

This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights and duplication or sale of all or part is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for research, private study, criticism/review or educational purposes. Electronic or print copies are for your own personal, non-commercial use and shall not be passed to any other individual. No quotation may be published without proper acknowledgement. For any other use, or to quote extensively from the work, permission must be obtained from the copyright holder/s.

Women, nature and the Kantian sublime: can a reconciliation be found?

By Amy Elizabeth Kings

This Thesis is submitted to Keele University's SPIRE department
in Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Philosophy in Philosophy.

July 2016

Word Count: 30,409

(Does not include footnotes and references)

Abstract

This thesis will investigate the relationship between Immanuel Kant, women and the natural world. Using mainly Kant's third critique, *The Critique of Judgement* and his *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, I will seek to establish whether Kant's philosophy can be interpreted more sympathetically with regards to the environment, women and perhaps even to ecofeminism; than has traditionally been allowed. This research will explore Kant's thoughts on the beautiful and the sublime, as well as a wider range of linked issues such as aesthetics, ethics and morality, in order to illustrate how his work may not be altogether antithetical to the ecological and feminist aims at the heart of the ecofeminist project. It is my central contention that Kant can be reconciled with ecofeminism and that in spite of the necessarily limited nature of this reconciliation: it does help to provide us with a much needed and more sympathetic account of Kant's relationship with both women and nature.

Key words: *sublime, beautiful, ecofeminism, normative dualism, aesthetics, extrinsic purposiveness, Copernican revolution, aesthetic consciousness.*

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge and pay gratitude to the unfailing support, advice and guidance I have received from my primary supervisor Dr. Sherilyn MacGregor, secondary supervisor Professor. Sorin Baisau and Dr. Elisabeth Carter. I would also like to thank Dr. James Tartaglia and Professor. Pamela Sue Anderson, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Contents

Abbreviations.....	5
Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview	6
Chapter 2. The Sublime	11
Chapter 3. The Kantian Sublime	26
Chapter 4. Mixing Kant and Ecofeminism: An Impossible Task?	46
Chapter 5. Feminist Philosophy, Ethical Duties and Sexual Objectification	63
Chapter 6. Kant as a Normative Dualist	83
Chapter 7. Aesthetic Appreciation and Moral Responsibility	111
Chapter 8. Concluding Thoughts.....	126
References	133

List of Main Texts and Abbreviations

Works by Immanuel Kant:

OFBS *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764)

LE *Lecture on Ethics* (1979)

CPR *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781)

Idea *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* (1781)

GMM *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785)

COPR *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788)

CJ *Critique of Judgment* (1790)

MM *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797)

Other Central Works Referred To:

Feminism and the Mastery of Nature Val Plumwood (1993)

Women's Liberation and the Sublime Bonnie Mann (2006)

The Sublime, Terror and Human Difference Christine Battersby (2007)

Chapter 1

Introduction and Overview

1.1 Introduction

Immanuel Kant's work is customarily regarded as being antithetical to both the environmental and feminist project (Mann 2006; Wollstonecraft 1986; Klinger 1977; Battersby 1995; Hall 1997 and Irigaray 1985). Traditional interpretations point out an example of this opposition can be found in Kant's work on the sublime, found primarily in the pre-critical period essay, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764) and in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790). Kant argued that the sublime, otherwise known as feelings of extreme awe and captivation at nature's beauty are actually misplaced feelings of "reverence for the natural world" (Mann 2006: 34) which should instead be replaced with a reverence for the ability of a human to reason. In the *Critique of Judgment* Kant posits there are two realms: that of nature (sensible) and that of freedom (supersensible) and between the two there is a "...great gulf fixed." (CJ 195). Whilst the former "...is powerless to exercise influence" on the latter "...the latter is meant to influence the former." (Ibid.). Here Kant appears to not only cast off nature as that which is 'sensible' but attempts to create a global hierarchy which secures the

thinking man at the top under whose foot nature is trampled. Reversing the roles of nature and man provides the ultimate justification for the current “fundamental model of...domination.” (Radford Reuther cited by Dobson 1995: 192) a model which since the pre-enlightenment period has emphasised the mechanisation of science (Plumwood 1986: 121) which, at the expense of nature, intends to universalise the project of “...reduction, fragmentation and violent control.” (Dobson 1995: 193).

This thesis will explore the nature of Kant’s thought on both women and the environment, with reference to the notions of the beautiful and the sublime and the implications which these philosophical concepts have on his overall judgements on the nature of the human relationship with the natural world: more specifically this thesis will investigate whether the notion of ecological feminism is compatible with Kantian philosophy. Ecological feminism or *ecofeminism* being an area of academic study concerned with understanding the dualisms which inform our society, with focus on exploring the interconnected relationship between the domination of women and the domination of nature. Ecofeminism recognises that the oppression of women and the oppression of nature share a common point of causation (Ibid. 139) which can be located in the set of ‘dualistic contrasts’ (Plumwood 1993: 33) dominant in Western culture and philosophy. In examining these issues I will seek to establish whether a more sympathetic interpretation of Kant’s work is possible, with regards to his beliefs about

nature, than has been traditionally allowed by environmentalists, ethicists and feminists/ecofeminists alike. Or instead whether Kant's philosophy is irreconcilable with the aims of ecofeminism and the broader environmental project. It is my central contention that it is possible for Kant to be reconciled with ecofeminism and that in spite of the necessarily limited nature of this reconciliation: it does provide us with a much needed (and more sympathetic) account of Kant's relationship with both women and nature.

1.2 Overview of 'Women, Nature and the Kantian Sublime

Including the introduction and conclusion this thesis is comprised of eight chapters, all of which will appeal either to Kant's aesthetic or moral theory (particularly in Chapter 5) in order to establish whether Kant truly is incompatible with ecofeminism. Chapter's 2 and 3 will begin to explore some of the background surrounding the subject and the history of philosophy's relationship with women and the natural environment. It will discuss the notion of the sublime and its historical origins whilst also introducing Kant's version of the sublime and the way in which it has traditionally been conceived of in relation to women, the environment and ecofeminist philosophy. Especially the way feminist and environmental scholars have interpreted it as being terminally incompatible with the central aims of the environmental and feminist projects. This section will refer to Kant's thoughts on the 'beautiful and the sublime' found in the *Observations on the Feeling of*

the Beautiful and Sublime (1764) and also Kant's later (and more developed) thoughts found in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790). Chapter 4 will explore the roots of ecofeminism, focusing on the main tenets of ecofeminism: which involve the recognition that the oppression of women and the oppression of nature have at their root the same patriarchal cause and secondly that in order for either the oppression of nature or women to be successfully addressed, they must be tackled simultaneously. Chapter's 5, 6 and 7 will pursue more deeply whether Kant's writings on women and nature can be interpreted in such a way as to be compatible with ecofeminism. In order to do so I will look to understand Kant's views on sexual objectification and ethical duties (Chapter 5) and the role of normative dualism in Kantian philosophy (Chapter 6). In Chapter 7 I will explore the potential for the imagination of Kant's thoughts with regards to the environment by considering ideas such as aesthetic disinterestedness and the experience of the sublime as boundary. In the final chapter (and conclusion) I will both summarise my findings and attempt to draw them together in such a way as to provide an answer to the central question of this thesis: namely is there a way for ecofeminism (and the environmental and feminist aims it represents) and Kant to exist together in harmony?

It is my hope that this piece of writing will act as a stepping stone up from work I have completed on the subject of ecofeminism and intersectionality and serve as a springboard

to my continued research into the Kantian sublime and its extended implications for women and the environment.

Chapter 2

The Sublime: An Introduction

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will introduce the notion of the sublime in a general manner, looking to the historical origins of the concept both within and without of philosophy. I will demonstrate how the idea of the sublime has changed over the course of two millennia from being used mainly in the context of politics/rhetoric to instead being used more in reference to a human experience relating to the natural world.

2.2 History of the Sublime

Derived from the Latin *sublimis*, an amalgamation of *sub* (meaning ‘up to’ or ‘upwards’) and *limin* or *limmis* (meaning ‘threshold’ or ‘lintel’) the sublime is literally defined as being something which is ‘high’ or ‘elevated’ (see Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2003).

However, the word sublime has a many more applications in the English language and can be used to describe a wide range of instances, such as: the process by which a solid substance is converted into a gas, a stunning landscape, an awe inspiring piece of architecture, a great tasting meal or a beautifully worded poem. Most generally, the word

‘sublime’ is used to describe the scenario when, some outside force or object compromises one’s ability to comprehend the said object (whether this be a majestic mountain top view or a Shakespearean sonnet) leading to a moment of sublimity: whereby words completely and utterly fail to accommodate the idea of infinity contained within the experience.

The concept of the sublime has long roots in both literature and philosophy, stretching back to the first century AD, found in the anonymous work known as *Peri Hypsous*, *On Height* or *On the Sublime* (translated by Havel 1890) but is attributed to the Greek writer and critic Dionysius Longinus. Although *Peri Hypsous* discusses the sublime mainly in terms of the power of political rhetoric, it still provides an important account of the conception of the sublime and allows us to understand the beginning of a long historical notion which maintains relevance into the twenty-first century. Longinus claimed that the sublime, with reference to the sublime contained in political writings or oratory, “...consists in a certain loftiness and excellence of language...” (1890: 2) and that whilst ordinarily, an audience member is able to resist the persuasive powers of the writer or orator, true sublimity is “...endued with strength irresistible, strikes home and triumphs over every hearer.” (Translation by William Smith 1770: 46). A truly sublime experience is thus, able to transcend the ordinary and elevate the reader (or listener) to a higher plane of existence, albeit perhaps only for a singular moment. An all-encompassing

definition of the sublime may be a task ultimately doomed to fail but like Longinus so aptly demonstrates, the effects generated by the experience of the sublime are more easily identifiable:

It is natural in us to feel our souls lifted up by the true Sublime, and, conceiving a sort of generous exultation, to be filled with joy and pride, as though we had ourselves originated the ideas which we read (1890: 12).

Despite Longinus writing *Peri Hypsous* sometime in the 1st (or perhaps 3rd) century AD, it was not until the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that his work became widely known; when the sublime first ‘came’ to England in the form of the 1674 French translation of his *On the Sublime* by Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux (Monk 1960: 21). Boileau’s translation and the subsequent English versions proceeded to launch Longinus and the sublime into the public domain of pre/enlightenment thinking and had enormous influence on an abundance of British writers in the eighteenth century (Shaw 2006: 27) and beyond. Prior to this point in time, the notion of the sublime had been thought of as primarily something which was merely “...supremely elevated or overwhelming.” (Wright 2010: 88) but Longinus presented the sublime in terms of language, writing and rhetoric and its ability to “...elevate, ravish and transport.” an audience (Monk 1960: 32). This idea of the sublime was explored over the course of the next two centuries and transformed in numerous ways, most noticeably by those (such as

John Dennis (1693) who sought to shift the focus of the sublime away from language/rhetoric and move it more towards the natural world (as Wright mentions 2010: 89). Over a twenty year period: John Dennis (1693), Ashley Cooper (1709), the third Earl of Shaftesbury, and John Addison (1711 and 1712) all wrote about their adventures of crossing the Alps. These individual accounts illustrated the sheer beauty and magnificence of their experience but significantly for the notion of the sublime: they also demonstrated the set of conflicting emotions generated when presented by an object of such overwhelming magnitude. Addison describes at length, the contrasting aesthetic qualities which manifest in the ‘subject’ when confronted by both nature’s scale and force:

I cannot see the Heavings of this prodigious Bulk of Waters, even in a Calm, without a very pleasing Astonishment; but when it is worked up in a Tempest, so that the Horizon on every side is nothing but foaming Billows and floating Mountains, it is impossible to describe the *agreeable Horror* that rises from such a Prospect. A troubled Ocean, to a Man who sails upon it, is, I think, the biggest Object that he can see in motion, and consequently gives his Imagination one of the highest kinds of Pleasure that can arise from Greatness. (1712: no.489).

Addison describes facing the vastness and power of an oceanic storm as an, “...agreeable horror...” one which provoked within him equal parts of: delight, fear and astonishment. Whilst Addison goes on to attribute this sublime ‘feeling’ to a mystical force, he is also first to discuss the way in which the twin faculties of imagination and reason (or the term

‘understanding’ as is used here) are affected by such sublimity and how the one (reason) supersedes the other:

...The Imagination prompts the Understanding, and by the Greatness of the sensible Object, produces in it the Idea of a Being who is neither circumscribed by Time nor Space. (Ibid).

Addison’s belief about ‘greatness’ and his characterisation of the ‘exhilarating terror’ which is produced in a human subject when challenged by both the sheer enormity and ferocity of the natural world, was of enormous influence to future writers such as Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant; in particular to Burke, who would become the first to acknowledge the mutual exclusivity of beauty and the sublime. Addison however, was the first to recognise that what was ‘merely beautiful’ could never be sublime, “... [the] Beauty that we find in the several Products of Art... does not work in the Imagination with that Warmth and violence.” (1712: 412: 5). Addison remarks that central to the conception of the sublime (although he does not name it as such) is the idea of fear or terror; here he compares the sublimity of nature to the beauty of a work of art:

...They can have nothing in them of that Vastness and Immensity, which afford so great an Entertainment to the Mind of the Beholder. The one may be as Polite and Delicate as the

other [but] There is something more bold and masterly in the rough careless Strokes of Nature, than in the nice Touches and Embellishments of Art. (1712: 414: 10).

It is clear from this excerpt that Addison believes there to be something fundamentally different between the experience of viewing a beautiful painting and observing a naturally occurring phenomenon. At the heart of his conception of sublimity lies the ability of an object to produce in the subject a feeling of fear: which consequently gives rise to the, "...highest kinds of Pleasure that can arise from Greatness." (1712: no.489). Addison's ideas, particularly concerning the division of beauty and sublimity and the importance of the role of fear, were of both great consequence to readers at the time and of colossal influence on the later writings of such philosophers as Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant on the subject of the sublime.

2.3 Burke on the Sublime

Edmund Burke's thoughts on the concept of the sublime can be found in his treatise, *A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1756).

In this seminal work on the sublime, Burke builds upon the ideas of earlier writers, including those of: John Dennis, Shaftesbury, John Addison and John Baillie (1953). In particular Burke looks to expand on the dual notion of the sublime, making the strict distinction between beauty and sublimity: which Burke claims are mutually exclusive,

“...it will appear that the sublime and beautiful are built on principles very different, and that their affections are as different.” (2008: §xxv: 144). Burke claims that the distinguishing feature of the sublime, is that it invokes a type of terror in the subject whereas the merely beautiful produces only ‘positive pleasure’, “...the great has terror for its basis, which...causes...astonishment,” and “...the beautiful is founded on mere positive pleasure, and excites in the soul that feeling which is called love.” (2008: §XXV: 144). However, Burke is quick to qualify the idea of terror being the root cause of the sublime by adding that the horror/terror produced by the sublime must not in actuality threaten the life of the subject: if it does then the resulting emotion will be that of simply fear and no sublimity can be experienced:

In all these cases, if the pain and terror are so modified as not to be actually noxious; if the pain is not carried to violence,...they are capable of producing delight; not pleasure, but a sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquillity tinged with terror; which, as it belongs to self-preservation, is one of the strongest of all the passions. Its object is the sublime. (2008: §VII: 123).

Burke further specifies, that for a sublime moment to be experienced, the abject terror produced in the subject by an outside natural force, must be converted from a moment of sheer terror to one which is also what Burke defines as, *delight*. Burke uses this word, *delight* to express the ‘sensation’ which accompanies the banishment of any ‘pain or danger’ (2008: §IV: 34) without which a moment cannot truly be classified as belonging

to that which can be characterised as the sublime. In a moment of terror, where a person truly fears for his/her life, one cannot experience the sublime because, “No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as *fear*.” (2008: Part II §2: 53) and for the sublime to be encountered one’s sense of reasoning is essential. Whilst the sublime may at first evoke horror in the subject, these emotions are altered via the ‘sensation of delight’, to instead produce intense feelings of ‘agreeable horror’ (1712: no.489). Ultimately (for Burke at least) the moment of true sublimity is produced when one is faced with a natural object of overwhelming power and/or magnitude, the fear one experiences is transformed into a kind of joyous terror, so-called because the pleasure (and therefore sublimity) is derived from the knowledge that one in reality has nothing to fear from either the power or magnitude of the natural world.

Kant’s writings on the sublime in *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764) and in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790) are heavily influenced by Edmund Burke’s earlier writings, particularly in regards to the role of real terror incapacitating the faculty of reason and the necessity of overcoming these feelings of fear in order to experience the sublime. I will discuss the Kantian sublime in much greater depth in the following chapter but the remainder of this chapter will be used to discuss the sublime after the (and during) the influence of Burke and Kant including the romantic postmodern and modern sublime.

2.4 The Romantic Sublime

The philosophical sublime did not evolve in isolation from the wider social and political context but rather developed directly alongside it, of particular mutual influence was the literary exploration of the sublime (most notably during and after Kant's life). Romanticism in literature and poetry (in both Germany and England) was particularly affected by the idea of sublimity being found in the grandeur of nature and the duality of fear/pleasure present in the individual experiencing the sublime. This influence can be seen in the works of poets in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, scholars and authors such as: William Wordsworth, Victor Hugo, John Keats, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Blake and Christian Hirschfeld. Many of the 'Romantics' explored ideas touching upon the sublime in nature, architecture, love and even death; focusing on the relationship between the world of appearances and the world beyond the immediate sensible realm. Often, literature would explore the melancholic and sometimes painful aspect of the sublime experience, caused by the failure of the imagination to comprehend the breathtaking delight or monstrosity of the 'sublime object', allowing melancholy to arise from the "...imagination's loss of its empirical employment." (Hamilton 1983: 55). In Book Thirteenth of Wordsworth's 1805 *Prelude*, Wordsworth describes his experience of climbing the Welsh mountain Snowdon:

... A meditation rose on me that night
Upon the lonely mountain when the scene
Had passed away, and it appeared to me
The perfect image of a mighty mind,
Of one that feeds upon infinity,
That is exalted by an under-presence,
The sense of God, or whatso'er is dim
Or vast in its own being ...

(Lines 66-73).

Throughout the *Prelude* Wordsworth touches upon many interpretations and definitions of the sublime as discussed by his contemporaries, in literature, art and philosophy. What is perhaps most notable about Wordsworth's exploration on the feelings of the beautiful and the sublime; is that it grows right alongside and even anticipates some of the later developments in the theory of the sublime, in terms of the fear-inducement which often accompanies the joyous abandon of the sublime feeling. Wordsworth recognises the duality of the sublime experience, being on the one hand potentially frightening: the lonely, mightiness of the mountain and on the other hand the sense of unadulterated infinity, connecting him to the Almighty. Kant similarly found that sublimity and the morality which it provokes within the subject (and the deductions made from these findings: such as the final purpose of man) pointed to the existence of a higher power i.e.

God. Kant develops these thoughts in the later sections of the *Critique of Judgment*, in which he discusses both Physicotheology and Ethicotheology (which involve the examination of nature, morality and the superiority of Mankind) in his bid to prove the existence of God (§85 onwards).

2.5 The Postmodern Sublime

Postmodernism, a term first coined by Jean-François Lyotard in 1979, refers to a time period spanning from the 1940s until the present day which is generally considered as a reaction to the philosophical assumptions made during throughout the modernist era of the Industrial Revolution and the age of Enlightenment. Postmodernists generally reject modernist tendencies towards the idea of the existence of an objective natural reality and instead claim that such a creation is a "...conceptual construct, [and] an artifact of scientific practice and language." (Duignan 2015). In terms of the impact postmodernity has had philosophically on the concept of the sublime, Lyotard observes that whilst the Romantic, Kantian and modern sublime all referred to nature: contrastingly the postmodern sublime has been discussed almost exclusively in relation to art (1989: 206). Postmodernism is what you have when the "...modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good." (Jameson 1991: ix) and whilst some such as Judith Butler criticised the use of the term 'postmodernism' as a kind of sweeping generalisation, Bonnie Mann has pointed out the postmodern tendency to reject the materiality of the

world and instead opt to retreat to a universe of text (Mann 2008: 85). Lyotard takes much of his theory on the sublime from Kant (as we will see in the proceeding chapter) for him what is sublime takes place, "...when the imagination fails to present an object which might...match the concept." (1982: 78). The sublime experience involves "...a combination of pleasure and pain: the pleasure that reason should exceed all... [and] the pain that imagination...should not be equal" to the concept (81). Lyotard claims that a sublime feeling shows the "...basic incommensurability..." within the experience (1984: 54) and the difficulty (if not impossibility) of bridging the gap between the worlds of the sensible and supersensible. Lyotard claims that whilst modernity promises the subject/audience some kind of ultimate '...reconciliation of the concept and the sensible...' (81-82) whereas the postmodern project seeks to refute the possibility of this task by acknowledging the 'absurdity' of trying to bridge the gap between the two worlds (Shaw 2006: 123). In terms of the sublime, postmodernity has attempted to abandon the external natural world in favour of creating a 'fantasy' world, "...made of consciousness, limited to consciousness [and] dependent on consciousness..." (Mann 2008: 82). The postmodern scheme strives to push philosophy further back into itself and points to the long standing tradition within philosophy to deny one's dependence on natural surroundings for survival because mankind's material nature is a lower and merely animal aspect of our being. However, as some have pointed out, to exist in a world limited to the immaterial: of reason, freedom and rationality, is perhaps just as

impossible as previous attempts to bridge the gap between the two realms, whilst still maintaining the superiority of the one (the supersensible) over the other.

