ARMS AND INFLUENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA/UNITED STATES


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The following have been excluded at the request of the university:

The quotes on pgs 16, 36, 42, 44, 127 & 129.

The map on pg 183.

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Bibliography.
This thesis investigates empirically the realist argument that the United States arms transfers produced political influence on Saudi Arabia's foreign policy behaviour between 1973 and 1983. Within six chapters I set out the conditions and interaction of certain variables which map the contours implied in my title.

In my Introduction I set out the aims, purposes and sources of the thesis. Against realism as purely a power model, I provide a reading of politics adequate to reality entailing flexibility of understanding and judgment by decision-makers.

Chapter One applies the model to foreign-policy analysis. Turning to influence, I argue that it is as much a pattern of historical relations between states as a pattern of synchronic inter-state relations. The arms/influence problem is determined within a national-interest centred concept of foreign policy.

Chapter Two brings us to the main empirical material. Here I examine four dimensions of the arms transfer process from the supply side, (i) motives, (ii) legal instruments, (iii) the due process involved in pre-1973, (iv) the nature of the historical relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia pre-1973. Chapter Three performs a similar analysis, but for the post-1973 period. The three arms sales are introduced.

Chapters Two and Three concentrate on the supply side, Chapters Four and Five take also into account the demand side. I review the historical development of Saudi security policy in terms of internal and regional problems. The last section details the military and strategical impact of the three major arms deals on Saudi security.

Chapter Five relates the supply side to the demand side, showing that despite the three major arms deals, Saudi Arabia has not co-operated automatically with US expectations. This lack of cooperation shows the basic incoherence in the US arms policy, especially in the Reagan era. This incoherence is not so much between Executive and Legislature, as the executive's belief in a direct relation of arms to influence, even though there is no adequate correlation.

The conclusion argues that the 'crude realism' of the US executive - arms procures influence directly - has to be more flexible in US/Saudi Arabian arms relations. The US decision-makers need a greater flexibility of approach and understanding, and a more sophisticated grasp of the Saudi Arabian/US arms relation.
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I, alone, am responsible for any errors, factual or of interpretation.
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAUG Association of Arab American University Graduates
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (U.S.)
ADL Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith
ADC Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
AECA Arms Export Control Act
AID Agency for International Development
AIPAC American Israeli Public Affairs Committee
AJC American Jewish Committee
ARAMCO Arabian American Oil Company
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
C3 Command, Control and Communications
CENTO Central Treaty Organisation
CFIUS Committee of Foreign Investment in the United States
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
CM Commercial Sales
COE U.S. Corps of Engineers
COIN Counter-Insurgency
CRS Congressional Research Service
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
DOD Department of Defense (U.S.)
DOS Department of State
DSSA Defense Security Assistance Agency (U.S.)
FMS Foreign Military Sales
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
GCC Gulf Co-operation Council
GDP Gross National Product
GPO U.S. Government Printing Office
HCFA U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs
HCIR U.S. House Committee on International Relations
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies (U.K.)
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISA International Security Affairs (U.S.)
MAP Military Assistance Programme (U.S.)
MEDO Middle East Defense Organisation
MIT-CIS Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Center for International Studies
MP Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
NAAA National Association of Arab Americans
NSC National Security Council
OPEC Organisatin of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PPB Programming, Planning and Budgeting
R & D Research and Development
RDF Rapid Development Force
RSAF Royal Saudi Air Force
SAMA Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
SATCO Saudi Arabian Tanker Company
SFRC U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sweden)
SOCAL Standard Oil Company of California
SPR U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve
USAF U.S. Air Force
USCENTCO U.S. Central Command
USMTM U.S. Military Training Mission
INTRODUCTION

"I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States."

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
18 February 1943

"The sale of AWACs and other air defense equipment to Saudi Arabia would make a substantial contribution to the national security interests of the United States in a vital part of the world."

President Ronald Reagan
5 October 1981
This is an empirical thesis. I do not exclude conceptual analysis but, for the most part, subordinate it to my explication of the Saudi Arabia/United States relationship. The primary focus is the relationship of arms and influence between the two countries.

The connection of arms and influence is a familiar one in International Relations literature and indeed is clearly stated in the bald title of the book by Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence. This too involves extensive historical analysis rather than game theory for which he is better known.

The suggestion of an 'arms/influence' relation implies the expectation that one can intuitively grasp the meanings of this relation. It ought to seem 'obvious' that a supplier who sells something regarded as relatively scarce, yet an important form of security such as arms, will produce influence upon a recipient. However, one needs more clarification on the arms/influence relationship, and the first chapter in particular will attempt to pick out some of the analytical features of making an arms transfer and the production of certain forms of influence. However, the thrust of the thesis will concern itself with illuminating foreign relations between the two states; it will not concern itself primarily with arguments about the theory of arms/influence.

Before I consider conceptual preliminaries as a way into the main theme of the thesis, I will offer a brief historical note on the background to the U.S. arms transfer to Saudi Arabia.
1. United States/Saudi Arabia Arms Transfers Relationship: A Brief Background

Arms transfers has been a controversial issue in many Western states. Since World War II there have been various organisations set up to oppose it, not least Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) and better known ones such as Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), concentrating on nuclear weapons. However, opposition to it has a history going back at least as far as the era of World War I when people thought that government control of the arms trade would promote peace. World War II demonstrated that this was not the case, and subsequent events, not least the escalating antagonism of the United States and the Soviet Union in the fifties (the Cold War), which continues to the present day, has shown how important the acquisition of arms is. Not only this, but the economic, ideological, strategical and diplomatic struggle of the two superpowers to gain influence and create allies, other than with their natural allies (for U.S. e.g. Britain/NATO countries, and for U.S.S.R., Eastern bloc) has brought about various forms of trade with many other countries. Perhaps the most conspicuous form of trade is arms, and for my purposes I look at this form of trade between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The background of the United States/Saudi Arabia arms trade has been inextricably bound to American oil interests whether in the form of the Arabian American Oil Company's (ARAMCO) exploitation of Saudi oil fields in the 1930s, or U.S. government oil negotiations in the troubled period of the 1970s and early 1980s. However, I must presume a Saudi need for arms in the first place, and I show in Chapter Four the Saudi rationale for purchasing arms. But in one word, it is 'security', both in internal and regional. Saudi Arabia has, since the 1950s, increased its arms imports massively, and one
fact stands out - that Saudi military development programmes have been wholly dependent on Western support, and that, overwhelmingly, is American.

I have noted the arms relations between Saudi Arabia and United States goes back to the issue of the U.S. realisation of the importance of oil. But it was not until towards the end of World War II in 1945 that American arms interests were first represented in Saudi Arabia. King Abdul Aziz's granted rights to the U.S. to set up a military airfield at Dhahran. Later that year, a U.S. military mission was sent to Saudi Arabia to determine suitable Saudi military equipment and training.

By 1946 Dhahran airfield was completed and this was followed in 1951 by the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance agreement which provided, reorganisation and training of Saudi military forces by the United States, and most significantly "the extending of procurement assistance to a nation whose ability to defend itself, or participate in the defence of the area of which it is a part, is important to the security of the United States." At the same time, the Dhahran Air Base agreement was signed to allow the continued use of the base by the U.S. for five years. The formal agreement showed several crucial elements founded in all subsequent United States/Saudi Arabia relations: military assistance, self-defence and regional issues.

The initial agreements were given more permanent substance in 1953 by the establishment of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG) in Saudi Arabia to train armed forces and advise on arms procurements. The USMAAG, heralded a significant increase in the American presence and contributed to the rising volume of Saudi military procurements from the United States.

Arms transfers of military hardware quickly followed. In 1955 the first U.S. tanks were bought at a cost of $1.5 million. At the
same time Saudi Arabia rejected a Soviet offer of arms.\textsuperscript{10}

As will quickly become evident, this thesis, focuses in particular on military aircraft sales by which to evaluate the validity of arms transfers/influence relationship. Military aircraft were first transferred to Saudi Arabia in the period of 1955/58. These included 9 B-26 Douglas "Invader" light tactical bombers between 1955/56, 10 North American F-86 "Sabre" jet fighters. 10 Lockheed T-33A trainers were given by the U.S. to Saudi Arabia under the military aid programme (MAP) between 1957/58.\textsuperscript{11} This 1957/58 arms transfers also included an assortment of tanks.\textsuperscript{12} At that time no Saudi navy existed.

Due to Saudi Arabia's inadequate revenues to meet its budgetary needs in these early years, much American assistance was in the form of MAP grant aid, and was characterized by comparatively modest, unsophisticated equipment and limited training for Saudi personnel.\textsuperscript{13} At that time, the continued use of Dhahran airbase by the Strategic Air Command was the basic U.S. defence interest in Saudi Arabia. The lack of perceived threat to Saudi Arabia did not stimulate an interest, for the U.S., to embark upon a modernisation programme for the Saudi armed forces.\textsuperscript{14}

A significant change occurred in 1965 with a joint United States/United Kingdom effort to modernise the Saudi military forces, particularly the air defence as a result of Egyptian attacks on Saudi territory during the Yemen civil war. Reacting to Egyptian attacks, the Saudis sought to acquire a modern air defence system. Britain was to provide most of the equipment including the advanced version of Lightning interceptors, and AEI environmental radar, with technical training and support services being provided by Airwork. The U.S. was to supply the Raytheon Hawk surface-to-surface missiles.\textsuperscript{15}

After the 1967 war, the American/Saudi military relationship was
reduced temporarily when Saudi Arabia turned to France for major purchases of armoured fighting vehicles. But by the early 1970s, the United States had become much involved in a number of defence modernisation programmes with Saudi Arabia. The basis for these programmes were cash sales as opposed to grant aid. Among the major military programmes in recent years between the U.S. and Saudi governments are:

1. Construction projects (coordinated by the U.S. Corps of Engineers - COE): 1965-85
   - Khamis Mushayt air/army base (1971), expenditures est. $81 million
   - Tabuk air/army base (1973), expenditures est. $81 million
   - Hafr al-Batin air/army base (mid-1980s), expenditures est. $7.8 billion

2. 'Peace Hawk' air force programme: 1971-79
   - Procurement of F-5s, training and maintenance, est. $3 billion
   - (60 F-5E/F (1975) at a cost of $769 million)

3. Naval expansion programme: 1972-81
   - Procurement of ships, training and maintenance (base construction included under COE above), est. $800 million

4. National Guard modernisation programme; 1973-78
   - Mechanization of infantry battalions with supporting artillery, training and maintenance (construction facilities under COE above), est. $275 million

5. 'Peace Sun' air force programme: 1978-1982/83
   - Procurement of 60 F-15s, training and maintenance, est. $2.85 billion

6. 'Peak Hawk II' air force programme: 1981-1985
   - Procurement of 5 AWACS/F-15s Enhancement equipment, training and maintenance, est. $8.5 billion
2. Arms transfers and political influence relationship

As stated earlier, during the Cold War years that followed World War II the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in (and are still in) open competition for influence among the emerging states of the Third World. As Third World states' independence began to materialise in a post-colonial world, their leaders sought arms, to guarantee their state's national security interests, to cope with domestic security challenges and to build respect and prestige abroad. The superpowers were willing to satisfy these demands and thus add new dimensions to their competition for foreign policy influence.

Arms transfers could be used by the superpowers to emphasise political support for friends and allies, or to exploit recipients' weaknesses in a critical region. Arms recipients were then considered to be in the camps of their arms suppliers, and thus subject to policy manipulation and under the influence of their suppliers. The recent escalation in the flow of advanced technological weapons systems from the United States and the Soviet Union to the Third World states, emphasises the momentum of the perception of arms transfers as a useful, if not a crucial, instrument of foreign policy. Arms transfers today, still constitute an essential component of international relations because they continue to be regarded as a principal instrument of suppliers' influence on recipients' foreign policy behaviour and therefore a crucial arena of the competition between the superpowers.

In the previous section I provided a summary history of arms transfers between the United States and Saudi Arabia from a historical standpoint but this secures no linkage with the concept of influence. This I need now to consider. To do this I will give to it a conceptual gloss rather than a historical one, for the latter is
the empirical substance of the rest of the thesis.

I have made it clear that this thesis addresses the relation of arms and influence in the context of United States/Saudi Arabia relationship. But it has been implied or suggested that influence is not the only motive of a power in making an arms transfer. There are other motives, not least of which are the suppliers’ concerns for the domestic economy and security of the recipient state, and the fear of loss of influence. But these are not ‘other’ motives. They are aspects of the suppliers’ perception of what enhances their influence over the recipient state. The supplier’s view of influence in practical terms is, a way of getting another state to give or lend certain advantages (it possesses) to the supplier to enable the supplier state to pursue its foreign policy aims. A supplier state, however, needs to enhance those aspects of the recipient state, that state perceives as important for itself. In other words, influence is based on an exchange mechanism. If it did not have a ‘voluntaristic’ aspect of exchange-by-agreement, the enabling measures provided by the recipient to the supplier would not be influence, but coercion by the supplier, or even sycophancy by the recipient. Influence has, it seems to me, to be achieved through negotiation, not merely granted by a recipient’s ‘open-house’ policy. By military means (e.g. threats of military action) a supplier could force a state to give it an enabling measure, but this would hardly be in line with what one understands by ‘influence’.

Thus a supplier state needs to give advantages to the recipient state for the recipient to provide the supplier with advantages. Furthermore, the recipient state and the supplier state must create or procure a climate in which that relation of exchange is not simply one of ‘payment-delivery of goods’ much as one relates to a shop, for when I merely buy goods I do not have influence over a shop. No, it
must be that other suppliers cannot outbid the original supplier by arms transfers-advantage procurement because there is a basic understood commitment to trade between the states on the basis of arms-advantages, rather than on the basis of clearing of debts procedure.

What then, I have done is to fly in the face of Thomas Schelling's thesis in *Arms and Influence* which articulates a view of influence as a product of military force. I want to say that influence is also a feature of arms transfers in peacetime. (This is not to say there are not other things which produce influence, but arms transfers are a main contender in the literature as the machinery productive of influence).

The arms transfers literature has not dealt in depth with the specific means of arms/influence relationship. For the most part, the arms transfers literature has concentrated on determining who is buying what from whom for how much. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions to this. Among these are research works on the processes and patterns of the arms trade by Amelia Leiss, Lincoln Bloomfield and Geoffrey Kemp in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There is also Lewis Frank's data-base study.

In general, the relationship between arms transfers and political influence has been much disputed among scholars. William Lewis contended that the political implication of U.S. arms transfers are uncertain. William Quandt found arms transfers to Israel did not produce positive results. Thomas Wheelock indicated the limited impact of arms transfers. Finally, Roger Pajak discovered that Soviet arms transfers to Arab states have restricted leverage. However, I will consider these references and contributions in Chapter One.

Nevertheless, the United States government continues to believe
arms transfers are directly related to U.S. foreign policy influence. In keeping with this view is the belief that arms transfers could serve primary functions. Among these are: influencing the political orientation of states of strategic resources towards moderation in price and production, to provide leverage on certain states on issues of trade and investment, to enhance access with governments to provide base rights and overseas facilities, and finally to influence the political orientation of key states to support diplomatic initiatives to resolve regional conflicts.

Since the United States has been, and still is, a principal arms supplier, examining U.S. arms transfers policies and their implications should yield insights into the relationship between arms transfers and influence.

3. Data Sources/Problems

A wide variety of sources have been consulted, though given the sensitivity of the subject of arms transfers many facts and figures remain classified. It is also important to point out that there is a variation of coverage of these sources, i.e. some provide data on military hardware (weapons, support equipment, spare parts and ammunition) others include military services (training, maintenance, technical services and construction work). Therefore comparison between them is difficult. Thus, it is necessary to be cautious in choosing among them in order to obtain the data most appropriate for supporting a particular point. Among the primary sources consulted on arms transfers are: the academic body Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbooks, World Armaments and Disarmaments, and the government-based organisation U.S. Arms Control and Disarmaments Agency's (ACDA) annual publication World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers. However, there are other useful sources of information on arms transfers. Among them the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) which reports on major identified arms agreements and lists military equipment found in each country's inventory in its annual publication *The Military Balance*. However, IISS does not aggregate monetary or military value of the transfers which is an important element in supplier-recipient relations. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies (CIS) provides a data set called *Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries*. Unlike SIPRI and ACDA, which emphasise the monetary value of the transfer, the CIS data set stresses the military utility of the transfer. The annual U.S. Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency's *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts*, unlike ACDA, lists data on military training and services. The statistical studies are published periodically by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. The annual U.K. *Defence Statistics* identifies defence equipments for trade and their destinations. The London annual publication of Janes Series, such as *Janes All the World's Aircraft*, have updated inventory data as well as major weapons systems performance. Finally, strategic and military journals include: *Aviation Week and Space Technology* (New York), *Armed Forces Journal International* (New York), and *International Defense Review* (Geneva).

Neither SIPRI nor ACDA include maintenance, construction and technical training data which is an important component of arms transfers for a country like the United States. For this information, Pentagon publications were consulted. In addition, neither examine the military utility of the weapons systems. For this, IISS and CIS papers were consulted. Regardless of data
problems connected with SIPRI and ACDA, both have a particular value as a source of information for the following reasons:

i) SIPRI and ACDA use monetary value (in constant current value\textsuperscript{20}) of actual transfer and deliveries of arms rather than the agreements signed. The actual flow of arms is easy to verify. In contrast, the signing of an agreement is not only harder to verify, but signed agreements may never be consummated.

ii) Both agencies trace arms transfers globally, regionally and in some cases by country.

iii) Both have a clear-cut terminology applied to major weapons systems such as aircraft, warships, tanks and missiles.

iv) ACDA's statistics are based upon information provided by the U.S. intelligence community.\textsuperscript{21} ACDA is a principal agency within the U.S. administration, review requests of purchase for American military equipments.\textsuperscript{22}

v) SIPRI's worksheets (if available) allow the researcher to analyse the supplier-recipient interaction in regard to influence and conflict.

When doing fieldwork in Washington D.C. (December 1982-June 1983), the researcher interviewed various individuals involved in decision-making or negotiations on arms sales or those with experience in the field of foreign affairs and Saudi/American relations. These included Colonel McKalip, senior officer, Pentagon; William Quandt, senior foreign policy analyst, Brookings Institution; Jim Hoagland, assistant director of foreign news, Washington Post; and Faisal Alhegelan, ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States. A list of consulted personnel, as well as those of sources of material on military and foreign affairs, will be found in the bibliography section.
4. Objectives of the Thesis

Saudi Arabia provides a laboratory for evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. arms transfers, particularly when they are thought to protect U.S. economic, strategic and political interests in the region. From 1950 to 1972, U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) agreements to Saudi Arabia accounted for over $573 million, U.S. foreign military construction (FMC) agreements accounted for over $603 million. However, FMS and FMC deliveries were $188 million and $257 million.\textsuperscript{23} From 1973 to 1982 the FMS and FMC were much higher, accounting for over $22 billion for FMS and over $18 billion for FMC. However, FMS deliveries were over $8 billion and FMC were only $9 billion respectively.\textsuperscript{24} The primary rationale for these U.S. arms sales was to enhance political influence over Saudi Arabia so she would support policies favourable to U.S. interests in the region.

Have these interests, attributed to arms transfers by the U.S., been achieved in Saudi Arabia? This question is difficult to answer since the relationship, as I stated earlier, between arms transfers and political influence in this context has not been thoroughly examined by academic studies. This thesis is an attempt to investigate whether U.S. arms transfers produces political influence on Saudi Arabia's foreign policy behaviour. Further, it examines the political structuration of influence between the states, the forms it took, and the success or failure of America to maintain its reach of influence.

Nevertheless, any study of the use of arms transfers for the purposes of influence must resolve the difficult questions of what influence is, and how best to consider it. Once these problems are resolved then one should seek evidence to support the assumption that a direct relationship exists between arms transfers and political influence. However, one might find out that the arms transfers
variable is not the only one that might produce influence. Thus, there might be several variables other than arms transfers by which arms suppliers may have influenced the recipients' foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, we need to investigate the place of arms transfers and political influence within the context of other variables. It may be a broader set of reasons which leads one to an effective assertion of a relationship between arms suppliers and their recipients, rather than a simple bilateral relationship.

5. The Scope of this Thesis

I have chosen the U.S.-Saudi arms transfers relationship, especially military aircraft, from 1973 to 1983 for the following reasons:

1. Since 1973, Saudi Arabia has emerged as a principal world oil supplier while the U.S. has become increasingly dependent on Middle East oil imports. Saudi oil made up 14.3% of American oil imports in 1973, and 20.8% in 1977. The percentage rose to 23.8% in 1980, and 25.3% in 1981.25

2. The financial power brought by the oil boom enhanced Saudi Arabia's desire for modernisation in the areas of society, economics and the military, and the importation of Western goods and services. The exchange of high-tech American goods and American skilled manpower for Saudi petrodollars and investment26 also emphasise a change in the relationship. In other words, among other factors, American need for oil gave Saudi Arabia a bargaining position in regard to America it did not have prior to 1973. Though still asymmetrical, there was no longer a one-way dependence of Saudi Arabia on the United States.

3. Oil and financial power was outweighed by the prevailing
military weakness of Saudi Arabia to face the development of the following crises: a) the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, b) the revolution in Iran, c) the War of Yemens, d) the Soviet advancement in Afghanistan in late 1979, e) the Iraq-Iran War in 1980, and f) the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Thus, increased U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia and the flying of the U.S. flag in the region, emphasised mutual concerns and interests that would cement the more nearly symmetrical relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

4. Finally, it may be noted that the U.S. has a long-range goal of gaining influence and impact upon various Middle East states through its relationship with Saudi Arabia which in its turn has influence with the Middle East in virtue of its fiscal and cultural strength.

6. The Approach of the Thesis

The thesis is 'realist' in its approach. According to this approach, states are involved in struggles for 'power'. Power could be described as the ability of actors to affect the behaviour of other actors in a favoured manner. A second central concept of this realist approach is 'interest'. An actor is one who promotes national interests. Thus, to act in one's interest is to seek power (that is, to have the ability to influence others' behaviour in a desired manner). Consequently, arms transfers can be used as an instrument by the U.S. to influence Saudi Arabia's foreign policy behaviour towards desired interests.

Nevertheless 'realism' has been attacked for its absence of a means of testing its validity. Trevor Taylor in his review article (1978) has pointed to the catch-all characters of power and its essentially indefinable character in regard to successful
policy-making:

T. Taylor continues to say:

Taylor's demand for certainty, "ideal behaviour", 'maximisation', 'full quantification' are extraordinary. Why should a realist want these kind of absolutes? What has been overlooked is that a realist decision-maker should be a realist - a man who in his decision-making capacity is committed to believing that power is the basis both for analysis and decision, and that power manifests itself in many forms, but that situations may arise which require flexibility of decision and longer-term planning. Robert Berki in his On Political Realism.

Berki has an important point to make. He wants, to make political activity adequate to reality. Realism as the scholars put it, emphasises power-maximisation, but this lacks an empirical referent. It is unsurprising that absolutes such as 'maximisation' are difficult to get to grips with. Yet among decision-makers is a persistent belief that one can use one's resources - one's power - to effect the decisions of others. This subjective assertion is an intrinsic part of the link between belief and actions, by governments, and should be taken as a 'fact' about the decision process. If there is a real world referent for any sort of realism it
must accord with the character of political behaviour and action. A realist may back-off and deliberately not maximize power in one area so as to gain a surer basis for power later. The 'realist' must be 'accountable' to situations, not just pursue a maximisation of power policy. To do the latter is the work of a crude, dogmatic realist.

This thesis shows that America had a tendency to take the latter position because it totalised its relations with Saudi Arabia to the exclusion of other factors, but due to Saudi Arabia's relations with other Arab/Islamic states, was later forced to climb down and re-negotiate the structure and mutual understanding of power between Saudi Arabia and the United States. What I do here is to offer an alternative account of realism that deviates from the standard account of the scholars to one that focuses upon the relation of an agent to the real world. On the surface, to say that a decision-maker should be realistic may seem banal, but it is designed to make a point about the obstinate configuration of the real world and its' resistance to the ambitions of agents who believe in their omnipotent power. My idea of realism is deceptively simple perhaps. But it surely gains strength because it more nearly reflects its' empirical base of facts about a political world. The decision-makers need to take an account of the plethora of diplomatic, military and political strategies of nations as related to their interests, and for them to take a scholars' line on realism would reduce the subtleties to crudities in the manipulation of the resources of power open to them.

The policy-makers' view of realism in International Relations is defined in-use, not as a theoretical pre-disposition (an assumption of full power). Power is liquid and cannot be measured before it is used - it flows through a network of international relations. It is the anti-realist who wants to show the realists' power as a monolithic structure for each state, who is in error.
'Realists' power entails no necessary political or moral commitments in the minds of the decision-maker; his readings of political situations must be fluid, because he knows the dynamic, shifting sands of diplomacy and situations. Precisely his recognition of changing environments has led him to create multi-various simulation models, especially in post-war America (e.g. war game research). The desire to assert, even dominate a relationship with another country does not mean that this must always be done irrespective of the situation. As I have said, this America had to learn in its eroding relationship with the Middle East, (of which Saudi Arabia is a constituent) when America had a self-perception as a militarily and economically strong country who wanted friends and strategic bases in an immediate post-war world and could purchase them via offers of aid. Not surprisingly it believed it was a dominant power in any relationship it struck up, other than with countries to which it was ideologically opposed, e.g. Soviet Union. But when aid-dependent, tacitly friendly countries gained modes of independence through wealth or offers of arms from other countries, then America recognised it had to take action to revitalise its position. In other words it was aware it had made a loss of interest (if it valued the interest being lost) and this for U.S. was a mode of power-loss (loss of influence mainly). It did not have to have an absolute measure of power or come to that, of influence, to realise it was losing-out where its' relations with other states were being usurped or strangled.

I select a form of 'realism' because in essence it is flexible in-use. Realism, I want to say, is the practical belief of decision-makers, that international order is not constructed by law, because laws can be made or abrogated upon more or less indiscriminately if need demands it; and moreover the stance towards
international laws or rules can be changed unilaterally. The struggle between Mrs. Thatcher and the E.E.C. is indicative of this. Equally it is not a moral order. The range of intelligence services activities are testimony to this. No, the practical beliefs of decision-makers are founded in a realism which presents power-brokerage as the basis of decisions, and these in turn are based on national interests determined by the say-so of executives or legislatures.

The power I speak of, is the capacity of a state to get what it wants by fair means or foul through its agencies such as the armed forces, diplomats and intelligence services as well as its international and economic resources. This capacity is delimited by the anticipated costs decisions could have, and the assessment of the capacity for cover-ups or damage limitation exercises.

In summation, I believe that the critics and advocates of the standard theory of realism have produced a caricature of what in essence realism should mean. It is in error as to the 'ordinary language' use of the term 'realism' and in error in regard of the 'absolutes' criterion it demands for the theory. If critics demand impractical criteria they will get an impractical theory which forces a no contest. But in the material world of decisions, caricatures of positions are to be studiously avoided, because they are useless.

In addition to this conceptual realist approach I have also taken the historical approach. My main concern is to mention primary events within a chronological framework which might explain Saudi-American relations before and during the period 1973-1983. Continuities with earlier events (1933-1973) determine contemporary events (1973-1983). Though the continuities of the relationship are not well known due to lack of adequate scholarly literature, they are central to understanding the nature and direction of current and
ongoing relations. Policy debates in the U.S. over U.S.-Saudi military relations have been severely restricted by this lack of historical dimension. For instance, the Congressional debate over the U.S. government's sales of F-5s in 1975, F-15s in 1978, and AWACs/Enhancement Equipment in 1981 to Saudi Arabia paid little attention to historical developments. All these previous sales can be linked directly to the Kennedy Administration's promise to conduct an air defense survey for Saudi Arabia, if she would agree to a settlement with Egypt over the Yemen civil war.

Moreover, historical developments of primary events of the pre-1973 period play a key role in determining whether there is or is not a change in the amount and direction of influence vis-a-vis the findings of the investigated period (1973-1983).

7. Significance - Why This Thesis?

The relation of arms to influence appeals to our intuitions, and seems self-evident and furthermore is a theme regularly referred to in International Relations literature. Unfortunately, the details of the hypothesis - that arms produces influence - which is a U.S. foreign policy axiom, has been little examined. As a Saudi national and part of a culture suspicious of, and sensitive to 'colonialism and imperialism', but also part of a modernising world involving itself in 'nation-building', the idea of dependence is, at least theoretically, anathema. However, world opinion, in particular that of Saudi Arabia's neighbours (often Soviet-backed), has frequently pointed out, or alluded to the 'immoral' connections with the United States. The implication is that for a modernising state in the process of establishing its sovereignty, (not in terms of territory which is legally secure), but in terms of military security of that territory - its ability to control that territory - Saudi Arabia
should not be beholden unto another power.

Thus the academic question of the identity and character of Saudi Arabia in International Relations is not, in my case, merely a spontaneous gesture to scholarship, but is a genuine problem for myself and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, a state of conservative disposition seeks neither to publicly assert nor deny, the forms of its relationship with the United States. It recognizes the value of a 'low profile', but its size, and strategic and economic importance give it a significance in world affairs it cannot wish away.

Having explained in personal terms why I chose to write the thesis, we must now turn to the substantive issue of the significance of the thesis within the study of International Relations.

I have mentioned several elements within the thesis which propose lines of original inquiry and the procurement of original results. Methodologically I believe this thesis offers a modified version of realism showing that testability and measurement are a demand of an out-dated positivism. Further, this thesis demonstrates a concern with the decisions - structures, intentions and perceptions. In other words, I produce a rather more cognitive, as opposed to a behavioural version of events.

At the empirical level I attempt to show the change in the U.S. understanding of arms - influence relationship post-1973, and argue that establishment U.S. decision-making adopted a crude power-realism which had to shift after 1973. In other words I am looking at things from the point of view of the decision-makers, not the International Relations scholars. In connection with this I examine three major aircraft sales decisions as inter-actionary, as between the various branches of the U.S. government and interested parties, the decision-makers in Saudi Arabia and between the representation by Saudi Arabia to United States, and vice-versa. I have sought to
overturn and expose the errors in the perception of the U.S. decision-makers, and provide insights into the under-researched areas of the United States/Saudi Arabian arms transfers.

Finally, I come to the question of why I have a problem to be explained, and this will lead me to understanding the connection with what seems to be a commonplace answer.

It is received opinion by scholars that there is usually no direct casual link between arms transfers and influence. In other words other factors are invariably present. This is quite true. But my problem is, what one makes of the decision-makers beliefs about the connection between arms transfers and influence, and this tells a different story. In successive U.S. governments, the executive, though less so the legislature and oversight bodies, have presented the relationship between arms and influence, as direct and causal. This in turn has profoundly effected the prescriptions executives have made about the aims of arms transfers-generated foreign policy, and political decision-making. In part at least, this offers, pointers for an account of the history of U.S. perceptions and Saudi perceptions of the relationship. But it also suggests that America was somewhat credulous in thinking that the future would be much the same as the past. If arms transfers really procure the influence America thought it did, then would Saudi Arabia have acted quite so unilaterally vis-a-vis U.S. in the mid-1970s in siding with its Arab neighbours?

Whatever scholars have said about the complexity of arms and influence, i.e. that it is necessarily mixed with many other factors - strategical, diplomatic, political and economic, the single mindedness of U.S. foreign policy-makers to see the arms-influence relationship in a vacuum, has made the holding of a coherent United States/Saudi Arabia arms transfer policy, but also the U.S.
maximizing its influence on Saudi Arabia, difficult. If Saudi Arabia takes a much broader view of the relationship of arms/influence and connects it with a wide range of factors, then the Saudi response to U.S. arms supply is going to fluctuate in accordance with those other factors (depending on their significance on Saudi Arabia). It is as if two parties, who may want to achieve a common goal have two different maps one which portrays a journey as the crow flies, the others full of geographical features which have to be negotiated. At best the two are not going to achieve the same goal at the same time. There is a coordination problem. This is analogous to the United States/Saudi Arabia arms/influence relationship. I argue that the failure of U.S. foreign policy-makers to take into account the fluctuating factors affecting Saudi Arabia (recipient) behaviour, has lead to a U.S. misunderstanding of this relationship. This in turn, has effected its ability to influence Saudi Arabia to help U.S. in its role in such crucial areas as Camp David and on the resolution of the 1970s oil crisis.

As I see it, I am not so much arguing with the International Relations scholars view of the complexities of arms/influence relationship, as arguing with the decision-makers views of International Relations, and this is a real International Relations problem, not a second order discourse of the applicability of scholar's models.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION


9. HCFA, op.cit., p.16.

10. Ibid.


12. Ibid.


14. Ibid.


17. Their literature on arms transfers include the following: Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss, Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970s (New York: Knopf, 1969) and Geoffrey Kemp, "The International Arms Trade: Supplier, Recipient and Arms Control Perspectives", Political Quarterly (October/December 1971).


19. This is a contentious point, but is crucial to the thesis and will therefore be considered in detail later.

20. Current value means the actual prices recorded at the time of a particular sale. Constant value means prices of a particular sale in a specified year.


24. Ibid.


28. Ibid.


EARLIER IT WAS MADE CLEAR THAT I ADOPT A PARTICULAR TYPE OF REALISM. IT IS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THIS APPOINTS THE IDEA OF POWER TO A MAIN EXPLANATORY ROLE IN UNDERSTANDING OF FOREIGN POLICY. WHAT IT DOES NOT SPECIFY IS A PARTICULAR ANALYTICS OF POWER OR WHAT DECISION-MAKERS MAKE OF POWER. THE LATTER IS THE MAIN POINT IN RESPECT OF MY ARGUMENT THAT DECISION-MAKER'S 'REALISM' IS AN UNDERSTANDING ON FOREIGN-POLICY IN-USE. WHEN ANALYSING DECISIONS ONE NEEDS TO RECONSTRUCT IN SOME SENSE WHAT CONTEXT DECISION-MAKERS USE IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING THEIR DECISIONS: WHAT 'IDEA-LOGY' THEY USE. I SUGGEST THAT FOR AMERICANS IT IS BROADLY A REALIST SET OF ASSUMPTIONS, BUT A SET FAR MORE ATTUNED TO THE EVERYDAY DEMANDS OF MAKING DECISIONS ADEQUATE (AS BERKI PUTS IT) TO REALITY. YES - USE OF POWER AND NATIONAL INTEREST ARE AT THE ROOT OF UNDERSTANDING POLITICS, BUT THESE NEED A DE-EMPHASIS OF THE DESIRABILITY OF THE NAKED OR CRUDE PURSUIT OF POWER, AND A SHIFT TO A MORE STRATEGICAL VIEW OF POWER - ONE THAT ADEQUATES TO THE CHARACTER OF THE REAL WORLD. I EXAMINE THE ELEMENTS OF A MODIFIED REALIST LANGUAGE WITH RESPECT TO ARMS AND INFLUENCE AND HOW IT PROVIDES AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK THAT DECISION-MAKERS CAN WORK WITH.

THERE ARE TWO VARIABLES IN THE ABOVE TITLE, THE UNDERSTANDING OF WHICH IS CRUCIAL TO MY DISCUSSION IN THIS THESIS. THESE VARIABLES ARE: A) ARMS TRANSFERS, B) POLITICAL INFLUENCE. MY IMMEDIATE TASK, THEREFORE, WILL BE TO ANALYSE THESE VARIABLES. TO BE SURE, THE ORDINARY DEFINITIONS OF THESE TERMS MIGHT BE SUGGESTIVE OF THEIR MEANING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. BUT WHEN TAKEN WITHIN THE
theoretical context of international relations, they assume an analytical dimension. But their relevance to my discussion must be understood within a decision-making perspective and therefore have a practical relevance to this empirical study. It should be noted that influence as a concept belongs to the much broader spectrum of power, which in itself is reflected in the Realist School of International Relations. Hence, for a meaningful understanding of the concept of influence, one must discuss the theory of power first.

The Concept of Power

In his 'Discord and Collaboration', Arnold Wolfers defined power as "the ability to move others or to get them to do what one wants them to do and not to do what one does not want them to do."¹ In this definition, Wolfers was only echoing a theme which had been set down previously by some authors, notably Nicholas Spykman. In his book America's Strategy in World Politics, Spykman contends that power consists of the ability to order men to behave in a desired manner through "persuasion, purchase, barter, and coercion."² Contributing to this debate Hans Morgenthau described power as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men."³

Clearly, power can only materialize in a 'cause and effect' situation with the latter being a result of the former. Realist authors perceived constituents of power as including: military force, population size, level of technological development, national resources endowment, geo-strategic location, political leadership and ideology. Therefore, the full meaning of a realist theory of power can be realized through its context of social, political, economic and national elements.

The pre-occupation of the realists with the concept of power, and the context and justification for its employment in international
politics, is based on the forms and forces within the international environment. Due to the absence of adequate institutions at the international level comparable to those in most domestic political systems, conflict is the rule rather than the exception. This is because each state within the international system always seeks to pursue or sometimes to maximise its national interests. But because states exist within a community of states, it happens that national interests are pursued or maximised at the expense of other nations. This does not mean that power is the only relevant variable operating under realism, nor is its maximisation. It is precisely that power has a limiting context that determines not only legitimate but also feasible channels of the exercise of 'power'. States try to widen those channels, lengthen them or open new ones and this is done through the deployment of power-resources in the form of military, diplomatic or economic action.

In the present day it is usually diplomatic and economic rather than military action which is deployed initially, and they are essentially forms of power in-use which work upon existing forms and relations of power. Thus power begats power. Contrary to the critics of realism who charge that realism is the justification of naked power, I want to say that it lends itself to being subtle as well as a blatant instrument of policy implementation and that one identifies the subtle-blatant spectrum by using such names such as force, coercion, rhetoric, persuasion, threats, duty, obligation, ideology, destruction or influence. It is 'realistic' to tailor means to not only ends but to the context within which one is operating. The realist may wield power by the scalpel or the knife, and this according to his perceptions of the relation of context, ends and means. If the realist is a man who exercises power or makes sense of the structure of world power in a strictly 'can I get what I
want now' way - that is on a rather ad-hoc basis, there would probably be a tendency to use whatever instruments of appropriation were at hand - most likely the armed forces. But this approach provides no investment for the future, no foundation of relations. Countries need a working friendship so as to get what they want, when they want it, even if there are reasons why a supplier country is reluctant to give it. It is for this reason that countries must employ subtle uses of power and build up a relationship, not just 'muscle in'.

It is only on this basis that one can 'realistically' achieve a position that satisfies Arnold Wolfer's definition of power as "the ability to move others or to get them to do what one wants to do and not to do what one does not want them to do." I have attempted to provide an account of power that interprets "the ability to move others or to get them to do..." in the context of practical International Relations rather than purely a logical scenario of an analytical concept of 'power'. "Getting others to do" as an outcome, is a result which is desirable so long as the costs do not seem immediately to outweigh the benefits.

The sting in the tail of my version of realism is the demand to be 'realistic' not 'power-mad'! But this does not mean that countries should only react to situations for to suggest this would be to imply that a country has no 'national' interests of its own it would seek to protect.

The concept of national interest is indeed a crucial one in the literature of International Relations though much debated. For my purposes I have to draw a line, if only a heuristic one, between national interests which are common to all states in virtue of their constitution as states, and national interests which are held by particular governments at particular times.
I suggest there are some 'national interests' which no government could give up or abrogate on, whereas there are others such as nationalised industries, the sale of which is regarded as necessary in the national interest by some, and as "selling the family silver" by others. I shall call the former, basic national interests, and these are intuitively-held. Among these are the security of the state, the continuity of the state, the institution of a government, economic development and continuity, and the having of foreign relations.

Hans Morgenthau in his discussion of national interest seems to equate it with power. He writes: 'the acquisition and use of power is the primary national interest of a nation-state.' Rather, I want to give an account of national interest in terms of necessarily - or contingently-held values which a state seeks to protect, reproduce or implement, through the use of multi-various forms of power.

Donald Nuechterlin is more specific than Morgenthau by delineating the forms of national interests as: defence, economic prosperity, world order, and ideology. It is only the last point with which I would have any quarrel. It does not seem to me that many states have a specific set of values covering the 'correct' moral and political values which should be held by all citizens. Even the Soviet Union is more variegated than Nuechterlin's notion demands. In many countries peaceful ideological debate is legitimate and indeed an essential part of a country's democracy and political practice. However, defence, the economy and foreign relations (world-order interest) are pursuits legitimised and expected of all countries by their citizens and this has been so, for most countries for many years. (The isolationist tendencies in the U.S. in the earlier part of the 20th century have not excluded relations with 'back-yard' neighbours.) These constitute the basic national
interests expected and practiced by all states. But there are many 'national interests' which are described as such, but are policies and ideological factors which do not represent the national interest but only sectional interests, but are argued to represent national interest. No one questions that there should be defence, but they do question what forms it takes. This has been highlighted in the defence debates within the Labour Party, and between them and the Conservative Party. It is claimed the nuclear weapons are/are not necessary to defence. This is a legitimate debate, but while there is a claim that to have weapons systems 'X' is necessary to national interest, another side is arguing it is not. In this sense, national interest reduces to sectional debates and ideology. Equally there being foreign relations is not in dispute, but the forms of foreign relations are, and this involves the problem of arms transfers/influence relationship. It is argued by some that weapons sales are essentially immoral and therefore, the benefits they bring to foreign relations normally de-legitimises those benefits. Of course this argument becomes a form of rhetorical power in the hands of oppositional states who do not want, say U.S., to gain a foothold via arms transfers in another country, so they make an issue out of the immorality of arms transfers.

My discussion then, seeks to situate the arms/influence relationship in a framework of national interest. What I want to say is that the arms/influence relationship is often pursued through the rhetoric of national interest and that this relationship is made possible through the operation of various modes of power. Power enables the pursuit of national interest, but it is not identical with it. And national interest is of two sorts: 'necessary' and 'contingent'. The arms/influence relationship is contingent in that the mode of gaining influence - arms transfers - is a much debated
issue and is not recognized as a basic form of national interest.

In my concept of power I am in sympathy with Raymond Aron who pointed out that states do not desire power for its own sake but as a means to achieve some goals such as self-survival or peace or to influence the future of the international system. It is the forms of power and gaining what one wants that are crucial to the discussion, and as I have shown, arms transfers and its relation to influence are modes of power contingently used to gain a power base so as to pursue further aims. Power then, is an enabling factor, but is limited, no so much by direct counter-power such as arms meeting arms, but by contextual challenges such as diplomatic protocol or investments which prohibit the uses of other forms of power that would disrupt a diplomatic relation.

I conceive of arms transfers and influence in two basic ways: from the viewpoint of the supplier of arms transfers and the recipient of them.

For just as in one case arms transfers is supplied by United States and received by Saudi Arabia, so influence is 'supplied' by Saudi Arabia and 'received' by the United States. But arms and influence are inextricably linked by the implication that had arms not been transferred, the supplier of arms transfers would not have received the material realisation of influence, e.g. granting of air base use in arms recipient country. Both arms and influence can be interpreted as goods which each side tries to gain. As goods they are absolute indexes of each country's exchange values, but relationally arms transfers and influence are indexes of the priority of each country's commitment to the other in the face of competing world interests, and requirements to pay attention to factors other than those in the immediate circumstances of the recipient-supplier relationship. So how much influence 'X' can bring to bear on 'Y' is
X's power to get Y to give it things not normally exchanged on open-markets for money.

It has been pointed out by various scholars, but especially Andrew Pierre, that arms sales do not just produce political influence per se, but produce security and economic benefits.\(^8\)

The production of arms is an economic structure which employs workers in a variety of industries, i.e. metals, electronics, explosives, light and heavy engineering, etc. It also brings in significant revenue and as Pierre pointed out, helps to offset increased oil prices in the 1970s. Such economic arrangements squeeze out the effectiveness of arms transfers for procuring influence. The incentive to sell arms will be high enough not to make arms a recipient's demand, the granting of which makes receiving arms a privilege conferred by one state to another. It is the privileges of gaining arms and the recognition (by both states) of the arms transfers as a privilege that makes arms transfers suitable as a lever to obtain influence. Where supply and pressure to create a demand increases, then influence will not be a primary aim or a primary effect; it will be revenue. When several countries compete to sell arms to one country, then, unless a firm relationship of friendship and influence pre-exists between 'X' and 'Y', then 'V', 'W', and 'Z' suppliers are going to compete, maybe successfully, in a now open-market structure for commercial and financial gain. The link between arms and influence is then broken.

It is claimed that another function of arms is to promote another country's security. However, it is difficult to see this in terms other than the supplier's desire to influence either the balance of power in the recipient region, or to create an influence with the recipient government in the form of supporting and securing that regime. One way or the other, this case seems to boil down to
the issue of political influence.

Finally, arms transfers can take place to prevent a loss of influence, but this again must surely be for the purposes of procuring or re-procuring influence, so this case is the same as arms producing influence.

**Definition of Influence**

Power is the main factor in producing a 'realist' account of International Relations. I have shown this is bound up with the determination of what constitutes national interest. National interest is the motive for pursuing foreign relations, and power its means of representation. Power I have implied, is two-fold - power as resources, i.e. potential power, and power as an enablement to act within specific contexts. Power then, is beholden unto the national interest as it is delimited by its specific context upon the determination of policy pursuant of national interest. In other words, I seek a practical and operational definition of power, national interest and foreign relations.

I have said influence is a mode of power - it enables one to pursue national interest, so I must offer a definition of influence as an enabling process. In this sense, influence is not absolute but relational. In the context of International Relations, influence must enable one to bring about a favourable foreign policy situation, the procurement of which is to some extent dependent on another state. To have an adequate meaning, influence must entail more than merely passive acquiescence by an inert state in the granting of another state's demands. If this were the case, influence would not be needed.

