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Tartaglia, J (2022) The Ontology of Freedom. Human Affairs, 32 (4). pp. 461-473. ISSN 1210-3055
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Tallis-Tartaglia (1).docx - Accepted Version
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Abstract
I begin by clarifying Tallis’s revisionary terminology, showing how he redraws the lines of the traditional debate about free will by classifying himself as a compatibilist, when in standard terms he is an incompatibilist. I then examine what I take to be the two main lines of argument in Freedom, which I call the Mysterian Argument and the Intentionality Argument. I argue that neither can do the required work on its own, so I ask how they are supposed to combine. I then argue that a commitment to the ontological priority of everydayness, of the kind suggested in chapters 5 and 6 of Freedom, might combine the arguments in such a way as to secure Tallis’s conclusion. I conclude that the argument of Freedom requires positive metaphysical commitment of a kind Tallis has yet to provide.
Item Type: | Article |
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Additional Information: | The final version of this article and all relevant information related to it, including copyrights, can be found on the publisher website. |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | free will; determinism; compatibilism; libertarianism; metaphysics; F.H. Bradley |
Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JC Political theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Social, Political and Global Studies |
Depositing User: | Symplectic |
Date Deposited: | 04 Aug 2022 09:23 |
Last Modified: | 20 Feb 2023 10:02 |
URI: | https://eprints.keele.ac.uk/id/eprint/11163 |