2.6 The Current Sublime

Current literature on the subject of the sublime has been mainly focused on investigating those areas of the sublime which had not been fully explored. In recent times particular attention has been paid to the role (or lack thereof) of women in sublime theory as well as the complete subordination of the natural environment to the superiority of *mankind*. Response to Kant's theory of the beautiful and the sublime, attempt to address the implicit (and sometimes explicit) speciesism, sexism, racism and misogyny, which is found in Kant's major aesthetic works: *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1781) and the *Critique of Judgment* (1799). In terms of theory on the sublime, women's inferior position in philosophy, is personified through their location merely as beautiful objects: incapable of experiencing the sublime like their male counterparts. Feminist and feminine interpretations and discussion surrounding the sublime have been offered by those such as Bonnie Mann (2008), Christine Battersby (2007), Timothy Gould (1990), Patrick Wright (2010), Robin May Schott (1997), Cecilia Lippai (2009) and Patricia Matthews (2001) to name but a few. Literature can also be found addressing the environmental side of the debate (e.g. Marc Lucht 2007), which attempt to investigate the implicit (and often explicit) assumptions made about the role of

the natural world and animal kingdom: particularly in that they are subordinate to man. I will look to pursue both of these directions throughout the rest of this thesis, in particular I will attempt to explore Kant's views on the sublime and the impact these views could potentially have on current work in ecofeminism.

2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have explored the changing nature of the sublime, especially its journey into the enlightenment era where it began to develop into what we recognise today. Central to the sublime's transformation was the idea of the duality of the sublime experience; this idea is something which both Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant used to effect particularly in distinguishing the positive from the negative aspects of the sublime experience and the consequences which they necessarily entail. This chapter has also touched upon the potential implications which the notion of the sublime may have for both women and the natural world; especially how certain forms of the sublime could be interpreted in such a way as to justify the wanton disregard for the environment and the placement of women as subordinate to men. This type of interpretation would clearly be problematic for feminist, environmentalists and ecofeminists alike. However it remains to be seen as to whether Kant's version of sublimity could exist harmoniously alongside ecofeminism (which will be discussed much more in depth from Chapter 4

onwards) and if it cannot, then whether it is possible to salvage a reconciliation between the two from other areas of Kant's work on morality or aesthetics.

Chapter 3

The Kantian Sublime

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the nature of the Kantian sublime found in his work in *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764) and *The Critique of Judgment*. I will discuss the way in which Kant's thoughts on the sublime developed over time, to become more comprehensive and nuanced. Also in this chapter I will begin to examine the implications which Kant's views on the sublime have for women and the natural environment.

3.2 Kant's Early Work on the Sublime and the Beautiful

Kant's main work on the sublime can be found in, *The Critique of Judgment* first published in 1790 (and henceforth *CJ*) and containing his only *major* contribution to aesthetics, Part I: The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (from 167) and Part II: The Critique of Teleological Judgment (357 onwards). Discussion on the sublime can also be found in Kant's lesser known, pre-critical essay, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764) in which he first semi-philosophically examines the nature

of both the beautiful and the sublime and offers his ideas on what distinguishes the one from the other. The Kant writing in, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (henceforth *OFBS*) is generally considered to be a very different kind of author from the Kant of the three Critiques (as stated by Goldthwait in his translation of *OFBS* 2003: 13), not only in terms of style do these works differ but also with regards to content, philosophy and complexity. Goldthwait suggests that *OFBS*, rather than being a work of philosophy has instead an ‘underlying’ philosophical tone, in which the actual philosophy has to be excavated. *OFBS* is not an analytical piece but one in which Kant discusses, in an unusually conversational manner, the differing characteristic and manifestations of the beautiful and the sublime. Whilst it is true that *OFBS* is often ‘mined’ for proof of Kant’s sexist and racist tendencies (Shell 2008) it is also true that the essay contains important information about the early thoughts of Kant (at barely forty years old) on the nature of the sublime and its implications for humanity. *OFBS* consists of four sections, the first and shortest begins to differentiate between the beautiful and the sublime, which Kant claims, constitute the two and essentially different forms of ‘finer feeling’ (1764/2003: 46). Kant identifies the beautiful as being found in a flower-filled meadow with trimmed trees and winding brooks which produces in the subject “...a pleasant sensation but one that is joyous and smiling.” (47). Whereas the sublime can be found in a raging storm, melancholy shadows, night time, sacred groves or a snow-topped mountain and creates feelings which “...arouse enjoyment but with horror” (Ibid). Kant

states that whilst, "...the sublime moves, the beautiful charms." the beautiful manifests through cheerfulness and mirth whereas the sublime can often be accompanied by "...dread, melancholy...or quiet wonder." (Ibid). He goes on to identify three types of sublime feeling: the terrifying, the noble and the splendid sublime. Deep loneliness is part of the terrifying sublime, awe striking wonder can be described as noble and the splendid examples of sublimity are associated with objects of pervasive beauty (such as gold mosaic work).

The last three sections of *OFBS* look to explore how the characteristics of the beautiful and the sublime are exhibited in men, women and various national cultures respectively. Section two seeks to establish the features of the sublime and beautiful in man in general and it is here that Kant moves from the purely aesthetic to the moral by speculating on what virtue and behaviours are sublime by nature. Kant distinguishes between adoptive and genuine virtues; whilst the "...former are beautiful and charming; the latter alone is sublime and venerable." (OFBS: 61). Men who choose to act in a good or kind-hearted way based on their feelings, form part of the class of adoptive and beautiful virtues, but the man who is known to have a 'noble heart' and acts virtuously as a matter of principle, is capable of true sublimity as "...he alone is a righteous person." (Ibid). Furthermore Kant discriminates four main types of human disposition found in men, each affecting their ability to engage in and feel either beautiful or sublime activity. A person (man)

with a *melancholy* frame of mind is perhaps most susceptible to feelings of the sublime: a man so permanently dejected cannot be falsely swayed by frivolity or mere beauty but instead finds delight only in things which truly move him in the way only the sublime can (63-64). A *sanguine* person by contrast has a prevailing feeling for the beautiful, this person is changeable and preoccupied with trivial diversions (67) and as such his character is likely to deteriorate with age and could well be in danger of becoming an 'old dandy' (68) with old age. Any virtue that a sanguine person displays is liable to change based on their fluctuating emotions on any given day and is thus considered as more of an adoptive virtue than a truly genuine one. On the other hand the *choleric* complexion (irritable) will on occasion seek out the 'moral consequences' of finer feelings but largely the chasing of virtue is "...aimed at the *gloss* of sublimity" (68) this person is swayed by the outward appearances of "glitter...tinsel and painted merit." (Ibid). Whilst he is attracted to the splendid forms of the sublime and even on the surface may appear to be genuinely virtuous: these behaviours have a tendency to mask the ulterior and perhaps selfish motivations of the individual (68-70). The fourth and final 'type' of persona which Kant identifies, is that of the *phlegmatic* man, a person so full of apathy that he is barely worth considering in the context of discussion; as he cannot possess or display any of the 'ingredients' of either the beautiful or sublime in any quantifiable measure (70).

It is the third section in which Kant turns to exploring how the beautiful and the sublime are divided between the sexes, the central contention being that women (the 'fair sex') are primarily concerned with and have feelings of the beautiful whereas men (the 'noble' sex) are chiefly concerned with the notion of the sublime (*OFBS*: 76). A woman's merit is judged on her ability to engage in what Kant describes as a kind of 'beautiful understanding' (78) which requires little in the way of thinking and more in the way of feeling. Furthermore women should "...leave Descartes his vortices to whirl forever without troubling themselves about them." for a woman who insists on filling her head with philosophy or Greek might as well grow a beard because she will have so failed in her duties of being a woman (78-79) which is to be nothing more than beautiful in nature (78). Kant does however acknowledge that as a woman ages, her charm diminishes and her beauty is destroyed (92) meaning that she may need to fill the gaps left in her attractiveness by pursuing more intellectual pursuits. Still, a woman's sublimity manifests itself only in her ability to recognise and encourage the noble, intellectual and sublime virtues/attributes of her husband (94). This idea would be majorly problematic for feminist and ecofeminist accounts, which place great value on women being their own independent and autonomous selves: capable of enjoying their own intellectual and sublime virtues (e.g. Plumwood 1993).

The final section of *OFBS* is concerned with how the qualities of both the beautiful and the sublime manifest in differing nationalities, here Kant provides what have become some of his most infamous written passages (Shell 2008 3). People of non-European descent are deemed to have little in the way of sublime characteristics and those within Europe are not automatically guaranteed to be part of an exclusive set of nations. According to Kant only those of German, English and Spanish heritage can be classed as having the superior features found in their potential ability to experience and display sublime properties (2003: 97). Kant identifies these three nations as being distinguished from other countries by two particular attributes: the first is their treatment of women (in terms of the supposed lack of discrimination faced by women in European nations) and secondly, their ability to have feeling for the morally beautiful (112) which Kant believes others are incapable of feeling. Kant identifies, “The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rise above the trifling” (110) and at one point even goes so far as to disregard the otherwise astute remark of a ‘negro’ stating that, “...it might be that there was something in this to be considered but...this fellow was black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid.” (113). The clear proof of this ‘negroes’ stupidity is not in itself made clear but it can perhaps be assumed that Kant believes that ‘savages’ are incapable of the type of “...mental character disposed to finer feelings” (112) necessary for them to gain access to the sublime.

3.3 Connections between Kant's Critical and Pre-Critical Periods

OFBS departed from previous works on the sublime/beautiful in a number of ways, perhaps most significantly because in this pre-critical work, Kant locates true sublimity not in an outside object (raging seas, stunning waterfalls etc.) but rather in man himself (46-48). This is noticeably different from the writing of earlier thinkers, particularly the Romantics whom Susan Shell identifies as, "...yearn[ing] (hopelessly) for a recovery of natural wholeness (via the imagination)..." instead of finding divinity and sublimity in natural objects Kant instead "...pegs human wholeness on a moral integrity inseparable from man's natural disjuncture." (2008: 4). Kant in *OFBS* comes perhaps the closest he could to placing nature and man on an 'equal footing' but ultimately it is the "...the beauty of nature, [which] for Kant, is always less than the sublimity of virtue." (Ibid.).

The addition of man to the concept of the sublime was central in changing the nature of the discussion points surrounding these issues in philosophy, aesthetics and ethics. *OFBS* marks the beginning of Kant's exploration of the connections between aesthetics and morality, he states that a virtuous life is defined by one's ability to be guided by the "...feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature." (57) and that it is man's dignity alone which is, "...the ground of the judgement that man himself is sublime." (Goldthwait 2003: 25). The superiority of the sublime (as opposed to the merely beautiful) is evident in Kant's philosophy throughout *OFBS* but it is his later work, *the*

Critique of Judgment, in which the theories of aesthetics and ethics are further developed and intertwined.

As a philosophical work *OFBS* cannot stand up to the great Kantian Critiques but as an early insight into Kant's thought process, it is invaluable. In fact it offers a 'breath of fresh air', (from the usually difficult and sometimes unfathomable writings of Kant) in which he writes in a lucid, personable and even jovial manner; displaying his deep sensitivity to the role of human emotion in making moral decisions. Even so, *OFBS* biggest failure lies in Kant's inability to provide a "...principle of explanation with a principle of conduct" (Goldthwait 2003: 31) or a grounding for the moral and aesthetic rules (or laws) discussed in the text. The *Observations* was not however meant to be read as a complete philosophical theory but rather as the title would suggest: observations on the twin notions of beauty and sublimity from Kant's point of view, not with the eyes of a philosopher but with those of an observer (Ibid.). As a result *OFBS* can be seen as only the preliminary theoretical section of Kant's later work, in which the subjects of aesthetics and ethics were returned to almost twenty-six years later in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790). The third *Critique* would further explore the roles of women, nature, beauty and sublimity in relation to both aesthetics and morality. Importantly the *Critique* (mostly probably influenced by Edmund Burke's *Inquiry*) distinguishes the sublime from

its previous incarnations by making true sublimity dependent on the production of fear in the subject.

3.4 The Kantian Sublime in the *Critique of Judgment*

Kant's most influential works are contained in his three *Critiques*, the first of which, entitled *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) explores the limits of our theoretical understanding in order to determine the limits on human's mental cognition. In *CPR* Kant establishes, what is known as his transcendental philosophy, with transcendental being defined as "...knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of our knowledge is to be possible *a priori*." (*CPR* §12). This involves a complete investigation into the nature of our ability to ascertain what can be known about the world *a priori* (non-empirically) without the aid of any sensible faculties. The *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) is a work focused on moral philosophy and attempts to determine the transcendental conditions of our practical or moral activity (Shaw 2006: 76). Kant's second critique establishes a 'metaphysics of morals' in which through 'rational cognition' it is possible to have *practical* knowledge of the moral laws (Pluhar 1987: x1vi). It is however the third critique to which I shall now turn, the *Critique of Judgment*, like the first two critiques it explores our cognitive powers but this time in relation to the world of

aesthetic judgments. The *CJ* is divided into two parts, the first is the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment which deals with judgments of taste (in nature, art and the sublime). The second part, the Critique of Teleological Judgment approaches the way in which we make judgments are made about nature ‘in terms of final causes or ends/purposes’ (xxiv). Central to *CJ* and also to this thesis, is Kant’s discussion and conclusions surrounding the importance and treatment of the sublime; in which he builds upon previous work such as that found in *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*.

In Book II of the *Critique of Judgement: The Analytic of the Sublime*, Kant first offers his more mature re-imagination on the subject of the sublime. He claims that “The beautiful and the sublime are similar in some respects. We like both for their own sake.” (§23, 244) yet there is something fundamentally different about the two, as “The beautiful is the exhibition of an indeterminate concept of understanding, and the sublime as the exhibition of an indeterminate concept of reason” (Ibid.). It is here in which Kant adds to the work done in *OFBS* by building upon the idea that whilst beauty exists in the object, the sublime exists not in any outside object but rather in man himself (Goldthwait 2003: 25). It is in the third *Critique* however where Kant goes further than in previous discussions, by claiming that there is:

...nothing purposive whatever in nature itself but only in what use we can make

of our intuitions about nature so that we can feel a purposiveness within ourselves entirely independent of nature. (§23, 246).

The notion of sublimity is thus contained not within any "...sensible form but concerns only ideas of reason." (255) for the beauty in nature it is necessary for man to look beyond himself but for the sublime we must seek a "...basis merely within ourselves..." (246). Further discussion on the relationship between Kant's philosophy and nature will be explored in Chapter 6, for now I will turn to the definition of the sublime presented by Kant in §25-30 of the *Critique of Judgment*.

Whilst Kant identifies only one 'type' of beauty (as being defined by quality) he makes the distinction between two types of the sublime (which is defined by quantity or magnitude) which are represented by two different types of agitation: that of the *mathematically* sublime and those instances which are *dynamically* sublime (§24, 247). Simply put, the *mathematically* sublime refers to that which is of a great magnitude whereas the *dynamically* sublime refers to an occurrence which displays tremendous might, strength or power. The crux of the sublime experience, whether *mathematic* or *dynamic*, lies in the arousal of a certain kind of fear (although more so in relation to the dynamic sublime) which is brought about by the failure of one's imagination to 'deal with' the enormity or force of the sublime object. Thus leading to the success of one's

faculty of reason in being able to take over control and thereby producing within the subject a feeling of relief and great pleasure, or as Kant would have it: sublimity. However the fear produced in the subject "...is not actual fear..." (Ibid.) but rather it is merely fear produced by the imagination being unable to comprehend the enormity or might of the object he is presented with. Whilst "the sight of such an object becomes all the more attractive the more fearful it is..." this is only the case provided that we are in a safe place to witness it from (239). Sublimity is arrived at when the object is apprehended as sublime, "...with a pleasure that is possible only by means of a displeasure." (§27, 260). The actual feeling of the sublime when experienced in the subject is caused by a sense of "...displeasure that arises from the imagination's inadequacy." (257) and thus the "...the imagination *feels* the sacrifice of deprivation...to which it is subjugated." (269). This displeasure and deprivation is what Kant describes as an 'agitation' comparable to a 'vibration' which goes back and forth in one's mind from repulsion to attraction over the object in question (258). When presented with an object of extreme magnitude or might, the subject's imagination is faced with its own inadequacy compared to its counterpart: the faculty of reason and as a result the subject is also "...seized by *amazement* bordering on terror, by horror and sacred thrill." (269).

When presented with something of the *mathematical* sublime such as: the expression of π , the vastness of our solar system or the sequence of the entire human genome, "...our

imagination strives to progress towards infinity...” (250) but because it is impossible for infinity to be grasped by any sensible intuitions (Shaw 2006: 81) our power of understanding is inadequate to the sheer magnitude on display. This feeling of inadequacy however itself is the, “...the arousal in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible power.” (250) and this feeling (of man’s superior faculty of reason over imagination) reconfirms Kant’s central contention that what we call the sublime is not an object of sense but “...the use of judgment...and attunement of the intellect” with which it causes in the mind of the subject.” (Ibid.). Specific to the *mathematically* sublime (but also relevant to the *dynamic*) are the twin sensibilities of apprehension and comprehension which are both challenged when presented with an object of sublimity. Apprehension itself involves no problem as “...it may progress to infinity.” (252) however “Comprehension becomes more and more difficult the further apprehension progresses, and soon it reaches its maximum” in the end the apprehension reaches a maximum which cannot be exceeded and it “begins to be extinguished in the imagination” (Ibid.). The imagination, for all of its ability, does not have the capacity to contain the sublimity of the experience because “...all the might of imagination [is] still inadequate to reason’s ideas.” (256). The sublime is derived when “...ideas of reason... [are] provoked and called to mind precisely by this inadequacy” (245) which in turn causes the mind to “...abandon sensibility and to occupy itself with ideas that contain a higher purposiveness” (246). Kant locates the sublime not in the outside, physical or

sensible world for but instead identifies the ‘feeling of the sublime’ we see in nature is actually “...respect for our own vocation.” (257) which shows that “...every standard of sensibility is inadequate to the ideas of reason” (258). In other words, whilst the sublime may be delivered to the subject through the form of a physical conduit, the real location of sublimity exists within the mind of the man only: signalling to him his own superiority over those objects of sensibility (269). More precisely Kant states that:

When we speak of the sublime in nature we speak improperly; properly speaking sublimity can be attributed merely to our way of thinking, or, rather, to the foundation this has in human nature. (280).

The sublime is contained in two parts, which involve both negative and positive aspects, both of which are essential. The first part of the sublime experience is one of negativity, unpleasant and “...counterpurposive [too big] for the operation of the imagination” (2005 Helmut Wenzel: 107) whereas the second part of the experience is both pleasant and purposive for “...reason and our moral vocation and a human being.” (Ibid.). The sublime experience involves the failure of the greatest faculty of sense - the imagination – giving way and allowing for the successful ‘exhibition’ of the greatest and higher faculty of reason (257-258). A superior faculty which allows human men to, “...transcend the limitations of our finite phenomenal existence” (Crowther 1989: 99-

100). Furthermore, the success of man's capacity to both reason and comprehend great magnitude and might (including infinity itself) points to his superiority over the physical world and all that is sensible.

3.5 Kant and Nature in Part I of the *Critique of Judgement*

For the beautiful in nature we must seek a basis outside ourselves: in a gentle bubbling brook, a sunset, flower strewn meadows, hills, valleys and so on and so forth. Whereas when we (meaning man) searches for the sublime, he need only look as far as the end of his own nose, for the sublime has, "...merely a basis merely within ourselves." (*CJ*: 246). Man himself has been endowed with an innate ability to "...to judge nature without fear and to think of our vocation as being sublimely above nature." (264). The mightiness of nature has no dominion over man or his faculty of reason and rationality (257) and whilst "...a boundless ocean may dwarf the mind" (Shaw 2006: 82) it is impossible for man's supersensibility to be so equally dwarfed. Kant posits that it is man's very ability to conceive of the inadequacy, caused by the inferiority of one part of his mind (his imagination) when confronted with a raging storm or Milton's infernal Kingdom, which points to his higher calling/vocation. Here he asks:

Who would want to call sublime things as a shapeless mountain masses piled on one another in wild disarray, with their pyramids of ice, or the gloomy raging sea?

(*CJ*: 256).