Influence has to be demonstrated as an in-use context - its work-ability. Certainly it is a form of power which enables further
exercise of power, but it is exercised through its invocation. However, as an in-use concept it has limits, and those are set by its effectiveness in gaining a national interest-serving advantage from another state.

What then is the mechanism of influence? Let me attempt a definition. Influence is the relational power between at least two states which surrounds an exchange or a gift where that exchange (a gift) would not be made with another state, in preference to the state in the relationship of influence.

Influence then is a granting of privileged access, and a mode of serving exclusive or exclusionary advantages. It excludes other potential exchanges of gift recipients/suppliers.

In 1955 the Soviet Union offered arms to Saudi Arabia which Saudi Arabia rejected partly because of the international relations with the United States. Here influence acted as a power to prevent the offer and enabled in a weak sense, Saudi Arabia to maintain its relation with America, which of course translates into receipts of American arms and aid in the future. Influence was the pertinent factor here - it raises the counter-factual case of: what if Saudi Arabia had accepted, would it still have retained its privileges vis-a-vis arms procurement from the U.S. As with all counter-factual issues, one cannot say, because it did not happen. But the reasons why it did not happen must rely on the evidence at the time, and this seems to indicate that the United States/Saudi Arabia pattern of influence operated against the Soviet arms offer. So I am saying that influence operates as a relationally defined power when one country will act in accordance with the explicit or perceived wishes of its influence-relative partner, to the exclusion of other countries not in an influence relation with it.

Influence is not specific with regard to event/time, mostly it
is not situation specific, but is a longer-term, enabling measure which facilitates specific acts in an ongoing relationship.

In connection with arms transfers, I may say that influence is present where arms transfers as opposed to economic or technical aid transfers brought about advantages to the other state, and arms would not be accepted or bought from outside states. I am still not complete in my definition. Influence needs also to be looked at from the other side - how one brings about a change in another, in a two-person relationship. That is, if there are only America and Saudi Arabia, how would influence operate? Influence not only acts as an exclusionary measure, but also to bring about a change that would not otherwise have happened. If I influence someone, I bring about a set of actions he would not otherwise have done. Michael Taylor has written that influence is:

This is a definition which is cast in causal terms rather than in terms of a backdrop presence which sets a context of understanding. Both notions work on the basis of enabling, but only the latter brings out the factor, crucial to International Relations: that of excluding other states to establish a 'special relationship'. Influence is not to be thought of as purely cost/benefit rational choice for this involves explanations in terms other than the placenta which influence provides.

Influence then provides for:

i) privileged access
(37)

ii) advantages not given to others

iii) long term relations

iv) possibility of bringing about attitude/decision changes

The historical and regenerative aspect of influence can be shown as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{Time of A} & \text{relation of } & \text{Build up of} & \text{Influence} & \text{Action} & \text{Enhances} & \text{B} \\
\text{relation of } & \text{relation of } & \text{because} & \text{influence} & \text{(partly) relation} & \text{of presence (cements it)} \\
\text{‘X’ and ‘Y’} & \text{‘X’ and ‘Y’} & \text{‘X’ and ‘Y’} & \text{of influence} & \text{between ‘X’} & \text{and ‘Y’} \\
\end{array}
\]

Of course it is the historical dimension that M. Taylor ignores, but I hope that my comments can provide a corrective to his coincident view.

Arms Transfers

Arms transfers simply, is the giving (as exchange or gift) of arms to another country. From the suppliers' side this may be for commercial, military, politico-diplomatic or recipient security enhancement reasons. From the recipients' side is to facilitate the prosecution of war, enhancement of suppliers' influences, internal security, enhancement of trading relations. There are probably many other reasons. The recipients may have their own personal reasons for involvement in arms trade, or reasons dependent on the reason of other state, e.g. enhancement of influence which in turn improves the recipients' relations with that state.

The relative conceptual simplicity of arms transfers leaves me to specify what in 'hard' terms, I am talking about when I talk about arms, e.g. conventional, nuclear, and this I do now. Here, I aim to establish the type of arms supply with which this research is concerned. Since both the United States' Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) are the primary sources of aggregate data with regard to our area of concern, I shall adopt their definitions of the type of arms involved in international arms transfers. According to SIPRI, arms transfers involve major weapons systems which include "aircraft, armoured vehicles, missiles and warships." In identifying these major weapons systems, SIPRI specifies the criteria for determining which items are included under each of these four components. According to SIPRI:

ACDA, however, broadens the definition of the arms transfers. According to the American agency:

Notable in the primary categories of conventional weapons systems are defined by both SIPRI and ACDA is that they both include military aircraft, armoured vehicles, missiles and warships. For my purpose I shall concentrate on military aircraft. This choice is, of course, deliberate and for the following reasons:
1. Military aircraft, given Saudi terrain, have better defensive and offensive capabilities (including combat range, ordinance pay-load, and speed capacity) than other types of weapons systems. These enhance the capability of the state to deal effectively with internal and external threats.

2. Advanced military aircraft provide substantial political and military prestige for the air forces of a recipient land act as a deterrence against weaker and parity-armed regional adversaries.

These factors mean that such military aircraft, if chosen carefully so that they are suited to the geographical and environmental conditions of their recipients, can partake in missions against internal enemies such as an army or navy in revolt, while keeping the airforces loyal and against external aggressors who often have similar terrain. 13

Correlation of Arms Transfers and Foreign Policy Influence

It should be recalled that the main assumption of this study is that major arms suppliers provide arms as an instrument of acquiring political influence over the foreign policy behaviour of the recipients. In short, there is a relationship between arms transfers and political influence. As I argued earlier in this chapter, influence occurs when one country, without force of arms can get another country to comply with its wishes despite that country not wanting to do so, for whatever reasons. This may include provision of aid or an interest in maintaining a long-standing relationship. The question that follows is: can arms transfers be used to influence the behaviour of arms recipients? The immediate answer will be 'Yes'. The principal reason is because advanced weapons systems such as F-5s, F-15s and AWACs are highly specialized. Therefore spare
parts and ordinance supplies can only be provided from the initial suppliers and manufacturers. This increases the leverage of the original suppliers on the amount of spare parts to be sold.

Therefore, when one refers to arms transfers and political influence, one is more or less saying arms transfers do provide political influence and are often used as a supplier's foreign policy instrument to induce a recipient to act according to a supplier's interests/preferences. Whatever these interests might be, compliance with a supplier's preferred policy implies compatibility of recipient's behaviour with supplier's interest.

Having explained the relationship between arms transfers and political influence, it should be realised that relations between states are complex. It is even more difficult when one is trying to measure the causal relationship between arms transfers and political influence. This is so because, before a single foreign decision/action is taken, a variety of interests may have to be considered. This is discussed in Chapter Three.

Therefore, although a country may behave in a particular way immediately after taking delivery of an advanced weapon system, it is difficult to determine precisely whether it was the immediate supply of arms that caused the decision or whether the recipient in acting was taking into consideration others factors. Thus, it is possible to believe that the recipient might have behaved in a similar fashion without the transfer of arms. One therefore has a problem of measurement. One possible way of solving the problem is to compare the relationship between the supplier and the recipient before and after the supply of the weapon system. Even that is open to judgement. Another question which could follow this, is whether other means could be used rather than arms transfers, assuming that the direct goal of the supplier is to influence the recipient's
behaviour? For example, the supplier could use other instruments of foreign policy to influence the recipient. Nevertheless, arms transfers are rather pertinent, especially taking into consideration the perpetual conflict in inter-state relations. As suggested by the power theorists, the only defence against obliteration is power - and military power is the inevitable choice, even though other non-military factors have been tried. The preference for military power is that it brings immediate results. Faced with the dilemma of insecurity, arms recipients might yield cooperation with their arms suppliers. However, since open intervention by major powers to pursue security objectives of their allies and friends is politically costly and dangerous, major powers have found it is less risky and costly to enhance the military capability of their allies through the tool of arms transfers. Enhanced stability, especially of a regime threatened either from internal sources or from outside adversaries, might induce allies' co-operation towards major powers' wishes.

Identification of the Problem

Even then there is hardly any evidence to suggest a direct relationship between arms transfers and political influence. Indeed, international relations scholars have never denied the use of arms transfers as a sort of political leverage, but the effectiveness of arms transfers to always produce desirable results is highly contentious. Reviewing the U.S.A. policy of arms transfers and their effectiveness in pursuing foreign policy goals, William Lewis observed that:

While there are few alternative tools of United States foreign policy available... the results of arms transfers can be uncertain, mixed, or at times, outweighed by costs. Lewis' analysis, in fact, underscores the difficulty of measuring the causal relationship between arms transfers and political influence.
Therefore, it is impossible to make a generalisation about this relationship. Each situation cannot be replicated, and in this way must be seen as an isolated event. William Quandt, in his study of America's arms suppliers to Israel, Iran and Turkey, found that:

In essence, arms transfers to Iran, Israel and Turkey by the United States did not stop the recipient countries from pursuing their perceived foreign policy goals during the period studied by Quandt. Another study by Thomas Wheelock on the relationship between Israel and the United States after arms had been transferred, indicated that America enjoyed only limited political leverage on Israel in respect of the latter's behaviour with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Interestingly, both Quandt and Wheelock were looking at an almost similar issue, though they came out with marginally different interpretations. This is a result of the problem of measurement as mentioned above. However, David Pollock's investigation of Israel's attitude during the situation indicated that American leverage over Israel was effective during crises. Nevertheless, because of domestic politics, the U.S. foreign policy-makers are most anxious to avoid arms supplies as a tool of political influence.

Uri Ra'anan, indeed, contended in his study of the arms transfers relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt that:

Ra'anan's study demonstrates the complexity of generalisations when commenting on the causal relationship between arms transfers and political influence. To underscore this point, Roger Pajak, in a
study on the link between Iraq and Syria on one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, discovered that military assistance to Iraq and Syria did not provide the Soviet Union with effective control over the behaviour of the two Arab states, adding that "Despite receiving large amounts of modern weapons and technical support, Iraq and Syria have not hesitated to antagonise Moscow when vital interests of these countries were at risk."\(^{20}\) One must, however, point out the error in Pajak's analysis. Control is not synonymous with influence. Influence is the willingness or rationalised decision of one country to do the bidding of another despite obstacles either through the promise of aid or through shared interest. Influence also presupposes the right of every nation to act freely in deciding its policy, but without the presence of force, taking into consideration the interest of another state. This does not, however, rule out the remote possibility of the use of force. Control on the other hand connotes the use of force or a colonial relationship. This can hardly be suitable in assessing the relationship between the Soviet Union on the one hand and its Iraqi and Syrian allies.

Curiously enough, despite this lack of strong evidence to support the claim that arms transfers to a recipient country gives the supplier a leverage over the recipient, both the United States and the Soviet Union continue to use arms transfers as a key foreign policy instrument to maintain and expand influence in the Third World.\(^{21}\) For example, during the Cold War years, the United States decision-makers considered American security assistance to its Third World allies as a major foreign policy tool for containing communist advancement. In contrast to America's perceived goals and actions, the Soviet Union regarded arms transfers as a means of undermining the U.S.A.'s ideological network by an encircling communism. The recent escalation in the transfer of sophisticated weapons systems
from the United states and the Soviet Union to the Third World underlines the mutual suspicions between the two superpowers and the desire by both powers to maintain their spheres of influence in world politics. Today, arms transfers have become an essential component of international relations, because they are regarded as a principal medium of supplier’s influence on recipient’s policy in order to maintain and enhance interest, and therefore a crucial arena for superpower competition.

Before I conclude this section to make a note about the concepts of supply and demand of arms. In the literature they each have a specific meaning. Lewis Snider has made these points clear by linking supply to influence, and demand to sub-system autonomy. He writes:

The crucial point to note here, is the idea of a clash between the arms of the supplier and those of the recipient. It follows that demand is not a basis for influence, as the ‘demanders’ interests are supposed to lie outside those of the suppliers. However, it is presumed that the supplier does not sell arms out of magnanimity, but he will expect to gain an advantage or influence from the recipient in terms of the recipient giving the supplier an advantage it would not otherwise give, in the absence of arms. The simplicity of these identifications, do not really satisfy the analysis of the thesis. For as I show, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States is not that of two sovereign states exchanging, but of two states who have built over time, a relationship of goodwill, self-interest serving exchanges, and influence. The latter notion can often be shown to overcome any struggle for ‘autonomy’ and
further, the impact of America's determining of Saudi defence needs in the first place, makes the surface simplicity of a struggle for influence on the one side, and a struggle for autonomy, a nonsense. What L. Snider does not make an issue over, are the levels of relative autonomy, Saudi Arabia could gain from the United States, through arms transfers and the play of other factors upon them.

A. Demand Side: Influencing Factors

The foregoing discussion leads me to the main agenda - that is, whether U.S. arms transfers to Saudi Arabia have made Washington more influential in regard to Saudi Arabian foreign policy behaviour? The question which I now ask has been asked by other scholars in international relations: Are arms transfers sufficient to produce influence? Or more directly, have the United States and the Soviet Union always achieved their foreign policy objectives through only arms transfers? The answer to this question cannot be 'yes' or 'no', because the subject is a complex one, especially when I take into consideration the earlier discussion in this thesis. Account will have to be taken of such matters as the expulsion of Soviet military advisers by Egypt in 1972 despite the Soviet's huge military investment in the latter country, or the disgrace the Americans suffered in Iran in 1979 despite their sizeable security assistance to the Shah. All these suggest that arms transfers may have little to do with the ability of the superpowers to have effective influence over arms recipients' foreign policy behaviour.

My contention in this thesis is that arms transfers between two countries take place within a much broader inter-state relationship and I provide a particular case study: that the under researched relationship of Saudi Arabia/United States arms transfers/influence relationship. To isolate only one variable in this relationship (in
this case, arms transfers) as the only instrument of achieving influence is not only to de-emphasise other important factors in the relationship, but is misrepresentation of facts, and this would lead to wrong conclusions. In any case, other factors might be as important as arms transfers in determining whether the arms supplier achieves its objective in the recipient country. This, in fact, is the main contention of this thesis.

Traditionally the arms/influence relationship has been examined largely from the supplier to the recipient but I want to balance this by also examining the problem as it flows from the recipient to the supplier.

I shall now proceed to analyse the other variables which must be taken into consideration in analysing the effectiveness of influence. My main contention is that, whether an arms recipient would always accept influence from another state (in this case the arms supplier) depends on the following interacting variables:

1. Recipient's alternative sources of arms supplies
2. Recipient's conflict/arms race involvement
3. Recipient's evaluation of supplier's interests

1. Recipient's Alternative Sources of Arms Supplies

My argument here is that the extent to which a recipient country is vulnerable to influence by a supplier, will depend on whether it relies solely on one supplier. In a situation of alternatives, the recipient is in a far stronger position to act contrary to the interests of its supplier, whereas if the recipient is dependent on only one supplier, it is liable to be influenced, even against its better judgement.

Having said the above, it is pertinent to analyse the relationship between arms suppliers and their recipients, especially
when advanced weapons systems are involved. It should be noted that most Third World countries (with the exception of Israel, South Africa, India and Brazil) possess no capacity to produce advanced weapons systems. Therefore they rely on technologically advanced countries for these types of weapons. These weapons systems are highly sophisticated, specialised and complicated, and this sophisticated means it is difficult for them to be installed and operated. It is even more difficult to change them. Conversion often requires a long transition during which time the recipient's military capability is impaired. This creates the tendency to want to remain with a single supplier.23

Of course, the recipient countries rely on the supplier countries because the latter are technologically superior. It is for similar reasons that the recipients will have to depend on the original arms suppliers for considerable technical assistance, spare parts and formal training programmes for possible handlers of the weapons systems. This is even more the case with the type of the weapons included in my discussion.

The very specialised nature of these weapons systems might render the already acquired weapons virtually useless during the after conversion. The immense cost of these weapons systems therefore makes any conversion unattractive. This also means that the weapons systems cannot be substituted. In fact, in some cases, there is just no substitute. For example, the Soviet Union. Its counter-insurgency (COIN) aircraft are far less sophisticated then the U.S.A.'s A-4 Skyhawk, and A-37 Dragonfly.24 These 'coin' weaponry and others in similar categories are used in the Third World against popular uprisings and local dissidents. Therefore, the recipients may not find an alternative supplier outside NATO. In any case, these weapons systems are manufactured by few countries, thereby
further reducing the range of supply.

Apart from the need for technical assistance and spare parts already mentioned, financial problems in fact reduce, or even eliminate, the possibility of securing alternative supply sources. This is especially the case when seen against the background of the high cost of these sophisticated weapons. In general, recipients who obtain arms through grants (for example, the U.S. Military Assistance Programme - MAP) are often considered to be more susceptible to suppliers' manipulation than those who purchase through direct sales (for example, the U.S. Foreign Military Sales - FMS). Nevertheless, even when recipients purchase weapons systems outright, suppliers, particularly the United States, retain the right to control the use of weapons. Most of the U.S. arms sale agreements prohibit the resale or the transfer of the weapons systems to a third party and restrict their deployment (location) and use.

In addition, political and ideological relations between recipients and suppliers may also rule out the opportunity of alternative sources of arms supply. For example, countries (like Saudi Arabia) opposed to communism may refrain from turning to Moscow and its allies for major weapons systems. Furthermore, the conservative complexion of these states depend upon American political support against domestic as well as foreign adversaries. Similarly, states in the international community considered to have 'pariah' status such as Israel and South Africa have had their options narrowed for acquiring major weapons systems, except from a recognised and sympathetic ally like the U.S. in the case of Israel.

Faced with these constraints, it is assumed that a recipient prefers to succumb to policy manipulation by the supplier rather than incur the supplier's displeasure, which might possibly lead to future arms transfers being terminated or restricted. Nevertheless, under
some circumstances, arms recipients may take actions contrary to their supplier’s wishes. To illustrate this point one could mention the Egyptian/Soviet experience. In 1972, Egypt not only expelled the Soviet military advisers and technicians and reduced the Soviet diplomatic mission in Cairo, but also shifted from the Soviet Union as a primary supplier to a consortium of Western arms suppliers, particularly the United States, but mainly, after 1978.\textsuperscript{25}

2. Recipient’s conflict/arms race involvement

The willingness of a major power to provide a recipient with weapons systems, either for an external offensive or a counter-insurgency operation, is assumed not only to deter a recipient’s regional adversaries, but also as gestures of political support and commitment to the recipient’s domestic and foreign policies. Therefore, arms transfers have a two-fold purpose of reassuring friends and warning adversaries.

Given these assumptions of suppliers’ political support for recipients, it is expected that the recipient, in return, will co-operate in a way that is preferable to the suppliers’ interests. Israel in this case would be the most susceptible to major power/influence attempts via the arms connection. Would Israel be expected to be vulnerable to American pressure? The reasons are many. First, Israel has been in conflict with its Arab neighbours since its creation in 1948. Second, Israel is not likely to obtain the policy support it needs against its neighbouring states without the political support of Washington, hence arms transfers imply political support. Third, U.S. economic assistance to Israel enables it (Israel) to buy the weapons systems it needs. Finally, since 1967 the U.S. has been the only source of major weapons systems to Israel.

Was Israel affected by American pressure during its conflict
engagement? The answer is that Israel tended to be more co-operative with the United States during crisis situations.\textsuperscript{26} The 1973 October War represents a good example of a crisis situation in Israel's history. Israel in 1973 perceived that its national security was in danger, particularly when Egypt and Syria made successful military advances in the early days of the war. Israel also recognised the fact that the U.S. was, and is still the only power which would and could remove the danger. Faced with the 1973 dilemma, Israel was in a position to modify its policies towards the Arab states and thereby keep with the wishes of the U.S. in return for arms she needed desperately at that time. Nevertheless, Israel's concessions to the Arab states and thereby to U.S. wishes were generally limited.\textsuperscript{27}

It was anticipated that Egypt would be vulnerable to the manipulation of arms transfers because of its active foreign policy in inter-Arab politics (1955-1978). The activism brought Egypt into an ideological Cold War with its Arab neighbours (Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Libya and Saudi Arabia). Egypt's pan-Arab commitment was further demonstrated by its involvement in military operations in the Yemen (1962-1967). Cairo's authority was also challenged by domestic insurgents from the right and the left alike. Finally, one may note that Egypt had been the leading recipient of Soviet arms in the developing world from 1955 to 1973.

The question to be asked now is, whether Egypt was influenced by Soviet arms supplies during its conflict involvement? The answer is that Egypt tended to be influenced by Soviet arms during its conflict involvement. This is represented by Soviet military access in Egypt: "Between 1969 and 1972, the Soviet Union had access to six air bases, several ports, and dry dock and other naval facilities in Alexandria and elsewhere."\textsuperscript{28} Nevertheless, Soviet influence over Egypt's policies was restricted.\textsuperscript{29}
There is an obvious connection between conflict and arms race in the sense that potential conflict or actual conflict will invariably lead to greater demand for arms, and this in turn will throw the recipient into the arms of the supplier. When regional pressures on the potential recipient, expressed as conflict, force the recipient to demand arms, then the dependency on a supplier state will be very great. This is especially so, when, like Saudi Arabia, a country has built up a strong pre-existent relationship with its supplier, thereby contingently restricting its arms market. Influence under such conditions are very likely to be created. Of course, when conflict is present, the influx of arms into a region is likely to be very great, and this will in turn further destabilise that region in that it will, in fits and starts, enhance the power of conflicting states to be aggressors. Equally the distrust of regional states of another state's arms acquisition, is likely to lead them to want arms, or is the mere presence of regional conflict because of the fear of a spillover or there being drawn into the conflict through being called on to be allies.

The most appropriate definition that distinguishes the arms race from other arms acquisition patterns is given by Lewis Snider. He defines an arms race as "an acquisition of arms intended to alter the relative power relationship among competing states." According to this definition, in a conflict situation like the Arab-Israeli dispute, each adversary is looking for suppliers who are willing to furnish weapons systems whose effectiveness is equivalent to whatever their adversaries are receiving, in order to alter the military status quo in its favour or at least to uphold it.

Responding to such demands the supplier provides the recipient with effectiveness weapons systems capable of keeping the military balance even and it is assumed that the recipient may be willing to
allow the supplier some leverage over their foreign policy behaviour. The recipients become dependent on the suppliers for spare parts, maintenance and training, particularly when sophisticated weapons are provided.

Before assessing suppliers' attempts to manipulate the arms supplies within the context of a recipient's arms race, one might introduce Geoffrey Kemp's study of the type and quality of Soviet and American weaponry. Kemp suggested that Soviet aircraft and armour have limited military utility. Popular Soviet fighter aircraft such as MIG-23s and SCUDs surface-to-surface missiles are used for 'defense missions'. Alternatively, U.S. conventional weaponry sold to the Middle East countries such as Israel have often been provided with sufficient military air power such as F-15 and F-16, capable of warding off external threats, 'offensive operations', keeping the political status quo and upholding the regional military balance.\(^{31}\)

Given Kemp's analysis of the superpowers' weapons systems' characteristics Israel was thought to be more vulnerable to the U.S. wishes than the recipients who receive Soviet weapons. Israel, whose arms race with Egypt has been sustained by conflict since 1948, was provided with the most effective U.S. air power system (F-4s, F-15s and F-16s) capable of offsetting any military attempts to change the status quo in the Middle East region.

The question now to be asked is, whether Israel has been affected by American arms supplies during its arms race in the region. Because Israel is sensitive to any improvement of its principal adversary's military capability, she tends to withhold co-operation from the U.S. by making some concessions towards resolving its conflict with its neighbours until additional arms are promised. For example, the Golan Heights Disengagement Agreement of 1974 as well as the Sinai II Disengagement Agreement of 1975 were
accompanied by substantial U.S. military credits to Israel.\textsuperscript{32} This suggests that Israel would not be nearly as responsive to supplier's influence, via arms transfers were it not for the intensity of its arms race in the Middle East regions.

3. Recipient's Evaluation of supplier's Interests

As I have shown the findings generally support the assumption that the use of arms transfers might extract co-operation towards suppliers' wishes from recipients who are involved in the arms race or conflict or dependency on primary source of arms supplies. Nevertheless, arms transfers within the context of these three variables have not produced a clear positive political influence. Therefore, the effectiveness of these three variables to make a positive connection between arms transfers and political influence, is very likely dependent on the introduction of a fourth variable which I shall call 'value orientation' or 'policy priority'. What I mean by 'value orientation' is how much and for what reason recipient's value the interests that suppliers attempt to achieve through the transfer of arms.

Applying recipient's value orientation of supplier's interests, the following major hypothesis, which is to be evaluated in Chapter Five, might read as follows:

The suppliers' ability to influence recipients' behaviour tends to depend on the recipients' evaluation of the interests that suppliers attempt to achieve through arms transfers.

If supplier's interests involve questions of the survival and existence of recipients, e.g. protection from internal and external threats, then recipients might be willing to comply with supplier's wishes, simply because the former places high value on these questions and situations. On the other hand, if recipients do not
feel threatened, or if suppliers attempt to induce recipients to support unpopular policies by the use of arms transfers, then suppliers might be disappointed by the lack of co-operation on the behalf of their recipients. One reason for the lack of co-operation by recipients might be the political cost that recipients may have to pay at home in support of such policies. Finally suppliers might/might not extract co-operation from recipients when the former's interests do not represent either a threat or a political cost for recipients.

Therefore, based on the range of values attributed by recipients to certain suppliers' interests, the utility of arms transfers as an instrument of influencing foreign policy, varies widely. It is also possible that this critical variable orientation of recipients would depend on the previous three variables - conflict involvement, arms race and primary source of arms supplies - to determine the effectiveness of arms suppliers' influence over arms recipients' behaviour. One possible explanation for this assumption is that the two other variables are the cause for arms demand, and thereby can contribute to the linkage of arms to political influence through the 'value orientation' in a positive relationship.

A major assumption underlying this hypothesis of 'value orientation' is that the United States desires to influence Saudi Arabia's foreign policy behaviour, via arms transfers, towards U.S. interests in the Middle East region, i.e. Saudi Arabia co-operates with U.S. wishes. This will be analysed in Chapter Five. By the application of the hypothesis in Chapter Five, I will examine the nature of the structure of influence flowing between U.S. national interests and Saudi Arabia's foreign policy behaviour.

Since the primary purpose of this study is to analyse U.S. attempts to use arms transfers to influence Saudi Arabia's behaviour
towards American interests, there will be no discussion in regard to Saudi Arabia's attempts to influence United States' behaviour (reverse influence) despite the fact that the United States cannot remain unresponsive to Saudi Arabia's political/military wishes. Therefore, one of the spin-offs of this thesis would be to investigate how Saudi Arabia can use its strategic and economic assets to make the United States susceptible to its political wishes.

Looking at the result of factors influencing the demand side, one might conclude that if arms transfers lead to political influence (getting the recipient to do what he would not normally do), the effectiveness of such influence is likely to be dependent on the 'value orientation' variable. But, other variables such as the recipient's conflict engagement, arms race and primary source of arms supply, are important in determining the arms influence relationship. It is ironic, however, that arms transfers as an effective foreign policy influence is dependent on variables that are not amenable to direct manipulation of arms suppliers.

B. Supply Side: Influencing Factors

Foreign policy is not only a matter of Executive decision, but often entails accountability to the legislature and its oversight bodies. Executive-determined 'national interest' is not the only factor at work. A multiplicity of interests ranging from pressure groups to Secretaries of State, Defense and Congress have a voice in the drama of the decision-making, and these are influencing factors. Apart from the roles played by domestic representatives, are the issues of policy continuity, security and strategy as it is effected by foreign oppositional forces, e.g. the U.S.S.R. in relation to the U.S., and the continuity of an established pattern of influence. However, this portrait of a fully operating modern democracy which
debates the issues, weighs up the arguments and applies due process to decision, is one that does not fit reality.

Arms transfers are so lucrative for arms manufacturers, who in the U.S. are usually major corporations, that inevitably those corporations will actively pressurise and squeeze politicians to support arms transfers initiatives. This form of pressure can tend to override the requirement by statute, for arms sales to be accountable in terms of foreign policy. This is not to say that arms sales goes through irrespective of foreign policy considerations, but that domestic factors, sometimes illegitimate ones such as bribery, corrupt the legitimate pursuit of 'national interest' through arms sales. The diffusion of national interests in this way, inveighs against the obviousness of an account of the effects of arms sales as procuring, in my case, oil and strategical and political influence and advantage. Certainly these 'local' factors which are 'below board' can be reduced to the acceptable, normative factor of 'national interest', but the means by which this is achieved, and the particular interest served by these means, indicates the diffraction of arms transfer policy, and a basic incoherence foreign policy may suffer in its passage from initiation to implementation.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE


5. H. Morgenthau, op.cit., p.5.


11. Ibid., p.244.


13. For further analysis of aircraft performance see Lewis Snider, "Arms Transfer and Recipient Cooperation with Supplier Policy References: The Case of the Middle East", International Interactions (1978), Vol.5:2/3, p.264. Here he produces factor scores for selected combat aircraft on two missions - specific performance dimensions - air defence/air superiority, and ground attack/tactical support.


18. Ibid.


24. Ibid.


26. See note no.15.

27. See note no.16.


29. See note no.19.

30. See note no.22.

31. See note no.22.


CHAPTER TWO

UNITED STATES ARMS TRANSFERS POLICIES: INITIATION TO IMPLEMENTATION

Introduction

Above I have argued that the U.S. has attempted to apply a redundant model of the arms transfers relationship. This, I suggested, led to co-ordination problems. What I do in this chapter is concretise our claims by providing a historical outline of the United States/Saudi Arabia arms/influence relationship as it is seen from the American perspective (the supply side) in the pre-1973 era.

Before I do this, there are several factors which have for the most part, been permanent features of the United States/Saudi Arabia arms transfers relationship:

1. Frequent review of Saudi Arabia military needs through the U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM).
2. U.S. oil needs.
3. The competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to have a political, military or economic presence in the Middle East ultimately for strategical purposes.
4. U.S. domestic opposition to arms transfers to Saudi Arabia from pro-Israeli groups outside and within Congress.

The inter-relationship of these factors will be explicated within the narrative.

In the main I deal with the arms transfers policy and process from the supply side, but this cannot exclude its underside - the demand side (Saudi Arabia), though the secretiveness of Saudi Arabia makes the analysis of its policy process difficult.

Michael Klare in his 'American Arms Supermarket' has argued that
the politico-military factors are of primary importance, and insofar as this is true, he claims that "... because many U.S. policy-makers believe in the long-term efficacy of the arms transfer instrument, these factors retain their motivational power, and thus it is important that I examine them closely."¹ I am, of course, not in disagreement with this, for I want to account historically for arms/influence relationship precisely in these terms: the beliefs of U.S. policy-makers and the impetus their beliefs give to making arms sales a major instrument for procuring influence, via the central notions of 'national interests', in recipient countries. The history of arms/influence is as much as history of intertwining of foreign policy-makers beliefs with 'national interests' as it is of the actual sales themselves.

Post-War Affluence: The U.S. Arms Surplus

The Neutrality Act of 1939 lifted prohibition of arms sales and this enabled the exchange of arms for cash. Thus began the role of U.S. as being a major supplier of arms to the world and lifted its ranking as an arms supplier from 4th to 1st. The notion of such value-free arms sales was quickly compromised by the forming of wartime alliances. These were to establish the distribution pattern of arms for the following decades.² The alliances in a post-war era were hardened into formal alliances, under the umbrella of (1) NATO, and (2) UN. However, the post-war aims of universal peace did nothing to create a post-ideological politics, and the swift setting-in the 'Cold War' period constituted a global duality of America and the Soviet Union, and this has been a dominant factor in the forefront or at the back of the minds of U.S. foreign policy-makers since.

Behind formal post-war organisations lay two significant U.S. provisions with regard to arms transfers: 1941 Lend-Lease scheme
which enabled enormous amounts of arms to be transferred to Allied Forces between 1941 and 1945. It may be noted, perhaps prematurely that this scheme was extended to aid Saudi Arabia economically upon their providing air facilities to the United States during World War II. The second programme of importance was the Military Assistance Programme (MAP) whereby stockpiled American arms, now surplus, were given "free" to friendly countries. This programme was enabled under the Mutual Defence Assistance Act (MDAA) legislation passed by Congress in 1949.

Primarily aimed at the defence of NATO and friends of the U.S., the MDAA and MAP also found the basis of a policy to oppose the encroachment of communism in the form of the Soviet Union. While NATO under the dominant influence of U.S. were inevitably drawn into the emergent U.S. policy of containment and deterrence of Soviet aspirations, the U.N. because of the presence of its halls of the Soviet Union and its friends and allies could not be so drawn, though undoubtedly America took a lead in devising the U.N. policy of collective security and the pursuit of nation-building. Through NATO and grants-in-aid, militarily and economically the U.S. has pursued its foreign policy objectives as overshadowed by the threat of 'communism'.

This policy of "containment and deterrence" dating from 1947 became formally known as the "Truman Doctrine" having emerged from the Truman administration years. The expansion of this policy in the 1950s and 1960s led to the extension of military assistance to non-NATO and non-European states especially to the Middle East and the Far East; the latter not least because of the Korean War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1964-75).

The absorption of surplus arms by the mid-1960s heralded a change in arms transfers from these as 'grant' under the MAP to procurement
of revenue under Foreign Military Sales (FMS). A few years later the largesse of the U.S. declined further such that the 1969 "Nixon Doctrine" declared that a country friendly or allied to the U.S. would continue to receive aid under treaty commitments, but would have to depend on its manpower for its defence. Significantly, this underlined the accusation of 'imperialism' thrown at the U.S. by its domestic critics, but paradoxically showed the impact of their criticisms and protest over the Vietnam War, in addition to which, it was anyway a spectacularly unsuccessful war adding, with embarrassment for the U.S. with the fall of Saigon to the communist forces in 1975.

Though maybe shocked and embarrassed into withdrawing or restricting the presence of American troops and manpower in foreign countries, U.S. arms sales increased rapidly, and as Roger Labrie and others have pointed out, in 1966, 59 nations received FMS deliveries, but in 1975 this had risen to 74 nations. In addition, commercial sales (CS) from U.S. countries rose from 51 countries in 1966 to 77 countries in 1974. The easiness of arms procurement from the U.S. to other states, was of concern to Congress and the passing of the 1968 Foreign Military sales Act, required successive administrations to list clearly FMS with foreign policy objectives. With this went the extension of Congressional oversight, though this was circumvented by Nixon's instruction in 1972, to satisfy virtually all Iranian requests for conventional arms and Ford's 1976 instrument to do the same for Israel. The failure of oversight and the continuing rise of FMS suggested that FMS were largely in the hands of presidents and their administrations, and that the 'imperial' president, despite reverses in active foreign intervention, was Emperor at home.

Despite the apparent power of Congressional committees, foreign policy was largely as it had always been, located in the White House,
and the bureaucracy. Only when the Office of the President had been disgraced and weakened by the scandal of Watergate, and the ‘Lockheed scandal’ had had full effect, did Congress produce effective review measure for FMS.

The apparent split of Congress and Executive to the diminution of the role of Congress in the development and policy process of FMS, is a question of the locus of decision-making with regard to arms transfers.

Largely having reviewed arms sales to other countries from the supply side, this thesis has rested on the assumption of a homogenous and relatively passive recipient. I shall show that with the changing balances of regional power, the model became less applicable by which presidents could assess the link between foreign policy, national interest and regular pattern of influence. However, for the purposes of this chapter, I show recipient’s behaviours did indeed make their responses to arms transfer one of an epiphenomena to an initial causal agent. In this way, the who, what, when, how and why of selling arms was very much in the hands of the supplier, and I require an internal examination of American perceptions of the structure of arms transfers to best account for them in the pre-1973 period.

Arms Transfers: Motives and Processes

In a politically and morally differentiated governance such as the United States, invariably debates and struggles ensue which have the effect of constraining or enabling the passage of a decision via ‘due process’. The structural features of this process are primarily articulations of the formal roles of the Congress and executive. But the politics of the passage from policy initiation to implementation is a different story. This turns on the roles of interests,
ideological pre-dispositions and existent policy arrangements.

Prior even to this is the question of the genesis of a policy initiative itself - the motives - I discuss these first. They are constant in character in that they are as Michael Klare puts it "always present, no matter who occupies the White House". In other words, this is a matter of the factors underlying all policy-making in the U.S. or come to that, most countries. Arms transfers then, are not just accountable in terms of arbitrary executive-defined interests, but should be seen in terms of being a permanent empirical feature of a nation's foreign policy. This goes to the core of national political consciousness, and the idea of, an implicitly legitimated set of actions or purposes, the presence of which in themselves are politically indisputable.

The question for political actors, is not whether the motives behind arms transfers should or should not be there, for to abolish them or to argue against them is to remove a central plank of the rightful practice of government. No, the issue is to what extent they should be pursued, and how, and the implications of, and motives behind, these motives, and whether these are legitimate. The latter in particular entails the operation of a review procedure. But what are the 'proper' motives? At this juncture the motives behind particular arms sales are not in question, what I seek is to identify the general motives behind most major arms sales.

It is common to divide motives into three types: political, military and economic. The location of these motives is within the executive and as M. Klare rightly points out, the executive-bureaucratic monopoly on arms transfer policy has acted as a bulwark against oppositional sectors vis-a-vis particular arms sales. The motives to make arms sales are regarded by its progenitors as essentially non-negotiable.
The political level of common agreements as to the rightful motives for arms transfers are: the support of U.S. friends and allies, the procurement of anti-communist commitment from those allies both voluntary and coerced, the political alignment of other states with the U.S. and the deterrence to regional border states not aligned with the U.S., the attainment of base rights, overseas facilities to support the deployment and operations of U.S. forces and intelligence systems, the indirect political benefits brought to a particular administration through the effective use of revenues from arms sales, the political enhancement of U.S. in regard to its standing due to increased economic strength through arms sales revenues, the ability of the U.S. to directly or indirectly influence the government of a country through its dependence on U.S. for arms which enhances its internal and external security. Finally, the promotion of regional stability whereby arms sales or withholding of arms acts as an incentive to bring warring countries to heel or get opposed countries to reconcile differences. However, that does not mean that political effects are always in the control of the suppliers' decision to sell or not to sell for political purposes. This control measure is tempered by the fear that not selling arms to the state, may lose a taken-for-granted pattern of influence, and instead produce a negative reaction by the now non-recipient who will then search for a new supplier. Thereby, the original supplier may lose the wider pattern of influence had had nurtured, and which he thought he controlled.

In a variety of statements emanating from the White House and the various executive branches of the U.S. government, many or most of the points in the above list have been endorsed as contributions to U.S. national interests. Which points or 'motives' have a higher priority than others is difficult to determine because of
different perceptions of different administrations and perhaps more importantly the priorities given to certain motives in certain situations. The latter are often part of the rhetoric in speeches, and designed to allude to, persuade, coerce, satisfy, promise or threaten the audience to whom the speech is addressed. But what really are the priorities in terms of the logic of foreign policy can for the most part only be inferred or guessed at.

Politico-Military Motives

It is often not clear how to separate the political from the military motives for an arms transfer. Where in my discrimination of the political motives, military motives are secondary. It may be that when concentrating on military motives, the same political motives originally primary, will now be secondary. Again, this depends on the purposes and reasons for prioritising one type of motive over another, according to specific situations. In other words, the constant presence of such motives, is no indication of their ordering in active foreign policy.

However, the military motives which can be discriminated are as follows.

Without doubt, an obvious role of arms transfers is to have a measure of military support from a regime in the event of war or regional conflict. I noted earlier, the deliberate programme of withdrawal of U.S. manpower from other countries as stated in "Nixon Doctrine" so that American military aid should as time passes tend to be evaluated in terms of U.S. military hardware sales, in particular, sales of offensive weapons.

The moral and political dilemma of "imperialism" through the presence of U.S. troops is partially alleviated through this transfer
of emphasis from the presence of troops plus arms, to just the sale of arms. This at the same time not only signifies a kind of alliance between one state and the U.S., to other states, but also directly between the recipient and the supplier. Such an implied alliance is the basis on which the willingness by a state to act in the strategical interests of the U.S., stands. The substitution of arms for troops is a point made by Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, James Buckley, when in 1981 he testified to the Sub-committee on International Security. He said of the substitution that it permitted "them [recipients] in some cases to undertake responsibilities which otherwise we ourselves might have to assume."\(^{14}\)

Arms transfers to friendly regimes to complement or alternate the provision of U.S. troops is then used to share the burden of U.S. military responsibilities with other friendly regimes. The fundamental point of this burden-sharing is the bolstering up of a regime friendly to the U.S. Like many of the motives, it can be interpreted in the light of the superpower competition between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. The military aspect of this is strategical insofar as a U.S. friendly regime will tend to be opposed to the U.S.S.R. and not only rebuff their offers of various kinds of aid, but will resist Soviet regional threats. The resulting failure of a Soviet Union 'ally' to intimidate or coerce a U.S. ally will rebound politically and militarily upon the image or idea of a Soviet regional threat, and will therefore tend militarily to have a pro-U.S. stability effect in a region. Where there is a perceived, indirect Soviet threat, it is likely that countries having these perceptions will not be receptive to U.S. advances. When Soviet regional presence is strong, countries in that region which are not threatened by a Soviet backed regime, and are neutral, may well prefer to stay neutral in the face of U.S. offers, lest they draw
Soviet attention to themselves by an implied alliance, having accepted a U.S. arms transfer. The potential U.S. influence will be lost. The U.S. must strongly back a regime in which it has a foothold, to take another step.

These points are in the main strategical, but there is another military motive which is limited to military resources. Arms transfers-created alliances will tend to lead to intelligence sharing both with regard to regional issues and Soviet influence. Not only may the U.S. be allowed to maintain intelligence-gathering facilities manned by its own personnel, but the regime may share with the U.S., intelligence gathered by its own, often U.S. supplied monitoring equipment, manned by its nationals.

Economic Motives

I have seen the bonding between the military and political motives. The economic motives are, I suggest, relatively autonomous of the politico-military linkage.

Arms transfers are intrinsically economic. They are all sales. I noted the shift in the mid-1960s from free arms transfers (MAP) which absorbed World War II surplus stock, to arms sales (FMS). Arms transfers are now a certain form of procuring revenue for their producers, and through taxes, the U.S. In regard of the latter point, some may want to argue that large corporations in the U.S. spend a lot of effort reducing their tax burden such that some highly profitable corporations pay negligible taxes.

Arms are expensive to produce, and due to high demand and the political and military cachet of getting more and better, arms are expensive to buy. This does not mean that production is low. Indeed arms manufacturers produce a formidable arsenal and spend large amounts of money on research and development (R & D) in anticipation
of domestic government contracts. Should there be a fall in the Pentagon's expenditure, arms manufacturers will often be left with surplus arms, which due to their high production costs, must be sold to get back their costs. An unsold weapons system is not like an unsold banana, one unsold weapons package may ruin a company which has not sold many arms anyway. Due to this phenomenon of occasional surplus, market-clearing becomes necessary and this entails selling to foreign markets. In this way, firms can recoup potential losses before they occur. In such cases, the Defence Department is obliged to support foreign transactions lest they create uncertainty, distrust and suspicion in the domestic arms industry. In turn, the collapse of an arms manufacturer would create political costs for an election-conscious administration in terms of unemployed people; though this, in terms of numbers would be relatively insignificant. Equally, the costs of developing arms can be shared between foreign and domestic buyers, thus lowering the costs of purchase to the U.S. So again FMS has an economic kick-back accruing to the U.S.

One somewhat obscure point, but one which the likes of C. Wright Mills would make. The support given to the Republican presidents and to a lesser extent GOP (the Republican party) by the "military-industrial" complex is, in high cost elections, crucial to Republican candidates, and a lack of support for arms manufacturers is likely to reduce their financial support.

Having dealt with the supply side, which is the main purpose of this chapter, I turn briefly to the demand side.

The demand for arms is necessary for non-arms manufacturing countries to provide or enhance their domestic and external security needs. This may extend to the acquisition of arms to demonstrate a regime's political strength internally and to the world at large, and their capacity to prosecute wars. In other words, a demand for arms
may not only be a response to threats and immediate security issues.

Again, I have broadly, two identifiable clusters motives - politico-military, and economic. The politico-military motives, which dominate, are those I have mentioned. The economic motives are not so obvious. But in countries where development as a whole is low, the need to maintain and operate arms entails learning 'industrial' skills which can be put to good use for the economy as a whole. Various countries have used the army as a vanguard of economic development.

However, insofar as recipient's economic concerns affect their ability to gain arms, it is internal economic ability or possessions such as oil that generate sufficient revenue to increase the demand for arms. This is especially so when the price of a natural resource in a recipient country rises, such as the price of oil did in the 1970s, that causes a correspondent increase in the demand for arms. Where recipient regimes have military governments, (and many do) arms acquisition is a priority not only by a virtue of the priorities in the military mind, but to ensure support of the armed forces to an encumbent military government. To enhance the arms of the military is to buy the support of the armed forces. President Aquino is discovering this at present.

Institutional Perspective of an Arms Transfer in the U.S.

Before I pick up the main purpose of this section, let me draw a distinction between institutional and historical explanation. Let me call an institutional explanation one which elucidates the due process of a policy or decision as it passes from initiation to implementation through the formal structure of government. Further let me divide this into several broad movements: (1) Formulation, (2) Presentation, (3) Review, (4) Approval, (5) Final Approval, (6)
Enactment. In other words, institutional explanation is an examination of how a decision ought to be made in terms of the processing of a policy through legitimate and constitutional instruments of the decision-making process. Historical analysis is an account of how particular decisions are actually made irrespective of whether they have passed through the legitimate or constitutionally appropriate channels. 'Real' decisions may involve bribery, lobbying, influence - all instruments (depending on how they are used) which are strictly speaking not properly part of the 'due process' of implementation.

