the imperial troops besieging Brescia were reported to have included a detachment sent by the sultan. al-Kāmil’s death in the same year threatened to interrupt the relationship which had been built up with the Ayyūbid dynasty in Cairo, and the news of the sultan’s demise was said to have deeply distressed the emperor. But despite this blow the friendship survived: in October 1239 an embassy from al-ʿĀdil II, al-Kāmil’s successor in Egypt, was expected in Sicily, and in late 1241 and early 1243 imperial ambassadors were despatched on missions to the Egyptian court. The Annales Siculi indicate that both these embassies were headed by the captain of Sicily, Roger de Amicis, but the annals are at odds with a letter addressed by Frederick to Roger in October 1241 which places Roger firmly in Italy at the very time he was supposed to be in Egypt (although this would not however preclude Roger’s participation in the 1243 embassy).
Frederick's diplomatic contacts with the Muslims were condemned by Innocent IV at the Council of Lyons in 1245, but were nevertheless maintained right up to the end of the decade. Around 1248, reportedly as a result of his failure to dissuade Louis IX from departing on crusade, Frederick was said to have sent messengers to al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb (who had replaced al-ʾAdil II) warning him (according to Muslim sources) of the French king's plans to invade Egypt. After Louis's defeat and capture in April 1250, imperial envoys were despatched to intercede with Ayyūb's successor, Tūrān Shāh, for the French king's release. There were those, however, who suggested the real aim of the embassy was to ensure the king's continued imprisonment.

But there is no firm evidence that either embassy was hostile to Louis or to his expedition: in the first place Frederick may not have known the ultimate destination of the crusade, and secondly, although relations between the king and emperor could not be said to be close, Louis's desire to promote peace between the pope and emperor and Frederick's offers of assistance for the crusade might tend to suggest that the embassy of 1250 was prompted by a genuine concern for Louis's well-being and that the 1248 mission may even have been an attempt to pressure the sultan into granting territorial concessions. If Frederick did try to dissuade Louis from his plans (and we cannot be certain of this), it may simply have been an attempt to influence the destination of the crusade. Consequently, although Frederick was in touch with the Ayyūbids during 1248-50, the intercourse should not necessarily be regarded either as being suspicious or as being detrimental to Louis's crusade.
By the time of Frederick's death in December 1250 the idea of
diplomatic relations between Sicily and Egypt was well established,
and the tradition which Frederick had begun was continued
uninterrupted by his son Manfred.

* * *

The benefits of the accord which the Egyptian sultan envisaged
when he first approached the emperor in 1226/7 with proposals for
military intervention in Syria, were not lost on Frederick. Here was
a golden opportunity not only to fulfil his longstanding vow of
crusade, but one which appeared to guarantee success in the form of
huge territorial concessions. At the same time it would allow him
personally to re-establish imperial rights in Cyprus (which until now
he had attempted to achieve by a series of letters addressed to Alice
of Champagne) and to supervise the restoration of royal rights in
the kingdom of Jerusalem, rights which had been slowly eroded since
at least the end of the twelfth century. Even more importantly,
al-Kamîl's overtures offered maximum return for minimal involvement
in Syria at a time when, although Welf opposition had been subdued,
the German princes continued to indulge in petty local squabbles in
defiance of the regent's authority and, more dangerously, relations
between the German principalities and the ambitious kingdom of
Denmark threatened to degenerate into open warfare. The stubborn
refusal of the communes of northern and central Italy to accept
restrictions on their independence, or to fall in line with
Frederick's conception of empire, was a further concern. In
addition personal experience of the kingdom of Sicily had shown that
prolonged absence could lead to a virtual collapse of royal power and a resurgence of the nobility. In the interests of the empire, therefore, it was imperative that the emperor's personal involvement in the crusade should be limited to as short a period as was practical, the more so after the replacement of Honorius III by the hard-line Gregory IX whose attitude subsequent to the emperor's failure to depart on crusade in the summer of 1227 acquired a more aggressive quality, not just towards Frederick, but to the empire in general.