Hannah Arendt was disturbed by this tendency for ‘modern’ philosophers (i.e. since Descartes) to almost exclusively concern themselves with the entity of ‘self’ and to “...reduce all experiences, with the world as well as with other human beings, to experiences between man and himself.” (1958: 254). Kant’s exposition on man’s sublime experience can be seen as a furthering of this tendency to alienate the physical world from man; in doing so it allows for mankind to divorce himself from the sensible world as far as possible in order to ascend to a higher plane of existence where humanity is no longer confined to the merely corporeal realm.

3.6 Kant and Nature in Part II of the *Critique of Judgment*

Kant further develops his theory on the relationship between nature and mankind in Part II of the *Critique of Judgment*, in furthering his analysis Kant seeks to show how the existence of the natural world helps to establish man as both a moral and free agent. For Kant the theory of the sublime is a “...mere appendix...” (246) to our aesthetic judgment on the purposiveness of nature (or lack thereof) and the demonstration of man’s propensity towards moral feeling. Kant claims that it is not in the objects of sublimity in the natural world which can be judged to be purposive but instead the purposiveness lies in the cognitive powers which are awakened by those objects which are judged

aesthetically as able to induce the sublime (260 and again at 280). When we speak of the sublime existing in nature we simply ascribe the sublimity of the mind to such objects, such as the raging storm, which make us aware of the mind's sublimity (Pluhar 1987: 1xx) and making man the only "...natural being in whom we can nonetheless cognise..." (CJ: 435). Man's cognitive awareness, discovered through natural objects of sensibility which arouse his sense of sublimity, manifests itself in his supersensible ability (that being of freedom as opposed to necessity) to apprehend, "...the law and the object of this causality..." the object that this being "...can set before itself its highest purpose." (Ibid). Kant claims that mankind alone (and only in terms of him being a moral subject) has a final purpose, one in which all of nature is necessarily and teleologically subordinated:

His existence itself has the highest purpose within it; and to this purpose he can subject all nature as far as he is able, or at least he must not consider himself subjected to any influence of nature in opposition to that purpose (435).

Whilst Kant acknowledges the diversity, complexity, coherency and artful formation of the natural world and all of the creatures contained within it, he is also quick to make clear that without humanity: it would all be for nought (442) because "...all these diverse creatures would exist for nothing if they did not include human beings." (Ibid.). Since man is the only moral subject (able to rationalise and make moral decisions) we must

also presuppose that mankind is the final purpose of nature (443) and as such that “...Without man all of creation would be a mere wasteland, gratuitous and without a final purpose.” (442). Whilst certain natural phenomena may appear to display a type of purposiveness, Kant maintains that it would be wrong to assume from such observations that these natural objects have teleological basis (410-411) but rather that such ‘technic’ found in nature is a result of mere autonomous mechanism (411). Without humanity the natural world, which has nothing at its basis that is consciously self-aware (and thus cannot be subject to moral consideration), would exist for no conceivable purpose (435-443).

Kant forges a boundary of monstrous proportions between the physical realm, which is characterised by necessity and a lack of supersensibility and the world of morality in which humans are capable of making free and rational moral choices. Kant himself states that the ‘great gulf’ separating the two realms, “...completely cuts off the domain of the concept of nature under the one legislation...” and that of freedom under the other (195). Whilst the former has no power to exert over the latter, the latter not only *can* influence the former but in fact, *ought* to do so as is perfectly within his right (Ibid.).

3.7 Kant and Women in the *Critique of Judgment*

In *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (OFBS)* Kant made many bold (and perhaps controversial) statements (see previous chapter) about the nature of women's status in society, the relationship between women and the beautiful and the bond between men and sublimity. His central contention was that women (the 'fair sex') are primarily concerned with and have feelings of the beautiful whereas men (the 'noble' sex) are chiefly concerned with the notion of the sublime (*OFBS*: 76). This 'observation' was further explored in the *Critique of Judgment*, in terms of Kant's exploration of the sublime and its role in pointing to the final purpose of humanity and the morality of man. However, Kant does not further examine the role of the sexes in the experience of the sublime, in the third *Critique*, any more fully than he had done in previous works. Which highlights the implicit assumption that the word 'mankind' must necessarily referred to the manly sex and the absolute lack of interest attributed to clarifying any type of gender issues at the time this was written. Some have argued that none of Kant's projects (including the *Critique of Judgment*) can be rescued from the "...taint of patriarchy..." or from the "...cauldron in which bourgeois aesthetic ideology ..." was created (Gould 1990: 307). However if one was to dismiss Kant's work on the sublime out of hand or try to remove the tension of gender from his writing, one would be doing a great disservice to both Kant and philosophy; just because the idea of the sublime is tilted towards a masculine perspective does not mean that there is nothing of merit to learn

from it (1990: 307). In fact the gendering of the sublime, which began in the domain of male writers, is part of what makes the topic of the sublime not only interesting to analyse but also important in understanding the depth and breadth of philosophy's male orientation and the way in which women have traditionally been relegated to the role of the beauty without (or indeed needing to have) brains.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined Kant's general thoughts on both the beautiful and the sublime, first within Kant's lesser known and more controversial *Observations* and secondly those found in his third *Critique*. It is evident that over time (between 1764 and 1790) Kant's views changed substantially in their extremity and whilst his thoughts (particularly with regards to women, nature and non-Western men) arguably softened over the years: his central thesis appears to remain intact. Kant's contention that man is fundamentally distinct from the natural realm has severe (and negative) implications for the natural environment and those who are considered to have a connection to it (see above). Clearly this would be an extreme point of contention with environmentalists, feminists and ecofeminists alike and whether these differing views can be reconciled will be the subject of the following chapters.

Chapter 4

Mixing Kant and Ecofeminism: An Impossible Task?

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will seek to investigate whether the views and philosophy of Immanuel Kant, particularly with regards to his work on the sublime, found in both the *Critique of Judgment* and *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* are fundamentally incompatible with the ideology of the ecofeminist movement. This chapter will first explore the notion of ecofeminism, focusing on the main tenets of ecofeminism: which involve the recognition that the oppression of women and the oppression of nature have at their root the same patriarchal cause and secondly that in order for either the oppression of nature or women to be successfully addressed, they must be tackled simultaneously. I will discuss the way in which ecofeminist philosophy seeks to reject the traditional dualisms of woman/man, mankind/nature and man/animal, which it argues are deeply embedded into the fabric of Western culture and society. I will go on to show how many of these normative dualisms, which have come to inform how we choose to live and how we think about the world, have actually originated in philosophical writings stretching back to the times of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. I will

also begin to analyse Kant's own contribution to this traditional philosophical approach and his views upon women and nature, in attempt to determine the potential compatibility of his philosophy with ecofeminism, later chapters in thesis will pursue this question in much more depth. Finally, I will (again, begin to) consider the conventional interpretation of Kant's relationship with both the natural environment and women, from the perspective of Bonnie Mann, Christine Battersby and others. This conventional interpretation generally involves a critique of Kantian philosophy (for upholding sexist, racist and anti-environmental views) and would most likely find the compatibility between Kant and ecofeminism unlikely at best. This chapter will explore the roots of ecofeminism and introduce the traditional interpretation of Kant from a feminist/environmentalist/ecofeminist perspective, which throughout the rest of thesis I will look to determine the veracity of.

4.2 What exactly is ecofeminism?

The term, *ecofeminism*, was coined by Francois d'Eaubonne in her work 'Le Féminisme ou la Mort' (Feminism or Death) published in 1974; but according to Karen Warren the first explicit use of the word *ecofeminism* in an academic context was in the 1980s; in two articles published in 1987 and 1986, by Warren herself and Val Plumwood respectively. Both articles attempted to make connections between feminism and ecology, in the case of Plumwood, she drew parallels between the domination of women

and the domination of nature in an attempt to show the logic behind merging the disciplines of feminism and environmentalism together (1986: 120). Part of the challenge for early ecofeminists was in creating a new (and recognised) academic sub-discipline: one in which they could dispute and analyse the ordinary preconceptions surrounding the political status of nature women. As it is today, ecological feminism or *ecofeminism* is an area of academic study concerned with understanding the dualisms which inform our society, with focus on exploring the interconnected relationship between the domination of women and the domination of nature. Ecofeminism recognises that the oppression of women and the oppression of nature are caused by the same intellectual and philosophical traditions: which help to encourage a worldview rooted in a prevailing set of 'dualistic contrasts' (Plumwood 1993: 33) which are dominant in Western culture and philosophy.

Ecofeminism recognises that there is a shared point of causation for the oppression of women and nature (Ruether 1989: 139) and that this common location can be found in the 'dualistic contrasts' present in Western society. A dualism by definition, requires nothing more than a distinction between two conceptually opposed ideas (for example man/woman, man/nature, culture/nature, reason/nature) however ecofeminism recognises that a dualism can be arranged in such a way as to promote the superiority of one and the subordination of the other (Moyer 2001: 80). This commonly leads to those 'lower parts'

of the dualism, in this case women and nature, being made inferior to and being conceived as something diametrically opposed to those dominant elements of the dualist framework.

For instance man's separateness from the natural world which has come to define 'our' traditional understanding of philosophy and politics: results in man's belief that as rational beings "...our material nature is a lower and merely animal aspect of our being." (Sayers 2002: 2). Ecofeminism postulates that in order to achieve any kind of liberation on the behalf of women or nature it is first necessary to destroy such notions that men have any such superiority over nature or women and indeed that humanity itself has any superiority over the world in which we live (Kings 2014: 9). For this to occur, it would be necessary for a seismic shift to take place in the very foundations of our society because the liberation of women and nature is unlikely to occur without a "...radical reshaping of the basic socioeconomic relations and the underlying values of this [modern industrial] society." (Reuther cited by Warren 1996: ix). Such restructuring would involve the recognition that as humans (man or woman) we are not radically removed from the processes of nature but rather that we as physical beings are completely dependent upon the natural environment for our own survival: to deny this would make no sense. Yet this is exactly what certain philosophical understandings would have us believe; the idea that man has some kind of 'right over nature' (294) lies at the heart of a Westernised conception of power and productivity (rooted in patriarchy) which, as

Vandana Shiva identifies, continues to see what is “...at an ecological level highly destructive.” (1990:196) as economically productive. As Ariel Salleh has claimed, it appears that much of the current ecological crisis has been a direct result of a Western and Eurocentric and patriarchal culture being built on the domination of nature and the domination of women (1997: 13). A belief which was epitomised in the work of the ‘father’ of modern science: Francis Bacon, a man who supposed that man had some kind of natural ‘right over nature’ (Merchant 1980: 273). Bacon’s views fed easily into the industrial revolution and the capitalist spirit of productivity which demanded the exploitation the secrets of the natural world by using one hand to “...search into the bowels of nature...” (Bacon 1620: 343) and the other hand to “...shape nature as an anvil.” (Ibid.) to be used in ways determined by man. Bacon described nature in female terms, branding ‘her’ the “...common harlot.” (320) capable of being used and even “...forced out of her natural state, squeezed and moulded.” (246). It is this supposed link whereby women are considered to have a closer connection and relationship with nature than their male counterparts (Klinger 1997: 108) which justified their being used, manipulated, exploited and mastered (Ibid.). Salleh considers it the central purpose of ecofeminism to explore the political, environmental and personal consequences of this “...culturally elaborated gender difference.” (1997: 13). Furthermore

whilst women may be perceived as being closer to nature, they are equally a part of nature as the rest of humanity but the achievement of manhood seems to be entirely dependent upon “...men distancing themselves from this fact.” (cited in Kings 2014: 11).

4.3 Philosophy, Nature and Women

The traditional, masculine philosophy of (among others) Kant, Descartes and Plato has historically been a hugely influencing factor with regards to certain modes of thinking about the natural world (ibid: 43). Kant especially has had a major role to play in both the justification of man’s superiority over nature and the notion of unrestrained, unlimited progress which has resulted in the continued degradation of our natural surroundings. In the *Theaetetus* Socrates recalls the story of Thales, who resembling the archetypal absent-minded philosopher, falls into a well whilst contemplating the skies (Plato 369: 174a). A young Thracian peasant girl upon seeing the incident, laughs and teases Thales that he was concerned only with what was ‘up there’ and not what was behind him or directly under his feet, hence being unable to see the hole in the ground and tumbling into it. To the philosopher Socrates points out, the physical world holds but a shadow of ultimate reality and thus detachment from the physical manifestations of one’s environment is not only encouraged but necessary true contemplation (173e). The

philosophically minded man is therefore likely to fall into all manner of pits, appear the 'fool' to ordinary folk (174e) and be derided by the 'common herd' (175b) who being stuck in a practical existence, can have no conception of the otherworldly realm inhabited by philosophers and no capability of accessing this higher form of life. In this instance, the 'common herd' are characterised in the personhood of not only a lower class, uneducated, ethnically stereotyped, service worker but also in that of a woman: the ultimate outsider. This unnamed female represents those engulfed in the practical matters required of daily living, who at least in this account, are rigidly separated from those such as Thales, Socrates and Plato who have the ability to disengage themselves from the realm of necessity in order that they may ascend to a higher plane of existence (175a).

Emphasis on the importance of the philosopher's detachment from the physical world, typified in the story of Thales, is by no means exclusive to the intellectual thought of Plato. Rather it epitomises a line of reasoning with a long historical precedent in Western philosophy, which traditionally has found its foundations in a general unwillingness to accept any dependence on nature and the realm of necessity. The historical precedent which separates and sets man above nature has also been responsible for enforcing other dualistic contrasts which are deeply entrenched into Western Society: setting culture above nature, humanity above the natural world. This dualism is intimately connected to others forming the bedrock of Western philosophy, including; man/woman, western

man/non-western man, rich/poor and human/animal all of which contribute to an overall understanding that what is nature or perceived to be closer to nature (such as women, people in the Global South, animals and of course the environment itself) of a lower class and necessarily inferior. An unwillingness to admit dependence on natural surroundings for sustenance and one's continued survival appear to lie at the centre of the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes and Kant who considered that as rational beings "...our material nature is a lower and merely animal aspect of our being." (Sayers 2002: 2) as such the notion of man's separateness from the natural world has come to define 'our' traditional understanding of philosophy. Notions of duality have contributed to a worldview responsible for creating a violent disjunction (Bookchin 1986: 13) between man and nature, which has helped to render parts of humanity unmindful of its own responsibility towards the natural environment and the non-human other.

4.4 Kant, Women and Nature

Throughout the *Critique of Judgment* and *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, Kant advances his work on the subject of the sublime and aesthetics whilst connecting these issues to his wider philosophical framework on morality and the existence of God. However both written works, have much to say on subjects which although not of the highest priority to Kant, are still able to offer an insight into his thinking on a wide range of important (of importance more so than Kant and his

contemporaries) such as racial and national stereotypes, women's place in society and humanity's relationship with the natural world. Kant's views on these issues are perhaps typical of the time in which he was writing, however for others (Moyer 2012), they point to a deeper, more intrinsic aspect of Kantian philosophy: one which at its heart is outright incompatible with either the feminist or environmental movements. Kant's philosophy on the state of mankind's relationship with the natural environment also has severe implications for man's relationship with women and their *very* differing roles in society. Kim Hall observes that the dominion which the male subject has over nature has ramifications for women and non-Western men (and also one would think non-Western women) who have traditionally been associated with nature, in terms of the perceived 'closeness' that these individuals share with the physical world (Hall 1997: 263) in contrast with their Western-male counterparts whom (in their own estimations) are not bound necessarily to the Earth. Central to Kant's understanding of the sublime is the idea of freedom (referring to a realm free and superior to that of sensibility/physical limitations) and necessity (as in being necessarily bound to the natural world). In *CJ* and *OFBS* Kant posits that the male sex possesses that which makes him capable of experiencing the sublime, namely an innate ability to reason and therefore can transcend the material realm. One of the central features of the Kantian sublime is the establishing of the dominance of the masculine over the feminine (Mann 2008: 38). Whilst women have a tendency towards the beautiful: beauty being their most prized possession (*CJ* 92)

and as a result: have no ability to disengage themselves from the realm of necessity. The implication of this observation being that if man's experience of the sublime points to his status as a moral creature: women are perhaps not considered as capable of (or as capable of) making moral decisions as "...Failure to remain in the role of a beautiful object...results in a failure to be a woman at all." (Mann 2008: 43). Women are therefore associated with the natural realm: the world of sense and feeling whilst men are affiliated with the world of reason, rationality and freedom. The male sex are encouraged to disassociate themselves from emotions and feelings (Battersby 2007: 67) that are identified as so-called 'feminine characteristics' (65) which Kant implicitly believes to be 'downgraded' notions and are thus attached to the side of weakness. According to Christine Battersby (2007) Kant was (at best) ambivalent about whether women counted as moral beings (51) and at worst considered women as "...natural subordinates to males..." (62) and thus a lesser part of humanity (53). As a result of this line of thinking, *mankind* is given a 'double positioning', as both the self-determining person of the physical reality and also as the logical 'I' which transcends such reality to exist ultimately in a type of timeless formless form (135). However ecofeminists seek to honour the relationship between the phenomenal and noumenal (as that which exists independent of the mind) realms in a way which does not deny the reality of either or risk prioritising the one over the other (see Plumwood 1993). Rather ecofeminism (in general) attempts to reinterpret traditional modes of reasoning in order to highlight the

mutual dependency which *all* humans have on the environment and the responsibility with which *humankind* (as opposed to *mankind*) has to protect and preserve the natural world for future generations; with this in mind it seems *prima facie* that Kant's ideas are incompatible with those of ecofeminist or, for that matter feminism and environmentalism in general. However, it could be argued that Kant's less than politically correct views on women, black people, Orientals and man's relationship with the environment, are neither relevant nor important to his overriding philosophical project. His views on these subjects, are hardly surprising given the time they were written but they do seem to exemplify the style of thinking which was common during the period in which Kant wrote, this can specifically be seen in his approach towards women and the non-European man. Kant's treatment of these issues does however have far reaching implications, not only, within his own philosophy but also in terms of their wider influence in philosophy at the time. For example, Kant's work on the sublime and the beautiful, could be considered as a singular and unrelated point of interest, one which details the nature of the feeling of the beautiful and the superior feeling of the sublime that helps humans to transcend their ordinary existence. However, this would be a mistake: the ramifications of Kant's theory on the 'beautiful and sublime' extend far beyond the reach of aesthetics and poetic feelings inspired by an awe inspiring view. Kant's philosophy on the sublime helps to form a major part of his work on proving both the existence of God and the ability of man to make moral (and rational) judgments; it

also highlights the way in which considerations for gender and the environment were of an exceedingly low priority to Kant and many (although not all) of his contemporaries.

4.5 Kant and Ecofeminism

Whether Kant and the theoretical discourse of ‘ecofeminism’ are mutually incompatible will depend primarily on two things, firstly whether Kant’s philosophy (or lack thereof) on nature can be reconciled with the environmental ethic advocated ecofeminism and secondly, whether Kant’s views on women can be interpreted more sympathetically than has traditionally been allowed. In the remainder of this chapter I will examine the thoughts of two writers, Bonnie Mann (2008) and Christine Battersby (2007) and their perceptions on the relationship between Kant, women and nature (with particular reference to the notion of the sublime); in order to begin to understand the complexity of this potential relationship. In addressing Mann’s ideas I will first discuss her interpretation of Kant’s views on the environment and then go on to examine her considerations of Kant’s exploration of the role of women.

In her 2008 work, *Women’s Liberation and the Sublime*, Bonnie Mann observes Kant’s preoccupation with the problem of freedom in the *Critique of Judgment*; remarking that his chief goal in this work was to reconcile man’s materiality with his ‘soul’ (37). More precisely, he tries to answer the following questions: “How can an animal with a body be

a moral agent? ... [and] How can a creature of nature not be a creature of nature at all?" (2008: 37). Or simply, how it is possible for man, whose corporeal body is bound by earth also capable of transcending this sensible realm and make himself superior to all that is material? These questions highlight the struggle which philosophers have tried to address since the days of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, in attempting to reconcile consciousness, morality and the prima facie differences between mankind and the rest of the natural world, when man is a creature of nature after all. However as Mann (amongst others) have pointed out: throughout the course of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant appears to continually deny this very 'fact' by finding ways to expand the interior universe of man at the expense of the "...degradation of and disregard." (Mann 2008: 57) for all that is sensible (e.g. *CJ*: 245-246, 257, 264-265, 269). Not only does Kant expand the interior universe of man but he also intends to "...catapult the subject out of his dependence on nature." (2008: 38) and into an illusion of his own freedom from sensibility. Whilst he accepted the existence of the external and natural world, it seems only as a means to "underpin the inward powers of the subject." (55) and to justify man as the superior entity (*CJ* 280, 411) especially since that Kant believed that he looked into the mirror of nature only to see himself (Mann 2008:143). Kant, along with those Mann identifies as promoting the Euro-masculinist ideology of the modern/Kantian era, contributed to a philosophical 'Copernican turn', which in a similar vein to the Copernican scientific revolution, turned the entirety of the philosophical tradition on its

head. However, whilst the Copernican revolution of science involved the discovery that mankind/Earth was no more (nor never had been) the centre of the universe, the Kantian ‘Copernican turn’ involved the inversion of this very idea: making man once again the centre of both internal and external realms. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant remarks:

“...a light broke upon all students of nature...that it [reason] must not allow itself to be kept on nature’s leading strings, but must itself show the way with principles of judgment based upon fixed laws, constraining nature to give answer to the questions of reason’s own determining.” (bxiii)

Furthermore, man’s experience of the sublime allows him not only to experience his own superiority over the natural world (through the triumph of reason over imagination) but also recognise his ability to dominate and use environment for his one’s own requirements. Kant divorces himself and mankind from nature and reverses the order of dependence, so that no longer is man dependent on nature but rather that the “...the world is dependent on the autonomous subject.” (Mann 2008: 47) with this ‘autonomous subject’ naturally being man himself. The sublime experience allows man to realise his true purpose and vocation (*CJ* 257) which lies in refusing to bow down to nature (262) because his elevated and sublime status enables him to judge nature without fear (264). Kant’s argument for man’s superiority over nature has in part been used to justify the

notion of 'unlimited progress' which is at the heart of Western consumerism and colonial expansion (Kim cited by Mann 2008: 53). Moreover whilst emancipation from the realm of necessity is the ultimate goal for man (who must rise above his sensible intuitions) yet the price for mankind's 'independence' from the sensible realm, is in the main a denial of an essential and natural part of what makes each of us human.

