D'Oro, G (2007) The gap is semantic, not epistemological. Ratio, 20 (2). 168 -178. ISSN 1467-9329

[thumbnail of The gap is semantic not epistemological (GDOro).pdf]
The gap is semantic not epistemological (GDOro).pdf - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial.

Download (336kB) | Preview


This paper explores an alternative to the metaphysical challenge to physicalism posed by Jackson and Kripke and to the epistemological one exemplified by the positions of Nagel, Levine and McGinn. On this alternative the mind-body gap is neither ontological nor epistemological, but semantic. I claim that it is because the gap is semantic that the mind-body problem is a quintessentially philosophical problem that is not likely to wither away as our natural scientific knowledge advances.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is the accepted author manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Wiley at https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00355.x - please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
Uncontrolled Keywords: philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment
Depositing User: Symplectic
Date Deposited: 11 Nov 2014 11:37
Last Modified: 17 Dec 2018 11:48
URI: https://eprints.keele.ac.uk/id/eprint/47

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item