Keele Research Repository

This dissertation establishes and defends three positions: (1) The question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ is a request for a global-metaphysical explanation for life and existence that narrates across those elements of most existential import to human beings, and this is distinct from the question ‘How may I attain meaning in my life?’; (2) The former question is a legitimate one to ask, despite some of the strongest and most prominent arguments that claim otherwise; (3) For this question to be answerable in principle, even if not in practice, we must hold either to (a) empirical idealism, direct external realism, or indirect external realism, all of which must be held as transcendentally real, or (b) a form of transcendental idealism that allows for direct perception of the world in itself, or that allows for us to infer things about the world in itself despite it being experientially inaccessible.