The recent "Iran-gate" scandal has shown how certain appointees in the executive branch have attempted to by-pass existing roles and regulations controlling the flow of arms and alliances between the U.S. and named states. These rules are rules restricting arms sales and have the force of law, and thus should be obeyed in regard to any future decision. Various Acts or rules having a bearing on arms transfers have been in force since arms transfers became recognised as a major form of trade with political as well as economic significance. As I am dealing with the relationship between two countries which has only properly existed on a government to government basis since the 1940s, I shall mainly consider arms transfer regulations and laws as they pertain to that period.

The predominance of the Military Assistance Programme (MAP) over Foreign Military Sales (FMS) prior to the mid-1960s meant that rules regulating arms transfer were mainly a question of who was eligible to receive and eligibility conditions of receiving arms rather than the conditions in terms of 'due process' and finance, under which arms transfers could be made. There have been numerous acts which have affected arms transfers, but I shall pick on the most salient.

The "founding" legislation was the 1951 and 1954 Mutual Security
Acts. Within the confines of the "Cold War" division of the world in anti-communist/communist, these acts provided for bilateral mutual defence assistance. The 1951 Act placed on the Secretary of Defense responsibility for supervising the uses to which military aid was put. However, the dissatisfaction of Congress with the Act as it was presented, led it to determine certain conditions which the recipient had to accept. They were rather high-minded, such as promoting international understanding and pursuing world peace, mutual action with the U.S. to eliminate cause of international tension, fulfil requirements of existing agreements with the U.S., contribute as far as is compatible with its development, to its own security, and use the arms grant properly.\textsuperscript{18}

Aid to Iran in 1952 was stopped because Iran refused to meet those conditions.\textsuperscript{19} A supporting Act of 1951, the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (Battle Act) added a rider that countries threatening U.S. security including the U.S.S.R., and countries under its domination, could not receive strategic material. This, however, still allowed the president, after careful review, to continue aid to countries which aided socialist countries. The 1954 Mutual Security Act further empowered the president to waiver the above controls.\textsuperscript{20}

These early acts after the 1951 Act were enabling rather than controlling in the sense that they permitted the president to override the vague, yet in their vagueness, demanding requirements of the 1951 Act. Instead of furthering the idea of Congressional review these acts maintained that arms transfer policy was to be primarily in the hands of the Executive in general, and the president in particular. Another means of controlling arms transfers, in particular to the Middle and Near East, was the provision of the 1950 'Tripartite Declaration' regarding the security in the Near East which insisted that recipients of arms should "play their part in the
defense of the area as a whole;\textsuperscript{21} an example of this was the 1955 Baghdad Pact.

The 1954 Mutual Security Act was effective for commercial arms sales until 1976 when it was superseded by the International Security Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976. However, FMS were made subject to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act which regulated FMS as well as grant aid arms. This itself was superseded by the 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act which incorporated most of the provision of the 1961 Act. The remaining provisions of the 1961 Act continued to be effective on military grant and over and above FMS.\textsuperscript{22}

The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) cut down the provisions of the 1951 Act and its successors. As applied to military grant aid it restricted the cost of defence article to $3 million in any one year. But it also specified that apart from a recipient affirming the principles in the U.N. Charter, a country would use the resulting arms for its own defence and that "of the free world". It reaffirmed that a country maintained its own defence correspondent with its social and economic capacity and that the increased defence capability of a country is important to the U.S.\textsuperscript{23} Still the president was given much leeway, and the determination of recipient conditions was in terms of U.S. security. Amendments to this in the 1962 Foreign Assistance Act stated that aid should be cut off if any of the clauses were violated and that countries clearly able to defend themselves should become ineligible.\textsuperscript{24} In 1967 an amendment was added to the Foreign Assistance Act requiring that economic aid be cut off to any underdeveloped country (except forward defence countries) buying sophisticated weapons it does not need and cannot afford. This amendment was incorporated into the 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act including credit sales.\textsuperscript{25} This implied a considerable limit on the Executive decisions to sell arms. Third
World nations aspired to possess sophisticated weapons, and those with military government were especially prone to this desire. Required to refuse aid to countries which overstepped themselves by their military demands was potentially an embarrassment for the US Executive, and a tying down of its control of a major component of foreign relations. However, the 'Executive-legislative Consultation' on U.S. arms sale document of 1982 judged that "it has only been since the rapid growth of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cash and credit program in the early 1970s that Congress has focused intensive attention on this subject."26

The passing of the decade brought increased demand for congressional oversight. As the 1982 document puts it "the executive branch increasingly sought to use arms sales as an instrument in support of American foreign policy goals."27 This taken with the 1973 Arab oil embargo led to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act which most notably established Congress' right of review and veto over major defence sales.

The above lands me just over the border of the pre-1973 period I am to discuss. It offers an outline of the major acts and regulations which were enabling or restricting measures on arms sales. With these in mind I now turn to the formal structure of the policy process.

Formal Structure of Arms Transfer - Pre-1973

The formal process of an arms transfer has held fairly constant since the 1950s through to the early 1970s. This constancy is based on a comparative absence of extensive oversight, and the granting of the president the power to decide who gets what, where, when and how. The latter point, 'how' is one that sits uneasily between the possibility of presidential by-pass of rules and regulations and the
formal legislation process.

One cannot emphasize enough the centrality of the role of the Department of Defense (DoD), though other areas of government were involved, as I have implied or stated in several places in the pre-1973 period. The formal structure of arms transfer was firmly in the hands of the Executive rather than the legislative branches of government. However, before I go further I must reiterate the distinction to be drawn between Military Grant Aid and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). FMS were largely features of the post-1973 period, but sufficiently significant to mention their implementation structure in the pre-1973 period.

Arms transfers start with a request for information on U.S. arms by a potential recipient, though this is often preceded by a U.S. review of a country's defence needs. In the grant aid years the process was much determined by the DoD which pooled together the information of a recipient country's needs which had been investigated by annual report of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). The DoD then worked out estimates of the size of the grant based on the MAAG submission. The required amount would then be sent to Congress who would have to approve the appropriation. In response to criticism of the way decisions were actually being made by the DoD, a Director of Military Assistance was appointed in 1960 with the task of overseeing the administration of all military aid.\(^{28}\)

The President was in final command of grant aid and the organisation of foreign military assistance period. He could re-organise the structure and order of responsibilities for the execution of an arms transfer.

The co-ordination of administration with assessment of defence needs, strategical implications and defence policy came from the DoD or as the 1951 Mutual Security Act put it: "The Secretary of Defense
shall establish priorities in the procurement delivery, and allocation of military equipment..."29

Other than this two major bodies administering arms transfers were: (1) Agency for International Development (AID), (2) The Department of State (DoS). The former was responsible for the coordination of military and economic aid but the latter formulated military aid policy in relation to economic and political aspects of foreign policy whereas the DoD was supposed to be solely concerned with the military aspect of a transfer. The 1959 Draper Committee expressed disquiet at the inadequate understanding by the departments of their different roles. It was, of course, the president's role to implement reforms in the departments and allocate the roles with more precision. The role of the DoS was supervisory in the main, since the particular military knowledge which decided the nature and size of the aid was in the hands of the Pentagon. This, of course, gave them leverage over their formal superior, the DoS. It has been pointed out by Trevor Taylor (1972) that Eisenhower and Kennedy believed the "State Department should have final legal authority over military aid". 30 This was reinforced by Eisenhower's establishment of an Inspector General to oversee wasted expenditures and supervise aid procedures.

The main role of Congress was the formal appropriation of funds, this gave them control over the purse-strings in line with their role as protector of the proper use of taxes. But to suggest that this constituted 'a determining role' over policy as T. Taylor does is to ignore the point that really, the restriction of appropriation only sets limits on the size of grant and does not shape policy in any specified way other than expenditure.

It was widely agreed one of the central bodies in arms sales policy was the International Logistics Negotiations (ILN) unit
located in the Pentagon. Established in 1961 under the auspices of the International Security Affairs section it primarily had a role to assess the economic aspects of arms sales.

It both encouraged the U.S. arms manufacturers to seek foreign markets and stimulated foreign countries to purchase U.S. weapons. This had the effect of bringing in considerable revenue which would cover the costs of U.S. military spending. Again the location of arms transfer control question arose - as to whether it was the responsibility of the DoD or the DoS. The ILN gave the DoD a powerful voice but the office of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) in the DoS set up in 1961 acquired a military knowledge so as to provide a firmer base from which to supervise the work of the ILN.

The role of the President in FMS was much the same as for grant aid - delegating responsibilities. The actual decision-making is of course at the ultimate behest of one man - the President - though he is subject to the advice of the various state Departments, National Security Council (NSC) and anyone else he feels like taking note of.

The struggle between the DoS and the Pentagon was not just a struggle for administrative control, but also for policy and decision-making control, and this was often a reflection of the Secretaries of the Departments as they saw fit.

The United States/Saudi Arabia Relationship - An Historical Perspective on Influence Pre-1973

It is common place to assume that the basis of the United States/Saudi Arabia relationship is the exchange of arms for oil. This is not as it stands wrong. But it does need considerable refining.

The promotion of arms transfer pre-1973 has a lot to do with U.S. arms policy determinants, not least the rules and regulations standing over arms transfers. These set out considerations the U.S.
had to take in giving military grant aid or making sales. The Cold War period and the recently formed U.N. made the international ramifications of arms transfers a major policy criterion. Within these limits the politics of arms and the ever-present uncertainties both moral, and strategical in regard to the Israeli problem, made the issue of arms a focus of domestic as well as foreign interest. But in a post-war world where the United States and the Soviet Union, and most other countries were seeking some form of alliance so as to lay down lines of influence or of aid, the demand-push enhanced by the formation of regional alliances drew together the ‘Superpowers’ and aid seeking countries, especially Third World countries. The domestic political costs tended to be offset by the need to articulate a U.S. foreign policy which would not be blocked by the Soviet Union. The weakness of oversight and the permissions given to the president and the executive branches of government settled few restrictions on foreign-policy decisions. Any restrictions as I have shown were largely provoked by inefficiency, inter-departmental competition to control policy, or indirect security threats to the U.S. recipients selling their military grants to states not-friendly to the U.S. One further form of restriction, if it could be called that, was the encouragement of recipients to agree to the ideals of democracy and the U.N. Charter.

Insofar as I want to evaluate the nature of influence between United States and Saudi Arabia one needs to reiterate this in terms of the interplay of its two forms: (1) the historical structuring of influence so that U.S. can achieve desired foreign policy aims in another state with the acquiescence of that state, and that, that relationship can help to bring about particular ends with which in the absence of the historical relationship, that other state would probably not co-operate or comply; (2) the immediate use of influence
which gets another state to do something it would not otherwise do;
(3) behind the emergence of a pattern of influence are the processes of the decisions which supplement the construction of influence.

I examine these three factors from the point of view of the supplier's intentions.

Obviously a relationship has to start somewhere such that a common domain of interests is discovered and for the United States/Saudi Arabia relationship, this occurred in the 1930s.

In 1933, Ibn Sa'ud, the King of Saudi Arabia, granted an oil exploration concession of 66 years to Standard Oil of California (SOCAL). A subsidiary company, California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASCO), ran the operation and by 1938 oil was flowing. In 1939 the oil was exported and by 1942 Saudi oil output reached 15,000 barrels per day, this amounting to about 5% of Middle East oil production. 82% of oil came from Iraq and Iran, but Saudi oil fields were more important since they were considerably located farther south and thus became less vulnerable than those in Iraq and Iran to be subjected to German offensive through Turkey. Further, Saudi Arabia was capable of much greater output should it be needed. However, particular concern from CASCO officials was raised by the 1940 Italian air-raid on Saudi oil installations from the Axis air base at Eritrea and contributed to decline in oil output. CASCO requested the presence of U.S. troops and anti-aircraft guns. This proposal had considerable official support from the U.S. charge d'affairs in Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Secretary of State.

This was one of the first manifestations of 'imperial' encroachments, the King had worried about. In granting the 1933 oil concession, Ibn Sa'ud had believed that a concession to a private American company would not be used by the U.S. government to obtain a political toehold in the Kingdom in the manner of European imperial
powers. That Ibn Sa'ud was less suspicious about U.S. intentions than Britain's, led Britain to support CASCO's request. Also Britain thought that the U.S. would help negotiate the plugging of the oil fields in the face of a German advance into the Middle East. Daniel Silverfarb makes the important point, that in 1942 "the British government wanted U.S. troops around the oil fields badly enough to accept the probable increase in American influence in Saudi Arabia which would result from this deployment." Britain had sent in officers to plan an oil denial scheme, as had the U.S., but it was the U.S. who, through their oil experts, got CASCO to plug 22 of its wells, leaving 6 in production. These were sufficient to satisfy the allied oil needs.

Despite the conflicting maneuvers between Britain and the U.S. in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia had not declared war on the Axis powers though invited by Britain to do so in 1942. It is not clear why Ibn Sa'ud would not do so, but it has been speculated that Ibn Sa'ud was not certain of the outcome of the war and also he feared that his declaration would lead to allied troops in Saudi Arabia. At this stage, British and U.S. interference in Saudi Arabia was covert and the King remained largely unaware of the maneuvers.

What Silverfarb fails to mention in his article is the extent of Saudi Arabia's financial difficulties. Due to the war Saudi Arabia's main source of revenue gained from the Hajj Pilgrimage to Mecca had been severely reduced. CASCO had lent Saudi Arabia $6.8 million up to 1939, but naturally did not want to be burdened with the underwriting of the Saudi treasury. They turned to the U.S. government. In 1941 CASCO through James Moffett, a friend of Roosevelt, requested a loan of $6 million for five years to Saudi Arabia against a discount on oil products but at the urging of the Navy Secretary, the loan scheme was turned down. The Navy had
submitted that the oil could not be used for U.S. ships. However, by 1943 the influence of the State Department and CASCO officials prevailed. They had underlined the strategic importance of oil to the U.S., who at this time was fully engaged in the war. For this reason, and that of Washington's concern over Britain seeking influence in Saudi Arabia to the detriment of U.S. led to an offer in 1943 of Saudi inclusion in the Lend-Lease Scheme.

Finally, the U.S. had come to the realisation that oil was a crucial resource, not only this but also the competition with Britain had pushed the U.S. into furthering its interests in Saudi Arabia. What is not clear is whether the U.S. wished to entertain any post-war designs in Saudi Arabia.

Apart from oil interests, the U.S. was granted permission by Ibn Sa'ud in 1942 to overfly Saudi Arabia, which carried no reciprocal arrangements, and in that sense was not clearly an affirmation of a basis of any relationship. But for war purposes it served to maintain lines of communication, and the flow of war materials to the Soviet Union, and thus was another reason to incorporate Saudi Arabia in the Lend-Lease scheme.

Under the recommendation of Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, President Roosevelt made the necessary finding that the defence of Saudi Arabia was vital to the U.S. This done, arrangements to formalize the lend-lease scheme to Saudi Arabia were initiated in the same year.

It was this that provided the basis on which the first arms transfers from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia could take place. However, Saudi Arabia's initial requests for arms were planned to be implemented by using Britain as the conduit of supply. Once again, the conflict of interests between Britain and the U.S. over their respective relations in Saudi Arabia, surfaced. Upon this Britain
backed off gracefully, and it was made understood that direct arms transfers between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were to be effected.

Under the lend-lease programme, the Saudi government in 1943, requested arms assistance consisting of rifles, ammunition, tanks, anti-aircraft guns as well as advisers to instruct Saudis in the use of the equipment. This was the first direct military connection between the Saudi Arabia and the United States. However, the U.S. responded by providing only token military supplies, which in type and quantity were just sufficient to maintain law and order. Included were rifles, machine guns, ammunitions and a small American military mission. This now satisfied Saudi Arabia's desire to better protect herself internally, but it did not boost the confidence of the oil company in regards of protection of its essential interests.

Despite the paucity of this military assistance, it marked the beginning of a long-term direct association between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in the field of military/oil cooperation.

Despite Middle East oil contributing to the recovery of Europe, it played a relatively small role in supplying the U.S. with energy requirements. For instance, the U.S. in 1948 was importing about half a million barrels per day of foreign crude - about 8% of its total domestic production. However, it was the fear of Soviet advances in the Middle East, characterized as an aspect of the 'Cold War', taken in conjunction with the creation of state of Israel (1948) were major determinants of the background to the fortunes of United States/Saudi Arabia relations. These two areas manifested themselves as problems of mutual security and as domestic political accountability to a significant Jewish electorate. As President Harry Truman was reported to have said to State Department Counsel: "I'm sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands, who
are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents".46

Despite this, in 1949 the American Legation in Jiddah became an embassy. This was a sign not of retrenchment in the face of Saudi annoyance at U.S. recognition of Israel, but of an expansion of United States/Saudi Arabia relations.

Back in 1943 Secretary of State Cordell Hull had spoken of providing the U.S. with 'extensive air facilities'47 but these did not show any sign of appearing until 1945 when an agreement was reached between the United States and Saudi Arabia to construct an air base at Dhahran.48 This airfield had little interest for the U.S. after the war, until 1949. With the advent of the Cold War and the Soviet threat to the area, it regained its strategic importance. In June of that year a second agreement was concluded which gave the U.S. access to the airfield.49 At the same time an American military survey team began an assessment of Saudi military needs.

In 1951 the Mutual Defense Assistance and Dhahran airbase agreement provided for an exchange of arms and military training for the continued use of the base.50 But this was not as direct as it may seem. U.S. priorities of oil and the policy of keeping the regime in power mediated the exchange. The Mutual Security Act (MSA) of 1951 demanded that arms recipients should pursue moves toward democratic ideas was forced to take a back seat in the face of military and economic considerations.

When the Dhahran airbase agreement came up for renewal in 1956 the negotiations included a Saudi demand for $300 million in military grants. Most interestingly the inclusion to the request for tanks and F-86 Sabre jets.51

The transfer of tanks to Saudi Arabia had been agreed, but due to the rising tensions between Arab states and Israel which obliged
Saudi Arabia to partake in an Arab 'defensive alliance' the sale met with a backlash from Israeli-American protest. The day before the shipment was due to leave (February 16, 1956) it was temporarily suspended so as to give the executive, namely the Under-Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, a chance to lobby key senators. Though not wanting to face the criticism of the pro-Israeli lobby, Senate allowed the deal to go through, and the M-41 light tanks were sent to Saudi Arabia. The irony was that most of this small scale arms package was obsolete anyway. It was in mid-1956 that protest would have had more success. Then the U.S. agreed to a sale of M-47 'Patton' medium tanks and F-86 'Sabre' jet fighters.

There could be some puzzlement as to why the U.S. supplied the tanks. Perhaps the most fundamental reasons, other than an obligation under the 1951 treaty with Saudi Arabia to supply military equipment, was (a) that it might make the Dhahran airbase renewal easier and (b) that Saudi Arabia had needs of them for training and internal security. Both these reasons were linked to U.S. policy priorities in regard of Saudi Arabia namely, the crucial military importance of Dhahran airbase to U.S. interests in the Middle east, the (stated) policy of protecting or rather promoting countries to protect themselves internally and their oil, and in particular encouraging the continuity of the Saudi pro-Western regime. Given the rise of nationalism in the region, that continuity was not a certainty and therefore, making the regime secure created a certain influence over the future of Saudi stability. The implication is of course, that protection of Saudi interests was the protection of U.S. interests: oil, military and influence.

The incident of the tanks demonstrated a certain incoherence, indeed administrative disparities in the executive, but in the long term, more significant was the concern of the public and Congress
generated by it. This latter point proved to be the axis on which opposition to particular arms sales would line up. But these forms of pressure were combatted by the articulation of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' in 1957 which made issue of the 'communist' spectre. It was this that asserted the primacy of the executive in the control and determination of foreign military policy priorities.

Despite the relative absence of Congressional oversight of the arms transfers process and attempts to secure a distinct congressional role, both the tanks and the Dale Smith episode demonstrated the sensitivities of the executive to domestic criticism. It also betrayed the inter-departmental uncertainties over who did what in effecting a transfer. This, and the consequent Draper Committee report tended to place arms transfer on the political agenda of a rather wider group of interested parties than the executive would perhaps have liked. It could also mean that the granting of arms requests would in future be more circumspect, which in turn would potentially limit the willingness of the U.S. government to readily accede to requests. But not to show willing to recipients requests would tend to be taken as a sign of reluctance in the face of friendship and commitment. Thus, there was a political tight rope to be walked by successive U.S. governments who for a plethora of reasons needed to affirm their commitment to Saudi Arabia. I have said that U.S. priorities in selling arms were oil, security of the Saudi regime, and access to strategical bases in a region susceptible to Soviet pressure.

Over and above the military reasons for Saudi vulnerability and the threat to U.S. influence in the region through Soviet activity, was the ideological forces that were flowing in Arab states in the form of republican and popular nationalism. Nasser-led Egypt had in 1963/64 on several occasions flown across and bombed Saudi territory
without opposition, thereby demonstrating its strength. But more important than this was the reason for opposition to Saudi Arabia. Republicanism was obviously deeply opposed to Saudi monarchy, and nationalism was inimical to Arab state's ties to Western or foreign powers. This ideological challenge posed a two-pronged threat to U.S. interests and to Saudi Arabia, and was backed by the superior forces (in relation to Saudi Arabia) of Egypt. The U.S. who had, as I have shown, a positive programme to encourage states to defend themselves through their own manpower were also restricted by political costs, of directly interfering in the Saudi-Egyptian antagonism. Thus, J.F. Kennedy warned Nasser that U.S./Egyptian relations were being jeopardised and further, wrote to King Faisal affirming U.S. support and sent out a U.S. training mission and a fighter squadron - this was known as Operations Hardsurface. Here U.S. was prepared to get Egypt to back-off, at the same time draw Saudi Arabia closer to it, and justify the military presence in the region, even if it did withdraw its 'training mission' after a few months. However the problem was, that such intervention would be taken as a firm commitment, to bail out a friend in the event of conflictual situations arising involving the friendly state. The U.S. wanted Saudi Arabia to acquire its own weapons system so that the U.S. would not be dragged into regional conflicts and always have to pay a political cost, especially given the anti-American nationalist criticism. Clearly it was a relief to the U.S. when in 1964 Saudi Arabia concluded it needed a comprehensive air defence system which would include jet fighters, advanced radar and communications system, and (SAM) missiles. This Saudi air defence package had been largely conceived within the presence of American air defence survey team in 1963. The arrangement as it stood was clear cut, the package would be American and three squadron of 12
aircraft either Northrop F-5s or Lockheed F-104s would be its backbone. But from here on the situation became complicated, and showed up the way in which the U.S. could be duplicitous in its dealings with Saudi Arabia and largely get away with it.

Complexities set in when Britain needed a major arms export in order to facilitate her purchase of an F-111 package from the U.S. From having no preference between Lockheed or Northrop as to who should supply the planes to Saudi Arabia, Robert McNamara swung away to support a joint U.S./U.K. aircraft package of three squadrons of British F-52 lightning interceptors plus radar and communications supplies. The U.S. for its part would supply the Raytheon Hawk (SAM) missiles. The total package was worth about $300 million.

The Saudis had been persuaded to buy this joint package. Saudi Arabia was vulnerable to western offers of security assistance. The long struggle from 1958-1964 between King Faisal and his brother King Sa'ud over the control of the government left the Saudi defence and financial ministries in a weak status with regard to organisation and procurement apparatus. Thus, the Saudis were not prepared to evaluate or manage Western security offers on their own. This was an indication of the weakness of Saudi defence procurement and planning, and a sign of the completeness the U.S. had over the terms of Saudi security development. It was also an evidence of the dependency of Saudi defence needs on the U.S., and the consequent influence the U.S. could exert in the specifics of this trade area.

From the domestic side of American politics, the episode emphasized executive autonomy, especially that of the Defense department and the ILN in a case which was eminently suitable for Congressional oversight. The probable blindness of the Saudis to the duplicity of the deal most likely obviated justifiable feelings of manipulation and consequent distrust of U.S. action.
From the point of view of the arms transfer decision process this was perhaps the last deal of significance before my main period of interest - post-1973. The cooling of relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia due to U.S. support for Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israel conflict caused a lull in arms transfers between the two countries. Saudi Arabia then turned mainly to France for arms. By the early 1970s the U.S. was once again involved in arms deals with Saudi Arabia.

I have tried to show in my historical narrative how the relationship connecting U.S. oil interests and Saudi Arabia arms interests was shaped from the pre-war period to 1973. The important point was the gradual build-up to the realisation of the importance of oil for the U.S. and the consequent need for the U.S. to enhance Saudi Arabian security if the U.S. was to secure its oil needs, and later its defence needs, by which to oppose the spread of Soviet influence. There was confidence that Saudi Arabia would supply oil to the U.S., but the U.S. was concerned about Saudi Arabian security and its own military advantages which protected the flow of oil from Saudi Arabia. It was this in particular which pushed the U.S. into making arms transfers, rather than the threat of an oil embargo at the time.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO


10. Ibid, p.41.


22. R. Labrie, op.cit., p.25.


27. Ibid.


41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid. pp.873-74.

44. Ibid, pp.885-86.


53. Ibid.

54. In mid-1957, Brig. General Dale Smith, the head of U.S. Military Advisory Group (MAAG) opposed Suadi request for obtaining F-86 aircraft on the ground that Suadi forces were not ready for more advanced aircraft. Suadi objections were voiced to Washington and Washington overruled him and some F-86 were sent to Suadi Arabia and he was replaced. Cited in "U.S. Defense Adviser to Suadis Relieved", New York Times, 28 October 1957, p.3.


57. D. Long, op.cit., p.45.


59. Ibid.
CHAPTER THREE

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN SUPPLY ARMS TO
SAUDI ARABIA, POST-1973

The previous chapter outlined the nature and regulations of arms transfer decisions in the U.S. It also offered a brief account of the character and politics of particular arms decisions pre-1973 and the circumstances which constituted and affirmed the relationship and influence-structure operating between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The major points made were, that America seeks for oil from Saudi Arabia and to achieve this enhances Saudi Arabia internal and external security. The U.S. attempts to dissuade (1) the Soviet Union from advancing in the Middle East region, (2) enhance Saudi security which in turn (3) ensures the flow of oil and (4) advances U.S. military and strategical interests in the region, (5) creates the opportunity for U.S. foreign policy initiatives in the region. The last point embodies much of what one means by historical influence working upon immediate influence. That is, the conditions of, at least, partial dependency of Saudi Arabia upon U.S.-provided security the facilitation of which is rooted in the historical relationship, creates circumstances of obligation towards U.S. initiatives even when Saudi Arabia does not want to accede to those particular requests because of perceived costs to Saudi Arabia, it may bring.

Further, I noted the weakness of Congressional oversight and the acts which confirmed that the process of decision are largely absent of interference by committees of Congress. In other words, it is at the behest of, in the main, the Departments of State and
Defense, and the President.

Since my main purpose is to examine the post-1973 period concentrating on 3 major arms deals, the last chapter of necessity was skimpy, compared to this one which will make a detailed analysis of the post-1973 arms deals.

What I do is to elaborate a model of the arms transfer process for the post-1973 period which is cognisant of the basic theoretical issues of the linkage between foreign policy and arms transfers. The primary focus is on foreign policy interests and how they are processed and made coherent or incoherent and, in turn, how they become considerations in effecting an arms deal with another state, in this case Saudi Arabia.

This chapter attempts to explore the nature of the interests that the United States seeks to achieve through its arms transfers to Saudi Arabia. Section A attempts to find answers to a set of questions designed to provide an analysis of a state's foreign policy objectives in relation to the transfer of arms. Among these questions are the following: what constants determine the framework of arms transfers? Which rules and laws determine, restrain or enable arms transfers? What is the process of making an arms transfer? Historically, what has characterised the domestic politics of arms transfer? With respect to Section A, Section B will examine the nature and implications of the three major aircraft arms deals between the United States and Saudi Arabia. By this, one is led to ask whether the United States achieves its foreign policy objectives in Saudi Arabia.

Before I move directly to Section A, we must make a note about the character of foreign policy insofar as it is relevant to this chapter.

While 'real-politik' obliges one to recognise that a dividing
The line between foreign and domestic policy is often very thin, and subject to trade-offs and the overriding of domestic restraints, one must acknowledge a realm of foreign policy exists wherein one country makes a decision so as to facilitate a certain type or set of relational positions with other countries.

United States' foreign policy refers to actions undertaken by the government of the U.S.A. in the international or 'global' arena. The question that might arise now is, What is the purpose for which actions are taken? A foreign policy then is not only a course of action but also the purposes it is intended to serve. The purposes these actions are supposed to serve are usually called goals or national interests. In other words, foreign policy refers to "a course of action developed by the decision-makers of a state vis-a-vis other states, aimed at achieving specific goals defined in terms of national interests". But foreign policy is not made in a vacuum. It is influenced by internal and external forces and effects.

Within the ever-shifting balance of International Relations, States will attempt to take decisions which are teleological in character, that is, they are goal oriented by design, and are intended to achieve that policy-goal. Relative to its political and economic strength a country will have a relatively successful or unsuccessful policy initiative without incurring too many costs or externalities. In this way it can serve its national interests and preserve existing ones. The United States, better than most, is in a position to exert and carry out a vigorous and robust foreign policy with regard to many countries. Of course, this is based on a relatively stable groundwork of rules and procedures. Foreign policy may be defined within the national setting as the formulation of decisions with regard to economy, political structure, ideology an
and within the external setting, as that which tries to influence the behaviour of the global system and more especially the intentions and actions of other states. Here foreign policy may be described as "a response to external challenges, and opportunities".3

Finally, what means are available to a government of a state to achieve its national interest? Here one may describe foreign policy as the representation by a state to another state of one's national interest, the usage of appropriate means to materialise the desired interests and the preservation of existing interests. It is worth noting that achieving goals outside a state boundary implies that the intention of a state's foreign policy vis-a-vis other states is to affect their behaviour in order to get the desired outcomes. Foreign policy can then be expressed in terms of goals and actions, as well as the national and international settings that are linked to them.

Means to effect interests can result from a policy only if the policy-makers in a state clearly understand what they have in mind, what these interests are, and the factors that influence them, as well as possible consequences of such a policy. A model can illustrate policy or behaviour that relates national/international factors to a state's objectives/means and potential outcome. Foreign policy can be represented as follows:
Figure 1: Foreign Policy Behaviour Model

Relating national/international factors to foreign policy objectives/actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions: Factors Influence Foreign Policy Objectives</th>
<th>Ends: Foreign Policy Objectives</th>
<th>Means: Actions in Pursuit of Foreign Policy</th>
<th>Outcomes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. National - Belief - Economic - Political - Interest groups - Political parties</td>
<td>A. Defence/security B. Political/diplomatic</td>
<td>A. Force B. Diplomacy C. Trade Including the transfer of arms, service and maintenance D. Executive/legislative</td>
<td>A. Success B. Failure with regard to (1) stated policy (2) case by case intentions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<th>Feedback</th>
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Note: Oil is the biggest single dominant of policy initiative in regard to American-Saudi arms transfers.

Explanation of the Model

Figure 6 suggests how a foreign policy behaviour model is conceived. The model is divided into four stages identified by Arabic numbers. These are (1) (2) (3) (4). One includes a set of internal/external situations/events that might instigate responses by the government of a state to take actions in regard to these situations/events. The elements of inputs of the first stage are mainly specified for the developed/industrial countries, particularly the United States. This is largely because First World states have a more complete access and coherent control over a wider range of these
elements than do, say, Third World or underdeveloped nations. This is of course a pragmatic distinction.

(1) Inputs - Influencing Conditions

A National Conditions

Among the national conditions that influence foreign policy behaviour are as follows:

1. Belief - The Role of Ideology and Culture

K.J. Holsti describes ideology as "any explicit set of beliefs that purports to explain reality and usually prescribes goals for political action". He adds that ideology not only establishes goals but justifies action. Therefore, there are two essential elements of ideology: a set of beliefs, and its relationship to political action. One can assume that in order to explain the behaviour of a state one must understand how a state adheres to an ideology such as capitalism or communism. The foreign policy of a state reflects its belief system - the values it holds. The adherence of the United States President, Woodrow Wilson, early in this century, for instance, to the principle of self-determination as an expression of nationalist ideology was surely, at least in part, a reflection of American traditional sentiment of Anti-Imperialism, Isolationism, and Democracy - of the sovereign and constitutional nation. Today, America's changed attitude to foreign policy - a policy of activism in world politics - has led American to intervene in various states' affairs, not least in South East Asia - a traditional area of interest to the U.S. and Latin America. Partly to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a hold in various states, and partly to achieve a pro-American stance by these states, America has used a variety of influencing or interventionary strategies such as the offering or removing of economic aid, or the sending in of troops to prop up an
ailing regime (Dominican Republic 1965). While this shift away from an ideology of absolute sovereignty seems to be a shift from ideological reasoning, in fact it could be argued the ideological goals have shifted such that America conceived of democracy as a long term achievable goal of capitalistic regimes which happen to be pro-American. Of course this is not the whole picture because the rhetoric still proclaims that subjects of American intervention are being aided in their move towards self-determination. The gap between ideological rhetoric and reality is an inevitable aspect of foreign relations; contradictions abound in the desire to obtain influence. The Soviet Union has supplied military assistance to states that prohibit communist organisations and activities - Nasser's Egypt, Hussein's Iraq and Gaddafi's Libya and others. Therefore, ideologies are (despite strategical shifts) forces of political relations that are taken into consideration when formulating foreign policy behaviour.

A subsidiary consideration is that of culture. Though undoubtedly a factor in social and political explanation, it seems largely to have been traded off against ideology by the U.S. Insofar as culture is a set of fundamental norms and beliefs which underpin the whole of a society or are recognised as valuable and inviolable by that society, there is little reflection of domestic cultural considerations in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Of course culture is a far more relevant consideration when developing a policy for another country. In dealing with a traditional society such as Saudi Arabia, diplomatic sensitivity and high protocol towards cultural norms and values of that country is often required. A classic case of cultural insensitivity (though this refers to Britain) was the British sponsored film "Death of a Princess" which appeared to question the morality of Saudi society and leadership.
Relations with Britain were nearly severed.

2. Economic - The Search for Raw Materials and Foreign Markets

In order to stay in power, most governments of industrialised states have to develop policies of economic growth and social welfare which reflect an increase in the nation's Gross National Product (GNP) as well as improvement of employment. These domestic needs can possibly be fulfilled through economic expansion abroad since most of the developed states, and super powers, have not yet proven to be economically self-sufficient in terms of raw materials and markets. Thus, access to foreign markets and searches for raw materials and opportunities of investment abroad, are necessary for increasing a state's economic welfare.

The Marxist view of American "imperial" capitalism is of exploitation of the Third World countries in a search for markets for its goods and services, cheap raw materials for its industries, and high return investments for its capital. These capitalistic interests, for the Marxist, explains American imperialist behaviour in the international scene. Equally the Marxist-Leninist who resists claims about the Soviet Union does not behave towards the Eastern Bloc as America does towards the countries it "exploits". Eastern Bloc countries provide the Soviet leadership with markets and investments. Therefore, regardless of ideological orientation, a state, of needs, must enhance its economic base, and ensure its people's welfare, and this can only effectively be done through economic engagement abroad.

3. Public Opinion - Interest Groups and Political Parties

Public opinion on foreign policy may be described as the views and attitudes of the public in relation to the foreign affairs of a
state. However, the transformation of public views and attitudes relies on representations by persons and organised groups that desire particular policy goals. These extra-executive or legislature bodies are terms interest groups and political parties. The question now is whether interest groups and political parties can affect foreign policy decisions. One may legitimately ask this question because of the vast immigrant population in the U.S. Since the end of the 19th century the immigrants in successive generations have retained a sense of origin and heritage-of-roots in another country, such that they are not only American but, say, Irish or Central European, or Arab, e.g. Edward Said. This leaves many Americans prone to taking an active and practical interest in foreign policy, especially when it deals with the country of their origin; thus the motives behind the powerful Irish or Jewish lobbies in New York. These factors can significantly affect the formulation of foreign policy. Of course, whether groups do affect policy decisions depends on the preparedness of a government to permit pressure groups and political parties. In the case of the U.S., pressure groups and political parties are an essential component of the political structure.

i) Interest Groups

The primary reason for organising an interest group is "to reach and influence the decision-making agencies of the government toward predetermined goals". But it is not only an interest group that sets the goals. Governments may set the goals and anticipate opposition to them. Through lobbying, foreign policy interest groups, for instance, may have the opportunity to appear and testify in front of their congressional representatives (legislatures), the media, the bureaucracy, and the like, in an effort to have policies adopted that are beneficial to them. Among the most powerful interest
groups in foreign policy are the ethnic groups and the military/industrial establishments. Ethnic groups are active in influencing foreign policy decisions which result in favourable positions towards their countries being adopted. In the U.S.A. for instance, the most powerful lobby groups are the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). These interest groups have sought and still seek, through lobbying the administration, the Congress, and the political parties, U.S. economic and military assistance to Israel. These groups also have attempted to block U.S. arms sales to Arab countries hostile to Israel, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

There is a strong linkage between the military establishment and industrial corporations. This linkage can simply be identified in terms of the dependence of the military interest groups on the industrial interest groups for the manufacturing of armaments since armaments in most Western states, particularly the U.S., is a private business. Armaments in the U.S. means profits for the industrial groups and power for the military ones, and vice-versa. It is at least a bi-lateral relationship. C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite has shown that the politico-military-industrial complex expresses a multi-lateral relationship. Within this context, arms sales to other countries means making profit for the former, and testing new weapons systems as well as buying friends abroad for the latter. For this reason among others, arms manufacturing companies and military elites lobby through the Congress and the administration to facilitate the sales of arms. And since they provide a government with the necessary means, such as armaments, to implement foreign policy decisions, a government
might find it hard to avoid their leverage.

ii) Political Parties

In Western democracies, the foreign policies of political parties often assess the views of their supporters and take note of certain interest groups. In the U.S., for instance, the Republican or the Democrat Party proclaims a set of proposals and policies that attract to its banner the maximum number of votes of all interest groups and others. However, these proposals and policies, particularly the controversial ones, may be modified during or after the election.

Generally speaking, the Republicans stand for heavy outlays on foreign aid, particularly economic and technical assistance, as well as on the stationing of American troops abroad. The Democrats favour foreign aid and commitments abroad. With respect to military assistance, both the Republicans and Democrats favour U.S. arms sales to allies and friends in an attempt to win their support for U.S. objectives. Examples are President Nixon's arms sales to Iran in the 1960s and the 1970s, and arms sales by Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan to Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s.

B. International Conditions

These are divided into two sub-groups: one the Global system and the other, the Regional system.

1. Global System

This system might be described as the "pattern of interactions, and relationships among the major territorially based political actors existing at a particular time". But who are these major
political actors that compose the global system? Today, the global system, taken as a pattern of major political and economic actors, would include the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and China. The point here is to draw a practical as well as a conceptual distinction between a dominant system of international political and economic forces, whose actions have multilateral global effects, and regional sub-systems whose foreign representatives tend to be unilateral, or epiphenomenal in character as a result of another’s input. Especially since World War II the number of actors included in the global system has increased, but it is evident that the United States and the Soviet Union dominate the global system.

This global system is still largely characterised by competition though often in competition for influence and strategical superiority, action by one superpower triggers responses by the others, and thereby unintentionally tending toward a balance of power between them. This balance between the two super powers is also applicable to their relations towards regional sub-systems. A super power’s actions to pursue its national interests in the Middle East, for instance, must take into consideration, at least formally, the affect of these actions on the other super power. In this case both the U.S. and U.S.S.R are obliged, in taking note of each other’s actions in the Middle east, to take especial cognisance of oil supplies and the Arab-Israeli conflict. And since both super powers are the key suppliers of arms to the Middle East, and have obvious strategical, political and economic reasons for supplying arms, they continue and extend this arms market.

2. Regional System

Just as ‘global’ actors respond to each other, so may regional actors similarly respond to each other. Equally, as I have suggested
above, regional actors may perform actions which are epiphenomenal to 'global actors' inputs. A possible response by a state of the global system towards a state of a regional system could be explained within the context of national interests. If a state of a regional system is to ask a state of the global system for economic or military assistance in order to cope with its internal/external challenges, then this might constitute an opportunity for a state of the global system to maximise its national interests in the international environment. Among these interests would be, to influence the behaviour of a regional state or to neutralise the actions of another global state. For example, the attacks in the 1960's of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong forces, supported by the Soviet Union and China, on South Vietnam prompted the latter to seek military and political backing from the United States. The U.S. viewed these attacks as an attempt to disturb the balance of power of the superpowers in South-East Asia. In addition, the U.S. regarded South Vietnam's request for assistance as worthy since its positive response would keep the latter as an ally to the former. The U.S. also perceived that a defeat for South Vietnam could lead to defeats for other friendly governments in the South-East Asia region (domino theory), i.e. if one state in South-East Asia is taken by Communism, nearby states will be taken over, one after another.

(2 & 3) Ends and Means

In my model in regard of boxes 2 and 3, I list the main categories which predominate in foreign policy discussions as means or ends. We will see in the forthcoming narrative, how security, political and economic priorities have been ends pursued in making arms transfers. One end may take priority over another according to the conditions obtaining at the time, but from the point of view of
stated policy it is frequently the case that all three, security, political and economic objectives are tied together. I examine this clustering effect in relation to actual policy separation of them in the historical analysis of various presidential arms transfer policies. In regard of means, the categories mentioned are for the most part formal alternatives as they often do not play a part in actual foreign policy processes. It is obviously preferred that force is not used. Though it is true that Thomas Schelling's book *Arms and Influence* has set out to demonstrate how force may be used to procure influence - in my case studies force hardly features at all. Diplomacy is of essence. It is the mode of communication linking policy-makers with those affected by decisions and acts as a means of persuasion to accept, and representation to the affected of the policies agreed upon. Trade can be an end where it represents the benefits gained from say, an arms sales. But usually it is a means when cast in the form of military and economic essentials for the recipient.

The final category - Executive/legislative power is something I focus upon extensively, for it reflects the way in which the Executive has tried, and for the most part succeeded, in dominating and controlling the legislatures attempts to have a say in foreign policy decisions. Through executive control of foreign policy and their measures to maintain it, the means to effect foreign policy in whatever way the executive determine, has been consolidated. In my analysis I show how executive predominance has been sustained despite the legislature's valiant attempts to restrain it.

(4) Outcome
I consider outcome with respect to stated policy and case-by-case intentions. This gives me leverage upon the difference between rhetoric and reality, and thus a means of assessing the performance of the supplier state's government. Clearly, policies do have measures of success and measures of failure, and it is my responsibility to sort these out. But I have to do this with reference to particular indexes. Thus: (1) stated policy intentions on arms transfers as they relate to the idea of having a general arms transfer policy; (2) case intentions - i.e. the considerations and aims of particular arms sales as they are perceived in their time of conception and execution. Since there can be changes of aims between conception and execution because of changing circumstances, I try to monitor these shifts. The final version of aims agreed upon by a government, will of course be the one that most concerns me.

Finally, the role of feedback is important in that the possibility of its occurring may provide risks because of retaliation by other goods suppliers or by other countries with whom one is trading, but equally well, feedback can provide a mechanism of information by which a supplier may get warning of problems or better opportunities for new trade.

Rules and Laws Governing Arms Transfers - Post-1973 Period

I showed in Chapter Two the increasing presence of rules and laws as they affected the development of arms transfers policy and policy process. I now look at the same type of phenomena as they relate to the post-1973 years.

"The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes the President to provide military assistance to friendly nations, while his authority to make government to government (FMS) sales and to licence commercial sales derives from the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1969, and the Mutual Security Act of 1954, respectively".13
In this short lucid summary, Paul Warnke and Edward Luck spell out the legislative inheritances which launch me into the post-1973 period.

What is striking about the arms sales policy process is the lack of firm guidelines on arms transfers or as Michael Klare puts it "an overall policy framework for arms transfers". Responsible for this lack as Congress and commentators saw it, was the Nixon administration. The 1967 amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961 provided the legal machinery to curtail aid to countries which spend excessively on sophisticated weapons. These amendments were incorporated into the Military Sales Act of 1968 and expanded to cover military credit sales as well. However, as the 1970s began, political and economic situations shaped U.S. arms policy. In the light of the Vietnam fiasco, Washington, guided by Nixon's Doctrine, sought to enhance its military capabilities of selected Third World countries through accelerated arms transfers. Similarly, in order to improve the balance of trade vis-a-vis oil producing states of the Middle East, Nixon sold sophisticated armaments. Furthermore, Nixon lifted the restraints on sales of high-tech munitions and encouraged U.S. arms firms to sell arms to the Middle East oil-producing countries. This continued under President Ford. FMS rose from $1.1 billion in 1970 to $15.8 billion in 1975.

The apparent lack of control encouraged a Congressional reaction post-1973. It was first manifested in 1974 by the sponsorship of an Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which gave Congress a limited veto over major FMS. Known as the Nelson Amendment it was incorporated into what was to become the centre-piece legislation covering the arms transfer and the control of arms transfer policy-making - the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976.

