Keele Research Repository
Explore the Repository
Itaya, J-I and Tsoukis, C (2020) Social capital and the status externality. International Journal of Economic Theory. ISSN 1742-7355
Social capital - accepted IJET.pdf - Accepted Version
Download (1MB) | Preview
Abstract
This paper investigates how the presence of social capital affects the externality arising from status-seeking preference as a parable for inefficient antagonistic behavior. It is assumed that the stock of social capital accumulates through the strategic interaction among rational, infinitely-lived, individuals of a finite number. Using a differential game, we show that there are two types of Markov perfect equilibrium strategies, of which one leads a society to zero social capital, while the other leads to the satiation level of social capital. When there is an unstable interior steady state, there is a threshold: with any initial stock of social capital above (below) that, society is able to build social capital (correspondingly, get stuck in a poverty trap of null social capital). In the latter case, the intervention of governments is called upon, because social welfare in the poverty trap is less than that in the social capital-rich society.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Uncontrolled Keywords: | differential game; Markov perfect equilibrium; poverty trap; social capital; status externality |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HA Statistics |
Divisions: | Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Keele Business School |
Depositing User: | Symplectic |
Date Deposited: | 18 Jun 2020 15:53 |
Last Modified: | 01 Jul 2022 01:30 |
URI: | https://eprints.keele.ac.uk/id/eprint/8153 |