Allen, SR (2016) From Possibility to Properties? Or from Properties to Possibility? Philosophy, 92 (1). pp. 21-49. ISSN 0031-8191

[thumbnail of Allen SR - 2016 From Possibility to Properties. Or from Properties to Possibility - Final draft.pdf]
Allen SR - 2016 From Possibility to Properties. Or from Properties to Possibility - Final draft.pdf - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial.

Download (238kB) | Preview


This paper contrasts two metaphysical accounts of modality and properties: Modal Realism which treats possible entities as primitive; and Strong Dispositionalism in which metaphysical possibility and necessity are determined by actually existing dispositions or powers. I argue that Strong Dispositionalism loses its initial advantages of simplicity and parsimony over Modal Realism as it is extended and amended to account for metaphysical rather than just causal necessity. Furthermore, to avoid objections to its material and formal adequacy, Strong Dispositionalism requires a richer fundamental ontology which it cannot explicate without appealing either to possible worlds or to an account of counterfactual truth conditions, both of which Strong Dispositionalism was intended to replace.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is the accepted author manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Cambridge University Press at - please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
Uncontrolled Keywords: philosophy,
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment
Depositing User: Symplectic
Date Deposited: 16 Dec 2016 16:00
Last Modified: 04 Apr 2019 08:46

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item