Most significant in the Nelson Amendment was its demand for
legislative veto. The rationale behind it was to provide Congress with an institutionalised mechanism that would give Congress the opportunity to study the circumstances surrounding each major arms sale, and to assess the foreign policy impact of each such transaction.\(^19\)

Further formalised by the 1976 Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the Act aimed to shift the emphasis from selling arms to controlling the sales of arms.\(^20\) The Act emphasized public disclosure and review procedure. The Act required Congress be given 30 calendar days to review proposed sales of $25 million or more if they are "defense articles or service" and of $7 million or more if they are "defense equipment".\(^21\) If, within that 30 day period, Congress voted to block the sales, they could not proceed. The Act also provided for the supplying of information on arms sales to Congress if it was requested.\(^22\)

On the face of it, Congress was attempting to restrict Executive autonomy in matters of arms transfer. In February, the Department of Defense (DoD) agreed to allow an informal 20 day preview of forthcoming arms sales that might be submitted under AECA.\(^23\) The purpose of this 20-day informal notification was to pave the way for proposals that otherwise may have a rough ride through Congress.

As one may begin to see, the history of arms transfer legislation is the history of Congressional oversight, and this was largely effected through amendments to AECA. The author of the study on 'Executive-legislative Consultation' on U.S. arms sales, 1982, has noted that between the years of 1977-1980 there were a string of successful amendments to AECA that for the most part improved the control of arms transfers by Congress. 1977 saw the provision of veto for 3rd country transfers, and 1980 saw the right of veto over commercial sales. But 1979 was perhaps the most interesting of the
group of that period because it demanded that the Executive "submit a detailed report estimating the level of arms sales in the coming fiscal year, noting which specific sales are most likely to occur". This seems to be a formalisation and extension of the informal 20-day 'pre-review' offered to Congress in 1976 by the DoD.

The one amendment which gave ground was the 1981 amendment increasing the threshold limit at which transfers are subject to review. The threshold on defense article and services rose to $50 million, design and construction services rose to $200 million and major defense equipment rose to $14 million.

To indicate the extent of marked attempts to oversee Presidential and Executive control of arms transfer policies I will consider two major amendments: (1) the Javits amendment, (2) the Hamilton amendment.

The Javits amendment, 1978, paid attention to Section 25 of AECA. It required the President to submit to Congress an "Arms Sales Proposal". This was "expected to be an authoritative projection of all sales the executive branch contemplates as being eligible for approval during the fiscal year".

The justification for this rather demanding order for legislative review was, that normally Congress, as the International Security Act of 1978 puts it, "makes its decisions on the basis of information provided about individual sale decisions and without the framework of an integrated plan and rationale in which to judge the broader significance and potential ramifications of the sale under consideration".

This, in effect, was a Congressional resolution upon how to articulate its fears that arms transfer policy had 'run riot' and was largely either a response to individual country's demands or to the particular shape of the international relations scene as perceived by
the executive at any one time. By insisting ex-ante, on plans of arms sales, Congress could oblige the President not only to stick to his stated intentions, but force on him a policy framework and plan that was relatively independent of other country's demands and global political events. In some sense, the measure tried to make an 'honest woman' out of arms transfers. Before, it was beholden unto events economic, political and military outside the foreign policy aims of the U.S.: now arms transfer was required to have a line of development.

The 1979 International Security Assistance Act improvised on the Javits amendment by its insisting that in the annual report, the President identify all arms sales "deemed most likely to result in the issuance of a letter of offer" during the coming fiscal year. It further required the President to notify Congress every six months of "any changes in the arms sales proposal "for a given fiscal year and the reasons for these changes". This would not only effect a coherent oversight strategy but would of course hand over, to interested parties, much of the information they needed to know to effectively opposed proposed arms transfers.

The Hamilton amendment, again to AECA in 1979, was particularly tough. It specified that quarterly reports were to be submitted which listed prices and availability estimates with respect to possible sales of major defense equipment over $7 million or defence articles and services over $25 million to foreign countries. Further, each listing was to specify the name of the country, the equipment involved, the quantity involved, and the price estimate. The amendment also insisted that the above quarterly report list each request for arms received by the U.S. It was argued that, by gaining such an early review, the U.S. could save itself from upsetting its foreign relations had Congress vetoed a sale at the
It is agreed that the effectiveness of the legislation discussed above has been mixed, particularly on controversial sales, but it nevertheless charts the progress of Congressional oversight and the potential shift in control as Congress has not so much demanded a bigger role in arms transfers though this is so, but as it has insisted on its right of earlier review and earlier in the policy process.

Formal Process of an Arms Transfers - Post-1973 Period

I have shown how the process of an arms transfer is circumscribed by various acts and amendments which have considerably improved Congress' leverage over the process. However, in analytical terms there is a line of review from the initial request for data of U.S. arms and services through to a transaction.

The review bodies have multiplied since the 1960s and now involve not only the DoD and Department of State (DoS) and their sub-units, but also the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), National Security Council (NSC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Agency for International Development (AID), Office of Management and Budget (OMS) and Treasury and Commerce Departments (TCD).

Before a sale reaches any of these bodies it must first be appraised by the President, if only formally. As in the pre-1973 era, the President is charged with the overall command of arms transactions.

As the chief foreign policy-maker, the President can conclude arms sales agreements with other states. The U.S. Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, for instance, places in the hands of the U.S. government vested control over conventional arms sales. "In
furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States ... the President is authorised to control the import and export of defense articles and defense services." The AECA also identifies two distinct channels for arms transfers, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Commercial Sales (CS).

In regard of FMS, the government functions as a middleman whereby she buys military equipment from American arms corporations and resells them to foreign governments. FMS involve total value of defense articles (combat aircrafts, missiles, tanks, battleships) and defense services (training, maintenance). FMS continue the bulk of American arms transfers, which increased from a figure of $3.8 billion in 1973 to $19.6 billion in 1982.

The U.S. government also provides credits to some other foreign governments to enable them to purchase arms through the FMS programme. Another channel of arms transfers as recognized by AECA is commercial sales. Here, the U.S. arms corporations sell directly to foreign governments. However, these corporations have to apply to the State Department's Office of Munitions Control (OMC) for a licence to export their military items. Examples of items transferred through commercial sales include spare parts, ammunition, and small arms (rifles, shotguns), support equipment (jeeps, transport planes) and police articles (clubs, teargas, prison hardware). CS constitutes 10% of American arms exports - about $2 billion per year.

Having cleared these preliminaries, one can now begin to offer an account of the process itself. The starting point is the official request to the DoS from a foreign government ambassador or military attache. Former DoD's Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), General Howard Fish, has observed that countries in practice often make an appropriate request through diplomatic channels to the DoD and then to the DoS. Michael Klare though, made the point that "all
such requests theoretically go first to the Office of Security Assistance Sales (SAS) in the DoS's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM). Whichever route is taken by foreign governments in regard of the initial requests, it is the DoS which has official responsibility for the first links forged in the arms transfer process between the U.S. and another country. This is not dissimilar to the process in the 1960s when President Kennedy recognized that the DoS had formal superiority over the DoD.

After a request is made, it is subject to a basic evaluation through DoD and DoS consultation to determine whether the request is consistent with U.S. policy, and whether it will serve the national interest. This part of the process starts by the SAS deciding which sales categories apply, i.e. whether the sales are FMS or CS, whether by cash or credit, if they are weapons or services. This done, the proposed sale will be put through an appropriate succession of review agencies. What is most significant is, what M. Klare notes in 'American Arms Supermarket': "Although the DoS theoretically retains ultimate control over all military export transactions, the Secretary of State has authorized the DoD to assume full responsibility for military sales to the NATO powers... as well as to Australia, Japan and New Zealand". 35

So for the most part, the DoD is very much in the driving sat. The powerful role of the DoD has been set out thus: "DoD is involved in detailed force planning, in considerations of pricing... and training deliveries, payments, and continued support of arms sales". 36

Within the DoD itself, prime responsibility for arms transfers lies with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA). Its fundamental role is in formulating DoD arms transfer policy. Within the DoS the main
agencies are the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) and the Regional Bureau (RB). The PM serves as the Secretary of State's support staff for supervision of arms transfers to review and evaluate requests. The RB's participate when countries under their charge are affected. In regard to Saudi Arabia, for example, it is the Near East Section that is brought into play.

Upon a request which takes the form of a letter (LOR) for planning and review data and price and availability data, the PM and the RB and ACDA in co-ordination with the DoD decide whether such data should be released. If it is released, it is not surprising that, as Roger Labrie and others (1982) note: "the issuance of the data is often perceived by potential recipients as an indication that the United States is prepared to sell".37

Should this information prove satisfactory to the purchaser, then the foreign government must submit another request, this time for a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) from the U.S. This confirms that the U.S. is willing to make a sale. Written by the appropriate military service, a LOA must be issued with the DoS approval. However, before the initial request for data is granted many months may pass, and the requests will channel down through the various review agencies I named earlier. Let me consider some of them.

Despite the expertise of many commentators the process and its time-structure is not agreed on. M. Klare, for instance, spends little time on the agency review programme, yet this seems to be the centrepiece of the whole process. What one can assert is, that the main work of the agencies is done after the request for data is received.

In the previous chapter I suggested that the DoS through its PM can assert itself more effectively against the inbuilt expertise of
the DoD. By 1980, Joel Husbands was claiming that: "the Bureau [PM] is the centre of the arms transfer decision-making within the executive branch". Other agencies, nationally peripheral to the arms transfer process may be brought in at such time as required.

The Bureau of Human Rights have a say, if arms transfer is going to a country with a bad human rights record. The Treasury Department participates when a sale draws on the FMS credit programme, and the Commerce Department becomes involved when arms equipment such as computers, data-processing materials, and cargo planes are sought. The latter two Departments have to review arms transfers in the light of both economic and security interests of the U.S. Where arms are sought from a country in receipt of U.S. economic aid then AID's advice on the impact of the arms transfer to that country is required.

The agencies at the centre of the pre-LAO review are those concerned with 'threat' analysis. These evaluate the military and security aspects of a sale. Crucial are ACDA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSC and CIA.

The ACDA is empowered by the Arms Export Control Act to "review pending U.S. arms transfers, and to advise the Secretary of State to any adverse implications of arms transfers that would trigger arms race or conflict escalation in a region which might jeopardise U.S. security interests". ACDA also functions as one of the primary sources of data on the arms trade.

The CIA is involved in reporting on the stability of intentions of the would-be U.S. arms recipients. The DIA prepare an analysis of the military threat facing the prospective arms recipients.

The NSC is to advise the President on a wide range of domestic, foreign and military affairs relating to national security. Although the NSC reviews arms transfers on a regular basis, its main function
is to review controversial cases.

The main assessments of the threat factor comes from the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, in Husband's view the CIA is usually only asked to supplement the office's analysis.42

Only after the full range of appropriate analyses are done, is a letter of offer and acceptance received and approved. The President usually only takes an interest and a final review in cases that must be reported to Congress.

This concludes my 'objective' account of the arms transfer process from gestation to approval. It has sought to highlight the role of the review agencies. As I shall show in the next section the formality of my description does not reveal the underlying politics of an arms transfer.

The Character of Arms Transfers in the Post-1973 Period

This section will act as a preface to the next section which discusses the three major aircraft deals between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Here then, I will examine successive presidential and executive changing attitudes and stances towards arms deals highlighting the American-Saudi arms transfer relationship where appropriate.

The 1973-1983 period in the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia was a deeply perturbing one for both, but especially so for the U.S. The notorious oil embargo of 1973/74 pushed Saudi Arabia from the "back-bench of inter-Arab politics"43 to Prime Ministership. If Saudi Arabia had been part of the Arab opposition to the U.S. the sudden elevation would not have been politically so difficult but the strength of Saudi Arabia relations with the U.S., the course of which I charted in the previous chapter, threw Saudi Arabia into a confrontational position with the U.S., it
did not want to assume. If nothing else, this forced upon the U.S. a re-orientation of their 'taking Saudi Arabia for granted' attitude predominant until then. The background to the embargo lay in U.S. positive response to Israeli requests for military aid by which they could prosecute the 1973 October war. President Nixon, as was his want in regard of arms transfers, had requested from Congress $2.2 billion in emergency arms aid to Israel, and this was too much, even for Saudi Arabia. The Arab protest, and response was vigorous and swift and on October 20th Saudi Arabia announced the oil embargo against the United States.

The War had begun properly on October 6th, but it had been building up for some months prior to this. Action by the Israelis in April against Palestinians they considered to be terrorists, and the shooting down of a Libyan air liner the previous February had caused mobilisation of Arab forces and the preparation for war. Saudi Oil Minister, Ahmed Yamani, had warned Washington on April 19th that an oil output increase would not be forthcoming if the U.S. did not change its stance on the Arab-Israeli tension. But Nixon had pressures against him, not least Watergate, and did not want to alienate the influential Jewish lobby who were considerably more than merely Rabbi Karff.

Given the build up it was not surprising that voices of opposition were raised against the sale of Saudi Arabia of F-4 Phantom jets in June 1973, Secretary of State Williams Rogers told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Saudi Arabia would not deploy them against Israel, the opposition arguing, they would. This measure of support for Saudi Arabia did not prevent OPEC from raising oil prices by about 10% in July 1973, i.e. from $2.29 to $2.48 per barrel. President Nixon underscored at a news conference between the oil situation and the Middle East dispute declared that
his new Secretary of State Henry Kissinger would make a strenuous effort to bring about a Middle east settlement.49

Two days after the hostilities had broken out, Kissinger not having had any time to begin negotiations, King Faisal ordered Aramco to cut by half, the outflow of Saudi oil, ostensibly to prevent huge petroleum losses if the pipelines were sabotaged. But this had the effect as Benson Grayson puts it, of Saudi Arabia and United States finding "themselves in unwanted position of being virtual adversaries".50 Despite these pressures on the U.S., Nixon began the shipping of emergency arms to Israel. His $2.2 billion package that followed the hostilities was a final straw that broke the camel's back, and an embargo began and oil prices rose, and production was reduced.

The succession of moves against the U.S. by Saudi Arabia were indicative of a new footing for the relationship - one that previously had not been crucial in terms of what was to be anticipated of Saudi Arabia, namely the pulling of the oil lever. I have been clear in stating that the flow of Saudi oil was important to the U.S. and arms transfers to Saudi Arabia interacted strongly with the guarantee of oil, but it had been little thought that Saudi Arabia would force an oil embargo. In this case oil became a factor independent of arms crucial to Saudi Arabia and tied to the regional interests of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The threat to the U.S. came not so much in the form of Arab unity, as the unilateral potential of Saudi Arabia to become more than merely a significant regional power. The agenda of the economics of oil, had now become one of the politics of oil.

The oil embargo forced on the U.S. the realisation of the need for an integrated energy policy51 and the overall nature of domestic and foreign supply and demand factors. However, on the issue of arms
transfers, the embargo brought home the controversial, indeed devastating impact, they could have in relation to other states. This was a damning indictment of two widely held perceptions that Paul Warnke and Edward Luck have identified as creative of a pro-sale disposition. The two perceptions are: "(1) the assumption that selling arms is the normal course of action, while refusing to sell is abnormal; and (2) greater sensitivity to the possibly negative consequences of denying particular sales than to the adverse effects of approving them". These perceptions are only valid if an arms transfer is made relatively independent of the foreign relations context of the recipient, and the supplier belief in his power and autonomy to act in his national interest. The problem of the oil lever upset the stability of oil supply as a constant in relation between United States and Saudi Arabia when it became a variable. Then, U.S. autonomy in making arms transfers and the U.S. ability to quieten, say Arab opposition to a sale to Israel, or vice-versa by redressing the imbalance with a later sale to the Plaintiff became unviable. The unilateral character of America as an arms supplier was jeopardised and worse still, the break in U.S.-Arab relations left doors ajar through which Soviet influence could pass. More than anything the oil embargo showed the disarray into which American foreign policy could be put. From the standpoint of arms transfer, its aims of enabling recipient states remain U.S. friendly, gain military capacity and offer regional strategical advantages to the U.S. collapsed. And further Arab states could always turn to Moscow or others for arms.

Of course, the impact of the Israeli lobby in the U.S. is not the only aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. The foreign policy connections are overwhelming. As Philip Groisser puts it, Israel has "the most effective army in the Middle East, is vital as a deterrent
to possible Soviet aggression, and thus essential to American
national interest," The conjunction of Israel's army and its
democratic habits have made it a reliable ally for the U.S. in the
stance against Soviet advances in the Middle East. Thus the
reluctance of the U.S. to be seen by Israel to undermine its
relations with her is considerable apart from the criticism of
domestic lobbying. In any discussion of arms transfers to Arab
countries, this deep-founded connection with Israel is crucial for an
understanding of it. But equally the oil demands of the U.S. upon
Saudi Arabia in particular, and OAPEC in general, tend to make arms
transfer intrinsically destabilising of U.S. relations with both
sides. U.S. is in effect caught in a double-bind.

So far in this section I have concentrated on the impact of the
1973 oil embargo and the lessons it taught the U.S. with respect to
foreign relations and arms transfers. But arising out of my analysis
of the controversies arms transfers can generate in an increasingly
unstable Middle East situation at the beginning of the period I am
particularly interested in, one may ask, what differences this made
to successive executive arms transfer policies? The discussion will
encompass the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, offering a
brief outline of the post-1974 policies.

In their account of Watergate, "The Final Days" Woodward and
Bernstein suggested that the prospect of Gerald Ford taking over
the Presidency, particularly at such a crucial time for the U.S., was
viewed with great trepidation by the Nixon administration and may
have had some part to play in Nixon's reluctance to leave office.
Whatever, Ford could really, only push the wheelchair for the
crippled office of a Republican presidency towards defeat in 1976.
We have seen so far, that for Congress it was a time of advice and
consultation as regards to oversight of arms transfers. The Nelson
Amendment and later incorporated in AECA ensured this. However, the crippling of the presidency did not mean paralysis of presidential politics and withdrawal in the face of Congressional vigour.

The executive realised that the failure of the American presidency could besmirch the trust Saudi Arabia and Israel had in the U.S. To counteract the loss of faith, one month after Ford took office, he assured Israel that close support of U.S. to Israel would continue as before. Later in September, both Ford and his Secretary of State Kissinger assured the visiting Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs of its continued support. For the Arab nations, the support offered them by the U.S. entailed an even-handed settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In his shuttle-diplomacy trips, as Benson Grayson notes, "Kissinger... took pain to insure that Saudi Arabia was kept fully briefed on the status of his efforts, meeting with King Faisal on October 13th 1974". The upshot of this meeting was that Faisal indicated Saudi willingness to try to secure a reduction in the price of oil, if the U.S. could secure greater concession from Israel in the Middle East negotiations. Ford put pressure on Israel when in January 1975 he opined that he could not assure security for Israel unless further progress was made by Israel in eroding the tensions. Clearly the Ford administration was favouring the Arabs at this time by showing that the U.S. considered Israel the difficult partner in the negotiations. The nightmove of the oil embargo, and the temptation for Saudi Arabia to use it again had to be countered and to this end, in January 1975 the U.S. agreed to sell Saudi Arabia a $769 million arms package of 60 F-5E/F Tiger fighter aircraft.

The elements of reverse influence effected by Saudi Arabia at the time of the embargo were paying a double dividend. Firstly, the U.S. was attempting to establish a settlement of the Middle East conflict which would enhance Saudi security given that she had taken a high
profile in 1973 and therefore made herself a potential target for Israeli attack, and secondly, the U.S. was going to make the largest arms transfer to Saudi Arabia to date.

Despite the position of strength attributable to Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia herself could not escape her dependency on the U.S. arms. The access to military hardware and expertise, and the U.S. commitment to her security in the Middle East made the U.S. a far safer bet in any arms relation than adopting one with Moscow. Her perception of her military needs and the continuing relationship with the U.S. were probably a not 'inconsiderable' influence upon her refusal to agree to a 15% increase in oil prices at September 1975 Vienna Meeting of OPEC. Later, in June 1976 at Bali Meeting, Saudi Arabia refused another oil increase of 20% by OPEC states. In August the executive notified the Senate that it intended to issue a letter of offer to Saudi Arabia for the sale of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles for the F-5s, Maverick air-to-air surface missiles, Dragon and Tow anti-tank missiles and other defense articles at an approximate cost of $830 million. In the case of the Sidewinder and Maverick missiles, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee questioned the need for 850 and 650 respectively (pared down from the original Saudi request of 1000 and 1500) because the missiles "would have a potentially destabilising effect on the military situation in the Middle East". Only after hearing Secretary Kissinger's testimony regarding the potential negative consequences of denial of the missiles to Saudi Arabia did the Senate approve the sale. With the Senate and the House approval, the sale of reduced number (850 Sidewinder and 650 Maverick) missiles was allowed to proceed.

On the domestic front arms transfers politics as usual was running apace. These were in the form of executive opposition to
Ford made clear his unhappiness with having to approve the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act. In the second paragraph of his statement of approval, he implicitly defends the "Constitutional responsibility of the President for the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States". He does this by referring to a previous incarnation of AECA which in his view would have undermined the Constitutional role of the President. More significantly, he expressed his disapproval of the legislative veto on arms sales and noted that "I reserve my position on its constitutionality if the provision should ever become operative". Thirdly, and in a defiant mood, Ford expressed his distinct opposition to the ending of Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) by September 1977 and indicated that he would circumvent this measure by exploiting the provision in the bill to retain MAAG's in specific countries.

This very distinctive statement makes clear antagonism existing between Congress and President on the rightful range of Congressional control over arms transfers. It summarises the Ford Administration's attitude towards arms transfer policy as one of affirming the status quo reaching back to immediate post-war precedent; that arms transfer is the executive's proper sphere of determination and policy, not Congress'. Ford's rather defensive attitudes towards the furtherance of oversight were to be re-iterated by Carter, though ironically Carter so actively wanted to restrict arms sales that Congress was led to oppose Carter's proposed reductions.

The ascendance of Jimmy Carter to the Presidency was the inevitable outcome of a disgraced republican administration. Though symbolising a distinct change in the moral and political atmosphere, the necessary continuity in foreign relations and for my purpose in arms transfers would be found to be a restraint on his early attempts
to reduce arms transfers. When campaigning in 1976 Carter had emphasised the contradiction between America's role as the peacemaker and arms salesman when he said: "I am particularly concerned by our nation's role as the world's leading arms salesman... the United States cannot be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war". Carter promised he would emphasise "peace... and reduce the commerce in arms".68

Through Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Carter proposed massive arms sales reduction, but after Congressional wrangling, this was modified and scaled down, and by May 1977 a presidential directive was approved by the NSC and made public in Carter's statement on it. Exploring the moral dimensions, Carter again emphasised the "threat to world peace embodied in this spiralling arms traffic".69

The thrust of his stated arms sales policy was distinctly contrary to his predecessors. Carter argued that FMS should be abnormal rather than normal as an instrument of foreign policy. His rider that arms transfers required clear demonstration of their contribution to national interests must presumably be taken as an indication that national interest would not be used as an excuse to make an arms sales, but as an excuse not to make one.70

He affirmed U.S. treaty obligation and most importantly the "historic responsibilities to ensure the security of the state of Israel". Furthermore, he called for radical restrictions of the sale of advanced weapons. But to cover himself against the charge that he demanded an absolute and massive reduction in arms sales, he linked reduction to the idea of multilateral cooperation with the policy, i.e. the U.S.S.R.

Though he reduced arms sales to countries outside of treaty commitments, the sales to countries involved in treaties with the U.S. outweighed the reductions and thus it was that FMS rose from
$8.8 billion in fiscal year 1977 to $11.2 billion in fiscal year 1978. The 1978 decision to sell some 200 combat aircraft to the Middle East served to confirm the retreat from arms sales reduction. But even if this were excused as good intentions some bad through counter-pressures of the armaments industry and vested interests in the DoD and DoS, one cannot ignore the fact that as early as May 1977, five months into his presidency, Carter had promised the Saudi Crown Prince Fhad that the U.S. would sell an F-15 package Saudi Arabia had been seeking. Further, Carter was determined upon this sale despite the obvious opposition it would generate. Congressional opposition to the sale was on the grounds that the Saudi aircraft package would upset the Arab-Israeli balance of power. In 1977 Carter had had the "gruelling experience of the Iranian AWACs sale fight" and he still pursued the sale of 60 F-15s to Saudi Arabia, though in delaying it to work and how best to circumvent the worst of the opposition, he incurred Saudi Arabia annoyance at the delay. Now under Saudi pressure, Carter advanced on Congress, getting Secretary Vance to threaten that if the Saudi part of the total 1978 arms sales which included 90 aircraft to Israel, was vetoed, then the sale to Israel would be withdrawn. The Israeli deal would of course add strength to the executive argument that the regional balance would not be upset, since Israel would be getting the main portion of the arms sale. The irony was in Secretary Vance's remarks to the press corps when he linked arms to the pursuit of peace. He said "These proposals are an important part of our search for peace in the Middle east".

It is hard to escape the point that Carter's policy of restraint had broken down. It had in effect foundered on the need to continue arms sales as an intrinsic aspect of foreign policy.

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Though the Congressional Quarterly saw the success of Carter to
get the 1978 arms sales proposal through Senate as a "major Carter victory"77 one would have to take it 'in vacuo' to see it as this. In relation to the whole of Carter's policy it was one more disparate element in a programme of 'restraint' which had failed. Despite the contradictions, Carter, in February 1979, was still insisting that: "Conventional arms transfers restraint is an important objective of this administration and Congress".78

It was left to Leslie Gelb, Director of the Bureau of PM to admit that Carter's arms transfer policy had failed. He said "The rhetoric promised a revolution... [but Carter]... continued a large-scale sales program [and] it was inevitable... that the administration would be seen as a naive or hypocritical, or both".79 Carter was assailed on both sides. Initially Congress had disapproved of his massive arms sales reduction, then, and this was the dominating feature of Congressional response to Carter's actual sale policy, Congress had vigorously opposed arms sales to Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia, and Carter had the weight of commercial interests and those of the DoD, and DoS not entirely favourable to his reduction. The DoD through the MAAG to Saudi Arabia could influence Saudi Arabia to seek U.S. arms and the DoD could indirectly pressure Carter - a sale denial would or could harm foreign relations. A 1977 Report of Staff survey mission to Ethiopia, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula made similar point:

As a final turn around; in 1980, not least as a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the collapse of the Shah's regime, Carter began negotiations to sell Saudi Arabia AWACs. Carter had told Congress it would not sell F-15 enhancement equipment, but in
late 1979, meetings between American and Saudi officials were held to discuss further enhancement of Saudi air defense capabilities.\textsuperscript{81} To justify embarking on such a negotiation, Carter could draw on the provision of the 1977 statement wherein he stated that "reductions in the worldwide traffic of arms will require multilateral cooperation".\textsuperscript{82} The Afghanistan and Iranian affairs were sufficient to exemplify a lack of multilateral co-operation and justify moving towards AWACs deal.

In fairness, this policy was more than justified by the Middle east regional instability arising out of the above two factors, but this was not to deter Congressional and pro-Israeli pressure groups from opposing this sale. This sale to Saudi Arabia was one part of Carter's arms policy which could be seen to be consistent with his 1977 statement of intention, but it was no triumph for Carter for it was Reagan who was to see it through, having defeated the hopeless Carter in the 1980 Presidential elections and denied him a second term of office.

Under Ronald Reagan - a gut conservative - it was evident the administration was going to do to Carter's policies what Carter did to Nixon's - reverse them. His motto was not peace through sales reduction, but peace through strengthening the armaments of friendly nations. The beligerance of his policies were to be directed against communist regimes, in particular the U.S.S.R. - 'the evil empire'. The expressed policy was one of re-linking arms sales to foreign policy initiatives. Upon taking office, Reagan entrusted his Under Secretary for Security Assistance, James Buckley, to produce an alternative policy to Carter's. Before Buckley's work was complete Reagan approved several major sales, not least the AWACS/F-15 Enhancement to Saudi Arabia.

Buckley defended the Reagan turn around in his evidence to the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1981. He argued that substantial sales were justified because of the build-up of arms at the regional and global levels:

Rhetorically his submission is fascinating. He turned away from U.S. interests, to stress the 'West's' interests. He stresses both the global and regional impact of Soviet advances, and further, he invokes a relationistic justification of crude use of arms sales by appealing to states' perceptions. Lying behind his rationale is the assumption of the simplistic character of other nations' foreign policies - they are crudely utilitarian - they need bigger and better arms. Implicit is the suggestion that the U.S. knows the truth of the matter, it is sophisticated, but the possibility of a coherent planned arms sales policy is impossible given the calculative character of others. What can you do when our friends are grabbing at bigger and better arms? Buckley sidesteps the possibility that the U.S. actively wants to sell the arms, and transfers responsibility for more sales onto the unsophisticated heads of other states. As I have noted, the transference is backed by the 'objective' truth of Soviet expansionism about which he proceeded to furnish a string of facts and figures.

Later in his submission Buckley recognises the links between arms sales and influence when he says that the administration will use arms sales for several purposes, not least "arms transfers... as political capital to be deployed without reference to the military
needs of the recipient". This he says will avoid or rather judge each perspective transfer in the light of both U.S. interests and its own particular merits. He lists four factors to take into account: (A) How defence article would help repulse a threat, (B) whether regime was able to absorb a transfer in the light of its development, (C) the effect on regional stability, (D) adverse effects of a transfer on U.S. forces. Bar one, all these account for arms transfers in terms of effects on recipients, yet a few lines later he really spells out U.S. perception: "It should be kept in mind that our principal purpose in transferring arms... is not to help a particular regime but to buttress our own security and serve our own interests". 84

A more clear and crude assertion of realism could barely have been made. This if nothing else demonstrated the retrogressive step in arms policy taken by the Reagan administration. Thus, the basic points made were: (1) there is to be no coherent U.S. arms sales policy - it was to be made on a case-by-case approach period. (2) National interest takes precedence over most other reasons for arms sales. (3) The Soviet threat was the obstacle to be overcome as the 'objective' reason for an arms transfer. (4) The dialectic of security of the U.S. in balance with the security on arms transfer brings to another state was abandoned for the view that arms transfers were evaluated in terms of what they did for U.S. interests. The U.N.'s conceptions of harmony, and development and security of Third World nations was of secondary importance, if not placed on the shelf.

None of these measures served to restrict arms sales and indeed Reagan introduced three measures to enhance arms sales as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. He offered FMS credit to favoured regimes, to be paid back over 30 years. He established a stock pile
system of weapons for future exports, and pushed through measures which reduced the specificities for Congressional oversight. The dollar threshold over which Congressional oversight was mandatory was doubled, and Reagan requested that NATO members, Japan, Australia and New Zealand be exempt from prior 30-day notification of sales to these countries. Reagan does not mention human rights. He maintains: "The best way to promote human rights is through ‘quiet diplomacy’ that does not dogmatically link a nation’s right record to arms sales or other assistance". Sales more than doubled in the period of 1981-82 from $7.3 billion to $19.6 billion.

In relation to Saudi Arabia’s issues, the centrepiece was the 1981 sale of AWACS/F-15 Enhancement equipment. This did much to raise Congressional alarm at the escalation of arms sales. In view of enormous priority given to national interest, it is difficult to determine how much the historical commitment to Saudi Arabia mattered, and how much the administration was concerned with the immediate relationship between arms sales and influence.

Though one may be uncertain as to how much difference political pressure and situations made to Nixon and Ford policy of arms sales such that they were obliged to sell arms to secure foreign policy initiatives, there can be no doubt that Reagan pursued an active, voluntary policy of arms sales, thus reversing the Carter policy and taking the U.S. back to the situation of arms policy before Carter. Whether it is a good or bad thing morally was of little concern to the Reagan administration, what mattered was the re-enforcement of the belief in the active pursuit of foreign policy influence through arms sales. It is this view be it a structural or an intentional phenomena, that has characterized much of the U.S. arms sales policy since the War and which I have suggested is based on naive perceptions.
I have argued that despite contrary intentions, U.S. sales under Carter rose substantially and that this is perhaps an inevitable part of foreign relations. I have given an overview of the arms sales policy trajectories of four presidents in relation to various arms sales decisions, especially as they relate to Saudi Arabia. The three major arms sales to Saudi Arabia must now be examined in detail for they will stand as my index of assessment of the arms transfer/influence relationship.

These decisions were outstanding in their complexity, and for the way they brought together the various factors which have especially joined Saudi Arabian interests to U.S. interests.

In order to illustrate U.S. foreign policy interests in supplying arms to Saudi Arabia, one might reconstruct the arguments that were advanced by the national factors - Executive, Congress and interest groups - as well as competition/pressure created by the international factors in major U.S. aircraft supply to Saudi Arabia which included F-5s, F-15s and AWACS/F-15 Enhancement. Table 1 presents the relevant information on the three major aircraft deals.
Table 1. Saudi Arabia's Major Aircraft Acquisitions from the US (1973-1983).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Approval</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item of weapon</td>
<td>Northrop F-5E/F</td>
<td>MDD (a) F-15 C/D</td>
<td>Boeing E-3A Sentry/F-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Item</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of weapon</td>
<td>Ground attack/</td>
<td>Air Superiority</td>
<td>Airborne warning and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tactical reconnaissance</td>
<td>fighter with</td>
<td>control system (AWACS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>capabilities for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>air-to-air</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>interception/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ground interdiction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Price</td>
<td>$769 million</td>
<td>$2.85 billion</td>
<td>$8.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>including spares/support</td>
<td>including training,</td>
<td>including spares, support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>spares/support</td>
<td>and training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of delivery</td>
<td>1976/79</td>
<td>1981/84</td>
<td>Begun in 1985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. McDonnell Douglas

Sources:
I. F-5s

The adoption of 'Nixon's Doctrine' in the late 1960s and the OPEC oil price in 1973/74 motivated President Nixon to supply security assistance to friendly countries strategically significant or with energy sources such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. This helped the Nixon administration to cope with a budget deficit and trade imbalance caused primarily by U.S. military expenditure in Vietnam and a rise in energy costs. This was reflected most clearly in the increased U.S. desire to be responsive to Saudi arms requests and military modernisation programme in the early 1970s. One of the most notable areas of increase in U.S./Saudi military co-operation was in the air defence.

Upon the setting up of a joint commission in 1974 on Saudi defense and training requirement, headed by Saudi Minister of Defense, Prince Sultan, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Robert Elseworth, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) prepared a series of studies for a comprehensive modernisation programme for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) known as 'Peace Hawk'. These studies and other supporting studies, examined the air threat to Saudi Arabia and Saudi air defense requirements. These studies dealt solely with Saudi air power and not with overall Saudi defence planning and modernisation.

The 'Peace Hawk' programme was based on the need to protect the country's far reaching coastal zones and the oil facilities which only had small military installations. Superiority in air defence could compensate for smaller numbers. However, the combat performance of F-5Es and dual seat F-5Fs varies depending on the armament configuration and the type of mission being flown. Major armament that can be carried with the F-5s include AGM-65 Maverick air-to-surface missiles, various guided bombs and AIM Sidewinder
air-to-air missiles. With this payload, the F-5E Tiger II with a range of 620 miles with 2 AIM-9Bs and 2,500lb bombs,\(^8^9\) from Khamis Mushayt, Taif, Tabuk, Dhahran bases, could with other support aircraft better protect Saudi air spaces in the South, South/West, North/West and North/East.

The willingness of the U.S. to sell the F-5s aircraft articulated largely in terms of security support to a moderate state country which was a friend of the U.S. The Director of DSAA, General Howard Fish, in his 1975 testimony to the House Committee on International Relations stated that the rationale for the sale of F-5s was the basic "fact that we have perceived them [the Saudis] as a moderating influence in the Middle East" and that "this was an attempt to begin to modernize their airforce".\(^9^0\) Further assessment by General Fish of the rightness of such enhancement sales was cast in terms of the potential threat to a country perceived as weak, the enemy generated by that country having "significant resources" and in the case of Saudi Arabia the difficulties of its foreign relations with Iraq, Syria and the Yemen.\(^9^1\) But it is acknowledged in the Report of Staff Survey Mission to the Arabian Peninsula, December 1977, that the 1974 DoD survey of the RSAF played a key role in recommending the purchase of the F-5E aircraft. Further to this, one may note that the Saudis did not want the F-5s but had been seeking the more powerful F-4 Phantom multi-role fighter aircraft which only then were being used to modernise the USAF (though it was anticipated that F-15 air superiority would quickly supersede the F-4s in the USAF). However the restricted flying distance of the F-5s to 220 miles tended to satisfy the Israeli lobby that they would not be used to attack Israel.\(^9^2\)

Each major increment of U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia led to a more serious debates in the U.S. Congress than had occurred over
the previous sales. For instance, the sale of AWACS/F-15s Enhancement in 1981 triggered more heated Congressional debates than the sale of F-15s in 1978, and the former sale created more debates than the sale of Maverick and Sidewinder missiles in 1976. At the same time, as I stated earlier, new laws were created to give the Congress a more effective oversight on U.S. foreign military sales. The most important act was the AECA of 1976 which obliged the Executive to release more data than had previously been available to Congress and the public. The release of technical information on the weapons systems helped trigger more intense efforts by various pro-Israeli groups, and in the Congress, to attempt to block the U.S. administration's proposals to sell advanced 'high-tech' weapons systems such as the F-15s in 1978 and AWACS/F-15 Enhancement in 1981.

While members of the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs committees were most concerned that increased U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia would represent a threat to the security of Israel and upset the military balance of the region, they were not aware that the Saudis' large requests for weapons systems were based on U.S. assessments of Saudi air defence needs which in turn, and ultimately, were U.S. military planning factors. By advising on 'restricted' F-5s, and not F-4s, the DoD clearly did not always respond on the basis of Saudi air defence needs, but had also to consider the concern for profit by the U.S. arms corporations and the minimisation costs to the USAF R & D. Furthermore, Congressional hearings on arms sales to Saudi Arabia illustrated that Senators participating in these hearings seemed not to be aware of the history of the Anglo-American air defence package in the mid-1960s, and the commission payments by Lockheed, Raytheon and Northrop for their C-130s transport planes, Hawk missiles, and F-5s aircraft in the late 1960s and early and middle 1970s. Instead Congressional hearings
placed the blame of commission payments on senior Saudi officials and arms dealers such as Adnan Khashoggi of Saudi Arabia.

It is clear from the text of 1976 Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Saudi Arabia was often blamed for making large weapons requests (60 F-5s in 1975) when it was simply following the advice of the USAF. Consequently the Senate hearings referred to possible Saudi motives such as piling up arms for the Arab states threatening Israel. It is obvious from the Saudis requests published in the hearings that the DoD was encouraging the Saudis to buy more aircraft (Saudi Arabia had 70 F-5Es in 1977 and 114 in 1983) than it needed and that the U.S. MAAG in Saudi Arabia was probably not tailoring its work to Saudi military needs and operating conditions.

II  F-15s

A  Influencing Factors (National)

1  Executive Branch

In early 1978, President Carter proposed to sell as 'Jet Package' of two hundred advanced aircraft: sixty F-15 fighter/interceptors to Saudi Arabia at a cost of $2.85 billion including spare parts, training and support, fifteen F-15s to Israel, which already had twenty-five, along with seventy-five F-16 fighter/bombers and fifty F-5 fighters to Egypt. The 'Jet Package' was submitted by the Carter administration later that year to the Congress which could, under the terms of AECA of 1976, veto the package of sales proposals within 30 days. President Carter warned the Congress that he would withdraw the whole arms package proposals if the Congress should accept a portion of it and reject another. President Carter's warning against congressional veto underlay his conviction of the utility of arms transfers in promoting American political and economic interests in the Middle East when he stated
that congressional veto would lead to "turn aside those in the Middle
East who work for moderation and peace... shattering their confidence
in us".99 Apparently President Carter believed that arms transfers
would dissuade Sadat's Egypt from breaking away from the American
supported peace initiative in the Arab-Israeli conflict after that
initiative seemed to go nowhere. Implicitly the American President
hoped that Saudi Arabia would not back an oil embargo against the
U.S. if the peace initiative failed.100 As would have been expected,
both the DoD and the DoS backed the deal unreservedly. Secretary of
State, Cyrus Vance, argued that arms transfers served U.S. national
interests by asserting that the 'Jet Package' would increase
confidence in the recipients to defend themselves and thereby would
move them towards a negotiated peace settlement.101 Later the
Secretary, in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, defended
President Carter's position in selling the jet planes to Saudi Arabia
when he referred to Saudi Arabia's importance to the support of U.S.
dollars (i.e. Saudi Arabia sells oil for American currency) and to
Saudi moderation on OPEC prices.102

Since the Department of Defense's military survey in the early
1970s in Saudi Arabia established the latter's defense needs,103 the
DoD argued in favour of the Saudi military aircraft sales. Also the
sales represented a powerful financial incentive for the DoD since it
would help the DoD to reduce its unit cost of weapons systems through
longer production lines,] and to recoup Research and Development (R &
D) costs by passing on a share of the costs of weapons to Saudi
Arabia.

However, the three main interested agencies held reservations.
ACDA advised restraint by arguing that the sales of advanced jet
aircraft to Saudi Arabia would lead other countries in the Middle
East to seek comparable aircraft, i.e. the sale would accelerate the
arms race in the Middle East region, and thereby might jeopardise U.S. security interests.

Because of the possibility that advanced military aircraft might be lost to unfriendly hands in case of a change of government in Saudi Arabia, both the CIA and the DIA supported the sale as long as a U.S. sharing of the F-15s classified technology with the Saudis would be permitted.

The departments most concerned with economic aspects expectedly supported the race. Both Treasury and Commerce Departments emphasised the importance of the jet sale to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia had invested $30 billion in U.S. government securities and $10 billion in U.S. industries, thereby recouping America's energy import costs. In addition to military purchases, Saudi Arabia purchased $5 billion in non-military goods and services from the U.S.

The Energy Department described Saudi Arabia as the most important source of foreign oil for the U.S. Saudi Arabia provided one-fifth of of total U.S. imported oil in 1977. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producing country to defend the use of U.S. dollars in determining oil prices. Therefore, a Saudi switch to other currencies would be likely to send the value of the dollar downward with the possible consequence of a loss of international confidence in the American economy. Finally, Saudi Arabia, by producing more oil than she needed for its development, was satisfying the American as well as the Western countries' energy needs. Below is Table 2 showing the percentage of U.S. oil inputs from Saudi Arabia. Thus, the executive branch was not as one on the decision, though as I have shown, in their view, there were no substantial objectives to the sale despite the obvious second-term electoral worries. The uncertainties in Iran made electoral considerations rather redundant.
Table 2  U.S. Crude Oil Imports 1973-1983 (millions of barrels annually)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Imports</th>
<th>Imports from</th>
<th>Per cent of</th>
<th>Per cent Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Saudi Oil</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1184</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1269</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1498</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>2414</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2320</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2380</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1605</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1273</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1215</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2. Legislative Branch

Senator Jacob Javits (R - NY) warned that the sales of F-15s to Saudi Arabia would make the Israeli leader Menachem Begin less flexible on the U.S. supported Middle East peace initiative. 107 Senator Henry Jackson (D - Washington) argued that the sale of advanced jet aircraft to Saudi Arabia would have "a profound and destabilising effect on the delicate military balance between Israel and her neighbours". 108 Senator Daniel Moynihan (D - NY) warned that the sales of the planes to Saudi Arabia would make the security of Israel an item of barter in American-Arab relations. 109 However, Senator Abraham Ribcoff (D - Conn) stressed that "a strong and secure Israel is in our national interest... but a strong United States, military, economically and diplomatically is also in Israel's interests". 110 Senator George McGovern (D - Sth Dak) warned that
Israel supporters should not press too hard against the arms sales to Saudi Arabia "to the point where America loses its capacity to influence the Arab leadership toward the peace table". 111

3. Pressure Groups

The Saudi lobby in Washington D.C. led by the then Saudi military attache, now the present Saudi Ambassador Bandar Bin Sultan, argued that the Saudis needed arms to replace their obsolete fighters for the defense of the Kingdom’s huge, but vulnerable, oil fields which were of great importance to Western energy needs. In interview, Sheikh Faisal Alhegelan stated clearly that Saudi Arabia needed arms to protect its vital interests and that Saudi Arabia and the United States had a common interest in protecting the oil fields and the sea routes for oil exports. He pointed to the disastrous consequences for Saudi Arabia and the West should there be a lack of military protection. 112 Further, the Saudis stressed that they had the cash to buy replacements elsewhere such as Britain, France or others if the U.S. turned them down. The Saudi lobby also aimed at raising American consciousness about the friendship and common strategic and economic interests that bound the U.S.A. to Saudi Arabia. 113 John Richardson of the NAAA, for instance, linked arms sales to Saudi Arabia to U.S. national interests when he urged that America as an industrial giant had to "face up to the fact that interests include continuing access to the one commodity - oil - that makes this whole thing go". 114

Counterposed to the Saudi lobby was the distinctly more powerful Israeli lobby. In his visit to Washington, the Israeli leader, Manachem Begin, commented that "Saudi Arabia will be turned automatically into a confrontation state", and that Israel regarded the proposed arms sales as "very, very dangerous" 115 and these would
escalate and not reduce tension in the Middle East. This notion was echoed by the Israeli ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, in Washington when he stated that the sales of F-15s to Saudi Arabia represent "a potential threat". Morris Amitay of the AIPAC warned against the sales of warplanes to Saudi Arabia as a 'reward' for Saudi moderation in regard to oil prices and to the Arab-Israeli conflict: "A cycle of blackmail could be established as the United States attempts to keep Saudi Arabia moderate". It may be noted that Israel would resent most forms of support for an Arab state, such that their objection at root would not be just the military threat Saudi Arabia could pose.

