



**'Tour de Psycho': Sociopathy and doping in sports.**

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## ***'Tour de Psycho': Sociopathy and doping in sports.***

### ***Introduction***

When, in 2013, the erstwhile invincible king of cycling, Lance Armstrong, confessed to doping, the sporting world was gripped by a sense of shock. Commentary invited us to ponder on the meaning of this 'fall from grace' in which a publicly revered figure had proven, yet again, that 'all was not well' in athletics. And yet, apropos of Armstrong's revelation on 'Oprah',<sup>i</sup> there was a sense of 'where there is smoke there is fire': Hadn't previous investigations- denied by Armstrong, of course- including that the *World Anti-Doping Agency* (WADA), after arrived at a similar conclusion? Wasn't the evidence 'there for us to see'- in the sworn affidavits of former teammates, or in the avalanche of lawsuits (culminating in out-of-court settlements) that his network of attorneys mounted against the international sports media? The purpose of this article is to engage with this 'smoke', this 'writing on the wall', which hangs menacingly in front of our view every time there is revelation of doping in sports. Deploying the notion of sociopathy, hitherto the staple of the standard corporate crime narrative (see, for example, Pech & Slade, 2007; Akhtar et al., 2012; Croall, 2012), we reveal how sociopathy is embedded in everyday pursuit of success and how the standard 'success' legend overlaps with criminality, and by extension staging the hypocrisy of the collectivity which was, for example, 'shocked' by Armstrong's revelation: The reader should expect to encounter the 'other Armstrong'- the one willing to push the envelope as long as s/he is not caught- in all of us!

The debate adopts the following structure: First, we justify the deployment of the concept of sociopathy; what is in it for us, the criminologists? What can such deployment contribute in terms of insight? This is followed by a definition of the notion of doping, including the different things that accompany this road to ruin- for those who are caught, at least, or success for others who aren't. The logic staged here is picked in the section after that which looks at the usage of sociopathy, as distinct from psychopathy for instance, and its practical deployment in recent research. A detour is deliberately made here so the reader can see other sociopaths (in the food industry, in popular media, banking and so forth. The discussion then returns to illustrate the

sociopathy surrounding cycling (Armstrong) and athletics (in Russia and Kenya), thereafter drawing a conclusion on the impact of this conceptual tour.

Let us begin the debate, appropriately I think, with the standard sociopath's question:

***What is 'in it' for me (the criminologist)?***

Two things: First of all, there is discernible dearth of criminological literature on sociopathy outside the traditional (corporate) scope of large, multilevel, financial organisations. There is surprisingly little criminological focus on sports crime, despite the widespread con in the last 30 years (from Ben Johnson's doping in the 1988 Soul Olympics, all the way to the recent disgrace of American sprinters Marion Jones and Justin Gaitlin- and the present stand-off between the World Anti-Doping Agency<sup>ii</sup>, WADA, and a number of countries ahead of the 2016 summer Olympics in Rio). There has been little examination, *in nuce*, of how we, as a society, are affected by the seemingly 'harmless' sociopaths who populate the tributaries of the media and sports industry. There is even less interdisciplinary readings of the public's (you and me) role in the construction and legitimation of the success narrative on which most sociopathy (which we define shortly) rides. (As part of this exploration we shall therefore be claiming that, although the role of individual sociopaths is definitive in criminal enterprises, the impact of what Punch (20002) refers to as 'suite violence' would be diminished, were it to be severed from the wider (socio-economic and political) veins which feed it.: At the macro-level, these wider veins include the public attachment to capitalist success stories- from messiah figures, to heroes, to 'come-back kids' who succeeded against all odds (See also Boddy, 2011; Punch, 2000.))

Our conviction, secondly, is that only interdisciplinarity can offer the badly needed critique of the rhizomes of sports doping. We bring, apropos of the milieu of sociopathy and sociopaths, the surgical tools of *Organisational culture analysis* (for example, Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Lippens, 2001; Lippens and Van Calster, 2004; Glasbeek, 2002), *Psychology* (for example, Lykken, 1996; Bakan, 2008; Huston, 2013; Easton, 1991; Pech and Slade, 2007) and *Criminology* (for example, Slapper and Tombs, 1999; Croall, 2001; 2012; Gobert, 2008; Braithwaite, 2000; 2013). The point here is that, although criminological attention is shifting to so-called 'victimless crimes' (for example, Pech & Slade, 2007; Akhtar et al. 2012) contemporary analyses of sociopathy

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3 (mostly in organisational behaviour literature) limit their purview to occupations such  
4 as banking, law or stock brokerage- perhaps because of the inherent conditions  
5 allegedly favourable to sociopathy within these career paths (Thomas, 2013; Bakan,  
6 2005; Boddy, 2011). Nonetheless, while we broadly agree with past research which has  
7 demonstrated that all corporations (size notwithstanding) culturally nurture  
8 sociopathic tendencies amongst their successful players (Pech & Slade, 2007; Boddy,  
9 2013, Basham, 2011), we claim that the contours of recent 'sociopathy' discourse  
10 (wedded too much to 'Wall street' and 'serial killings') are not just too limited, but are  
11 also too limiting: There is scope to breach these limiting gulags by examining the toxic  
12 encounter of sociopathic<sup>iii</sup> culture (in organizational analysis) with 'poor institutional  
13 oversight' (White collar criminology) and what others- for example O'doherty et al.  
14 (2011); Bakan (2005)- have referred to as the 'white spaces' of capitalism (cultural  
15 criminology)<sup>iv</sup>. But, first things first:

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26 ***Doping: A 'tour de facts':***

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29 Public commentary has widely been preoccupied with the notion of doping in sports-  
30 but what exactly is it? Higgins (2013) apropos of Clarke (1962) defines doping as  
31 athletes taking illegal substances to improve their performances. Such illegal substances  
32 have been categorized by WADA into five classes<sup>v</sup>, the most common of which are  
33 stimulants and hormones (which besides being illegal also carry additional health risks  
34 and, as such, are also banned by wider sports' governing bodies). According to the UK  
35 Anti-Doping Agency (UKad<sup>vi</sup>), substances and methods become illegal (and are  
36 therefore banned) when they meet at least two of the three-point criteria: (1) when  
37 they enhance performance, or (2) pose a threat to athlete health, or (3) violate 'the  
38 spirit of sport'. There is no space to unpack these conceptualisations at length, but  
39 suffice to note that the most commonly (ab)used substances are so-called 'androgenic  
40 agents', the most popular of which are (anabolic) steroids. Anabolic steroids, usually  
41 taken either in tablet form or injected into muscles or applied to the skin in creams or  
42 gels, came into the purview of anti-doping bodies precisely because of their  
43 enhancement power; for example enabling athletes to train harder, to recover more  
44 quickly from injury and 'burn-out' or to build more muscle. (The gym 'fanatic' comes to  
45 mind here). But, there is a flip side to this enhancement power too: Excess (ab)use could  
46 lead to kidney damage and increased aggression (Buckley et al. 1988; Irving et al. 2002).