Since in these respects Frederick's aims were essentially short-term, it seems strange that the relationship initiated between the sultan and emperor at the time of the crusade should persist long after the initial objectives of the arrangement had been achieved—particularly since the friendship which was struck up by the two leaders was regarded with such contempt by the papacy and with such suspicion elsewhere in Europe. But although Frederick probably viewed their friendship primarily as a means of guaranteeing continued Christian control of Jerusalem, and ten years of peace in the Holy Land, during which time he might pursue his effective recognition as de facto ruler in the Latin Kingdom, and possibly even as a vehicle for the rejuvenation of trade between Italy and Egypt, in al-Kâmil he appears to have found a genuine friend and kindred spirit. Frederick's patronage of the arts and sciences was mirrored in Egypt, and together with the strong Arabic cultural influences in Sicily and on Frederick's Sicilian court, may have been a factor in encouraging their association. Whatever the reason, the links between the Sicilian and Egyptian courts far outlasted the crusade itself.
Notes to Chapter Eight

1. 'Eracles', p383; HDFS, iii.110,139.

2. For the dating of the Muslim attack, see below p235 and n.8.

3. For the size of the Christian community in Jerusalem about this time v. supra chapter 6, p178 and nn.74,75.

4. 'Eracles', p384.

5. 'Eracles', p384, and supra chapter 6, pp175,177.

6. The whole episode is related in 'Eracles', pp383-5. Ibn Abī Dam's account of the incident (f.173r) mentions 500 dead, but it is unclear whether these were Muslims or Franks. 'Eracles', p385, claims that more than 2000 of the Muslim raiders were killed (for the loss of only one Christian defender, according to Ernoul, p468, and 'Rothelin', p489, both of which put the Muslim fatalities at 500). On this see also chapter 6, n.64.


8. The attack definitely occurred before 13 December 1229, when it was referred to in a letter from Gregory IX to the archbishop of Reims ('Lettre de Grégoire IX concernant l'empire latin de Constantinople', p231), but the attacks on pilgrims heading for the holy city noted by the 'Eracles', p384, as a preliminary to the assault on Jerusalem were referred to by Gerold in a letter assumed to have been written in May 1229 (HDFS, iii.139).


11. See, in particular, chapter 5, pp136-7, and chapter 6, p200.

12. HDFS, iii.87,90; Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.345 (no.427); chapters 5 and 6, pp136,194-5.

13. Stevenson, p314; and see also chapter 5, n.129, for comments on the relationship of Antioch-Tripoli to the kingdom of Jerusalem.

14. By way of example of al-Kāmil's suspicions, Qilīj Arslān, the ruler of Hamāh, a former ally of al-Nāṣir Dāʾūd and al-Ashraf against al-Kāmil, surrendered Hamāh to al-Kāmil in August 1229/Ramādān 626 H. and was compensated with Bārīn (Maqrīzī, pp203,211; Humphreys, pp201,207); in 630 H./1232-3, however, he was deprived of the iqtāʾ and imprisoned (Maqrīzī, pp211,218; Abū al-Fidāʾī, RHC Hist. Or., i.105; Ibn al-Athīr, RHC Hist. Or., ii.179-80). For al-Kāmil's problems with insubordination amongst the garrisons of three northern fortresses in the territory of Tyre and Sidon in 1229, see Ernoul, p464, Jackson, 'The Crusades of 1239-1241', p42n.64, and supra chapter 6, n.116.

H./November 1230 - October 1231 was subsequently beaten off by troops from Aleppo (Ibn al-Athir, RHC Hist. Or., ii.180).


17 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, i.345 (no.427).

18 On this see chapter 6, p178.

19 Ibn Wāsil in Arab Historians, pp276-8. Henry III of England also appears to have had (unsolicited) contact with the Ayyūbids: a Christian envoy originally sent to Henry by al-Mu'izzam, and in England in February 1228, was given letters urging the release of Christian captives (Close Rolls, 1227-1231, p94). A Saracen envoy who arrived in 1238, apparently seeking English and French aid against the Mongols, was confined in Canterbury castle to prevent him from spying out the land (Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III, 1237-1242 (HMSO, 1911), p136; Chronica Majora, iii.488-9; and see also Forey, 'Crusading Vows', p230 and note), but it is unclear if he was sent by any of the Ayyūbid princes.