Kant's (and his successors) version of the 'egotistical sublime' (Battersby 2007: 123) has a tendency towards one typical narrative that of the singular male 'I' being trapped in a mortal body and 'dying' to get out and achieve his independence from the physical realm. Mann does however acknowledge that at least in Kant's modernist idealism, the realm of nature still occupies a sentimental place in man's heart and is recognised as being awe-inspiring (so much so that it points to the existence of God) whereas in the postmodern tradition (which have taken the ideas discussed by the likes of Kant) and taken them to their logical conclusion (2008: 124). The postmodern project as seen by Mann and Christine Battersby (2007) has at its core the desire to annihilate the external world, whilst Kant may have offered a "...reduced and impoverished..." view of nature (Ibid) postmodernism seeks to disregard nature altogether by taking necessity itself and relocating it within a "[self] constituting consciousness." (Ibid). Such a consciousness, comes by way of retreat into a "...self-enclosed universe of text." (viii) which results in the alienation of the daily life of human existence from the natural world. As discussed

by Judith Butler in her analysis of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* (originally 1945) some philosophers have not been completely convinced by the postmodern aims, Merleau-Ponty remarked that one ought to resist "...escaping from existence into the universe of things said." (1962: xv) because, "...the human body...which weaves round it a human environment, has running through it movement towards the world itself." (327). Kantian philosophy and that which proceeded from it sought to establish man as both separate to the natural environment and dominant over it. However for ecofeminists, dependency on the physical world, as well as dependency on other living being, "...is a primary vulnerability...that we cannot will away without ceasing to be human." (Butler 2004: xiv). Ecofeminist philosophy would certainly seem contradictory to these ideas and as Mann, Battersby (2007) (amongst others) have argued, the world is not reducible to the world in which we ourselves have created through language; rather that as natural beings we are as much part of the physical world as animals, rainforests and oceans.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the notion of ecological feminism or ecofeminism as being a philosophical and political project which seeks to dismantle the patriarchal machinery subjugating both women and the environment simultaneously. Ecofeminism rests on a rejection of the traditional dualisms of woman/man, mankind/nature and man/animal,

which have been deeply embedded into the fabric of Western culture and been heavily influenced by certain philosophers right the way through history. Kant's role within this is a complicated one and on an initial inspection, his views could quickly be determined as being antithetical to the feminist and environmental aims at the heart of ecofeminism. Yet as we have seen in order to achieve a truer idea of Kant's thoughts on these matters, it is necessary to look a little further and deeper than an initial brief scan could possibly allow.

Chapter 5

Feminist Philosophy, Ethical Duties and Sexual Objectification

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter I will examine how making an appeal to a different part of Kantian philosophy (namely his work on morality and ethics) may be useful in determining the compatibility of certain feminist and environmental aims with Kantian philosophy. In particular I will look to explore one way in which as a result of traditional, masculinist views, women have been subject to discrimination in academic philosophy; justification for this can at least (in part) be traced back through the writings of philosophers including Immanuel Kant himself. I will also discuss how an alternative and more sympathetic interpretation of Kant's writing might provide a more positive outlook on Kant's relationship with women, in particular I will focus on Denis' ideas about Kant's account of 'ethical duties' and the way in which she argues that these duties (including a duty to avoid servility) can be equally applied to both men and women. Finally I will explore Kant's thoughts on sexual objectification and consider whether his ideas relating to instrumentalisation could potentially coexist harmoniously with those of feminism.

5.2 The Sublime

Earlier in this thesis I considered how Kant's notion of the sublime impacted upon and contributed to his overall position on the nature and role of women in society. Unfortunately analysing Kant's views on sublime did little to counter the idea that Kant is not reconcilable with feminism or environmentalism. Through the sublime experience, women are associated with the natural realm (the world of sense and feeling) whilst men are affiliated with the world of reason, rationality and freedom. Whereas man's experience of the sublime allows him not only to experience his own superiority over the natural world (through the triumph of reason over imagination) but also to recognise his ability to dominate and use environment for his own requirements. Since Kant connects the ability to experience the sublime to the capacity for moral action, Battersby contends that he is either ambivalent about whether women counted as moral beings (2007: 51) or that he actually believed women were "...natural subordinates to males..." (62) and thus a lesser part of humanity (53). Women (the 'fair sex') are primarily concerned with and have feelings of the beautiful whereas men (the 'noble' sex) are chiefly concerned with the notion of the sublime (*OFBS*: 76). In the *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant contends that women are moral persons but goes to far as to say that they surrender such 'personhood' on entering marriage (1797: §24). In the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, Kant goes further than in the more nuanced (and later) *Critique of Judgment*, by claiming that a woman who insists on filling her head with philosophy or

Greek might as well grow a beard because she will have so failed in her duties of being a woman (*OFBS*: 78-79) which after all is to be nothing more than beautiful as is necessitated by her very nature (78). Elsewhere Kant has expressed contradictory views on the position of women in society, from the quite misogynist ideas presented in *OFBS* to the more culturally acceptable ideas in *the Critique of Judgment* and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Holly L. Wilson worked to convey the less misogyny-laden aspects of Kantian philosophy by analysing his work in the earlier aforementioned writings and attempting to show his compatibility with ecofeminism by denying that he engages in normatively dualist thinking. Whilst she contends that Kant does not portray women as "...weak, helpless, powerless or inert." (1997: 385) it is difficult to accept this conclusion based on the evidence with which Wilson presents her readers with. Particularly detrimental to Wilson's thesis is her almost 'pick 'n' mix' approach towards selecting quotations: choosing to stay within the realms of some of Kant's lesser known works and ignoring great swathes of evidence indicating his rather obvious use of normative dualisms in other areas of his writing. Of course, this is not to say that evidence cannot be found elsewhere to support the idea of Kant's potential compatibility with feminist (and eco-friendly) ideas but that simply appealing to Kant's lack of dualist thinking will not achieve these ends when major evidence to the contrary can be found elsewhere.

5.3 Women and Philosophy

Christine Battersby (like Jeanna Moyer) is less than optimistic about the reconciliation between Kantian philosophy and women (and nature), she claims that in Kant's famous essay '*An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?*' (1784) he accuses women or the 'fair sex' of cowardice (57) and of being too lazy to think and speak for themselves. However when one looks at the text, Kant does not single out women as being either cowardly, lazy but rather stipulates that the vast majority of the world is suffering from a 'self-incurred immaturity' (1784: 1). He does however specify that anyone can achieve enlightenment by cultivating their own minds and freeing themselves from immaturity; he does not then go on to exclude the 'fair sex' from being able to also partake in this process. Instead he very much leaves the door of enlightenment open to the possibility of anyone entering through it; including those who may have traditionally been disallowed from such an occurrence, for example women.

One such way in which women have been traditionally disallowed from achieving enlightenment (as opposed to their male counterparts) is through exclusion from participation in intellectual pursuits such as philosophy itself. As discussed in previous chapters on the sublime, Kant states that women ought to "...leave Descartes [and] his vortices to whirl forever without troubling themselves about them." for a woman who

insists on filling her head with philosophy or Greek might as well grow a beard because she will have so failed in her duties of being a woman (*OFBS*: 78-79). Kant states that even if a woman, such as Mme Dacier (a translator of the *Iliad*) or the Marquise de Chatelet (who won French Academy of Science prize in 1738) should greatly succeed in her endeavours: by pursuing such avenues she has effectually destroyed the merits which are "...proper to her sex." (from *OFBS* 1960 78-79 cited in Mann 2008: 39). Kant's resistance to the idea of women pursuing academic and intellectual fields is indicative of the time period in which Kant was writing (before it was even possible for women to receive recognition for university education) but elements of this resistance still persist to this day. One particular instance of this can be found within academia itself, whereby women currently working in academic philosophy (for instance) often find themselves the subject of discriminative practises which their male counterparts do not experience in an equal measure.

5.4 Feminist Philosophy

It has been said that philosophy never changes (Langton 2005: 231) whereas feminism, by definition, constantly seeks to change and overthrow the dominant power structures which continue to subordinate women. Resisting influence from the outside world, philosophy performs a kind of 'god-trick' (Haraway cited by Jenkins 2014: 264) by which it is able to hide an implicitly 'male, white and otherwise privileged' viewpoint

under the guise of both universal objectivity and univocal relevance (Maybee 2002: 143). Thus presenting itself as a supposedly neutral discipline; philosophy reinforces a hyper-masculine world-view which encourages the familiar dichotomies found in Western Philosophy such as; and culture/nature, objectivity/subjectivity, mind/body, masculine/feminine, which “map neatly onto gender dichotomies” (Haslanger 2008: 218). As Rae Langton suggests, it is the propensity towards gendered dichotomies, encouraging dualistic and androcentric thinking (2005: 232) which make it so difficult for feminist philosophers to receive recognition in a field where their voices are drowned out by overwhelming support for the status quo. Haslanger claims that it is next to impossible for a feminist to find a place within philosophy that is not “actively hostile” towards themselves and their work; especially since it is naturally assumed that a successful philosopher “...should look and act like a (traditional white) man.” (Haslanger 2008: 212). The idea of including feminist philosophy in major edited philosophical texts on metaphysics, ethics or epistemology, is simply ‘shrugged off’ by traditional philosophers, both male and female alike (Ibid.). The very existence of feminist philosophy is called into question, with feminists repeatedly asked to justify the “adequacy and significance” (Williams Jones cited in Jenkins 2014: 268) of their particular philosophical orientation or approach. Either implicit or explicit in this systematic interrogation of feminist philosophy, lies an insinuation that what feminists are doing in philosophy, is somehow not ‘proper philosophy’ but instead more akin to

sociology or politics (see Jenkins 2014; Webb 2002; Dotson 2012). However success as a professional philosopher remains dependent upon one's congruence within these 'norms of disciplinary engagement' (Dotson 2012b: 7) and an inability to walk this narrow line, massively hinders the 'positive philosophical status' of one's work (*Ibid*, 13).

Feminist research in philosophy is subject to 'de-legitimisation' on several grounds, including; supposed lack of objectivity due to difference in methodology, incompatibility with privileged narratives and conceptual hostility (Jenkins 2014: 263-265). Kitcher suggests that justification according to a 'monolithic set of justifying norms' is no longer relevant in today's society but rather, that philosophical validation and investigation should materialise from situations in which "...people - many people, not simply an elite class - find themselves in." (Kitcher 2011: 250). Feminism can provide just such, "radicalising energy to philosophical inquiry" (Langton 2005: 232) yet it is philosophy's inhospitability to diversity and its dominant 'culture of justification', which makes the feminist project a problematic one; particularly as the recognition of research is governed by her/his ability to fit inside the pre-existing cultural norms of philosophical scholarship. The sheer enormity of the project facing feminists becomes clear when one considers how feminist philosophy has had insufficient time to make a significant impact on the wider discipline and many of philosophy's canonical texts are either implicitly or

explicitly anti-feminist (Jenkins 2014: 266). Katherine Jenkins identifies the issue of objectivity as one of the key points of tensions between the differing methodological approaches of feminist philosophy and traditional philosophy. (Ibid. 263). Whilst traditional philosophy features a ‘tacit commitment’ to detached neutrality, feminist philosophers on the other hand attempt to expose hidden forms of prejudice, with the knowledge that:

...knowledge is typically situated and partial, that the personal is the political and that the individual perspective of the researcher does have a legitimate role to play in feminist research...and objectivity cannot simply be presumed: claims stand in need of scrutiny and justification, especially when they are made by those speaking from privileged social locations. (Jenkins 2014: 263).

Dotson describes these issues as only ‘symptoms’ of the *culture of justification* inherent within the tradition of Western Philosophy. She identifies two of the main methods of exclusion; *exclusion via incongruence* and *exclusion via exceptionalism* (Dotson 2012: 11). Exclusion via a sense of *incongruence*, stems from one rejecting the idea that there exists; universal, absolute and commonly held justifying norms within philosophy. Leaving a sense of academic dissonance between one’s own beliefs and the beliefs of the discipline one is trying to survive and succeed in (Ibid.). The requirement of a philosopher to take a disembodied and neutral standpoint, is at odds with the beliefs of a diverse array of practitioners in philosophy (Ibid. 13-14) as is evidenced by proponents

of minority-group philosophers found in; Africana philosophy, Hispanic philosophy, feminist philosophy, queer theory, black feminism, etc. Secondly, the notion of *exclusion via exceptionalism* was defined by Sandra Harding with regards to the sciences, but can be made equally applicable with regards to philosophy, “Exceptionalism assumes that the West alone is capable of accurate understandings...There is one world, and it has a single internal order.” (2012: 6). In philosophy, exclusion via *exceptionalism*, can be seen in the unfounded dismissal of large bodies of research based on the uneven persuasive power of alternative philosophy and privileging of one group above all other (Dotson 2012: 11-12). Thus, researchers practising non-traditional philosophy (whether gender, feminist, race or queer) can expect to fail tests of legitimacy, when such tests, require an academic to provide one’s ‘philosophical passport’ (Sanchez 2011: 39) in order to gain permission to ascend the ivory tower.

Of course, Kant could not be made entirely responsible for the struggles women in professional philosophy currently face on a daily basis, but it also cannot be denied that part of his philosophical project (especially in his discussion on the sublime) involved creating a realm to which women were confined to (primarily beauty, necessity and sensibility) and to which they ought not to stray if they wish to maintain their female status.

5.5 Ethical Duties towards our Rational Selves

As we have so far seen, Kant's aesthetics may not be a rich source for feminists but one potential avenue for a positive feminist interpretation of Kant lies in his theory of morality and in particular, his discussion of mankind's ethical duties towards himself and others. Kant describes these ethical duties in his doctrine of virtue in *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). The ethical duties which Kant describes, stem from a deep respect for the rationality contained within us and other rational agents, and in order to duly respect such rationality one must reject certain maxims which do not honour our human nature and adopt other maxims which help to foster our rational self. Discussion on the nature of these ethical duties and their potential positive implications for feminist dialogue have been explicated by Lara Denis (2002) whose writing on the subject promotes a way in which Kantian ethics can perhaps be interpreted sympathetically, in order to support a feminist ethical standpoint. Whilst Kant could certainly not be said to have been practising feminist ethics, his theory on morality/ethics encourages the fair treatment of all rational creatures and thus also condemning attitudes and maxims of action that oppress and degrade women. In *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) Kant laid the infrastructure for his moral theory, which at its foundation rests the 'categorical imperative', this is the idea that one should act only in accordance with a maxim which one would desire to be extended as a universal law (*GMM*: 421). Lara Denis points out that the categorical imperative requires us to respect the rational nature both in ourselves

and others too (2002: 163) and she argues that this is a “...standard that every feminist should welcome...” (160) because it promises to reject the immoral practises of manipulation, exploitation, and coercion which often result in the unfair and discriminatory treatment of women (and of course others). Denis who identifies herself as a feminist proponent of Kantian ethics (158), observes parts of Kantian moral theory which she claims are compatible with feminist moral theory. Denis looks to the categorical imperative and its universalisability (159) as being a positive part of Kantian ethics, specifically because it requires that the whatever maxims are subscribed, must also be applicable to *all* rational beings and not just those who are typically discussed in Kantian philosophy i.e. men. However the fact that a categorical imperative ought to be universal, does not guarantee that it will also be indifferent to the differences of gender, race and class, but it does go some way towards minimising these differences in terms of offering an inclusive principle by which all can abide, no matter their sex, colour or creed. Denis goes on to argue that by its very nature, the categorical imperative helps to promote respect for every person capable of rational thought, making all deserving of dignity and having their individual agency taken into when moral decisions are made (159). Whilst being attractive to feminist ethicists because although God does play a role in Kantian ethics: religion does not. Kant does not claim that moral duties are prescribed by God but rather that morality stems from reason and since God is a ‘perfectly rational being’ he desires that categorical imperatives be adhered to (163). The fourth and fifth

characteristics concern man's relationship and reliance on other people, for Kant acting in a way which treats another person as merely a means to an end is morally reprehensible, even if no harm falls upon the person who is used as an object in order for the subject to reach their desired outcome. This ties in with Kant's acknowledgment of how as humans, we naturally have connections to each other which cannot be ignored; these connections mean that our behaviour does not occur in a vacuum and we must each rely on others in order to realise his or her own personal agency (161). By its very definition, categorical imperatives cannot be employed as a universal law if they are only applicable or desired by a group of isolated individuals. In order for the moral laws to work correctly Kant specifies that individuals must work together and also respect one another's personal autonomy, this is discussed in more length by Kant in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* where he further considers the role of 'ethical communities' (1793: 93). Denis believes that these last two aspects of Kant's moral theory would be particularly appealing to feminists, in terms of their emphasis on non-objectification and the necessity of working with others to 'make the world a better place' (Wood paraphrased by Denis 2002: 162). Denis herself is adamant that Kantian moral theory is compatible with feminism, even though it is not always obviously the case, she does argue that Kant's discussion of duties (especially duties to oneself) are a rich source for feminism:

...they require women to act in ways that show respect for themselves as rational human agents by, e.g., avoiding servility, self-deception, self-mutilation, and sexual self-degradation, and cultivating their natural talents (as well as their virtue) (157).

In Kant's *GMM* he further emphasised the importance of respecting the rational capacity in oneself and others, one way in which this can be achieved is to abide by maxims/duties which prohibit any action that would degrade either material body or the immaterial mind (especially one's ability to use reason). Kant claims that such duties include avoiding suicide, self-mutilation, sexual self-degradation, gluttony and drunkenness (Denis 2002: 167 and *GMM*: 421-423). This list of responsibilities which everyone has to themselves and to each other, revolve around the idea of mutual self-respect which is also arguably *the* central to the notion of feminism. Denis claims that this 'law' of mutual self-respect forbids a person (i.e. in this instance women) from engaging in dangerous practices such as non-essential cosmetic surgery (such as breast augmentation), sexual degradation and even staying in an abusive relationship (169). The duties to oneself as a moral and animal being are paramount in preserving the integrity of our physical body and our transcendental soul, it is our own individual duty to protect and preserve ourselves from the type of degrading actions which will endanger one's soul (*GMM* 441). It is Kant's belief that how a woman treats her body and allows others

to treat it is directly connected to her own sense of self-worth and is also (at least) partially responsible for the self-worth which other people will attach to them. The virtuous Kantian agent has a duty to respect nature 'within and without' and part of achieving this level of respect involves (as we have previously discussed) avoiding certain activities which demean one's physical or 'spiritual' nature (MS 407-409). In order to live in a manner which is conducive to Kant's ethical principles, Kant claims that each of us has a duty to avoid servility; this has particular import for feminists, as it is often women who are placed as the submissive and servile counterpart to men. In acting as the subservient partner women are degrading themselves in two ways, firstly by allowing herself to be treated as a means to an end (e.g. sexual gratification) and secondly by downgrading herself as a rational agent. Kant claims that acting in either of these ways is destructive to one's moral character (paraphrased by Denis 2002: 175) and whilst Kant may have had men in mind when he first wrote of this, Denis points out that he does not rule out the possibility of applying these ideas to women (Ibid.). Carol Hay concurs that:

Despite what Kant himself might've thought, we know that women's rational capacities are no different from men's. Thus we can use Kantianism to explain why women are just as deserving of respect as men and why this respect is incompatible with sexist oppression. (Carol Hay 2013).