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3 (Other side-effects include baldness and low sperm count for men, and increased facial  
4 hair and deepened voices for women.) Then there are 'stimulants', which make athletes  
5 more alert and can overcome the effects of fatigue by increasing heart-rate and blood  
6 flow. But they are addictive too, and, in extreme cases, can lead to heart failure (Hsu et  
7 al. 2006; Ghafery, 1995). Other drugs which have become prominent over the years  
8 include 'Diuretics' and 'masking agents', which are used to remove fluid from the body-  
9 and thus are deployed when the need to hide other drug use arises or, in sports such as  
10 boxing and horse racing, to help competitors "make the weight" (Sonksen, 2001). There  
11 are others such as 'Narcotic analgesics' and 'cannabinoids' which are used to mask the  
12 pain caused by injury or fatigue - but in practice can make injuries worse, or become  
13 addictive- with products such as morphine and oxycodone (banned, although its opiate-  
14 derived painkiller codeine is allowed). Then there are 'peptide hormones'- substances  
15 such as EPO (erythropoietin) and HGH (human growth hormone) - which increase bulk,  
16 strength and red blood cell count and give athletes more energy<sup>vii</sup>.  
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28 Nevertheless, the use of stimulants and strength-building substances in sport is not a  
29 new phenomenon as Higgins (2013) apropos of Clarke (1962) argues: The received  
30 wisdom is that use of substances goes as far back as *Ancient Greece*. Case in point: In the  
31 1904 Olympics, marathon runner Thomas Hicks used a mixture of brandy and  
32 strychnine and nearly died (Bamberger and Yaeger, 1997; Sonksen, 2001). As Wadler et  
33 al (1989) point out, it was not only uncommon for athletes during this period to use  
34 mixtures of strychnine, heroin, cocaine, and caffeine - sometimes with individuals  
35 deploying their secret formulae, to outcompete their field, but this was also common  
36 practice until heroin and cocaine became available only by prescription in the 1920s.  
37 After this ban, amphetamines replaced strychnine as the stimulant of choice for athletes  
38 in the 1930s (Kutcher et al, 2002) while, in the 1950s, the Soviet Olympic team first  
39 used male hormones to increase strength and power (Wadler et al, 1989). (There were  
40 even elements of what, below, we refer to as 'organizational sociopathy'; for example  
41 the well-documented, meticulous and controlled hormonal doping experiments on  
42 adolescent athletes by the East German administration, which only became known after  
43 the collapse of the Berlin Wall, as Franke and Berendonk (1997) also claim.)  
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56 Nonetheless, it was during the 1920s that the idea of restricting drug use in sport gained  
57 traction. In 1928 the *International Association of Athletics Federations* (IAAF) - athletics'  
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3 world governing body - became the first international sports federation to ban doping  
4 (Higgins, 2013). In 1966 *Union Cycleste Internationale* (UCI)<sup>viii</sup>, the world governing  
5 body for cycling, and *Federation Internationale de Football* (FIFA), were the first to  
6 introduce doping tests in their respective world championships, with the first Olympic  
7 testing coming in 1968, at the Winter Games in Grenoble and Summer Games in Mexico.  
8 By the 1970s, most international federations had introduced drug-testing. (The  
9 standard 'test' involves taking blood and urine samples, or both, from athletes. Most  
10 testing for doping products uses a long-established technique called mass spectrometry,  
11 which involves firing a beam of electrons at urine samples to ionise them - turning the  
12 atoms into charged particles by adding or removing electrons. Scientists claim that  
13 substance samples contain unique "fingerprints" so that it is possible to link a positive  
14 test to an individual within a very small margin of error.<sup>ix</sup> The tests are not fool-proof  
15 however: Some by-products of doping substances are so small they may not produce a  
16 strong enough signal for detection. Blood testing is capable of detecting EPO<sup>x</sup> and  
17 synthetic oxygen carriers, but not blood transfusions. One method introduced to aid the  
18 detection of such transfusion is the 'Biological Passport' brought in by WADA in 2009,  
19 the passport aims to reveal the effects of doping rather than detect the substance or  
20 method itself. It is an electronic document about an athlete that contains certain  
21 markers from throughout their career. If these change dramatically, it alerts officials  
22 that the athlete might be doping. Some scientists have questioned the passport's  
23 efficiency - especially when complicating factors such as training at altitude are factored  
24 in - but also its sensitivity to micro-dosing, a little-but-often approach to doping  
25 (Committee on Sports and Doping, 2005; WADA, 2006).  
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43 In recent years- and perhaps as a result of the aforementioned factors- sports events  
44 have been characterised by one or other revelations of substance-enhanced cheating in  
45 the wake of systematic doping tests. In that sense, although the widely publicized  
46 revelation of doping by the retired American cyclist Lance Armstrong has become the  
47 emblem of doping in sports, this is an on-going matter: In December 2015, for example,  
48 a German TV document alleged that many as 99% of Russian athletes were guilty of  
49 doping, although the Russian Athletics Federation described the allegations as "lies"<sup>xi</sup>.  
50 Prior to Armstrong's confession, Ben Johnson was probably the world's highest-profile  
51 drugs cheat. The Canadian sprinter tested positive for anabolic steroids at the 1988  
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3 Olympic Games in Seoul, just after winning the 100m in a world record of 9.79 seconds  
4 (which he was subsequently stripped of). Similarly, the British sprinter Dwain  
5 Chambers was banned for 2 years in 2004 after being found guilty of taking the anabolic  
6 steroid THG, while compatriot Linford Christie, a former sprint champion, was  
7 suspended from athletics altogether after failing a drugs test. In all such cases the  
8 outcome has been determined by the criteria- or window- set out by sports governing  
9 bodies, and the choices that athletes make in light of this knowledge. As an example,  
10 although the UCI - cycling's world governing body- has introduced a 24-hour testing  
11 window in 2016, its effectiveness will hinge on not only regulatory acumen, but also the  
12 choices athletes make in light of the weaknesses of this framework. As an example,  
13 previously there was no testing between 11pm and 6am- providing a potential window  
14 of opportunity for micro-dosing products, such as EPO, without being caught- but it may  
15 also be doping cheats will invent around ever-stricter criteria. The point: Violation of  
16 strict sports protocols is not merely down to how stricter they become, or are put into  
17 effect; it is also an aspect of the thing we turn to, next:

### 28 29 ***Sociopathy and crime***

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32 In popular culture, sociopathy and psychopathy are commonly used interchangeably,  
33 often distinguished by skewed definitions. As others (Lykken, 1996; 2006; Hall and  
34 Benning, 2006; Boddy et al. 2010, for example) argue, this is often due to a presumption  
35 that psychopathy is attributable to violent, murderous behaviour- while sociopathy is  
36 its non-violent, 'diet' version. The standard definition of psychopathy as 'a personality  
37 disorder' emphasizes 'enduring antisocial behaviour', 'diminished empathy', 'lack of  
38 remorse', and 'disinhibited or bold behaviour' as the hallmarks of the psychopath<sup>xii</sup>. On  
39 the other hand, since its coinage by the German psychiatrist Karl Birnbaum in 1930,  
40 sociopathy has been used as an alternative to the concept of psychopathy<sup>xiii</sup>, with this  
41 alternative deployment emphasizing the inclination to violate social norms. Patrick  
42 (2005) and Rutter (2007), for example, base their distinction of psychopathy from  
43 sociopathy on the former's biological causation, and in tandem with Hare (1999) who  
44 (usefully for our purposes) claims that the dominant usage of sociopathy over  
45 psychopathy is not one of etymological distinction but mere preference: Sociopathy is,  
46 as we also agree, preferred by analyses emphatic on social factors and early  
47 environment, while psychopathy is the province of psychological, biological, and genetic  
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3 (although sometimes in addition to environmental) factors. Our emphasis on the social  
4 milieu of sociopathy should not be taken as conclusive resolution of any conceptual  
5 lacuna between the two: On the contrary, it merely allows us to show our hand- and also  
6 because space does not allow a lengthy and detailed analysis of the concepts, much less  
7 the implication of their practical deployment. A similar path has been taken by Kailemia  
8 (2016) in that analysis of his which engages with 'sociopathy in the EU food industry',  
9 and also by Boddy et al.'s (2010) analyses of corporate ethics. In both accounts the  
10 underlying logic is preference.  
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18 The usage of sociopathy as an analytical framework outside the corporation is thus  
19 gaining traction: Kailemia (2016) (apropos of Lippens, 2000 and Deleuze and Guattari,  
20 1987) compares the network of sociopathy responsible for the 2013 *EU Horse Meat*  
21 *Scandal*<sup>xiv</sup> to a rhizome of complex, messy, multi-directional network of dealers at  
22 various levels: (1) Animal farmers and breeders (from the bigger, more commercially  
23 successful, who slaughter their own livestock and sell the meat to the smaller ones who  
24 transport their animals for slaughter to abattoirs); (2) companies that separate the  
25 different cuts of meat from the animal and process the rest of it; processors (including  
26 those who buy processed meat from other meat processors, but also mix it with meat  
27 from multiple suppliers or their own products); (3) Suppliers (who may also be  
28 processors) of different grades of processed meat to their buyers; (4) ready-meals  
29 producers (such as factories which usually purchase frozen mince blocks but also make  
30 ready meals and other meat products like mince, burgers, instant lasagne, bottled meat  
31 sauce, meat stock, pies and sausages).  
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42 The idea of a rhizome has parallels with recent analyses of doping in sports, which we  
43 turn to shortly, but briefly, its main power is in erasing the clear delineation of  
44 'perpetrators from victims', suppliers from consumers' or 'processors from distributors'  
45 and so on, so that, in the case of the meat scandal:  
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50 There is a more sinister motive to this arrangement...: To eliminate all possibility  
51 of product traceability<sup>xv</sup>, capitalising on legal loopholes... Traceability is more  
52 complex when corporate activity is transnational or cross-Sectoral, as is the case  
53 with the EU meat rhizomes. Here, multiplicity of supply and processing  
54 diminishes the traceability/audit trail between the farm and consumer,  
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3 sometimes even when the routes taken are relatively short and few (Kailemia,  
4 2016: 74).  
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7 You could substitute the beef (horse?) cuts with the illegal drugs and still retain the  
8 same logic of evasion: The power of sociopathy lies in deliberate development of  
9 rhizomes of evasion which allow cheating to remain in sight but invisible<sup>xvi</sup>. But, these  
10 rhizomes would be ineffective were it not for the presence of individuals and  
11 organizations that are willing to go as far as it takes to develop and sustain their  
12 operation. In the case of the case of the Horse Meat Scandal, one Lawrence McAllister,  
13 proprietor of the *Red Lion Abattoir*, slaughtered and sold sickly horses infected with  
14 Bute- a dangerous chemical- in his abattoirs where  
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21 Polish migrant workers... were often offered huge bonuses- paid in cash to avoid  
22 audit trails- for working in the middle of the night defrosting frozen meat, up to a  
23 year old and sometimes rotten. The workers would grind up this old meat with  
24 horse meat and newer beef, only to repack it as fresh beef for sale.  
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29 How about the infamous Armstrong, who has become the face of doping? Does the  
30 outline of a sociopath apply to him?  
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### 33 ***'How we did it in Texas'!*** 34

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36 The legend of Lance Armstrong has been with us for some time: He started his athletic  
37 career at the age of 12, first as a swimmer and subsequently as a Triathlete, winning the  
38 '*Iron Kids Triathlon*' at age 13<sup>xvii</sup>. He showed remarkable prowess<sup>xviii</sup>, turning pro at 16  
39 and becoming the number-one triathlete in the 19-and-under group (and along the way  
40 meeting Chann McRae, who became a US Postal Service cycling teammate and the 2002  
41 *USPRO* national champion). When the *Motorola Cycling Team* signed him up in 1992  
42 Armstrong won 10 one-day events and stage races, with the breakthrough victory  
43 coming in the *UCI Road World Championship* held in Norway. This, itself, came in the  
44 heels of *Tour de France* win, in the stage from Châlons-sur-Marne to Verdun. But, even  
45 at this early stage, he had shown penchant for violating the rules of the game: For  
46 example, despite winning, in quick succession, the *Thrift Drug Triple Crown of Cycling*,  
47 the *Thrift Drug Classic* in Pittsburgh, the *K-Mart West Virginia Classic*, and the *CoreStates*  
48 *USPRO national championship* in Philadelphia, he has been alleged by another cyclist  
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3 competing with in the *CoreStates Road Race* to have bribed that cyclist so that he would  
4 not compete with Armstrong for the win. Despite these career highs Armstrong's  
5 narrative has been dominated by his revelation of doping which may be summarised by  
6 the USADA dossier thus<sup>xix</sup>:  
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- 10 • The achievements of *USPS/Discovery Channel* pro cycling team, of which  
11 Armstrong was part of, were, according to the *United States Anti-Doping Agency*  
12 (USADA), accomplished through the most sophisticated, professional and  
13 successful doping programme that sport has ever seen.
- 14 • Engagement in 'serial cheating' with a career fuelled 'from start to finish' by  
15 doping.
- 16 • Confirmation by more than a dozen former team-mates, friends and former team  
17 employees of fraudulent course of conduct.
- 18 • The existence of a network of 'small army of enablers', including doping doctors,  
19 drug smugglers and others within and outside the sport and his team.
- 20 • The exercise of ultimate control over not only his own personal drug use but  
21 over the doping culture of the team.
- 22 • Deployment of a team of enablers who could predict when testers would turn up  
23 and seemed to have inside information.