Above the political particularities of Saudi and Israeli lobbies were the highly influential arms co-operations. In the U.S. much research, development (R & D) and production of arms is done by private industries such as McDonnell Douglas (produces F-15), Northrop (produces F-5), and Boeing (produces AWACS). Most of these arms corporations' products are consumed by the Pentagon. Logically then these corporations and others expand their foreign arms sales whenever the Pentagon fails to consume their total products. Without this foreign outlet any continued downturn in the Pentagon outlet would cause a fall-off in the arms industries and eventually lead to the closure of major plants and assembly lines. The importance of this foreign outlet proved critical to U.S. arms firms after the U.S. withdrawal from South East Asia in the mid 1970's, and Pentagon cutback in military programs. Thus, instead of closing plants or assembly lines, the arms corporations launched an aggressive campaign with the U.S. government to sell arms to foreign countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. These corporations were also aware that if their countries did not make arms sales agreements with foreign countries then they would lose their share in the arms market to other international corporations. Therefore, the arms corporations
lobby argued that the sale of F-15s at a cost of $2.85 million meant profit, work and an increased share of markets.118

B. Influencing Factors (International)

Not only was the justification of the Carter administration to sell arms to Saudi Arabia based on strategical factors, i.e. to help governments in the area to meet the threats of their security from the Soviet activism in the Southern Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of African and later in Afghanistan,119 but was also because she lost ground to some aggressive competitors particularly the Soviet Union, in the Third World arms market.120 If one accepted the assumption that arms sales symbolised friendship and political commitment to recipients, then Soviet capturing a share of American Third World markets meant Soviet attempts to establish arms-supply relationships with these countries. Of course, there was no possibility of Saudi Arabia turning to the Soviet Union, but the advancement of Soviet arms trade in the Middle East region was an implicit threat to Saudi Arabia. Thus she needed to be assured of U.S. support and moreover, U.S. commitment.

Saudi officials used the sale of F-15s as a test of this friendship and commitment to Saudi security. For instance, oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani expressed concern about the lack of appreciation by Washington to Saudi Arabia's security needs when he asserted that if the sale of F-15s was rejected by the Congress "we will have a feeling that they are not concerned with our security and do not appreciate our friendship".121 Minister of Information, Muhamed Abdul Yamani, added that "approval of the aircraft sale would lead to a strengthening of the bonds of friendship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States".122 The foreign minister, Saud Al-Faisal, warned that rejection of the sales would
lead to a re-evaluation of relations with the U.S.\textsuperscript{123} King Khalid wrote to President Carter pointing out that U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia were a symbol of American security commitment against communist expansion in the region.\textsuperscript{124} It appeared that Saudi's request for the F-15s reflected more than a military significance. It was a demand for political responses and reassurance that could not be understood only within military terms.

III AWACS/F-15s Enhancement

A Influencing Factors (National)

1. Executive Branch

In early 1981, President Reagan proposed the sale of AWACS and materials to upgrade the existing F-15s to Saudi Arabia. He stated that the sale was essential "to protect our interests in the region... and because a serious deterioration over the last year or so of security conditions in the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf region and the growing threats there to our friends from the Soviet Union and other pressures".\textsuperscript{125} Therefore, in order to meet the growing threat of the Soviet Union after Afghanistan, the uncertainty of the Gulf after the fall of the Shah in the late 1970s and the onset of war between Iraq and Iran in the early 1980s, the President announced an arms package to Saudi Arabia. This was composed of five Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACs) and F-15s enhancement (fuel tanks, bomb racks, and air-to-air missiles) at a cost of $8.5 billion.\textsuperscript{126} President Reagan believed that the arms package to Saudi Arabia was of paramount importance to U.S. national security interests since it would help to counter the new alliance of South Yemen, Ethiopia and Libya which was formed in the early 1980s. Among the objectives of this new alliance was to eliminate western influence in the Arab world, the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean.
The strategic linkage of South Yemen and Ethiopia would enable these two pro-Soviet states to control the Southern straits of the Red Sea.

The Red Sea has been and is becoming increasingly important to the West due to the new Saudi oil terminal at Yanbu which exports 1-2 million barrels a day at present with a capacity to increase this output if necessary.

If the strategy of the alliance is to eliminate Western influence then one way to do it is to put military pressure on the pro-Western oriented governments such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Sudan. If as a result the pro-Soviet alliance was able to change the political system of one of these states, similar changes might occur in the neighbouring states (domino theory).

Reagan, in proposing the arms package to Saudi Arabia, also expressed his political commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia. Later in the year, President Reagan defended his decision to sell arms to Saudi Arabia, stating that he would not allow Saudi Arabia to turn into another Iran. Illustrating Western dependence on Saudi oil he stated, "There is no way we could stand by and see that country [Saudi Arabia] to be taken by any one that would shut off that oil". Commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia was asserted later when the President stated, "I am convinced that providing Saudi Arabia with this equipment will improve the security of our friends, strengthen our posture in the regions, and make it clear to both local governments and the Soviet Union leadership that the United States is determined to assist in preserving security and stability in South East Asia". Finally, the President was convinced that the U.S. arms package to Saudi Arabia would "... enhance the atmosphere and prospect for progress towards peace and the initiatives towards the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region..."
The defence of this AWACS package was more problematical, but unlike Carter's stated policy of arms reduction, the Reagan policy was more aggressive and U.S. centred. The Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, in defending President Reagan's decision to sell AWACs and the F-15s Enhancement equipment to Saudi Arabia, stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "We must not let our friends' worries about one another diminish our commitment to their security or hinder our plans to extend strategic co-operation with them". Haig asserted that arms sales "can move the peace process forward and protect our vital interests in an unstable area exposed... to threats from the Soviet Union and its proxies". The proposed arms sales, he added, will increase the Saudis' "ability to defend themselves against local threats, they will directly assist the U.S. forces deployed in the region just as the U.S. AWACs today". Saudi Arabia also provided itself as an essential partner in broader U.S. interests: "Saudi assistance has been important in the past to states that broke away from the Soviet embrace. Saudi Arabia has provided important financial assistance to moderate states such as the Sudan and Pakistan... it has played an essential diplomatic role in negotiating the recent ceasefire in Lebanon... we expect Saudi co-operation in fostering peace and stability". James Buckley, State Department Under Secretary for security assistance, stated that the Reagan administration "believes that arms transfers serve as an important adjunct to our own security... by helping to deter acts of aggression and by enhancing the self-defense capabilities of nations with which we share close security ties". In the aftermath of the lack of American responses to the fall of the Shah, the American hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, James Buckley asserted that the proposed arms package sales to Saudi Arabia is the 'corner stone' of the Reagan policy of
reviving American "strength and credibility in the region... the best long guarantee of security... of states in the area wishing to remain free from Soviet pressure". 136

The DoD argued similarly as it did with the sale of F-15s in 1978, that the Reagan proposed 1981 arms sales to Saudi Arabia would reduce the aircraft's unit cost and thus provide budgetary savings. Strategically, the DoD after the fall of the Shah in Iran and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, hoped that arms sales to Saudi Arabia would strengthen the military co-operation of the Saudis with the United States. 137 Moreover, the DoD believed that American advanced defense systems would soften Saudi opposition to the U.S. to acquire docking privileges or overflight rights in Saudi Arabia or in the neighbouring states for the American Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF).

Once again, among the advisory agencies there was uncertainty and divisions. The NSC was in line with Reagan's policy - whereas ACDA and the CIA gave vent to fears in terms of potential problems at the regional and global levels.

In a television programme (Macneil-Lehrer Report) in September 1981, the National Security Council adviser, Richard Allen, stated that the arms package sale to Saudi Arabia serves U.S. foreign policy interests by enhancing the defences of Saudi Arabia in a situation that is threatened by a number of factors including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, war in the Gulf and Cuban advisers in Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia could be drawn to a network of nations that seek peace and stability in the Middle East. 138

ACDA on the other hand expressed caution that the sophisticated arms package to Saudi Arabia would undermine the military balance in the Middle East by bringing other states of the region into an arms race. (Michael Klare, 1984).
The CIA director, Stansfield Turner, warned of the AWAC's technological secrets being exposed to Soviet intelligence activities: "If the Soviets gain access to AWACs, they could advantage five to seven years in certain technology and learn any now-contemplated version of the AWACs".139

In their role as a judge of matters economic, the Treasury and Commerce Departments supported the sale. The payment of $8.5 billion for the AWACs deal in cash by Saudi Arabia meant creating jobs and improving the balance of trade. Table 3 indicates the net advantage to Saudi Arabia from U.S./Saudi Arabia trade. It will be seen that only recently has the U.S. gained the advantage.

Table 3 U.S. Trade with Saudi Arabia 1973-1983 ($ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports (a)</th>
<th>Imports (b)</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>-1228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>-835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>2623</td>
<td>-1121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2772</td>
<td>5213</td>
<td>-2441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3575</td>
<td>6347</td>
<td>-2772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>4370</td>
<td>5307</td>
<td>-937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>4875</td>
<td>7893</td>
<td>-3108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5769</td>
<td>12509</td>
<td>-6740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>7327</td>
<td>14391</td>
<td>-7064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>9026</td>
<td>7443</td>
<td>+1583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>7903</td>
<td>3627</td>
<td>+4276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Excluding military items and services  
b. Mostly in form of oil

Sources:

In addition, Saudi Arabia by retaining investment of a major part of its surplus funds in dollars would strengthen the U.S. dollar. Saudi Arabia also provides a market for U.S. advanced
technology, such as for the Saudi nation-wide computer information systems, water desalination plants, and projects in solar power.

2. The Congress

The U.S. Congress was again divided on whether or not the arms package of AWACs and the F-15 enhancement served U.S. national interests. Congressional critics of the arms sales to Saudi Arabia urged that the F-15s equipped with fuel tankers, would be able to strike deep in Israeli territory and the AWACs would provide a command platform in the air to guide the F-15s for attack. AWACs also would be able to monitor Israeli defense installations and activities within the Saudi skies. Critics also opposed the arms sales on the ground that if the sale is a test of friendship, that friendship should be reciprocal and thus political and economic concessions from Saudi Arabia on U.S. initiatives such as Camp David as well as Saudi restrain on oil production and price policies should be met before approving the arms sales. It was further argued that the sale of sophisticated AWACs package necessitated the presence of American servicemen and personnel to service and maintain aircraft, and train pilots in Saudi Arabia, and if Saudi Arabia should get involved in a local or regional conflict, then these American servicemen are possibly subject to involvement in the conflict. "If for example, they [the Saudis] used their AWACs in a regional conflict, that would necessarily involve American servicemen and draw in the United States against its will and against its interests". Congressional proponents of the arms package argued that arms sales to Saudi Arabia served the economic as well as the political interests of the United States in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, for instance, froze its oil prices at $32 a barrel, (the lowest among OPEC), in 1981. William Quandt has made the point that the U.S.
wishes to exercise restraint on the Saudi oil policy by stating that arms sales to Saudi Arabia represent an attempt by the U.S. to influence OPEC over oil price and production. Some in Congress argued that AWACs do not necessarily represent a military threat to Israel since, according to General David Jones (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) Israel has the military capability to jam the AWACs radar as well as knock them down. Proponents of the arms sales added that Saudi Arabia executed political efforts to moderate the PLO and other radical regimes towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Senator Edward Kennedy (D - Mass) stressed that the arms sale package to Saudi Arabia is not in the national interest of the U.S. since the "arms package offensive weapons could endanger the U.S.'s closest ally in the Middle East - Israel". Senator Bob Packwood (R - Idaho) stated that Saudi Arabia is not committed to the course of peace in the Middle East. Instead, Saudi Arabia condemned the Israeli-Egypt peace accords, financed the PLO and called for a holy war against Israel. Senator Patrick Moynihan, concerned with the loss of sophisticated weapons to unfriendly hands in case of social disorder, pointed out that the U.S. almost sold its sophisticated radar planes (AWACs) to the Shah of Iran in 1977, and he demanded to know: "where would we be if the Ayatollah had the AWACs". Senator Alan Cranston (D - California) concerned with the arms race in the Middle East, stated that "the introduction of these sophisticated new weapons in the Middle East can only escalate the arms race and place Israeli military force on a hair trigger". The fall of these sophisticated planes into unfriendly hands, according to Senator Rudy Boschwitz (R - Minnesota) would hurt the Pentagon's ability to counter Soviet planes in Europe and elsewhere. However, other Senators argued that the arms sales to Saudi Arabia does not represent a security threat to Israel. Senator William Cohen (R -
Maine) who changed his vote from opposition to support, said that his support of the sale was based on President Reagan's assurance that "he would not permit Israel's military superiority to be eroded". Senator Barry Goldwater (R - Arizona), on the other hand, stated that AWACs "is not offensive. it is designed to give Saudi Arabia information of what potential enemy forces are up to". Moreover, "Israel could send jets up to shoot down AWACs any time it wants". He added, "It is about time for us to worry about the United States" and stressed that "the defence of Saudi Arabia... is more important to America than the defence of any Arab country in the Middle East" because "if Soviet power ever gains domination over the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf we will be through as a world power".

Senator James McClure (R - Idaho) urged that since the Western World depends largely on the Middle Eastern oil, particularly from Saudi Arabia, then the arms sales to the latter country serves the national interests of the United States. He added that "if Congress rejects the $8.5 billion arms package that includes AWACs, Saudi Arabia will reassess its oil policy. The Saudis may also look elsewhere for weapons".

3. Pressure Groups

James Akins, a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, agreed with senator McClure when he said that "the Saudis will re-examine their oil production policy if Congress rejects the deal". He added "if, as some people say, the Saudis produce as much oil as they do because they economically have to, then rejection would make no difference However, if the Saudis feel they can produce less... the rejection could result in a cut in Saudi output".

The Saudi Ambassador, Faisal Al-Hejelan, argued in the 1981, as he had done concerning the F-15s in 1978, that the United States is
constantly putting Israel's interests before its own. Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Robert Neumann, observed Saudi's peaceful efforts in the Middle East, citing the Saudi sponsored negotiations that led to the indirect ceasefire between Israel and the PLO in 1981 and the cooling of the Syrian-Israeli missile crisis in 1982 and helping the Western Sahara dispute to move towards a peaceful settlement.

The clear moderation of Saudi Arabia compared to the radical nationalist or Pan-Arabist ideologies of other Soviet-backed states is in firm contradiction to Senator Packwood's comments about Saudi Arabia cited above. Indeed, Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post noted that "Saudi Arabia is willing and able through its growing oil wealth to counter radical trends and Soviet influence in areas of the Middle East, Africa and even Europe". The main thrust of the Saudi case was in terms of their non-aggressive intentions and moderate political outlook in the Middle East. This line was met head-on by the Israeli lobby. The Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, warned that the sale of AWACs and extended range equipment for F-15 fighter/interceptors to Saudi Arabia could create a grave danger to the security of Israel since the AWACs can monitor Israeli aircraft, airfields, and military installations from Saudi territory, and the extended equipment such as fuel tanks and the air-to-air missiles would increase the range and power of the F-15s. The Prime Minister also attacked the claim by the U.S. administration that Saudi Arabia played a useful role in crises: "Saudi monarch is bent on Jihad, or holy war, against Israel, and not capable of playing any useful role whatsoever". The Israeli foreign minister, Yitzhak Shamir, disputed U.S. administration of Saudi moderation, asserting that the Saudis were extremely motivated by a "fanatic hatred of Jews and Israel".
Anti-Defamation League (ADL) opposed the arms sales to Saudi Arabia on the basis that Saudi Arabia is "an oil arrogant... opposed Camp David and financed PLO terrorism".162

Any economic lobby was likely to push invariably for a highly lucrative sale. The U.S. arms manufacturers were deposed to the sale as were the Treasury and Commerce Departments. The arms corporations lobby argued, as it did with the F-15s of 1978, that arms sales to Saudi Arabia would serve as an outlet for their product, whenever the Pentagon fails to consume their total product. Arms corporations found support from the Reagan administration which exercised less restraint on arms transfers policy.

B. Influencing Factors (International)

According to President Reagan on the arms transfer policy of 1981, the U.S. "must not only strengthen its own military capabilities, but be prepared to help its friends and allies to strengthen theirs through the transfer of conventional arms".163 Strategically then, the President's willingness to sell sophisticated conventional weapons such as AWACs to a friend of the United States, i.e. Saudi Arabia, emphasised his real intention for using the arms sales as an instrument to challenge the Soviet Union and gain influence after the latter succeeded in having influences in Afghanistan, Southern Arabia and the Horn of Africa. Economically, the President's flexibility in transferring advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia was intended to compete with the Soviet Union in the Third World markets. This intention was backed by Reagan's inflexible attitude towards characterising the Soviet Union as the enemy. This taken with the emphasis upon U.S. domestic strength be it through direct or indirect military enhancement, meant that American intentions and Saudi intentions diverged, through their particular
major domestic interests converged. The bitter experience of the 1978 F-15s sales did not deter Saudi Arabia from requesting U.S. military assistance in the early 1980s in order to continue improving their own defence capabilities. A commitment to military aid from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s symbolised, for the Saudis, friendship and a demand for reassurance and reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to Saudi security in the wake of unstable conditions in Southern Arabia, the Gulf and the Horn of Africa. These threats necessitated an acceleration of military aid to Saudi Arabia by the United States.

Though Saudi Arabia spent massively on defence modernisation there still remained a very limited ability to meet its territorial integrity. In other words, Saudi military capacity did not match Saudi defense expenditure, which was in excess of $20 billion per year. One reason is that Saudi Arabia spent 50% on constructing military bases and infrastructures, 20% on purchasing military hardware, and only 30% on developing fighting capability.

Therefore, the maintenance of American military assistance and advice was at the least necessary as a symbol of American political commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis regional as well as global threats. Logically then, the AWACs and the improvement equipment to the F-15s in 1981 became once again a symbol of American friendship and support to Saudi Arabia. To illustrate this point one may mention the Saudi official's statement to an American delegation visiting Saudi Arabia that, if the package sales were to fail, the larger security commitments would be in question.

Conclusion

From my analysis of the long-term politics of the US Congress and Executive, the following policy interests, which are also reflective
of Saudi interests and responses, are brought into relief.

One could summarise that the national and international factors have characterised the following national interests of the United States vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia, through its arms transfers of F-5s in 1975, F-15s in 1978, and AWACs/F-15s Enhancement in 1981, as follows:

I. Economic/Oil
   A To ensure Saudi co-operation on oil production and price policies.
   B To absorb the surplus output of arms corporations as well as to assist in the cost of research and development of new weapons systems.
   C To encourage Saudi trade and investment.

II. Military/Defense
   A To ensure the safety of the Saudi oil fields which are of immediate concern to the U.S.
   B To promote a regional military balance and stability.
   C To acquire military bases/facilities on a regular or emergency basis.
   D To assure the security of the regime internally and externally.

III. Political/Diplomatic
   A To provide leverage on the Saudi leadership by the pursuit of important diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East.
   B To maintain the pro-Western orientation of Saudi Arabia and thereby to exclude Soviet attempts of influence in Saudi Arabia.
   C To contain Soviet influence.

It must be noted here, that one, in describing political 'reality', cannot separate off US ends from Saudi ends. For the most
part, insofar as there is a relationship between US and Saudi Arabia, they are in a dialectical relationship of mutually determining interests. There is little doubt that at the initiating point of the relationship, US shaped Saudi responses through the US setting of US interests. But the emergent historical relationship set within global politics from the War onwards, bound them together. Thus, for instance, the protection of Saudi oil is what Saudi wants for its economic interests, and it is what America wants Saudi to do through the American arms supply. But what America wants Saudi to do, what Saudi Arabia wants America to do (supply arms) and what Saudi wants to do for itself, (oil/domestic security) are inextricably linked together historically. The 'immediate' causal structure of influence is set against an historical structure of influence, and it is this, which determines the interplay of the two states, and the limits of the causal structure of influence. As I have said, one must examine this in dialectical, not one-way causal terms. The meaning of what US wants Saudi Arabia to do, is as such, indeterminate without a global and an historical setting.

It is clear that the United States' interests in supplying arms to Saudi Arabia are influenced and shaped by a number of significant factors, including national as well as international ones. Amongst national factors, there are: the executive, the legislature, pressure groups, and arms manufacturers. As for international factors, one has to remember that the U.S.A., as a super power, has a position to defend vis-a-vis the other super power (Soviet Union). Furthermore, as a global power, it has a vested interest in determining the relationships with and between regional states (Saudi Arabia).

To put it into perspective, the U.S.A.'s attempts to influence are shaped and limited by these very factors. Similarly, although the U.S.A. may wish to become the significant party in the use of
arms transfers to influence Saudi Arabia’s behaviour, it would always be faced with the conflict of interests vis-a-vis the situation in the Middle East. For instance, domestic constraints require the United States to maintain the security of Israel. The external pressures (regional conflicts of Southern Asia, the Gulf, the Middle East) require the United States to preserve the security of Saudi Arabia.

Finally, the question remains: Does the United States achieve or fail to achieve the intended economic, military and political interests, through the three major aircraft deals vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia? This is tackled in Chapter Five where an attempt is made to provide an in depth analysis.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE


5. Ibid, p.325.


12. We say 'formally' because we beleive that in many cases a superpower's sphere of influence, or lack of it, is so great in certain areas that their conception of the logic of a foreign policy initiative automatically, in effect a-priori, takes as an assumption the effect of their policy on their opposite numbers.


22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
32. Ibid, pp.31-32.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.


41. Joel Husbands, op.cit., p.163.

42. Ibid.


45. Ibid.


48. HCFA, op.cit., p.28.


57. B. Grayson, op.cit., p.117.
64. Ibid.
65. CQ, Kissinger Wins Over Foreign Relations Committee on Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, Congressional Quarterly, October 2, 1976, pp.2711-12.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
73. HCFA, Executive-Legislative on U.S. Arms Sales, op.cit., p.16.
74. Ibid.


84. Ibid, p.6.


90. Ibid, p.21.


92. Ibid, p.33.


94. SFRC, op.cit., pp.2-4, 10, 24.


96. SFRC, op.cit., pp.55-60, 70-80, 87.

97. AWST, op.cit., p.48.


104. Ibid.


111. Ibid.


117. SFRC, op.cit., p.166.


124. AWST, 22 May 1979, p.20.

125. HCFA, Saudi Arabia and United States, op.cit., p.64.


127. As of the Iraq-Iran War, Saudi Arabia built a new oil terminal at Yanbu on the Red Sea for exporting its oil and to ensure that supplies would not be hampered in the events of future conflict in the Gulf region.


132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.


140. Many of these opponents and supporters' arguments are found in SFRC, The Proposed AWACS/F-15 Enhancement Sales to Saudi Arabia, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1981), and HCFA, Proposed Sale of Airborne Warning and Control System, (AWACS), and F-15


146. CSM, 28 September 1981, p.27.


148. CSM, op.cit., p.27.


151. CSM, op.cit., p.1.


153. Interview, op.cit., p.67.


155. Ibid.


CHAPTER FOUR

SAUDI ARABIA'S SECURITY DETERMINANTS IN SEEKING U.S. ARMS

This chapter attempts to explore Saudi Arabia's security determinants in seeking American arms assistance. Section I attempts to provide an analysis of the concept of security by asking questions such as: What is security, at what level? What challenges might a state face at home and abroad? What policies, in terms of objectives and actions, might a state implement to cope with these challenges? Section II applies the analytical framework of security to the case of Saudi Arabia and is divided into two main periods of pre-1973 and 1973-1983. The first period broadly analyses the development of security/defence policies in terms of threats and strategies. It is crucial to note that the pre-1973 period sets the scene and functions as a context for my central period: 1973-1983.

I. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS

A. The Meaning of Security

Security is a basic concept in the field of international relations. It helps to connect usually separate studies such as strategy, sovereignty and foreign policy. Security is a modern term in political discourse broadly meaning the protection of all state interests against internal and external threats. Therefore, security is a central concept. Prominent studies in the 1970s on oil and Islamic politics which have been largely concerned with strategy, can also be seen as a part of security analysis since security can include the political and economic, as well as military dimensions of these studies. Also foreign, military and economic policies of a
state are largely based on the perception of threats to state security since such policies are formulated to lessen these threats.

As I have shown, the concept of security plays a central role in the field of international relations. However, scholars in this areas have neglected research in comparison to other concepts. A lack of attention by scholars to the concept of security compared with the amount of work done on such concepts as 'power' and 'peace', creates a gap in the literature. However, I employ a working definition for the concept, and then apply it to the state I am concerned with - Saudi Arabia.

One may look at the following definitions in order to examine the concept of security:

1. Websters Dictionary defines security as "freedom from danger... freedom from fear or anxiety... something that secures Protection". Whilst this definition is useful in illustrating that the essence of security is to protect from danger or attack, it is very broad and general.

2. John Herz describes security as the "ability of the Political authority (the State) to provide both pacification of and control over, internal relations and protection from outside interference". Herz's definition of security is specific and deals with security at one level - the State.

3. Michael H.H. Louw states that "national security includes traditional defence policy and also the non-military actions of a state to ensure its total capacity to survive as a political entity in order to exert influence and to carry out its internal and international objectives".

4. For my purposes the concept of security is the use of specified state organs, normally the armed forces, police, and intelligence services to reduce internal vulnerabilities and
external threats.

Whilst both my own and Louw's definitions specifically address the responses of the state to various challenges, the use of resources to that end, I also encompass the source of such challenges as stated in Herz's definition. Also, my definition of the concept of security is applicable to the case of Saudi Arabia, as will be discussed later. One point which should be made, is that the definition of 'security' involves both the employment of the agents of security and the discursive modes of ensuring the continuation of security, e.g. foreign relations/diplomacy.

This attempt to define the concept of security is useful in two ways: Firstly it focuses on one level - the State, which I will discuss further, and secondly, it clarifies the ends and means of State security policies towards challenges, which I will also analyse more fully.

B. The Level of Security - The State

In this Chapter I will attempt to examine the issue of security at one level - statehood. Largely this thesis deals with relations between two states, Saudi Arabia and the United States, rather than its internal plurality of individuals, groups, factions, tribes and the like. But below I consider the bearing such elements have upon the security of the state.

In order to illustrate the link between individuals, groups, and state security, it could be said that whilst some states provide security for the populace - such as protection from disease, crime, unemployment, others may intend threats to individuals or organised groups. Among these threats are imprisonment and torture, denial of civil rights and self-determination for ethnic groups. While there is implication of harmonious relations between individuals and state
in the first case, a definite disharmony exists between individuals or groups in the second. Moreover, the actions of individuals or groups (the Basques in Spain, the Kurds in Iraq, Iran and Turkey and the PLO in 8 Arab states) may pose serious internal security problems. Equally states are, or feel threatened by other states: Iraq/Iran, U.S.A./U.S.S.R. One concludes then, that security policies of States must be formulated in relation to both domestic and foreign contexts.

The association of the international system (external environment) and state security could be similar to individual and state security - i.e. it could be a relation of harmony or disharmony. When a state refuses to take account of other states, a system of anarchy may prevail. Such anarchic relations will generate endless struggle between states to consolidate sovereignty and thereby provoke endless conflict and war between them. On the other hand, where there is mutual recognition, and acceptance of sovereignty, territorial boundaries and other national determinants, then war and conflict is less likely. In addition, other norms such as settling disputes by peaceful means, non-interference in the affairs of others and respect for ideologies stabilise relations between states, enabling them to enjoy order and security derived from attempts to regulate relations in a harmonious and balanced way. Once again, one might state that since there is a linkage between state security and international system (environment), security policies of states must consider the interests of other states. This relation between the international system and state security will be discussed later when examining the external threats facing Saudi Arabia.
C. **State Security**

1. **Security Challenges**
   a) Internal
   b) External

2. **Security Policies**
   a) Objectives
   b) Actions

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1. **State Security Challenges**
   a) **Internal**

   The previous definition of security assumes that security is a primary value for most states since this value involves their existence and survival. Though this value is shared by most states, some will experience different problems in their search for security. One reason for this is that states are different in nature. When this is the case, security challenges vary from one state to another. In order to understand the challenges confronting them, one must analyse the nature of these states.

   The nature of states consists of different elements, and I will now consider some of the more essential:

   **Elements of States -**

   i) **A Distinction**

   What are the functions of the state? It must provide law and order, goods and services, and defence for its people. But underlying the material benefits a state can provide, is a requirement of political and economic stability - harmony among its people. It may be noted that some patterns of stability will be the result not only of common material desires, but
common cultural and ethnic underlinings. These obtain in the idea of a "nation". A state on the other hand is the assertion of a dominant political, military and economic force over a territory which may contain many "nations" e.g. U.S.S.R. Thus the distinction; nation-state, and state-nation. The latter, from the point of view of intra-state opposed groups, tends to be more unstable. Its proneness to internal conflict also makes it subject to external aggression.

It can be seen, therefore, that different forms and formations of states can be exposed to varying probabilities of security problems. Some states derive great strength from their link to the nations, whilst for others, the link between state and nation might expose them to vulnerability and threat.

ii) The Governing Institutions of States

A governing institution of states includes the executive, legislative and judicial branches. While the executive in a democracy is organised to carry out domestic affairs and to conduct foreign relations, the legislature and judiciary having primary duty to forge law and execute it, and also keep the executive responsive and under control. On the other hand, in states not adhering to democratic principles, one might find that the dominant branch of government is the executive, and all other branches are drawn towards this. The concentration of power in the executive then, leaves the other two branches ineffective in carrying out the roles and duties with which they are constitutionally charged. They become rubber stamp for the executive or party leaders. For instance, in many states of Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The primary functions of the legislature and the judiciary here, are to reflect and legitimise the executive decisions and positions.
Also, there is a tradition in these countries that nothing must be permitted to stand in the way of the policies of the ruling elites.

Frequently undemocratic governments of a single man, party or military executive are unstable in that they do not have, or cannot ultimately command popular support (other than by extreme measures/secret police) and are often resistant to delegating decisions and authority. The absence of checks and balances and of a state-wide legitimation processes, removes a plurality of support and removes a spread of communication and information channels adapted to decisions in local conditions. Imposed decisions without regard to such conditions frequently harm people and thus cause discontent. This in turn may lead to the crushing of discontent which will then lead to a further collapse of good government-populace relations, and the rise of more militant opposition and internal conflict. Sources of internal threat might come in the form of militant dissidents (Sha'is in Iraq), military coups (Ghana and Nigeria), guerilla movements (Dhofar in Oman), or full revolution (Iran and Nicaragua). Also, lack of public support (lack of legitimacy) for these governments might give the external adversaries an opportunity to intervene on behalf of the domestic opposition. For example, Amin's Uganda was overthrown by the military intervention of Tanzania in 1979.

iii) People of States

Of course, a state consists of people, but how many people are needed to make a state? Can it have too small or too large a population? A state with a small population is likely to face more security problems than a more populous and powerful state. Acquisition of modern weapons systems by small states may serve
to balance the scale of power against a populous and strong state. However, the procurement of advanced arms by the latter might be fatal to the former.

The introduction of other aspects of population is important in relation to security. For example, what kind of people comprise a particular state? Are they literate, technologically advanced? Are they technically-technologically skilled? Are they an homogenous people, made up of one, rather than many nationalities or races? Do they speak one rather than many languages? Are they multi-religious? Do they embrace the same customs and traditions?

Homogeneity plays an important role in the security of the state. A homogenous society is likely to have internal cohesion and national consensus on issues related to war and conflict with other states. Alternatively, a state made up of societies differing in language, race, religion and tradition, is likely to be subjected to internal polarization, particularly in times of crisis and war.

iv) Territory of States

Territory is essential to the state since it provides a physical base for state institutions, people and natural resources. Territorial characteristics such as size, climate, terrain and geographical location play an important role with regard to the security of the state. A small geographical area, for instance, would be more vulnerable than a large one, because it would be less difficult to occupy and hold. Climate and terrain contribute similarly to explanations of the security of states. Past failures by France and Germany to invade Russia successfully testify to the importance of vast space and harsh climate. One wonders if all these factors have been somewhat
lessened by the creation of sophisticated weapons-systems? But
the experience of the United States in Vietnam demonstrated that
even a superpower with high technology of weaponry can be
hindered by an adversary fighting in difficult terrain.

Geographic location may also affect the security of a
state. This location factor might create conditions of security
or insecurity. For example, a state that has borders with one
or two neighbours is likely to be more secure than one that has
five or more neighbours since the latter has to confront the
probability of multiple sources of threat to security.
Switzerland, despite being landlocked, is a classic case of a
state possessing an advantageous geographical location - it is
partly surrounded by mountains. However, there are exceptions;
such states as Nigeria or Brazil are relatively secure because
they have a hegemonic position vis-a-vis their many neighbours.
Their security and hegemony are due to the fact that they are
buffered on all sides by smaller, weaker states. Weak but
strategic states such as Oman, South Yemen and Somalia, located
on important maritime choke points leading to the Gulf oil,
attempt to improve their defence through arms assistance from
the superpowers which use their territories as a quid pro quo
for assistance.

v) Resources of States
This analysis is limited to resources that are related to state
security. These related resources are as follows:

v.i Economic wealth

v.ii Military power

v.i Economic wealth

The sale of such natural resources as crude oil in
states like Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran enabled them to
accumulate vast wealth, particularly since 1973/74. Wealth plays an important role in conditioning attitudes and behaviour of states towards security. For instance, wealth often enhances the stability of a state. Wealthy states buy modern weaponry and have their armed forces trained abroad, or by instructors from western armies. They embark on foreign aid programmes to make friends and isolate adversaries. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has since the oil boom of the seventies continued to assist financially North Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and others.

On the other hand, poor countries are unable to build modern military establishments or to influence other actors through the use of economic assistance programmes.

One can, however, challenge the implied connection between massive wealth and military capability by asking why wealth states, rich in natural resources, are relatively weak in certain of their military resources.

v.ii Military power

Reviewing the economic factors one might assume that wealth was important for improving military positions. Another factor would be the state's ability to produce its own weapons. Let me test this factor against states in situations of crisis and war. States with indigenous weapons systems are less vulnerable to the threat of arms cut off, than states which import finished weapons or their components, from abroad. In this case, the cut off of arms or the resumption of arms supplies, will determine the outcome of crises and wars for states that import weapons. However, one may note that the relation between the suspension of military aid and influence is not a simple
one, but often mediated by the character of the regime in recipient of arms. A regime such as Israel or South Africa may often be prepared to go on with military strikes and call the bluff of the 'global' power that is threatening to cut off arms.

1. State Security Challenges

    b) External

    As I explore the internal vulnerability within the context of the state, I will also explain the nature of external threats to state security.

    External threats to state security come from many different sources. The following are some examples:

i) Military Threats

    The use of direct threat of military action is usually an attempt to bring about a change in another country's policy. Should the threat be transformed into successful military action, then the paramount value of the survival of the state is partly (attack) or wholly (total invasion) subverted. Unless a threatened state is overwhelmingly more powerful than the issue of the threat, then the state would be advised to consider the implications of the threat and make reply. Implied or indirect threat is when one country persuades, induces, or overtly supports the action, or threat made by one country to another. Israel's role in training and supporting Phalangist militias against the Syrian-backed Shi'ite militias during the 1975/76 Lebanese civil war provides an example of Israel issuing an indirect threat to Syria's influence over the Lebanon.

ii) Political Threats

    External military threats can produce internal political threats and ultimately, change. For example, if a state sieges
a territory or threatens to use force in order to change the behaviour of a certain state, this might lead to its collapse. Political threats are basically threats to ideas or ideologies, for example, capitalists versus communists; monarchial versus republican; seculars versus theology, and so on. Such states are engaged in ideological disputes about the right structure of society. Therefore, there are more boundaries than territories for states to be concerned with.

The spreading of contrary ideas or ideologies by an external force could be very disruptive. For example, if a state's propaganda supports a political group of similar persuasion in other states, then this could possibly be followed by the funding and multiplication of such groups leading to military assistance and training. For instance, the radio of the Islamic Republic of Iran called upon the Sha'is dissidents to unite and overthrow the secular regime in Iraq and to establish a revolutionary Islamic republic. This ended with military training and assistance to that group in Iraq. A further example can be found in American Anti-Sandanista attitudes which initially gave anti-government groups in Nicaragua moral and political support, and ended with military training to overthrow the regime in Managua. But equally, political threats can be played out in the international forum when a country or a group of countries proposes or imposes a non-recognition agreement upon another country. This in effect delegitimates one country so that it is deprived of a voice in world affairs, and possibly access to world markets; e.g. South African boycotts. The threat is thus one of political isolation.

iii) Economic threats
Specific economic threats can be related to national security. Firstly, threats to strategic assets, if one accepts that military capability rests on economic success either by generating revenues from exchange of resources, or by use of these resources for purposes of natural importance than the threats to cut off the supply of these materials, is considered of concern to national security in the final analysis. The Gulf states consider any restriction of oil supplies to the international market as a national security problem for them. In conflicts between Gulf states, notably the Iran/Iraq war, one of the major military objectives has been to launch attacks on oil terminals, e.g. at Kharg Island, so as to deny the relevant country oil revenue. This in turn denies oil states wealth to buy more military hardware and training. The absence of these threatens national security. Secondly, let me consider threats to domestic stability. Since the welfare of the Gulf states depends largely upon the revenue of oil, any substantial drop in scales of oil might make them vulnerable to domestic instability as the socio-economic structure of these states has become so dependent on the sustained growth of oil revenue.

To sum up, then, the insecurity of a state reflects a combination of vulnerability and threats. Vulnerability is concerned with the nature of the state and is associated, for instance, with state-nations, weak institutions, indefensible borders, limited population and poor resources. These weaknesses expose the state to domestic disruption and therefore may be a relevant causal condition for a foreign threat in military political or economic forms.

2. State Security Policies (objectives and actions)\textsuperscript{10}

As discussed earlier, security challenges vary from one state to
another, according to their conditions and capacities. Security policy also varies from one state to another for the same reasons. However, once a state recognises its vulnerability and threats, then the next step is to work out strategies to cope with these challenges. By security policy then, I mean a regime which carries out a set of defined objectives (ends) and actions (means) to create or preserve an internal or external order consonant with its own interests. State security policy refers to ends and means, - 'ends' in terms of desired outcomes and 'means' in terms of affecting the behaviour of its own people and those abroad, towards desired outcomes. The two are needed to formulate a policy that makes the state internally and externally secure.

Since it is stated that security policy consists of ends and means, one should be reminded of the limitations of the ends-means chain. Firstly, things that are believed to be objectives are also means for further objectives. The objective of the Iraqi regime, for instance, to win the war in Iran, is only a means to contain the spread of revolutionary Islam. This in return seeks to preserve the balance of power in the Gulf favourable to Iraq, thus protecting Iraqi security. Clearly then, the relationship between ends and means is ambiguous. Secondly, means might be ineffective, producing opposite results to those intended. Alternatively, means might be effective and produce the intended ends. This shows that means might create negative or positive consequences. Thirdly, states may have objectives, some of which are in conflict with each other. Thus, the means to achieve an objective might require the abandoning of another objective, illustrating that certain means should be used for certain ends.

Despite these limitations, a national security policy process must formulate a clear and reliable means-end chain (means actually
leads to desired ends), controlling the tendency of means to become ends, making means to create positive consequence and selective objectives that are not in contrast with each other. The following figure illustrates a suggested security policy process:

**Figure 2: State Security - Policy Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Conditions</th>
<th>Ends (Objectives)</th>
<th>Means (Actions)</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **A Internal Vulnerabilities** | 1 Ensure self-preservation survival 2 Preserve law and order 3 Maintain the integrity of the borders 4 Secure natural resources 5 Enhance regional power and status | 1 Reform/concessions 2 Force/threat of force 3 Arms acquisition 4 Alliances/alignments 5 Foreign aid/diplomatic manoeuvres | **A Success**  
B Failure |
| **B External Threats** | 1 Military 2 Political 3 Economic | | |

Figure 2 suggests how this process of state security policy may be portrayed. The process model is divided into four stages. The first includes a set of internal and external input factors that prompt or compel the governing elites responses to security problems. The number of input factors are mainly specified for Third World countries, particularly the Middle East. The response of governing elites to input factors result in three output stages. The first and second (ends and means) are taken by the state elites to form the
major components of state security policies. They include 10 dimensions of security policy (5 ends and 5 means). These responses lead to a fourth stage characterised by the outcome; that the success or failure of state security policy has a feedback effect on these policies. The outcome can also be seen as a mixture of success and failure with the feedback effect limiting or encouraging the actions of the ruling elite. The impact of feedback might prompt the ruling elite to reassess their understanding and perceptions of their input factors or goals.

The four stages of the security of state process are only briefly mentioned, but will be elaborated in the following analysis of Saudi Arabia's security challenges that prompt the ruling elite to seek U.S. arms.
MAP 1.
Location of Major Saudi Bases, Core Area (Oil facilities) and Centres of Government/Cities/Population.

Sources.

II APPLICATION OF SECURITY ANALYSIS TO SAUDI ARABIA

A State Condition - Saudi Arabia

B Saudi Security Challenges and Politics

A State Conditions - Saudi Arabia

1. Population

The population of Saudi Arabia is comprised of some 5-6 million indigenous people, plus an estimated 2 million foreign workers and their dependants. The population is distributed along three belts which correspond to historic and geographic divisions. Approximately half of the population lives in the Hejaz and Asir regions of the west and the southeast; these areas include the Holy cities of Mecca and Medina and the ports of Jeddah and Yanbu. The second population belt consists of cases extended from Hail in the north to Karj in the south. This is the area of Najid Power of the House of Saud and includes Riyadh, the Saudi capital. The third belt begins on the east coast on the Gulf near Qatif, Sha'is population centre, and extends south and west to the oasis of Haradh. This is the site of Saudi oil fields and facilities, the Dhahran airbase and the new port of Jubail.

The three population belts are separated from each other geographically, and each is surrounded and divided by vast thinly inhabited spaces, resulting in a multitude of sub-regions. These cause a division of population into major tribal groupings and many more sub-groupings.

Nearly half the Saudi population is under the age of fifteen, and half of the remainder are women, most of whom are excluded from the labour force because of tradition. The national labour force amounts to approximately one million, or about 20% of the population.
Because of this severe manpower shortage, to enable Saudi development plans to go ahead, foreign labour has been imported on a massive scale. The bulk of an estimated 2 million foreign workers come from poor Arab states such as the Yemens, and Jordan, from the Indian subcontinent and from the Far East, particularly Nationalist China, the Philippines and South Korea. A large number of managerial and skilled jobs are occupied by westerners, mainly from the United States and the United Kingdom.

2. Geography and location

The small Saudi population lives in a vast, wasteland country. The realm forms a rough rhombus more than 1,000 miles long and 800 miles wide, comprising about 900,000 square miles, about four-fifths of the Arabian peninsula, and is about the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. There are no rivers, and rainfall is scarce except in the southwest; less than 1% of the country is suitable for agriculture. Most of the realm - except the mountainous west - consists of great sand deserts. There is the Rub al-Kali (Empty Garden) in the south, the Dahna (desert) in the east and the Nafud (desert) in the north. The desert in the east, where oil fields and their facilities are located, is flat and low-lying and therefore difficult to defend.

Although the realm has a coastline of 1,300 miles on two seas (800 miles on the Red Sea and 500 miles on the Gulf) it has access to the open sea only through the two choke points on the Red Sea, and one on the Gulf. The 20 mile wide strait of Bab al-Mandab, adjacent to South Yemen, controls the passage between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, while the Suez Canal links the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. The 30 mile wide strait of Harmouz, adjacent to Iran on one side and Oman on the other, links the Gulf to the Arabian Sea.
Until recently, all Saudi oil exports had to go through the Strait of Hormuz. The completion of the 750 mile pipeline from the Ghawar oil field to Yanbu on the Red Sea has provided an alternative outlet for over two million barrels a day, but has also increased the country's dependence on the Suez Canal and Bab al-Mandab. Both Saudi oil imports and goods are vulnerable to blockade of the choke points.

The desert nature of the terrain of the Arabian peninsula makes the precise demarcation of boundaries virtually impossible. For example, Saudi Arabian boundaries to the south and the east are not well defined. This could explain Saudi Arabian involvement in border disputes with her immediate neighbours such as Abu Dhabi of the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. A much more serious security problem facing Saudi Arabia comes from some 12 states surrounding the country which are either too strong such as Iran or Iraq, or too weak, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The former threaten aggression, whilst the latter invite it, particularly since many inhabitants of both are also extremely rich, and vital Saudi interests could suffer in the process.

3. Economic resources

The realm of Saudi Arabia has one of the greatest of economic resources - oil. In the years of 1973-79 Saudi Arabia commanded about 40% of production in the Middle East, but in the years 1980-83 this rose to 51.9%. As of the end of 1984 Saudi Arabia oil resources in relation to world reserves stand at about 24%. Most of Saudi Arabia's oil producing capacity is derived from five fields clustered in an area 250 miles long and 50 miles wide on the Gulf coast and offshore. The production of these oil fields has risen sharply over the years. It was 7.6mbd in 1973, 8.3mbd in 1974, 6.9mbd in 1975, 8.5mbd in 1976, 9.2mbd in 1977, and 8.3mbd in 1978.
But in the years 1979-81 it stabilised at an average of 9.8mbd. In 1982 this dropped to 6.7mbd, and again down to 5.2mbd in 1983. Terminal facilities serving all Saudi fields occupy 50 mile stretches between Ras Tanura and Al-Khobar. Until recently, all Saudi oil was loaded at Ras Tanura until the additional terminal of Ju'ayma became operational. The entire area is furnished with power plants, pumping stations, refineries and tank farms.

The entire 50 miles of oil facilities could be subjected to damage, sabotage or airstrike by regional hostile forces. It could also be vulnerable to military action from one of the great powers. The use of force, even by a friendly power against the rich oil areas, could also occur when Saudi Arabia, for instance, decides to cut production or proclaim an oil embargo.