20 See chapter 2, n.54.

21 Ibn Wāsil, Mufarrij, iv.206; Maqrizi, p198; HPEC, iv/1. 105-6. See also Abū Shāma, RHC Hist. Or., v.185, and al-Ṭayfīn, RHC Hist. Or., ii/1. 186-7. None of these give an exact date for Fakhr al-Dīn's embassy to Sicily, only that it occurred some time during the Muslim year 624 H./ 22 December 1226 - 11 December 1227. According to Van Cleve, Frederick II, p203, and Grousset, iii.289, Fakhr al-Dīn headed two embassies to Frederick II. Maqrizi, p199, seems to indicate that there were indeed two embassies, but that the second was led by Jamāl al-Dīn ibn Munqidh al-Shayzari. On this see also HPEC, iv/1. 105.

22 Joinville, p73. Frederick's letter reproduced in the Ta'rīkh Manṣūrī, pp120-1, also indicates his affection for Fakhr al-Dīn.

23 Ta'rīkh Manṣūrī, pp119-23; Maqrizi, p212.

24 Richard of San Germano, MGHS, xix.368; 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii.263. The former mentions the arrival of the Damascene envoys, apparently in March 1232; the latter notes the presence of al-Kāmil's envoys in July. Van Cleve, Frederick II, p305 (see also P.K.Hitti, History of the Arabs (London, 1939; rpr. 1968), p610), attributes the gift of the planetarium to al-Ashraf of Damascus. It is possible that the two embassies were one and the same sent either by al-Kāmil or by al-Ashraf and mistakenly identified by one or other of the chroniclers. Also present at the Imperial court in July 1232 were envoys sent by the Old Man of the Mountain ('Chronica Regia Coloniensis', loc. cit.), and a banquet thrown for them is said by Richard, Latin Kingdom, p237, to have been in thanks for co-operation in the assassination of Louis of Bavaria the previous year; on Frederick's supposed involvement in Louis's death see the 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', loc. cit.; 'Annales Marbacenses', SRG in usum scholarum, ix.94; HDFS, vii/1. 325; Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, MGHS, xxiii.929. Frederick had originally made overtures to the Assassins in 1227 when promises of tribute were apparently secured (Ta'rīkh Manṣūrī, pp115-6). Tribute had in fact been exacted from the Assassins by the
Hospitallers since at least 1212, but payment was irregular and made begrudgingly (see Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, pp139-40; B. Lewis, The Assassins (London, 1967), pp119-20; also Joinville, p139, for comments on the reluctance of the Assassins to render payment to the military orders at the time of Louis's crusade), and it seems unlikely that Frederick would have fared much better. With the exception of 1232, no other embassies are recorded.

25 al- demási, RHC Hist. Or., ii.196.

26 'Annales Placentini Gibellini', MGHS, xviii.479: 'Erant enim cum eo [Frederick]... milites regis Anglie, Francie et Yspanie, comes Provincie cum centum militibus; milites quoque soldani et Vatacii Grecorum imperatoris, aliarumque diversarum gentium'. Although the sultan is not identified by name, it has generally been assumed that the reference is to al-Kämîl - see for example Amari, Storia dei Musulmani, iii.665; HDFS, intro, p.ccclv, n.2; Barbour, p89.

27 Chronica Majora, iii.486.


29 The 'Annales Siculi', MGHS, xix.497, note Roger's appointment as 'capitaneus Siciliae' (cf. HDFS, v/1. 435,745, where he is styled 'justitiarius Sicilie [in Sicilia]', and see also Acta Imperii Inedita, i.643 (no.848), n.) in 1238, and his presence in Egypt in 1240 and 1241, but the indiction years cited by the annals restrict the embassies to September 1241 - September 1242, and September 1242 - September 1243, and documents reproduced in HDFS, v/1. 794,936,1066-9, show Roger to have been in Italy for much of 1240. The corrected dates coincide with the History of the Patriarchs [HPEC, iv/2. 235-6,294] which notes the arrival in Egypt of unnamed envoys in October 1241 and again in the spring of 1243. Barbour, p90, claims that in 1241 Frederick renewed his truce with Egypt, and that in the following year a trade and general agreement stipulating mutual aid and perpetual peace between the two governments was signed, but there seems to be no evidence for these assertions beyond the presence of imperial ambassadors in Egypt, although Huillard-Bréholles permits himself a certain amount of speculation - see HDFS, intro, pp.ccclxii-ccccli.