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36 As Armstrong himself confessed, although he acted 'on personal volition', he  
37 nonetheless relied on a network of enablers whose task it was to corrupt its way  
38 through doctors to masseurs to product developers, test-administrators and so on. He  
39 told Oprah of a network which was  
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Definitely professional and it was definitely smart, if you can call it that, but it was  
very conservative, very risk-averse, and very aware of what mattered<sup>xx</sup>.

In this exposé he also shows predisposition to the matter thus;

I don't want to accuse anybody else. I don't want to talk about anybody else. I  
made my decisions. They are my mistakes.... The culture was what it was... I  
viewed it as very simple. There were things that were oxygen-supplying drugs  
that were beneficial for cycling. My cocktail was EPO, but not a lot, transfusions  
and testosterone. I was the leader of the team and the leader leads by example.

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3 There was never a direct order. That never happened. We were all grown men  
4 and made our choices. There were team-mates who didn't dope<sup>xxi</sup>.  
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8 And, notice how he rationalizes the risk of being caught:  
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10 No. Testing has evolved. Back then they didn't come to your house and there was  
11 no testing out of competition and for most of my career there wasn't that much  
12 out-of-competition testing so you're not going to get caught because you clean up  
13 for the races... It's a question of scheduling. That sounds weird. I'm no fan of the  
14 UCI but the introduction of the biological passport [in 2008] worked... I'm paying  
15 the price and I deserve this. That's okay. I deserve it... My ruthless desire to win  
16 at all costs served me well on the bike but the level it went to, for whatever  
17 reason, is a flaw. That desire, that attitude, that arrogance. Yes, I was a bully. I  
18 was a bully in the sense that I tried to control the narrative and if I didn't like  
19 what someone said I turned on them... It was winning at all costs. When I was  
20 diagnosed (with cancer) I would do anything to survive. I took that attitude - win  
21 at all costs - to cycling<sup>xxii</sup>.  
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32 There is sufficient here to offer a tautological analysis of sociopathy- I mean, from the  
33 perspective of someone who not only justifies winning at all costs but also links it to a  
34 tragedy (of cancer), which has appeal across a wide spectrum of listeners. It is even  
35 more tempting when you consider that, prior to his revelation on Oprah, Armstrong had  
36 taken every step to silence anyone who came up with these specific allegations,  
37 including high profile legal suites against media houses, individual journalists and  
38 former team mates. But then, as he told Oprah,  
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45 I kept hearing I'm a drug cheat, I'm a cheat, and I'm a cheater. I went in and just  
46 looked up the definition of cheat and the definition of cheat is to gain an  
47 advantage on a rival or foe that they don't have. I didn't view it that way. I viewed  
48 it as a level playing field."  
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53 Let us, by way of analysis, reconsider sociopathy  
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### ***From meat adulteration to doping in sports; the role of sociopathy***

The narratives of sports cheats, such as Armstrong, and food adulterers allude to a 'sociopathic personality' which Lykken (2006) describes as involving egocentricity, lack of remorse and denial. This personality, Lykken argues, rides on 'incomplete manifestation of disorder'; that is, moderate deployment of the sociopath character mostly to avoid detection and/or criminal prosecution or conviction. Among other exhibitors of these personalities, Lykken includes prominent businessmen, physicians and religious figures. There is parallel here with the figure who, on the one hand, deploys a small army of corruptors, but on the other hand, is also a respected cultural icon, an achiever and family figure. (Armstrong actually confessed to Oprah that he 'came out' after the anguish of seeing his son defending his record in front of his peers)<sup>xxiii</sup>.

The point not to be missed is that, while the individual cheat is important, we should not lose sight of the fact that sociopathy – as 'moderated disorder' (Lykken, 2006)- succeeds by precisely embedding itself onto the narrative of societal accomplishment, even becoming its defining element (see also Bakan, 2005). Armstrong appears to vindicate Hall and Benning's (2006: 459) argument that 'certain psychopathic traits might in fact serve as valuable personal assets in some professions, such as law, politics or business': Success in these career paths, *in nuce*, rides (pardon the pun) on a sociopathy 'checklist' which includes: Superficial charm; a grandiose sense of self-worth; pathological lying; manipulation; lack of remorse about harming others; lack of emotional depth; cold calculation and lack of empathy for 'losers', and; denial of responsibility. Armstrong's widely analysed life, or even the sit-down with Oprah, appears to embrace this checklist: He was a pathological liar, denying any use of performance-enhancing drugs on camera and in sworn affidavits- even accusing USADA of spiking his urine with drugs so he could fail tests (in the case investigated by UCI, discussed below)<sup>xxiv</sup>. He went further than this and manipulated drugs results employing a complex network of enablers who could warn him of impending tests, sometimes having dope flown on private jet into practice sessions in Europe<sup>xxv</sup>. As for his sense of self-worth, analysis would be merely 'academic'.

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3 Armstrong is also the stuff of popular culture: While many Wall Street traders crumble  
4 under their losses, *the wolf of Wall Street* brushes off failure and starts afresh the next  
5 day (Belfort, 2007). Or, where average people would shudder, the 'Navy Seal' sniper  
6 calmly squeezes the trigger (Huston, 2013) *et cetera*. And, true to character, recent  
7 literature (for example, Bashan, 2011 and Hall and Benning, 2006) has correctly  
8 predicted the inevitable rise of sociopaths in the business or military world: The  
9 sociopath is more likely to be the chief executive of a corporation than to be the person  
10 sweeping the floors. Look at the parallel: In the July 2005 issue of *Outside* magazine,  
11 Armstrong hinted at running for governor. Armstrong and former president George W.  
12 Bush, a Republican and fellow Texan, even called themselves friends so that Bush even  
13 called Armstrong in France to congratulate him after his 2005 *Tour De France* victory.  
14 (In August of that year, *The Times* reported that the President had invited Armstrong to  
15 his Prairie Chapel Ranch to go mountain biking). Armstrong even created a YouTube  
16 video in 2007 with former President George H. W. Bush to successfully pass Proposition  
17 15, a US\$3 billion taxpayer bond initiative which created the Cancer Prevention and  
18 Research Institute of Texas.

