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Non-Redcuctivism and the Metaphilosophy of Mind

D'Oro

Authors



Abstract

This paper discusses the metaphilosophical assumptions that have dominated analytic philosophy of mind, and how they gave rise to the central question that the best-known forms of non-reductivism available have sought to answer, namely: how can mind fit within nature? Its goal is to make room for forms of non-reductivism that have challenged the fruitfulness of this question, and which have taken a different approach to the so-called “placement” problem. Rather than trying to solve the placement problem, the forms of non-reductivism discussed in this paper have put pressure on the metaphilosophical assumptions that have given rise to the question of the place of mind in nature in the first instance.

Acceptance Date Jun 1, 2018
Publication Date May 28, 2019
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Inquiry
Print ISSN 0020-174X
Publisher Routledge
Pages 477-503
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2018.1484001
Keywords Naturalism, non-reductivism, post-Kantian idealism, metaphilosophy of mind
Publisher URL http://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2018.1484001