Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

Know versus Familiar: Differentiating states of awareness in others' subjective reports of recognition

Williams, Helen; Moulin, Chris J.A.

Know versus Familiar: Differentiating states of awareness in others' subjective reports of recognition Thumbnail


Authors

Chris J.A. Moulin



Abstract

In the Remember-Know paradigm whether a Know response is defined as a high-confidence state of certainty or a low-confidence state based on familiarity varies across researchers and can influence participants' responses. The current experiment was designed to explore differences between the states of Know and Familiar. Participants studied others' justification statements to "Know" recognition decisions and separated them into two types. Crucially, participants were not provided definitions of Know and Familiar on which to sort the items--their judgements were based solely on the phenomenology described in the justifications. Participants' sorting decisions were shown to reliably map onto expert classification of Know and Familiar. Post-task questionnaire responses demonstrated that both the level of memory detail and confidence expressed in the justifications were central to how participants categorised the items. In sum, given no instructions to do so, participants classify Familiar and Know according to two dimensions: confidence and amount of information retrieved.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jul 11, 2014
Publication Date Jan 1, 2015
Publicly Available Date Mar 28, 2024
Journal Memory
Print ISSN 0965-8211
Publisher Routledge
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 23
Issue 7
Pages 981 -990
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2014.945460
Keywords Dual-process, Familiarity, Recognition, Remember–Know, Subjective experience, Adolescent, Adult, Awareness, Cues, Decision Making, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Mental Recall, Recognition (Psychology), Retention (Psychology), Surveys and Questionnaire
Publisher URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2014.945460

Files




You might also like



Downloadable Citations