4. Type of State

The Saudi state consists of territory and population as a physical base and governing institutions which control the physical base. The question that arises now is: What type of state is Saudi Arabia in relation to security? Generally speaking, Saudi Arabia is a state-nation. Since the beginning of this century, the House of Saud united through military operations various regions and people, who were under different kinds of rules and control. The Hashemite control, for instance, was in the western region while the Turkish influence was in the East. Central Arabia was left to the competing warlords of different tribes. Moreover, in every region of Arabia there were tribes whose identity lies in relationship with similar tribes or relative tribes but not to the population as a whole. Since the military unification in 1925 until the present day, the Saudi state has been attempting to develop a common national consciousness and identity for all these people in different regions.
Until this is accomplished, the Saudi nation-state is likely to be vulnerable to challenge from both within and without.

5. Governing Institutions

The contemporary Saudi state can be described as the Saud family's oligarchy, committed to Islamic governance under a non-constitutional monarchy. A Saudi monarch governs his eponymous Kingdom without any limitations to his power. In the absence of institutions such as national assembly, political parties or labour/professional unions, the Monarch's authority is not restricted or defined. However, despite this totalised secular power, the monarch accepts the Sharia - the Islamic law that is based on Qur'an which his religious advisers construe as the only basis of government and justice.

The Monarch's commitment to the unitarian concept that secular and religious life is indivisible, as well as his commitment to the social and economic well being of his subjects, probably provides crucial elements for the legitimacy of his rule, as well as minimising the effectiveness of opposition.

Since formal institutions for making or legitimising decisions have never been developed, political power has been highly centralised, with the government largely reflecting the Monarch's abilities and interests. King Abdul Aziz, the founder of the Kingdom, for instance, involved only himself and his expanding family in running the government. Opposition groups were not tolerated, and when the zealous Ikhwan-Muslim Brethren, which he organised, allied, all those committed to religious principles were crushed when the Ikhwan broke away from his absolute secular leadership.

King Abdul Aziz's son, King Saud, proved to be politically and administratively inept. As a result his power base was eroded, and
his vulnerability attracted political opposition groups. The most important and effective opposition came from within the Royal family itself, and forced his abdication when his ability to provide political leadership appeared to jeopardise their security and survival.

King Faisal, brother of King Saud, sought to widen the political base in the government by introducing non-royal members and by using the revenue from oil to initiate the first five year development plan in the country, thereby balancing absolute authority of leadership with the welfare of the people.

Whilst King Khalid expanded government services and functions to serve the majority of the people, the present King, Fahd, supported government programmes on developing and modernising Saudi society both socially and economically.

However, balancing absolute authority with modernisation could be problematic, leading to polarisation between the pro-development faction versus the pro-traditionalists. Also, the process of development might create a generation not only satisfied by economic needs, but also by political development.

Despite these social and economic developments, can the Saudi monarchical system still maintain popular acceptance and minimise opposition in the absence of crucial governing institutions? Also, can the Saudi system ignore the politics of the external world? These questions can be answered within the context of the challenges that have faced Saudi Arabia since its existence both at home and abroad.

B. Saudi Security Challenges and Policies

The second five year development plan (1975-1980) outlined seven fundamental goals. Several of these goals dealt with economic and
social issues, such as increasing economic growth, developing the physical infrastructure and improving human resources. Others, however, had much wider moral and political implications and related directly to the fundamental attitudes of the Saudi ruling elite. Thus, the first two goals of the plan were stated as 'maintaining the religious and moral values of Islam' and 'assuring the defence and internal security of the Kingdom'. The third goal was to 'foster social stability under circumstances of rapid social change'. The achievement of social stability could help to enhance the state security.

Security and social stability are therefore, among the basic values of the Saudi ruling elites. Security, in this sense, is defined as the defense of the state, by whatever means, against internal and external challenge. Two key questions arise here: what are the security challenges that have confronted Saudi Arabian leadership since its formation in 1926? What policies have the Saudi leadership designed to cope with these challenges? The most natural division to this extended discussion, is that of the respective reigns of the Saudi Kings. It is necessary to go right back to Ibn Saud so as to understand policy development in a state whose rulers are inherently conservative and resistant to radical policy shifts. Thus one King's policies are often intimately linked to the policies of his successor, though as I shall see, the continuity of policy has suffered disruption from a variety of sources. It is one of my major concerns to identify these sources.


The territory now known as Saudi Arabia was, prior to establishment as a unified Kingdom in 1932, divided by tribes and warring factions. Ibn Saud, the strong chieftain of Najd province, later King Ibn Saud, backed by his Wahhabi Ikwan or brethren, gained
full control of his own domain of Najd in the face of Turkish-backed rivals by 1906, and over the next 20 years successfully gained control over Saudi Arabia through war and the expulsion of the various tribes including the Shammar, the Idrisi and the British-backed Hashemite.

By 1926 Ibn Saud could proclaim himself King of Hejaz and Sultan of Najd and dependencies, and as such, his rule was first recognised by the Soviet Union and by Britain under the treaty of Jeddah in 1927.

However, the British presence did not wholly dissolve and he had to agree, under the above treaty, to recognise the British supported Hashemites as the legitimate rulers of Trans-Jordan and Iraq, and not to encroach upon British protected Sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf. In this sense, Saudi Arabia, as a nation, was born into a field of potential conflict because it had expelled rival tribes from its territories. Thus, Ibn Saud's rule had instant external security threats. If this did not make for uncertainty, the Wahhabi Ikwan and supporters, also rose against Ibn Saud in 1929 because he was seen as compromising Muslim brotherhood through agreements with Western powers in pursuit of the consolidation of his control over Saudi Arabia. And it is an irony that this revolt was quashed by the use of the British Royal Air Force. Having re-established control over the Ikwan, Ibn Saud was able to deploy them effectively against the 1934 challenge from the southern region of Asir and the Kingdom of Yemen. Using the Ikwan Army to invade Yemen, Ibn Saud soon ended Yemen's backing of the Asir revolt, and brought Asir back under his control.

Thus in the early years, Saudi Arabia's borders were as shifting sands, and the relatively low-level tribal wars and their resolution (which lacked finality) posed problems both of internal
and external security.

The local politics of Saudi Arabia made it appear that Saudi Arabia was outside of the political and economic fortunes of the world. However it was, as were most countries, suffering from a lack of finance and in a bid to raise revenues in 1933 Ibn Saud sold a 66-year exploration concession to Standard Oil Company of California (SOCL) for a paltry £30,000 in gold. In the years of World War II the neutrality of Saudi Arabia was violated by Italian air raids on oil installations and this produced uncertainty among American staff working there, leading to a reduction of oil production and revenue. The revenue from pilgrims also declined due to war conditions. These conditions brought hunger and starvation to southern Hejaz. Ibn Saud, facing the possibility of disorder among tribes, threatened to end the oil concessions with SOCL unless he was provided with funds to alleviate his financial crisis. SOCL in turn appealed for support from the U.S. government which turned out to be in the form of including Saudi Arabia in the lend-lease scheme in 1943. In addition to the retention of SOCL interests, the Saudi government agreed to the Allies' use of Saudi air space to carry war material via Iran to the Soviet Union, and to the construction of Dhahran air base (adjacent to the oil fields) in 1945 which aided American efforts to prosecute the war against Japan. The U.S. use of Dhahran was again ratified in 1951, granting them access to it for five years, with the option of a further five years extension. A mutual defence assistance agreement was signed at the same time, laying the ground for the U.S. to provide arms and military advisers to Saudi Arabia. (These agreements are found in Appendix A). This was the first major arms transfer between the United States and Saudi Arabia that laid the ground for a U.S. military training mission and arms deliveries.
The conjunction of Standard Oil Company, U.S. government interests and the availability of lend-lease to Saudi Arabia was a crucial moment for Saudi aid, and was a catalyst to it having significance in the setting of international relations.

The rapid increase of Saudi oil revenue from $10 million in 1946 to $212 million in 1952, combined with acceleration of U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia and the absence of tribal threats to Ibn Saud's rule in the immediate post-war period, implied both a context of stability for Saudi development, but more importantly for my study, an opportunity to create and pay for the means of future security, both internal and external. The presence of a 'standing army' is now central to the definition of a state, and lacking this in the pre-war era, Ibn Saud and his successors now had the financial power to provide monies for permanent Saudi Armed Services. Anthony Cordesman has observed that at the time of the Ikwan rebellion 1929/1930, Ibn Saud was "still using irregular forces whose modern armament was limited to a few armoured cars and machine guns".

Though Ibn Saud created a Ministry of Defense in 1940, it was not until 1947 that modern military training started and only in 1952 did Saudi acquire jet fighters, namely the British-made 'Vampire'. But the weakening of defence provisions could be seen not only in terms of hardware, but also in terms of the inadequacy of organisation of staff, and ad hoc defense planning, largely due to an over-emphasis on internal security provision. Although the breakdown of figures (due to the paucity of details) is not known, one may note that defense and security allocation rose from SR157 million in 1951/52 to SR400 million in 1952/53 or 52% of total revenue SR758 for FY 1952/53.

As with so many emergent nations, Saudi development politically, economically and militarily, was in fits and starts. Its absolute
monarchy was not conducive to efficient organisation and decision-making, and to the nurturing of these three elements. More particularly, Saudi defence policy looked more toward internal security, and it was to quiet its anxieties on these problems and, to a lesser extent, threats on its borders, that Saudi Arabia wanted to purchase arms from the United States and also from Britain.

The death of Ibn Saud in 1953 and the rise of King Saud, Ibn Saud's son brought no major re-orientations of defense policy. Much as his father had done, Saud sought British and American defense aid to contain internal security threats and an alliance with Egypt and Syria to restrain Hashemite antagonism towards Saudi Arabia. But the appearance of Nasser and the vigorous ideology of pan-Arabism in conjunction with the rising tide of anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist rhetoric and action, complicated the reading of the issues for the new king.

Not only this, but the Baghdad Pact countries - a Pact promoted by Britain and America to halt Soviet interests in its Middle East neighbours - of (initially) Iraq and Turkey, and later Iran, Pakistan and, because of colonial ties, Britain, by their membership, were able to procure Western arms supplies. This meant that the Hashemite threat from Iraq in the 1950s was greatly enhanced. To deflect this problem, Saud nurtured connections with Egypt, despite Egypt's radical Arab orientation under Nasser. The latter opposed the Baghdad Pact because it was pro-Western, rather than a pan-Arab, Pact. Saudi Arabia's connection with another major Arab state produced a formidable Arab alliance not easily resisted, morally or politically. In this, Saudi Arabia supported pan-Arabist efforts, though it is important to recognise that Saudi Arabia did not accept Soviet arms supplies while Egypt did. This pointed to the ideological differences between the radicalism of Nasser's Egypt and
Saudi Arabia's conservatism. Moreover, Saudi Arabia supported Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal, and this taken in conjunction with their opposition to the Baghdad Pact placed Saudi Arabia in opposition to Britain and America on two grounds. In 1954 Saudi Arabia had dismissed the American Point Four Mission declaring that the economic and technical assistance offered was small compared to that of Israel.\textsuperscript{39} This revealed, for the first time, Saudi misgivings about the links developed between the U.S. and Israel. To drive home its connection with Egypt, and to signify its rejection of Western and particularly American policy in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia in 1955 signed a defence agreement with Egypt which provided for the training of Saudi forces by Egypt, in addition to training by U.S. military personnel. Despite the tension between Saudi Arabia and the West, the U.S. lease of Dhahran air base was not terminated, but renewed in 1957 for a further five years.\textsuperscript{40}

What King Saud had not anticipated fully but was to discover, was the impact of Nasser's pan-Arabism in the Saudi Army Corps. For example, a Department of State intelligence report stated that in mid-1955 a group of senior army officers with nationalistic and revolutionary sentiments had plotted a coup.\textsuperscript{41} The signal of a challenge to Saudi autonomy and Saud's personal power was clear, and relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt cooled. Saudi Arabia had overstepped the mark. Its involvement with Nasser had brought it internal instability, and the distrust of the U.S. due to Saudi friendship with a friend of the Soviet Union and the straight-down-the-line radicalism of Nasser. Further, it had compromised its relations with Britain. Accordingly, the Royal Family asserted itself and Saudi policy was realigned in favour of Western interests and internal stability.

The Western need for oil was beginning to have an impact.
American concern found its expression in the 1957 proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Saud’s positive way of showing this realignment towards Western interests was to approve of the Doctrine which ‘gave the President the right to intervene in the Middle East whenever a legitimate government said it was threatened by Communism and asked for aid’ and as stated before, he also granted the U.S. use of the Dhahran air base for a further five years in exchange for American military assistance. Indeed Saud now conceived of a ‘King’s Alliance’ with the Kings of Iraq and of Jordan to counter Nasser’s populist revolution. But the change of options from supporting Egypt to a ‘King’s Alliance’ was to leave Saud dangling in the middle, for in the final analysis he could not afford either option as supporting Egypt, as I have shown, would bring the distrust of the West and thereby the loss of Western security assistance, and pushing ahead with the monarchical union would bring upon his head the vilification of Arab states impressed by Nasser’s stand.

The intervention of the Royal Family in the continuation of Saud’s pro-Nasser policies was an indication that they would be prepared to turn an absolute monarchy into an oligarchy, as well as demonstrating a regular problem of absolute rule - that of good decision-making. To facilitate improved administration, Ibn Saud just before his death had set up a Council of Ministers under Crown Prince Faisal. But this led to conflict between Faisal and his brother, King Saud. Faisal wanted the Council to have regular ministerial annual budgets, development plans and control over the regular army and national guard, but he was frustrated by Saud’s interference in the management of the Council and his overspending which placed the country in financial trouble, despite its rising income. Finally in 1958 these problems of finance and political
responses to Nasser and to the West pushed the Royal Family into acting against Saud. They removed his exclusive powers, which were now vested in Faisal, though Saud retained the title of King. 46

Faisal's policies attempted to calm the situation with Nasser and his supporters, by condemning British and American intervention in Jordan and Lebanon in 1958. 47 He promised not to renew the Dhahran air base lease upon its expiry in 1962, and suspended the development of Saudi forces, thereby reducing the demand for American military aid.

Under Faisal, balance fiscally and politically was the main criterion. But by a coalition with various princes, Saudi regained power in 1960 though he confined the stances taken by Faisal on pan-Arabism and Dhahran. 48

In 1962 the monarchy in Yemen was overthrown and replaced by a republic. There followed a civil war, and the republican forces appealed for Nasser's help, whereas the Saudis aided the pro-royalist forces. This was a distinct threat to Saudi security for two major reasons: firstly the Egyptian presence in the Saudi backyard - Yemen - could encourage dissidents in Saudi Arabia to follow the Yemeni example and to do this, ask for Egyptian military help. Secondly, the Saudi armed forces - subjected to Nasser's pan-Arabism ideas during the Saudi-Egyptian harmony - were no match for Egyptian forces in the event of Nasser deciding to invade Saudi Arabia from the south, i.e. from Yemen. The Yemen conflict impressed on Saudi Arabia the continued need for American military aid, and these new challenges to Saudi security paved the way for the return of Faisal to power to secure the realm from the revolutionary Egyptian-Yemeni threats.

Continuing with Ibn Saud's policy of seeking allies among the opponents of his enemy and reviving British and American connections,
Faisal secured Hashemite support from Jordan (Taif Pact, 1962). However, Saudi forces, joined by stronger Jordanian forces, failed to dislodge Egyptian forces from Yemen or to deter Egyptian air and naval attacks on the Saudi border. To combat the Yemeni threat, Saudi Arabia also accepted British military assistance which included a dozen Lightning and Hunter jets, a battery of Thunderbird surface-to-surface missiles, and pilots and military personnel. U.S. assistance came in 1965/66 in the form of Hawk surface-to-air missiles and communication systems.

The critical point of the defense policy was thrown up in 1962 with the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War. Saudi Arabia was unprepared militarily despite increased military spending which rose from SR486 million in 1961/62 to SR676 million in 1962/63 or 28% of total revenue, and SR2452 million of FY 1962/63. The division in the armed forces due to the effect of Nasserism was forcibly demonstrated when some Saudi pilots, ordered to supply Yemeni pro-Royalist bases, defected. The upshot was a grounding of the entire Saudi air force and a purging of it.

In the period between 1962 and the beginning of Faisal's reign, Saudi security perceptions had changed radically, and the importance of the West to fulfil Saudi military needs was made greatly manifest. Faisal in the reign of Saud had demonstrated his capacity for administration and upon his accession he united the powers of King and Prime Minister so that he headed the Council of Ministers. This rapid consolidation of power would be resistant to internal challenges from pro-Republican forces or from a resentful and deposed Saud. In addition Faisal embarked on political, economic and social reforms that would strengthen the internal situation against revolutionary appeals. These reforms were presented in a ten-point programme, among the most significant of which were the formation of
a 'Basic Law' or constitution, improvements in standard of living, and the abolition of slavery.\textsuperscript{54}

The sixties presented a rough ride for Saudi Arabia. Yemen by 1965 was receiving both Soviet and Egyptian aid, and Saudi anti-Republican moves were not effective against the pro-Republican elements and supporters. This North Yemen threat was overtaken in 1967 by a South Yemeni threat. British withdrawal had given way to a Marxist regime and this was a clear problem to Saudi Arabia. Not only this, but South Yemen supported another civil war on the Saudi border - the Dhofar rebellion in Oman. These extensive worries justify Anthony Cordesman's judgement that only upon the incoming of Faisal's government was there "any serious attention to improving Saudi defense planning and modernization".\textsuperscript{55}

Faisal, despite more insight than his predecessors into military needs, still had no adequate defense procurement mechanism and it was left to Faisal's defense minister, Prince Sultan, to organise competing Western bids and commission agents to acquire weapons technology.

It said something for the improvement in Saudi defense that the South Yemen occupation of the Saudi border town of Wadiah in 1969 was removed by Saudi air power.\textsuperscript{56} This was, for all intents and purposes, Saudi Arabia's first military engagement since 1934 in Yemen and the symbolic engagement in Palestine in 1948.

The rebellion in Oman was ended by British and Iranian forces, and Saudi money in the early 1970s, but the Yemens were to remain a permanent security problem for Saudi Arabia.

Through the period from 1965 to 1968, Saudi Arabia substantially increased its air force. It acquired the Hawk missiles, a further supply of Thunderbird missiles and, for its air force, 49 Lightning interceptors and training and support services, at a cost of $62
This procurement, an Anglo-American package termed the 'Magic Carpet' programme, was disastrous in its organisation, causing major delays in supply and leaving a quite inadequate Saudi air defense system. Saudi Arabia desperately needed proper air defense to combat its' neighbours' air power. Because of the vast territory, her neighbours were largely unable to attack Saudi Arabia on land or sea, but they could attack Saudi Arabia by aircraft or bombers. Further, Saudi Arabia, due to limitation in human resources and skills, could never hope to compete with the ground forces of even some of its smaller but more populated neighbours. Thus Saudi weakness in the air could severely damage her defences. To improve things further, Saudi Arabia purchased 25 BAC-167 Strikemaster counter-insurgency trainers from Britain. But British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 confronted Saudi Arabia with the loss of Britain as a strategic shield against Iran and Iraq, and against radical penetration of the Trucial states. The sudden absence of a protector in the Gulf prompted the old adversaries, Iran and Iraq, to stand as candidates for this inauspicious role of protector and consequently they involved themselves in an arms race.

Four years earlier the shocking defeat of Egypt in 1967 in the 'Six Day War', when the Israeli air force had neutralised the Egyptian air force by destroying most of Egypt's aircraft on the ground, had brought home vividly to Saudi Arabia, the need to improve air power and to obtain more effective attack aircraft. To this end, despite the wish of Prince Sultan to purchase McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom multi-role attack fighters, including reconnaissance equipment which was sold to Iran and Israel in 1970, Saudi Arabia ended up with a rather weaker aircraft in range and performance, the Northrop F-5A aircraft from the U.S. in 1971. At the time this was acceptable because most potential threat fighters lacked long range
and low-altitude flying capabilities. Through the sixties, in a rather muddled way, Saudi Arabia effected greater defense procurement. The cumulative effect of trouble, in the Yemens and Oman, with Iran and Iraq over British withdrawal from the Gulf land most important of all, the destruction of Egyptian forces by the Israelis, concentrated Saudi minds wonderfully on the need for a much more formidable defense system. Not only this, but an indirect threat to Saudi Arabia was posed by her relationship with the United States, given extensive U.S. support of Israel over the Six Day War, and beyond.

King Faisal pleaded with the U.S. to intervene to stop the fighting along the Suez canal in the "War of Attrition" that followed the 1967 war, as a step towards a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, since the presence of Israel in Arab lands fuelled the spread of Arab radicalism and the raison d'etre for a Soviet presence and influence, as well as bringing criticism of Saudi Arabia for not taking an unambiguous stance against both U.S. and Israeli actions. This would expose Saudi Arabia to dangers, particularly as the Saudi demand for American arms was increasing. That is to say, the increasing association with the U.S., and the latter's unconditional support for Israel, put Saudi Arabia in a difficult position in the Arab world. King Faisal's appeals, and U.S. worries about the Soviet presence in the Middle East region, produced the 1969 Rogers Plan which called for an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel. Egypt and Israel accepted these proposals in 1970. The result was a delimited a drift towards general war and further dependence of Egypt upon Soviet support. It also portrayed Saudi Arabia as an honest broker for the Arabs, with the U.S. able to calm hostilities in the region. This helped Saudi Arabia to negotiate openly with the U.S. for major defence and
civilian projects crucial to the first five year plan (1970-1975). Negotiated between 1970 and 1972, these security and defence agreements were worth about $80 million in 1970, $15 million in 1971, and $371 million in 1972.62

King Faisal once again was involved in a balancing act, having to retain his security and defence connections with the United States and at the same time take a clear pro-Arab line in the complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the failure of King Faisal to enlist American support to gain Egypt's expulsion of the Soviets in 1972 and to pressure Israel to withdraw from the Arab-occupied territory of pre-1967, was a crucial factor for Egypt and Syria in their joint attacks against Israeli forces stationed there in 1973.

Washington's significant military support for Israel, which was a crucial factor in enabling her to turn a near defeat into a military victory, directly led to the oil embargo of 1973/74. To try to halt U.S. help to Israel starting in the October 1973 war, Saudi Arabia cut oil production by 5% a month. Later it increased this to 10% a month as a prelude to its total oil embargo against the United States.63 This of course had the knock-on effect, of Western arms suppliers competing to sell arms to Saudi Arabia. In 1973 Saudi Arabia signed defense and security agreements worth $2.176 billion or about 33% of a total revenue of $6.517 billion, of which over $700 million was with the U.S.64 Now Saudi Arabia's support could not be taken for granted. Through political rationalities and the necessary restructuring of political and economic commitments, Saudi Arabia had come to realise her power.

The following figure summarises and illustrates the Saudi security/defense process during the pre-1973 period as follows:
### Figure 2: Saudi Security/Defense Process pre-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saudi State Conditions</th>
<th>Ends</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong> Internal Vulnerabilities</td>
<td>A Preservation of dynasty/realm</td>
<td>A Tribal grants</td>
<td>A Internal/external conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tribal/ regional conflict</td>
<td>B Containment of Hashemite and Nasserism threats</td>
<td>B Use of force</td>
<td>B Rising conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Royal division</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong> External threats</td>
<td>C Settlement of Arab-Israeli conflict</td>
<td>C Economic/social reforms</td>
<td>C Rising importance of Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Political: Nasser's Pan-Arabism. Radicalism, Communism.</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Economics: Oil fields</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E Foreign aid</td>
<td>C Relative military strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>F Anglo-American arms transfers</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

After the assassination of King Faisal in 1975, his brother, the Crown Prince Khalid, became King Fahd (Khalid's brother) became Crown Prince and first deputy Prime Minister. The Royal family spoke of continuing with King Faisal's established policies. However, King Khalid's reign was marked by a major change in the power structure. The result of this change was a collective leadership which replaced the unitary rule of King Faisal. This collective leadership was headed by a final arbiter in the person of King Khalid and supported by the presence of a prominent leader with delegated responsibility, in the person of Crown Prince Fahd. The basic rationale of this shared power structure was to be the avoidance of the King Saud/King Faisal power struggle which occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s which nearly brought disaster upon the Saudi dynasty and its realm. This collective leadership worked well between 1975 and 1979 due to the fact that foreign and domestic conditions were relatively stable. Crown Prince Fahd was the most influential figure in this period, but when conditions changed between 1979 and 1982, differences of opinion among the leaders emerged and Crown Prince Fahd's prominent role was opposed by his brother, Abdallah. Among the new conditions that emerged in 1979 which triggered a critical debate among the Saudi leaders, was the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran, the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the war of the two Yemens.

The Royal split in the era of King Khalid, resembling that of King Saud's reign, ended when the wisdom of compromise among the leaders prevailed.

Once this power-sharing war was settled, the Saudi leadership continued with King Faisal's policies of development. King Faisal had allocated $143 billion for the second five-year plan (1975-1980).
The collective leadership under King Khalid went even further in the third five-year plan (1980-1985) and spent over $237 billion on civilian projects as well as £100 billion on military projects. Figure 3 indicates that the increased oil revenues, due to high oil output particularly from 1973 to 1983, enabled Saudi Arabia to embark on such enormous development plans.
Figure 4: Saudi Oil Production/Revenues 1938-1983.

Legend.

$bn.y. = US billions of dollars per day.
mbd = Millions of barrels a day.
--- = revenue scale.
---- = production scale.
* = Since March 1983, Saudi Arabia accepts no formal quota production but adjusts production to fill the gap between OPEC production (17.5 mbd) and world demand.

Sources:

Among the main objectives of the development plans were the strengthening of Saudi defence capabilities, and the move towards a solid economic structure based on industrialisation. Though military modernisation enabled the country to have a military infrastructure, modern weapons and military advice, the vast territory, lack of Saudi manpower and insufficient experience in military confrontation contributed to a lack of progress in military power. With regard to the Saudi economy, she intended to use oil revenues to finance major industrial development programmes such as steel and petrochemicals. Modernisation in the field of industry would be essential to the enhancement of defence capabilities, whereas the development of a solid economic base founded on technology could provide skilled technical manpower to the area of defence and security. However, only the future can tell us whether Saudi industrial development will become an important asset to the enhancement of defence and security capabilities.

The massive and expensive Saudi five-year-plans naturally increased the country's dependence on foreign goods and services. Saudi Arabia's import of goods and services rose from $15 billion in 1975 to $135 billion in 1981. Thus, there was a possibility that Saudi Arabia would be vulnerable to retaliation from the industrial world in the event of a Saudi attempt to use the oil weapon. These imports were also subject to disruption from those countries controlling the choke points on the Suez Canal, Bab al Mandeb and the Strait of Harmouz.

Given the expanding scope of Saudi Arabia's development plans, there is no doubt that the proportion of foreign to indigenous workers in the country must rise continually to keep pace with new construction. The need for massive foreign labour for development brought with it cultural conflict in terms of their social and
cultural background quite different to that of the Saudis. Foreign labour, as stated earlier, represents about 1/3rd of the total of the Saudi population, the latter estimated to be between 5 and 6 million. Nevertheless, the involvement of foreign labour mostly in civilian projects enabled the release of the indigenous Saudi work force for military modernisation.67 The importance of foreign labour contributes to an increase in the general level of education - a significant area in the realisation of the country's potential. A whole generation of young Saudis has been exposed to Western ideas of social liberty and democracy, through having Western teachers at home or abroad.

The fear of a decline of a unified Islamic culture has caused considerable misgivings among the Saudi leaders, as it has across the Arab world. But the political and eventual cultural impact of Western technology signifies an irreversible need to accommodate such "corrupting" influences. Saudi Arabia must have oil markets, extensive defence capability and a continuation of its internal public policies if it is to reign supreme defensively, economically, and politically as well as theologically in Islam.

If oil wealth made it possible for the Saudi collective leadership to embark on impressive development plans and thereby improve their legitimacy, the expensive military modernisation plans, particularly in the airforce, training and infrastructure (see Figure 4 which expresses the relation between oil wealth and military expenditure) did not in general improve military capability such that Saudi Arabia could invade or attack regional enemies, but it did mean that the old and new foreign challenges which threatened the national security of Saudi Arabia, could be repulsed or deterred.
Figure 5: The Relationship of Oil Revenues to Defence/Security Allocations, 1973-1983.

(a) in constant dollars.

Sources:
constraints and keep the people 'pure', Saudi Arabia has imported many workers (and their dependents). These workers often possess skills which Saudi Arabia could not, otherwise, command. The irony is that these workers whose responsibility is to provide structural modernisation (one pole of the cultural threat) also provide a more insidious threat - diversity of views expressive of modernistic attitudes, communicated at levels of the foreigners' interaction with the Saudi people. So ideological modernisation is the other side of the cultural threat. With these come the influx of countervailing political ideas about the role of Saudi Arabia in the Arab world, and these arise from non-Saudi, Arab advisers (more a feature of the Sixties).

A significant and continuing problem for internal security is one reflective of tribal division. In Saudi Arabia there exists a minority Shi'ite Muslim population against a majority of Sunni Muslims. It is the Shi'ites who make up between 40% and 60% of the oil field work force. They are regarded as of secondary status and have benefited little in the oil revenue boom years from the 1960s onwards. Their discontent has been occasionally expressed in protests in towns, but a great filip to their efforts was afforded by the coming to power in 1979 in Iran of the fundamentalist Shi'ite leader, Khomeini, who himself encouraged Saudi Shi'ites to revolt. Shi'ite demonstrations followed in 1980/81, but then, the Saudi National Guard and security forces quelled the minority uprising.

Although the Shi'ites are a minority, the Saudi royal family is aware that the daily flow of oil - 'The Kingdom's' lifeline - depends critically upon the Shi'ite labour force to operate the oil wells and refineries without interruption. Therefore the Saudi rulers keep a close security check on their activities.

A third source of internal security challenges to Saudi is an
arising middle, or middle professional, class. Development, supported by oil revenues, has led to an extension of educational and welfare facilities for the population, and this in turn requires a professional infrastructure to execute the new 'needs' created by modernisation, e.g. medicine, and for overall security purposes they need a proportion of the 'professions' filled by nationals. The problem lies in the fact that members of this 'middle class' are trained largely in the West, usually the U.S. and Britain, or are taught in Saudi Arabia by Western teachers. The inevitable inheritance of Westernised attitudes has led to Westernised expectations of the Saudi state by these groups. They now desire, not only a greater share in the economy, but have Western political aspirations of liberalisation and democratic practice. An attempt to meet these demands came in the form of an as yet, undelivered promise of a 'Basic Law' or constitution which defines the obligation of the citizen in return for their participation in the political process. 70

2. Local

Local security is the issue of the relations of states immediately on the borders of Saudi Arabia which do not affect the concerns of all states in the region. Most critically this means the running problem of the Yemens. South Yemen, a Marxist regime, has permitted Soviet use of its territory to facilitate Soviet support to warring nations in the Horn of Africa such as Ethiopia against Somalia in 1978/79 over the Ogaden dispute. 71 South Yemen's socialist commitments make them obvious antagonists to conservative Saudi Arabia. Further, Saudi Arabia is made more nervous by the attempts to force an alliance between the Yemens under the leadership of the Aden government. What impact this eventuality will have on the estimated one million Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia does not,
for the Saudi authorities, bear consideration.

In addition to the Yemeni security problems are the security problems of the smaller Gulf states such as Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman. Especially due to the Iran/Iraq war and the Iranian fundamentalist Shi’ite regime, these states who have close ties to Saudi Arabia are eminently invadable, or subject to invasion in error due to an overspill of the Iran/Iraq war. The weakness of the small states and their pro-West, pro-Saudi stance may permit the war to encroach on Saudi borders, or permit Iranian Shi’ite influence to traverse across the smaller states into Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi Arabia is also concerned about the impact of the Shi’ite revolution in Iran on these smaller Gulf states which contain large Shi’ite communities.  

It may be noted that the U.S. military presence in these states is relatively low-level, only extending to a naval base in Bahrain, and an air and naval base in Oman.

3. Regional

In the past, efforts towards regional settlements have been effected by political and economic manoeuvres, but after the fall of the Shah of Iran, Saudi Arabia was obliged to create a major military deterrence against Iran. In the early 1970s, the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict, which hindered its efforts to fill the vacuum in the Gulf upon British withdrawal from the region, as well as the Shah’s growing military power bought with American arms and training, led Saudi Arabia to seek an ‘understanding’ with the Shah of Iran over the issue of the Gulf. This understanding was based on the Shah’s recognition of the smaller Gulf states (with the exception of the Islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs) as fully under Saudi influence, in return for which the Saudis acknowledged the Shah as the new guardian of the Gulf. Thus, the fall of the Shah in Iran
by the end of the 1970s, in security terms caused deep anxieties for Saudi Arabia. The volatility of Iran (and Iraq), both bad cases of political or religious neuroses, has created massive uncertainty in the Gulf, leaving all the states to unilaterally minimise risk to themselves.75

The massive military input required to minimise regional threats, imposed upon Saudi Arabia the need for further dependence on the West and the U.S. Also the low population in relation to territorial size required advanced military technology, especially in regard to air defence systems, to match the huge manpower of Iran and Iraq.

One of the issues dominating Arab politics has been the conflict with Israel. Saudi Arabia for the most part, in no way seeks confrontation with Israel, knowing full well that in any military action Saudi defences are likely to be destroyed. The more powerful armed forces of Egypt and Syria were subjected to severe damage by the Israeli airforce in 1967, 1973 and 1982 (Syria). Thus, Saudi Arabia avoids significant participation in the Arab-Israeli conflict other than preserving its position as the moral and religious guardian as well as the financial backer of all things Arab and Islamic. This necessitates the rhetoric of disapproval of Israel and the U.S. role in the Camp David Accords, and occasional action, usually through manipulation of oil supplies or prices to the West as illustrated by occasional approval of OPEC price-rise decisions. But Saudi Arabia has found that such practical moves may gain it renewed respect by Arab states who have condemned Saudi Arabia's close friendship with the supporter of Israel - the U.S., and lose it substantial portions of oil revenues in the long run, as countries try other oil markets or resort to their own oil supplies. By not confronting Israel, Saudi Arabia does not want to complicate its
security connection with the United States.

4. International - the Soviet Union

Representation in the Gulf is as important to the Soviet Union as it is to the United States, largely for the same reasons - the presence of each other. The central issue of the U.S.S.R. presence may not only be located in the Saudi oil fields but in the pursuance of maintaining pressure on the U.S. In this sense, Saudi Arabia becomes a secondary factor in International Relations and strategy. It has been argued that, from the Saudi perspective, the priority of combatting a direct Soviet threat has "always been relatively low".76 Thus, the U.S. is seen as a guarantor of Saudi defence against local and regional security threats.

B. The provision of Saudi defence, 1973-1983

In the mid-seventies, Saudi Arabia faced the disapprobation of the West due to the oil embargo of 1973/74. However, in many eyes, this was compensated by the fact that the wealth immediately generated by the consequent and massive rise in oil prices enabled Saudi Arabia to effect much greater defence provision. The resumption of good relations with the U.S. in mid-1974 did not mean that Saudi Arabia would once more cling to the U.S. for arms transfers. It now had the financial capability and political autonomy to purchase weapons systems from other Western states, especially France and Britain. Between 1973 and 1975 defence expenditure increased from $3.447 billion to $6.774 billion or 6.99% and 9.8% of total Saudi Gross National Product (GNP) of $49.956 billion and $69.122 billion in 1973 and 1975. In 1981 and 1983 it was $22.164 billion and $24.183 billion or 16.7% and 20.3% of total GNP of $132.718 billion and $119.128 billion.77

Despite my focus on air defence, I must briefly consider Saudi
response to continuing internal security problems. The Saudi government would shy away from using air power to control its population, though air power would be useful if deployed against guerrillas in the open desert.

The control of internal security is nowhere near as administratively inefficient as control over the armed services, emanating out of the Ministry of Defence and Aviation (MODA). Until the uprising at the Grand Mosque in Makkah in November 1979 there was no pressing need to restructure the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), the intelligence services, or various sections of the Ministry of Interior charged with public security. After this episode, the Royal family sought to improve its contacts with tribal, religious and regional leaders, and the Saudi government also examined the possibility of the U.S., Britain, France, Jordan or Pakistan training Saudi personnel in internal security measures. It eventually signed an agreement to this effect with France on 2 November 1980. But until Makkah, Saudi Arabia had been satisfied with general help on internal security from other nations, and using its own means.

The relative absence of direct violent action, bar the Makkah case, provided little incentive to reform the administration of the armed services. The development of bureaucracy had begun in the sixties via King Faisal’s reforms, but a Saudi bureaucratic temperament, unlike that of say, the British, was not innate. Low-level civil servants would always refer decisions upstairs or just lose the problem in paperwork, and senior decision-makers had a tendency to make snap judgements on inadequate briefings. Certainly there was a demand-push to produce ad hoc solutions to ‘shock’ security problems such as the fall of the Shah or Afghanistan, but their difficulty in effecting good decisions also lay in poor
implementation of Western administrative procedures such as programme planning budgeting (PPB) used to such effect in McNamara's Department of Defense. This was worsened by foreign advisers helping MODA failing to insist that the locus of decision should not fall on one person, but on collective thinking. A further lack of co-ordination of military decision resulted from Western advisers being appointed to solve individual problems without reference to other previous plans, defence activities or the overall defense programme. These weaknesses crippled MODA's efforts to improve its management and planning activities to respond to changes in external threats.

Ultimately, MODA was attempting to spend its way out of trouble, and in terms of cost-benefits, failing. Of course, in some sense, the failings of MODA which continued through to 1983, are of little issue with respect to the U.S. arms transfers as long as Saudi Arabia can go on spending on arms and producing oil at reasonable prices, and Saudi Arabia does not have to procure a total mobilisation of its forces to meet a formidable security challenge. The effects of its inefficiency will only be felt internally as they affect the politics of status among the Saudi hierarchy within MODA.

It is clear that in the face of its huge size and lack of manpower, Saudi's military policy has centred on building up an airforce which has the capacity to defend vast tracts of Saudi territory at speed and with force roughly equivalent to that of her most troublesome neighbours such as Iran and Soviet-backed South Yemen.

France and Britain have both supplied weapons to Saudi Arabia, but it is the U.S. who has sold Saudi Arabia most of her arms; and importantly, her most sophisticated weapons systems such as AWACs. Of course, ideological difference and the need to maintain strong
relations with the U.S. have prevented Saudi purchasing arms from the Soviet Union despite Soviet willingness to sell arms to Saudi Arabia.


The background to the U.S. intention to supply arms to the Middle East countries was the outcome, not only of a general desire for security for oil production, but of an articulation of a two pillar policy calling for support for two strategic countries, one in Iran and the other in Saudi Arabia. But in reality, military support, intended to obviate the need for a deployment of U.S. forces (the Nixon doctrine) was given to the Shah’s Iran, whereas Saudi Arabia was treated almost solely as an oil supplier. This had the double benefit of releasing U.S. troops for Vietnam and cutting out the ‘contradiction’ implicit in U.S. support for Israel and Saudi Arabia; and the resultant pressure on the U.S. exerted by the pro-Israeli lobby and criticism of Saudi Arabia by Arab states. As I have implied, America could not afford these doctrines after the oil embargo of 1973/74. These U.S. policies had offered an opportunity for Iran to become the dominant military force in the Gulf, and a threat to Saudi Arabia. To avoid this, Saudi Arabia needed to build a military infrastructure, but in doing so, it was forced to spend the vast majority of its defence budget on construction and training. As late as 1978 it was spending 72% of its military budget on construction and infrastructure, and the rest on training and hardware. Worst of all from Saudi’s perspective, was that Congress misperceived Saudi’s military response capacity by only understanding Saudi military potential in terms of dollars spent. On this basis it has, since 1974, appeared that Saudi Arabia was equal to Iran. The weakness of Saudi military led her to effect economic diplomacy and
gain support of other conservative Arab states such as Jordan, Oman, Egypt and the Sudan, through the provision of financial aid.

At the same time, for reasons outlined above, Saudi Arabia entered a modernising programme for her armed forces. The most important of these steps was the enhancement of its air force, substantially reinforcing it with the purchase of Northrop F-5 aircraft through the years of 1971-1976. As Northrop supplied more F-5A and F-5E aircraft, so the U.S. airforce took over more and more of the training of Saudi pilots, which formerly had been done by British staff at the Saudi Air Institute at Riyadh and the Technical Studies Institute at Dhahran. By 1976, the facility to train 100 Saudi pilots a year was set up at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas. Northrop's status changed from being a supplier in competition with other suppliers, to working closely with the Saudi Air Force and senior Saudi defence officials. A hiccup over Prince Sultan's attempts to buy the F-4 Phantom, which had a greater capacity than the F-5 in terms of radius of action and payload carrying ability, and a split in the Defence Department as to whether they should agree to sale, was smoothed over by an agreement to sell more F-5E and sufficient improved Hawk surface-to-air missiles to provide a point defence of Saudi air bases, key cities, and oil facilities. The break in U.S.-Saudi Arabian relations due to the oil embargo was, in part, resolved by the building up of military ties. The need of both sides to establish good relations gave much incentive to the purchase of arms with the setting up of the American-Saudi's Joint Committee on Economic and Defense Co-operation in 1974. Both sides witnessed a massive expansion of U.S. military assistance to Saudi Arabia. U.S. foreign military sales and military construction agreements increased from about $709 billion in 1973 to $2,031 billion in 1974 and to $3,614 billion in 1975 ranking Saudi Arabia second to Iran in
buying U.S. arms. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) planned a series of studies named ‘Peace Hawk’, which examined the air threat to Saudi Arabia and Saudi air defense modernisation requirements. By 1975, Saudi Arabia had purchased F-5E/F, and by 1978, upon the purchase of F-15, all the F-5s were operational. The IISS reported that the success of the Peace Hawk programme was demonstrated by the fact that the Saudi Air Force had reached proficiency levels superior to those of any Gulf air force except that of Iran. Averaging $1.2 billion in the period 1976-1980, Saudi aircraft purchase provided Northrop with between 22% and 44% of total sales. However, all was not as smooth as it may have seemed. As stated earlier, Congressional and, more particularly Senate hearings, on corruption in international arms sales implicated Saudi Arabia, and some elements of the senior Saudi defence personnel were stigmatised. Such scrutiny of a country averse to any publicity, especially bad publicity, increased tensions in Saudi/American military relations, and raised doubts as to whether Saudi Arabia should rely so heavily on U.S. arms transfers.

The Joint Commission's researches had shown that Saudi Arabia would need a replacement of its obsolete Lightnings, which were really interceptor/fights with some loiter capability. Looking towards Saudi air defence needs for the 1980s, a 1975 Saudi study team was invited by the U.S. to review and evaluate the F-14, F-15 and F-18. President Carter in early 1978 announced that the U.S. was committed to selling an advanced plane package to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt. In 1977 the Saudi Air Force had determined that the all-round capacity of F-15 made it the right one to purchase. Further, it was anticipated that this would be acceptable to Congress, unlike a purchase of the F-14 or F-16 which were regarded as superior to Israeli planes. While the F-15 air-superiority
fighters would be adequate in meeting Saudi air defence needs (long range attacks and interception missions) against Yemen and in the Gulf, it lacked the advanced target-acquisition, munition-delivery capability and attack avionics crucial to make Saudi Arabia effective in meeting more formidable adversaries such as Israel.96 But to put Israeli minds at rest, however much it infuriated the Saudis (and it did), Carter assured Israel that the Saudi F-15 planes would be subject to the condition that the planes could not be sold to a third party without prior U.S. consent, and that they were only to be deployed at Taid, Khamis Mushayt, and Dhahran bases to protect key Saudi oil fields, cities and ports.97 This, of course, was enforceable by the U.S. refusing to train pilots or service the plane and provide spare parts in the event of the agreement being broken. The Congressional debate over the Saudi purchase of F-15 was bitter, with Israel’s supporters arguing that the sale would make Saudi Arabian military intervention in any Arab-Israeli conflict highly likely. Also, it was argued, the addition of 110 upgraded F-5Es with Sidewinder missiles98 would add considerably to the Saudi military threat to Israel. However, this would only be possible when the acquisition of F-15 would require support from advanced radar systems, either in the form of Boeing AWACs or the Grumman Hawkeye system.

The sale was finally approved in May 1978 by a narrow majority in the Senate of 54-44. Various commentators have speculated as to whether the deal would have been passed in Congress had not the defeat of Somalia by Soviet-backed Ethiopia, recently taken place.

From Saudi’s point of view, the need to have these advanced planes was more than demonstrated by the crisis in Iran. It also showed the U.S. (as if it needed reminding after the oil embargo episode) how much it needed Saudi Arabia so that it could use her
territory as an 'over-the-horizon' base to monitor developments in Iran. Having passed the hurdle of Congress over the F-15, it was as the pro-Israeli lobby expected: Saudi Arabia began a run-in towards the hurdle to which an 'AWACs' label was attached.

The need for advanced radar facilities was made evident by the Yemen's border war in March 1979 to which (on behalf of Saudi Arabia) the U.S. sent two E-3A AWACS planes, and also by the Iran-Iraq war in October 1980 when it was thought likely that Iran would attack Arab oil facilities in the Southern Gulf. The U.S. had transferred a ground radar system TPS-Y3E to Saudi Arabia to detect aircraft around the oil fields, but it was weak in that it could not overcome electronic counter measures, and had limited surveillance coverage (186 miles). As Anthony Cordesman notes, "the lesson was clear that Saudi Arabia would require much more sophisticated air defences than the F-15 alone could provide.