### 31 ***What about the networks?***

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33 In the wider context available literature on corporate crime and organisational deviance  
34 (especially in investment banking and the petrochemical industry) has revealed how  
35 sociopathy is nurtured by rhizomic networks which delink the decision-maker from his  
36 customers/victims (Lippens, 2000; 2001; Messerschmitt, 1997; Thomas, 2013). This  
37 delinkage allows the sociopath, in the words of Thomas' (2013) article, 'to hide in plain  
38 sight'. Lippens (2001, p.234), for example, shows how corporate crime relies on 'flexible  
39 networks' which are formed in order to be able to react quickly to 'internal' as well as  
40 'external' problems. In this sense, networks are not just aimed at 'external' threats; the  
41 'outside' is part and parcel of the 'inside', so that once you are in (on the secrets) you  
42 can never be 'out'- the network ensures you are either in or miserable (bankrupted by  
43 lawsuits, shunned by friends, for example) out there!

44  
45 The recent gaze on Armstrong has shown how he built such a complex demand-and-  
46 supply rhizome, roping in it both regulators and collaborator. This was aimed at  
47 complicating detection or punishment. Bakan (2005) was already aware of this

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3 detection firewall when likened 'organized' sociopathy to the 'white spaces' of late  
4 capitalism- the unexamined, unpoliced corporate feeding trough which only receives  
5 attention when something goes wrong publicly. This 'white space', in the case of food  
6 adulteration and sports doping, is frequented and thrived on by many, despite their  
7 'internal conflicts' (as we see in the 'good' and 'bad' Armstrong) because it collectively  
8 shields them from responsibility. Punch has characterised this 'iron dome' of  
9 responsibility as one which

10  
11 encourages covert alliances to cope with structural uncertainty, weak  
12 enforcement with co-opted regulators, a near collusive government engaged in  
13 prestigious projects and mindful of the importance of the industry for the  
14 national economy, etc. - made it almost rational and reasonable to break the  
15 law.' (Punch, 2008, p. 104)

16  
17 Apropos of Punch, we should view this covert alliance as enabling a symbiotic  
18 relationship of 'mutual protection' between athletes, drug suppliers and sports policing  
19 agencies. This is more so when it comes to anti-doping agencies, such as USADA or  
20 WADA: Because of the asymmetry of power between big (pharmaceutical, fitness and  
21 advertising) business and oversight institutions, the subordinated latter is  
22 characterised by what Boddy (2006) refers to as 'management failure'. This 'failure'  
23 could be read as either 'reluctance' but also a 'lack of acumen' as the case may be. As an  
24 example, in October 2005, in response to calls from the *International Olympic Committee*  
25 and WADA for an independent investigation, the UCI appointed Dutch lawyer Emile  
26 Vrijman to investigate the handling of urine tests by the French national anti-doping  
27 laboratory, LNDD<sup>xxvi</sup>. Vrijman's report cleared Armstrong because of improper handling  
28 and testing. His report said tests on urine samples were conducted improperly and fell  
29 so short of scientific standards that it was "completely irresponsible" to suggest they  
30 "constitute evidence of anything. The recommendation of the commission's report was  
31 no disciplinary action against any rider on the basis of LNDD research. He also called  
32 upon the WADA and LNDD to submit to an investigation by an outside independent  
33 authority. The *International Olympic Committee* (IOC) Ethics Commission subsequently  
34 censured Dick Pound, the President of WADA and a member of the IOC, for his  
35 statements in the media that suggested wrongdoing by Armstrong.



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3 So, whether through collusion or lack of acumen (or the fact that this industry is  
4 characterised by a revolving door in which experts from the anti-doping agencies take  
5 up better paid jobs as defense for athletes they formerly targeted), the end result is  
6 development of a 'white space' of corruption/exploitation which fits the sociopath's  
7 view that 'it is fine to break the law because everyone else is doing it'. Isn't this what  
8 Armstrong means when he says (on Oprah) that he saw doping as the 'creation of a level  
9 playing ground'? As the typical sociopath, Armstrong deployed his 'small army' or  
10 corruptors to 'level the playing ground': In July 2006, for example, the *Los Angeles Times*  
11 published a story which showed how Armstrong's levels of EPO had risen and fallen  
12 consistent with a series of injections during the 1999 Tour De France race, but also how  
13 he paid experts retained by SCA Promotions to lie about the circumstances when *the*  
14 *Laboratoire National de Dépistage du Dopage* (LNDD) accused him of doping. Apropos of  
15 this revelation, Armstrong's army of lawyers successfully sued (for breach of privacy),  
16 culminating in the Vrijman report, which pointed to procedural and privacy issues in  
17 dismissing the LNDD test results.  
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20  
21 On August 23, 2005, *L'Équipe*, a major French daily sports newspaper, reported on its  
22 front page under the headline "*le mensonge Armstrong*" ("The Armstrong Lie") that 6  
23 urine samples taken from the cyclist during the prologue and five stages of the 1999  
24 Tour de France, frozen and stored since at "Laboratoire national de Dépistage du  
25 Dopage de Châtenay-Malabry" (LNDD), had tested positive for erythropoietin (EPO) in  
26 recent retesting conducted as part of a research project into EPO testing methods.  
27 Armstrong immediately attacked this report, on his website, as another case of the  
28 'witch hunt' tabloid journalism'. Similarly, when the *Los Angeles Times* published an  
29 article citing information on testimony given by Armstrong's former teammate Andreu,  
30 and his wife Betsy, Armstrong sued the paper, but not before he got his former team  
31 mate, Jonathan Vaughters, to sign a statement disavowing the comments stating that he  
32 had 'no personal knowledge' that any team in the *Tour de France* engaged in any  
33 prohibited conduct whatsoever. This is but one example of a long series of denials and  
34 law suits against the media that Armstrong mounted up until a few months to his  
35 confession<sup>xxvii</sup>. In such cases, the standard outcome was an 'out of court settlement'  
36 which allowed Armstrong to not only continue racing, but to maintain his vast stream of  
37 endorsement money as well as claiming the moral high ground. For example, after the  
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3 *Los Angeles Times* case was settled out of court, Armstrong called the outcome ‘proof  
4 that the doping allegations were baseless’. (In October 2012, following the publication  
5 of the USADA decision on doping accusations against him, SCA Promotions announced  
6 its intention to recoup the monies paid to Armstrong totalling in excess of \$7 million. As  
7 fate would have it, he lost the case against the SCA in 2015 and was ordered to pay back  
8 \$10m<sup>xxviii</sup>).

