McCarthy, Jennifer (2020) Understanding gender and its relation to the philosophy of personal identity. Masters thesis, Keele University.

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The aim of this thesis is to establish that there is no metaphysical account of personal identity that requires us to regard gender as essential to our identities. I shall begin by examining forms of essentialism as well as rejections of essentialism, relating these theories to the issue at hand.
Secondly, I shall evaluate the social existence of gender and the impact it has upon individual lives and communities. I shall go on to evaluate psychological accounts of identity to determine how
gender adheres with understandings of personal identity as a psychological continuity. I will then look to the antithesis of such views and examine physiological accounts of identity, again relating
these to the issues of gender. Finally, I shall compare what each of these theories tells us about the
existence of gender in our lives and conclude that gender is a social construct, and that since no legitimate metaphysical account of identity encourages belief in gender essentialism, harmful prevalent attitudes to gender within society are ultimately irrational.

Item Type: Thesis (Masters)
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Social, Political and Global Studies
Contributors: Tartaglia, JPF (Thesis advisor)
Depositing User: Lisa Bailey
Date Deposited: 14 Aug 2020 10:59
Last Modified: 14 Aug 2020 10:59

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