This feminist (and sympathetic) interpretation of Kant encourages women to respect themselves and also pushes men to respect women as part of the set of basic moral requirements which the 'virtuous Kantian agent' must abide by (157). Kant's theory of morality, requires all individuals to recognize the moral equality of all other rational human beings (165) which Denis claims fits very well within the realms of feminism; particularly as feminism helps to support and promote equality for all humans irrespective of gender. The Kantian duties of sympathy and love (see pages 184-187) help to encourage the sensitive and sympathetic treatment of others, which in turn helps in the understanding of the issues women face and be more receptive to the ways in which these problems could be solved.

5.6 Sexual Objectification

One other such way in which Kant could be interpreted as fitting with certain feminist modes of understanding, is in relation to his thought on sexual objectification and the various forms it takes (such as sex, prostitution, pornography, sexualisation of women, etc.). As we have already seen, Kant's moral philosophy centres on his 'categorical imperative' a law which promotes the idea that one should act only in accordance with a maxim which you would desire to be extended as a universal law (*GMM*: 421). Part of acting as a 'moral agent' within the bounds provided by the categorical imperative, means one ought to act in such a way as does not lead to the treatment of other people as

means to an end; instead it is necessary to think of every individual as each being their own end. Treating another person in a way which does not respect their innate rationality by using them only to meet one's own end, means that the 'object' is denied their humanity and rationality. In such a circumstance however, one is not only denying the humanity of the 'object of their desire' but also runs the risk of losing their own, especially since rationality is what separates man from the animal/natural kingdom: denying one's own (or somebody else's) humanity/rationality is to deny that you (or them) are actually human at all. In his *Lectures on Ethics* (1979) Kant discusses the way in which acting on sexual impulses outside of marriage are problematic in the sense that it tends to mean a person is used only to satisfy the subject's sexual urges, after which they lose their usefulness. Sexual inclinations reduce the person one desires into an 'object of appetite', which means a person:

...a person becomes a thing, and can be used and treated as such by everyone. ...[he/she is] used by all and sundry as an instrument for the satisfaction of sexual inclination.

(Kant 1979: 163-165).

Kant speaks of the loss of humanity as occurring as a result of degradation, subordination, sexualisation and exploitation; involving the 'object of desire' being treated as a mere 'sexual instrument' (385). This instrumentalisation allows the 'object'

to be dishonoured in such a way as to reduce her moral status (or equally his) to that of an animal: her body is treated as a tool for use of one's sexual pleasure, and to that extent becomes for the other person a "...fungible, [or] functional thing." (Soble 2002: 225-226). Furthermore, whilst these ideas about objectification could technically apply to either men or women, Kant recognised that women were most often the subject of objectification by men (*LE*: 165). Many feminist (and ecofeminist) philosophers/academics have written about the way in which women are and have been objectified in Western society; in particular writers such as Martha Nussbaum (1995 and 1995), Andrea Dworkin (1974), Catherine MacKinnon (1987) and Rae Langton (2005) have illustrated how "...sexual desire is a very powerful force...which leads to people being treated as a means to an end." (Nussbaum, 1995, p.394). MacKinnon and cohorts have argued that sexual objectification (particularly in the case of pornography) portrays women as, "dehumanised...commodities." forces women into a position of "...inferiority." (MacKinnon, 1987, p.303) in both sex and society. Those feminist philosophers mentioned above all, like Kant, tie sexual objectification of women to two main things: depersonalisation (removal of individuality) and instrumentalisation. Kant believes that sexual appetite turns humans into consumable, fungible objects (cited in Shrage 2005: 46) mainly because sexual desire is only aimed at a part of a person and does not treat them as a whole or as though they were capable of their own rational decisions. In other words, when objectification takes place and a person is

instrumentalised: they also suffer from depersonalisation which in turn leads to a person being viewed as 'lacking certain mental states' (Loughnan et al, 2010) and as such are not seen as deserving of a moral status superior to that of an animal. However, whilst it is certainly true that Kant rejects the objectification, commodification and the exploitation of the female body, it is not true that his writings on this subject are free from being problematic to other areas of academia i.e. environmentalism. As previously discussed in relation to the sublime, Kant presents a seemingly impenetrable frontier between nature and mankind. Hence when Kant states that treating somebody else as an object (in this case sexually) is a failure to treat them as their own subject; it is also meant that by reducing someone to the status of an object, one also reduces them to the realm of the purely physical: which in Kant's mind is a purely negative occurrence.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter contained three main sections, in the first section I discussed one way in which women have traditionally been discriminated against, in this instance through their experience of exclusionary practises in academic philosophy. The importance of this discussion is highlighted in the way which great philosophical thinkers, such as Kant, contributed to a certain mode of understanding which helped justify the confinement of women to the realm of the merely beautiful, whilst their male counterparts had freedom to move within the sublime. However, in the second and third sections of this chapter I

focused on exploring alternative and more sympathetic interpretations of Kantian philosophy with regards to his relationship with women. In first looking at Lara Denis' analysis of Kant's 'categorical imperative' and her interpretation of Kant's views on ethical duties, we saw that in *GMM* Kant rejects any instance of a human being treated as a means to somebody else's end: this Denis believes is enough to make Kantian moral philosophy a 'rich source' for feminist ethicists to draw upon. I went on to examine the discussion concerning Kant's ethical theory and the various ways in which Kant's work has been identified as being potentially in-keeping with feminist analysis on subjects such as depersonalisation, sexual objectification and instrumentalisation. In particular Andrea Dworkin, Lara Denis and Catharine MacKinnon's ideas surrounding these issues, especially those concerning prostitution and pornography, appear to have at their heart a noticeably similar foundation. At their basis they are anxious that women ought not to be treated as a means to an end, or in such a way that would encourage their objectification or instrumentalisation. Although, where the aforementioned feminist's research and writing stems from a desire for gender equality and the breakdown of patriarchy, Kant's belief in the non-objectification of women and in general the positive aspects of his theory which relate to women, nature or animals, appear to be an afterthought or perhaps merely an unintended consequence of his overall theoretical work on morality. In the next chapter this is something which I will analyse in more depth, by exploring whether Kant is a normative dualist, I intend to establish whether the positive elements (for

feminism and environmentalism that is) of his philosophy were consciously planned or instead merely an inadvertent outcome of a larger and unrelated project.

Chapter 6

Kant as a Normative Dualist

6.1 Introduction

As a theoretical conception, ecofeminism has the potential to bring together the four great ‘tectonic plates’ of liberation theory, these being chiefly concerned with the oppressions of: nature, gender, race and class (Plumwood 1993: 1). Central to ecofeminist philosophy is the notion that the domination of women and the domination of nature are conceptually connected. The nature of this connection, has been much debated within ecofeminist philosophy and whilst there is a rich history accompanying discourse on this topic, this will not be the central focus of this chapter. Instead this chapter will seek to explore the notion of ‘normative dualism’, which forms an important aspect of the ‘critical ecofeminist’ philosophy advanced by Val Plumwood in her seminal work *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature* (1993). Understanding the role of normative dualism within the framework of ecofeminism and the role such dualisms take in Kantian philosophy is essential to the central aim of this thesis: namely in establishing whether Kant and ecofeminism are in any way compatible. This chapter will begin with a description of the role which ‘normative dualism’ has had within philosophy and

ecofeminism and an identification of the central four characteristics a normative dualism typically portrays. I will go on to analyse two contrasting accounts of Kantian philosophy, both of which attempt to establish whether Kant is guilty of operating under the assumptions of a normatively dualist narrative. These vastly differing accounts can be found in Jeanna Moyer's 'Why Kant and Ecofeminism Don't Mix' (2001) and Holly Wilson's 'Rethinking Kant from the Perspective of Ecofeminism' (which is located in Robin May Schott's 1997 edited collection). I will begin by discussing Jeanna Moyer's paper and contrast her thesis that ecofeminism and Kant are incompatible with the earlier article written by Wilson. I will then offer a critique of Wilson's account of the existence of normative dualism/s (or lack thereof) within Kant's work, drawing from Moyer's analysis in her 2001 paper.

6.2 Normative Dualism and Ecofeminism

Plumwood compares the quagmire that is 'dualistic thinking' to a Mountain, which is responsible for 'swallowing' many an unwary traveller with its 'mazes and chasms' (3). In its simplest form a dualism, requires nothing more than a distinction between two conceptually opposed ideas; however ecofeminism recognises that a dualism can be arranged in such a way as to promote the superiority of one and the subordination of the other (Moyer 2001: 80). For ecofeminism the dualism of culture/nature or reason/nature has particular import, since the concept of reason provides the "...unifying and defining

contrast for the concept of nature, much as the concept of husband does for that of wife, as master for slave.” (Plumwood 1993: 4). Whilst this dualism is especially useful for the interpretation of ideas from an ecofeminist perspective, the culture/nature (freedom/necessity) dualism is only one in a set of “...interrelated and mutually reinforcing dualisms...” which have permeated the “...western culture forms a fault-line which runs through its entire conceptual system.” (42). Val Plumwood claims that the existence of such a ‘network of dualisms’ (1993: 3) has helped to explain many of the:

...problematic features of the west’s treatment of nature which underlie the environmental crisis, especially the western construction of human identity as ‘outside’ nature. (1993: 2).

One of the essential characteristic of normative dualism (according to Val Plumwood 1993) is a ‘complex feature’ known as backgrounding, where the treatment of the subordinate member of the dualism provides the background to the dominant’s foreground (21). Backgrounding involves an “...irresoluble conflict...” (48) resulting from the hierarchal relationship between denial and dependency; a relationship whereby the dominant party on the one hand (in this instance humankind or man) depends upon the subordinate party (whether nature or women) but on the other hand refuses to acknowledge this dependency (48-49). As was put so eloquently by Plumwood herself:

“...it is the slave who makes the master a master, the colonised who make the coloniser, the periphery which makes the centre.” (49) Those who are part of the ‘master class’ reap many benefit from their lives and experiences being in the foreground yet they also have a tendency to deny that their very success has come as a result of the existence and work of others. Ecofeminism recognises that the backgrounding of both women and nature is deeply embedded into our cultural, economic and social practises in such a way that these systems would not exist, much less work without the contributions of women and the natural environment. In the Western world the dominant reality is one of ‘phallogratic’ patriarchy (Frye 1983: 167) which in order to thrive, relies on systematically backgrounding the needs and desires of women and nature in order to meet the increasingly demanding requirements of both the public and private sectors (Plumwood 1993: 21). Essential to this endeavour is a second and related key feature of a normative dualism; that of ‘radical exclusion’ or ‘hyperseparation’ (49). Where the ‘other’ is not just treated as a differently to the beneficiary but also treated as the inferior member of the pair, so much so that differentiation between the two “...demands not merely distinctness but radical exclusion, not merely separation but hyperseparation.” from one another (Ibid.). The aim of such radical differentiation between the privileged and non-privileged group, lies in the attempt to polarise the experiences of the two in the hope that by doing so one is able to fundamentally separate the different innate ‘natures’ of the two groups (48-49). Creating a barrier between the two parties makes the process

of backgrounding even easier to accomplish because the ‘bifurcation’ of reality generates “...two worlds between which there is nothing in common...” (Durkheim 1915: 39) and allows for the ‘master class’ to dissociate themselves completely from those considered beneath them. In terms of the impact this has on the relationship between men and women, hyperseparation has helped contribute to the creation of “...exaggeratedly different male and female orders...” which conceives of the “...natures and destinies of men and women as utterly different...” (Plumwood 1993: 67). The idea of ‘radical exclusion’ or hyperseparation has widely contributed to Western philosophy in terms of helping to create and maintain certain styles of dualistic thought such as: mind/body, culture/nature, freedom/necessity, human/non-human nature etc. Examples of hyperseparation in philosophy include Plato’s work on the distinction between the soul and the body, the soul being that which is associated with the divine and thus is impervious to the ravages of time whereas the body is by its very nature “...unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable” (Plato cited by Plumwood 1993: 65). Inferiorising the materiality of the body has a long historical precedent throughout Western philosophy, Descartes developed this further by taking the culture/nature distinction and applying it to the mind/body dualism which helped create the maximum possible distance between the two realms. Ecofeminism seeks to breakdown these barriers of segregation, which have resulted in the detention of women to their ‘special’ and ‘inferiorised’ space, by emphasising the common points of

humanity shared by both men and women. Plumwood also discusses the notion of 'incorporation' or 'relational definition' as a feature of some types of dualism, meaning that the two members of the dualism depend upon each other for their identity (52-54). This dependency is not however one of equality, the master's superiority cements the notion that he is the subject (as opposed to the object) and as such his qualities are regarded as primary and in relation to them the subordinate member of the pair is somehow lacking or deficient. The consequence of this for the relationship between men and women is that the characteristics and qualities of man are used to negatively define the role of womankind, as Simone de Beauvoir remarks "...humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being..." she becomes the "...inessential to his essential." (cited by Plumwood 1993: 52). The backgrounding and instrumentalisation of nature and that of women run closely parallel, the idea of instrumentalisation, supposes that those who are the subordinate member of the dualism are forced to put aside their own beliefs and desires for the interest of the 'master', as such they are thought of as mere instruments and as means to the ends man (53) whom is already an end in and of himself. The lower side (whether women, nature, black people or Orientals) are objectified to the point that their usefulness is determined by how successful they are at helping to meet the needs of the superior party (21).

The final feature of a normative dualism as identified by Val Plumwood in her seminal work, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature* (1993) is that of homogenisation which helps to enforce the other four features: including backgrounding, hyperseparation, incorporation and instrumentalism. Homogenisation (also known as stereotyping) divides the world into ‘two orders’ (54) by homogenising the experiences by disregarding the differences among the inferiorised group (Hartsock 1990:160–1) whilst the interests of the superior group are used to provide the ‘cultural grounding’ for the male, European and human centeredness of society (Plumwood 1993: 55).

6.3 Kant as a Normative Dualist?

Jeanna Moyer, in her paper ‘Why Kant and Ecofeminism Don’t Mix’ (2001) contends that Kant as a normative dualist cannot by definition be compatible with the aims of ecofeminist thinking; which attempts to break down these traditional modes of thought. Moyer goes on to systematically illustrate how Kant’s philosophy, with regards to women and nature, executes all five of the features of dualistic thinking: hyperseparation, backgrounding incorporation, instrumentalism and homogenisation. The notion of radical exclusion (or hyperseparation as defined by Val Plumwood) is discussed by Moyer as a way in which Kant, particularly in the *Critique of Judgment*, polarises the differences between nature and mankind (*CJ*: 81-82). By maintaining the idea that humans are the only beings with a teleological purposiveness (directed purpose as opposed to mere

mechanical purposiveness) Kant denies any shared characteristics between humans and other natural beings (in this case primarily animals) and instead places humans as fundamentally different and above nature (82). Moyer also identifies instances of Kant's tendency to place the male, the acting subject, in the foreground (80) whilst leaving (in this case) both women and nature in the background. For Kant backgrounding involves the placement of man, the moral agent, in direct opposition to the unreasoned and unruly state of nature (269) which is incapable of rationality or reason and thus moral action. Resulting in the belief of man that he is free from any natural influences and whilst moral actions may be carried out in nature – this is just an inferior background to man himself and activities that are determined by reason alone (2001: 80-81). Kant uses the technique of backgrounding, to form a dualistic conception of man's relationship with nature, one which presents man as being entirely self-sufficient and in doing so Moyer contends that he 'trivialises if not obscures' man's dependency on the natural world (82) allowing for the acceptable destruction of nature (Ibid.). The failure to recognise humanity's reliance on nature contributes to its ongoing destruction (and Moyer would argue the destruction of humanity itself) in namely two ways, first by the process of backgrounding: the degeneration of the natural environment is seen to have little effect upon the lives of humans and thus secondly that because of this (and that nature is seen as the inferior member of the dualism) this continual deterioration is considered to be at best necessary and at worst palatable. Furthermore Moyer recognises that the placement of mankind

above nature, portrays Kant's use of instrumentalism (or objectification) in his key philosophies on nature, women and their relationship with the male sex (82-83). The subordinate members of dualisms are generally treated as a means to the dominant's end (Plumwood 1993: 53-54) and in the case of Kant, it is man who as the rational agent can exploit the existence of those not classed in the same moral category (Kant 1791: 435-436). Culture is the final purpose or 'ultimate end' of humankind, all of the natural environment can be deemed, by its very nature (or lack thereof) to be submissive to the demands and requirements of its 'master' and as such the master is free to use, abuse, consume and dispose of nature as he should desire (Moyer 2001: 82). A final aspect of most dualistic relationships recognised by Plumwood is that of stereotyping (or homogenisation) and Moyer claims that although not at first altogether obvious, homogenisation does occur in Kantian philosophy. She argues that whilst Kant does acknowledge difference between inanimate objects (trees, flowers) but in terms of the sub-groups of 'inert and organic beings...Kant ignores difference.'" (83). Moyer argues that Kant's philosophy provides justification for the imposition of human will over nature through the use of normative dualism, featuring aspects including: backgrounding, homogenisation, objectification and hyperseparation.

6.4 Wilson's Alternative

Holly L. Wilson offers an alternative analysis to Moyer's in her paper 'Rethinking Kant from the Perspective of Ecofeminism' (1997) in which she attempts to get around the supposed incompatibility of Kant and ecofeminism by arguing in direct opposition to Moyer's central thesis; that Kant was a normative dualist. In her paper she claims that Kant's thinking on both human and physical nature, is not just non-dualistic but also fully compatible with the principal aims of ecofeminism: primarily for the preservation of the natural environment and gender equality. In order to justify this non-traditional thesis, Wilson's concentrates her attention mainly on Kant's earlier work including, his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), the *Universal Natural History and the Theory of the Heavens* (1755), *Lectures of Ethics* (1797) and his later *Critique of Judgment* (1791) also known as the *Critique of Teleological Judgment*. Wilson looks to three central parts of Kant's philosophy in order to highlight the non-existence of normative dualism in his work, the three main areas of focus are: the differences and implications of intrinsic and extrinsic purposiveness, the relationship between man and animal and finally the association between culture and nature. Wilson finds no evidence within these areas of Kant's philosophy which would indicate that he is 'guilty' of committing to the normative dualisms of mind/body, man/woman, human/animal or culture/nature and as such can be reconciled with both the environmental and feminist causes.

Wilson contends that Kant had (at least) never to her own knowledge spoken of the human domination of nature (1997: 375) or ever connected women to nature in a less than positive sense. According to Wilson, Kant did not claim that the realms of humanity and nature were entirely distinct (381) but rather that neither was superior/inferior to the other and as a result Kant cannot be conceived of as a normative dualist (380). Kant does not present nature as being inferior, inert or passive but instead claims that it has its own purposiveness (282) which feature humans as co-members of the system of nature (Kant CJ 1791: 385). Wilson claims that the purposiveness of nature is, at least in part, an aid to the process leading to the education of humans and the cultivation of society (Wilson 1997: 382) of the kind suggested by Carolyn Merchant who claimed that nature "...is the teacher of the species" (Merchant cited by Wilson 1993: 382).

Wilson first looks to Kant's treatment on the distinction between women and men in order to examine whether contained in his views on these subjects are traces or outright portions of dualism. However, since Wilson's central thesis revolves around showing that Kant is compatible with ecofeminism, she tends only to dip in and out of Kant's major critical works and instead focuses her attention on the lesser known and earlier works found in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798). Wilson contends that much like the critical ecological feminist Val Plumwood, Kant shares the

view that the key to overcoming dualism is to recognise the powers of women, where these powers resting in a kind of femininity.

Kant does not portray women as weak, helpless, powerless or inert... Kant is a Philosopher who recognizes the power that women had and the value that they contributed. (1997: 385).

Wilson argues that Kant took very seriously the power women had in ‘traditional marriage’ and that he also valued their role in the ‘preservation’ of the species (1993: 380) but even she cannot find much more in the way of positive thinking towards women’s role in society compared to that of man’s. Wilson acknowledges that her favourable interpretation of Kant would still not be acceptable to liberal and radical feminist (or just ecofeminists now) but she does claim that Kant’s connection of women and nature – is not meant in any derogatory sense but rather is justified epistemologically on the basis of a theoretical view of nature and human being organic and purposive (380 and 384-385). Wilson finds no normative dualism within Kant’s writings on women and nature, including his connecting of women to nature and man to ‘some other realm’ and claims we cannot reproach Kant for his views on the civil rights of women which did not yet exist (385).