14 Perhaps the biggest lesson the rhizomes of Armstrong’s doping can teach us is how the  
15 individual sociopath interacts with his environment. Here, the greatest danger of  
16 organizational sociopathy is what it does to those who do not start out as sociopaths. Of  
17 course not every individual involved in unethical or questionably illegal corporate  
18 activities is a head-hunted sociopath. Nonetheless, some more fluid personalities can be  
19 moulded by the container they fill, as Bakan (2005) also reminds us. In that sense, the  
20 container of operational sociopathy is also sometimes an amoral one: Unlike  
21 immorality, amoral go-getting is always not driven by a pathological desire to commit  
22 sadistic abuse of others (for example due to a lack of empathy), but could be due to the  
23 common sense desire to ‘put the food on the table’ which, depending on the  
24 environment, could also involve justifying means by the ends they obtain. As Zimbardo  
25 (2004) taught us with his ‘situationist perspective on evil’ thesis, crowd ‘excitation  
26 transfer’ should be reckoned with in situations of fear, anger or desire. In the meat  
27 industry con which we examined above, substituting beef in burgers with horsemeat  
28 might be a risky activity, but may also be a completely rational and ‘risk-free’ gesture  
29 from the perspective of collective benefit- say, when balanced against the prospect of a  
30 fine which could easily be offset by the sale of the corrupted meat before it is spotted  
31 and stopped. This is more so when the culprit has embedded their presence in the  
32 collective psyche, as ‘one of us’, a ‘Robin Hood’- or simply as a messiah figure like the  
33 Armstrong who succeeded against odds, becoming the first Texan kid to buy a private  
34 jet from cycling, or the larger than life Armstrong who beat cancer (an inspired  
35 Livestrong)<sup>xxix</sup>!

53 Where does that leave us? In order to understand the motivations and protections of  
54 offenders, the focus should be on the organisational cultures of enterprises generally, or  
55 criminal ones specifically, and how these cultures appropriate life-stories to embed  
56 themselves onto the consumer choices.  
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### ***'How do you say "stop doping" in Swahili?'***

Since Armstrong, there has been a steady increase in revelations of doping, coming in the wake of revelations of sports corruption in general, and specifically the FIFA corruption scandal which is now under investigation by international authorities. As of the writing of this article, FIFA President Sepp Blatter and Uefa President Michel Platini have been banned for eight years from all football-related activities by Fifa's ethics committee, and a Swiss criminal investigation into the pair is also continuing<sup>xxx</sup>. Athletics has not been spared either: French prosecutors are, as of June 2016, investigating allegations of corruption in the bidding and voting processes for the Rio 2016 and Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games. So far, there have been multiple arrests, including that of the former president of the *International Association of Athletics Federation* (IAAF), Lamine Diack, and an international arrest warrant for his son Papa Massata Diack, the federation's marketing consultant<sup>xxxi</sup>. As if that is not enough, Africa's athletic giant, Kenya, is involved in a standoff with WADA over allegations of systemic doping with the threat of being banned from Rio 2016 menacingly hanging over the country<sup>xxxii</sup>. Those with intimate knowledge of the country laugh at suggestions of systemic state-sponsored doping. But the combination of unscrupulous agents and doctors and athletes hoping for a better life is dangerously potent: around 35 athletes have tested positive since 2012, according to the *Guardian* (2015)<sup>xxxiii</sup> for example. Systematic corruption involving officials at the highest levels of *Athletics Kenya* (federation) have been highlighted by whistle-blowers and investigative journalists<sup>xxxiv</sup> for years<sup>xxxv</sup>, including millions of sponsorship money given by NIKE which never reached athletes, to allegations of trafficked athletes<sup>xxxvi</sup>.

But this is 'nothing' compared to the latest allegations of organized cheating- by Russia.

### ***'From Russia with Dope'***

Allegations of cheating by Russian athletes have been common in the last few years, but it was a claim by a *Das Erste* (German TV channel) documentary<sup>xxxvii</sup> that 99% of Russian athletes are involved in doping that has seized the world's attention. The documentary claimed that Russian officials systematically accepted payment from athletes to supply banned substances and cover up tests- and that this was facilitated by

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3 *International Association of Athletics Federations* (IAAF) which was bribed to turn a  
4 blind eye<sup>xxxviii</sup>. In the documentary, former discus thrower Yevgeniya Pecherina  
5 (currently serving a 10-year doping ban) claims that "most, the majority, 99%" of  
6 athletes selected to represent Russia used banned substances. As she claims, 'You can  
7 get absolutely everything... Everything the athlete wants'. In tandem, Liliya Shobukhova,  
8 who won the London Marathon in 2010, also claims the *Russian Athletics Federation*  
9 accepted 450,000 euros (£350,000) of bribe money to cover up her positive doping test  
10 result. In the documentary an undercover video purports to show Mariya Savinova-  
11 who won the 800 meters gold in the 2012 Olympic games- admitting to the use of the  
12 steroid oxandrolone. These allegations are anything but farfetched, however: Vitaly  
13 Stepanov, a former Russian Anti-Doping Agency (Rusada) official, and his wife Yulia,  
14 formerly an 800m runner who was banned for doping, have alleged that banned  
15 substances were supplied by leading Russian athletics officials in exchange for 5% of an  
16 athlete's earnings, which involved a collusion network of the Russian state<sup>xxxix</sup>. Yulia has  
17 claimed that, to avoid detection, the Russian state would issue fake travel documents for  
18 athletes training abroad to evade out-of-competition testing.  
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31 So, what is the point here?  
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34 While the standard take on sociopathy emphasises how 'one bad apple spoils the barrel'  
35 (Lykken, 1996; Boddy et al. 2010)- implying that an individual sociopath can ruin the  
36 rest of the actors within the organisation they all operate in- we should stretch our  
37 purview to include the wider legitimacy network on which sociopaths derive their  
38 life-blood. We should, alongside Glasbeek (2002), question the received wisdom of 'the  
39 rotting effect of the barrel': is it a handful of sociopaths incapable of empathy driving the  
40 rest of the organisation/society to moral ruin, or does the metastasis of the sociopathy  
41 feed from the protective uterus of societal/industrial sociopathy? It would appear that,  
42 although individual sociopaths may have the inclination- and can be nurtured- they  
43 nonetheless need the supportive oxygen of collective societal corruption to keep  
44 breathing. This is the lesson apropos of Kenya and Russia, two states notorious for their  
45 level of public corruption<sup>xl</sup>. That is to say, individual cheats would get nowhere unless  
46 there is a supportive and legitimacy framework, whether that framework relies on  
47 cold-pragmatics (getting ahead financially) or on nationalism (winning the medal tally).  
48 Braithwaite (1989) was well aware of the toxic mix of opportunity and crime, when he  
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3 taught us that all it takes for crime to thrive is the presence of a learning opportunity  
4 and blockage of a legitimate means of achievement: In both Kenya and Russia,  
5 systematic collapse of the economy goes hand in hand with widespread (official)  
6 corruption- the latter acting as a vent for the occluded space of legitimate achievement.  
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8 But, apropos of IAAF, Rusada and so on, it is Braithwaite's second factor- the  
9 embedment of 'conditions favourable to violation of law' -which we should not lose  
10 sight of: As Braithwaite argued, where penalties or sanctions do not 'exceed prohibitory  
11 definitions (see also, Sutherland and Cressey, 1978) we can expect violation of norms.  
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### 17 **Conclusion**