30 Acta Imperii Inedita, i.664 (no.869). I am indebted to Dr. Jackson for this reference.

31 HDFS, vi/1. 325,427; Ibn Wäsil in Arab Historians, pp276-7.

32 Qirtçay in Cahen, 'St. Louis et l'Islam', pp9-10; Ibn Wäsil in Arab Historians, pp276-7.

33 Joinville, p136; Jordan, Louis IX, pp29-30. By the time the ambassadors had arrived in the East Turān Shâh had been overthrown by the Mamlûks and Louis released.

34 See Purcell, p76, and cf. Richard, Latin Kingdom, p237, who states that the friendship with the Muslims 'deteriorated in about 1246... into collusion'.

35 According to the Recits d'un ménestrel de Reims, pp192-3, Louis's decision to attack Egypt was made known only after the fleet had left Cyprus in May 1249. But a letter from the papal legate, Eudes de
Chateauroux, in Spicilegium sive collectio veterum aloguot scriptorum qui in Galliae bibliothecis delituerant, ed. L. d’Achery, new ed. by E. Baluze, E. Martène, and L. F. J. de la Barre (Paris, 1723; 3 vols), iii. 628, indicates that the crusaders were probably aware at least as early as March 1249 that Egypt was their intended destination.


37 It would make more sense for the pope to have tried to dissuade St. Louis from his crusade, as in fact was the case, see Jordan, Louis IX, p26.

38 Ibn Wäsil in Arab Historians, pp276-7, could be interpreted as indicating that Frederick attempted to dissuade Louis from attacking Egypt; but cf. Qirţāy in Cahen, ‘St. Louis et l’Islam’, pp9-10, whose version of events makes specific reference to both Egypt and Jerusalem.

39 Ibn Wäsil in Arab Historians, pp276-7, and see also Blochet, p64.

40 'Gestes des Chiprois', p672.

41 HDFS, vi/1. 325, 427; Van Cleve, Frederick II, p306; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p237; and supra n. 31.

42 Richard, Latin Kingdom, p237; Van Cleve, Frederick II, p271; chapter 5, n. 196, and chapter 6, p198.

43 Maqrīzī, p208, notes that al-Kāmil consulted a number of experts on problems of geometry, arithmetic and law which the emperor had sent him whilst still in Syria, and it seems likely that this aspect of their correspondence was maintained - see Ibn Wäsil in Arab Historians, pp268, 276. Blochet, p60, prefers not to credit al-Kāmil with any personal expertise in these areas and asserts that the sultan rewrote solutions to Frederick’s problems in his own hand to give the impression that he himself had solved them.
Some Conclusions

In the sense that Frederick achieved his goal of limiting his own personal involvement in the crusade, and that Jerusalem was at long last returned to Christendom, albeit with certain restrictions, the imperial crusade of 1227-1229 can be said to have been a resounding success. In the same vein, in engineering before his departure on crusade, his own coronation as emperor and, against the wishes of the pope, the election of his son Henry as King of Germany¹, Frederick had been remarkably ingenious. But the successful conclusion of the crusade was achieved not through military skill, but by diplomacy and through Muslim disunity; and, by taking a broader view, it can be seen that not only did Frederick fail to realise a number of his fundamental objectives, but that the concessions which he claimed to have wrung from the Muslims were largely an exaggeration of the truth.

True, Jerusalem had been wrested from Muslim control, but outside the holy city gains were insubstantial, or merely a recognition of established facts. In Cyprus Frederick had sought to re-establish lapsed imperial rights; he was recognised as suzerain, but was not accorded the title bailli. In the kingdom of Jerusalem he was acknowledged as regent for his son, Conrad, but not as king, although in 1231 (as a corollary to the crusade) his aspirations to de facto rulership appeared to take a step closer to realisation when the High Court accepted the appointment of the imperial marshal, Richard Filangieri, as Frederick’s lieutenant².