Thus, in several ways, the need for AWACS was manifestly evident. What ran against the Saudis obtaining it was not only the pro-Israeli lobby who would have their "noses rubbed in it" if Saudi Arabia was given AWACs, but other "Western" nations who had requested AWACs or were negotiating on it, but had not secured a deal. Operating within a framework of resentment and apprehension against a deal were the complicating factors of Israel's rapprochement with Sadat which had caused anxiety and misgivings in Saudi Arabia; the fall of the Shah; and Saudi-U.S. misunderstanding on whether U.S. military presence in the Gulf was required, the U.S. assuming it was. The U.S. seemed to be working towards a permanent presence in the Gulf whereas Saudi Arabia was sitting uneasily between Camp David and the escalation of problems between Iran and Iraq, and within Iran. This U.S. pressure for a military presence made it doubtful whether she really grasped that Saudi Arabia had to steer a
narrow path between the need to appear to their Arab neighbours independent of American support, and Saudi's actual dependency on U.S. military support.

This problem in American-Saudi relations was compounded by the U.S. need to pull back on arms sales to Saudi Arabia due to the forthcoming Presidential elections. Given the opposition to the F-15 sales, accession to Saudi's request for AWACs and the F-15 enhancement equipment, which included fuel tanks, KC-135 tanker (FAST KIT) and Sidewinder missiles, would be an electoral liability. The postponement of the AWACs package until after the election meant that Saudi-American military relations were weak at a time when they needed to be strong.

In the face of the pro-Israeli lobby's arguments, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Douglas Bennet, wrote to Congressman Lee Hamilton in February 1978 that "an F-15 sale will not lead to the sale of E-2C (Hawkeye) or E-3A (AWACs)." But as the Iranian revolution escalated, the presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan increased, trouble in the Yemens flared and the Iran-Iraq War started, Defence Secretary Harold Brown observed that the U.S. should consider the Saudis request for AWACs "since the situation demands it", and by November 1980 President Carter had agreed to the sale in the wake of his electoral defeat. However, the Reagan transitional team decided that they would review the decision.

It was the aggressive style of the Reagan administration that may have been at least partly instrumental in their final decision in April 1981 to sell Saudi Arabia 5 E-3A AWACs aircraft, and the F-15 air defence enhancement package that included 8 KC-135 tankers, 1,177 "Sidewinder" AIM-9L air-to-air missiles, and 101 conformal fuel tanks (CTSs). The Reagan administration stated that the air defense package sale was a continuation of U.S. commitment to the defence of
Saudi Arabia, and that the sale was essential to protect U.S. interests in the Middle East region due to the deterioration of security in that region. State Department Spokesman William Dyess remarked the U.S. Middle-East policy would concentrate on a "bolstering of the deteriorating position of the West vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the region".110

The major point of determining Saudi Arabia's request for high-technological air defense systems, such as the AWACs and the F-15 enhancement, were the attacks Iraq and Iran made on each other's oil facilities. This was the first "oil" war between two oil producing nations in the region, and the means to enhance the air defence system was not only a legitimate response to protect its vital resources - the oil fields - but to the U.S. to protect Western supplies of imported oil. Further, the series of troubles in the Middle East between 1978 and 1980 made the sale of adequate air cover for Saudi Arabia (the most reliable ally in the region) crucial. The Reagan administration then had little choice but to endorse the Carter agreement to sell the AWACs package to Saudi Arabia.

The very openness of the oil fields (core areas) - their having no natural cover - made them susceptible to relatively simple airborne raids. Successive studies, especially the "Peace Hawk VII" report initiated by the U.S. Air Force in 1981 to study air defense feasibility of Saudi Arabia, had analysed the weakness in the radar system, and it recommended, amongst other things, that Saudi Arabia establish a comprehensive command, control and communication system (C3).111 But in order to understand the recommendations of the "Peace Hawk VII" for the improvement of Saudi air defence capability, one must understand the strategic area of Saudi Arabia. In strategic terms, Saudi Arabia must depend on air power defense due to the fact that the area of Saudi Arabia is 873,000 square miles, but it has a
relatively low population, limited skilled military personnel and few military bases. Thus she needs effective air power to protect the core area in the east - the oil fields/facilities from Safaniyah, Ras Tanura to Ghawar, the capital Riyadh, the two holy cities of Mekkah and Medina, and the two petro cities Jubail and Yanbu\textsuperscript{112} - against possible attacks from the Yemens, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Israel.

The most valuable terrain in this strategic area is the core area which covers 10,000 square miles and is flat with no mountains, and thus it may be subjected to bombing or aerial raids.\textsuperscript{113} The military weakness of Saudi Arabia means that aircraft can only operate from five military bases: Khamis Mushayt, Taif and Tabuk in the south-west, Riyadh in the centre and Dhahran in the east plus the one under construction at Hafar al Batin in the east.\textsuperscript{114} Though Saudi Arabia acquired fighter aircraft such as F-5s and F-15s in the middle and later 1970s, she did not have the C3 system to detect enemy aircraft or direct her own aircraft in case of military engagement. The radar operates on a line-of-sight principle and of course the curvature of the earth screens low flying aircraft from detection by a sectoral ground-based radar such as the then existing radar facilities in Saudi Arabia. Obviously the AWACs package was the answer to the problems of ground-based radar.

In many areas of Saudi Arabia, especially Dhahran, the most crucial airbase-radar has a maximum placing height of 1000 feet due to the lie of the land, making the area covered by Dhahran, namely the central oil fields, vulnerable. Again E-3A AWACs surveillance radar with its antennas in a rotodome could detect enemy attacks at 30,000 feet within a radius of 230 miles.\textsuperscript{115} It could track fighters at a medium or even low altitudes as little as 200 feet above the ground. The choice of AWACs was also made in the view of its 'electronic counter-measures' which could jam enemy
According to the U.S. Air Force, with such radar, air, computer and electronic equipments, 5 E-3A AWACs and 18 ground radar systems would be sufficient to provide warning and air-control capability to detect and track high- or low-flying fighters over both land and water before they could strike at Saudi oil facilities or coastal cities. Nevertheless, for all its sophistication, the AWACs sold to Saudi Arabia would still be vulnerable to superior U.S. and Israeli jamming devices. Israel has the best communication and jamming system in the Middle East, and with its E-2C Hawkeye could detect the Saudi AWACs and send its F-15s for an interception. Further since the AWACs would not be delivered until the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union would be able to deploy its new advanced early warning airborne system - Illyusion II-? 'Mainstay' in 1983.

The remainder of the package was also important. The KC-136 tankers would be capable of refuelling Saudi Arabia's fighter aircraft and extend the range of conformal fuel tanks for its F-15 fighters. These features would allow Saudi Arabia to redeploy its fighters rapidly from anywhere in the Kingdom, to concentrate their mass, and to provide the F-5s, F-15s, and E-3A AWACs with the endurance necessary to fly extended combat air patrol missions. The "Sidewinder" AIM-9L missiles would give Saudi Arabia an improved air-to-air missile with the shoot-down capability that it could use in "head-on" intercepts against low-flying attackers without having to sacrifice the time necessary to manoeuvre into a long chase or "dog-fight" position. This was essential, given the limited time warning by AWACs and the need for each F-15 to be able to engage more than one threat fighter per encounter.

Taken overall, the AWACS package did not give Saudi Arabia an attack capacity vis-a-vis some regional or international level nations to which I have referred. It did not match up to Israeli
hardware defense capacity, so the Israeli lobby fears could, to some degree, be quelled. At best, Saudi Arabia would have a self-defense capacity were she attacked. She could give a good account of herself. Thus the air enhancement still tied her down to largely a protection and deterrence role. This enhancement programme went a long way to allaying Saudi fears for her sovereignty and as to whether, in cleaving to the U.S., she had stood shoulder to shoulder with the wrong horse. In line with the old maxim, "nothing succeeds like success", Saudi Arabia scored a triumph in procuring AWACS/F-15 before NATO states. Not only this, but the fact that it now had AWACS added to its credibility as possessing an adequate deterrence force. If, as I said above in regard to the oil embargo, Saudi Arabia found an identity politically and economically by defecting from the U.S. strategy, Saudi Arabia also had found an identity by co-operating with the U.S. strategy over the air defence enhancement package of 1981.

The following figure will illustrate Saudi Arabian security policy during 1973-1983 as follows:
### Figure 6: Saudi Arabia’s Security/Defence Process, 1973-1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saudi State Conditions</th>
<th>Ends</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A Internal vulnerability</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Foreign workers</td>
<td>A Preservation/ survival of the realm</td>
<td>A Oil wealth</td>
<td>A Internal conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Western educated middle class</td>
<td></td>
<td>B Social/ Economic military development</td>
<td>B Relative military capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Traditions vs modernity debate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B External Threats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Military: The Yemens, Iran-Iraq war</td>
<td>B Containment of the Yemens, Iran, Iraq and Arab-Israel conflict</td>
<td>C Diplomatic alliance</td>
<td>C Soviet activism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Political: Iran Islamic revolution, Arab-Israel conflict, Soviet influence</td>
<td></td>
<td>D American arms</td>
<td>D Continuation of the Yemens and Arab-Israeli and the Gulf conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Economic: Oil fields/ facilities</td>
<td>C Maintenance of U.S. security connection</td>
<td></td>
<td>E American Security enhancement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

In this Chapter I have suggested that the U.S. strategic priorities led it to view Saudi Arabia as a major oil producer whose oil was of considerable interest economically—enough to merit some arms transfers, but not as a military critical problem area. This realisation only came with the 1973/74 oil embargo. Unfortunately for the U.S., Saudi Arabia was then obliged by her Islamic brothers to take the moral high ground, causing her to shift politically away from the U.S. and toward Islam's interests. The new complex duality of United States/Saudi Arabian decision structure did not damage U.S.-Saudi relations, but proposed a position change in the long term understanding of the relationship for both players. The problem was that America lacked perception of the consequences of this new position, still acting as if Saudi security determinants were a function of those of the U.S. Saudi Arabia operated under the internal, local and regional constraints facing her and therefore was forced to defect from the U.S. position.\textsuperscript{122} I have shown that this problem of U.S. blindness occurred again in 1979 with the failure of U.S.-Saudi relations over the possibility of U.S. presence in the region. One must note that despite the continuation of US/Saudi arms transfer relations, Saudi has not been tied exclusively to US arms. Indeed the US did not object to Saudi Arabia buying arms from France, Britain and Germany. This was because US was increasingly unable to satisfy Saudi military requirements due to the domestic political constraints on making major arms sales.

Despite the 'bumpy ride' in the relationship in the past ten years, the anticipated or, by some, hoped for break between the two has never occurred, and the reason for this endurance is precisely the respective priority each country places on the Saudi security position in the Middle East and, (for Saudi Arabia), priorities at
There are still problems facing Saudi Arabia's response to her perceived security determinants, the foremost of which is the gap between bureaucratic and administrative functions in the armed services, namely those emanating from MODA, and the improved operational potential of the services if backed by good bureaucracy. This is a gap that may close with time, and training by Western instructors. Given this, I still have to acknowledge that it was by King Faisal's consolidation of his grip on the running of Saudi Arabia - a process started in the time of his struggle with his brother, King Saud - that Saudi Arabia has been able to play a greater and more structured role in the Middle East and in its relationship with Washington. At this level money is not the only determinant of a nation's power, either of its political voice or its military. Thus it is, that from King Faisal to King Khalid, Saudi Arabia though improving its military capability, is still not a threat to countries in the Middle East who mostly are her foes. At best, she can defend herself; to that end she has been allowed, despite the trouble in Congress, to buy F-5s, F-15s and, best of all, the AWACs system and an elaborate air defence enhancement package worth $8.5 billion.

The shocks in the period 1978-1980 (which I have shown had their origins in the reign of King Saud and King Faisal, for example, the Yemens, Oman and the Arab-Israeli conflict) were shown to force the decision to sell F-15s and AWACS to Saudi Arabia, irrespective of a presidential change from the hapless Jimmy Carter to the pro-Israeli, hawkish Ronald Reagan. But here the perceptions of security determinants diverged - Reagan was responding to the Soviet threat in the region (Afghanistan) and Saudi Arabia to the perennial problem of instability in the Middle East. In this Chapter I have addressed the
complexities and rationalities of Saudi security determinants via the concepts of 'state' and 'security' (Part A) and the development of Saudi-American relations in the Middle East context through the reigns of Ibn Saud, Saud, and Faisal.

This period, lasting from the final two years of King Faisal's reign to the end of King Khalid's reign, saw the change in U.S./Saudi relations structure with respect to air defence policy and weapons procurement, showing that though Saudi Arabia has grown strong - strong enough to look after herself - to date she is not strong enough to go on the offensive or to repulse an all-out attack from Iran or Iraq. At best, she is on a par. Saudi Arabia is still accountable to, and dependent on, U.S. arms transfers. The flow of U.S. arms, paradoxically keeps Saudi Arabia both strong and weak at the same time.

Saudi Arabia is exposed to internal, local, regional and global concerns. This is one of the penalties of being a developing nation but having the resources to generate fabulous wealth. My examination has concentrated on the dimensions of my problem (arms transfers) almost solely from the perspective of Saudi Arabia. Yet it has been seen that however central a position Saudi Arabia may occupy in this discussion, from the conditions of its emergence perhaps until the day oil runs out, Saudi Arabia will be overlain by the problems at home and of its near neighbours, distant enemies and allies alike.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR


5. Edward Kolodziej and Robert Harkavy, Security Policies of Developing Countries, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), Chaps. 1,16 discuss these two dimensions of security. However, this distinction is fairly standard throughout the literature. For 'traditional' analysis, see: Hans Morgenthau, Power Among Nations, (New York: Knopf, 1968), Chaps. 8-10; A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, (New York: Knopf, 1968), Chaps. 6-9; and for recent analysis, see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).


7. For useful discussion on this area see: Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager, Economic Issues and Natural Security, (Kansas: Regent Press of Kansas, 1977).


Americans and Europeans.


15. Ibid, p.5.

16. In the aftermath of the 1973/74 oil embargo, some American analysts discussed the control of the oilfields from oil producers whose interests were assumed to be at odds with U.S. interests. These oil producers were viewed as capable, through the imposition of high oil prices or oil embargo, to strangle the economics of the industrialized countries. Among the most notable advocates for the seizure of the Middle East oilfields was Robert Tucker, "Oil: The Issue of American Intervention", *Commentary*, (January 1975), Vol 59, pp.21-31.


19. The name of the Saudi Arabian state refers to two components. First, the dynastic qualifier. Second, the character of the territory.


25. Ibid.


27. FRUS, 1943, op.cit., p.854.


30. Ibid, pp.1460-1465. The war in Palestine 1947/48 increased Ibn Saud's apprehension about the military strength of the Hashemite rulers of Trans-Jordan, since their armed forces were the only ones to hold a part of Palestine. In contrast to other Arab forces, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestine Army and a small Saudi battalion which suffered heavy defeat and proved unequal to the task. Cited in J. Philby, op.cit., p.353. These factors could have influenced Ibn Saud's decision to sign the 1951 agreements with the U.S.


33. A. Cordesman, op.cit., p.73.

34. Ibid, p.74.

35. Ibid.


44. The Army is drawn from the tribes to defend the whole country. The National Guard, originally known as the 'Royal Guard', is drawn from 'loyal tribal troops', to defend the King. For further details see: A. Cordesman, op.cit., p.101.


SIPRI, op.cit., p.561.


SIPRI Yearbook 1972, op.cit., p.128.

Ibid.


HCFA, op.cit., p.48.


Western personnel have been employed in defense/security forces. According to 1981 Committee Report on Foreign Affairs, there was an estimated 30,000 U.S. military related personnel working in Saudi Arabia. Cited in HCFA, op.cit., p.51.


Some believed at the time that King Faisal's Ten-Point reform and development programme of 1962, headed by the promise of a 'Basic Law' or constitution and concluding with the intention to abolish slavery, was mainly to counter Nasser's propaganda and to please Kennedy's liberal views. Nevertheless, and despite Faisal's failure (and his successors to date) to deliver political reform, i.e. the 'Basic Law', it is apparent that the programme led particularly to the completion of 3 Five-Year Development Plans (1970-1985) which improved Saudi social conditions and established the country economic foundations.


The Gulf Cooperation Council, (GCC), of 1981 May obviate a unilateral policy but the difficulties of its working properly still leaves the burden of defence training on the shoulders of individual states.


HCFA, op.cit., p.52.


Ibid.


86. HCFA, op.cit., pp.51-52.

   The F-4 Phantom which the Israelis had, was more preferable than the F-5s. The conflict between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was not so much about U.S. reluctance to sell Saudis a prestige plane, because as A. Cordesman notes: "The Saudis ... had little sensitivity ... to the importance of advanced avionics ... and as yet had failed to develop an overall concept of air defense or air force modernization that made specific aircraft performance characteristics importance. As a result Saudi and American interests coincided in the Saudi purchase of F-5A, [in early 1970s] particularly when the U.S. could provide the combined training, support, and munitions aid that Saudi Arabia required". The real conflict erupted over commission payments and their distribution. The notorious Saudi arms dealer, Adnan Khashoggi, who gradually became the agent for U.S. arms corporations dealing with arms sales to Saudi Arabia, had monopolised the market in effecting U.S./Saudi arms sales and made huge commissions. But other 'Saudis' involved in sales demanded high payments. Increasingly becoming public, the row spill-over and the U.S. had a series of hearings exposing the scandal of Northrop payments to Khashoggi and others on the sale of F-5A which were in effect bribes. This left a bitter taste in Saudi mouths, and many Saudi officers and educated elite questioned the wisdom of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Cited in A. Cordesman, op.cit., pp.143-144.

88. HCFA, op.cit., p.51.

89. See Appendix C.


96. A. Cordesman, op.cit., p.207.
103. HCFA, op.cit., pp.55-56.
104. Ibid.
105. SFRC, op.cit., 1-2.
106. Ibid.
107. HCFA, op.cit., p.61.
110. HCFA, op.cit., p.63.
111. SFRC, op.cit., p.61.
112. See Map 1.
113. SFRC, op.cit., p.19.
114. See Map 1.
116. Ibid.
117. SFRC, op.cit., p.60.
118. Ibid, pp.31-32.
119. C. Chant, op.cit., p.159.
120. SFRC, op.cit., p.60.
121. Ibid, p.62.
over 3 years starting 1985. When the Israelis criticized Britain’s decision to sell sophisticated aircraft to Saudi Arabia stating that it would escalate arms race in the Middle East and increase tension, Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for Defence, replied that Saudi Arabia had proved to be a major force for peace and moderation in the region. He added, "If they had not bought these from us, they would have bought them from somebody else [presumably France]." One major characteristic of Britain’s decisions to sell arms to Arab countries that differ from America’s is that Britain attaches no conditions on how fighter aircraft will be used or where they should be stationed. Cited in The Times, 27 September 1985, p.28. However, as the case in Britain’s sale of Lightning supersonic fighters in mid-1960’s, there are restrictions on the resale of the aircraft by the Saudis.
CHAPTER FIVE

UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND SAUDI ARABIA'S BEHAVIOUR:
AN EXAMINATION OF ARMS AND INFLUENCE

As I stated at the end of Chapter Three, an attempt will be made to investigate whether the decisions of the United States to sell F-5s, F-15s and AWACS/Enhancement to Saudi Arabia in 1975, 1978 and 1981 respectively achieve or fail to achieve American oil/economic, military/strategic and political/diplomatic interests in Saudi Arabia. This is very important, the rationale of these sales, as stated in Chapter Three(1), being to advance such American interests.

In the first chapter of this thesis I also discussed the relationship between arms transfers and political influence. I also analysed contending perceptions of this relationship. I concluded that arms transfers per se might not always be enough to produce influence, but added that whether arms transfers will be an effective instrument of influence will depend on the context of the transfers, ie the ability of suppliers to use arms transfers as an instrument of influencing recipients' behaviour towards desired interests is likely to be dependent on the ‘issue area’ in which suppliers attempt to exercise influence (the major hypothesis).(2)

In applying the previous hypothesis that was formulated in Chapter One, the following figure might emerge. All Saudi key decisions with a positive rating of co-operation towards US interests might indicate US influence is likely to occur, ie compatibility between Saudi behaviour and US interests. All Saudi key decisions with a negative rating of co-operation towards US interests might show no US influence on Saudi behaviour (incompatibility).
Therefore, in this chapter I intend to analyse the role of arms transfers in the Saudi-American relationship. We also want to establish whether arms transfers by the United States to Saudi Arabia necessarily create a direct influence on Saudi behaviour, especially before and after the transfer of major military aircraft. As I stated in the introduction of the thesis, I am interested in studying the period between 1973 and 1983. However, in order to take a global view of this relationship, I will also analyse the nature of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States prior to 1973.

Note on evidence:

This chapter's structure has, as its dominant theme, oil. It is the centring upon oil policy which determines the rest of the chapter's analysis of security strategy and political activity. Thus in relation to oil, the latter two areas hold a secondary position.

It will be noted as the chapter progresses that the strength of evidence becomes somewhat attenuated. The reasons for this are
themselves indicative of Saudi Arabia political behaviour and its changes over the period with which I deal (1973-1983). As Saudi Arabia has become deeply involved in highly sensitive arms/oil deals, publicly available information on the execution and dimensions of foreign policy has become necessarily restricted. To dig into this material would not only be foolhardy, but most likely unfruitful.\(^{(3)}\)

**Riyadh and Washington Connection: Pre-1973**

Prior to 1943, Riyadh/Washington contacts at the official level were largely ad hoc and always aimed at solving specific problems arising from any threat to American oil companies operating in Saudi Arabia. Thus, American interest in Saudi Arabia was purely commercial. Indeed, even when the United States established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in 1942 it was at the request of American oil companies\(^{(4)}\), and was aimed at protecting American oil companies from adverse competition from other multinational corporations and threats from within Saudi Arabia due to the financial crisis of the late 1930s that led to political unrest.\(^{(5)}\) This rather functional relationship was a direct result of the relatively stable geo-strategic situation in the Middle East region. Even when the state of Israel was established in 1948, Saudi Arabia was relatively weak and too poor to play any major role. Saudi Arabia was not perceived as a major actor in the region.

However, the outbreak of World War II and the rising wave of Arab nationalism with regard to the Palestinian issue (the former from the early 1940s and the latter from the late 1940s) changed the geo-strategic map of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, because of its geographical location, became an important sea-port along the Red Sea and the Gulf shipping routes which were crucial to the Western Alliance war efforts. Moreover, its accessibility to India and the Far East rendered it even more pertinent. The extension of the US
lend-lease aid programme to Saudi Arabia in 1943 was a reflection of the growing importance of Riyadh. In extending the aid to Saudi Arabia, the Americans justified their action on the Far East:

"Saudi Arabia lies between the vital Red Sea and Persian Gulf shipping routes and across the direct air route to India and the Far East."\(^{(8)}\)

The aid programme allowed the United States military aircraft the right to fly over certain uninhabited zones of Saudi Arabia.\(^{(7)}\) The programme was also an attempt by Washington to prepare the ground for extensive air facilities in the future. Curiously, the United States in return for Saudi Arabia's gesture provided the latter with two million dollars in silver coins.\(^{(8)}\) Saudi Arabia also secured the services of an American military survey to determine its military needs.\(^{(9)}\)

This was to be the beginning of military co-operation between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The construction of an American military base in Dhahran in 1945 was a move in this direction, even though the two countries signed the agreement for the construction of the air base for two different reasons. For Saudi Arabia it was mainly for financial reasons, whereas for the USA it was part of a global move under Truman to expand their influence as well as part of the military efforts of the Allied Powers in the Far East.\(^{(10)}\) However, there was a significant change in the airbase agreement. It was intended that the United States turn over the airbase to Saudi Arabia at the end of the three-year period following the end of World War II.\(^{(11)}\) But the subsequent cold war that developed within the Super Power politics, and the perceived Soviet threat to America's vital interests of the Middle Eastern oil, prompted a request for renewal of the airbase by the United States, which Saudi Arabia approved in 1949.\(^{(12)}\) Although Saudi Arabia rejected the earlier US
'Hoskins' proposals to establish Arab-Jewish dialogue towards the Palestine issue she showed, by approving the renewal, her shared mutual interest in curbing the Soviet overtures in the region and in protecting her vital oil fields. The renewal also resulted in military training assistance worth 100 million dollars over a five-year period for the formation of a modern Saudi armed force.

Despite these parallel interests, Saudi Arabia in 1953 refused to be a part of the proposed Middle East Defense Organisation (MEDO) under the auspices of the United States. The organisation was to be an anti-communist defence line in conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). However, strong opposition from the Arab world, and especially vehement criticism by Nasser's revolutionary Egypt, forced the United States to drop the idea. The Baghdad pact in 1955 was seen as a possible alternative. Consisting of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan, the US-sponsored Pact was rejected by Saudi Arabia who preferred instead a security alliance with Egypt. Despite her concerns with the US over the postwar Soviet threat in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia rejected the Baghdad Pact for the following reasons:

1. Iraq's involvement in the Pact was seen as a resurgence, in a most harmful form, of the old Hashemite threat.
2. Britain's participation in the Pact was also regarded as a means of weakening Saudi Arabia's claim over key strategic and oil-exploration areas along the border with Qatar, the Trucial States and Oman, all of which were under British protection.
3. Participation in the American-inspired security pact would deprive Saudi Arabia of its legitimacy as an independent state and would become a political liability within the Arab world.
4. In any case, the USA's protection was far preferable to a formal military alliance which might lead the signatories into a
super-power conflict as well as limiting Saudi Arabian regional diplomatic flexibility.

Interestingly, Saudi Arabia endorsed the USA's declaration of intention to use force if necessary to assist any Middle East country that was threatened by international communism. Originated by President Eisenhower, the declaration of 1957 was aimed at checking the ambition of the Soviet-supported Nasser's radical Pan-Arabism in the wake of the Suez war. In fact, the policy was geared towards protecting the conservative regimes in the region. Saudi Arabia's support for the American declaration reflected the country's impatience with Nasser's pro-communist attitudes and advocacy of a united Arab nation stretching from Cairo to Baghdad right along Saudi Arabia's border.

A decade later, Saudi Arabia agreed to be involved in a US-sponsored agreement (Bunker Agreement of 1963) to half support for the feuding parties in the Yemen civil war which was fuelled by both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. American interest in the Yemen conflict was apparently to prevent the conflict from threatening a regional order. Of course, Washington and Riyadh shared a mutual interest in preventing the expansion of communism in the region. In fact, the deployment of a fighter squadron (8 F-100s) in Saudi Arabia by the US in 1963 known as Operation Hardsurface was both to force Egypt's Nasser to accept a ceasefire and a clear signal of USA concern about the civil war in Yemen. In particular, Washington was concerned that the left-wing pro-Moscow group did not gain the upper hand in the war.

The continuing concern felt by Washington about the possible expansion of Soviet influence in the Gulf, especially after the British withdrawal in 1971, encouraged the reconstruction of Nixon's 1969 doctrine which was aimed to "assist in the buildup of strong
regional allies that would obviate the need to station US troops abroad". With regard to the Gulf, the doctrine was to stand on "two pillars" - Saudi Arabia and Iran. Due to the indecisive military solution to the conflict in Vietnam, this policy was perceived as an alternative for the US to search for regional states with compatible interests, to assume responsibility for security. Though Saudi Arabia shared mutual interests with the US over the Soviet threat in the region, she refused to identify herself with the American security policy in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia's refusal was based on the grounds of lacking the skilled manpower necessary for such a responsibility. In any case, identifying with US Gulf security policy might seriously damage Saudi Arabia's reputation in the Arab world, especially in view of the US's continued active support for Israel. Indeed, a "two pillar" policy involving Saudi Arabia and Iran was most strange in view of the mutually antagonistic history of the two countries.

This discussion clearly indicates that since 1943, the Saudi-American relationship was largely oriented towards satisfying American security needs in the Middle East region. In fact, Washington's interest in the region at that time was part of a global concern over the possible extension of Soviet influence in the Middle East in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular. Of course, the United States was also sensitive to any signal of left-wing success in the area. Their collaboration to end the civil war in Yemen is a point in this direction. But Riyadh's support was regularly lacking in other areas of American security interest. Obviously, Saudi Arabia's responses were largely dependent on the possible implications which such a support for America would have on their role in the Arab world. This might be the case when Saudi support could have an Israeli linkage. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia found it
ideologically convenient to do practical business with the USA, but political to keep a public distance in order to retain a robust image as an independent state championing the cause of the Arab world. But Riyadh never concealed their ideological preferences. They vividly demonstrated these when necessary. One could therefore perceive a twin-strategy reflecting the instinct for national survival and the desire to play a key role in the Arab world. The former rather than the latter being of crucial importance. Thus, Saudi Arabia was prepared to tolerate Nasser's revolution at the rhetorical level and if limited to Cairo, but was definitely not prepared to tolerate Egypt threatening their very existence and survival as a state.

Although security concerns dominated the Saudi/American relationship, it was nevertheless not the only issue in the relationship. As stated earlier, the initial interest of the United States in Saudi Arabia was commercial. This continued to grow despite the emphasis placed on security. But this was largely aimed at increasing Saudi stakes in the American oil companies operating in Saudi Arabia since the oil concession of 1933. By 1950, Saudi Arabia gained a fifty-fifty profit-sharing with the American oil companies (Aramco). In fact, the 1954 SATCO (Saudi Arabian Tanker Company) agreement with Aristotle Onassis, the Greek shipping magnate, to transport Saudi oil in his tankers was both an attempt to diversify commercial partnerships and a pressure on the American companies to accept increased Saudi Arabian participation in their operations. Although the agreement with Onassis was revoked in 1958 due to arbitration between Saudi Arabia and Aramco, which had been supported by Washington to oppose the agreement, the Saudi action served to warn foreign companies of Saudi Arabia's intention to be involved in decision-making with its oil resources. In fact, Riyadh carried this policy further, to the international arena, by
playing a key role in the establishment of the organisation of oil petroleum countries (OPEC) in 1960. By the late 1960s, the international cartel, OPEC, was seen as an international lobby to pressurise oil companies to accept increasing participation of oil producing countries in the oil companies' concessions which had been granted to them in years past. The subsequent acquisition of a 25% stake in Aramco's equity in 1972 did not therefore come as a surprise.

I United States Interests and Saudi Arabia's Behaviour: The Oil Connection 1973-1983

The foregoing discussion indicates a trend in the behaviour of Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis their relationship with the United States. Riyadh certainly preferred to have American military bases and military assistance. They also welcomed the exploitation of Saudi oil resources. However, the Saudis displayed a significant degree of independence in international politics. Thus, Saudi Arabia wanted practical collaboration with Washington in terms of oil policy but preferred independence and flexibility in international politics. There was therefore a clear dividing line between Saudi internal affairs (the shape of which were affected by American involvement) and Riyadh international politics. Of course, Saudi Arabia co-operated with the United States when fundamental issues were at stake. Here again, the Saudis created a dividing line between fundamental issues like security of oil, stability of the state and its ideology, and secondary issues which had no effect on its existence as a nation. In fact, one must bear this in mind when analysing the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States between 1973 and 1983. Equally important, and which ought to be taken into consideration in the next pages, are issues which may have a negative effect on the well-being of the United States as a nation.
Therefore, while assessing the level of influence on Saudi Arabia achieved by the United States as a result of shipping major military aircraft, care must be taken in understanding what issues are crucial to each country, and what issues are secondary.

For the United States, oil was of crucial importance to maximise a high level of economic growth. Therefore, the source of the supply of oil, and its price, were of great interest to the Americans. Obviously, the Americans wanted a reliable source of oil supply at a reasonable price, and Saudi Arabia, with its enormous reserves, was historically regarded as an ally and a friend. The continuance of a low oil price was needed to ensure the low cost of energy and therefore the relatively low production costs in the manufacturing sector of industry. This was essential if America was to remain competitive in world markets. At the ideological level, high economic growth had to be maintained to underscore the existence of capitalism as a better alternative to communism. Saudi Arabia shared these sentiments, and the perception in Riyadh was that the Western industrialised nations, in particular the United States, should not be deprived of their energy needs. Indeed, in late 1972, King Faisal declared that American companies would be given privileged access to Saudi oil. (32)

The unpredictable character of world politics led Saudi Arabia to take a hostile action against the United States in the aftermath of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In retaliation for the US military airlift during the war, the Arab oil producing countries led by Saudi Arabia imposed an oil embargo on the United States. (33) To reinforce their pressure on other western countries in an attempt to isolate Israel, Saudi Arabia supported an Iranian-sponsored resolution at the December 1973 meeting of OPEC, that oil prices should be increased from $5.17 to $10.84 per barrel - an increase of
over 100\%.(34)

The immediate and direct effect of these two actions was a severe world economic recession. In fact, at a joint meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the United States and its Western partners warned that the world might be facing "an economic crisis paralleling that of the 1930s". (35) This was no doubt an acknowledgement of the importance of oil in international economic relations. It also demonstrated the preparedness of Saudi Arabia to break with the US, even when an issue fundamental to the United States was involved.

Subsequently, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, mediated an agreement for Egyptian-Israeli disengagement of forces (Sinai I, January 1974). In the aftermath of this Egyptian-Israeli settlement, Saudi Arabia and its Arab oil producing partners lifted the oil embargo against the US.(36)

Curiously enough, Saudi Arabia shortly after that took a deliberate action, or deliberately initiated action, within OPEC aimed at forcing the price of oil down. Indeed, in July 1974, Riyadh announced its intention to auction 1.5 mbd (million barrels/day) in the open market and to accept whatever price the market set. (37) This in part was a response to the American complaint that the oil price had been fixed at an artificially high price. It was felt that, if the ordinary law of supply and demand was allowed to operate, the oil price would fall. Saudi Arabia's intention was therefore to release more oil to the market unilaterally, to force the price down from the price set at the Tehran oil conference. Strong opposition from Arab members as well as Iran in OPEC persuaded the Saudis to abandon their plan. As anticipated(38), President Ford warned that OPEC's high oil price would lead the world economy into depression, and would lead to the breakdown of world order and
safety. Henry Kissinger, in fact, threatened that unless the oil price was lowered, the United States would have to alter its policies of helping the oil producing countries in their development plans. (39)

The Vienna Conference of December 1974, however, accepted a Saudi-sponsored compromise between the demand of oil importing countries for price relief and the desire of OPEC members to maintain the existing price. The compromise package was a 4% reduction in the price of oil, i.e., oil price dropped from $10.84 to $10.46 per barrel. (40) This was no doubt a response to United States representations concerning the price of oil. The United States agreement (in January 1975) to sell sixty F-5 E/F to Saudi Arabia at a cost of $769 million, including spare parts and support, (41) acted as a mutually beneficial 'exchange' for the oil, though of course one must note that given the long historical relationship and particular intricacies of the package, there was no direct causal link.

An attempt by some OPEC members to raise the price by about 15% at the Vienna Conference in September 1975 was strongly opposed by Riyadh which threatened a substantial increase in production to undermine any price increase. (42) Faced with the possibility of the Saudis' threat to raise production, OPEC accepted a 10% increase until mid-1976, a compromise price since the Saudis has preferred a 5% increase. (43)

The reduction in oil price in 1974 and the moderate increase in 1975 had helped to improve the economy of the industrialised nations and led to a consequent increase in demand for OPEC oil. It was feared that, given the existing low oil supply, this might encourage an increase in the price of oil. The Americans were worried by this possibility. Therefore, Jimmy Carter, during his presidential campaign, warned OPEC members that the United States would withdraw
arms supplies to those who might seek higher oil prices. This threat rang loud in Riyadh which was anxious to maintain US military assistance. Thus, against the mood within OPEC at the Doha Conference in December 1976 to substantially increase the oil price, Saudi Arabia suggested a moderate increase of 5%. The majority of members of OPEC wanted a 15% increase. Displeased, Riyadh, supported by the United Arab Emirates, went ahead with only a 5% increase. But to further resist the 15% increase wanted by the rest of OPEC members, Saudi Arabia increased its oil production from 7.1 mbd in 1975 to 8.5 mbd in 1976. Riyadh threatened to increase its production to the maximum capacity of 12 mbd. This was clearly a conscious policy of price restraint, which was condemned by Iran and Iraq but praised by the United States. According to President Gerald Ford, Saudi Arabia should be applauded for "exercising international responsibility and concern for the adverse impact of an oil price increase on the world's economy". The American Treasury Secretary was even more generous in his praise. According to him, Saudi Arabia was a "true friend of the West in general and the United States in particular". Others in the US described the Saudi moderating influence on oil price hike as 'statesmanlike' and 'courageous'. Capitalising on the praise from the United States, the Saudi minister of oil, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, demanded a quid-pro-quo for Saudi assistance on oil prices when he declared that "we expect the West to appreciate what we did, especially the United States". These statements operated at two levels, one on Congress such that Congress, who traditionally had misgivings about the aggressive pro-sales policy to Saudi Arabia, would be more sympathetic.

But Saudi Arabia was also concerned with divisions within OPEC, and was interested in increasing its influence within the oil cartel.
Riyadh, therefore, sponsored reconciliation at the Stockholm Conference in July 1977 by raising its oil price by 5% - bringing its oil price into line with the other OPEC members. The compromise was, however, based on a price freeze by OPEC throughout 1978.\(^{(53)}\) The July 1977 compromise in OPEC thus brought about an agreed oil price at about $12 per barrel.

The Executive appreciated the Saudi oil policy of moderation, and the Senate approved Carter's proposal to sell sixty F-15 C/D to Saudi Arabia as part of a military aircraft package to the Middle East in May 1978.\(^{(54)}\)

Against a background of revolution in Iran, various actions and deals occurred. The revolution reduced Iran’s capacity to produce oil. The December 1978 Abu Dhabi Conference provided an opportunity to rectify this shortfall which might have led to a price increase. The Conference accepted Saudi Arabia’s proposal to allow Riyadh to increase oil output from 8.3 mbd to 9.5 mbd.\(^{(55)}\) However, Saudi Arabia went along with OPEC's decision to gradually raise oil prices by 14.5% during 1979 in four stages. This meant that since the oil price stood at $13.33 per barrel in January 1977, by October 1979 it would have reached $14.54.\(^{(56)}\)

At the same time as the United States was playing a major role in sponsoring the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accords, OPEC held an emergency meeting at Geneva in March 1979 to revive its Abu Dhabi Conference decision on price. The emergency conference was called ostensibly to discuss the oil market situation where most OPEC members were offering $8 higher than the $13.33 agreed upon at Abu Dhabi.\(^{(57)}\) But it was more than a coincidence that the Conference reneged on its December 1978 agreements against the background of strong Arab opposition to the Camp David Accords. The March 1979 Geneva Conference agreed to an immediate implementation of the Abu
Dhabi decision\(^{(58)}\), ie oil prices moved up from $13.33 to $14.54 per barrel from January to March 1979. Also at the Conference, Saudi Arabia agreed to the demand of the new Iranian regime to cut production in order to enable Iran to resume its production disrupted during the revolution.\(^{(59)}\) Saudi Arabia oil production was then cut in April 1979 from 10.4 mbd to 8.5 mbd.\(^{(60)}\) Unexpectedly, this decision raised the spot oil market price from about $20 in March to about $35 in June 1979 although the official OPEC price was fixed at $14.54 per barrel.\(^{(61)}\)

Clearly, the OPEC official price was unrealistic and the June 1979 Geneva Conference was an attempt to rectify this situation. Official OPEC price was raised to $18 per barrel where OPEC's members were allowed to surcharge up to $5 per barrel.\(^{(62)}\) Thus while Saudi Arabia agreed to raise its crude oil price to $18 per barrel, other OPEC members were charging over $23 per barrel.\(^{(63)}\)

The Americans were obviously unhappy about the oil situation, especially in view of the negative effects on growth of the high oil price. President Carter therefore requested the Saudis to increase their oil production. In response, Riyadh increased its oil production in July 1979 by one million mbd (from 8.5 mbd to 9.8 mbd)\(^{(64)}\) and the President welcomed the Saudi increase as a "positive decision".\(^{(65)}\) This decision led to a decline in the price of the oil spot market. The spot market price came down from $35 in June to about $33 per barrel in August 1979.\(^{(66)}\)

The December 1979 Caracas meeting of OPEC and the June 1980 Algiers Conference failed to persuade Saudi Arabia to reduce its oil output which was then 9.6 mbd\(^{(67)}\), although other members of the international oil cartel reduced production in order to maintain a high oil price.\(^{(68)}\) The June 1980 meeting, in fact, left OPEC divided and weak, with delegates agreeing that each member-state
should fix its oil price. (69) Saudi Arabia, for its part, decided to sell at $28, as against $32 per barrel being offered by other members of OPEC. (70) Clearly, Saudi Arabia tried in the first instance to force OPEC to lower the oil price. When this failed, Riyadh maintained a high production in order to increase supply and lower prices. The Saudis succeeded in convincing its OPEC colleagues of the need not to allow frequent price increases. The September 1980 Vienna decision of the oil cartel to freeze oil prices (71) appeared to be the result of Saudi Arabian pressures, although economic recession and conservation programmes in the industrialised nations, as well as the increased oil supplies from non-OPEC oil (72), may have had an additional impact. In a move to close ranks with its OPEC colleagues, Riyadh agreed to increase its oil price by $2 per barrel (making it $30 per barrel). (73) This was still far less than what was being demanded by other OPEC members which then stood at $36 per barrel. (74)

Given Saudi Arabia's close relationship with the West, it was not unmindful of the West's economic position and the effects a rise in oil prices would have. Once again the historical position of Saudi Arabia in relation, particularly to the US, operated, and the notion that higher oil prices might reduce arms sales was not Saudi's major consideration. It was more the case that a general rift could occur between Saudi Arabia, the US, and the West.

Iraqi-Iranian War Reduces Oil Supply:

Riyadh Prevented Oil Price Increases

The aftermath of the Iraqi-Iranian war which broke out in September 1980 led to a loss of over 2 mbd from the two warring nations. (75) The Saudis quickly increased their oil production from 9.5 mbd to 9.9 mbd (76) in order to make up for the loss in supply, and thereby prevented a market panic that might have increased oil
prices. In fact, the fall of the Shah of Iran, and Saudi Arabia's decision to reduce production in response to a request from Khomeni's Iran, had had exactly that impact. The decision of Saudi Arabia was therefore an attempt to prevent any possible demand for a high OPEC price rise. As it happened, the December 1980 Bali Conference agreed to limit oil price increases to $2 per barrel. OPEC prices then ranged between $32 per barrel (Saudi Arabia) and about $40 per barrel (Libya).\footnote{77} However, a continued high production level by Riyadh forced the spot market price down from $40 per barrel in December 1980 to $32 in June 1981.\footnote{78} Against the background of Saudi Arabia's high production and, as mentioned earlier, the economic recession in the West which had caused a lower demand for oil, long-term contracts by oil companies with OPEC members were cancelled. For example, Nigeria and Kuwait were unable to contract the selling of their oil at their desired prices.\footnote{79} Faced with these new developments, OPEC at the May 1981 Geneva Conference requested Saudi Arabia to cut its oil production so as to avoid the worsening of oil prices. The Saudis, however, failed to accede to this request. Riyadh, in fact, refused both to cut its oil production and raise prices so as to close the price gap with the rest of OPEC.\footnote{80} In any case, OPEC members (except the warring Iraq and Iran) agreed to freeze oil prices and cut production by 10% in the face of the intransigence of the Saudis to fall in line with general OPEC policy.\footnote{81}

It should be recalled that there was a shared Riyadh-Washington interest to keep oil prices low. This was part of the American plan to keep energy prices low in order to achieve lower costs of production and high highly competitive industrial products. For being faithful to this information agreement, the Reagan Administration rewarded the Saudis by proposing, in October 1981, to
sell AWACS/F-15s Enhancement Equipment to Saudi Arabia. This proposal was eventually approved by the US Senate in late October 1981. \(82\)

Saudi Arabia's continued opposition to high prices was maintained at the OPEC Vienna Conference in March 1982. The Conference failed to impose a quota production for each member, due to opposition from Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. \(83\) The first two countries' opposition was based on the paradoxically similar reason of the need to finance their war efforts and war-torn economies. The March 1983 London Conference of the oil cartel agreed on price and production levels. Oil price was reduced to the then spot price of $29 per barrel, while a quota ceiling of 17.5 mbd was imposed for the rest of 1983. \(84\) Riyadh, however, accepted no formal quota. She obtained the right to be flexible on its production so as to fill any gap between what the rest of OPEC produced and world demand. For example, if the market demanded the 17.5 mbd OPEC ceiling, and all the twelve members produced 12.5 mbd, Saudi Arabia would produce 5 mbd. This was no doubt a substantial drop in Saudi Arabia's oil production.