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20 This article has shown that, although doping in sports is not attributable to a single  
21 factor- indeed it is a complex rhizome of supply and distribution criminality- there is  
22 nonetheless scope to contribute to understanding sports cheating through the notion of  
23 sociopathy. We have explored not only the rise and fall of individuals corresponding to  
24 the textbook qualities of sociopaths, in both the food industry and athletics. We have  
25 also taken a further step to show how the individual sociopathy develops, and inclines,  
26 on a network of enablers and how this enabling arrangement is itself part of a  
27 legitimacy framework of public expectation and attitude. The point not to be missed is  
28 the ordinariness of the figures we have outlined above- whether individuals,  
29 professions, industries or states. This is the genius of sociopathy especially the  
30 organizational kind: When something is repeated too often, the sublime (or active)  
31 repetitive gestures familiarises the thing, making it normal and defensible- especially  
32 where the figure involved is a cult leader, an embodiment of the collective will or  
33 malaise. There are no better totems than cancer survivors, national sporting heroes,  
34 rags-to-reaches super-achievers etc. Or, as Zizek (2015) argues, in a world where the  
35 neoliberal agenda actively encourages us (in advertisements and curricula) to be  
36 'entrepreneurs of the self', there is something vindicating about seeing 'one of us'  
37 succeeding against the odds, one of us 'levelling the playing ground'. In most cases, we  
38 are the 'playing ground' which is levelled, the 'odds' which are beaten.  
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53 The main achievement of this article is that, while most available literature on corporate  
54 sociopathy traditionally concentrate on large corporations in 'suspect' sectors (such as  
55 banking and petrochemicals) we have brought the same thinking to examination of a  
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3 hidden sector which feeds off public apathy and ignorance while at the same heavily  
4 investing in this ignorance to maintain consumption compliance. Thus, while the  
5 populace was enraged by the excesses which led to the collapse of the insurance and  
6 banking industry in 2008, entrenched sociopathy was busy, in the case of EU meat  
7 scandal, replacing one ruminant with another in shape of the 60% filler economy  
8 burgers; in the case of sports one scandal replaces another, along the daily ebb and flow  
9 of sponsorship money and televised gladiator contests. I mean, who wants to watch  
10 news bulletin on football corruption or athletics doping when you can watch records  
11 stumbling?  
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15 The approach of this paper is best summed up in the words of Floyd Landis-  
16 Armstrong's racing team mate and fellow cheat: 'At the end of the day someone will  
17 have to look children in the eye and say that "Santa Claus is not real"'.  
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16 <sup>i</sup> In a televised interview with the Oprah Winfrey in January 2013, Lance Armstrong, cycling's most  
17 decorated champion, who was also considered one of America's greatest athletes, confessed to cheating  
18 for at least a decade, admitting that he owed all seven of his Tour de France titles and the millions of  
19 dollars in endorsements that followed to his use of illicit performance-enhancing drugs. With this gesture  
20 he had turned his back on years of denials and confessing that his storied career at the top of competitive  
21 cycling was fuelled by drugs, lies and bullying. Armstrong said it would not have been possible to win the  
22 titles he did without cheating, and that the cycling sport is marked by the prevalence of performance-  
23 enhancing drugs.

24  
25 <sup>ii</sup> A major drug scandal at the 1998 Tour de France underlined the need for an independent international  
26 agency to set standards in anti-doping work. The World Anti-Doping Agency (Wada) was established the  
27 following year.

28  
29 <sup>iii</sup> It is important to note here that most relevant literature speak of corporate psychopaths –psychopathic  
30 individuals who work for corporations (Boddy 2006; 2010; Pech & Slade 2007; Akhtar et al. 2012).  
31 However, some speak of sociopath corporations / corporate psychopathy in reference to organizations  
32 (even fictional entities) with psychopathic tendencies/ symptoms (Bakan, 2005).

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34 <sup>iv</sup> Because of these 'white spaces', for example, Braithwaite (2013) claims that it is almost inevitable that a  
35 market driven by demand for heroes will result in adulteration to supply the 'high' which is the  
36 legitimating 'yard stick' of post-culture: Our emphasis, however, is that lax enforcement alone is not  
37 enough to account for the prevalence of food sports doping: Other factors, including deliberate  
38 operational cultures, must be in place to circumvent existing frameworks of regulation- precisely because  
39 organizational sociopathy feeds off the umbilical cord of public ignorance and/or tacit cooperation.

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41 <sup>v</sup> See <https://www.wada-ama.org/>

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43 <sup>vi</sup> See, <http://www.ukad.org.uk/>

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45 <sup>vii</sup> A full list of banned substances in athletics can be found on the IAAF website.

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47 <sup>viii</sup> See: <http://www.uci.ch/>

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49 <sup>ix</sup> See also, WADA (2006) and, Yesalis (2002).

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51 <sup>x</sup> Erythropoietin (often shortened to EPO) is a naturally occurring hormone, secreted by the kidneys,  
52 whose function is to regulate red blood cell production. The use of EPO started in the 1980's as a quicker,  
53 cleaner alternative to blood doping. Testing for EPO only became possible in 2000, by using blood and  
54 urine samples, prior to this, comparisons to a 'normal level' were used to highlight a possible cheat!

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56 <sup>xi</sup> The video can be seen at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iu9B-ty9ICy>

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58 <sup>xii</sup> See for example Patrick, Christopher (2005). *Handbook of Psychopathy*. Guilford Press.