Frederick visualised himself as the temporal leader of Christendom, and sought from the first to restore the Holy Roman
Empire as a unified imperium consisting of Sicily, northern and central Italy and Germany. Superimposed on this appears to have been a concept of world empire, in which the Holy Roman Empire, as the direct descendant of its Roman ancestor, held universal sovereignty: Christendom would be administered jointly by pope and emperor, the emperor being divinely ordained head, but subject to the spiritual guidance of the papacy. His vow of crusade, therefore, was a logical extension to the concept of universalism, and essential to the imperial dignity.

But the dignity and prestige which accompanied the assumption of the cross were severely undermined by Frederick's failure to participate in the Fifth Crusade, and the repeated postponement of his crusading plans 1223-1227, culminating in his excommunication by Gregory IX, further sapped his authority. Admittedly the delays were genuine enough - civil war and the breakdown of law and order in Germany; the restoration of royal authority and the suppression of the Saracen revolt in Sicily; conflict with the Italian communes; apathy among the German nobility for a new crusade, and Frederick's own debilitating illness, but the respect which he had acquired by the oath of crusade had been gravely damaged, and even the return of Jerusalem seems to have been insufficient to recoup what had been lost. The contradictions of the crusade confounded many: here was a military campaign which should have been roundly welcomed by the Church, but was not, which was headed by the temporal leader of Western Christendom, but who was an excommunicate, which had not engaged the enemy and yet had won back the Holy City, which guaranteed the Christian right of worship in Jerusalem, but which also permitted the Muslims to worship there. According to Ibn Wāsīl, Frederick had told Fakhr al-Dīn that he had insisted on the return of
Jerusalem solely to safeguard his reputation amongst the Franks\textsuperscript{6}, but it did little to enhance his already tarnished reputation in the eyes of the Church or to increase his stature amongst the princes of Europe; the treaty infuriated as many people as it placated, and the papacy remained hostile and unappeased.

As a military venture, if it could ever rightly be construed as such, the crusade was a failure. Frederick was not a great military leader, and his military record did not bode well for the forthcoming crusade: the war which he had conducted against Otto IV in Germany was a catalogue of ineptitude, neglect of supply lines and inadequate provisions, and what successes were gained in six years of war, were largely achieved through luck. Only with Otto's death (by natural causes) was Frederick ultimately freed of his Welf protagonist. Likewise the 1226 campaign against the Lombard League collapsed into impotence when the League, simply by blocking the Alpine passes, prevented Henry VII from bringing German troops to Frederick's aid\textsuperscript{7}.

In order to ensure that the lack of preparation and forethought which had characterised the war in Germany was not repeated, efforts were made during the years 1222-1227 to create a financial and logistical superstructure for the imperial crusade. The papacy, however, failed to provide any direct financial assistance, and an English subsidy levied in aid of the Holy Land was not made available to Frederick. At the same time other commitments throughout the empire proved a drain on imperial resources. Almost inevitably this resulted in a series of belated and \textit{ad hoc} financial measures which included near-piratical demands on John of Brienne and on the clergy of the Latin Kingdom. Frederick also had his share of ill-luck: ships which had been under construction since 1224 were delayed by
bad weather and illness so that a proportion remained unfinished at the time of the fleet's departure, and crusaders massing at the Apulian ports in 1227 were decimated by the wildfire spread of disease - in all probability an epidemic to which Frederick directly contributed by failing to make adequate provision of sustenance and shelter. In addition 400 knights promised by the Lombard League failed to materialise. Consequently despite early efforts to plan and structure the crusade, its military effectiveness was seriously undermined long before it set sail.