In proving the compatibility of Kant and ecofeminism, Wilson secondly looks to Kant's discussion on the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic purposiveness in order to help demonstrate his lack of engagement with dualistic modes of thought with regards to mankind and the natural world/animal kingdom. Wilson looks to his discussion on the idea of intrinsic and extrinsic purpose in §10 of 'Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment' found in the *Critique of Judgment* (1791) and Wilson uses this discussion to substantiate her claim that whilst Kant does establish nature as a 'totality of objects' in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is in the *Critique of Judgment* where he provides a more refined, well rounded and inclusiveness view of nature; and importantly one in which does not suppose the superiority of human nature over natural nature. Generally speaking, intrinsic purposiveness is used by Kant to refer to an entity of organic nature, one which is also "...an organised product of nature ... [where] everything is a purpose and reciprocally also a means." (Kant 1791: 376). In the *Critique of Judgment* Kant uses the idea of intrinsic purposiveness to highlight the way in which those exhibiting this type of purpose, have an ability to perform simultaneously as both means and ends for itself and its species (*CJ*: 370). Kant uses the example of tree in order to show how, an item of intrinsic purpose is able to produce itself and generate others of its kind (370-372) and that as an organised system there is a mutual dependence between the preservation of one part of the system and the preservation of others (Wilson 1993: 386). Kant claims that there is an 'integrity' within the species because the species "...reproduces itself

maintains itself and regenerates itself” (Ibid.) and as such organic nature is capable of reproduction, self-maintenance and self-regeneration allowing for it to be completely self-sufficient. The idea of intrinsic purpose does not however incorporate all of the elements present in the ‘real world’ so Kant introduces the contrasting notion of ‘extrinsic purposiveness’ which helps to highlight the way in which some organisms are able to use another organism for their own purposes (*CJ* 425) or as a means to an end. Extrinsic purposiveness allows us to judge things, such as air, water, earth as being purposive for organic things and on the other hand it also helps show how it would be impossible for organic things to be purposive inorganic things; especially because inorganic things do not display the properties required by intrinsic purposiveness (in terms of self-production etc.). Kant maintains that items of nature, whether of intrinsic or non-intrinsic purpose, may be used by those exhibiting extrinsic purposiveness in order to further advance their own ‘final purpose’, which in the case of humanity is moral action. Wilson posits however, that the notion of extrinsic purposiveness does not mean that simply because humans are the only species who can form a ‘concept of purposes’ (1997: 386-387) that mankind has any more substantial claim on organic and inorganic nature than anybody or anything else. (387). Wilson presents Kant’s philosophy on this topic as being both non-dualistic and congruent with the environmental aims of ecofeminism and argues that because human beings are just ‘living organisms’ they are in no way superior to any other organic creature (Ibid.). Even though the ends of nature

differ from the ends of man, where nature's is simply towards the preservation of the ecosystem and individual species (Wilson 1997: 381). Wilson fervently argues that according to Kant, humans are still a type of animal and as a result, certainly within the areas of the purposiveness of human/nature, no charge of normative dualism can be laid against Kant, at least in this part of Wilson's analysis; whether or not her claims are substantiated will be addressed later in this chapter.

In the third section of this paper Wilson continues to explore Kant's writings on the relationship between mankind and the animal kingdom. Wilson considers Kant's view of human beings as being one of dependency, dependency on natural ecosystems for survival: making mankind no different to other animal lifeforms whose existence is as equally contingent on the natural world (1997: 389). Kant appears to reject the dualism of man/animal since humankind are "so dependent on other creatures of earth...even though [their] understanding was able to rescue them..." (Ibid.) from the devastations of some natural disasters, whereby other creatures who lack the attribute of reason are otherwise subject to. Although in many cases humans must suffer natural disasters like any other being (*CJ*: 321) because contrary to other views of the time criticised the idea of human control over nature (Wilson 1997: 390). Whilst writing about the Lisbon Earthquake of 1756 Kant commented that humans could not control or organise the natural world any better than it is currently designed and any thought to the contrary is

simple self-flattery (1: 454). In the *Anthropology* Kant also criticises Descartes for trying to separate the mind from the physical body, in his dualistic conception of the mind/body problem (Wilson 1997: 387) and his equation of animals with mere machines (CJ: 464).

Wilson believes that Kant is in agreement with the ecofeminism with respect to the belief that the mind/body dualism found in Descartes' *Meditations* does not further help our ability to act teleologically or understand the relationship between all things (Wilson 1997: 389). Kant's conception of mind/body does not equate animal kind with the purely physical (and mechanical) realm but instead claims that whilst there is a distinction between humans and animals (which result from the human propensity towards moral action) this distinction is not one which puts man into a position of superiority. The following section is taken from the *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755) and documents Kant's earlier position:

The human being, so infinitely removed from the highest stage of beings is so bold as to allow himself, in a similar delusion, to be flattered by the necessity of his existence ... From the most sublime class among thinking beings to the most despised insect, not one link is indifferent to it; and not one can be absent without the beauty of the whole, which exists in their interrelationship, being interrupted by it (1: 354).

It was only later in the *Critique of Judgment* that Kant claimed humans had a special role in relation to nature (Wilson 1997: 391) which according to Wilson, resulted in Kant

explicating mankind's responsibilities and duties towards animals in order to help in the development of tender feeling towards nature and the animal kingdom (Ibid.). Humans as animals in a 'system of nature' (Ibid.) and are found to be superior to those of non-human lineage, only if their ability to rationalise manifests itself into moral thought and action. As such, Wilson continues to find no evidence of normative dualism in Kant's thoughts on the relationship between mankind and the animal kingdom.

In the final section of Holly L. Wilson's paper she argues that Kant's theory on human nature and physical nature is non-dualistic in its entirety, more specifically she contends that Kant has been fundamentally misunderstood in terms of his views on human culture and nature. The dichotomy presented in the dualism of culture and nature, has been central to the ecofeminist critique of the hyper masculinised, Euro-centric thoughts of the Western philosopher (Plumwood 1993: 39). This dualism is intimately connected to others forming the bedrock of Western philosophy, including; man/woman, western man/non-western man, rich/poor and human/animal all of which contribute to an overall understanding that what is nature or perceived to be closer to nature (such as women, people in the Global South, animals and of course the environment itself) of a lower class and necessarily inferior. Some feminists such as Bonnie Mann have identified Kant as helping to promote the dualistic and Euro-masculinist ideology of the modern/Kantian era (2008: 143). Wilson has argued that contrary to Mann's portrayal of Kant as a

transgressor of traditional anti-feminist and anti-environmentalist views, he has in fact been substantially misunderstood (1997: 394). Wilson contends that Kant can be compatible with ecofeminism because he does not engage with the modes of dualistic thinking that would ordinarily block one from engaging with the chief aims of ecofeminism, i.e. breaking down dualisms and the domination of women and the environment. We have already seen that Wilson finds no dualist thinking in Kant's conception of external/intrinsic purposiveness, in his thoughts on the relationship between man and woman or the differences and similarities between mankind and animals. In the last paragraph of Wilson's article (which can be found in Robin May Schott's: *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*, 1997) she very briefly introduces an idea about Kant's distinction between culture and nature, which unfortunately never gets fully developed. Wilson contends that "...human Culture cannot be opposed to nature because culture arises out of natural predispositions." (394) rather than it is *freedom* and not culture, which is opposed to nature in Kant's work. Even so, Wilson argues freedom in this instance does not equate to culture since "...anything one can find in culture can be traced back to a preceding state of affairs." (Ibid.) she claims that culture is simply a result of the interaction of nature and freedom. The resulting dichotomy in Kantian philosophy, of freedom and nature, does not allow for any 'unproblematic' conceptual superiority of mankind over nature, but according to Wilson does promote the idea of human responsibility towards the natural realm. Whilst Wilson

acknowledges the distinction Kant conveys between freedom and nature involving the notion of human autonomy, she does not believe that this entails any type of normative dualism or involves the avocation of human dominion of the natural world. Ultimately Wilson concludes that Kant's thoughts on women, men, animals and nature are in no way part of the 'dualist machine' and as a result can be perfectly compatible with ecofeminism.

6.5 Moyer's Analysis

As discussed earlier in this chapter, Jeanna Moyer tackles the complexities of understanding the 'relationship' between Kant and ecofeminism in 'Why Kant and Ecofeminism Don't Mix' (2001). The first part of her paper documents the five key features of normative dualism, as identified by Val Plumwood in *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature* (1993). In the second part of Moyer's paper she focuses on deconstructing Holly Wilson's analysis of Kant, by presenting a view which lies in direct opposition with Wilson's central thesis that Kant was not (as has otherwise been discussed in feminist literature) a normative dualist. Moyer maintains that Wilson is incorrect in her interpretation of Kantian philosophy and in reality Kant is not just a normative dualist but it is also the case that his entire philosophical project is at its core antithetical to both the feminist and environmental enterprise. Moyer's critique of Wilson's 1997 paper focuses on Kant's discussion about the relationships between

man/woman and mankind/nature. Moyer argues that one does not have to look too hard through Kant's writings to find examples which clearly indicate that normative dualism lies at the heart of his entire body of work. Whilst Wilson maintained that Kant's juxtaposition of man/nature was not one based on superiority, Moyer argues that Kant offers a classic account of the man/nature dualism throughout his work which presents humans not just as fundamentally different from nature (2001: 87) but also that they are necessarily defined "...in opposition to both nature and animals." (Ibid.). Moyer argues that Wilson commits a fatal mistake in trying to appeal to Kant's moral philosophy in order to justify her thesis because actually the very possibility of moral action "...depends on a dualistic account of the subject." (Ibid.) and this seems to be a fact Wilson completely ignores in order to argue her case. For man to complete moral actions, it is first necessary for him to emancipate himself from the realm of sensibility and from the "despotism of desire" (94). Of course as Wilson pointed out, the idea of moral action occurring within nature is entirely possible but man must rise above the natural world in order for him to be completely independent and allow reason alone to dominate (Ibid.). For Kant, Moyer suggests that culture is the final 'end' for humankind and that nature is just one of the resources for man to use in order to meet this end (CJ: 332 and Moyer 2001: 92). Only rational beings belong to the kingdom of ends and since nature is a realm of pure sensibility and thus contains no ability to rationalise: it is both 'inessential' (it is backgrounded) and at the disposal of man (instrumentalised). Furthermore Moyer

posits, that Kant clearly states that as part of the natural world, animals are also a 'means' for man to use in order to meet his own ends (94). Whilst Wilson attempted to prove that any distinction between man and animals did not involve any hierarchical structure between the two; it appears that she had either purposively or accidentally misled, misinterpreted, ignored and/or failed to mention that her quotation from Kant about 'animals not being considered as mere machines' was actually only a brief footnote (90). Although Kant does indeed reject Descartes mechanistic view of animals, he also says that humans and animals act on different 'presentations' and that whilst human behaviour could be thought of as 'analogous' with animal behaviour, the human aptitude for reason sets mankind apart and above the animal kingdom (89-90). This, Moyer argues is another classic example of dualism in action: in this case manifesting itself through a practise known as 'radical exclusion' (otherwise known as hyperseparation) which as has been previously been discussed produces two 'realms' which have nothing in common. The aim of such radical differentiation between the privileged and non-privileged group, lies in the attempt to polarise the experiences of the two in the hope that by doing so one is able to fundamentally separate the different innate 'natures' of the two groups. In this case Kant differentiates between the human (or rather male) association with reason, culture, freedom and rationality and on the other hand the animal/natural realms tendency towards sensibility, necessity and lack of ability for moral thought or action.

Moyer's secondary line of attack focuses on Kant's maintenance of the normative dualism between men and women; she adamantly rejects Wilson's contention that Kant connects women to nature in any kind of positive sense. Instead arguing that Kant clearly distinguishes the role of men and women in a dualist manner by differentiating between the two very different roles and different final purposes of the male and female sex (92-94). In Kantian philosophy women and men are designed with very, very different final purposes in mind, whilst on the one hand women are designed to reproduce and continue to perpetuate the human species and men are designed with an idea of moral action instilled into their 'souls'. Kant depicts women as emotional, weak, beautiful creatures: incapable of real rational thought and physically dependent upon men (95). Wilson categorically denies Kant's portrayal of women as weak, passive or inert (1997: 385) and that in connecting women to nature he does do in a purely positive sense. In Wilson's interpretation of Kant's discussion on women, she sees his account of gender differences as being "linked to biological differences and arises out of those biological differences." (384-385). The conceptual connection with which women share with nature in Kant is interpreted by Wilson as non-dualist but by presenting it in such a way as to make clear the apparent inferiority of women to men (a classic characteristic of normative dualism) it is difficult for Moyer to understand how this could be positively construed. As was discussed in the previous chapter, ecofeminism itself struggled with the notion of

essentialism for many years, eventually coming to terms with the idea that conceptually connecting women to the environment has been the result of more harm than good (Gaard 2011: 203)). Whilst Wilson argues that Kant's account is not meant to establish an "...efficient causal connection between biology and social destiny." (1997: 384). It is difficult to conceive of this in a positive manner, even if his account refers to the natural tendencies of women and not the natural social traits (Ibid.). Moyer goes on to argue that, to put simply, "...if women = nature, and humans are better than nature, then 'humans' are better than women." (94). It is troubling for Moyer that Kant so clearly engages with a dualist conception of men/women and that in his work women remain inferior to and essentially different from their male counterparts. Moyer argues that Kant maintains dualisms between human/nature, humans/animals, culture/nature and men/women, because ecofeminism seeks to reject dualist thought in its totality: it is thus utterly impossible for her to find a way in which ecofeminism could feasibly coexist peacefully alongside Kantian philosophy.

6.6 Reaction

Wilson's interpretation of Kant as a non-normative dualist centrally argues that Kant does not advocate dualism between mankind and nature or women and men. However as we have seen there are some serious issues with the way in which Wilson has analysed Kant's work, particularly problematic is the apparent 'biased selection' of quotations and

supporting materials which she has chosen in order to justify her thesis. Which was the result of 'picking and choosing' only those parts of Kant's writings which support her point and ignoring the many, many examples which clearly indicate Kant's less than ecofeminist views about women and nature. This is not to say that Wilson's paper is entirely without merit because there are certainly interesting ideas contained within the article and her attempt at reconciling Kant and ecofeminism is indeed commendable. Of particular interest is Wilson's discussion of Kant's theory of human nature and physical nature, especially her contention that Kant does not oppose culture with nature but that instead it is *freedom* which clashes with the nature (in his own philosophical world) and since a freedom/nature dichotomy does not involve any superiority on the part of mankind: in this regard Kant is not a normative dualist. However as has been discussed in this chapter and previous ones, Kant repeatedly states that mankind is the ultimate end of nature (*CJ*: 435-436) and as such is in an important way 'above' the natural world and able to use it to suit his own needs. How this is reconcilable with Wilson's contention that Kant is innocent of maintaining normative dualisms is unclear: particularly because she wholly denies that this is the case. Instead Wilson maintains that (according to Kant) nature is not designed to produce human happiness (1997: 392) but rather that it exists in order to teach humankind the true capacity of their ability to reason: which has more than instrumental value (393). Whilst it certainly may be the case that the happiness of mankind is not dependent upon nature, it would be incorrect to infer from this that nature

then has a right to make moral claims upon human beings or that Kant's account of nature requires the preservation of the environment. In reality Kant's conception of human happiness is reliant on man's ability to reason and as we have already seen in the instance of the sublime experience, this is where mankind's ultimate purpose (and ultimate happiness) lies. Whilst the Kantian sublime (and man's ability to reason) does not *necessarily* allow for the complete annihilation of the natural environment, by the same token it also does not grant nature/animals any special rights with regards to being able to make moral claims upon humankind: which is what Wilson would have us believe. It appears that Wilson's argument, especially her claim that nature has some important part to play in the final purpose of man and thus should be treated kindly, is in direct contradiction with Kant's own discussion of the subject. In the *Critique of Judgment* Kant explicitly states that man is indeed the "...lord of nature." and that in searching for the final purpose of man, we "...must not seek from within nature at all." (*CJ*: 433) but instead look to man himself, to which all of nature is teleologically subordinated (*CJ*: 436). Kant's unmistakable disavowal of nature's intrinsic worth is somehow missed by Wilson, who chooses to gloss over this section of the *Critique* in favour of using more sympathetic quotations from Kant's *Anthology from a Pragmatic Point of View*.

Furthermore Wilson attempts to convince her reader that because Kant happens not to advocate cruelty towards animals, he also does not maintain the normative dualisms between man/nature and man/animal (1997: 389). She argues that the parallel which Kant draws between human and animal nature mean that human kind has a duty of respect towards the animals kingdom. However what Wilson fails to sufficiently address in her paper, is that these duties are only important or even necessary because by committing them we “indirectly do our duty towards humanity.” (Kant’s *Lectures on Ethics*, 1979: 82). Here Wilson seems to mistake (in much the same way as she does with women and nature) the lack of animosity towards animals found in Kant’s work, for his belief that creatures of the animal kingdom are intrinsically valuable. When in reality their worth is only determined by their utility which is determined by man, furthermore Kant believes that because animals have no capacity for rational thought and they “...are not self-conscious.” that they are able to be used as “...merely means to an end.” (2010: 82). Kant does not believe that one ought to pay attention to the animal’s own needs (83) and he has no qualms with the cruelty of vivisection because animals “...must be thought of as man’s instruments.” (82). It appears here that Wilson continues to choose only those quotations which help to support her thesis whilst simultaneously ignoring those parts of Kant’s work which would quickly show her ideas to be somewhat lacking. So it is certainly true that Kant does not encourage the ill-treatment of animals, in fact he

looks very favourably upon looking after one's own pet, but only because it teaches men how to be sensitive to the needs of other beings i.e. other men.

6.7 Conclusion

As has been discussed in the previous chapter, certain feminist interpretations of Kant's moral philosophy have found much that is positive in his work, particularly his thoughts on sexual objectification and rationality; which those such as Lara Denis and Andrea Dworkin have argued make his work compatible with certain feminist aims. And whilst it may be the case that certain elements of Kant's moral theory are compatible with certain other elements of feminist theory, it had not been established that this then meant Kant could be congruent with ecofeminism itself. This chapter has gone some way in determining the nature of normative dualism and whether it is possible for Kantian philosophy and ecofeminism to be compatible, on the basis that Kant does not engage in the type of normative thinking which ecofeminism unequivocally rejects. I first identified the main features of a normative dualism (as presented by Val Plumwood) and then proceeded to discuss both Jeanna Moyer's and Holly Wilson's differing accounts on the subject. Wilson's primary contention that Kant was not a normative dualist, runs into complications when confronted with stark evidence from the contrary as discussed by Moyer. As we have seen, Kant makes it clear on numerous occasions that he does in fact use the traditional dualisms of man/nature, human/animal and woman/man, in order to

erect a wall between the realms of freedom/necessity and further his philosophy in both morality and aesthetics. The discussion found in this chapter appears *prima facie* to contradict the idea that it is possible to reconcile Kant with ecofeminism, on the basis that Kant was a normative dualist and that his work rests on the dualisms of mind/body, man/woman and freedom/nature which is at odds with the anti-dualism sentiment found within ecofeminist literature. However, it is important to note that this finding does not preclude the possibility of reconciliation but instead highlights the impossibility of finding an 'easy' method of potentially reconciling Kant and ecofeminism; whilst also allowing us to recognise the limitations that any such reconciliation would necessarily entail.

Chapter 7

Aesthetic Appreciation and Moral Responsibility

7.1 Introduction

In previous chapters I have discussed Kant's relationship with women, nature and animals, in an attempt to understand how an ecofeminist viewpoint may potentially be compatible with Kantian philosophy. In Chapter's 4 and 5 I focused mainly on understanding Kant's relationship with women, particularly in analysing his moral philosophy and how this could fit within certain strands of feminism and the feminist branch of ecofeminism.

Throughout these chapters (and the previous one in which I investigated whether Kant could be said to maintain normative dualisms) it has arguably been established that some of Kant's ideas are not completely antithetical to the aims of both feminism and environmentalism. However Kant's positive attitude towards women and to a much larger extent) nature has so far not been effectively established, other than in those places where it seems to appear almost accidentally (as discussed in Chapter 6). It is important

to point out that Kant's compatibility with ecofeminism is dependent upon two things: first his compatibility with particular feminist ideas and secondly his compatibility with certain other environmental ones. Compatibility with only one of the two would rule out Kant's compatibility with the entirety of ecofeminism and whilst I can arguably state Kant is not completely incongruent with certain feminist aims (previously discussed) the same can certainly not be said about his thoughts on the environment. In this chapter then, I will return to explore Kant's work on both aesthetics and the sublime with the intention of discovering whether such a thing (compatibility with ecofeminism) is indeed possible, with particular emphasis on his thoughts about nature, which (unlike his discussion relating to women) has thus far been almost entirely negative.

I will first draw upon Cecilia Lippai's critique of the Kantian sublime and her discussion of an alternative conception, which provides (in her eyes) a more compelling and positive account of mankind's relationship with the environment. The second part of this chapter will focus on Marc Lucht's more favourable interpretation of the Kantian sublime which may help in determining whether compatibility with ecofeminism is indeed a possibility.