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60 <sup>xiii</sup> See, Rutter, Steve (2007). *The Psychopath: Theory, Research, and Practice*. New Jersey: Lawrence  
Erlbaum Associates. p. 37

<sup>xiv</sup> For a general idea of the Scandal, see: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013\\_meat\\_adulteration\\_scandal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_meat_adulteration_scandal)

<sup>xv</sup> Shackell (2008) defines traceability as 'the ability to maintain a credible custody of identification  
...products through various steps within the...chain from the farm to the retailer,'

<sup>xvi</sup> In the case of the Horse meat Scandal Lawrence (2013) and Kailemia (2016) single out the company *Silvercrest* (see, Guardian, 2013), linked to a horse dealer, Lawrence McAllister who in October 2012 was caught smuggling cannabis in a consignment of sick and wounded horses and donkeys unfit for travel, (Lawrence, 2013c). After the incident, investigations by the *Ulster Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals* (USPCA) revealed that the reason for MacAllister's frequent transport of unfit horses was not to dispose them off but to slaughter them for sale at the *Red Lion Abattoir* in Nantwich, England (Lawrence, 2013a: 27) and so forth.

<sup>xvii</sup> See: Armstrong Kelly, Linda; Rodgers, Joni (2002). *No Mountain High Enough: Raising Lance, Raising Me*. Broadway Books.

<sup>xviii</sup> Armstrong's total points in 1987 as an amateur were better than those of five professionals ranked higher than he was that year. At 16, Lance Armstrong became a professional triathlete and became national sprint-course triathlon champion in 1989 and 1990 at 18 and 19, respectively

<sup>xix</sup> See: <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/mar/09/lance-armstrong-cycling-doping-scandal>

<sup>xx</sup> See: [http://espn.go.com/sports/endurance/story/\\_/id/8855686/lance-armstrong-admits-doping-interview-oprah-winfrey](http://espn.go.com/sports/endurance/story/_/id/8855686/lance-armstrong-admits-doping-interview-oprah-winfrey)

<sup>xxi</sup> See: [http://espn.go.com/sports/endurance/story/\\_/id/8855686/lance-armstrong-admits-doping-interview-oprah-winfrey](http://espn.go.com/sports/endurance/story/_/id/8855686/lance-armstrong-admits-doping-interview-oprah-winfrey)

<sup>xxii</sup> See: [http://espn.go.com/sports/endurance/story/\\_/id/8855686/lance-armstrong-admits-doping-interview-oprah-winfrey](http://espn.go.com/sports/endurance/story/_/id/8855686/lance-armstrong-admits-doping-interview-oprah-winfrey)

<sup>xxiii</sup> In June 2012, the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) accused Armstrong of doping and trafficking of drugs, based on blood samples from 2009 and 2010, and testimonies from witnesses including former teammates. Further, he was accused of putting pressure on teammates to take unauthorized performance-enhancing drugs as well. Armstrong was initially suspended and eventually banned from participating in sports sanctioned by WADA. He chose not to appeal the ban, saying it would not be worth the toll on his family. After years of public denials, Armstrong reversed course and admitted doping in an interview with Oprah Winfrey in January 2013. While admitting in the interview to the things he did, he also said it was "absolutely not" true that he was doping in 2009–10, and that the last time he "crossed the line" was in 2005. In September 2013, he was asked by UCI's new president, Brian Cookson, to testify completely about his doping.

<sup>xxiv</sup> In June 2006, French newspaper *Le Monde* reported claims by Betsy and Frankie Andreu during a deposition that Armstrong had admitted using performance-enhancing drugs to his physician just after brain surgery in 1996. The Andreus' testimony was related to litigation between Armstrong and SCA Promotions, a Texas company attempting to withhold a \$5-million bonus; this was settled out of court with SCA paying Armstrong and Tailwind Sports \$7.5 million, to cover the \$5-million bonus plus interest and lawyers' fees. The testimony stated "And so the doctor asked him a few questions, not many, and then one of the questions he asked was ... have you ever used any performance-enhancing drugs? And Lance said yes. And the doctor asked, what were they? And Lance said, growth hormone, cortisone, EPO, steroids and testosterone. Armstrong suggested Betsy Andreu may have been confused by possible mention of his *post-operative treatment* which included steroids and EPO that are taken to counteract wasting and red-blood-cell-destroying effects of intensive chemotherapy.

<sup>xxv</sup> See, for example: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/sports/cycling/how-lance-armstrong-beat-cyclings-drug-tests.html? r=0>

<sup>xxvi</sup> Vrijman was head of the Dutch anti-doping agency for ten years- since then he has worked as a defense attorney defending high-profile athletes against doping charges.

xxvii See for example: <https://web.archive.org/web/20120626051528/http://uk.eurosport.yahoo.com:80/13062012/2/state-ment-lance-armstrong.html>

xxviii <http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/report-armstrong-pays-dollar-10-million-to-settle-sca-litigation-case/>

xxix See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Livestrong\\_Foundation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Livestrong_Foundation)

xxx See, for example: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32897066>

xxxi See, for example: <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/mar/01/french-police-corruption-investigation-2016-2020-olympic-bids>

xxxii The Kenyan Olympic Committee chairman, Kipchoge Keino, has publicly warned that the World Anti-Doping Agency was "seriously considering" banning Kenya from track and field for four years, because of corruption allegations against senior figures in Athletics Kenya, and because the country has dawdled and delayed implementing credible anti-doping measures.

xxxiii <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/nov/17/iaaf-kenya-investigation-doping-allegations>

xxxiv In 2016, for example, the Sunday Times revealed that detectives were questioning three of the most senior officials at Athletics Kenya over claims they pocketed close to \$700,000 (£460,000) from Nike: Isaiah Kiplagat, chairman of Athletics Kenya, the vice-president David Okeyo and Joseph Kinyua, its former treasurer. Okeyo, who sits on the IAAF's 26-person ruling council, has denied the allegations.

xxxv See, for example: <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06/world/africa/nike-under-scrutiny-as-payments-for-kenya-runners-are-drained.html? r=0>

xxxvi See for example, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kWRJ2w0FBPA>

xxxvii Which can be view here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iu9B-ty9JCY>

xxxviii The Russian Athletics Federation (RAF) says the allegations are "lies", but both the IAAF and the World Anti-Doping Agency (Wada) have said they will look into the claims. The IAAF has since 'noted a number of grave allegations', but also claims that 'some of the claims were "already on-going" investigations.

xxxix Russia, which hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, and finished top of the medal table, currently has 67 athletes serving sanctions for doping offences, according to the latest IAAF report. In September 2014, Wada banned the gas xenon following allegations, in another German TV documentary, it had been used as a performance-enhancing substance by Russian competitors at Sochi.

xl <https://www.transparency.org/country/>