D'Oro, G, Giladi, P and Papazoglou, A (2019) Non-Redcuctivism and the Metaphilosophy of Mind. Inquiry, 62 (5). pp. 477-503. ISSN 0020-174X

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This paper discusses the metaphilosophical assumptions that have dominated analytic philosophy of mind, and how they gave rise to the central question that the best-known forms of non-reductivism available have sought to answer, namely: how can mind fit within nature? Its goal is to make room for forms of non-reductivism that have challenged the fruitfulness of this question, and which have taken a different approach to the so-called “placement” problem. Rather than trying to solve the placement problem, the forms of non-reductivism discussed in this paper have put pressure on the metaphilosophical assumptions that have given rise to the question of the place of mind in nature in the first instance.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is the accepted author manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Taylor & Francis at https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1484001 - please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
Uncontrolled Keywords: Naturalism, non-reductivism, post-Kantian idealism, metaphilosophy of mind
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment
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Depositing User: Symplectic
Date Deposited: 04 Jun 2018 08:02
Last Modified: 02 Jan 2020 01:30
URI: https://eprints.keele.ac.uk/id/eprint/4977

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