Hansen, N, Porter, JD and Francis, KB ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3875-8904 (2019) A Corpus Study of “Know”: On The Verification of Philosophers’ Frequency Claims about Language. Episteme. 1 - 27.

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Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We investigate claims about the frequency of “know” made by philosophers. Our investigation has several overlapping aims. First, we aim to show what is required to confirm or disconfirm philosophers’ claims about the comparative frequency of different uses of philosophically interesting expressions. Second, we aim to show how using linguistic corpora as tools for investigating meaning is a productive methodology, in the sense that it yields discoveries about the use of language that philosophers would have overlooked if they remained in their “armchairs of an afternoon”, to use J.L. Austin's phrase. Third, we discuss facts about the meaning of “know” that so far have been ignored in philosophy, with the aim of reorienting discussions of the relevance of ordinary language for philosophical theorizing.</jats:p>

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019
Uncontrolled Keywords: discourse markers; frequency; J.L.Austin; know; knowledge; linguistic corpora; meaning; ordinary language philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions: Faculty of Natural Sciences > School of Psychology
Depositing User: Symplectic
Date Deposited: 23 Apr 2021 08:27
Last Modified: 23 Apr 2021 08:27
URI: https://eprints.keele.ac.uk/id/eprint/9351

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