An overview of the foregoing analysis indicates a deliberate and consistent policy by Saudi Arabia to induce a reduction in oil price. This was always contrary to the policy positions of other members of OPEC. Of course, a consistent confrontation was always stemmed by practical collaboration. This was the case when OPEC was still strong. The resistance to a price rise was a conscious decision by Saudi Arabia to pursue its policy of oil price reduction and still remain influential within the oil cartel. However, Riyadh became a little more intransigent when OPEC was weakened by an excess oil supply in the market. As stated earlier, Saudi Arabia's behaviour over the ten years under study, revealed a remarkable coincidence
with the interests of the United States of America. On the face of it, Saudi Arabia was doing the Americans' bidding. Nevertheless, dependent on the issue area upon which arms supplies attempted to effect an influence, one can explain Saudi oil behaviour. Riyadh, out of conviction, would believe that a low oil price might ensure the continued dependence of the industrialised nations on oil. This could be an attempt towards making oil producers important within the international economic system. But the Saudis' low price policy started in the 1970s, and was clearly at variance with Riyadh's earlier preference for a higher oil price. In fact, one of the primary objectives of OPEC at its inception was to ensure this. If one held that influence was articulated only in terms of particular sales, then it would be difficult to establish whether Saudi Arabia complied with the US because of Saudi conviction or US influence. But my thesis has argued that there is an historical relationship at work which over-determined particular sales decisions, but not forgetting historical patterning. It is the relationship of the historical to the particular, which patterns the trend of arms sales and the willingness of Saudi Arabia to agree to US demands. I have shown that the pattern of historical influence tended to reconcile quickly differences between Saudi Arabia and the US, or at least maintain a security/military relationship at the same time as there were differences in other issue-areas.

Having said the above, it must be borne in mind that the main aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between arms sales and influence. The immediate question therefore is whether there is any direct relationship between arms transfers to Saudi Arabia and its position within OPEC. It is difficult to indicate a direct relationship, especially as Saudi Arabia's support for lower oil price predates the major military aircraft deals between the two
countries. Indeed, the apparent deduction from the fact above is that arms supplies were used as a means of compensating an ally who had been supporting a particular position, rather than an attempt to make another country behave in a particular fashion. It should be emphasised that Saudi Arabia and the United States share similar ideological positions and had had a mutually beneficial relationship for several decades. Within this context it is difficult to conclude that Saudi Arabia behaved in a particular way because of a single variable - namely arms transfers. Of course, arms transfers strengthen this long relationship and help to encourage Saudi Arabia to continue its pro-capitalist position. No doubt Saudi Arabia, either through coincidence of interests and values and therefore out of conviction, or through a conscious attempt to please the Americans, did support the position of America on oil. That the United States did influence Saudi Arabia, should be seen within the broader context of a long mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. Influence did occur, but not directly due to the supply of arms. Thus, arms transfers could be perceived as a means of reinforcing a relationship, rather than the main variable dictating how one country should behave towards another. Arms transfers along the Riyadh-Washington axis indicate long-term political commitment, and another stage in this close relationship. It is therefore a function of maintaining and strengthening an existing relationship, rather than being the point of origin for the close ties.


The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States at the economic level was mainly based on two major agreements. The first agreement was concluded in early 1974 and one of the highlights
was that Saudi Arabia would invest largely in the United States through the purchase of US government bonds, notes and treasury bills. In return, the United States would guarantee confidentiality on Saudi Arabia's investments.\(^{(85)}\) A special investment arrangement was reached in late 1974 between the US Treasury Department and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) whereby the latter purchased US government securities through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Documents outlining details of the special (then secret) arrangement between US financial authorities and SAMA will be found in Appendix B.

The second agreement, which was a formal treaty signed in June 1974, provided for "co-operation in the fields of the economy and defense".\(^{(86)}\) The agreement provided for a 'US-Saudi Joint Commission', adding that the United States would give aid on a large scale and help Saudi Arabia in its development plans. Details of this massive American assistance to Saudi Arabia's development plans in economic and security will be found in Appendix C.

With nearly $142 billion to spend on its Second Five-Year Development Plan (1975-80)\(^{(87)}\) that aimed at building the country's physical infrastructure, its petro-chemical industries and developing its social services, Saudi Arabia could become a very attractive market for American goods and services. (See Table 3 - Chapter Three: US Trade with Saudi Arabia.)

Saudi Arabia's signing of the above important agreements on trade and investment, particularly at a time of US recession that followed the high energy costs caused by the oil embargo of 1973/4, represented hard evidence of Saudi Arabia's co-operation with US wishes to ease the problem of trade imbalances and enhance US financial stability. The factor of 'issue area' can adequately explain Saudi Arabia's acceding to US wishes for increased trade and
investment, given the desire to encourage the US to provide military assistance necessary for Saudi military weakness. Investment in the US would also generate income necessary for Saudi's own financial stability. It is in Saudi Arabia's interest that its development plans be carried out by US skilled labour and high technology. Saudi Arabia has few avenues for investment on its soil, and therefore it is a practical financial judgement to invest its surplus funds in the West which might give the best chances for the protection and security of its assets and investments. \(^{(88)}\)

Saudi Arabia, as I stated earlier, acquired three major types of military aircraft from the US in 1975, 1978 and 1981. Therefore, Saudi/American co-operation agreements on trade and investment in early and mid-1974 preceded all the previous arms deals. Consequently, Saudi Arabian co-operation with US interests on trade and investment occurred before the arms deals. If US influence was suggested by this co-operation, then Saudi Arabia's economic behaviour was influenced by US wishes. This means there was a compatibility between certain US interests and Saudi economic behaviour.

Although the evidence supports the compatibility relationship between American interests and Saudi economic behaviour in terms of co-operation from the former towards the latter, the question that might rise now is whether the economic co-operation of Saudi Arabia is a function of US arms transfers. Clearly the answer is no, especially since the two main agreements guiding the trade relationships between the two countries existed before any major arms deals. The US government, to aid Saudi, deployed its lend-lease programme in the 1940s, and further helped by giving technical assistance in setting up a financial and bureaucratic infrastructure in the 1950s. Therefore, following my reasoning above, trade and
investment connections between the US and Saudi Arabia are not a function of arms transfers. Although arms transfers may have contributed to the strengthening of the relationship between the two countries, they could not be regarded as the sole determining factor in the decision of Riyadh to promote trade and investment in Washington. Trade and investment only blossoms in an atmosphere of confidence and trust which can only be built over a period of years.

As stated earlier, Saudi Arabia and the United States preferred capitalism. This mutual ideological value and commitment could not be better demonstrated than in the terms of economic connection between the two countries. Here again, Washington and Riyadh closely collaborated to protect Saudi Arabia's investment in the United States. This move displayed the Saudi Arabian adherence to a capitalist economic system. On the other hand, by investing a larger percentage of her petro-dollars in the United States, Saudi Arabia strengthened the hands of the United States in discouraging any future hostile government in Riyadh. What is of interest to me in this thesis is the level of economic co-operation between Riyadh and Washington, and the immediate question of the long period of the relationship. Arms transfers in the short term can hardly achieve this.


Despite the active collaboration between Saudi Arabia and the United States on oil and economic issues, Saudi Arabia deflected from US Middle East strategy for regional security, on the grounds that supporting such security plans would carry heavy political costs. This aspect of Saudi Arabian behaviour followed the pattern already set by Riyadh in the 1960s, when she refused to renew the lease of its Dhahran airbase to the Americans. For Saudi Arabia, it appeared
that collaboration at the level of oil and the economy were considered of fundamental interest to both countries, whereas supporting Washington's Middle East strategy was considered to have a heavy political cost at home and abroad. For political reasons, Saudi Arabia then opposed such security plans, particularly those which involved Israel. (89)

At a time of increased regional insecurity upon the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Saudi Arabia refused to co-operate with two major US security arrangements which included the Persian Gulf Strategy of 1980 (seeking regional military accesses) and the Strategic Consensus of 1981 (mobilizing regional defense pacts). (90) While the Saudis remained supportive, though not in public, of bolstering of a US "over the horizon" presence as an exercise of the US global strategic role, they declined to any American attempts to increase a force presence in the region or any suggestion of joint military co-operation, or the basing of US forces on Saudi soil. (91) This provided evidence of Saudi Arabian lack of co-operation vis-a-vis vital US strategic interests. Why did Saudi Arabia refuse to co-operate militarily with the US plans despite the fact that the US provided Saudi Arabia with three major military aircraft in 1975, 1978 and 1981?

Before one might answer this question one might examine the refusal of Saudi Arabia to co-operate within the context of these previous major arms deals. Saudi Arabia received F-5s in 1975 and F-15s in 1978, and then rejected the American-sponsored Persian Gulf Strategy in 1980, then received AWACS/F-15s Enhancement Equipment in 1981, then resisted the US Strategic Consensus in 1982. Therefore, Saudi Arabian refusal of military co-operation with the United States occurred after the major military aircraft transfers.

If influence is suggested, as stated in Chapter One, by
recipients' co-operation towards suppliers' interests, then Saudi Arabian behaviour could be best described as incompatible with US strategic interests.

Although the evidence implies the incompatibility between US strategic interests and Saudi Arabia's behaviour, in terms of lack of co-operation of the latter towards the interests of the former, the factor of 'issue area' might provide me with an adequate explanation for such lack of co-operation, ie the primary motives behind Saudi Arabian lack of co-operation towards United States strategic interests. These primary motives are as follows:

1 While US security policy usually operates openly and formally and in an atmosphere of media exposure, Saudi Arabia security policy, like most of the Third World countries, is kept secret and informal. Thus, Saudi Arabia would seek to avoid an open action that would make her display ties with the United States.

2 Though Saudi Arabia would welcome a US firm stand against Soviet expansion, she would like to see US military access to bases over-the-horizon but not on her soil. This would avoid Arab criticisms that call for an absence of foreign military presence in Arab territories.

3 Since the United States signed an agreement on strategic co-operation with Israel, this would make Saudi Arabia guilty of an alliance with Israel by being seen to support US military policy. This would probably not only weaken her stand at home, but would limit her diplomatic manoeuvering essential to her security in the region.

4 While the Carter Administration in the US, and Israel, considered the Camp David formula as the only basis for a settlement in the Middle East, general Arab attitudes, including Saudi Arabia's, were in opposition to this formula. Therefore,
Saudi Arabia's refusal to co-operate with US strategic wishes could be understood within this context.

5 Since the Reagan Administration considered the Israeli settlement in the Arab occupied lands as an obstacle to peace but not illegal, if Saudi military policy aligned itself with US policy it would jeopardise her influential position in Arab as well as Islamic worlds.

6 Then the question of how much Saudi Arabia trust the United States to be consistent in its support, especially military, to Saudi Arabia. The answer is not too much, it seems - one can at least in part explain why Saudi Arabia refused the Dhahran airbase extension (and other cases) by pointing out that if Saudi Arabia pretty much broke with its Middle East neighbours, and threw its lot with the US, it would then tend to need a permanent US military presence to ensure its (Saudi Arabia's) security. Presumably, because it thought that the US would not remain totally loyal to Saudi Arabian security needs and would be tempted to pull out at any suitable juncture, the Saudis could not afford to be seen wholly in accord with US military desires and intentions.

A crucial question which must be answered is whether Saudi Arabia's refusal to support both the US Persian Gulf Strategy of 1980 and the Strategic Consensus of 1981 can be termed a failure of American arms transfer policy to achieve influence. As has been repeatedly stated, arms suppliers (in this case the USA) never stated a specific intention to use a given arms supply to influence the recipient to pursue a particular line on a given policy. Nevertheless, it is difficult for there not to be a spillover effect on other issues than the issue mainly affected by arms transfers. Thus Saudi Arabia's refusal to support American strategic positions
in the Middle East should be perceived as the inevitable result of the relationship between the two countries, each with its own defined but irreducible compled of interests. To start to find a connection between Saudi Arabia's refusal to support the American strategic position and Washington arms supplies to Saudi Arabia should be understood within the context of the overall Riyadh/ Washington relationship, including the arms factor.


The United States perceived the Middle East as a major foreign policy area. Both for domestic purposes, because of the ethnic affinity between the American Jews and the state of Israel, and for its economic interests in terms of oil, the United States believed it must always be seen to act even handedly so as to pursue the objective of achieving regional peace and stability in the Middle East. Consequently, Washington has always sponsored peace proposals. The United States always regarded these proposals as important, especially because they were practical efforts designed to resist Soviet influence in the Middle East region. The primary US peace initiatives in the Middle East from 1973 to 1983 are as follows:

1 Sinai II Agreement 1975

The first major political proposal was the Sinai II Agreement of 1975 which followed the 1973 Israeli-Arab war. Its purpose was to enforce a further retreat of Israel's forces along the Suez Canal as a precursor towards peace negotiations between the two countries. The agreement provided for the following:

a) The withdrawal of Israeli forces from two strategic passes in Sinai, Gidi and Mitla.

b) An operation of radar warning systems for the Gidi and Mitla passes by the US technicians.
c) An expansion of UN neutral zone stationed between Israeli and Egyptian forces according to the terms of Sinai I Agreement.

d) An approval of Egypt to permit the passage of non-military cargoes bound for Israel through the Suez Canal. (92)

The Sinai II Agreement, which was directly initiated by the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, with consultation with the Saudis (93), was endorsed by Riyadh. The treaty was, in fact, described by Saudi Arabia as an important step in the right direction towards a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. (94) Saudi Arabia did not stop at mere endorsement; Riyadh also helped to persuade Syria, who had objected to Egypt's unilateral move, to accept the treaty. To encourage the Syrians to support this policy, Riyadh provided financial aid and recognised Syria's prominent role to lead an Arab deterrent force in Lebanon. (95) However, it may be noted, Syria in reality only made a nodding acquaintanceship with the Treaty to which she was, from the beginning, a reluctant signatory.

2 Camp David Accords 1978

President Jimmy Carter's sponsored Camp David Accords were not popular with the Saudis who rejected them (96) despite President Carter's efforts to get the Saudis to support the Accords. (97) According to the Accords, Egypt would regain sovereignty over Sinai up to the pre-1967 border, while Israel would withdraw its armed forces from Sinai. They also provided for freedom of navigation for Israel through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran. (98) Other highlights of the treaty include:

a) Limitation of Egyptian armed forces to one division (mechanised or infantry) within fifty kilometers east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.
b) Withdrawal of Egyptian forces on the remaining part of Sinai.

c) Limitation of Israeli military forces to four infantry battalions within three kilometers east of the international border.

d) Deployment of United Nations forces to be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Agaba, varying in width from 20-40 km.

e) Peace treaty between Egypt and Israel to include full diplomatic recognition, economic and cultural relationships, termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people. (99)

The Camp David Accords also provided autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A tripartite agreement between Israel, Egypt and Jordan was to establish for the inhabitants an elected self-governing autonomy (administrative council) in the area, and Israeli armed forces were to be withdrawn from inhabited locations and be redeployed to specified security areas. According to the Accords, once the self-governing authority has been established a transitional period of five years was to begin. By the end of this five-year period, the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be determined. Finally, Palestinian refugees would be returned to the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the unanimous approval of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the self-governing authority. (100)

Clearly the implementation of the Accords would involve official diplomatic recognition to Israel by Egypt in return for the latter's right to repossess Sinai. However, it failed to provide for a Palestinian homeland in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The treaty also failed to demand Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian
'Golan Heights' or the Saudi 'Tiran and Sinafir Islands' occupied by Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. These treaties' shortcomings might then arouse Arab opposition. Due to general Arab opposition and the pressures on Egypt, who faced almost total isolation in the Arab world, Riyadh had no option but to oppose the treaty.

3 Reagan's Palestine Program 1982

This plan, which was a direct follow-up to the Camp David Accords, was equally rejected by Saudi Arabia. The core of this proposal, considered generally unacceptable by the Arabs, was the provision that Palestinian autonomy was to be administratively co-ordinated by Jordan, and the plan's position on the status of Jerusalem was ambivalent. This was an obvious contradiction of the official position of the majority of the Arab states, which endorsed at the Fez meeting in 1982 a proposal calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip with Jerusalem as its capital. The 1982 Fez proposal was largely based on the 1981 Fahd eight-point Peace Plan. Though the Fez proposal was not as forthcoming as the original Fahd Plan it had the merit of Arab majority consensus, contained an indirect recognition of Israel (in Point Seven), and was not totally incompatible with the Camp David Accords of 1978, at least as a negotiating position. Thus, although the Saudis, who failed to get Arab endorsement in 1981, saw their efforts were successful in 1982, for their part the Americans were encouraged by Saudi Arabia's implicit recognition of Israel as a country with whom to negotiate.

4 Lebanese-Israeli Agreement 1983

In a move inconsistent with its earlier positions on Middle East
politics, Saudi Arabia provided tacit support to President Reagan's sponsored Lebanese-Israeli Agreement of 1983 which provided for Lebanese recognition of the state of Israel. Lebanon was to stop the use of its soil as a base for military actions against Israel. Finally, Israel withdrew its forces from Lebanon. In a tacit approval of the agreement, Saudi Arabia persuaded Syria to soften its position on the American-sponsored withdrawal agreement.

Here again, Saudi Arabia was consistent in following the pattern of behaviour already laid down pre-1973. Riyadh displayed some flexibility in its relationship with the United States. Nevertheless, this relative flexibility towards US diplomatic initiatives was always dependent on the possible impact such flexibility would have on its inter-Arab politics.


If influence is defined by recipients' co-operation towards suppliers' interests, then Saudi Arabian behaviour could be best described as compatible in the one case and incompatible in the other. However, Saudi Arabia's compatibility or incompatibility with major US diplomatic initiatives from 1973 to 1983 in the Middle East could be explained through the factor of 'issue area', i.e. the primary motives behind Saudi Arabian endorsement of some American initiatives and its rejection of others. Among the primary motives
are the following:

1 Saudi Arabia's support for Sinai II and Lebanese-Israeli Agreements would keep the Soviet influence out of the Middle East peace process (compatible with US wishes). Also stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict might lead to a military confrontation in which Saudi Arabia would find itself. Finally, Saudi Arabia's ability to get Syria (a key political actor in the region) to approve the previous agreements would minimise Saudi Arabian political costs in the Arab world.

2 Saudi Arabia's lack of support for Camp David and Reagan's Program Agreements in 1978 and 1982 were perceived as follows:
   a) Camp David Accords alienated most of the Arab world from the US and thereby could have increased Saudi vulnerability if she had wished to tie itself with US diplomatic proposals.
   b) Fear of retaliation from radical Arab groups, or Arab hard-liners like Syria.
   c) Feeling of kinship towards Arabism and obligation to Palestinian cause.
   d) Both the Camp David Accords and Reagan's Palestine Plan failed to establish a comprehensive peace that restored Arab-occupied lands and established an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

As the main objective of this thesis is the relationship between arms transfers and political influence, the crucial question that arises is whether Saudi Arabia's endorsement of the US sponsored initiatives (Sinai II 1975 and Lebanese-Israeli Agreement 1983) is a function of arms transfers, or whether Saudi's refusal to endorse both the other major American proposals (Camp David 1978 and Reagan's Palestine Plan 1982) is meant to illustrate a failure of arms
transfers. (This of course is based upon the standard hypothesis, that arms transfers initiate and shape political behaviour.) The answer to both questions is no, particularly when Saudi Arabia's endorsement of the former proposals occurred after the approval of the transfers of F-5s (1975) and AWACS/F-15s Enhancement Equipment (1981). By the same token Saudi Arabia's rejection of the Camp David/Reagan Palestine Plan agreements also occurred after the approval of the last two arms supplies. Saudi Arabia's refusal to endorse American sponsored diplomatic initiatives should be seen as an inevitable result of a complex relationship between the two countries, each with its own defined interests.

**Conclusion**

Taken as a whole this chapter has tried to establish that there was a consistent pattern in the Saudi behaviour over the years. It might be recalled that I divided the interacting issue areas between the two countries into fundamental and secondary areas.

In the case of fundamental issues such as oil and trade/investment, Saudi Arabia followed a consistent policy of supporting American interests. On the other hand, where secondary strategic/political issues were involved, Saudi Arabia showed inflexibility towards the former and some degree of flexibility towards the latter. Therefore, Riyadh's co-operation strategy was only affected when it suited her, i.e. when her interests coincided with the US and at no political cost. The question of whether arms transfers succeeded in producing influence on Saudi's co-operation vis-a-vis US interests, or failed to produce influence and thereby lack of co-operation, was demonstrated within a 50-year span of US/Saudi relations. What are the implications of these findings? Do or do they not support the assumption that the link of arms transfers to political influence depend on the issue area involved? The answer
to these questions and others will form the basis of our next, concluding chapter.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. See Chapter Three, 154-155.

2. See Chapter One, pp.51-53.

3. See Note 85.


7. Ibid.


11. Ibid.


27. Ibid.

28. OPEC was established in September 1960 by Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait and later included Qatar, Libya, Indonesia, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, Gabon, and the United Arab Emirates. Prompted by inability to manage their petroleum resources on an individual basis, OPEC sought to present the oil companies with a unified front. Among OPEC primary priorities are to control oil price and production.

29. Propagated by Saudi Arabia, the principal of increasing participation by the oil producing states in the concessions of the oil companies was adopted by OPEC in Vienna meeting in 1968. Cited in Walter Levy, Oil Strategy and Politics, (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1982), p.186.


31. Saudi Arabia increased its share of ARAMCO ownership to 60% in 1974, and assumed full ownership of ARAMCO in 1980. Nevertheless, ARAMCO, under Saudi control, still operates and manages the exploration, production, refining, and marketing of most Saudi petroleum.


33. Ibid, p.255.

41. See Table 1, Chapter Three.
44. Ibid, p.258.
46. Ibid.
49. Ibid, p.iv.
52. MEES, 10 January 1977, p.6.
54. See Table 1, Chapter Three.
55. BP, 1985, p.5.
58. "Market Crude Price Up", *Arab Oil and Gas*, 1 April 1979, p.5.

60. PIW, 11 June 1979, p.7.


63. PIW, 10 September 1979, p.4.

64. Ibid, p.11.


68. Ibid.


73. PIW, 5 January 1981, p.11.

74. Ibid.


77. PIW, 5 January 1981, p.11.


80. Ibid, p.25.

81. Ibid.


83. A. El-Mokadem, op.cit., p.35.


pp.9-11. The confidentiality of the investment agreement makes the exact amount and the nature of Saudi Arabia's investments in the U.S. highly unreliable. Using Freedom of Information Act, Senator Frank Church (D - Idaho), Congressman James Scheuer (D - NY) and Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal (R - NY) all requested detailed information on the amount and the nature of Saudi Arabia and the other OPEC members' investments in the U.S. Their requests were directed to the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Bank, the State Department and the CIA. All these departments/agencies declined these requests. Cited in HCFA, The Operation of Federal Agencies in Monitoring, Reporting on and Analyzing Foreign Investment in the United States, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1980), p.199.


88. Nevertheless, Saudi investment in the West might be vulnerable to freeze. Example, Jimmy Carter's freezing Iran's assets in the U.S. in 1980, confiscation, currency convertibility losses, inflationary erosion of real values, and unfavourable laws and regulations.


94. Ibid.

95. A. Cordesman, op.cit., p.36.


CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The preceding investigation in Chapter Five has analysed US attempts to use arms transfers to influence Saudi Arabia foreign policy behaviour (1973-1983). Our investigation has confirmed the importance of that means of influence during this period. It has been suggested that influence should be seen within the context of a long mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. This holds true both for Saudi Arabian foreign policy outcomes and for the US decision-making in attempting to influence Saudi behaviour with arms transfers. This concluding chapter will review major implications of arms/influence in the United States/Saudi Arabia relationship, and then attempt to draw some generalisations for use in the future.

The predominant arena of existing analysis embodied in the academic studies of William Quandt, Thomas Wheelock, Uri Ra'anan, Roger Pajak and others is concerned with the arms/influence relationship in a variety of different countries, but they have not adequately discussed the US/Saudi Arabia relations.

As I stated in the thesis, the previous scholarly studies of arms transfers do not suggest that they are always without value as part of political discourse, but that the effectiveness of the arms transfers to produce desirable results is unlikely to be wholly positive. If there are any results, they are likely to be restricted as William Quandt and Thomas Wheelock have observed with regard to the US arms supplies to Israel, and Uri Ra’an'an and Roger Pajak have observed as regards Soviet arms transfers to Arab states.
Despite the lack of persuasive evidence, the United States government continued to use arms transfers as a primary foreign policy measure for maintaining and expanding its interests, in this case with Saudi Arabia.

Academic studies have examined the arms/influence relationship from different aspects. I have investigated the use of arms transfers by the United States to gain political influence on Saudi foreign policy behaviour in conjunction with other variables/factors: arms and influence is understood within a much broader context. Among the variables that I have suggested are as important as arms transfers in determining US ability to achieve its interests in Saudi Arabia, are Saudi Arabia's alternative sources of arms supplies, Saudi Arabia's involvement in Middle East conflicts, and Saudi Arabia's 'policy priority' or 'value orientation' - how much and for what reasons Saudi Arabia values the interests that the US attempt to achieve via the transfer of arms. From the supplier's side, I have examined the legal, Executive and Congressional instruments and manoeuvres which enabled or impeded arms sales to be made.

The examination of arms/influence in the US/Saudi Arabia relations 1973-1983 has revealed significant results. Among these are: US attempts at influence via arms transfers are more successful in areas of oil and trade than in the areas of diplomacy and have achieved little in regard to its military and defense plans.

The examination of Saudi oil policy within OPEC indicated a deliberate and consistent policy by Saudi Arabia to induce a reduction of oil prices and adequate oil supplies to the Ist. A primary example was the sponsoring of a resolution to reduce oil price from $10.84 to $10.46 per barrel at the 1974 Vienna Conference. (1) This was a response to US concern about the high prices of oil. In January 1975, the US administration agreed to sell
sixty F-5s to Saudi Arabia. In the 1978 Abu Dhabi Conference Saudi Arabia announced an increase in production from 8.3 mbd to 9.5 mbd.\(^{(2)}\) Immediately prior to this had been Iranian domestic unrest and US concern about the uncertainty of oil supplies from the Gulf. Earlier in May 1978, US Congress approved the sale of sixty F-15s to Saudi Arabia after which Saudi oil production increased. The high production of oil during the Iran-Iraq war, which broke out in September 1980, stood at 9.9 mbd up from 9.5 mbd.\(^{(3)}\) This continued high oil production forced down the spot market oil price from $40 per barrel in December 1980 to $32 in June 1981.\(^{(4)}\) Five months later the US Congress approved the Reagan administration’s proposal to sell AWACS/F-15s Enhancement Equipment to Saudi Arabia.

If influence, as defined in Chapter One, is the obtaining of a recipient’s co-operation by the suppliers’ actions which the recipient would not otherwise have done, then the three primary examples revealed a remarkable Saudi co-operation in oil price/production with the US wishes. The apparent deduction from these examples is that there is a direct relationship between US arms supplies and Saudi Arabia oil policy especially when Saudi oil co-operation occurs before and after the sale of major US weapons systems. However, it is difficult to establish a firm causal basis to such a relationship. Indeed, the three major arms deals - F-5s, F-15s and AWACS/F-15 Enhancement - could be taken as evidence of coerced or simple exchange relationships, for instance as a reward to Saudi Arabia for its conformity to US demands in regard to oil policy. By implementing a policy of stable prices and high production, Saudi Arabia tried to ensure the dependence of the West on their oil. Instead of the West looking to conservation measures, the West would still depend on Saudi oil at reasonable prices and in adequate quantities.
Full Saudi oil production (12 mbd.) would oblige other OPEC countries to follow the Saudi wishes, otherwise Saudi could use her controlling share of oil resources to enforce compliance and thereby control the decisions of the OPEC cartel anyway.

When oil prices are low, it is tempting to leave the oil underground, yet Saudi Arabia can produce massively whatever the fortunes of the market. Though as I noted in Chapter Four, actual oil production rose and fell markedly in the period of 1973-1983. Why does it do this? Largely because Saudi wants to retain its share of the market, the West's trust and also her high revenue. Even though marginal profits may fall close to zero in a weak market, the opportunity costs of not producing are, by implication, more than would be incurred by producing, over time. Reduction of the oil output would strain Western economies and little serve Saudi interests. Were Saudi to reduce oil output, it would place in question military and security ties with the US. There is of course a bi-lateral price dependence between US and Saudi Arabia in terms of oil and arms, due to the fact that if the price of oil rises, then the increased costs will be passed on to the US manufacturer of arms, (as well as much of the rest of the US industrial sector).

But there is a limit in regard to the harmony of interests. Saudi Arabia can allow an oil price rise if there is a growth in the US economy and a slowdown in inflation, because America's capacity to buy oil at a higher price is then greater. In 1982, Saudi Arabia sold its oil at $34 per barrel and claimed that they were still serving US interests, despite the significant rise in the oil price. Before I recap on the pre-1973 period, we must hold clear in our minds, the point, that after 1973 Saudi Arabia/US co-operation was high and distinctly harmonious in the area of oil.

With the exception of the oil concession of 1933, Saudi
co-operation with the US commercial interests was significant, as shown in Chapter Five. There was a series of Saudi/American clashes beginning in 1950, when Saudi Arabia gained a 50/50 profit-sharing agreement with Aramco, and then the 1954 Satco affair where Saudi Arabia attempted to be independent of American oil companies in oil transportation and marketing. Finally the Saudi-led forming of OPEC in 1960. OPEC of course wished to establish oil-producing countries right's to oil exploitation, production, and marketing. In 1972 Saudi Arabia succeeded in gaining a 25% stake in Aramco equity. Not least, there was a major clash of interests upon the oil embargo in 1973.

In regard to trade and investment, the results of our investigation have indicated that since the energy crisis of 1973, the United States has benefitted from Saudi investment due to the 1974 Investment Guaranties Agreement which facilitated the investment of Saudi revenue surpluses in the US in the form of purchase of US government bonds, notes and treasury bills, estimated at between $40-60 billion. The 1974 Co-operation Agreement in the areas of economics and defense also helped to buy American goods, and procured the transfer of services needed to achieve Saudi five-year development plans.

The above two primary agreements occurred at a time of a recession in the US which itself was partly due to high energy costs. The agreements indicated Saudi co-operation towards US economic interests. This co-operation preceded the transfer of US military aircraft, F-5s, F-15's and AWACS/F-15 Enhancement equipment in 1975, 1978 and 1981. The predominance of a co-operative strategy by Saudi Arabia toward the US in the face of the potential strength of its bargaining position over the US, and the likelihood of a political profit accruing by a defiance of US wishes in terms of Saudi Arabia's
popularity with her radical anti-US near neighbours, implies the persistence of influence by the US over Saudi Arabia. This Saudi behaviour also shows the Saudi desire to encourage the US to increase military aid.

Saudi investment in the US, generated additional income necessary for continuing its' development plan. Due to scarcity of avenues of domestic investment and the 'political' restraint on trading with other states, Saudi Arabia's investment in the United States is unsurprising.

The economic co-operation of the two countries was a function not only of arms transfers, but it was predicated by the initiation of the US lend-lease programme of 1943, and the financial technical assistance of the 1950's. Arms transfer, however, did play an important role in cementing the economic relationship. Trade and investment flourished in an atmosphere of confidence and trust which was built over a period of years. I re-iterate that Saudi Arabia and the US believed in the capitalist systems. Saudi Arabia, in investing in the US with a larger percentage of her surplus petro-dollars, enhances the mutual fiscal strength of the respective countries. The investment's return could then be used for economic modernisation in Saudi Arabia and thus, by implication, for the internal political stability of Saudi Arabia through the provision of public welfare services.

In regard to its security and defense policy, the US achieved very little in supplying arms to Saudi Arabia. This aspect of behaviour followed a pattern already established in the early 1960's when Saudi Arabia refused to allow the further use of its' Dhahran Airbase. Therefore the Saudia Arabian refusal to join the 1980 Persian Gulf Security Plan as well as the 1981 US strategic consensus, despite US arms transfers, implied the awareness of the
high political costs that Saudi Arabia would have to pay if she approved the plans. The 1958 deposing of the Iraqi monarchy predicated upon its collusion with the Western Military Alliance - the Baghdad Pact, served as a reminder and a warning to the Saudi Monarchy of the possible consequences of too close a relationship with Western powers. In addition despite Saudi approval of the US stand against the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, her preference for not having US bases on her soil because of the criticism which having them would bring from her neighbours, still remained, and any military alliance with the US implied a direct alliance with Israel who was a signatory to the US strategic consensus. This then would damage Saudi's position and influence with respect to her Arab states. The uncertainty of Saudi Arabia as regard to US military intentions has been justified in several cases. For instance the US failed to back its' friends and allies in the Third World countries when they were facing domestic opposition, despite its' military interests in those countries, e.g. Somoza of Nicaragua, and the Shah of Iran. Saudi Arabia from her point of view had to appear to maintain a sovereign independence, and this she did at crucial junctures such as in 1973-1974. She successfully ran the gauntlet between her concern at losing full US military help and her fear of strong adverse reaction by her Arab neighbours, many of whom held oppositional ideologies or political beliefs.

Saudi's lack of co-operation with the US military plans cannot be necessarily termed as the failure of US arms transfers to achieve influence on Saudi behaviour, because the US never openly stated that specific arms transfers were intended to achieve certain objectives. Thus, Saudi Arabian refusal to support all aspects of the US military policy in the Middle East is an inevitable result of the relationship of the two countries, each having a defined, but complex set of
interests. Thus, US arms transfers not achieving complete Saudi military co-operation must be understood within the context of the overall relationship between the two countries, and not in crude terms of policy failure.

The evidence provided in Chapter Five also suggests relative success of US diplomatic policy on Saudi behaviour through arms transfers, i.e. Saudi Arabia endorsed the US sponsored 1975 Sinai II and the 1983 Lebanese-Israeli agreements, but refused to back the 1978 Camp David Agreement or the 1982 Reagan Plan on Palestine. Influence - as co-operation or compliance - was achieved in some cases but not in others.

Saudi endorsement of the first two US sponsored agreements was based on the Saudi attempt to involve the Americans in the peace process, and thereby excise Soviet influence on regional settlements. Solving the Arab-Israeli conflict peacefully would also have prevented Saudi Arabia from gradually being dragged into that conflict. Saudi Arabia's success in bringing about the endorsement by Syria of Sinai II, would have reduced Arab antagonism towards Saudi Arabia. For them, any compliance of Soviet-backed Syria with an America-led initiative would have tended to undermine or weaken Syrian ties with the Soviet Union.

Saudi lack of support of the last two initiatives was based on the Saudi insistence that the Arab-Israeli conflict could only be settled within the context of recognition of Palestinian rights for self-determination as well as the return of the third Islamic shrine - Jerusalem. Thus, Saudi non-endorsement of the Camp David and Reagan programme emphasised Saudi Arabia's essential affinity to the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Again it is difficult to establish a linkage between US arms transfers and Saudi Arabia's approval/disapproval of US sponsored
diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East. But to gain a purchase on an understanding of Saudi behaviour, one must see it within the context of the complex relationship between the two countries which has existed over the past five decades. However, the overarching themes as I established earlier on, are the US' recognition of her need for oil, and Saudi Arabia's need for military aid as Middle Eastern politics have become more fraught.

The Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 following the October War, and the consequent high oil revenues it brought, changed the nature of the Saudi/American relationship. Suddenly Saudi Arabia not only became a relevant power in terms of oil and financial wealth, but the US gradually became more reliant on Saudi oil supplies and trade. Saudi provided a political significance instrumental to US diplomacy, and strategic bases which facilitated the effectiveness of an increased US military presence in the region to protect the oil supplies. Thus the relationship shifted to being more equal than it had prior to 1973, i.e. the US needed Saudi Arabia nearly as much as Saudi Arabia needed the US.

However, Saudi financial power was not matched by her military capability. Thus Saudi Arabia, in order to cope with this dilemma, used her new wealth in a series of strategies intended to reduce external threats and internal vulnerabilities; namely through US security assistance and development aid.

Saudi Arabia purchased advanced weapons systems and attempted to build a military infrastructure in order to enhance her defence capabilities. Indeed by 1980, Saudi was rated sixth in the world's annual military expenditures, after the US, USSR, UK, West Germany and France.7

Saudi military expansion has had continuing assistance from her primary arms supplier, the US. From 1950-1972, Saudi signed military
equipment and construction agreements worth about $1 billion. However, from 1973 to 1983, Saudi Arabia signed agreements for American arms supplies and military infrastructure construction worth $40 billion. Out of this, $12 billion went on the purchase of advanced weapons and their services such as F-5's, F-15's and AWACS/F-15 enhancement in 1975, 1978 and 1981 respectively.

In supplying assistance to Saudi Arabia, the US attempted to secure its national interests, not least in respect of oil supplies at reasonable prices and adequate quantities, trading advantages, access to military facilities and support for regional diplomatic initiatives.

If the level of such arms transfers is a measure of influence on Saudi it would seem intuitively that the US's influence on Saudi Arabia was wide and considerable, yet as I have argued, in certain areas it was restrained and limited. The US was able to influence Saudi Arabia mainly in oil and commerce, but had a far lesser influence on the diplomatic sphere, and none in the military, (e.g. the strategic consensus). In the pre-1973 period, US economic and military assistance influenced Saudi behaviour such that they agreed to US military bases on Saudi Arabia; however the diplomatic initiatives, and the small portion of oil activities held less significance.

The limited US influence (1973-1983) was due to Saudi attaining a bargaining position roughly equal to that of the US which diminished the leverage of arms supplier on arms recipients' policies. Influence weakens because recipients gain a clear idea of their over-riding interests which they will not sacrifice in favour of arms supplies. In recent years super-powers in the Third World have been requested to remove themselves in the wake of disputes between suppliers and recipients. This happened in regard both to US
presence in Turkey and the Soviet presence in Egypt. Yet again these moves were a result of regional and contextual reasons, i.e. nationalism, sovereignty and notions of self-determination, regional stability and local diplomacy.

The US's relative success in some policy areas but not in others can be seen in terms of the staggered realisation by the suppliers that recipients have different policy perceptions to them. I call this accommodation and recognition to the new status of the recipients, rather than confrontation.

Domestic American politics, the Congress and pressure groups such as the pro-Israeli lobby also played a role in diminishing US capacity to influence Saudi Arabia, since their pressure led the US administration to send low-level arms rather than sophisticated hardware in some cases, e.g. F-5's. The implication of this, of course, is that more powerful armaments lend more influencing power to suppliers over recipients.

This I examined extensively in Chapters Two and Three. The suppliers' capacity to supply arms as I have shown, is accountable to the forms and forces of domestic politics. It is largely in the period after 1973 that the Congress asserted its' role in arms sale policy to the diminution of the Executives's control and hold over policy initiation and implementation. The consultation process generated countervailing interests and showed-up the uncertainties and incoherences in those policies. Up till 1973 there had been three main centres of policy control: Department of Defense, Department of State and the President. Though there was competition between the DoD, and the DoS due in the main to the formal hierarchy of the DoS over the DoD, though the DoD was obviously most concerned with arms sales, most arms sales issues were resolved within this triumvirate. However, after 1973, especially due to the Watergate
Affair which had weakened the symbolic power of the office of President, the Congress by a series of amendments to legal instruments governing arms sales insisted upon rights of oversight.

The purpose of oversight was to examine whether arms sales policies were operating in line with stated US foreign policy interests and responsibilities to recipient countries with regard to the world military and political balance. Thus the measure of arms sales policy, especially to the Middle East, was in terms, not just of the rights of the Presidency, but also of the US position in relation to global concerns and foreign policy. This index was an attempt to reel in a succession of arms sales policies which had permitted most sales to whatever country, to go through. With the exception of the [stated policy] of the Carter Presidency, the Nixon, Ford and Reagan presidencies had encouraged the proliferation of arms sales. But in the light of a basic desire of Congress to check this open-door policy on arms sales, and the underlying 'moral' view that the spread of arms was more likely to lead to war situations, and the further destabilisation of already unstable regions, in particular the Middle East, the Congress/Executive split on this issue meant that a coherent policy was unlikely.

The basic belief of successive Presidencies, that arms sales brings influence to bear upon recipients, has been shown to be mistaken. It is not at all apparent that arms sales has a direct causal relationship with the procurement of influence. To effect influence requires an historical relationship between supplier and recipients. When a recipients' interests and regional relationship are challenged by a supplier's actions, then the recipient (Saudi Arabia) refuses to give the supplier (US) her needs (oil). Certainly the historical relationship between Saudi and the US remains intact in the sense that diplomatic relations have been maintained and
cracks quickly papered over, but the arms sales by themselves were not enough to bring about oil supplies. In other words, arms failed to act as direct causal agent for the procurement of the supplier's interests. Thus it is, that the arms for influence assumption, is at best weak, and is severely limited in its' effectiveness as a single tool of foreign policy.

The findings of this thesis reassert the belief of all realist approaches that states seek power (influence) over other states to achieve their national interests. States use different instruments such as economic aid, force or arms transfers to influence other states. But, as we illustrated in Chapter One, if states use arms transfers as instruments of foreign policy influence, effective influence must be seen as localised to the recipient's valuation of supplier's interests. By the evidence shown, Saudi co-operation in some areas and lack of compliance in others, is part of the terrain of Saudi/American relations. Thus, depending on the issue area in question, influence is manifested. However it is difficult to conclude that Saudi co-operation towards some interests of the US is due to a single variable - arms transfers. Nevertheless, by the definition of influence, the US influenced Saudi behaviour in the area of oil. But this should be seen within the context of a long mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. Influence occurs, but it is not directly related to arms transfers. Arms transfers reinforce the relationship instead of dictating it.

Shahram Chubin has pointed to the dual aspects of influence - direct and indirect, local and historical as opposed to those, such as the US administration officials, who tend to think on terms of short-term political logic. One needs to point to the historical structure of beliefs, common political culture, trust, anticipations and expectations which co-ordinate US and Saudi Arabia's policy
towards each other. The long-term investment of friendship over the past fifty years has created a climate which, despite the Middle East regional struggles, has given the US grounds to expect that if pressure is applied, Saudi Arabia will broadly fall into line with US policy. America then, in fact, has a long-term influence over Saudi Arabia which cannot be erased just because Saudi Arabia has regional pressure placed upon her. She both knows or can anticipate American response to any situation in the Middle East, and lay the ground for placing herself between US interests and her neighbour's demands, at the same time trying to be closer to the US anticipated position than to the position of her radical neighbours. It could be objected that her political and economic ideologies - conservative and capitalist in character - cause her to act in line with US interests anyway, but this, as a historical point, is not enough. The overlay of temporally local political issues has imposed a logic of strategical response in an unstable region, and the recognition of that stability and the security needs of her great oil wealth has pushed her toward seeking and securing 'superpower' protection. The ideological attitudes of Saudi Arabia may explain why she sought American help originally, but are not enough to explain the ongoing relationship. That is a response to more varied factors, historical and political.

The thesis has analysed the form and function of (a) the influence/arms relationship, (b) the belief in a direct arms/influence relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US. Thus not only have I challenged the existing assumptions and intuitions on the relationship, but I have filled a surprising gap in the literature, that being the absence of an analysis of the US/Saudi Arabian arms transfer relationship.

A 'realist' approach should work on the basis that states are dynamic interpreters rather than positivistically-inclined
fact-gatherers. The uncertainty of human judgment is the limit on truth, and for a 'realist' the recognition of this must always be there. 'Realists' have reflexively to take into account their, and other's subjective perceptions, beliefs and also well-confirmed statements in formulating foreign policy. They produce judgments, not facts which on the whole they take as subject to unexpected developments. Part of America's mistake in relation to Saudi Arabia, which forced a change in the US attitude was the overturning of the US decision-makers entrenched view that arms produces influence without taking account of historical and contextual modifications.

I have shown that this is the responsibility of decision-makers, not of scholars. Though the US initially assumed a crude realism of the execution and maximisation of power, they learned that the decision process must be more subtle. With increased pressures upon the President by Congress, pressure groups and recipient response, crude realism will no longer do, though of course, Reagan has attempted to return to this attitude. My notion of realism-in-use is an attempt to extend the meaning of realism to make it relevant to decision-makers, for they are the bearers of it. Realism is the doctrine of the US government, but this does not mean they are bent on a Dr. Strangelove approach to international relations. Realism-in-use is implicitly flexible. All that it really asserts is, that power is the main element of political, military and economic relations, and that is what is assumed by most decision-makers.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

(1) see Chapter Five, note 40.

(2) ibid. note 55

(3) ibid. note 76

(4) ibid. note 78


(6) ibid. p.12.


(9) ibid. pp.1-2, 7-8, 13-16.

(10) see Fig.7, Chapter Five.

(11) "It is mistaken to see the manipulation of levers or instruments in the service of a specified goal. The overall relationship is important and this consists of clearly identifiable short-term mutual interests together with less tangible long-term mutual interests. The relationship resembles therefore a sophisticated dialogue rather than a simple trading relationship" Cited in S.Chubin, Security in the Persian Gulf: The Role of Outside Powers. (London: IISS, 1982), pp.72-73
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Research for this thesis began in October 1982, and since then I have undertaken several interviews in the United States and Saudi Arabia. Some were off the record and thus are not listed. The following interviews were conducted in Washington D.C. 1982/1983 with U.S. Government officials and academics as well as with Saudi Arabian diplomats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Alan Taylor.</td>
<td>Prof. of International Relations, Middle East Studies, School of International Studies, (SIS) American University.</td>
<td>22nd Dec. 1982.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Duncan Clarke.</td>
<td>An expert on arms control, SIS.</td>
<td>14th Feb. 1983.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel John McKalip.</td>
<td>Senior Officer, Pentagon, Near East and South Asia Section.</td>
<td>1st April, 1983.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bruce Ehrnman.</td>
<td>Senior Officer, State Dept., Near East Bureau.</td>
<td>8th April, 1983.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Philip Stadard.</td>
<td>Head of Middle East Inst.</td>
<td>15th April, 1983.</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Shaw.</td>
<td>Senior Scholar, Center for Strategic and International Studies, (CSIS), Georgetown University.</td>
<td>29th April, 1983.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Jim McKeown.</td>
<td>Senior Officer, National Defense University, Near East Affairs.</td>
<td>20th May, 1983.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dr. Mohammed Babu.  Professor of International Relations, Amherst College, 3rd June, 1983. Massachusetts.


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