In the final analysis, however, military might was not a factor which had to be called upon, and Frederick was able to take advantage of the Egyptian diplomatic approaches to reach a negotiated settlement. But even then the anticipated territorial gains in the Holy Land were reduced to a minimum, and in agreeing a treaty which effectively encouraged the encirclement of the Latin states by a unified Muslim power (contrary to Christian policy), and which promoted commercial and political relations with Egypt despite practical considerations which dictated such relations be with Damascus, Frederick divested himself of any remnants of what might just possibly have been interpreted as a thorough and overall plan of crusade. He had sought to overcome the poor preparation and pitfalls of his German venture, and in particular put great efforts into the construction of a fleet, but his plans were improperly laid and not fully thought through.

Frederick's crusade was short by contemporary standards - a mere eight months if we consider just the period of time the emperor actually spent in Syria - but it was not inconsequential. It confirmed Christendom's fixation with Jerusalem (which had been
distracted in 1202-4, and complicated in 1218-21 by the attack on Egypt), and established negotiation as a not wholly unacceptable means of securing concessions from the Muslims. However distasteful the truce in which it resulted might have appeared to the patriarch of Jerusalem, and to the Templars, it suffered only minor violations, and was terminated solely by the death of al-Kämîl in 1238. It was not the most spectacular crusade ever despatched to the East, nor the best planned, but it did reach its destination, and through it, if not in the manner in which the papacy had anticipated, Frederick at long last fulfilled his vow of crusade.

Notes

1 Supra chapter 1, p11, chapter 3, p51-2; Van Cleve, Frederick II, p125.

2 Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp176,180; Riley-Smith, 'Assise', pp199-200; and supra chapter 5, p113. Of course Frederick's right to appoint a lieutenant by letter was soon after disputed - 'Documents relatifs', RHC Lois, ii.399; Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule', pp27-8.

3 HDFS, v/2. 761; Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp101,241.

4 Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp535-9; Mayer, The Crusades, p225; M.Bloch, Land and Work in Mediaeval Europe, trans. J.E.Anderson (London, 1967), pp16-41, according to whom (ibid., pp18-20), despite Frederick's actions at the time of his assumption of the cross in 1215 (see 'Reineri Annales', MGHS, xvi.673, and supra chapter 3, n.103), and the generally held belief at that time that the Salian and therefore Swabian dynasties were descended from the 'noble and ancient Carolingian seed', the Carolingian tradition played only a minor role in the 'German' conception of world empire.

5 For a review of the criticisms prior to the crusade, see Siberry, pp63-8. Of the primary sources, a number accept the return of Jerusalem without comment (see, for example, 'Ann. Wintonia', AM, ii.85; 'Ann. Wigornia', AM, iv.420; 'Annales Sancti Trudperti', MGHS, xvii.293; 'Annales Schefflarianes Minores', MGHS, xvii.343; 'Annales Elwangelenses', MGHS, x.20; 'Annales Zwiefaltenses Maiores', MGHS, x.59), whilst others refer to Frederick's crusade but not to the restoration of Jerusalem (see 'Gaufridi de Collone Chronicon', MGHS, xxvi.617; 'Iohannis Longi Chronica S. Bertini', MGHS, xxv.836; 'Reineri Annales', MGHS, xvi.680). On the effect of the crusade on Frederick's prestige cf., however, Mayer, The Crusades, p228.
6 Ibn Wāṣil in Arab Historians, p207.

7 Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp534-5, who also notes that the contrasting speed with which Frederick retook his kingdom of Sicily in 1229 was remarkable, but that there were no real military successes, Frederick benefiting essentially from the fierce loyalty of the citizens themselves and the feeble efforts of the papal armies.
## Appendix 1