7.2 The Sublime as a Boundary Experience

In attempting to snatch Kant from the claws of the feminist or environmentalist critic, we must once again return to our exploration on the subject of the sublime. As discussed, generally the word 'sublime' is used to describe the scenario when, some outside force or object compromises one's ability to comprehend the said object: leading to a moment of sublimity whereby words completely and utterly fail to accommodate the idea of infinity contained within the experience. The Kantian sublime, which is nearly always discussed with reference to the natural world, could potentially hold the key to a reconciliation between environmentalism and Kant (if not feminism). The sublime offers an experience at the very boundary of human cognition by presenting mankind with an opportunity to confront the power and magnitude of the natural environment and to, as it were, peak behind the veil of Isis (Battersby 2007: 87-89). In her 2009 paper, 'The Sublime as a Boundary Experience', Cecilia Lippai explores the transformative properties of the sublime which she argues has not lost its 'extraordinary and rare' character in this postmodern age (62). The aesthetic sublime is an experience of and at the limits of the boundaries of our cognitive capacities and practical possibilities (what is and is not within our control). Whilst traditional notions have linked the sublime to a presentation of the metaphysical (looking beyond the limits of experience) Lippai suggests focusing on the sublime as a type of 'boundary experience' can free the idea of the sublime from

this 'metaphysical pathos' (61) and instead allows for the possibility of a reinterpretation and re-examination of our relationship with the natural world.

Lippai looks to the work of both Kant and Lyotard (1994) and their discussion on the sublime in order to explore the potentialities of the experience, but for the purposes of this thesis I will focus here on Lippai's analysis of the Kantian sublime. Lippai first describes Kant's presentation of the sublime, found in the *Critique of Judgment* and goes on to offer a critical analysis of the way in which Kant presents a 'fractured subject' or a battlefield between the faculties of imagination and that of reason (66). She claims that instead of the Kantian sublime offering a way to bridge the gap between the realms of nature/freedom by providing a unifying experience, instead we get a 'questionable' and conflicting hierarchy (68). The counter-purposiveness of the sublime seems to disallow any harmony between nature and the faculty of judgment. Whilst certain natural phenomena may appear to display a type of purposiveness (conscious intention), Kant maintains that it would be wrong to assume from such observations that these natural objects have teleological basis (*CJ*: 410-411) but rather that such 'technic' found in nature is a result of mere autonomous mechanism (411). The Kantian sublime in the first instance produces a negative feeling caused by being overwhelmed by the power and/or magnitude of the particular natural phenomena in question and then secondly a positive emotion produced by the greatest faculty of the mind (reason) overcoming the mind's

capacity of imagination in order to be able to comprehend the entire experience of the sublime. According to Kant, the ability of the mankind to overcome the sensible realm and ascend to a higher, transcendental plane of existence, allows for their superiority and dominion over the natural world. Lippai however denies that the differences between mankind and nature can be converted into a hierarchy, Kant believes that reason makes humans superior to nature 'within us and nature itself', she questions how it is possible for something 'infinite' (such as the human capacity to reason) can be superior to the process of imagination (67) and the sensible realm. Lippai contends that whilst Kant's version of the sublime invokes a deep respect for man's own vocation (*CJ*: 257) there is no basis for such a hierarchy, except in some notion of an idealised version of humanity (2009: 71). Rather, nature and freedom (reason, rationality) which, by Kant's own admission belong to two entirely different realms, are found on two different scales (69) where between the two lies an ungovernable and unpassable barrier.

Lippai does not accept the hierarchical stance which lies at the heart of the Kantian sublime but does admit that the sublime experience, being at the limit of our cognitive capacities and practical capabilities, does illuminate differences which help to reveal that our existence and the existence of nature does not always fully coincide (81). Lippai argues that the internal conflict between reason and imagination can actually be translated back into an external conflict with nature (64) and one which instead of being

hierarchical, allows for a union between the two. The boundary at which the two realms meet does mark a difference but it is also able to unite, because it "...makes them touch at precisely this limit and reveal them to be two aspects of the same occurrence." (81). Some thinkers including Kant have been more concerned with what is outside the boundary of the sublime experience whereas Lippai has emphasised the importance of changing the notion of the sublime to accommodate the 'boundary-ness' of the experience (71). The Kantian sublime, which locates itself inside the mind of man, is not completely incompatible with Lippai's alternative of the sublime (81), which perceives the sublime not found wholly in nature – nor in our mind but instead is formed of elements from both worlds. In spite of this however, we do still have every right to call nature part of the sublime (81) as the sublime is the "...pure affirmation of the presence of nature" (86) which through the experience of the sublime is undeniable:

We encounter an insistent overwhelming presence in its ungraspable complexity and diversity. The presence is so extraordinary, abundant or even violent that it is impossible to be disregarded, although it cannot be grasped intellectually ... nature present in the sublime slips away and overflows all rational expectations (86).

The overwhelming presence of both the power and magnitude of nature in the sublime experience, can risk alienating the subject, and cause the breakdown of the sublime into a 'dualistic' account of human vs. nature. This risk comes about with our realisation that

the natural world does not need humanity and could exist completely independently (and indeed successfully) of mankind (89). In contrast 'our' consciousness and even our existence is entirely dependent on the reality of the natural environment and the continued sustenance it provides us with; there is no co-dependency only an asymmetrical, one-sided reliance of humans on nature for their very survival. This does not mean however that the conception of the sublime as a 'boundary experience' cannot be conceived of positively, especially since the experience helps to reveal both the fundamental differences and the 'essential inseparability' (90) of the realms of man and nature. Both mankind and the natural world are mutually 'fused' at the boundary of man's experience of the sublime, creating a remarkable feeling of being co-present with nature and allowing for us to participate and relate to nature in a unique way providing mankind with opportunity to respectfully peak behind the veil of Isis.

7.3 Aesthetic Disinterestedness

As we have clearly seen through much of this thesis, Kant is traditionally thought to be hostile to environmental concerns, as was seen in Chapter 5, this idea is supported by his maintenance of certain normative dualisms such as man/woman, human/nature, mankind/animal and culture/nature (or freedom/nature as has been discussed by Holly Wilson 1997: 394). Much of the critique facing Kant's philosophy, is a direct result of the relationship which his philosophy develops alongside the aforementioned dualisms:

particularly because Kant not only maintains these dualisms but uses them as a foundation for his entire philosophical project. Kant uses basic normative dualisms in order to justify his erection of a wall between the realms of man and nature, this has made it difficult thus far to establish a positive account of his relationship with the environment. It is true that (so far at least) Kant's work in the field of ethics and morality has not been particularly favourable to environmentalism, but it is perhaps the case that his work on aesthetics could provide a much more compelling characterisation of the relation between human subjectivity and the natural world. As has been seen, Lippai finds Kant's aesthetics unable to offer a vision of the sublime which does not have at its basis a hierarchical and demeaning account of man's relationship with nature, but other interpretations have found this to be less so. One such analysis has been provided by Marc Lucht (2007) whose account of Kantian aesthetics and the sublime finds that an alternative and more positive understanding of his relationship with the natural world is possible; particularly if we look to his writings on aesthetic consciousness and disinterestedness, rather than solely focusing on the more obvious and controversial elements of his writings on both aesthetics and morality.

In his discussion of the sublime, Kant heavily distinguishes between the realms of man/reason and nature which led to his pronouncement that man is not only superior to nature (due to his propensity for moral action) but also that man has the right to use

nature in such a way as to meet 'his' own ends (CJ: 442). For Kant, morality stems from reason (Moyer 2001: 87) and since nature has no capacity to reason and only presents a mechanical purposiveness – it can make no moral claims upon mankind. Arguably Kant goes further than Descartes (1641) by instrumentalising nature to such a degree as to create an *ethicotheological* principle, by which it is meant that without the existence of humanity, nature would exist for no conceivable purpose. The natural world would instead be a 'mere wasteland' (442-443) without the existence of mankind to give its being meaning and purpose: which lies in its ability to provide humans with the resources necessary to meet their needs. Kant's discussion of man's relationship with the environment in his writings on morality (particularly in his *Metaphysics of Morals* §17) can hardly be said to portray concerns for the preservation of the environment (for its own sake) although it could perhaps also be said that Kant does not advocate the complete destruction of the environment either. For instance Kant does state that cruelty towards animals is immoral (LE 1979: 82) but not on the basis that animal cruelty is inherently a terrible thing (after all animals are a part of nature and so no more deserving of moral concern than trees or fields) but rather because hurting animals can lead to the degradation of man's moral sensibilities and his ability to sympathise with the concerns of his fellow man (Ibid). In spite of these views found in his works on ethics and morality, Marc Lucht proposes that they do not fairly represent the entire body of Kant's

work; which he argues can be interpreted far more sensitively if one looks to his work on aesthetics (referring mainly to the *Critique of Judgment*).

7.4 Reality check

Marc Lucht believes that Kant's views on man's relationship with nature can be interpreted more sympathetically in order to help reveal the compatibility of certain types of environmentalism with Kantian philosophy. Lucht does not in any way attempt to claim that Kant was the strongest advocate of caring for nature or animals for their own sake – it is clear to anyone familiar with Kant's work that this is certainly not the case. However Lucht does present a compelling alternative in his analysis, in terms of finding a foundation within Kant's work which would motivate the protection and preservation of the natural environment for present and future generations. Before moving on to explore Lucht's interpretation of Kant's aesthetic position, I will first discuss briefly the importance of comprehending the limits and deficiencies of current opinion on environmentalism and the way in which Lucht's more nuanced interpretation of Kant could perhaps help to fill gaps left.

A great deal of the academic work done since the 1960s on the subject of man's relationship with the environment has focused on determining if nature/animals are 'deserving' of moral concern and how/why they may have inherent worth. Non-

instrumental and non-objectifying views of nature have been promoted by many in academia (many of whom have been mentioned throughout this thesis) who can be identified as environmentalists. Certain forms of environmentalists, such as deep ecologists or ecofeminists, are committed to promoting non-anthropocentric worldviews (Plumwood 1993). Deep ecologists reject instrumental, dualist or anthropocentric models of behaviour and instead argue that mankind is simply another part of the wider natural ecosystem – no more or less important than other entity existing in the world (Sessions 1995: 3). Deep ecology, ecofeminism and other forms of environmentalism consider animals and nature to be intrinsically valuable and as such humans have moral obligation to protect and preserve the environment (and those creatures within it) rather than exploit and dominate. Lucht finds the idea of nature having intrinsic worth (and thus humans having a moral obligation towards it) as deeply problematic, not because the idea is too outrageous but rather that the ‘real world’ does not correspond with the theoretical one presented by deep ecologists such as Hans Jonas or Erazim Kohak (cited by Lucht 2002: 130). Lucht claims that the dominating world view of ‘instrumental rationality’ has become so prevalent as a way of understanding man’s relationship with the natural world that the non-anthropogenic and biocentrism of deep ecology seem not only ‘hopelessly romantic’ but also irrelevant in a world where nature is becoming ‘increasingly foreign’ to us on a daily basis (Ibid.). The collective forgetfulness of our moment-by-moment dependence on the Earth; for the air we breathe, the water we drink and the food which

we eat - has been deeply engrained into the way we think. This is evident in the practises of our daily living, where we find ourselves hopping in and out of 'sealed' vehicles, into underground parking lots, into sealed buildings, until we return home again to stare at televisions and computer screens (Mann 2008: 61). Instead of living in a world where, "...weather, landscape, or planetary motion are centrally important." (Ibid.) we instead live in a language driven two-dimensional universe, defined by words, flat surfaces and images. Thinking of nature as being intrinsically valuable and worthy of the same respect we ought to show other human beings, does not sit naturally easily within the technologically driven universe we all live. Martin Heidegger proposes that as a result of these deeply entrenched attitudes, it is almost impossible for many people to even consider nature as anything other than an 'object of assault' (1988: 100) and resource for man's survival and pleasure. Lucht posits that Kant could offer a way of bridging the gap between nature and mankind, which encourages people to see nature as more than a "gigantic gasoline station" (Heidegger 1966: 50) whilst at the same time working to prevent alienation. It is believed that by presenting man's relationship with nature in a way which helps people to see the environment more than being merely instrumental, it will eventually result in ideas pertaining to nature's intrinsic worth will become more palatable to mankind at large.

7.5 Kant's Thoughts

Part of Kant's aesthetic doctrine (which can be mainly found in the *Critique of Judgment*) demonstrates how our appreciation of the beauty of nature has significant moral import. Kant believes that when man is wondering at the beauty, power or might of nature something rather special happens: instead of a person being solely preoccupied with concern for self, his attitude changes to become more open to 'pure aesthetic considerations' (*CJ*: 270) and allowing for the suspension of self-interestedness. When one is considering a magnificent panorama, be it a beautiful sunset or a mountain, he/she is not thinking about the way in which such a landscape may possibly benefit oneself but is simply taking in and enjoying the view. Aesthetic contemplation is completely indifferent to the subject's needs or desires, which temporarily suspends one's 'selfish interests' in favour of quiet reflection (Lucht 2002: 132). Kant thought that 'disinterestedness of taste' and aesthetic consciousness, both of which take no notice of the potential uses of the object in question, could help encourage morality by making man unselfishly contemplate the world (*Ibid.*) instead of only seeing it as a potential means to his own end. Aesthetic consciousness encourages a non-instrumental or even anti-instrumental perspective Heidegger recognised that Kant's notion of disinterestedness does help to foster a good attitude to the environment (1966: 101). Whereas current metaphysical and technological understandings encourage the

instrumentalisation and objectification of nature, which has resulted in the continued exploitation and degradation of the natural environment.

When we aesthetically consider a beautiful view, it is possible to begin to view things for their own 'intrinsic significance' and not just their ability to satisfy our human goals (Lucht 2002: 135). Whilst an 'an agenda of mastery' guides the technological/scientific and metaphysical modes of thinking, aesthetic disinterestedness (meaning that the person is guided from an objective standpoint) promotes a less dualistic attitude towards the environment. Kantian aesthetics therefore suggests there is a fundamental ambiguity characterizing the human relationship with the world, as we have already seen in Kant's analysis of the beautiful and the sublime between human rationality and natural necessity. However Lucht argues that "...we are elevated above nature insofar as what is most important within us not subject to natural causality." (144) and in Kantian aesthetics it is precisely because of our "uniqueness that we are able to regard the world around us with moral concern." (145). It is because we, as humans are different from anything else (as conceived of by Kant) that we have the ability to look at the world as something more than a mere resource and can instead view the world with the kind of sympathy which allows for the recognition that humanity is much closer to nature than previously thought. Lucht also believes that the sensitivity which an aesthetic

consciousness can develop in the subject, also helps to serve as a check on the 'pretension' that we are radically separate to the natural environment (145).

7.6 Conclusion

Lucht's central claim about Kant and his discussion of mankind and the natural world are very modest, for example he does not believe that Kant would agree with his interpretation or believe that non-rational animals have intrinsic worth. However this does not necessarily mean that we cannot use Kant's aesthetic philosophy as a jumping off point for coming to terms with the idea that nature is perhaps due more care and attention than it is currently allowed in anthropocentric models of thought. Lucht believes that by developing a collective aesthetic consciousness, humanity has the potential to come to terms with the 'fact' that simply because humankind happens to be unique (in its ability to consciously rationalise) does not mean that we are also warranted to live in such a way as to disregard the natural world or to ignore the responsibilities (as the only consciously rational being) towards the world around us.

Chapter 8

Concluding Thoughts

8.1 Overview

This thesis sought to determine whether Kant's work could be reconciled with the feminist and environmental aims at the heart of the ecofeminist project. In order to establish whether this was the case I first looked to introduce the notion of the 'sublime experience' by documenting its history from inception to present day. As a concept, the sublime has changed considerably from the days of Longinus where it was traditionally used in reference to the ability of political rhetoric and powerful oratory to alter the perception or beliefs of the people. I went on to analyse Kant's interpretation of the sublime (found in *CJ* and *OFBS*) and the implications which this has had on his views pertaining to women and the natural environment. In Chapter 3 and 4, I began to evaluate how Kant has traditionally been interpreted through a feminist and environmentalist perspective. I discussed the thoughts of those such as Bonnie Mann and Christine Battersby, both of whom found little to support the idea that Kant could be understood favourably in terms of his perspective upon women and nature. In the main, this is because Kant contends that man is fundamentally distinct from the natural realm: an idea

which has severe (and negative) implications for the natural environment and those who are considered to have a connection to it (women, non-western persons and animals). Mann and Battersby (amongst others) have criticised this element of Kantian philosophy, especially on the basis that the central division which Kant presents between man and nature conflicts majorly with an ecologically feminist way of thinking. Kant's maintenance of normative dualisms (discussed specifically in Chapter 6) between man/nature, woman/man and freedom/necessity, stem from his belief that the only item of real intrinsic value is man's ability to reason. Which means anything without this capability (including nature, women and animals) is relegated to a lower place of existence: and is therefore allowed to be treated in such a way as is useful to man himself. This contrasts entirely with the ecofeminist thought, which rather than encouraging these distinctions between people and their environment, instead advocates the breakdown of such dualisms in order to create a more equal and environmentally conscious society. In Chapter 5 I discussed the way in which women have been subject to discrimination in academic philosophy and how justification for this can at least (in part) be traced back through the writings of philosophers including Immanuel Kant himself. By including this information I hoped to show, one very real way that women have been directly affected by the perpetuation of normative values throughout time, in this instance because they are deemed to have only a capacity for the beautiful (as

opposed to the sublime) and are thus not capable of reasoning or making any philosophical contribution without also losing their claim to womanhood.

In Chapter's 5, 6 and 7 I turned to examine several potential alternative understandings of Kantian philosophy, in order to do this I appealed both to Kant's moral (which stems from his aesthetics and the sublime) and aesthetic philosophy. In Chapter 5 I examined Kant's thoughts on the ethical duties, humans as rational moral agents, have to themselves and others. I used the work of Lara Denis, Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon to help elucidate the way in which Kantian moral theory, particularly Kant's ideas of 'ethical duty' and the categorical imperative, can help to promote aspects of the journey to gender equality and female empowerment. We saw that in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* Kant rejects any instance of a human being treated as a means to somebody else's end. This fact alone allowed Denis to believe that Kantian moral philosophy is a 'rich source' for feminist ethicists to draw upon; since many of his views are in-keeping with feminist analysis on subjects such as depersonalisation, sexual objectification and instrumentalisation.

As became clear throughout Chapters 5 and 6, Kant's discussion of these matters often do not directly pertain to women but instead appear to be an afterthought or an unintended consequence of his overall theoretical work on morality and/or aesthetics

(which he wrote with men in mind). This however, has not stopped certain feminists/environmentalists (such as Holly Wilson and Lara Denis) from applying Kant's thoughts to women, men and nature equally. Marc Lucht demonstrated this ever more clearly in Chapter 7 through his account of Kantian aesthetic disinterestedness and consciousness. He argued that experiencing the sublimity of nature helps mankind to cultivate sensitivity to the natural world and develop feelings of moral responsibility towards it.

8.2 Concluding Thoughts

This thesis has attempted to establish whether Kant and ecofeminism are in any way compatible. I have used Kant's work in aesthetics and ethics in order to highlight areas which are either particularly problematic or useful in helping to demonstrate the various ways in which Kant can be interpreted as being consistent (or not) with the central aims of ecofeminism. These central aims have roots in both feminism and ecology but most important to ecofeminist philosophy, is the promotion of the rights of women and the environment: both of whom experience subjugation and exploitation as a result of patriarchal values. Ecofeminist research seeks to aid in the destruction of such values and help in the construction of a fairer society, where neither women nor the environment are treated in an exploitative or discriminatory manner. Exploring Kant's beliefs surrounding these issues (in both his work on the sublime and certain elements of his moral theory)

has by no account been an easy task, especially because Kant's own views on many subjects, including the role of women, changed over the course of his lifetime. Kant's writings in *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* are often extreme and as such have presented certain critics with the perfect ammunition with which to use to critique Kant. However in his later work, Kant maintained a more subtle and nuanced position thus, whilst he could certainly not be said to have been in any way proactive about the protection of the environment, animal rights or the equality of women, it is also the case that he never explicitly condones the unwarranted destruction or exploitation of nature, animals or women. Kant does not recognise the intrinsic worth of nature or animals and only accepts their value in terms of what they can provide for humankind but it is possible that some type of reconciliation between Kant and ecofeminism may be salvageable on other grounds, even though the positive feelings which Kant does have towards the environment/animals are motivated solely by selfish desires for mankind.

Whilst Kant's thoughts about the role of women are somewhat neutral (not particularly negative or positive) his ideas about the natural environment can perhaps be interpreted more sympathetically. Marc Lucht offers a compelling account of the way in which Kant's aesthetic theory can be used to support an argument for the preservation of the environment and the animals within it. As was illustrated in Chapter 3 and 7, the Kantian sublime has a large role to play in Kant's moral theory, mainly because the sublime

experience allows man to become aware of his moral destiny and his uniqueness in a world full of non-rational creatures. Lucht extends this idea further when he proposes that it is actually *only* because man/woman is unique in the world that humans are able to view the world with a sense of moral responsibility. Kant acknowledges that man does not experience itself as completely independent of the earth but rather exists alongside it and as a result, has a duty to maintain and preserve the natural environment: even though the motivations for such activity are ultimately egotistical. Hence it appears on both counts (women and the environment) that Kant, whilst unlikely to have ever wanted to join PETA or the Fawcett Society, does still manage (unintentionally as is perhaps the case) to support the causes of both. Since the compatibility of Kant and ecofeminism rests on these two aspects, I can conclude from this that a compatibility (limited though it may be) is possible between the two. Kant's thoughts on these subjects could help to provide the beginnings of a journey, in which mankind can come to acknowledge that their 'human uniqueness' does not allow for the egocentric abandonment of the natural world.

