Lapan, H and Sikdar, S (2020) Strategic Environmental Policy and International Market Share Rivalry under Differentiated Bertrand Oligopoly. Oxford Economic Papers. (In Press)

[img] Text
StrEnvPolicyIntMktShRivalryDiffBertrandOligR2.pdf - Accepted Version
Restricted to Repository staff only until 15 June 2022.
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial.

Download (368kB)


We analyse strategic environmental policies under international Bertrand oligopoly when firms in different industries, located in different countries, produce differentiated products. Under cooperation, emission prices always exceed the joint marginal damage from pollution. Under non-cooperation, internationally nontradable and tradable emission permit prices are always higher than the domestic marginal damage from emissions (the Pigovian tax); emission taxes can also exceed the Pigovian tax. The non-cooperative emission prices under all instruments can exceed the joint pollution damage. Internationally tradable permits generate outcomes closest to cooperation – they result in the lowest pollution and the highest welfare among all instruments under non-cooperation. Pollution is the highest and welfare the lowest with taxes. Our results provide support for allowing international trade in emission permits even when governments choose their permit levels non-cooperatively.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: The final version of this accepted manuscript will be available at
Uncontrolled Keywords: Strategic environmental policy, differentiated products, transboundary pollution, public bad, tradable permits, leakage, Bertrand competition, profit-shifting, permit revenue, overregulation
Subjects: D History General and Old World > D History (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Humanities
Depositing User: Symplectic
Date Deposited: 30 Jun 2020 13:49
Last Modified: 07 Jul 2020 15:00

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item