### Chronology of important dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 December 1194</td>
<td>Birth of Frederick II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Easter 1195</td>
<td>Henry VI takes the cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September 1197</td>
<td>Death of Henry VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December 1212</td>
<td>Frederick crowned at Mainz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 July 1215</td>
<td>Frederick crowned at Aachen and takes the cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/5 November 1219</td>
<td>Damietta taken by Christian army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 November 1220</td>
<td>Coronation of Frederick and Constance in Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 September 1221</td>
<td>Damietta returned to the Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1222</td>
<td>Death of the Empress Constance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1223</td>
<td>Conference of crusade leaders at Ferentino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 July 1225</td>
<td>San Germano conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 November 1225</td>
<td>Frederick’s marriage to Isabella in Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1226/7</td>
<td>Fakhr al-DTN heads Egyptian embassy to Sicily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 March 1227</td>
<td>Death of Honorius III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1227</td>
<td>Thomas of Acerra departs for the Holy Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 September 1227</td>
<td>Departure of crusade army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 September 1227</td>
<td>Frederick’s first excommunication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 November 1227</td>
<td>Death of al-MuSaazza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April 1228</td>
<td>Birth of Conrad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May 1228</td>
<td>Death of Isabella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June 1228</td>
<td>Frederick’s departure from Brindisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July 1228</td>
<td>Frederick’s arrival in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 September 1228</td>
<td>Embarkation at Famagusta for Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 September 1228</td>
<td>Arrival at Acre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-23 November 1228</td>
<td>Move to Jaffa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 February 1229</td>
<td>Disclosure of peace terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 February 1229</td>
<td>Treaty sworn between Frederick and al-Kāmil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 March 1229</td>
<td>Crusaders enter Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 March 1229</td>
<td>Frederick wears the crown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 March 1229</td>
<td>Departure from Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-26 March 1229</td>
<td>Move from Jaffa to Acre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 1229</td>
<td>Frederick sets sail from Acre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May 1229</td>
<td>Frederick signs document at Tyre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May/June (October?)</td>
<td>Muslim attack on Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 June 1229</td>
<td>Frederick arrives at Brindisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 August 1230</td>
<td>Reconciliation with Gregory IX at Ceprano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 March 1238</td>
<td>Death of al-Kāmil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1239</td>
<td>Frederick's second excommunication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December 1250</td>
<td>Death of Frederick II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Translation of the Patriarch Gerold's extract from the Old French
text of the treaty concluded between al-Kāmil and Frederick II, HDFS,
iii.86-7.

1. The sultan gives to the emperor or his baillis Jerusalem the
Exalted that he may do with it whatever he wishes, whether fortify
[garnir] it, or anything else.

2. The emperor must not touch the Geemelaza, which is the Temple of
Solomon, nor the Templum Domini, nor anything in the entire
precincts, nor must he allow any Frank of whatsoever race he may be
to enter into the places mentioned [motit]; they shall remain with
nothing changed in the hands and custody of the Saracens who shall
hold them to make their prayers and proclaim their religion without
anyone preventing them or gainsaying them in any way, and the keys to
the gates to the precincts of these aforementioned places shall be in
the hands of those who are there to serve the places, and nor shall
they be taken from their hands.

3. No Saracen shall be forbidden from freely making the pilgrimage
to Bethlehem.

4. And if there is any Frank who has a firm belief in the exalted
and dignified character of the Templum Domini and who wishes to visit
it and say his prayers there, he may do so; and if he does not
believe in its height and its dignity, he must not be allowed to
enter in any part of the precincts.
5. If any Saracen does mischief in Jerusalem to fellow Saracens he should be tried in the Saracen manner.

6. The emperor will not help any Frank whatsoever in any fashion in any intention he may have of whatsoever kind neither to fight a Saracen nor to make war against any Saracens who are mentioned in this truce, nor will he incite them nor send [segra] any of them in any of the regions mentioned in order to do battle, nor will he give his consent to them in any fashion, nor will he aid them either with troops or goods or men.

7. The emperor will divert all those who intend to do injury to the land of the Sultan al-Malik al-Kamil and in the land which is mentioned in the truce, and he will defend them with army and his possessions and his men and as much as lies within his power.

8. If any Franks whatsoever intend to contravene any of the undertakings [fermites] recorded or specified in this truce, the emperor is bound to defend the sultan and take up arms [doster] and to divert them from it with his army, and his goods and his men.

9. Tripoli and its territory, Krak, Chastel Blanc, Tortosa, Margat and Antioch, and whatever is in their truce [territory? i.e. terre rather than trive] shall be as it was in war and in truce and on the emperor it should be [incumbent] that he shall forbid his people and his army and his dependants [aprendans] and those Franks who come there, whether natives [prives] or coming from outside, to assist the lords of these aforementioned places in any designs they may have on Saracen territory.
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