For an ecofeminist this would make an uncomfortable and unsatisfactory conclusion, especially as their deep beliefs about the intrinsic value of the natural world demand that humankind recognise their own place amongst nature, as being neither inferior nor superior but simply part of the world itself. This contrasts with Kantian philosophy

which demands only that women are not treated as a means to an end and that nature is not unnecessarily exploited. In spite of this, there is much that is progressive about the Kantian approach to both women and the environment (certainly more so in the case of the environment) and much that is also applicable to a 21st Century audience. Now more than ever, in an increasingly technological age, it can be difficult to incorporate nature into one's daily life, which has meant that often our moral responsibility towards the environment is forgotten. Kant reminds us all that the beauty of nature, which inspires the sublime, ought also to inspire within us a moral concern for the world around us, because without such concern we are doomed to perish in a universe where sublimity exists only as a fantasy of one's imagination.

References

- ▷ Addison, J. (1711) 'The Spectator in Three Volumes: Volume 1: 1891' [Online] Project Gutenberg. Available at: < <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12030/12030-h/SV1/Spectator1.html> > [Accessed 9th January 2015].
- ▷ _____. (1712) 'The Spectator in Three Volumes: Volume 3: 1891' [Online] Project Gutenberg. Available at: < <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12030/12030-h/SV3/Spectator3.html> > [Accessed 9th January 2015].
- ▷ Agarwal, B. (1992) 'The Gender and Environment Debate: Lessons from India', *Feminist Studies*, 18(1), 119-158.
- ▷ Arendt, H. (1958) *The Human Condition*. Chicago: The Chicago University Press.
- ▷ Bacon, F. (1620) *Works, Vol 4*. Translated by B. Farrington. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- ▷ Ballie, J. (1953) *An Essay on the Sublime*. The Augustan Reprint Society, 43. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- ▷ Battersby, C. (2007) *The Sublime, Terror and Human Difference*. London: Routledge.
- ▷ Bookchin, M. (1986) *Freedom and Necessity in Nature: A Problem in Ecological Ethics*. [online] Available at: < <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/murray-bookchin-freedom-and-necessity-in-nature-a-problem-in-ecological-ethics> > [Accessed 18th February 2014].
- ▷ Buckingham, S. (2004) 'Ecofeminism in the Twenty-First Century', *The Geographical Journal*, 170 (1), 146-154.

- ▷ Burke, E. (2008) *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ▷ Butler, J. (2004) *Precarious Life: Powers of Mourning and Violence*. London and New York: Verso.
- ▷ Caldecott, L. and Leland, S. (1983) *Reclaim the Earth: Women Speak Out for Life on Earth*. London: Women's Press.
- ▷ Carson, R. (1962) *Silent Spring*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
- ▷ Christ, C.P. (1990) 'Rethinking Theology and Nature', In I. Diamond and G.F. Orenstein (eds.), *Reweaving the World. The Emergence of Ecofeminism*, San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 58-72.
- ▷ Cooper, A.A. (1709) *The moralists, a philosophical rhapsody. Being a recital of certain conversations upon natural and moral subjects*. London: John Wyat.
- ▷ Crenshaw, K. (1991) 'Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color', *Stanford Law Review*, 43(6), 1241-99.
- ▷ Crowther, P. (1989) *The Kantian Sublime*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- ▷ Davis, K. (2008) 'Intersectionality as buzzword: A sociology of science perspective on what makes a feminist theory successful', *Feminist Theory*, 9 (1), 67-85.
- ▷ Davis, M. S. (1971) 'That's Interesting! Towards a Phenomenology of Sociology and a Sociology of Phenomenology', *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 23 (5), 1309-44.
- ▷ _____. (1986) 'That's Classic!' The Phenomenology and Rhetoric of Successful Social Theories', *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 16, 285-301.

- ▷ D'Eaubonne F. (1974) 'Feminism or Death', in Marks, E. and Courtivron, I.D (eds.), 1980. *New French Feminisms: An Anthology*. University of Massachusetts Press: Amherst. 64-67.
- ▷ Denis, A. (2008) 'Intersectional analysis: A contribution of feminism to sociology', *International Sociology*, 23(5), 677–694.
- ▷ Denis, J. (1693) *Miscellanies in Verse and Prose a Quote*. 2004. Michigan: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, University of Michigan.
- ▷ Denis, L. (2002) 'Kant's Ethical Duties and Their Feminist Implications', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary*, 28 (Supplement), 157-87.
- ▷ Descartes, R. (1641) *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Translated by John Cottingham. 1996. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ▷ Diamond, I. and Orenstein, G.F. (1990) *Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism*. San Francisco. CA: Sierra Club Books.
- ▷ Dobson, A. (1995) *Green Political Thought*. London: Routledge.
- ▷ Dotson, K. (2012) 'How is this Paper Philosophy', *Comparative Philosophy*, 3 (1), 3-29.
- ▷ Duignan, B. (2015) Postmodernism. [Online] Encyclopaedia Britannica. Available at: <http://www.britannica.com/topic/postmodernism-philosophy> [Accessed 13th February 2015].
- ▷ Durkheim, E. (1915) *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- ▷ Dworkin, A. (1974) *Woman Hating*. New York: E. P. Dutton.
- ▷ Fawcett Society. (2015) The Fawcett Society UK. [Online] Fawcett Society. Available at: <http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/> > [Accessed 8 August 2015].
- ▷ Frye, M. (1983) *The Politics of Reality*. New York: Crossing.
- ▷ Gaard, G. (2000) 'Review: Woman the Hunter', *Environmental Ethics*, 22 (2), 203-206.

- ▷ _____. (2011) 'Ecofeminism Revisited: Rejecting Essentialism and Re-Placing Species in a Material Feminist Environmentalism', *Feminist Formations*, 23 (4), 26-53.
- ▷ Gould, T. 'Intensity and Its Audiences: Notes Towards A Feminist Perspective on the Kantian Sublime', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 48 (4), pp. 306-315.
- ▷ Green, L.K. (2008) ' 'Bodiless Bodies': Perception and Embodiment in Kant and Irigaray', *Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy*, 1 (1), 23-37.
- ▷ Griffin, S. (1978) 'Curves along the road', In I. Diamond and G.F. Orenstein (eds.), *Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism*, ed. San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books: 87-99.
- ▷ _____. (1978) *Women and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her*, New York: Harper & Row.
- ▷ Gruen, L. (2009) 'Attending to Nature. Empathetic Engagement With The More Than Human World', *Ethics and the Environment*, 14 (2), 23-38.
- ▷ Hamilton, P. (1983) *Coleridge's Poetics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- ▷ Hall, K. (1997) 'Sensus Communis and Violence: A Feminist Reading of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*', in R.M. Schott (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 257-274.
- ▷ Harding, S. (2011) *The Postcolonial Science and Technology Studies Reader*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- ▷ Haslanger, S. (2008), 'Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone)', *Hypatia*, 23 (2), 210-223.
- ▷ Hay, C. (2013) A Feminist Kant. *New York Times*, [internet] 8 December. Available at: http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/08/a-feminist-kant/?_r=0 [Accessed 23

April 2015].

- ▷ Heidegger, M. (1966) 'Memorial Address', In: J.M. Anderson and E.H. Freund, *Discourse on Thinking*, New York: Harper & Row.
- ▷ _____. (1988) 'Age of the World Picture', In: W. Lovitt, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, New York: Harper & Row.
- ▷ Helmut Wenzel, C. (2005) *An Introduction to Kant's Aesthetics: Core Concepts and Problems*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- ▷ Hintz, G. (2003) 'Review: Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason by Val Plumwood', *Human Ecology Review*, 10 (1), 77-81.
- ▷ Jameson, F. (1991) *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. London: Verso.
- ▷ Jenkins, K. (2014) 'That's not philosophy': feminism, academia and the double bind.', *Journal of Gender Studies*, 23 (3), 262-274.
- ▷ Kaijssar, A. and Kronsell A. (2014) 'Climate Change Through the Lens of Intersectionality', *Environmental Politics*, 1-17. [Online] Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09644016.2013.835203> [accessed 10th November 2013].
- ▷ Kant, I. (1755) *Universal Natural History and Theory of Heavens*. Translated by Stanley L. Jaki. 1981. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press.
- ▷ _____. (1756) 'On the Causes of the Earthquakes, on the Occasion of the Calamity that befell the Western Countries of Europe towards the End of Last Year', Translated by Olaf

Reinhardt in E. Watkins (ed.), 2012. *Natural Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 329-336.

▷ _____ (1764) *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*. Translated by J. T. Goldthwait. 2003. Berkley: University of California Press.

▷ _____. (1781) *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by N. Kemp Smith. 1965. New York: St. Martin's Press.

▷ _____. (1784). 'Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?', Translated by Mary J. Gregor (ed.). 1996. In *Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.11-22.

▷ _____. (1788) *Critique of Practical Reason*. Translated by T. Kingsmill Abbott. 2004. New York: Dover Publications.

▷ _____. (1790) *Critique of Judgment*. Translated by W. S. Pluhar. 1987. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.

▷ _____. (1793). *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. Translated by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson. 1960. New York: Harper & Row.

▷ _____. (1785) *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Translated by May J. Gregor. 2012. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

▷ _____. (1797) *The Metaphysics of Morals*. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. 1996. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

▷ _____. (1798) *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Translated by Mary. J. Gregor. 1974. The Hague: St Martin's Press.

- ▷ _____. (1979) *Lectures on Ethics*. Translated by Louis Infield. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- ▷ Kao, G.Y. (2010) 'The Universal versus The Particular In Ecofeminist Ethics', *Journal of Religious Ethics*, 38 (4), 616-637.
- ▷ King, Y. (1990) Healing the wounds: Feminism, ecology, and the nature/culture dualism. In I. Diamond and G.F. Orenstein (eds.), *Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism*, ed. San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books: pp106-121.
- ▷ Kings, A.E. (2014) *Intersectionality: The Changing Face of Ecofeminism*. BA (Hons). Keele University.
- ▷ Kitcher, P. (2011) 'Philosophy inside Out', *Metaphilosophy*, 42 (3), 248-260.
- ▷ Klinger, C. (1997) 'The Concepts of the Sublime and the Beautiful in Kant', in R.M. Schott (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 191-212.
- ▷ Langton, R. (2005) 'Feminism in Philosophy', In Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.231-57.
- ▷ Lippai, C. (2009) 'The Sublime as a Boundary Experience of Nature. *Philobiblon*. XIV-2009, 60-89.
- ▷ Longinus, D. (1-3 C AD) *On the Sublime*. Translated by William Smith. 1739. London: J.F. Dove.
- ▷ _____. (1-3 C AD) *On the Sublime*. Translated by H.L. Havell. 1890. New York: MacMillan and Co.

- ▷ Lucht, M. 'Does Kant Have Anything to Teach Us about Environmental Ethics?', *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 66(1), 127-148.
- ▷ Lykke, N. (2005) 'Intersectionality Revisited: Problems and Potentials', *Kvinnovetenskaplig tidskrift*, 2 (3), 7–17.
- ▷ _____. (2010) *Feminist Studies. A Guide to Intersectional Theory, Methodology and Writing*, New York: Routledge.
- ▷ Lyotard, J.F. (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- ▷ _____. (1989) *The Lyotard Reader*. ed. Andrew Benjamin. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- ▷ MacGregor, S. (2006) *Beyond Mothering Earth. Ecological Citizenship and the Politics of Care*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- ▷ _____. (2010) 'Gender and climate change': from impacts to discourses', *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 6 (2), 223-238.
- ▷ MacKinnon, C. (1987) *Feminism Unmodified*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press.
- ▷ MacSwain, K. (2009) 'Dirty Words: Essentialism and Eco-Feminism', *Undercurrent Journal*, VI (I), 23-27.
- ▷ Mallory, C. (2009) 'Val Plumwood and Ecofeminist Political Solidarity: Standing With The Natural Other', *Ethics and the Environment*, 14 (2), 1085-6633.
- ▷ _____. (2010) 'What is Ecofeminist Political Philosophy? Gender, Nature and the Political', *Environmental Ethics*, 32 (3), 305-322.

- ▷ Mann, B. (2006) *Women's Liberation and the Sublime. Feminism, Postmodernism, Environment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ▷ Matthews, M.M. (1996) 'Kant's Sublime: A Form of Pure Aesthetic Reflective Judgment', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 54 (2), pp. 165-180.
- ▷ Maybee, J.E. (2002) 'Politicizing the personal and other tales from the front lines.' In: A.M. Superson & A.E. Cudd, eds. *Theorizing Backlash: Philosophical Reflections on the Resistance to Feminism*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 133-152.
- ▷ McCall, L. (2005) *The complexity of intersectionality. Signs. Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 30 (3), 1771–1800.
- ▷ Merchant, C., (1980) *The Death of Nature: Women, ecology, and the scientific revolution*. San Francisco: Harper and Row.
- ▷ Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) *The Phenomenology of Perception*. Translated by Colin Smith. New Jersey: Humanities Press.
- ▷ Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015) Sublime [Online] Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Available at: < <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sublime> > [Accessed 16 February 2015].
- ▷ Moen, M. (1997) 'Feminist Themes in Unlikely Places: Re-Reading Kant's *Critique of Judgment*', in R.M. Schott (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 213-256.
- ▷ Monk, S.H. (1960) *On the Sublime*. Michigan: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, University of Michigan.

- ▷ Moore, N. (2004) 'Ecofeminism as Third Wave Feminism? Essentialism, Activism and the Academy', In, Gillis, S. and Howie, G. and Munford, R. (eds.), *Third Wave Feminism. A Critical Exploration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- ▷ _____. (2008a) 'Eco/Feminism, Non-Violence and the Future of Feminism', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 10 (3), 282-298.
- ▷ _____. (2008b) 'The Rise and Fall of Ecofeminism as a Development Fable: A Response to Melissa Leach's 'Earth Mothers and Other Ecofeminist Fables: How a Strategic Notion Rose and Fell'', *Development and Change*, 39 (3), 461-475.
- ▷ Mortimer-Sandilands. (2008) 'Eco/Feminism on the Edge. A Commentary', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 10 (3), 305-313.
- ▷ Moyer, J. (2001) 'Why Kant and Ecofeminism Don't Mix', *Hypatia*, 16, 3, 79-97.
- ▷ Naess, A. (1989) *Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ▷ Nagel-Docekal, H. (1997) 'Feminist Ethics: How it Could Benefit from Kant's Moral Philosophy', in R.M. Schott (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 101-124.
- ▷ Nussbaum, M. (1995) 'Objectification', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 24(4): 249-291.
- ▷ _____. (1999) *Sex and Social Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ▷ PETA. (2015) PETA UK. [Online] PETA. Available at: < <http://www.peta.org.uk/> >
[Accessed 10 August 2015].
- ▷ Phoenix, A. (2006) 'Intersectionality', *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 13(3), 187-

- ▷ Plant, J. (1991) 'Searching for Common Ground: Ecofeminism and Bioregionalism', *Learning to Listen to the Land*, 1991, 212-219.
- ▷ Plato. (389 BC) *Theaetetus*. Translated by Joe Sachs. 2004. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
- ▷ Plumwood, V. (1986) 'Ecofeminism: An overview and discussion of positions and arguments', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy Supplement*, 64, 120-37.
- ▷ _____. (1993) *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*. London: Routledge.
- ▷ _____. (1996) 'Being Prey', *Terra Nova*, 1 (3), 33-44.
- ▷ _____. (2000) 'Integrating Ethical Frameworks for Animals, Humans, and Nature: A Critical Feminist Eco-socialist Analysis', *Ethics and the Environment*, 5 (2), 285-322.
- ▷ _____. (2004) 'Gender, Eco-feminism and The Environment', In R. White (ed.), *Controversies in Environmental Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 43-60.
- ▷ _____. (2008) 'Shadow Places and the Politics of Dwelling', *Australian Humanities Review*, 44, 1325-8338.
- ▷ _____. (2009) 'Nature in the Active Voice', *Australian Humanities Review*, 46, 1325-8338.
- ▷ Quinby, L. (1990) 'Ecofeminism and the Politics of Resistance', In I. Diamond and G.F. Orenstein (eds.), *Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism*, ed. San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books: 122-127.
- ▷ Reuther, R.R. (1989) 'Toward an ecological-feminist theology of nature', in J. Plant (ed.), *Healing the Wounds*, Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers: 144-50.

- ▷ Salleh, A., (1997) *Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx, and the Postmodern*. London: Zed Books.
- ▷ Sanchez, C. (2011) 'Philosophy and Post-Immigrant Fear', *Philosophy and the Contemporary World*, 18 (1): 31-42.
- ▷ Sayers, S. (2002) 'Freedom and the Realm of Necessity' in International Society for the study of European Ideas', proceedings from a conference held in Aberystwyth, 22-27 July, pp.1-7.
- ▷ Schott, R.M. (1997) *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- ▷ Schroder, H. (1997) 'Kant's Patriarchal Order', in R.M Schott (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 275-296.
- ▷ Sessions, G. (1995) *Deep Ecology for the Twenty-first Century*. Berkeley: Shambhala Publications Inc.
- ▷ Shaw, P. (2006) *The Sublime*. London: Routledge.
- ▷ Shell, S. M. (2008) 'Kant as Propagator: Reflections on Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime', *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 35 (3), 455-468.
- ▷ Shiva, V. (1988) *Staying Alive. Women, Ecology and Survival in India*. London: Zed Books.
- ▷ _____. (1990) 'Development as a New Project of Western Patriarchy.' In I. Diamond and G.F. Orenstein (eds.), *Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism*, ed. San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books: 189–200.

- ▷ Shoba, K.N. (2013) 'Ecofeminist Discourse in Postcolonial India: A Critique of Capitalism, Modernity and Patriarchy', *International Journal of English Language, Literature and Humanities*, 1 (3), 39-50.
- ▷ Shrage, L. (2005) 'Exposing the Fallacies of Anti-Porn Feminism', *Feminist Theory*, 6(1), 45-65.
- ▷ Soble, A. 2002, 'Sexual Use and What to Do about It: Internalist and Externalist Sexual Ethics', in A. Soble (ed.), *The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings*, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 259–288.
- ▷ Spretnak, C. (1990) 'Ecofeminism: Our Roots and Flowering', In I. Diamond and G.F. Orenstein (eds.), *Reweaving the World. The Emergence of Ecofeminism*, San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 3-14.
- ▷ Starhawk. (1990) 'Power, Authority, and Mastery: Ecofeminism and Earth-based Spirituality', In I. Diamond and G.F. Orenstein (eds.), *Reweaving the World. The Emergence of Ecofeminism*, San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 73-86.
- ▷ Verloo, M. (2006) 'Multiple inequalities, intersectionality and the European Union.', *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 13 (3), 211–228.
- ▷ Warren, K.J. (1987) 'Feminism and Ecology. Making Connections', *Environmental Ethics*, 9(1), 3-20.
- ▷ Warren, K.J., (1996) *Ecological Feminist Philosophies: An Overview of the Issues*. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- ▷ _____. (2000) *Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on what it is and why it Matters*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.

- ▷ _____ . (2002) 'Ecofeminism: Introduction', In: M.E. Zimmerman, J.B. Callicott, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren and J. Clark (eds.), *Environmental Philosophy. From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp.253-272.
- ▷ Webb, M.O. (2002) 'Feminist Epistemology as a Whipping Girl', In: A.M. Superson & A.E. Cudd, (eds.). *Theorizing Backlash: Philosophical Reflections on the Resistance to Feminism*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 49-66.
- ▷ Wilson, H.L. (1997) 'Rethinking Kant from the Perspective of Ecofeminism', in R.M Schott (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 373-400.
- ▷ Winker, G. and Degele, N. (2011) 'Intersectionality as multi-level analysis: Dealing with social inequality', *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 18 (1), 51-66.
- ▷ Wollstonecraft, M. (1986) *A Vindication of the Rights of Women*. New York: Penguin Books.
- ▷ Woolwine, S. (2011) 'Systematicity in the Critique of Judgment: The Emergence of a Unified Subject', *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 25 (4), pp. 343-358.
- ▷ Wordsworth, W. (1805) *The Prelude of 1805: in Thirteen Books*. [Online] DjVu Editions. Available at: < <http://triggs.djvu.org/djvu-editions.com/WORDSWORTH/PRELUDE1805/Download.pdf>> [Accessed 10th February 2015].
- ▷ Wright, P. (2010) 'A Timeless Sublime? Reading the Feminine Sublime in the Discourse of the Sacred', *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, 15 (2), pp.85-100.

- ▷ Yuval-Davis, N. (2006) Intersectionality and feminist politics. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 13 (3), 193–209.