Keele Research Repository

Despite having received a recent resurgence of interest, Panpsychism remains a worldview afflicted by various explanatory shortfalls. Chiefly, the literature is yet to provide a ‘proper’ panpsychist theory of consciousness with the potential to explain precisely how we have transitioned from a myriad of rudimentary, entropic instantiations of phenomenality to unified and bounded macro-level conscious subjects replete with an awareness of their ontology. This work recognises this particular shortfall and attempts to remedy it by offering a ‘complete micropsychist theory of consciousness’ that is capable of overcoming the various iterations of the combination problem, and explaining how the sort of minimal phenomenality associated with bottom-level physical entities might be reconciled with the sort of cognitive phenomenology we undergo as higher-level subjects, by advancing a new take on the nature of what a phenomenal property is that might very well lead us to both reanalyse our understanding of the natural world and rethink our own nature.