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The Ontology of Freedom

Tartaglia

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Abstract

I begin by clarifying Tallis’s revisionary terminology, showing how he redraws the lines of the traditional debate about free will by classifying himself as a compatibilist, when in standard terms he is an incompatibilist. I then examine what I take to be the two main lines of argument in Freedom, which I call the Mysterian Argument and the Intentionality Argument. I argue that neither can do the required work on its own, so I ask how they are supposed to combine. I then argue that a commitment to the ontological priority of everydayness, of the kind suggested in chapters 5 and 6 of Freedom, might combine the arguments in such a way as to secure Tallis’s conclusion. I conclude that the argument of Freedom requires positive metaphysical commitment of a kind Tallis has yet to provide.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jul 27, 2022
Online Publication Date Nov 2, 2022
Publication Date Oct 26, 2022
Journal Human Affairs
Publisher De Gruyter
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Pages 461-473
DOI https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0040
Keywords free will; determinism; compatibilism; libertarianism; metaphysics; F.H. Bradley
Publisher URL https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/humaff-2022-0040/html

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